25-101.
Civil action.The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits heretofore existing, are abolished; and in their place there shall be hereafter but one form of action, which shall be called a civil action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 2, p. 394; Laws 1867, § 1, p. 71; R.S.1913, § 7560; C.S.1922, § 8503; C.S.1929, § 20-101; R.S.1943, § 25-101.
Annotations
1. Nature and scope
2. Miscellaneous
1. Nature and scope
Despite the fact that the traditional distinctions between law and equity have been abolished, those distinctions do control in determining an appellate court's standard of review. Waite v. A. S. Battiato Co., 238 Neb. 151, 469 N.W.2d 766 (1991).
Application erroneously denominated as for coram nobis considered as petition for post conviction relief for reasons stated. State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 231 N.W.2d 345 (1975).
This section is modified by special statute, section 25-1925. Larutan Corp. v. Magnolia Homes Manuf. Co., 190 Neb. 425, 209 N.W.2d 177 (1973).
In this state there has been a complete merger of legal and equitable remedies. Wischmann v. Raikes, 168 Neb. 728, 97 N.W.2d 551 (1959).
Distinction between legal and equitable rights has not been abolished. First Nat. Bank of Wayne v. Gross Real Estate Co., 162 Neb. 343, 75 N.W.2d 704 (1956).
Eminent domain procedure act was not unconstitutional as being amendatory of this section. Jensen v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 159 Neb. 277, 66 N.W.2d 591 (1954).
Code of civil procedure, as a statute complete in all its parts, should be so construed as to make all of its parts harmonize with each other and render them consistent with its general scope and object. State ex rel. Johnson v. Consumers Public Power Dist., 142 Neb. 114, 5 N.W.2d 202 (1942).
Code of civil procedure expressly abolished all forms of actions and suits theretofore existing, and substituted one form of action called a civil action. In re Guardianship of Warner, 137 Neb. 25, 288 N.W. 39 (1939).
The character of the cause of action, as shown by the allegations of the petition, determines whether a particular action is at law or equity, unaffected by the conclusions of the pleader. Mills v. Heckendorn, 135 Neb. 294, 281 N.W. 49 (1938).
Abolition of common-law names and forms of action has not changed the essential character of judicial remedies. State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676 (1937).
To review errors of law occurring upon the trial of an equity case, a motion for new trial is necessary. Danbom v. Danbom, 132 Neb. 858, 273 N.W. 502 (1937).
Both legal and equitable principles may be enforced in the same action, according to the facts. City of Beatrice v. Gage County, 130 Neb. 850, 266 N.W. 777 (1936).
To maintain a civil action, it is not essential that the action be given any particular name. Rhoads v. Columbia Fire Underwriters Agency, 128 Neb. 710, 260 N.W. 174 (1935).
Provisions of civil code not only abolish bills of equity with discovery as incident thereto, but prevent incorporation in petition and answer of essential elements on which discovery as it formerly existed, was based. Marshall v. Rowe, 126 Neb. 817, 254 N.W. 480 (1934).
The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity is abolished. State Bank of Omaha v. Todd, 122 Neb. 557, 240 N.W. 754 (1932).
Contract between husband and wife may be enforced in civil action. Stenger Benevolent Assn. v. Stenger, 54 Neb. 427, 74 N.W. 846 (1898).
Abolishing distinctions between law and equity does not deprive the court, while sitting as the court of equity, to submit disputed question of fact to a jury. Alter v. Bank of Stockham, 53 Neb. 223, 73 N.W. 667 (1897).
2. Miscellaneous
Cross-petitions are not limited to strictly equitable actions. Rogers v. Western Electric Co., 179 Neb. 359, 138 N.W.2d 423 (1965).
Rules of law and doctrines of equity may be enforced in one form of action. Schreiner v. Witte, 143 Neb. 109, 8 N.W.2d 831 (1943).
A court of equity, having jurisdiction at commencement of suit, will retain it, where issues presented are in nature of an accounting, and are so numerous and distinct, and evidence to sustain them so variant, technical and voluminous that jury is incompetent to deal with them intelligently. Parsons Construction Co. v. Gifford, 129 Neb. 617, 262 N.W. 508 (1935).
Procedure in workmen's compensation case was equivalent to "civil action." Keil v. Farmers' Irr. Dist., 119 Neb. 503, 229 N.W. 898 (1930).
There is no distinction as to right of plaintiff to judgment on default, without making proof, whether the cause of action is legal or equitable. Weir v. Woodruff, 107 Neb. 585, 186 N.W. 988 (1922).
This is only one form of action, in which legal or equitable principles, either or both, may be enforced according to the facts. Kazebeer v. Nunemaker, 82 Neb. 732, 118 N.W. 646 (1908); State ex rel. Horton v. Dickinson, 63 Neb. 869, 89 N.W. 431 (1902); Hopkins v. Washington County, 56 Neb. 596, 77 N.W. 53 (1898).
Statute of limitations was intended to apply to all forms of the civil action. Boevink v. Christiaanse, 69 Neb. 256, 95 N.W. 652 (1903).
25-102.
Parties; how designated.In all civil actions, the complaining party shall be known as the plaintiff and the adverse party as the defendant.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 3, p. 394; R.S.1913, § 7561; C.S.1922, § 8504; C.S.1929, § 20-102; R.S.1943, § 25-102.
Annotations
Designation of party appealing as plaintiff in eminent domain proceeding was not prevented by this section. Jensen v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 159 Neb. 277, 66 N.W.2d 591 (1954).
25-103.
Feigned issues prohibited; issue not plead; tried, when.There can be no feigned issues; but a question of fact not put in issue by the pleadings may be tried by a jury, upon an order for the trial, stating distinctly and plainly the question of fact to be tried, and such order is the only authority necessary for a trial.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 4, p. 394; R.S.1913, § 7562; C.S.1922, § 8505; C.S.1929, § 20-103; R.S.1943, § 25-103.
Annotations
Common law remedies are still in force except as abolished by statute. State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676 (1937).
Jury is not allowed in quo warranto. State ex rel. Broatch v. Moores, 56 Neb. 1, 76 N.W. 530 (1898).
Jury is not allowed as of right in equity cases generally, though special facts may be submitted. Alter v. Bank of Stockham, 53 Neb. 223, 73 N.W. 667 (1897); Harral & Uhl v. Gray, 10 Neb. 186, 4 N.W. 1040 (1880).
Jury is not allowed in contempt cases. Gandy v. State, 13 Neb. 445, 14 N.W. 143 (1882).
Fictitious issues abolished. Cropsey v. Wiggenhorn, 3 Neb. 108 (1873).
25-201.
Civil actions; when commenced.A civil action shall be commenced only within the time prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued. Notwithstanding any other provision in this chapter, when an action has been stayed by any court of competent jurisdiction or by statute, such action shall be commenced within the longer of (1) the time prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, or (2) one year after the date the stay is no longer in effect.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 5, p. 395; R.S.1913, § 7563; C.S.1922, § 8506; C.S.1929, § 20-201; R.S.1943, § 25-201;
Laws 2001, LB 48, § 1.
Annotations
1. When action is commenced
2. When cause of action accrues
3. Limitation; applicability
4. Limitation; defense
5. Miscellaneous
1. When action is commenced
An action is deemed commenced on the date of the summons which is properly served on the defendant. George P. Rose Sodding & Grading Co. v. Dennis, 195 Neb. 221, 237 N.W.2d 418 (1976).
A civil action is commenced by filing a petition and causing a summons to be issued thereon. Gorgen v. County of Nemaha, 174 Neb. 588, 118 N.W.2d 758 (1962).
Action is deemed commenced upon filing of first petition, where cause of action is not changed in amended petition. Davis v. Manning, 98 Neb. 707, 154 N.W. 239 (1915), vacating former judgment 97 Neb. 658, 150 N.W. 1019 (1915).
2. When cause of action accrues
Cause of action accrues when the aggrieved party has the right to institute and maintain suit. Weiss v. Weiss, 179 Neb. 714, 140 N.W.2d 15 (1966).
A civil action to recover a statutory penalty must be commenced within a year after the cause of action accrued in favor of plaintiff. Hoffman v. Geiger, 135 Neb. 349, 281 N.W. 625 (1938).
A cause of action against a bank director participating in making of an excessive loan is complete the moment the loan is made, and statute of limitations begins to run, and action is barred after four years in absence of fraud or concealment. Department of Banking v. McMullen, 134 Neb. 338, 278 N.W. 551 (1938).
Statute of limitations on right to recover illegally imposed taxes runs from time of payment of tax and not from time illegality of tax is judicially determined. Monteith v. Alpha High School Dist. of Chase County, 125 Neb. 665, 251 N.W. 661 (1933).
Statute of limitations does not run on claims against state until legislative leave to sue has been given. Commonwealth Power Co. v. State, 104 Neb. 439, 177 N.W. 745 (1920).
When cause of action accrues stated. City of Omaha v. Redick, 61 Neb. 163, 85 N.W. 46 (1901).
3. Limitation; applicability
An oral promise by which defendant was paid some undisclosed amount in settlement of claim for damages based on loss of securities through conspiracy and fraud, which was not a promise made as a part of the alleged fraudulent transaction, did not operate to toll statute of limitations. Hollenbeck v. Guardian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 144 Neb. 684, 14 N.W.2d 330 (1944).
An action for relief upon the ground of fraud must be commenced within four years after the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud, or of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on an inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to discovery. Burchmore v. Byllesby & Co., 140 Neb. 603, 1 N.W.2d 327 (1941).
Where Legislature has created a new right and prescribed a special statute of limitations, the general statute of limitations is not applicable. Ray v. Sanitary Garbage Co., 134 Neb. 178, 278 N.W. 139 (1938).
Where trustee of trust fund, who was also president and managing officer of bank, invested part of trust funds in worthless notes belonging to bank in 1923, but concealed the fact from the county court and the cestui que trust until 1930, running of statute was tolled. First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Exchange Bank, 126 Neb. 856, 254 N.W. 569 (1934).
Statute does not run against claims depending upon the result of pending litigation. First Nat. Bank of Plattsmouth v. Gibson, 74 Neb. 232, 104 N.W. 174 (1905), reversed on rehearing 74 Neb. 236, 105 N.W. 1081 (1906).
General law as to limitations of actions is not applicable to revivor of dormant judgment. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 59 Neb. 170, 80 N.W. 484 (1899).
Set-off was barred by statute of limitations. Baker Ice Machine Co. v. Hebert, 76 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1935).
4. Limitation; defense
Statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded. Central Bridge & Constr. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 128 Neb. 779, 260 N.W. 172 (1935).
Statute of limitations does not raise a presumption of payment but is a statute of repose. Torgeson v. Department of Trade and Commerce, 127 Neb. 49, 254 N.W. 740 (1934).
One asking affirmative equitable relief is required to do equity and may not plead statute of limitations as defense to such requirement. Wiseman v. Guernsey, 107 Neb. 647, 187 N.W. 55 (1922).
Ordinarily third parties may not plead it as defense. Plummer, Perry & Co. v. Rohman, 61 Neb. 61, 84 N.W. 600 (1900).
Statute of limitations must be pleaded or is considered waived. Hobson v. Cummins, 57 Neb. 611, 78 N.W. 295 (1899).
Statute applies to facts or rights pleaded as defense, counterclaim or cross action. Parker v. Kuhn, 21 Neb. 413, 32 N.W. 74 (1887).
5. Miscellaneous
The fact that a claim against an heir is barred by the statute of limitations does not prevent the application of the doctrine of retainer. Fischer v. Wilhelm, 139 Neb. 583, 298 N.W. 126 (1941), opinion partially vacated on rehearing, 140 Neb. 448, 300 N.W. 350 (1941).
Plaintiff may not amend a cause of action barred by statute of limitations by substituting another and different cause not so barred. Thurston County v. Farley, 128 Neb. 756, 260 N.W. 397 (1935).
If petition shows on its face that it is barred by statute of limitations but pleads further facts in avoidance thereof, which are denied by defendant who also pleads affirmatively the statute, plaintiff cannot recover without first establishing facts alleged in avoidance. Baxter v. National Mtg. Loan Co., 128 Neb. 537, 259 N.W. 630 (1935).
Where a necessary party defendant is not made defendant because statute of limitations has run on claim against him, action should be dismissed. Dempster v. Ashton, 125 Neb. 535, 250 N.W. 917 (1933).
Contracts providing different periods are void. Miller v. State Ins. Co. of Des Moines, 54 Neb. 121, 74 N.W. 416 (1898).
Where statute confers and limits duration of right, it also limits the remedy. Goodwin v. Cunningham, 54 Neb. 11, 74 N.W. 315 (1898).
Defendant may present question of statute of limitations by motion to dismiss or demurrer if petition shows on its face that action is barred. Harrop v. United States, 10 F.Supp. 753 (D. Neb. 1935).
25-201.01.
Civil actions; savings clause; conditions.(1) If an action is commenced within the time prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations but the plaintiff fails in the action for a reason other than a reason specified in subsection (2) of this section and the applicable statute of limitations would prevent the plaintiff from commencing a new action, the plaintiff, or his or her representatives if the plaintiff has died and the cause of action survived, may commence a new action within the period specified in subsection (3) of this section.
(2) A new action may not be commenced in accordance with subsection (1) of this section when the original action failed (a) on the merits of the action, (b) as a result of voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff for a reason other than loss of diversity jurisdiction in a federal court, (c) as a result of the plaintiff's failure to serve a defendant within the time prescribed in section 25-217, or (d) as a result of any other inaction on the part of the plaintiff where the burden of initiating an action was on the plaintiff.
(3) A new action may be commenced in accordance with subsection (1) of this section within a period equal to the lesser of (a) six months after the failure of the action or (b) a period after the failure of the action equal to the period of the applicable statute of limitations of the original action.
Annotations
The savings clause in this section does not apply to an action under the State Tort Claims Act. Saylor v. State,
304 Neb. 779, 936 N.W.2d 924 (2020).
The dismissal of a plaintiff's first action for failure to abide by the progression standards is a dismissal because of a lack of action under this section. Zitterkopf v. Maldonado, 273 Neb. 145, 727 N.W.2d 696 (2007).
This section includes a savings clause for actions filed in federal court that are dismissed because of the loss of diversity jurisdiction. Brodine v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 272 Neb. 713, 724 N.W.2d 321 (2006).
25-201.02.
Amendment of pleading; effect.(1) An amendment of a pleading that does not change the party or the name of the party against whom the claim is asserted relates back to the date of the original pleading if the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.
(2) If the amendment changes the party or the name of the party against whom a claim is asserted, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading if (a) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, and (b) within the period provided for commencing an action the party against whom the claim is asserted by the amended pleading (i) received notice of the action such that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits and (ii) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
Annotations
Pursuant to subdivision (2)(b)(ii) of this section, while the mistaken identity inquiry of relation back is appropriately focused on what the defendant knew or should have known, the question is what the defendant knew or should have known about the plaintiff's intent when filing the original complaint. Davis v. Ridder, 309 Neb. 865, 963 N.W.2d 23 (2021).
Subsection (2) of this section applies only to an amendment that “changes the party or the name of the party” and that refers to a substitution, rather than to an addition, of parties. Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, 285 Neb. 952, 831 N.W.2d 696 (2013).
Amended pleading to identify intended defendant and to plead that intended defendant had constructive notice of lawsuit would not relate back to original complaint which was served on defendant's father who bore same name, for purposes of 4-year limitations period; name of defendant was same in both original and proposed amended complaint, and thus, there was nothing to amend, and summary judgment evidence indicated that intended defendant did not know about lawsuit before limitations period expired. Rudd v. Debora, 20 Neb. App. 850, 835 N.W.2d 765 (2013).
This section eliminates the 6-month grace period from the time in which a substituted defendant could have acquired notice of the suit; therefore, the substituted defendant must have had notice before the statute of limitations ran. Kotlarz v. Olson Bros., Inc., 16 Neb. App. 1, 740 N.W.2d 807 (2007).
25-202.
Actions for the recovery of title or possession of real estate or foreclosure of mortgages or deeds of trust as mortgages.(1) An action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or for the foreclosure of mortgages or the foreclosure of deeds of trust as mortgages thereon, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues. No limitation shall apply to the time within which any county, city, town, village, other municipal corporation, public power and irrigation district, public power district, public irrigation district organized under Chapter 70, article 6, irrigation district organized under Chapter 46, article 1, or natural resources district may begin an action for the recovery of the title or possession of any public road, street, or alley, other public or political subdivision grounds or lands, or city or town lots.
(2) For the purposes of this section as relates only to the rights and interests of subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value:
(a) The cause of action for foreclosure of the mortgage or foreclosure of the deed of trust as a mortgage accrues on the last date of maturity of the debt or other obligation secured by the mortgage or deed of trust as the date is stated in or is ascertainable from the filed record of the mortgage or deed of trust or the filed record of an extension of the mortgage or deed of trust;
(b) If no date of maturity is stated or is ascertainable from the filed mortgage or deed of trust or the filed extension, the cause of action for foreclosure of the mortgage or foreclosure of the deed of trust as a mortgage accrues no later than thirty years after the date of the mortgage or deed of trust; or
(c) If the mortgage creditor files an affidavit to the effect that the mortgage or deed of trust is unpaid and is still a valid lien, the affidavit is filed before the cause of action is barred under this section, and the affidavit is filed for record in the office of the register of deeds, the cause of action is not barred until ten years after the date the affidavit is filed. The period of ten years shall not be extended by nonresidence, legal disability, partial payment, acknowledgment of debt, or promise to pay.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 6, p. 395; Laws 1869, § 1, p. 67; Laws 1899, c. 79, § 6, p. 335; R.S.1913, § 7564; C.S.1922, § 8507; Laws 1925, c. 64, § 1, p. 220; C.S.1929, § 20-202; Laws 1941, c. 35, § 1, p. 145; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-202; R.S.1943, § 25-202;
Laws 1977, LB 208, § 1; Laws 1995, LB 297, § 1; Laws 2008, LB851, § 18.
Cross References
Part payment not applicable as against subsequent encumbrancers and purchasers for value, see section 25-216.
Annotations
1. Definitions
2. Limitation as to adverse possession
3. Limitation as to remainderman
4. Adverse possession not applicable
5. When cause of action accrues
6. Tolling of statute
7. Inverse condemnation
8. Miscellaneous
1. Definitions
"Subsequent purchaser for value" is one acquiring title after statute has run against prior encumbrance shown on record. Purchaser who assumed mortgage and paid interest thereon could not defend against mortgage as "subsequent purchaser for value," on ground of mortgagee's failure to refile mortgage. Tynon v. Bliss, 121 Neb. 80, 236 N.W. 184 (1931).
"Subsequent encumbrancer" hereunder is one who acquires his encumbrance after the statute has run against prior recorded encumbrance. Bank acquiring mortgage expressly subject to prior mortgage against which statute has not yet run did not thereafter acquire priority as "subsequent encumbrancer." Bliss v. Redding, 121 Neb. 69, 236 N.W. 181 (1931).
2. Limitation as to adverse possession
An action to recover possession of real property from a tenant who remains in possession without the landlord's consent after a lease has expired or been terminated under section 76-1437 is an action for the possession of real property and is therefore subject to the 10-year statute of limitations for the possession of real property as provided for in this section. Blankenau v. Landess, 261 Neb. 906, 626 N.W.2d 588 (2001).
One who claims title by adverse possession must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has been in actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession under a claim of ownership for the full 10-year period mandated by this section. A claim in the nature of a life estate is not a "claim of ownership" within the meaning of the adverse possession doctrine. Lewis v. Poduska, 240 Neb. 312, 481 N.W.2d 898 (1992).
Where the evidence shows that irrigation rights have not been used for more than ten years, a water appropriator loses his rights, independent of any cancellation proceeding. Northport Irr. Dist. v. Jess, 215 Neb. 152, 337 N.W.2d 733 (1983).
The ten-year period necessary to bar an action to recover land applies in an action seeking to establish a prescriptive easement. Sturm v. Mau, 209 Neb. 865, 312 N.W.2d 272 (1981).
Adverse possession is founded upon the intent with which an occupant held possession, and can best be determined by his acts. The intent, even though mistaken, is sufficient as where claimant occupies to the wrong boundary line believing it to be the true line, and even though he does not intend to claim more than that described in the deed. Weiss v. Meyer, 208 Neb. 429, 303 N.W.2d 765 (1981).
In determining the rights of an adverse owner, the entry and possession of his tenant, expressly authorized to act, is the entry and possession of such owner. Weiss v. Meyer, 208 Neb. 429, 303 N.W.2d 765 (1981).
Where a fence is constructed as a boundary line, although it is not the actual boundary line, and parties claim ownership of land up to the fence for the uninterrupted statutory period, parties gain title to such land by adverse possession. Conkey v. Anderson Farms, Inc., 205 Neb. 708, 289 N.W.2d 541 (1980); McCain v. Cook, 184 Neb. 147, 165 N.W.2d 734 (1969).
Possession by permission of the owner cannot ripen into adverse possession until after such change of position has been brought home to the adverse party. Imperial Service Corp. v. Phipps, 205 Neb. 622, 288 N.W.2d 749 (1980).
A person claiming title by adverse possession must occupy and possess the land adversely to the record owners with the requisite intent and purpose of asserting ownership. Rentschler v. Walnofer, 203 Neb. 84, 277 N.W.2d 548 (1979).
One who claims title by adverse possession must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been in actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession under claim of ownership for a full period of ten years. Rentschler v. Walnofer, 203 Neb. 84, 277 N.W.2d 548 (1979).
Title may not be granted or quieted on the theory of adverse possession in the absence of proof of exclusive possession for a purpose to which the land is adapted for the statutory period of 10 years. Rentschler v. Walnofer, 203 Neb. 84, 277 N.W.2d 548 (1979).
Where a person claims title to land by adverse possession by the previous occupants, the claimant must prove previous occupants had a hostile intent to occupy land that was not theirs. Barnes v. Milligan, 200 Neb. 450, 264 N.W.2d 186 (1978).
Section 76-701 et seq., R.R.S.1943, provides no specific statute of limitations; therefore the ten-year period in section 25-202, R.R.S.1943, applies in inverse condemnation proceedings. Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198 Neb. 608, 254 N.W.2d 691 (1977).
One who claims title by adverse possession must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been in actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious adverse possession under claim of ownership for full period of ten years. Campbell v. Buckler, 192 Neb. 336, 220 N.W.2d 248 (1974).
A party, in order to establish title to real estate by adverse possession, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been in actual, continuous, notorious, and adverse possession thereof under claim of ownership for the full period required by the statute. Shirk v. Schmunk, 192 Neb. 25, 218 N.W.2d 433 (1974).
An easement by prescription for discharge of waste irrigation waters into a natural depression through land of another cannot be acquired until it has been exercised without material change under a claim of right for ten years. Peters v. Langrehr, 188 Neb. 480, 197 N.W.2d 698 (1972).
Statutory period for the establishment of title to real estate by adverse possession is ten years. Mentzer v. Dolen, 178 Neb. 42, 131 N.W.2d 671 (1964); Fitch v. Slama, 177 Neb. 96, 128 N.W.2d 377 (1964); Beebe v. Reichert, 172 Neb. 172, 108 N.W.2d 804 (1961); Jones v. Schmidt, 170 Neb. 351, 102 N.W.2d 640 (1960).
Water rights may be lost by nonuser for the period of statutory limitations relating to real estate. State v. Nielsen, 163 Neb. 372, 79 N.W.2d 721 (1956).
One who has taken possession of real estate as tenant of another cannot hold the real estate adversely to his lessor until he surrenders possession, or, by some unequivocal act, notifies the landlord that he no longer holds under the lease. Kennedy v. Gottschalk, 138 Neb. 842, 295 N.W. 813 (1941).
Where a fence is constructed as a boundary between two pieces of property, and where the parties claim ownership to the fence for a full ten-year period, and are not interrupted in their possession or control during such period, they will, by adverse possession, gain title to such land as may have been improperly inclosed with their own. Ohme v. Thomas, 134 Neb. 727, 279 N.W. 480 (1938).
City discharging sewage into creek for a period of ten years in an adverse manner may acquire an easement for that purpose. Hall v. City of Friend, 134 Neb. 652, 279 N.W. 346 (1938).
Where a boundary, supposed to be the true line established by the government survey, is acquiesced in by the adjoining owners for more than ten years, it is conclusive of the location. Romine v. West, 134 Neb. 274, 278 N.W. 490 (1938).
Plea of title to land by adverse possession, to be effective, must be proved by actual, open, exclusive, and continuous possession under claim of ownership for the full statutory period of ten years. Ellsworth Corporation v. Stratbucker, 134 Neb. 246, 278 N.W. 381 (1938).
Where title to land has been quieted in plaintiff as against claims of defendant, and defendant does not re-enter after such decree, the statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of defendant and he cannot assert adverse possession until he brings express notice to plaintiff or his vendees that he claims adversely to plaintiff. Lennon v. Kearney, 132 Neb. 180, 271 N.W. 351 (1937).
Where mortgage contains clause accelerating due date or maturity on default in payment of interest, and mortgagee elects to declare mortgage due under such option, statute of limitations begins to run from date of such election. Hatch v. Ely, 131 Neb. 882, 270 N.W. 480 (1936).
An easement acquired by prescription is limited in extent to adverse use during the ten-year period. Onstott v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 129 Neb. 54, 260 N.W. 556 (1935).
Elements of adverse possession discussed. DeWulf v. DeWulf, 104 Neb. 105, 175 N.W. 884 (1919); Peterson v. Kouty, 103 Neb. 321, 171 N.W. 905 (1919); Armstrong v. Johnson, 97 Neb. 119, 149 N.W. 361 (1914); Jankee v. Robb, 97 Neb. 118, 149 N.W. 362 (1914); Prugh v. Searcy, 97 Neb. 116, 149 N.W. 362 (1914); Dringman v. Keith, 93 Neb. 180, 139 N.W. 1044 (1913); Delatour v. Wendt, 93 Neb. 175, 139 N.W. 1023 (1913); Ryan v. City of Lincoln, 85 Neb. 539, 123 N.W. 1021 (1909); Hull v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 21 Neb. 371, 32 N.W. 162 (1887); Haywood v. Thomas, 17 Neb. 237, 22 N.W. 460 (1885); Gregory v. Lincoln, 13 Neb. 352, 14 N.W. 423 (1882); Horbach v. Miller, 4 Neb. 31 (1875).
Tract contiguous to right-of-way acquired by railroad by adverse possession. Ferber v. McQuillen, 99 Neb. 280, 156 N.W. 506 (1916).
Right by adverse possession in village street upheld where acquired before amendment of 1899 to this section. Torbitt v. Village of Bennett, 98 Neb. 129, 152 N.W. 301 (1915).
Statute runs against bill to declare deed absolute in form a mortgage, in favor of grantee in possession, from time such possession becomes adverse to grantor's title. Minick v. Reichenbach, 97 Neb. 629, 150 N.W. 1001 (1915); Stall v. Jones, 47 Neb. 706, 66 N.W. 653 (1896).
There must be adverse public user of defined track or way for period sufficient to bar action to recover land. Smith v. Nofsinger, 86 Neb. 834, 126 N.W. 659 (1910); Nelson v. Sneed, 76 Neb. 201, 107 N.W. 255 (1906).
Notorious and exclusive possession without right constitutes a disseizin. Fitzgerald v. Brewster, 31 Neb. 51, 47 N.W. 475 (1890).
3. Limitation as to remainderman
An action for recovery of title to, or possession of lands, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action has accrued, and a remainderman is not required to bring action to quiet title in order to protect his remainder estate from a claim of adverse possession by a grantee of the life estate in possession under the grant. Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292 N.W. 38 (1940).
When statute runs against remaindermen stated. Anderson v. Miller, 103 Neb. 549, 172 N.W. 688 (1919); Mohr v. Harder, 103 Neb. 545, 172 N.W. 753 (1919); Criswell v. Criswell, 101 Neb. 349, 163 N.W. 302 (1917).
Statute does not always run against remainderman until death of owner of life estate. Criswell v. Criswell, 101 Neb. 349, 163 N.W. 302 (1917); Bohrer v. Davis, 94 Neb. 367, 143 N.W. 209 (1913); McFarland v. Flack, 87 Neb. 452, 127 N.W. 375 (1910).
4. Adverse possession not applicable
Actions to recover annual payments provided for by indenture granting perpetual easement for flow of water and to enforce equitable lien growing out of the indenture are not controlled by this section. Frye v. Sibbitt, 145 Neb. 600, 17 N.W.2d 617 (1945).
A fee simple title holder under an unrecorded deed does not forfeit title by failure to assert it affirmatively for ten years or any other period. Hadley v. Platte Valley Cattle Co., 143 Neb. 482, 10 N.W.2d 249 (1943).
Action for damages against city for changing grade of street, held not barred by statute of limitations. Quivey v. City of Mitchell, 133 Neb. 727, 277 N.W. 50 (1938).
Exception as to municipalities does not extend to irrigation districts. Central Irr. Dist. v. Gering Irr. Dist., 122 Neb. 199, 240 N.W. 289 (1932).
Railroad right-of-way is not divested by adverse possession so long as railroad operates over same. Edholm v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Corp., 114 Neb. 845, 211 N.W. 206 (1926); McLucas v. St. Joseph & G. I. Ry. Co., 67 Neb. 603, 93 N.W. 928 (1903), former judgment adhered to 67 Neb. 612, 97 N.W. 312 (1903).
Public easement in land used for highway cannot be divested by adverse possession; width of highway acquired by public user is question of fact determined by character and extent of use. Donovan v. Union P. R. Co., 104 Neb. 364, 177 N.W. 159 (1920).
Statute does not run against action to remove cloud on title while landowner is in exclusive possession. Essex v. Smith, 97 Neb. 649, 150 N.W. 1022 (1915).
Where party was placed in possession of land under agreement that he should hold possession until settlement was made, statute would not run on either action for land or claim for money. Tillson v. Holloway, 94 Neb. 635, 143 N.W. 939 (1913).
Action to foreclose mortgage may be commenced within ten years even though action on note has become barred. Campbell v. Upton, 56 Neb. 385, 76 N.W. 910 (1898).
5. When cause of action accrues
A seller under a land installment contract who has received a distinct and unequivocal repudiation of the contract by the buyer cannot wait more than 10 years after the repudiation to commence an ejectment action. Beckner v. Urban, 309 Neb. 677, 962 N.W.2d 497 (2021).
The statute of limitations does not begin to run in case of a resulting trust until trustee clearly repudiates his trust, and the time it commences to run must be determined upon facts in each case. Jirka v. Prior, 196 Neb. 416, 243 N.W.2d 754 (1976).
As between cotenants, statute of limitations begins to run from time of ouster. Unick v. St. Joseph Loan and Trust Co., 146 Neb. 789, 21 N.W.2d 752 (1946).
Partial payments do not extend period of time for commencing action as against purchaser for value. Weekes v. Rumbaugh, 144 Neb. 103, 12 N.W.2d 636 (1944).
Before possession can become adverse between co-owners, notice that the part owner in possession is claiming the entire estate in hostility to his co-owners must be brought home to the latter in some plain and unequivocal manner. Gramann v. Beatty, 134 Neb. 568, 279 N.W. 204 (1938).
Petition showing cause accrued twenty-six years before action was begun was demurrable. Parkin v. Parkin, 123 Neb. 836, 244 N.W. 638 (1932).
Statute does not begin to run against cestui que trust until trustee repudiates trust, since until then the fraud has not become known. Wiseman v. Guernsey, 107 Neb. 647, 187 N.W. 55 (1922).
Action to enforce lien of specific money bequest upon land in hands of residuary legatee, when barred. Overton v. Sack, 99 Neb. 64, 155 N.W. 222 (1915); Klug v. Seegabarth, 98 Neb. 272, 152 N.W. 385 (1915).
The statute will continue to run against one who has executed a valid deed of the premises under which the land is so held, although a later conveyance in the chain of title is found to be invalid. Davidge v. Talbot, 98 Neb. 816, 154 N.W. 543 (1915).
In mortgagor's action to redeem, statute begins to run when mortgagee takes possession with color of title. Essex v. Smith, 97 Neb. 649, 150 N.W. 1022 (1915); Jackson v. Rohrberg, 94 Neb. 85, 142 N.W. 290 (1913).
Statute does not run until notice that trustee denies his right in the property. Goodman v. Smith, 94 Neb. 227, 142 N.W. 521 (1913).
Action by heir to recover homestead illegally sold at administrator's sale must be commenced within ten years after attaining his majority. Holmes v. Mason, 80 Neb. 448, 114 N.W. 606 (1908).
Action may be brought any time before statutory bar is complete. Clark v. Hannafeldt, 79 Neb. 566, 113 N.W. 135 (1907); Dickson v. Stewart, 71 Neb. 424, 98 N.W. 1085 (1904); Dorsey v. Conrad, 49 Neb. 443, 68 N.W. 645 (1896).
Statute does not run against claim of subrogation under prior mortgage until ten years from maturity of latter. Boevink v. Christiaanse, 69 Neb. 256, 95 N.W. 652 (1903).
To obtain deficiency judgment upon mortgage indebtedness, action must be brought within five years. Omaha Savings Bank v. Simeral, 61 Neb. 741, 86 N.W. 470 (1901).
Subsequent mortgagee, not made party to foreclosure of prior mortgage, is not barred from action until ten years after cause of action accrues. Baldwin v. Burt, 43 Neb. 245, 61 N.W. 601 (1895).
Statute begins to run, when in favor of entryman on public lands. Mills v. Traver, 35 Neb. 292, 53 N.W. 67 (1892); Carroll v. Patrick, 23 Neb. 834, 37 N.W. 671 (1888).
6. Tolling of statute
A subsequent encumbrancer is one who acquires one's encumbrance for value after the statute has run against a prior encumbrance. A mortgage on real estate continues as a lien thereon for only 10 years from the maturity of the debt secured unless a payment has been made thereon, or the statute of limitations has otherwise been tolled. Vanice v. Oehm, 247 Neb. 298, 526 N.W.2d 648 (1995).
An action to foreclose a real estate mortgage may be brought within the limitation hereunder even though an action on the debt is barred. J. I. Case Credit Corp. v. Thompson, 187 Neb. 626, 193 N.W.2d 283 (1971).
Absence from state will not extend the time in which a real estate mortgage foreclosure may be brought against a nonresident. Brainard v. Hall, 137 Neb. 491, 289 N.W. 845 (1940).
Death of party against whom statute has commenced to run does not toll statute; it continues to run as against heirs. McNeill v. Schumaker, 94 Neb. 544, 143 N.W. 805 (1913).
Running of statute is arrested by service of summons. Butler v. Smith, 84 Neb. 78, 120 N.W. 1106 (1909).
Unless tolled, statute of limitations for foreclosure of real mortgage is ten years from maturity of the debt secured. Herbage v. McKee, 82 Neb. 354, 117 N.W. 706 (1908).
In determining period of limitation on action to foreclose mortgage, partial payments or written acknowledgment operate to toll statute. Teegarden v. Burton, 62 Neb. 639, 87 N.W. 337 (1901).
Conveyance by adverse occupant to one not competent to take title will not arrest running of statute. Myers v. McGavock, 39 Neb. 843, 58 N.W. 522 (1894).
7. Inverse condemnation
This section is a general statute of limitations that must yield to the more specific limitation provided in section 25-218 regarding inverse condemnation actions brought against the State. Hike v. State, 297 Neb. 212, 899 N.W.2d 614 (2017).
In the context of a regulatory taking, a cause of action for inverse condemnation begins to accrue when the injured party has the right to institute and maintain a lawsuit due to a city's infringement, or an attempt at infringement, of a landowner's legal rights in the property. Strode v. City of Ashland, 295 Neb. 44, 886 N.W.2d 293 (2016).
The period of limitations for inverse condemnation actions is the ten years within which actions for adverse possession must be brought pursuant to this section. Kimco Addition v. Lower Platte South N.R.D., 232 Neb. 289, 440 N.W.2d 456 (1989).
Section 76-701 et seq., R.R.S.1943, provides no specific statute of limitations; therefore the ten-year period in section 25-202, R.R.S.1943, applies in inverse condemnation proceedings. Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198 Neb. 608, 254 N.W.2d 691 (1977).
8. Miscellaneous
This section is applicable to an action to quiet title to an interest in real estate. Olsen v. Olsen, 265 Neb. 299, 657 N.W.2d 1 (2003).
The statute of limitations for a judicial action to foreclose on real property under a deed of trust is 10 years. PSB Credit Servs. v. Rich, 251 Neb. 474, 558 N.W.2d 295 (1997).
Courts of equity have the inherent power to refuse relief after undue and inexcusable delay independent of the statute of limitations. Cizek v. Cizek, 201 Neb. 4, 266 N.W.2d 68 (1978).
Where plaintiff's predecessor in title had been in actual, continuous, notorious adverse possession of island for ten years he became the owner thereof. Winkle v. Mitera, 195 Neb. 821, 241 N.W.2d 329 (1976).
A school district is an other municipal corporation and its real estate is other public grounds within provisions of this section. Buras v. School Dist. No. 37 of Sarpy County, 190 Neb. 836, 212 N.W.2d 632 (1973).
Undisputed evidence indicated defendants, by maintenance of drainage ditch through plaintiff's land for a period in excess of ten years, but for the public interest involved, acquired easement in their own right. Franz v. Nelson, 183 Neb. 137, 158 N.W.2d 606 (1968).
Subsequent encumbrancer is one who acquires his encumbrance for value after statute has run against prior encumbrance. Alexanderson v. Wessman, 158 Neb. 614, 64 N.W.2d 306 (1954).
A person, claiming right to mortgaged realty prior to mortgagee whose mortgage was extended by unrecorded written agreement, must show that the person is purchaser or encumbrancer who has parted with something of value. Franklin v. Zarmstorf, 145 Neb. 21, 15 N.W.2d 190 (1944).
Where an occupant of real estate disclaims title prior to the running of the statute of limitations, he is precluded from acquiring title by adverse possession. Weisel v. Hobbs, 138 Neb. 656, 294 N.W. 448 (1940).
The requirement that mortgage be rerecorded within ten years after cause of action accrues is limited in its application to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value. Hadley v. Corey, 137 Neb. 204, 288 N.W. 826 (1939).
Adverse possession of accreted lands must be proved by actual, open, exclusive, and continuous possession under claim of ownership for ten years. Conkey v. Knudsen, 135 Neb. 890, 284 N.W. 737 (1939).
Action for relief based on mistake and accident is not governed by this section, as such relief is classed as fraud. Sweley v. Fox, 135 Neb. 780, 284 N.W. 318 (1939).
In determining period of limitation in action to foreclose real estate mortgage given as security for note, this section should be construed in connection with section providing that part payment or acknowledgment of debt tolls statute. Steeves v. Nispel, 132 Neb. 597, 273 N.W. 50 (1937).
Courts of equity have inherent power to refuse relief after undue and inexcusable delay independent of statute of limitations. Perry v. Markle, 127 Neb. 29, 254 N.W. 692 (1934).
Bank held not subsequent encumbrancer within meaning of section. O'Connor v. Power, 124 Neb. 113, 245 N.W. 417 (1932), overruled in 124 Neb. 594, 247 N.W. 414 (1933).
Possession as between parties in parental or filial relation is deemed permissive. Chase v. Lavelle, 105 Neb. 796, 181 N.W. 936 (1921).
Mortgagor must do equity by tendering amount due on mortgage debt. Pettit v. Louis, 88 Neb. 496, 129 N.W. 1005 (1911).
Statute applied to streets. Agnew v. City of Pawnee City, 79 Neb. 603, 113 N.W. 236 (1907); Webster v. City of Lincoln, 56 Neb. 502, 76 N.W. 1076 (1898).
25-203.
Actions for forcible entry and detainer of real property.An action for the forcible entry and detainer, or forcible detainer only, of real property, can only be brought within one year after the cause of such action shall have accrued.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 8, p. 395; R.S.1913, § 7565; C.S.1922, § 8508; C.S.1929, § 20-203; R.S.1943, § 25-203.
Annotations
Where tenancy by sufferance is terminated by statutory three-day notice, cause of action for forcible detainer accrues and statute runs from service of notice. Federal Trust Co. v. Overlander, 118 Neb. 167, 223 N.W. 797 (1929); Clark v. Tukey Land Co., 75 Neb. 326, 106 N.W. 328 (1905).
When the right to bring an action of forcible entry and detention is barred as against the grantor, so likewise it is against the grantee. Weatherford v. Union Pacific R. Co., 74 Neb. 229, 104 N.W. 183 (1905).
25-204.
Actions other than for the recovery of real property.Civil actions, other than for the recovery of real property, can only be brought within the following periods, after the cause of action shall have accrued.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 9, p. 395; R.S.1913, § 7566; C.S.1922, § 8509; C.S.1929, § 20-204; R.S.1943, § 25-204.
Annotations
Cause of action to establish right to pension accrued at time fireman was totally and permanently disabled. Barney v. City of Lincoln, 144 Neb. 537, 13 N.W.2d 870 (1944).
Cause of action "accrued" when buyer acknowledged and promised to pay balance. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Smith, 142 Neb. 527, 7 N.W.2d 80 (1942).
Action by a husband for damages on account of assault and battery committed on wife must be brought within one year after cause of action occurred. Markel v. Glassmeyer, 137 Neb. 243, 288 N.W. 821 (1939).
The defense of statute of limitations is personal privilege of debtor, and can only be made by persons standing in his place. Neill v. Burke, 81 Neb. 125, 115 N.W. 321 (1908).
When not apparent on face of petition that action is barred, statute must be pleaded as a defense, or it is waived. Hanna v. Emerson, 45 Neb. 708, 64 N.W. 229 (1895).
Time may be extended by part payment or written acknowledgment. Lee, Fried & Co. v. Brugmann, 37 Neb. 232, 55 N.W. 1053 (1893); Rolfe v. Pilloud, 16 Neb. 21, 19 N.W. 615 (1884).
Promise by one joint debtor will not toll statute as to other joint debtors. Mayberry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368 (1877).
Under this and other statutes of limitations suit against employer to enforce agreement made in 1893 to deliver corporate stock was barred, in view of lapse of time, change in value, and repudiation of trust. Reed v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 37 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1929).
25-205.
Actions on written contracts, on foreign judgments, or to recover collateral.(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, an action upon a specialty, or any agreement, contract, or promise in writing, or foreign judgment, can only be brought within five years. No action at law or equity may be brought or maintained attacking the validity or enforceability of or to rescind or declare void and uncollectible any written contract entered into pursuant to, in compliance with, or in reliance on, a statute of the State of Nebraska which has been or hereafter is held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Nebraska where such holding is the basis for such action, unless such action be brought or maintained within one year from the effective date of such decision. The provisions hereof shall not operate to extend the time in which to bring any action or to revive any action now barred by reason of the operation of any previously existing limitation provision.
(2) An action to recover collateral (a) the possession and ownership of which a debtor has in any manner transferred to another person and (b) which was used as security for payment pursuant to an agreement, contract, or promise in writing which covers farm products as described in section 9-102, Uniform Commercial Code, or farm products which become inventory of a person engaged in farming, shall be brought within eighteen months from the date possession and ownership of such collateral was transferred.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 10, p. 395; R.S.1913, § 7567; C.S.1922, § 8510; C.S.1929, § 20-205; R.S.1943, § 25-205; Laws 1963, Spec. Sess., c. 2, § 1, p. 61;
Laws 1983, LB 343, § 9; Laws 1999, LB 550, § 3.
Annotations
1. Acts that toll the statute
2. Acts that do not toll the statute
3. Specific actions covered by statute
4. Miscellaneous
1. Acts that toll the statute
Although this section provides a 5-year statute of limitations on breach of contract claims, 28 U.S.C. 1367(d) tolls the state statute of limitations during the time the claim is being litigated in federal court. Ryan v. Streck, Inc., 309 Neb. 98, 958 N.W.2d 703 (2021).
A cause of action on an insurer's duty to defend does not run until the underlying action is resolved against the insured. Dutton-Lainson Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 Neb. 810, 716 N.W.2d 87 (2006).
Voluntary payment of any part of principal or interest tolls statute of limitations and new right of action accrues after each payment, not tolled as to joint maker unless payment made with his authority or consent. Pick v. Pick, 184 Neb. 716, 171 N.W.2d 766 (1969).
Where a new independent cause of action is filed by way of amendment, the statute of limitations runs until the filing of the amended petition. Horn's Crane Service v. Prior, 182 Neb. 94, 152 N.W.2d 421 (1967).
Mortgage subsequently given was an acknowledgment in writing of prior note. Alexanderson v. Wessman, 158 Neb. 614, 64 N.W.2d 306 (1954).
Where a bank assumed and agreed to pay the liabilities of another bank, the statute of limitations commenced to run against the assuming bank upon a certificate of deposit that had already matured at the time the assumption agreement was made. Diss v. State Bank of Holdrege, 141 Neb. 146, 3 N.W.2d 89 (1942).
Where a municipal warrant has been registered, statute of limitations does not commence to run until treasurer of municipal corporation gives notice to the holder of the warrant that there is sufficient money in the treasury to pay the warrant. Havelock Nat. Bank v. Northport Irr. Dist., 139 Neb. 747, 298 N.W. 695 (1941).
In determining whether statute of limitations has run upon a written instrument, part payments made by a debtor without specific direction may be applied by the creditor on any indebtedness owing by the debtor to the creditor. Fox v. Carman, 139 Neb. 34, 296 N.W. 343 (1941).
Where judgment is obtained on promissory note through fraud, court of equity will set it aside where it appears the maker had a good defense in that statute of limitations had run. Pavlik v. Burns, 134 Neb. 175, 278 N.W. 149 (1938).
Payments by one partner out of partnership funds, where partnership has become inactive but has not been dissolved, toll statute of limitations as to both partners. Jensen v. Romigh, 133 Neb. 71, 274 N.W. 199 (1937).
In suit on insurance policy based on presumption of death after seven years' unexplained absence, statute of limitations does not begin to run until expiration of seven-year period. Wells v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 130 Neb. 722, 266 N.W. 597 (1936).
Cashier of bank who endorsed to bank a note of which he was payee, and, instead of collecting the note as was his duty, made payments of principal and interest on note from time to time, and, in three instances marked the note extended for two years each, was estopped, when sued on his endorsement, to plead statute of limitations. Atlas Corporation v. Magdanz, 130 Neb. 519, 265 N.W. 743 (1936).
Where a judgment of revivor had been obtained within five years before bringing action in this state, it was not barred by the statute of limitations of this state. Packer v. Thompson, 25 Neb. 688, 41 N.W. 650 (1889).
2. Acts that do not toll the statute
Partial payments made without the authority or consent of a surety, unless ratified by the surety, do not toll the statute of limitations as to the surety. Watkins Products, Inc. v. Rains, 175 Neb. 57, 120 N.W.2d 368 (1963).
Action against surety on written contract of guaranty was barred although payments were made by principal within five years. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Smith, 142 Neb. 529, 9 N.W.2d 286 (1943), affirming 142 Neb. 527, 7 N.W.2d 80 (1942).
Surety was not liable when he did nothing to prevent running of statute of limitations. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Smith, 142 Neb. 527, 7 N.W.2d 80 (1942).
Payments on note by principal without authority or consent of surety does not prevent running of statute of limitations against surety. In re Estate of Soukup, 142 Neb. 456, 6 N.W.2d 615 (1942).
The right to retain the debt of an heir upon a promissory note from his distributive share of estate is not precluded even though action to recover upon the note is barred by the statute of limitations. Fischer v. Wilhelm, 139 Neb. 583, 298 N.W. 126 (1941), opinion partially vacated on rehearing, 140 Neb. 448, 300 N.W. 350 (1941).
Where will provided that any sum owing to testator by heirs should be deducted from share of such heir, an heir cannot successfully object upon the ground of the statute of limitations to deduction of notes which had not run five years at time of death of testator. In re Estate of Nissen, 134 Neb. 794, 279 N.W. 782 (1938).
Payment by one of several joint debtors on note, without authority or consent of other debtors, does not toll statute of limitations as to them. Kuhse v. Luther, 130 Neb. 623, 266 N.W. 66 (1936).
Stipulation contained in a note permitting the holder to extend the time of payment without notice, is not an agreement waiving the right to plead the bar of the statute. Allen v. Estate of Allen, 81 Neb. 600, 116 N.W. 509 (1908).
3. Specific actions covered by statute
This section governs deficiency actions brought after the judicial foreclosure of a trust deed. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Davey, 285 Neb. 835, 830 N.W.2d 63 (2013).
In a suit against the guarantors of a promissory note that contains an optional acceleration clause, the statute of limitations for an action on the whole indebtedness due begins to run from the time the creditor takes positive action indicating that the creditor has elected to exercise the option. City of Lincoln v. Hershberger, 272 Neb. 839, 725 N.W.2d 787 (2007).
In this case, the general 5-year statute of limitations must yield to the 3-year provision in a health insurance policy because such provision is authorized by the statutes regulating health insurance policies. Brodine v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 272 Neb. 713, 724 N.W.2d 321 (2006).
The statute of limitations provided in this section applies to an action on a contract of guaranty. The statute of limitations begins to run against a contract of guaranty the moment a cause of action first accrues, and a guarantor's liability arises when the principal debtor defaults. In the absence of provisions to the contrary in the controlling documents, a cause of action does not accrue against a guarantor until the guarantor's liability has arisen, and a guarantor's liability does not arise until the debtor defaults. City of Lincoln v. PMI Franchising, 267 Neb. 562, 675 N.W.2d 660 (2004).
This section, which provides for a 5-year statute of limitations on written contracts, applies in an insured's suit against its uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage insurer when the insured has timely filed the underlying claim against the uninsured or underinsured motorist. Schrader v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 259 Neb. 87, 608 N.W.2d 194 (2000).
Generally, absent a more specific statute, actions on written contracts may be brought within 5 years. Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., 255 Neb. 977, 588 N.W.2d 565 (1999).
An action for damages for breach of a covenant of warranty contained in a deed conveying land is an action upon a specialty and must be brought within 5 years after the cause of action accrues; this rule applies in actions for damages for breach of a covenant against encumbrances. Omega Chemical Co. v. Rogers, 246 Neb. 935, 524 N.W.2d 330 (1994).
An action based on breach of a written contract must be commenced within five years of accrual of a cause of action. Grand Island School Dist. #2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603 (1979).
Five-year statute of limitations applies to a third party beneficiary under a real estate sales contract. Mid-Continent Properties, Inc. v. Pflug, 197 Neb. 429, 249 N.W.2d 476 (1977).
Actions to recover annual payments provided by indenture granting perpetual easement for flow of water and to enforce equitable lien growing out of the indenture are controlled by this section. Frye v. Sibbitt, 145 Neb. 600, 17 N.W.2d 617 (1945).
Cause of action on indemnity contract accrues when loss thereunder occurs. Lyhane v. Durtschi, 144 Neb. 256, 13 N.W.2d 130 (1944); Bankers Surety Co. v. Willow Springs Beverage Co., 104 Neb. 173, 176 N.W. 82 (1920).
A domestic judgment is a specialty and suit thereon is barred after five years from date of judgment. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Axtell v. Merryman, 126 Neb. 684, 254 N.W. 428 (1934); Reed v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Assn., 122 Neb. 817, 241 N.W. 769 (1932); Armstrong v. Marr, 120 Neb. 182, 231 N.W. 758 (1930); Fisher v. Woodard, 103 Neb. 253, 170 N.W. 907 (1919); Armstrong v. Patterson, 97 Neb. 229, 149 N.W. 408 (1914), reversed on rehearing 97 Neb. 871, 152 N.W. 311 (1915).
Action for breach of covenant of warranty in deed is specialty, barred unless commenced within five years from date of breach. Campbell v. Gallentine, 115 Neb. 789, 215 N.W. 111 (1927); Kern v. Kloke, 21 Neb. 529, 32 N.W. 574 (1887).
Statute runs against married woman during coverture. Watkins v. Adamson, 113 Neb. 715, 204 N.W. 816 (1925).
Time of commencing action on city warrants stated. Trenerry v. City of So. Omaha, 86 Neb. 7, 124 N.W. 920 (1910); Rogers v. City of Omaha, 82 Neb. 118, 117 N.W. 119 (1908).
Time of commencing action for money had and received stated. Thiele v. Carey, 85 Neb. 454, 123 N.W. 442 (1909).
Time of commencing action on draft stated. Wrigley v. Farmers and Merchants State Bank of Beatrice, 76 Neb. 862, 108 N.W. 132 (1906).
Time of commencing action to reform policy of insurance stated. Grand View Building Assn. v. Northern Assur. Co., 73 Neb. 149, 102 N.W. 246 (1905).
Time of commencing action on county warrants stated. Bacon v. Dawes County, 66 Neb. 191, 92 N.W. 313 (1902).
Time of commencing action on award of damages stated. City of Omaha v. Clarke, 66 Neb. 33, 92 N.W. 146 (1902).
Time of commencing action on covenant against encumbrances stated. Johnson v. Hesser, 61 Neb. 631, 85 N.W. 894 (1901); Bellamy v. Chambers, 50 Neb. 146, 69 N.W. 770 (1897).
Time of commencing action on guaranty of payment stated. Cummins v. Tibbetts, 58 Neb. 318, 78 N.W. 617 (1899).
Time of commencing action on bank check stated. Connor v. Becker, 56 Neb. 343, 76 N.W. 893 (1898).
Time of commencing action on foreign judgments stated. Lonergan v. Lonergan, 55 Neb. 641, 76 N.W. 16 (1898); Hepler v. Davis, 32 Neb. 556, 49 N.W. 458 (1891); Marx & Kempner v. Kilpatrick, 25 Neb. 107, 41 N.W. 111 (1888).
Time of commencing action on contract for transportation of goods stated. Denman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 52 Neb. 140, 71 N.W. 967 (1897).
Time of commencing action for foreclosure of tax lien stated. Alexander v. Thacker, 43 Neb. 494, 61 N.W. 738 (1895); Shepherd v. Burr, 27 Neb. 432, 43 N.W. 256 (1889).
Time of commencing action on insurance policy stated. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Rad Bila Hora Lodge, 41 Neb. 21, 59 N.W. 752 (1894).
An action upon a foreign judgment is barred in five years. Nelson v. Becker, 32 Neb. 99, 48 N.W. 962 (1891).
Warrant issued by a village will be barred in five years from time it becomes due. Arapahoe Village v. Albee, 24 Neb. 242, 38 N.W. 737 (1888).
Time of commencing action on school district bonds stated. School Dist. No. 42 of Pawnee County v. First Nat. Bank of Xenia, 19 Neb. 89, 26 N.W. 912 (1886).
Time of commencing action on promissory notes stated. Hedges v. Roach, 16 Neb. 673, 21 N.W. 404 (1884).
A suit to collect on a contract that is from the foreclosed deed of trust is governed by the statute of limitations found in this section, rather than the 3-month statute of limitations found in section 76-1013. Boxum v. Munce, 16 Neb. App. 731, 751 N.W.2d 657 (2008).
Suit by employee against employer for breach of written employment contract was governed by Nebraska five-year statute of limitations rather than the four-year statute of limitations relating to actions upon a contract not in writing. Sandobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1979).
Cause of action for breach of contract of employment accrued on date of alleged wrongful discharge. Howard v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 146 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1945).
4. Miscellaneous
The statute of limitations on a deferred compensation agreement did not begin to run until the work was fully performed, which in this case was when the employer died and the claimant ceased to work for him. In re Estate of Lakin, 310 Neb. 271, 965 N.W.2d 365 (2021).
Where there is an ongoing contractual obligation, a separate cause of action accrues at the time of each breach. Where an obligation is payable by installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment individually from the time it becomes due. Andersen v. A.M.W., Inc., 266 Neb. 238, 665 N.W.2d 1 (2003).
A cause of action in contract accrues at the time of the breach or failure to do the thing agreed to. An insured's cause of action on an insurance policy to recover underinsured motorist benefits accrues at the time of the insurer's breach or failure to do that which is required under the terms of the policy. Snyder v. Case and EMCASCO Ins. Co., 259 Neb. 621, 611 N.W.2d 409 (2000).
The filing of a foreign judgment in a Nebraska court pursuant to section 25-1587.03 is not an action upon a foreign judgment within the meaning of this section. Deuth v. Ratigan, 256 Neb. 419, 590 N.W.2d 366 (1999).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the statute of limitations started running when the city failed to timely post notice of a promotion examination under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, not when the city actually administered the exam. Cavanaugh v. City of Omaha, 254 Neb. 897, 580 N.W.2d 541 (1998).
To toll the statute of limitations and to remove the bar of the statute, a debtor must unqualifiedly acknowledge an existing liability. Kotas v. Sorensen, 216 Neb. 648, 345 N.W.2d 1 (1984).
In a suit on a promissory note and security agreement, the statute of limitations begins to run when the creditor exercises his option to accelerate the debt, thereby making the entire amount of the debt due. State Security Savings Co. v. Pelster, 207 Neb. 158, 296 N.W.2d 702 (1980).
Where a covenant against encumbrances and covenants of warranty or quiet enjoyment appear in the same instrument, they are separate and independent covenants and one does not embrace the other. Cape Co. v. Wiebe, 196 Neb. 204, 241 N.W.2d 830 (1976).
This section bars action on the note, but not on the mortgage given to secure it. J. I. Case Credit Corp. v. Thompson, 187 Neb. 626, 193 N.W.2d 283 (1971).
Where insurance policy issued in this state provides twelve months' limitation for filing action, but also contains provision amending terms to conform with conflicting statutes, limitations in state statutes are applicable. Hiram Scott College v. Insurance Co. of North America, 187 Neb. 290, 188 N.W.2d 688 (1971).
Where community of interest or privity of estate exists between intervener and plaintiff, the commencement of action by plaintiff inures to benefit of intervener. Baker v. A. C. Nelson Co., 185 Neb. 128, 174 N.W.2d 197 (1970).
This section did not govern bringing of action on fire insurance policy. Rhodes v. Continental Ins. Co., 180 Neb. 10, 141 N.W.2d 415 (1966).
An action upon a contract in writing must be commenced within five years after cause of action has accrued. Weiss v. Weiss, 179 Neb. 714, 140 N.W.2d 15 (1966).
Instrument must in itself contain contract or promise. Grant v. Williams, 158 Neb. 107, 62 N.W.2d 532 (1954).
In action upon written instrument, where more than five years have elapsed from date of maturity, claimant must plead and prove facts to avoid bar of statute. In re Estate of Anderson, 148 Neb. 436, 27 N.W.2d 632 (1947).
Burden of proof rests upon plaintiff who pleads written extension of time of payment to avoid the bar of statute of limitations upon a promissory note. Prokop v. Mlady, 136 Neb. 644, 287 N.W. 55 (1939).
By failing to make demand, payee of a demand note cannot do away with the statute of limitations, which begins to run the day after the note is executed and delivered. Melville Lumber Co. v. Scott, 135 Neb. 379, 281 N.W. 803 (1938).
The statute of limitations on a note payable on demand begins to run the day after the note is executed and delivered. Luikart v. Hoganson, 135 Neb. 280, 281 N.W. 27 (1938).
Provision in insurance policy issued by fraternal benefit society that suit must be commenced within one year from date of member's death will be enforced in Nebraska if valid in state where contract was made. Avondale v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 134 Neb. 717, 279 N.W. 355 (1938).
Defense of statute of limitations was properly pleaded. Nebraska State Bank Liquidation Assn. v. Village of Burton, 134 Neb. 623, 279 N.W. 319 (1938).
Defense of recoupment must arise out of same transaction as plaintiff's claim, and survives as long as plaintiff's cause of action exists, even if affirmative action on the subject of the recoupment is barred by statute of limitations. Oft v. Dornacker, 131 Neb. 644, 269 N.W. 418 (1936).
When state bank, against which a creditor had taken judgment, reorganized as national bank, and creditor sues the national bank to enforce his judgment formerly obtained against state bank, the statute of limitations begins to run on judgment from date it was obtained. Wilson v. Continental Nat. Bank, 130 Neb. 614, 266 N.W. 68 (1936).
A claim for indemnification filed after the applicable statute of limitations for the underlying breach of contract does not preserve a separate cause of action for breach of contract. Keith v. Data Enters., 27 Neb. App. 23, 925 N.W.2d 723 (2019).
A claim for indemnification filed after the applicable statute of limitations for the underlying negligence or negligent misrepresentation claims does not preserve separate causes of action for negligence or negligent misrepresentation. Keith v. Data Enters., 27 Neb. App. 23, 925 N.W.2d 723 (2019).
Forum state's statute of limitations was procedural rather than substantive and was properly applied in diversity action for breach of contract. Player Pianette, Inc. v. Dale Electronics, Inc., 478 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1973).
In applying provision of Bankruptcy Act relating to proving of debt founded on contract express or implied, the character of the debt is determined by the law of the state where created. Erickson v. Richardson, 86 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1936).
25-206.
Actions on oral contracts or statutory liabilities.An action upon a contract, not in writing, expressed or implied, or an action upon a liability created by statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty, can only be brought within four years.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 11, p. 395; R.S.1913, § 7568; C.S.1922, § 8511; C.S.1929, § 20-206; R.S.1943, § 25-206.
Annotations
1. When cause of action accrues
2. When statute is applicable
3. When statute is not applicable
4. Miscellaneous
1. When cause of action accrues
Plaintiff's cause of action on oral contract for the sale of grain, to be paid for on demand, accrued when demand could have been made and not when demand was actually made and was, therefor, barred by this section. Stock v. Meissner, 209 Neb. 636, 309 N.W.2d 86 (1981).
Action to recover payments made by county for maintenance of insane patient in state hospital is barred after four years. County of Adams v. Ernst, 158 Neb. 15, 62 N.W.2d 110 (1954).
Claim for reimbursement from estate of recipient of old age assistance did not accrue until death of recipient. Boone County Old Age Assistance Board v. Myhre, 149 Neb. 669, 32 N.W.2d 262 (1948).
Where services are rendered under a contract of employment which does not fix the term of service or the time of payment, the statute does not commence to run until the employee's services are terminated. In re Baker's Estate, 144 Neb. 797, 14 N.W.2d 585 (1944).
Under oral contract of hire terminated by mutual agreement, and superseded by another written contract between the same parties, cause of action for payment of salary under the first contract accrues immediately upon termination. Price v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 139 Neb. 787, 298 N.W. 746 (1941).
The statute of limitations does not begin to run against the claim of an adult child for services continually performed under an oral contract for parents during their lives, until the contract is terminated by their death. In re Estate of Skade, 135 Neb. 712, 283 N.W. 851 (1939).
Where action is brought to recover on implied obligation to repay money borrowed on void warrants, statute of limitations begins to run on date of last payment on the warrant. Nebraska State Bank Liquidation Assn. v. Village of Burton, 134 Neb. 623, 279 N.W. 319 (1938).
Liability of a bank director for loss sustained on excess loan is barred four years after the excessive loan is made. Department of Banking v. McMullen, 134 Neb. 338, 278 N.W. 551 (1938).
Liability of county judge as recipient of distributive share of absent devisee, which he failed to turn over to his successor in office or to said devisee, is not a liability created by statute but an original and primary action on his bond and may be brought within ten years after cause of action accrued. Ericsson v. Streitz, 132 Neb. 692, 273 N.W. 17 (1937).
Statute runs from the date of an account stated, and not from incurring of original debt. In re Estate of Black, 125 Neb. 75, 249 N.W. 84 (1933).
Time of commencing action on contract for transportation of goods stated. Denman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 52 Neb. 140, 71 N.W. 967 (1897).
Action on commission account was barred four years from last item. In re Automatic Equipment Mfg. Co., 103 F.Supp. 427 (D. Neb. 1952).
2. When statute is applicable
An action for an accounting of rents and profits of land is limited to four years. In re Estate of Widger, 235 Neb. 179, 454 N.W.2d 493 (1990).
Excluding September 5, 1969, the last day on which work was done, the last day of the four-year period of limitations was September 5, 1973. George P. Rose Sodding & Grading Co. v. Dennis, 195 Neb. 221, 237 N.W.2d 418 (1976).
Claim for services rendered was not barred until four years after death of promisor. Houser v. Houser, 178 Neb. 401, 133 N.W.2d 618 (1965).
This section applies to action in mandamus to place fireman on pension rolls of city. State ex rel. McIlvain v. City of Falls City, 177 Neb. 677, 131 N.W.2d 93 (1964).
This section was applicable to action by city to recover amount paid on void contract. Arthur v. Trindel, 168 Neb. 429, 96 N.W.2d 208 (1959).
Statute of limitations applies to claims by one county against another for maintenance of an incompetent person in a state hospital. County of Kearney v. County of Buffalo, 167 Neb. 117, 91 N.W.2d 304 (1958).
Action for accounting of the rents and profits of land is limited to four years. Beacom v. Daley, 164 Neb. 120, 81 N.W.2d 907 (1957).
Contract partly written and partly oral falls under this section. Grant v. Williams, 158 Neb. 107, 62 N.W.2d 532 (1954).
Action against city to recover pension is based on liability created by statute and is barred if not brought within four years of accrual of action. Barney v. City of Lincoln, 144 Neb. 537, 13 N.W.2d 870 (1944).
Statute applies to claims against counties. Bryant v. Cedar County, 122 Neb. 853, 241 N.W. 538 (1932).
Liability of stockholder, under Article XII, section 4, Constitution of Nebraska, is not a penalty barred in one year, but is contractual and governed by this section. Bourne v. Baer, 107 Neb. 255, 185 N.W. 408 (1921).
Action to recover on implied assumpsit is barred in four years. O'Neill v. City of So. Omaha, 102 Neb. 836, 170 N.W. 174 (1918).
Where more than four years intervenes between execution sale and action to set it aside, the action is barred. Best v. Zutavern, 53 Neb. 604, 74 N.W. 64 (1898).
Section applies to action for money received by agent for principal. Arnett v. Zinn, 20 Neb. 591, 31 N.W. 240 (1886).
Action for money had and received must be brought within four years from receipt of the money. Murphy v. Omaha, 1 Neb. Unof. 488, 95 N.W. 680 (1901).
Suit against employer to enforce agreement made in 1893 to deliver corporate stock was barred by this and other statutes of limitation in view of lapse of time. Reed v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 37 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1929).
3. When statute is not applicable
Right of retainer against heir is not affected by lapse of time, even though action upon the debt is barred by statute of limitations. Fischer v. Wilhelm, 139 Neb. 583, 298 N.W. 126 (1941), opinion partially vacated on rehearing, 140 Neb. 448, 300 N.W. 350 (1941).
Oral agreement to compensate one for past services, not performed as gratuity and not barred by statute, as well as for future services, out of promisor's estate by testamentary provision, is an independent contract to which statute requiring new promise to be in writing does not apply, where promisee performs agreement. Weideman v. Peterson's Estate, 129 Neb. 74, 261 N.W. 150 (1935).
Lien of special assessments is not barred by this section. Lincoln St. Ry. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 61 Neb. 109, 84 N.W. 802 (1901).
Section does not apply to recover delinquent personal taxes collected by distress. Price v. Lancaster County, 18 Neb. 199, 24 N.W. 705 (1885).
4. Miscellaneous
The time limitations provided for in this section and section 25-218 do not infringe upon the Department of Labor's ability to collect an overpayment by setoff under section 48-665. McCoy v. Albin, 298 Neb. 297, 903 N.W.2d 902 (2017).
Section 76-701 et seq., R.R.S.1943, provides no specific statute of limitations; therefore the ten-year period in section 25-202, R.R.S.1943, applies in inverse condemnation proceedings. Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198 Neb. 608, 254 N.W.2d 691 (1977).
In absence of agreement, or directions by debtor, a credit for work and labor may be applied by creditor in such manner as to interrupt running of statute of limitations. Heineman v. Thimgan, 136 Neb. 357, 285 N.W. 920 (1939).
Where the defense raised is statute of limitations, the issue should be presented to the jury for determination. Nocita v. Guiliano, 130 Neb. 241, 264 N.W. 672 (1936).
Statute of limitations, not being pleaded, will not be considered. State ex rel. Davis v. Banking House of A. Castetter, 118 Neb. 231, 224 N.W. 21 (1929).
The 4-year statute of limitations for oral contracts provided in this section applies where, although there is a written contract between the parties, parol evidence is necessary in order to establish the terms of the agreement; in other words, the statute of limitations in this section, rather than that provided by section 25-205, applies where a contract is partly oral and partly written. Aurora Technology v. Labedz, 30 Neb. App. 33, 964 N.W.2d 474 (2021).
The unilateral crediting of defendant's debt without defendant's consent or knowledge was not a voluntary acknowledgment of the debt sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Hejco, Inc. v. Arnold, 1 Neb. App. 44, 487 N.W.2d 573 (1992).
Section 25-219 was applicable to federal civil rights claim of former guidance counselor in action against school district on allegations dismissal was due to his race and his exercise of First Amendment rights. Chambers v. Omaha Public School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976).
25-207.
Actions for trespass, conversion, other torts, and frauds; exceptions.The following actions can only be brought within four years: (1) An action for trespass upon real property; (2) an action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including actions for the specific recovery of personal property; (3) an action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated; and (4) an action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud, except as provided in sections 30-2206 and 76-288 to 76-298.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 12, p. 395; R.S.1913, § 7569; C.S.1922, § 8512; C.S.1929, § 20-207; R.S.1943, § 25-207; Laws 1947, c. 243, § 11, p. 766;
Laws 1975, LB 481, § 9.
Annotations
1. Conversion
2. Fraud
3. Real property
4. Trusts
5. Damages or injury
6. Miscellaneous
1. Conversion
Statute of limitations against trustee for conversion of trust property does not commence to run until knowledge is brought home to beneficiary of repudiation of trust. Bratt v. Wishart, 136 Neb. 899, 287 N.W. 769 (1939).
Where mortgagee of chattels unlawfully seizes mortgaged property before condition broken, action is barred after four years from date of seizure. Brashier v. Tolleth, 31 Neb. 622, 48 N.W. 398 (1891).
2. Fraud
An action for fraud must be brought within 4 years of when the cause of action accrues. Such action does not accrue until there has been discovery of the facts constituting the fraud or facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on an inquiry which would lead to such discovery. NECO, Inc. v. Larry Price & Assocs., Inc., 257 Neb. 323, 597 N.W.2d 602 (1999).
An action for relief on the ground of fraud can only be brought within 4 years. Such action accrues once there has been a discovery of facts constituting the fraud, or facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on an inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to such discovery. Bowling Assocs., Ltd. v. Kerrey, 252 Neb. 458, 562 N.W.2d 714 (1997).
In the context of a fraud action, the limitations period begins to run upon discovery of the facts constituting the fraud, or facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on an inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to such discovery. A cause of action cannot "accrue" before occurrence of all the elements which constitute a defendant's violation of a plaintiff's judicially protected right. Henderson v. Forman, 240 Neb. 939, 486 N.W.2d 182 (1992).
If facts pleaded in a petition are sufficient to plead an excuse to the operation of the statute limiting action based on fraud, a general demurrer will be defeated. Lee v. Brodbeck, 196 Neb. 393, 243 N.W.2d 331 (1976).
Where fraud should have been discovered within four years of recording of mineral deed, statute of limitations was complete defense. Jameson v. Graham, 159 Neb. 202, 66 N.W.2d 417 (1954).
Accrual of cause of action for fraud is fixed as of the time of discovery. Abels v. Bennett, 158 Neb. 699, 64 N.W.2d 481 (1954).
In action for relief based on fraud, suit was instituted when summons was served on original petition where amended petition merely set forth a more complete statement of original cause of action. Horrigan v. Quinlan, 149 Neb. 538, 31 N.W.2d 430 (1948).
An action for relief on the ground of fraud may be commenced only within four years after the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud or of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence on inquiry, which, if pursued, would lead to such discovery. Hollenbeck v. Guardian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 144 Neb. 684, 14 N.W.2d 330 (1944); Burchmore v. Byllesby & Co., 140 Neb. 603, 1 N.W.2d 327 (1941); Baxter v. National Mtg. Loan Co., 128 Neb. 537, 259 N.W. 630 (1935); Branham v. Ayers, 126 Neb. 688, 254 N.W. 259 (1934).
In a bill of interpleader, a defendant is chargeable with notice of a cross-petition charging fraud filed against him by another defendant before answer day, and such notice may prevent the statute from running against the claim set up in the cross-petition. Provident Savings & Loan Assn. v. Booth, 138 Neb. 424, 293 N.W. 293 (1940).
Actions for relief based on mistake and accident are analogous to actions for relief based on fraud, and are limited to four years. Sweley v. Fox, 135 Neb. 780, 284 N.W. 318 (1939).
Action against bank officer for fraudulent diversion of assets of bank must be brought within four years of discovery of fraud. Department of Banking v. Hall, 135 Neb. 191, 280 N.W. 844 (1938).
Lapse of four years after creditor of corporation acquired knowledge of facts sufficient to require inquiry as to fraud in connection with officer's purchase of corporation's assets barred creditor's action for relief on ground of fraud. Nipp v. Puritan Mfg. Supply & Co., 128 Neb. 459, 259 N.W. 53 (1935).
Cause of action for fraud does not accrue until discovery of fraud. Marshall v. Rowe, 126 Neb. 817, 254 N.W. 480 (1934).
Petition in action to set aside satisfaction of judgment executed in 1917, on ground of fraud, alleged to have been discovered in 1926, was not demurrable. Marshall v. Rowe, 119 Neb. 591, 230 N.W. 446 (1930).
Action must be commenced within four years of discovery. Hanna v. Bergquist, 102 Neb. 658, 168 N.W. 365 (1918); Coad v. Dorsey, 96 Neb. 612, 148 N.W. 155 (1914).
Where defendant took title in her own name to lands belonging to herself and her children, statute of limitations commenced to run on date of discovery of fraud. Bell v. Dingwell, 91 Neb. 699, 136 N.W. 1128 (1912).
Statute of limitations does not bar the defense of recoupment. Kaup v. Schinstock, 88 Neb. 95, 129 N.W. 184 (1910).
If relief is sought on the ground of fraud after four years, plaintiff should allege reason for delay in prosecuting action. Bank of Miller v. Moore, 81 Neb. 566, 116 N.W. 167 (1908).
Action to set aside fraudulent conveyance is not tolled by death of the fraudulent grantor. Lesieur v. Simon, 73 Neb. 645, 103 N.W. 302 (1905).
Equitable action by heir, who claims deed of ancestor is void on account of duress and fraud, must be brought within four years of accrual of action. Aldrich v. Steen, 71 Neb. 33, 98 N.W. 445 (1904), affirmed on rehearing 71 Neb. 57, 100 N.W. 311 (1904).
Where plaintiff was defrauded in purchase of shares of stock of bank, cause of action did not accrue until discovery of fraud. Gerner v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 135, 78 N.W. 384 (1899).
Matters appearing of public record operate as constructive notice and constitute discovery of facts with respect to fraud. State ex rel. County Commissioners of Brown County v. Boyd, 49 Neb. 303, 68 N.W. 510 (1896).
Relief from the effect of accident or mistake comes within the same rule of limitation as fraud. Ainsfield v. More, 30 Neb. 385, 46 N.W. 828 (1890).
Statute begins to run when party learns facts sufficient to suggest fraud. Wright v. Davis, 28 Neb. 479, 44 N.W. 490 (1890); Hellman v. Davis, 24 Neb. 793, 40 N.W. 309 (1888).
Statute applies to fraud affecting real estate as well as personal property. Kohout v. Thomas, 4 Neb. Unof. 80, 93 N.W. 421 (1903).
The discovery provision in this section relates to when an action must be instituted and does not depend upon the eventual success of a fraud claim. Kalkowski v. Nebraska Nat. Trails Museum Found., 20 Neb. App. 541, 826 N.W.2d 589 (2013).
Where a third-party petition generally involves the title to certain real estate but the specific factual allegations involve fraud and the cause of action clearly seeks relief on the ground of fraud, the 4-year statute of limitations under this section applies rather than the 10-year statute of limitations found in section 25-202, involving recovery of the title or possession of lands. McGinley v. McGinley, 7 Neb. App. 410, 583 N.W.2d 77 (1998).
Where action for fraud is commenced more than four years after fraudulent acts occurred, burden is on plaintiff to allege and prove that fraud was not discovered until within statutory period. Brictson v. Woodrough, 164 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1947).
Four-year Nebraska limitations statute on fraud could not commence to run until reinsurers were informed of extent of reinsured's misrepresentations regarding size of unearned premium portfolio, existence of excess and special risks department, and agent's status as managing general agent. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 526 F.Supp. 623 (D. Neb. 1980).
3. Real property
Where a covenant against encumbrances and covenants of warranty or quiet enjoyment appear in the same instrument, they are separate and independent covenants and one does not embrace the other. Cape Co. v. Wiebe, 196 Neb. 204, 241 N.W.2d 830 (1976).
Statute of limitations did not begin to run against a remainderman until knowledge was brought home to him that another was claiming title adversely. Graff v. Graff, 179 Neb. 345, 138 N.W.2d 644 (1965).
Actions for slander of title are not governed by this section. Norton v. Kanouff, 165 Neb. 435, 86 N.W.2d 72 (1957).
In action to quiet title to easement, an affirmative claim by defendant for damages for land taken is barred by statute of limitations. Dawson County Irrigation Co. v. Stuart, 142 Neb. 428, 6 N.W.2d 602 (1942), vacated on rehearing, 142 Neb. 435, 8 N.W.2d 507 (1943).
Where defendant mortgagor in foreclosure proceeding claims damages for alleged misrepresentations by mortgagee, such defense is not barred by statute of limitations though it would be barred in an original action on the same cause of action. Mettlen v. Sandoz, 131 Neb. 625, 269 N.W. 98 (1936).
Whether fraud by misrepresentation in real estate trade should have been discovered within limitation period was for jury. Vrbsky v. Arendt, 119 Neb. 443, 229 N.W. 337 (1930).
Statute may run in favor of one in possession of land so as to bar claim for rents and profits beyond period of limitation. Davis v. Davis, 112 Neb. 178, 199 N.W. 113 (1924).
Statute does not run against action of rescission of exchange of lands until discovery of fraud. Carson v. Greeley, 107 Neb. 609, 187 N.W. 47 (1922).
Action to remove cloud on title to real estate, created by recorded deed, must be brought within four years after defendant took possession claiming title under deed. Dringman v. Keith, 93 Neb. 180, 139 N.W. 1044 (1913); Dringman v. Keith, 86 Neb. 476, 125 N.W. 1080 (1910).
Fraudulent deed recorded is not of itself sufficient to charge parties with notice. Forsyth v. Easterday, 63 Neb. 887, 89 N.W. 407 (1902); Gillespie v. Cooper, 36 Neb. 775, 55 N.W. 302 (1893), overruled in Jones v. Danforth, 71 Neb. 722, 99 N.W. 495 (1904).
4. Trusts
This section is the applicable statute of limitations with regard to the establishment of a constructive trust on personal property. Manker v. Manker, 263 Neb. 944, 644 N.W.2d 522 (2002).
The statute of limitations does not begin to run in case of a resulting trust until trustee clearly repudiates his trust, and the time it commences to run must be determined upon facts in each case. Jirka v. Prior, 196 Neb. 416, 243 N.W.2d 754 (1976).
Statute does not begin to run against an action to restore beneficial interests in land under resulting trust until trustee denies the interest of the beneficiaries. Windle v. Kelly, 135 Neb. 143, 280 N.W. 445 (1938).
Where trustee, through himself as president of bank, purchased with trust funds valueless notes from bank and concealed transactions, running of statute was tolled. First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Exchange Bank, 126 Neb. 856, 254 N.W. 569 (1934).
Statute runs in favor of trustee ex maleficio from time of discovery of fraud. Abbott v. Wagner, 108 Neb. 359, 188 N.W. 113 (1922).
5. Damages or injury
A claim for damages caused by a continuing tort can be maintained for injuries caused by conduct occurring within the statutory limitations period. When there are continuing or repeated wrongs that are capable of being terminated, a claim accrues every day the wrong continues or each time it is repeated, the result being that a plaintiff is only barred from recovering damages that were ascertainable prior to the statutory period preceding the lawsuit. Alston v. Hormel Foods Corp., 273 Neb. 422, 730 N.W.2d 376 (2007).
This statute of limitations applies to actions allegedly arising under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Bauers v. City of Lincoln, 245 Neb. 632, 514 N.W.2d 625 (1994).
Under this section, plaintiff had four years from date of damage to file product liability action. New product liability statute of limitations appears at section 25-224. Morris v. Chrysler Corp., 208 Neb. 341, 303 N.W.2d 500 (1981).
An action grounded in tort must be commenced within four years of the occurrence of the event giving rise to the cause of action. Grand Island School Dist. #2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603 (1979).
Where defendant, which was plaintiff's insurance carrier, had made no payment to plaintiff for damage caused by a third party, it had no duty to sue as subrogee, and its failure to do so before the statute of limitations ran did not make it liable. Schmer v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 194 Neb. 94, 230 N.W.2d 216 (1975).
An action for an injury hereunder accrues when the damage occurs and not when plaintiff discovers cause of the damage. Omaha Paper Stock Co., Inc. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc., 193 Neb. 848, 230 N.W.2d 87 (1975).
Recovery for loss of crops was limited to period of four years before action was brought. Wischmann v. Raikes, 168 Neb. 728, 97 N.W.2d 551 (1959).
Damages to growing crops from floodwaters are limited to period commencing four years before commencement of action. Wischmann v. Raikes, 167 Neb. 251, 92 N.W.2d 708 (1958).
Where intention to inflict injury is entirely lacking, action in tort may be brought within four years. Newman v. Christensen, 149 Neb. 471, 31 N.W.2d 417 (1948).
Right to damages for obstruction of a stream by an insufficient culvert or drain does not accrue when the structure is built but when the overflow actually results. Schmutte v. State, 147 Neb. 193, 22 N.W.2d 691 (1946).
Action for damages for alienation of affections was not barred by statute of limitations. Baltzly v. Gruenig, 127 Neb. 520, 256 N.W. 4 (1934).
In actions for tortious interference with a business relationship, the statute of limitations under this section begins to run when the injury actually occurs. Additionally, this section does not provide for a discovery rule for tortious interference. Under this section, a claim for damages based on intentional interference with a contractual relationship accrues when the subject contract is breached, regardless of when the defendant supposedly induced the breach. Hroch v. Farmland, 4 Neb. App. 709, 548 N.W.2d 367 (1996).
Husband's action for alienation of affection accrues when wife leaves home and severs relationship, and the limitations period is not extended by the fact that the husband does not give up on the possibility of renewal of relationship until later, and thus suffers continuing damages. Mattice v. Messer, 493 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1974).
In tort action for occupational disease, statute begins to run when employee acquires knowledge of compensable injury. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955).
Where buyer sued to recover on substitute arbitrator's award because grain delivered did not equal sample, but creditors for whose benefit debtor's grain was being sold refused to be bound by agent's unauthorized appointment of substitute, claim for damages in amended petition was not barred by statute of limitations as change in character of relief sought did not prevent original petition from tolling statute. Otoe County National Bank v. Delaney, 88 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1937).
Statute of limitations was not tolled by absence from state of alleged tort-feasor, a California resident who was involved in automobile accident within the state, if at all times following accident California resident could be sued in the state by virtue of nonresident motor vehicle statute. Gatliff v. Little Audrey's Transportation Co., Inc., 317 F.Supp. 1117 (D. Neb. 1970).
6. Miscellaneous
The statute of limitations for ordinary negligence does not begin to accrue until the plaintiff becomes an aggrieved party with a right to institute and maintain suit, which requires that none of the elements of the claim depend upon abstract questions or issues that might arise in a hypothetical or fictitious situation or setting and may never come to pass. Susman v. Kearney Towing & Repair Ctr., 310 Neb. 910, 970 N.W.2d 82 (2022).
In order to toll the statute of limitations, allegations of fraudulent concealment must be pleaded with particularity. Chafin v. Wisconsin Province Society of Jesus, 301 Neb. 94, 917 N.W.2d 821 (2018).
This section applies to counterclaims when read in conjunction with sections 25-201 and 25-217 and the rule that a counterclaim must be an existing, valid, and enforceable cause of action. However, whether a counterclaim is barred by this section is determined by the date the related petition was filed, rather than the date the counterclaim was filed. Becker v. Hobbs, 256 Neb. 432, 590 N.W.2d 360 (1999).
"Discovery," as used in this statute, means that an individual acquires knowledge of a fact which existed but was previously unknown to the discoverer. If a petition challenged under the statute of limitations facially shows that a cause of action is barred by the statute, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to avoid the bar of the statute and must prove those facts at trial; but if a petition does not disclose on its face that an action is barred by the statute of limitations, the defendant must plead and prove the statute as an affirmative defense. Broekemeier Ford v. Clatanoff, 240 Neb. 265, 481 N.W.2d 416 (1992).
The filing of a petition does not toll the running of this statute of limitations for the purpose of bringing subsequent actions on the same set of facts. Sluka v. Herman, 229 Neb. 200, 425 N.W.2d 891 (1988).
This statute provides the applicable statute of limitations for actions for mutual mistake. The statute of limitations begins to run when mutual mistake was discoverable by reasonable diligence. Newton v. Brown, 222 Neb. 605, 386 N.W.2d 424 (1986).
The point at which a statute of limitations commences to run must be determined from the facts of each case; a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the aggrieved party has the right to institute and maintain suit, even though such plaintiff may be ignorant of the existence of the cause of action. Mangan v. Landen, 219 Neb. 643, 365 N.W.2d 453 (1985).
Four-year general statute of limitations applies to employer liable as joint tort-feasor with employee killed in accident, even if plaintiff's claim against estate of employee was filed out of time and barred by two-year nonclaim statute. S.M.S. Trucking Co. v. Midland Vet, Inc., 186 Neb. 647, 185 N.W.2d 667 (1971).
This section is not applicable to misrepresentation as to nature and cause of patient's condition in action against physician. Stacey v. Pantano, 177 Neb. 694, 131 N.W.2d 163 (1964).
Where petition was amended to change cause of action from action on contract to action based on tort, statute of limitations continued to run until filing of amended petition. Blair v. Klein, 176 Neb. 245, 125 N.W.2d 669 (1964).
The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of the debtor, and may be waived. Gurske v. Strate, 165 Neb. 882, 87 N.W.2d 703 (1958).
Where answer pleaded defense of statute of limitations, instruction thereon was required. Harsche v. Czyz, 157 Neb. 699, 61 N.W.2d 265 (1953).
Limitation in surety bond, that any loss for which claim is made must be discovered during term of bond or within fifteen months after termination of surety's liability as to the employee involved is not void as attempting to shorten by contract the time within which action for fraud can be brought. Dunbar v. National Surety Corporation, 140 Neb. 833, 2 N.W.2d 116 (1942).
Under the United States Constitution, conferring on Congress power to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, the two-year statute of limitations in the bankruptcy act supersedes all statutes of limitations passed by the various states. Engebretson v. West, 133 Neb. 846, 277 N.W. 433 (1938).
Second amended petition, introducing new causes of action which are barred by statute of limitations, cannot be basis for recovery against defendant. Rule does not apply to allegations of original petition, filed before statute had run. Streight v. First Trust Co. of Omaha, 133 Neb. 340, 275 N.W. 278 (1937).
Actions which in substance and effect are actions for money had and received, in the absence of specific statute of limitations, must be brought within four years from receipt of the money. Torgeson v. Department of Trade and Commerce, 127 Neb. 49, 254 N.W. 740 (1934).
Bank receiver's suit to recover bank's assets used to repay deposit of bankers' conservation fund was barred by statute of limitations. Torgeson v. Department of Trade and Commerce, 127 Neb. 38, 254 N.W. 735 (1934).
Statute will not run against action by pledgor to recover collaterals until liability is determined or repudiation of trust by pledgee. Parker v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 118 Neb. 96, 223 N.W. 651 (1929).
Statute does not begin to run against action for money had and received, where suit is for recovery of payment on land, until contract is terminated. Thiele v. Carey, 85 Neb. 454, 123 N.W. 442 (1909).
Time of commencing action for support of child born out of wedlock stated. Denham v. Watson, 24 Neb. 779, 40 N.W. 308 (1888).
Amended pleading to identify intended defendant and to plead that intended defendant had constructive notice of lawsuit would not relate back to original complaint which was served on defendant's father who bore same name, for purposes of 4-year limitations period; name of defendant was same in both original and proposed amended complaint, and thus, there was nothing to amend, and summary judgment evidence indicated that intended defendant did not know about lawsuit before limitations period expired. Rudd v. Debora, 20 Neb. App. 850, 835 N.W.2d 765 (2013).
In the context of a professional relationship, a continuous relationship may toll the statute of limitations but requires that there be a continuity of the relationship and services for the same or a related subject matter after the alleged professional negligence. Anonymous v. St. John Lutheran Church, 14 Neb. App. 42, 703 N.W.2d 918 (2005).
Section 25-222 is a specific exception as to professional negligence from the normal four-year statute of limitations. Horn v. Burns & Roe, 536 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1976).
While a party is prevented from enforcing a legal right by some paramount authority, the statute of limitations ordinarily is not treated as running against the right. Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corporation, 145 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1944).
Tort claim in state court against estate of deceased was barred by statute of limitations, but a federal diversity action against representatives of the estate not barred for four years. Williams v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 428 F.Supp. 976 (D. Neb. 1977).
25-208.
Actions for libel, slander, malpractice, and recovery of tax.The following actions can only be brought within the periods stated in this section: Within one year, an action for libel or slander; and within two years, an action for malpractice which is not otherwise specifically limited by statute.
In the absence of any other shorter applicable statute of limitations, any action for the recovery of any excise or other tax which has been collected under any statute of the State of Nebraska and which has been finally adjudged to be unconstitutional shall be brought within one year after the final decision of the court declaring it to be unconstitutional. This section shall not apply to any action for the recovery of a property tax.
The changes made to this section by Laws 2000, LB 921, shall apply to causes of action accruing on and after July 13, 2000.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 13, p. 395; R.S.1913, § 7570; C.S.1922, § 8513; C.S.1929, § 20-208; Laws 1933, c. 42, § 1, p. 248; Laws 1937, c. 43, § 1, p. 187; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-208; R.S.1943, § 25-208;
Laws 1972, LB 1132, § 2; Laws 1991, LB 829, § 2;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 2.
Annotations
1. Libel and slander
2. Assault and battery
3. Malicious prosecution
4. Penalty or forfeiture
5. Malpractice
6. Miscellaneous
1. Libel and slander
Publication of slander occurs when the words are spoken to and understood by a third party to pertain to the individual slandered. The statute of limitations on slander under this section begins to run from publication and will not be tolled unless the slanderer wrongfully concealed a material fact necessary for the accrual of the cause of action. Mere ignorance concerning the alleged slanderer's identity will not toll the statute of limitations. Lathrop v. McBride, 209 Neb. 351, 307 N.W.2d 804 (1981).
The statute of limitations in a libel action commences to run upon publication of the defamatory matter upon which action is based. Patterson v. Renstrom, 188 Neb. 78, 195 N.W.2d 193 (1972).
Action for damages for wrongfully encumbering plaintiff's title to real estate is a slander of title action and barred in one year. Gentry v. State, 174 Neb. 515, 118 N.W.2d 643 (1962).
Action for libel must be commenced within one year of publication of defamatory matter. Tennyson v. Werthman, 167 Neb. 208, 92 N.W.2d 559 (1958).
Actions for slander of title must be brought within one year. Norton v. Kanouff, 165 Neb. 435, 86 N.W.2d 72 (1957).
Action for libel must be brought within one year. Reller v. Ankeny, 160 Neb. 47, 68 N.W.2d 686 (1955).
A cause of action for libel or slander accrues on the date of publication of the defamatory matter. Publication of an allegedly libelous statement occurs when it is communicated to someone other than the person defamed. Vergara v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 Neb. App. 1141, 510 N.W.2d 550 (1993).
2. Assault and battery
Action for a battery is founded upon an intentionally administered injury to the person. Newman v. Christensen, 149 Neb. 471, 31 N.W.2d 417 (1948).
Action by husband for damages for assault and battery committed upon wife is barred unless brought within one year after the cause of action accrued. Markel v. Glassmeyer, 137 Neb. 243, 288 N.W. 821 (1939).
Action of damages for assault and battery must be brought within one year. Borchert v. Bash, 97 Neb. 593, 150 N.W. 830 (1915).
3. Malicious prosecution
Statute does not begin to run in a case of malicious prosecution until the criminal case is dismissed, or the prosecution otherwise finally terminated. Hackler v. Miller, 79 Neb. 209, 114 N.W. 274 (1907).
4. Penalty or forfeiture
Plaintiffs' causes of action for refunds of taxes paid in years prior to decision determining illegality of tax were barred by statute of limitations. Wats Mktg. of America v. Boehm, 242 Neb. 252, 494 N.W.2d 527 (1993).
A statute that permits injured party to recover treble damages authorizes the collection of a penalty. Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960).
Action to recover amounts paid under Industrial Loan Act was not one to recover a penalty. Jourdon v. Commonwealth Co., 170 Neb. 919, 104 N.W.2d 681 (1960).
Action against stockholder of a corporation for failure of corporation to publish annually notice of existing indebtedness is penal in nature, and must be brought within one year after cause of action accrued. Hoffman v. Geiger, 134 Neb. 643, 279 N.W. 350 (1938), reversed on rehearing 135 Neb. 349, 281 N.W. 625 (1938).
Action against bank director for participating in or knowingly assenting to an excessive loan is not penal, and is not governed as to statute of limitations by this section. Department of Banking v. McMullen, 134 Neb. 338, 278 N.W. 551 (1938).
Liability of stockholder, under Article XII, section 4, Constitution of Nebraska, is not a penalty, and is not barred in one year under this section. Bourne v. Baer, 107 Neb. 255, 185 N.W. 408 (1921).
Action for statutory penalty is barred if not brought in one year from date of accrual. Sheibley v. Cooper, 79 Neb. 232, 112 N.W. 363 (1907), rehearing denied 79 Neb. 336, 113 N.W. 626 (1907).
5. Malpractice
A single professional relationship will not be separated into various parts for the purpose of applying to one part of that relationship the fraud period of limitations found in section 25-207 and to another part the malpractice period of limitations found in this section. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 244 Neb. 408, 507 N.W.2d 275 (1993).
When an issue of consent to medical treatment is raised, the controlling statute of limitations is that for malpractice actions. Jones v. Malloy, 226 Neb. 559, 412 N.W.2d 837 (1987).
A cause of action for medical malpractice does not accrue until the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the malpractice. Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 244 N.W.2d 201 (1976).
Special two-year statute of limitations controlled action against doctor based on erroneous blood typing by his employee. Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. 651, 240 N.W.2d 24 (1976).
In a malpractice action, the limitation does not begin to run until the patient discovers or with reasonable diligence could have discovered the injury, and a patient has used reasonable diligence where she fails to discover because of the surgeon's repeated assurances of recovery and recommendations for therapy to aid in recovery. Toman v. Creighton Memorial St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 191 Neb. 751, 217 N.W.2d 484 (1974).
In a malpractice action against a physician, the statute of limitations does not commence to run until act of malpractice with resulting injury was, or by the use of reasonable diligence could have been, discovered. Acker v. Sorensen, 183 Neb. 866, 165 N.W.2d 74 (1969).
Special statute as to malpractice was controlling over general statute of limitations applicable to actions based on fraud. Stacey v. Pantano, 177 Neb. 694, 131 N.W.2d 163 (1964).
A cause of action against a physician for failure to remove a foreign object left in the body of a patient does not accrue until the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the presence of the foreign object. Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962).
Action in a malpractice suit does not commence to run until the treatment ends. Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941).
6. Miscellaneous
The 1-year discovery exception provided for in this section only applies if the injured party did not know or could not reasonably have discovered the existence of the cause of action within the time period provided for in this section. The 1-year discovery exception provided for in section 25-222 does not apply in actions governed under this section if the injured party knew or could reasonably have discovered the cause of action within the time set forth in this section. Berntsen v. Coopers & Lybrand, 249 Neb. 904, 546 N.W.2d 310 (1996).
The discovery doctrine set out in section 25-222 permitting commencement of the action within 1 year from discovery, if discovery could not reasonably have occurred sooner, applies to the period of limitations set forth in this section. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 244 Neb. 408, 507 N.W.2d 275 (1993).
Action to recover amount paid by city on void contract was not barred under this section. Arthur v. Trindel, 168 Neb. 429, 96 N.W.2d 208 (1959).
Section 25-219 was applicable to federal civil rights claim of former guidance counselor in action against school district on allegations dismissal was due to his race and his exercise of First Amendment rights. Chambers v. Omaha Public School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976).
25-209.
Actions on official or judicial bonds.An action upon the official bond or undertaking of an executor, administrator, guardian, sheriff, or any other officer, or upon the bond or undertaking given in attachment, injunction, or in any case whatever required by statute can only be brought within ten years.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 14, p. 396; R.S.1913, § 7571; C.S.1922, § 8514; C.S.1929, § 20-209; R.S.1943, § 25-209.
Annotations
1. Official bonds
2. Miscellaneous
1. Official bonds
Action on county treasurer's bond was commenced within time permitted by this section. City of Bellevue v. Western Surety Co., 184 Neb. 678, 171 N.W.2d 772 (1969).
Bond of chairman of Board of Public Works is an official bond within meaning of this section. Neisius v. Henry, 143 Neb. 273, 9 N.W.2d 163 (1943).
In suit against city officer and surety on bond to recover excess salary paid, all amounts paid more than ten years prior to date of filing suit are barred. Neisius v. Henry, 142 Neb. 29, 5 N.W.2d 291 (1942).
Statute of limitations on action on official bond of clerk of district court is ten years. Thurston County v. Farley, 128 Neb. 756, 260 N.W. 397 (1935).
Actions on official bonds may be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. McLaughlin, 76 Neb. 310, 109 N.W. 390 (1906).
Action on official bond is not barred until expiration of ten years from time action accrues. Bantley v. Baker, 61 Neb. 92, 84 N.W. 603 (1900).
Action on official bond of county judge is barred in ten years after cause of action accrued. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Philpott, 56 Neb. 212, 76 N.W. 550 (1898).
County treasurers are within the general designation "any other officer," and actions upon their bonds are brought within the provisions of this section. Alexander v. Overton, 22 Neb. 227, 34 N.W. 629 (1887).
2. Miscellaneous
The statute of limitations on action on statutorily required grain dealer's bond is 10 years. Stock v. Meissner, 217 Neb. 56, 348 N.W.2d 426 (1984).
Where bond was not applicable on the date the plaintiff's cause of action accrued, this section was inapplicable. Stock v. Meissner, 209 Neb. 636, 309 N.W.2d 86 (1981).
The limitation does not begin to run on a guardian's bond until he has obtained approval of his final account and been discharged by probate court. Sherwood v. Merchants Mut. Bonding Co., 193 Neb. 262, 226 N.W.2d 761 (1975).
Where amended petition introduces new causes of action which are barred by statute of limitations, such new allegations cannot be the basis of a recovery, but this rule does not apply to allegations contained in the original petition which are repeated in the amended petition. Streight v. First Trust Co. of Omaha, 133 Neb. 340, 275 N.W. 278 (1937).
Action accrues on official bond of a county judge when he fails to pay to his successor in office, on the expiration of his term, any money in his possession due to an heir or other person, which has not been paid to the person entitled thereto. Ericsson v. Streitz, 132 Neb. 692, 273 N.W. 17 (1937).
Action on appeal bond is governed by this section and is not barred until after ten years. Crum v. Johnson, 3 Neb. Unof. 826, 92 N.W. 1054 (1902).
25-210.
Actions against sureties on guardian's bond.No action shall be maintained against the sureties in any bond given by a guardian unless it be commenced within four years from the time when the guardian shall have been discharged; Provided, if at the time of such discharge the person entitled to bring such action shall be out of the state, or under any legal disability to sue, the action may be commenced at any time within five years after the return of such person to the state, or after such disability shall be removed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 32, p. 185; R.S.1913, § 7572; C.S.1922, § 8515; C.S.1929, § 20-210; R.S.1943, § 25-210.
Annotations
The limitation herein does not begin to run until the guardian has obtained approval of his final account and been discharged by probate court. Sherwood v. Merchants Mut. Bonding Co., 193 Neb. 262, 226 N.W.2d 761 (1975).
As to sureties on guardian's bond, statute of limitations begins to run from date guardian was discharged and not from time when cause of action accrued upon final settlement. Medow v. Riggert, 132 Neb. 429, 272 N.W. 238 (1937).
Guardian is "discharged," within meaning of this section, when ward dies. Hughes v. Langdon, 111 Neb. 508, 196 N.W. 915 (1924).
Action on guardian's bond accrues to ward when amount is ascertained by county court on final settlement. Bisbee v. Gleason, 21 Neb. 534, 32 N.W. 578 (1887).
25-211.
Actions on contracts by reason of failure or want of consideration.Actions brought for damages growing out of the failure or want of consideration of contracts, express or implied, or for the recovery of money paid upon contracts, express or implied, the consideration of which has wholly or in part failed, shall be brought within four years.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 15, p. 396; R.S.1913, § 7573; C.S.1922, § 8516; C.S.1929, § 20-211; R.S.1943, § 25-211.
Annotations
Statute of limitations will commence to run against the obligation evidenced by a warrant not entitled to registration from the date of last payment upon it. Pollock v. Consolidated School District No. 65 of Perkins County, 138 Neb. 315, 293 N.W. 108 (1940).
Statute of limitations on implied obligation to repay money borrowed by issuance of void warrant, where payments have been made thereon, commences to run on date of last payment. Nebraska State Bank Liquidation Association v. Village of Burton, 134 Neb. 623, 279 N.W. 319 (1938).
Contract sued on herein is not barred when commenced within four years from time of death of the father. Macfarland v. Callahan, 102 Neb. 54, 165 N.W. 889 (1917).
Action to recover on an implied assumpsit is barred in four years. Markey v. School Dist. No. 18 of Sheridan County, 58 Neb. 479, 78 N.W. 932 (1899).
25-212.
Actions not specified.An action for relief not otherwise provided for in Chapter 25 can only be
brought within four years after the cause of action shall have accrued.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 16, p. 396; R.S.1913, § 7574; C.S.1922, § 8517; C.S.1929, § 20-212; R.S.1943, § 25-212;
Laws 2011, LB9, § 1.
Annotations
1. Accrual of cause of action
2. Specific actions included
3. Miscellaneous
1. Accrual of cause of action
Generally, a suit to declare a contract void, which if void was void at its inception, must be commenced within four years of the execution of the contract. Lake v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc., 219 Neb. 731, 365 N.W.2d 838 (1985).
The point at which a statute of limitations commences to run must be determined from the facts of each case; a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the aggrieved party has the right to institute and maintain suit, even though such plaintiff may be ignorant of the existence of the cause of action. Mangan v. Landen, 219 Neb. 643, 365 N.W.2d 453 (1985).
Where there is a continuous running account, statute of limitations commences to run from date of last item. Lewis v. Hiskey, 166 Neb. 402, 89 N.W.2d 132 (1958).
Where demand for the repayment of money paid has been made, the statute of limitations as to when the taxpayer may sue begins to run at the expiration of the ninety-day period in which to make the refund. Loup River Public Power Dist. v. County of Platte, 144 Neb. 600, 14 N.W.2d 210 (1944).
Action to recover from county amount paid for void tax sale certificate accrues when tax sale certificate has been declared void by court of competent jurisdiction, and action must be brought within four years thereafter. McDonald v. County of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 741, 4 N.W.2d 903 (1942).
Mandamus to compel performance of continuing duty by public officer is not barred by this section, even though performance of duty may have been compelled more than four years prior to bringing of a suit. State ex rel. Cashman v. Carmean, 138 Neb. 819, 295 N.W. 801 (1941).
Action on official bond of county judge accrues on expiration of his term, when he fails to pay to his successor money in his possession due to an heir or other person. Ericsson v. Streitz, 132 Neb. 692, 273 N.W. 17 (1937).
Limitations in action for alienation of affections begin to run when affections are alienated and husband abandons wife. Von Dorn v. Rubin, 104 Neb. 465, 177 N.W. 653 (1920).
Husband's action for alienation of affection accrues when wife leaves home and severs relationship, and the limitations period is not extended by the fact that the husband does not give up on the possibility of renewal of relationship until later, and thus suffers continuing damages. Mattice v. Messer, 493 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1974).
2. Specific actions included
Nonconsent of irrigation company to transfer of water right was barred by statute. Vonburg v. Farmers Irrigation District, 132 Neb. 12, 270 N.W. 835 (1937).
In civil action to recover fees withheld by clerk of district court, statute of limitations is four years. Thurston County v. Farley, 128 Neb. 756, 260 N.W. 397 (1935).
Action for damages for alienation of affections was not barred by statute of limitations. Baltzly v. Gruenig, 127 Neb. 520, 256 N.W. 4 (1934).
Section is applicable to civil actions only. Mercer v. City of Omaha, 76 Neb. 289, 107 N.W. 565 (1906).
Action to obtain a new trial in which a judgment was rendered on the ground of unavoidable casualty and misfortune may be brought within four years. Ritchey v. Seeley, 73 Neb. 164, 102 N.W. 256 (1905).
State demands are not barred. Streitz v. Hartman, 35 Neb. 406, 53 N.W. 215 (1892).
A proceeding by mandamus is barred by the statute of limitations at the expiration of four years from the time the right to the writ accrued. State ex rel. Gage County v. King, 34 Neb. 196, 51 N.W. 754 (1892); State ex rel. Chem. Nat. Bank v. School District No. 9 of Sherman County, 30 Neb. 520, 46 N.W. 613 (1890).
Suit against employer to enforce contract made in 1893 to deliver corporate stock was barred by this and other statutes of limitations, in view of lapse of time, etc. Reed v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 37 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1929).
3. Miscellaneous
The defense of the statute of limitations may not be raised by a judgment creditor against a mortgagee. Gurske v. Strate, 165 Neb. 882, 87 N.W.2d 703 (1958).
Court will not require payment of damages barred by statute of limitations, under maxim that he who comes into equity must do equity. Dawson County Irrigation Co. v. Stuart, 142 Neb. 428, 6 N.W.2d 602 (1942).
Actions for relief based on accident and mistake are analogous to actions based on fraud, and are covered by section 25-207. Sweley v. Fox, 135 Neb. 780, 284 N.W. 318 (1939).
Where amended petition introduces new causes of action which are barred by statute of limitations, such new allegations cannot be the basis of a recovery, but this rule does not apply to allegations contained in the original petition which are repeated in the amended petition. Streight v. First Trust Co. of Omaha, 133 Neb. 340, 275 N.W. 278 (1937).
Amendment of petition to change legal theory of action, introducing new cause of action long since barred by statute of limitations, is not allowable. Hensley v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 126 Neb. 579, 254 N.W. 426 (1934).
Intent of Legislature was to cover every form of action not otherwise provided for. Beall v. McMenemy, 63 Neb. 70, 88 N.W. 134 (1901).
Under former law, section 43-666, R.R.S.1943, is not sufficiently analogous to 20 U.S.C. section 1415 for its statute of limitation to apply to actions under that federal statute. However, the statute of limitations under either section 25-212 or 25-219, R.R.S.1943, appears to be more appropriate. Monahan v. State of Neb., 491 F.Supp. 1074 (D. Neb. 1980).
25-213.
Tolling of statutes of limitation; when.Except as provided in sections 76-288 to 76-298, if a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in Chapter 25, the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act, the State Contract Claims Act, the State Tort Claims Act, the State Miscellaneous Claims Act, or the Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act, except for a penalty or forfeiture, for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or for the foreclosure of mortgages thereon, is, at the time the cause of action accrued, within the age of twenty years, a person with a mental disorder, or imprisoned, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within the respective times limited by Chapter 25 after such disability is removed. For the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements, or hereditaments or for the foreclosure of mortgages thereon, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within twenty years from the accrual thereof but in no case longer than ten years after the termination of such disability. Absence from the state, death, or other disability shall not operate to extend the period within which actions in rem are to be commenced by and against a nonresident or his or her representative.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 17, p. 396; R.S.1913, § 7576; C.S.1922, § 8519; Laws 1925, c. 64, § 2, p. 221; C.S.1929, § 20-213; R.S.1943, § 25-213; Laws 1947, c. 243, § 12, p. 766;
Laws 1972, LB 1049, § 1; Laws 1974, LB 949, § 2; Laws 1984, LB 692, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 1177, § 5; Laws 1988, LB 864, § 5; Laws 2007, LB339, § 1; Laws 2019, LB680, § 10.
Cross References
Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act, see section 44-2855.
Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, see section 13-901.
State Contract Claims Act, see section 81-8,302.
State Miscellaneous Claims Act, see section 81-8,294.
State Tort Claims Act, see section 81-8,235.
Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act, see section 25-3501.
Annotations
1. Minors
2. Mental disabilities
3. Nonresidents
4. Miscellaneous
1. Minors
Under this section, a person is within the age of 20 years until he or she becomes 21 years old. Carruth v. State, 271 Neb. 433, 712 N.W.2d 575 (2006).
Subsection (2) of section 25-224 is not tolled by a person's status as a minor pursuant to this section. Budler v. General Motors Corp., 268 Neb. 998, 689 N.W.2d 847 (2004).
One is within the age of 20 for purposes of this section until he or she becomes 21 years old. Brown v. Kindred, 259 Neb. 95, 608 N.W.2d 577 (2000).
Mere fact of imprisonment does not toll the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action. Gordon v. Connell, 249 Neb. 769, 545 N.W.2d 722 (1996).
One is "within the age of twenty years" until he or she becomes 21 years old. Lawson v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Neb. 725, 408 N.W.2d 256 (1987).
Suspension of the statute of limitations in accordance with this section inures to the exclusive and personal benefit of the infant, and not to the benefit of the infant's parent. Macku v. Drackett Products Co., 216 Neb. 176, 343 N.W.2d 58 (1984).
Workmen's Compensation Act makes no exception in favor of minor dependents as to limitation for filing claims, and action brought by minors under this act are governed by its provisions and not by general statute of limitations. Ray v. Sanitary Garbage Co., 134 Neb. 178, 278 N.W. 139 (1938).
Statute is not tolled by minority of heirs where it commenced to run in lifetime of ancestor. McNeill v. Schumaker, 94 Neb. 544, 143 N.W. 805 (1913).
Minor may bring action to recover interest in real estate within ten years after arriving at majority. Albers v. Kozeluh, 68 Neb. 522, 94 N.W. 521 (1903), former judgment adhered to 68 Neb. 529, 97 N.W. 646 (1903).
Time for bringing of action by minor against county for defect in highway under special statute is not extended by this section. Swaney v. Gage County, 64 Neb. 627, 90 N.W. 542 (1902).
This section tolls the running of the time limitation under section 25-222 until an infant reaches the age of majority. Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 679 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1982).
2. Mental disabilities
Insanity means such condition of mental derangement which actually prevents the sufferer from understanding and protecting his or her legal rights. Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 817, 341 N.W.2d 326 (1983).
In the case of recovery of real estate this section gives an incompetent ten years after disability is removed to bring action. In re Estate of Montgomery, 133 Neb. 153, 274 N.W. 487 (1937).
Statute does not commence to run against the owner of real property confined in an asylum for the insane at the time of a tax lien foreclosure, and who continues to be mentally incompetent after his discharge from the hospital, until he has been sufficiently restored to his mental powers to be able to comprehend that he was owner of the property and able to take some action to protect his rights with reference thereto. Walter v. Union Real Estate Co., 107 Neb. 144, 185 N.W. 323 (1921).
Fact that statute tolls limitation period during insanity does not deny prosecution of action for insane person by guardian during period of insanity. Wirth v. Weigand, 85 Neb. 115, 122 N.W. 714 (1909).
A mental disorder within the meaning of this section is an incapacity which disqualifies one from acting for the protection of one's rights. Anonymous v. St. John Lutheran Church, 14 Neb. App. 42, 703 N.W.2d 918 (2005).
A person with a mental disorder is one who suffers from a condition of mental derangement which actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his or her legal rights or from instituting legal action. Anonymous v. St. John Lutheran Church, 14 Neb. App. 42, 703 N.W.2d 918 (2005).
A person with a mental disorder is one who suffers from a condition of mental derangement which actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his or her legal rights or from instituting legal action. Vergara v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 Neb. App. 1141, 510 N.W.2d 550 (1993).
3. Nonresidents
Absence from state will not extend time in which foreclosure of real estate mortgage may be brought against nonresident. Brainard v. Hall, 137 Neb. 491, 289 N.W. 845 (1940).
Absence from state does not operate to extend the period within which mechanic lien foreclosure shall be commenced. Pickens v. Polk, 42 Neb. 267, 60 N.W. 566 (1894).
Absence from state does not extend time for foreclosure of mortgage. Merriam v. Goodlett, 36 Neb. 384, 54 N.W. 686 (1893).
4. Miscellaneous
Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act including one-year notice of claim requirement and two-year limitation for bringing action held constitutional. Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 195 Neb. 703, 240 N.W.2d 339 (1976).
This section does not toll the statutes of limitations for the benefit of executors or administrators. Sherwood v. Merchants Mut. Bonding Co., 193 Neb. 262, 226 N.W.2d 761 (1975).
Statute runs against married woman during coverture. Watkins v. Adamson, 113 Neb. 715, 204 N.W. 816 (1925).
Courts of equity have inherent powers to refuse relief after undue and inexcusable delay, independent of statute of limitations. Hawley v. Von Lanken, 75 Neb. 597, 106 N.W. 456 (1906).
Suit to quiet title is action in rem, within this section. Lantry v. Parker, 37 Neb. 353, 55 N.W. 962 (1893).
25-214.
Actions against absconding or absent debtor.If a cause of action accrues against a person while he or she is out of the state or has absconded or concealed himself or herself, the period limited for the commencement of the action shall not begin to run (1) until he or she comes into the state or (2) while he or she is absconded or concealed. If the person departs from the state or absconds or conceals himself or herself after the cause of action accrues, the time of his or her absence or concealment shall not be computed as any part of the period within which the action must be brought.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 20, p. 396; R.S.1913, § 7577; C.S.1922, § 8520; C.S.1929, § 20-214; R.S.1943, § 25-214;
Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 8.
Annotations
1. Absent debtor
2. Absconding debtor
3. Miscellaneous
1. Absent debtor
The tolling statute does not suspend the statute of limitations when one is absent from the state but nonetheless remains amenable to the service of personal process. Dalition v. Langemeier, 246 Neb. 993, 524 N.W.2d 336 (1994).
Petition in action on domestic judgment which appeared to be barred was sufficient to plead facts regarding defendant's absence from state to toll statute as against general demurrer. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Axtell v. Merryman, 126 Neb. 684, 254 N.W. 428 (1934).
This section is inapplicable to action for death of plaintiff's intestate, where defendant had been absent from state for more than two years. Gengo v. Mardis, 103 Neb. 164, 170 N.W. 841 (1919).
Absence from state does not toll statute where it has been of such a character as to entitle defendant to benefit of statute of another state to which he has removed. Webster v. Davies, 44 Neb. 301, 62 N.W. 484 (1895).
Nonresidence will not prevent running of statute on action to quiet title to real estate. Lantry v. Parker, 37 Neb. 353, 55 N.W. 962 (1893).
Mere temporary absence does not suspend statute. Blodgett v. Utley, 4 Neb. 25 (1875).
Where a person resided in another state, but came to this state each business day where service could have been had on him, he is not absent from the state within the meaning of this section. Webster v. Citizens' Bank of Omaha, 2 Neb. Unof. 353, 96 N.W. 118 (1902).
Statute of limitations was not tolled by absence from state of alleged tort-feasor, a California resident, if at all times following accident California resident could be sued in the state by virtue of nonresident motor vehicle statute. Gatliff v. Little Audrey's Transportation Co., Inc., 317 F.Supp. 1117 (D. Neb. 1970).
2. Absconding debtor
Note showing on face that it is outlawed does not render petition demurrable, where plaintiff alleges failure to begin action within five years was due to absconding of defendant. Cummings v. Keating & Co., 103 Neb. 453, 172 N.W. 358 (1919).
Concealment or absconding must be such as prevents bringing of action in this state. Talcott v. Bennett, 49 Neb. 569, 68 N.W. 931 (1896).
3. Miscellaneous
This section was not applicable to an application for modification of alimony under section 42-365 because that section concerns not the commencement of an action, but, rather, upon what an order of modification operates. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 242 Neb. 687, 496 N.W.2d 507 (1993).
Where debtor comes into state openly and stays sufficient period to afford requisite time for service of summons, he has "come into the state" even though his coming was temporary. Fort Collins Nat. Bank v. Strachan, 102 Neb. 233, 166 N.W. 553 (1918).
Statute does not run in favor of a foreign corporation while service of summons cannot be had upon it in this state. Ball Engine Co. v. Bennett Co., 98 Neb. 290, 152 N.W. 550 (1915).
Temporary absences cannot be aggregated together to prolong statute. Hedges v. Roach, 16 Neb. 673, 21 N.W. 404 (1884).
Debtor must reside for full statutory time within state before action is barred. Edgerton v. Wachter, 9 Neb. 500, 4 N.W. 85 (1880).
25-215.
Repealed. Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 47.
25-216.
Part payment; acknowledgment of debt; effect upon accrual.In any cause founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall have been voluntarily paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same shall have been made in writing, an action may be brought in such case within the period prescribed for the same, after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; Provided, that the provisions of this section shall not be applicable to real estate mortgages which have become barred under the provisions of section 25-202 as against subsequent encumbrancers and purchasers for value.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 22, p. 397; R.S.1913, § 7579; C.S.1922, § 8522; C.S.1929, § 20-216; Laws 1941, c. 35, § 2, p. 146; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-216; R.S.1943, § 25-216.
Annotations
1. Part payment
2. Acknowledgment of debt
3. Miscellaneous
1. Part payment
Part payment of a debt does not have the effect of tolling the statute of limitations, unless payment is made under circumstances which justify the inference that the debtor recognizes the whole debt as an existing liability. T.S. McShane Co., Inc. v. Dominion Constr. Co., 203 Neb. 318, 278 N.W.2d 596 (1979).
Where there was no proof of actual payment, endorsement of a payment placed on note by claimant's secretary did not operate to toll statute. In re Estate of Anderson, 148 Neb. 436, 27 N.W.2d 632 (1947).
Under oral contract of hire, superseded by written contract, voluntary part payment of salary will operate to toll statute of limitations. Price v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 139 Neb. 787, 298 N.W. 746 (1941).
Where, after death of maker of note, a bank applies a balance in checking account to the credit of the maker as a payment upon the note, the payment thus made is not voluntary and will not toll the running of the statute. In re McEachen's Estate, 139 Neb. 250, 297 N.W. 153 (1941).
Partial payment of principal or interest on promissory note by one joint maker with knowledge and consent of the other, out of funds in which they are jointly interested, tolls statute as to both. Kienke v. Hudson, 126 Neb. 551, 253 N.W. 687 (1934).
Running of statute of limitations on a contract obligation will be arrested by any voluntary partial payment thereon, made or authorized by debtor. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Steele, 125 Neb. 7, 248 N.W. 648 (1933).
Payment on a note in bar of the statute must be considered as of the time of actual payment, rather than as of the date of the endorsement thereof on the note. In re Estate of Zehner, 124 Neb. 426, 246 N.W. 863 (1933).
Part payment of debt or interest thereon tolls statute on mortgage securing debt. Bliss v. Redding, 121 Neb. 69, 236 N.W. 181 (1931).
Voluntary part payment will toll statute of limitations, or will revive debt, if same is barred. Blair v. Willman Estate, 105 Neb. 735, 181 N.W. 615 (1921).
Payment of interest on note by principal without authority, knowledge or consent of surety, will not stop running of statute of limitations as to surety. Dwire v. Gentry, 95 Neb. 150, 145 N.W. 350 (1914).
Part payment of a debt may be made in any property agreed upon by the parties. Brockman v. Ostdiek, 79 Neb. 843, 113 N.W. 529 (1907).
Part payment on debt secured by mortgage tolls statute limiting time within which foreclosure may be brought. McLaughlin v. Senne, 78 Neb. 631, 111 N.W. 377 (1907).
Payment of dividend on stock held as collateral, applied on note, tolls statute. Bosler v. McShane, 78 Neb. 91, 113 N.W. 998 (1907).
Part payment operates to revive a contract debt of its own vigor and not as evidence of an acknowledgment or new promise. Ebersole v. Omaha National Bank, 71 Neb. 778, 99 N.W. 664 (1904).
Payment of interest on note tolls statute. Teegarden v. Burton, 62 Neb. 639, 87 N.W. 337 (1901).
Payment made on a debtor's note by the sale of his property on execution, or other legal process, is not such part payment within the meaning of this section. Moffitt v. Carr, 48 Neb. 403, 67 N.W. 150 (1896).
Payment of dividend by the assignee of an insolvent debtor will not operate to toll the statute. Whitney, Clark & Co. v. Chambers, 17 Neb. 90, 22 N.W. 229 (1885).
The receipt and endorsement on a note by the holder of money realized from a collateral left for that purpose will remove the bar of the statute. Sornberger v. Lee, 14 Neb. 193, 15 N.W. 345 (1883).
Payment made by one of the joint promisors of a partnership after dissolution of the partnership and without knowledge of other promisor tolls the statute only as to one actually paying. Mayberry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368 (1877).
Payment to remove bar of statute must be voluntary and not obtained by subterfuge. Kyger v. Ryley, 2 Neb. 20 (1873).
Payment on specific account cannot toll statute on another account. In re Automatic Equipment Mfg. Co., 103 F.Supp. 427 (D. Neb. 1952).
2. Acknowledgment of debt
A mere reference to a promissory note, although consistent with its existing validity and implying no disposition to question its binding obligation, or a suggestion of some action in reference to it, is not such an acknowledgment as contemplated by the statute. Kotas v. Sorensen, 216 Neb. 648, 345 N.W.2d 1 (1984).
An acknowledgment of an executor or administrator does not bind him as a party in his personal capacity. Degmetich v. Beranek, 188 Neb. 659, 199 N.W.2d 8 (1972).
Voluntary payment is one that was intentionally and consciously made and accepted. Beacom v. Daley, 164 Neb. 120, 81 N.W.2d 907 (1957).
Execution and delivery of real estate mortgage was an acknowledgment in writing of note. Alexanderson v. Wessman, 158 Neb. 614, 64 N.W.2d 306 (1954).
A promise to pay a debt or other existing liability in a cause founded on a written contract, to prevent the running of the statute of limitations, must be in writing. Meyer v. Linch, 145 Neb. 1, 15 N.W.2d 317 (1944).
Oral promise to pay will not toll running of statute on mortgage foreclosure. Brainard v. Hall, 137 Neb. 491, 289 N.W. 845 (1940).
As against mortgagor, written extension agreement tolls the running of statute, even though not recorded. Hadley v. Corey, 137 Neb. 204, 288 N.W. 826 (1939).
An account stated creates a new cause of action, and written acknowledgment of original items of indebtedness is not required. In re Estate of Black, 125 Neb. 75, 249 N.W. 84 (1933).
To remove bar of statute, debtor must unqualifiedly acknowledge an existing liability. France v. Ruby, 93 Neb. 214, 140 N.W. 175 (1913); Nelson v. Becker, 32 Neb. 99, 48 N.W. 962 (1891).
A warrant issued by the proper authorities of a city in consideration of a valid indebtedness against it is a written acknowledgment of such indebtedness within the meaning of this section. Abrahams v. City of Omaha, 80 Neb. 271, 114 N.W. 161 (1907).
Acknowledgment of indebtedness sufficient to toll statute should be made to creditor or some one authorized to represent him. Wallber v. Caldwell, 79 Neb. 418, 112 N.W. 584 (1907).
A letter in which surety stated that he "will not longer be held good for the note" in case it be not promptly collected is sufficient acknowledgment within the meaning of this section. Harms v. Freytag, 59 Neb. 359, 80 N.W. 1039 (1899).
Execution of a deed, if intended as a mortgage only, was not acknowledgment in writing of an existing liability, debt or claim within the provisions of this section. Ashby v. Washburn & Co., 23 Neb. 571, 37 N.W. 267 (1888).
The unilateral crediting of defendant's debt without defendant's consent or knowledge was not a voluntary acknowledgment of the debt sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Hejco, Inc. v. Arnold, 1 Neb. App. 44, 487 N.W.2d 573 (1992).
3. Miscellaneous
A judgment is not a contract for purposes of the tolling provision of this section. Nelssen v. Ritchie, 304 Neb.
346, 934 N.W.2d 377 (2019).
The mere entry of credit by a creditor without consent of his debtor is without effect upon the statute of limitations and the fact that the debtor knows of an unauthorized entry of credit and makes no objection thereto is not alone sufficient to constitute a ratification of credit so as to toll the statute of limitations. T.S. McShane Co., Inc. v. Dominion Constr. Co., 203 Neb. 318, 278 N.W.2d 596 (1979).
This section applies to actions founded on contract and has no application to actions founded on a tort liability. Hollenbeck v. Guardian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 144 Neb. 684, 14 N.W.2d 330 (1944).
Oral request to defer settlement under indemnity agreement did not operate to toll running of statute of limitations. Lyhane v. Durtschi, 144 Neb. 256, 13 N.W.2d 130 (1944).
A waiver of "all notice of any nature whatsoever" in the suretyship agreement does not operate to supply the surety's consent and authority to the making of partial payments in the future. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Smith, 142 Neb. 529, 9 N.W.2d 286 (1943), affirming 142 Neb. 527, 7 N.W.2d 80 (1942).
In determining period of limitation in action to foreclose real estate mortgage given as security for note, this section and section 25-202 should be construed together. Steeves v. Nispel, 132 Neb. 597, 273 N.W. 50 (1937).
Oral agreement to compensate one for past services, not performed as gratuity and not barred by statute, as well as for future services, out of promisor's estate by testamentary provision, is an independent contract to which statute requiring new promise to be in writing does not apply, where promisee performs agreement. Weideman v. Peterson's Estate, 129 Neb. 74, 261 N.W. 150 (1935).
25-217.
Action; commencement; defendant not properly served; effect.(1) An action is commenced on the day the complaint is filed with the court.
(2) Each defendant in the action must be properly served within one hundred eighty days of the commencement of the action. If the action is stayed or enjoined during the one-hundred-eighty-day period, then any defendant who was not properly served before the action was stayed or enjoined must be properly served within ninety days after the stay or injunction is terminated or modified so as to allow the action to proceed.
(3) If any defendant is not properly served within the time specified by subsection (2) of this section then the action against that defendant is dismissed by operation of law. The dismissal is without prejudice and becomes effective on the day after the time for service expires.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 19, p. 396; R.S.1913, § 7580; C.S.1922, § 8523; C.S.1929, § 20-217; R.S.1943, § 25-217;
Laws 1979, LB 510, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 21; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 5; Laws 2019, LB308, § 1.
Cross References
For commencement of action, see section 25-501.
Annotations
1. Issuance and service
2. Commencement of action
3. Amendment
4. Dismissal by operation of law
5. Miscellaneous
1. Issuance and service
In the case of substitute service by publication under section 25-519, service is not "made" until the third publication, and prior to the third publication, a defendant is "not served" under this section. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 268 Neb. 439, 684 N.W.2d 14 (2004).
Where service by publication has been approved, a defendant is not served within 6 months from the date the petition was filed under this section unless the third publication under section 25-519 has occurred within 6 months from the date the petition was filed. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 268 Neb. 439, 684 N.W.2d 14 (2004).
In Nebraska, a defendant must be served within 6 months from the date the complaint was filed, regardless of whether the plaintiff falsely believed he had served the correct defendant. Rudd v. Debora, 20 Neb. App. 850, 835 N.W.2d 765 (2013).
This section does not allow Nebraska courts to extend the time for service of process, even in a case in which the wrong defendant was served within the 6‑month grace period after filing a petition, because it is a self‑executing statute which deprives a lower court of jurisdiction to take any further action in the case once the 6 months has run. Smeal v. Olson, 10 Neb. App. 702, 636 N.W.2d 636 (2001).
Service of process not proper and regular, and was therefore quashed. Stoehr v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 429 F.Supp. 763 (D. Neb. 1977).
2. Commencement of action
For purposes of determining whether an action is time barred, an action is commenced on the date the petition is filed. Kocsis v. Harrison, 249 Neb. 274, 543 N.W.2d 164 (1996).
One's notice and demand for payment from a dissolved corporation does not constitute commencement of an "action" or "proceeding" as contemplated by section 21-20,104. Under the provisions of this section, an action is commenced on the date the petition is filed with the court. Licht v. Association Servs., Inc., 236 Neb. 616, 463 N.W.2d 566 (1990).
Criterion of commencement of action for limitation purposes is date summons served on defendant. Schmer v. Gilleland, 185 Neb. 54, 173 N.W.2d 391 (1970).
Filing without issuance of a summons is not commencement of an action. Norris P.P. Dist. v. State ex rel. Jones, 183 Neb. 489, 161 N.W.2d 869 (1968).
An action is commenced at the date of the summons which is served upon the defendant. Gorgen v. County of Nemaha, 174 Neb. 588, 118 N.W.2d 758 (1962).
As to defendant, action is deemed commenced at date of summons which is served on him. Ramirez v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 116 Neb. 740, 219 N.W. 1 (1928).
Action is begun when petition is filed and summons issued thereon. Mosher v. Huwaldt, 86 Neb. 686, 126 N.W. 143 (1910).
Action is not deemed commenced at date of issuance of summons, unless same is served. Reliance Trust Co. v. Atherton, 67 Neb. 305, 93 N.W. 150 (1903), rehearing denied 67 Neb. 309, 96 N.W. 218 (1903).
Action is commenced at the date of the summons which is served upon the defendant. Calkins v. Miller, 55 Neb. 601, 75 N.W. 1108 (1898); Burlingim v. Cooper, 36 Neb. 73, 53 N.W. 1025 (1893).
Issuance of summons against one, not a necessary party to suit, to foreclose mechanic's lien is not commencement of suit against nonresident. Pickens v. Polk, 42 Neb. 267, 60 N.W. 566 (1894).
In action filed in federal court by Nebraska resident against California resident, Nebraska rule that action is deemed commenced at date of summons which is served is applicable. Gatliff v. Little Audrey's Transportation Co., Inc., 317 F.Supp. 1117 (D. Neb. 1970).
3. Amendment
For the purpose of applying the relation-back doctrine to a defendant named for the first time in an amended petition, the period during which the new defendant must be shown to have had the requisite knowledge of the suit includes the statutory period prescribed for the filing of the original petition plus the additional 6-month period in which summons could be served pursuant to this section. Smeal v. Olson, 263 Neb. 900, 644 N.W.2d 550 (2002).
Where original action was timely instituted, amended petition filed after running of statute of limitations, declaring on same cause of action, is not barred. Kennedy v. Potts, 128 Neb. 213, 258 N.W. 471 (1935).
Summons on appeal from compensation award may be amended by district court to correct date of return, notwithstanding objections to jurisdiction. Keil v. Farmers' Irr. Dist., 119 Neb. 503, 229 N.W. 898 (1930).
4. Dismissal by operation of law
Nothing in this section states that the action is dismissed against all the defendants or that the action stands dismissed as a whole. Davis v. Moats, 308 Neb. 757, 956 N.W.2d 682 (2021).
This section is self-executing. If a defendant who is named in the action is not served with summons and a copy of the complaint within 6 months from the date the complaint is filed, the action is dismissed by operation of law, even if a full trial has been held on the merits. Davis v. Choctaw Constr., 280 Neb. 714, 789 N.W.2d 698 (2010).
Pursuant to this section, an action is dismissed by operation of law as to any defendant who is named and who is not served with process within 6 months after the complaint is filed. Reid v. Evans, 273 Neb. 714, 733 N.W.2d 186 (2007).
The language of this section providing for dismissal of unserved petitions is self-executing and mandatory. After dismissal of an action by operation of law pursuant to this section, there is no longer an action pending and the district court has no jurisdiction to make further orders except to formalize the dismissal. If orders are made following a dismissal by operation of law under this section, they are a nullity, as are subsequent pleadings. Kovar v. Habrock, 261 Neb. 337, 622 N.W.2d 688 (2001).
The language of this section providing for dismissal of unserved petitions is self-executing and mandatory. A defendant's voluntary appearance does not waive the operation of this section. After dismissal of an action by operation of this section, a trial court has no jurisdiction to make orders thereafter, except to formalize the dismissal. Vopalka v. Abraham, 260 Neb. 737, 619 N.W.2d 594 (2000).
An action is dismissed by operation of law, without any action by either the defendant or the court, as to any defendant who is named in the action and not served with process within 6 months after the complaint is filed. Rudd v. Debora, 20 Neb. App. 850, 835 N.W.2d 765 (2013).
This section, requiring that complaint be dismissed if not served on defendant within 6 months of filing, was self-executing and mandatory, and did not authorize trial court to extend time for filing service of summons and complaint on intended defendant after 6-month deadline expired based on injured plaintiff's having erroneously served summons and complaint on intended defendant's father, who bore same name as defendant. Rudd v. Debora, 20 Neb. App. 850, 835 N.W.2d 765 (2013).
An action stood dismissed by operation of law upon the passing of 6 months after the filing of the petition, where the defendants were not served process and their voluntary appearances were entered more than 6 months after the date the petition was filed. Vopalka v. Abraham, 9 Neb. App. 285, 610 N.W.2d 433 (2000).
The phrase "shall stand dismissed" means that an action is dismissed if 6 months from the filing of the petition passes without service upon the defendant, without the need for initiating action by the defendant, and without the need for a formal entry of an order of dismissal by the trial court. The dismissal mandated by this section is self-executing. When a lawsuit is dismissed by operation of law for lack of service of process within 6 months of filing, the trial court has no jurisdiction to make orders thereafter and if made, they are a nullity, as are subsequent pleadings. Cotton v. Fruge, 8 Neb. App. 484, 596 N.W.2d 32 (1999).
The language "shall stand dismissed" is mandatory and self-executing, which means that an action may be dismissed without the need for initiating action, such as a motion by the defendant, and without the need for a formal entry of an order of dismissal by the trial court. Such dismissals occur by operation of law. McDaneld v. Fischer, 8 Neb. App. 160, 589 N.W.2d 172 (1999).
5. Miscellaneous
The service and automatic dismissal provisions of this section do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings. Childs v. Frakes, 312 Neb. 925, 981 N.W.2d 598 (2022).
"Appearance of Counsel" filed by the defendant's attorneys was not a voluntary appearance which waived service of the complaint because it did not request general relief from the court on an issue other than sufficiency of service or process or personal jurisdiction. Stone Land & Livestock Co. v. HBE, 309 Neb. 970, 962 N.W.2d 903 (2021).
The provisions of this section requiring service of process are not applicable to condemnation actions. Wooden v. County of Douglas, 275 Neb. 971, 751 N.W.2d 151 (2008).
The effect of a dismissal without prejudice is the same as if the case had been dismissed pursuant to this section, meaning that another petition may be filed against the same parties upon the same facts as long as it is filed within the applicable statute of limitations. Dworak v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 269 Neb. 386, 693 N.W.2d 522 (2005).
The limitation statutes found within Chapter 25, article 2, apply to counterclaims, and pursuant to this section, whether a counterclaim is barred is determined by the date the related petition was filed, rather than the date the counterclaim was filed. Becker v. Hobbs, 256 Neb. 432, 590 N.W.2d 360 (1999).
Where there is no voluntary appearance and summons is not served, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over a party. Henderson v. Department of Corr. Servs., 256 Neb. 314, 589 N.W.2d 520 (1999).
Excluding September 5, 1969, the last day on which work was done, the last day of the four-year period of limitations was September 5, 1973. George P. Rose Sodding & Grading Co. v. Dennis, 195 Neb. 221, 237 N.W.2d 418 (1976).
If record on appeal does not disclose date when action was commenced, Supreme Court will not take judicial notice thereof. Newberg v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 120 Neb. 171, 231 N.W. 766 (1930).
In absence of service of summons, date of voluntary appearance is the date the action is deemed commenced. Hotchkiss v. Aukerman, 65 Neb. 177, 90 N.W. 949 (1902).
Summons must be issued before bar of statute of limitations is complete. Ballard v. Thompson, 40 Neb. 529, 58 N.W. 1133 (1894).
Summons must be issued before bar of statute is complete, although it may be served afterward. Omaha Loan & Trust Co. v. Ayer, 38 Neb. 891, 57 N.W. 567 (1894).
Six months after the date a complaint is filed, the action is dismissed, without prejudice, as to any defendant not served, without predicate action by the trial court. If service is effected after this date, such service does not negate the dismissal. Old Home Enterprise v. Fleming, 20 Neb. App. 705, 831 N.W.2d 46 (2013).
25-218.
Claims by and against the state; when barred.Every claim and demand against the state shall be forever barred unless action is brought thereon within two years after the claim arose. Every claim and demand on behalf of the state, except for revenue, or upon official bonds, or for loans or money belonging to the school funds, or loans of school or other trust funds, or to lands or interest in lands thereto belonging, shall be barred by the same lapse of time as is provided by the law in case of like demands between private parties. This section shall not apply to any claim or demand against the state regarding property taxes.
Source:Laws 1877, § 16, p. 24; Laws 1881, c. 32, § 1, p. 211; R.S.1913, § 7581; C.S.1922, § 8524; C.S.1929, § 20-218; R.S.1943, § 25-218; Laws 1991, LB 829, § 3.
Annotations
The time limitations provided for in section 25-206 and this section do not infringe upon the Department of Labor's ability to collect an overpayment by setoff under section 48-665. McCoy v. Albin, 298 Neb. 297, 903 N.W.2d 902 (2017).
Inverse condemnation actions against the State must be commenced 2 years from the time of taking or damaging. Hike v. State, 297 Neb. 212, 899 N.W.2d 614 (2017).
Section 25-202 is a general statute of limitations that must yield to the more specific limitation provided in this section regarding inverse condemnation actions brought against the State. Hike v. State, 297 Neb. 212, 899 N.W.2d 614 (2017).
The state may raise the bar of the statute of limitations by a motion to dismiss filed with the administrative agency charged with determining the state's liability for payment on a contract claim. L.J. Vontz Constr. Co. v. Department of Roads, 232 Neb. 241, 440 N.W.2d 664 (1989).
This section applies to actions for money damage but not to actions for injunctive relief. Czarnick v. Loup River P.P. Dist., 190 Neb. 521, 209 N.W.2d 595 (1973).
Recovery by county for maintenance of insane patient in state hospital is not a claim for revenue. County of Adams v. Ernst, 158 Neb. 15, 62 N.W.2d 110 (1954).
Suit against state for taking or damaging private property for public use must be commenced two years from the time of taking or damaging. Bordy v. State, 142 Neb. 714, 7 N.W.2d 632 (1943).
All parties whose rights would be affected by modification or reversal of judgment must be made parties on appeal to Supreme Court. Donisthorpe v. Vavra, 134 Neb. 157, 278 N.W. 151 (1938).
Statute does not apply to action by state to recover revenue from county. Torgeson v. Department of Trade and Commerce, 127 Neb. 49, 254 N.W. 740 (1934).
Money levied and collected by county authorities to cover support of insane patients in state hospital, although transferred to county general fund, may be recovered in action by the state, without filing claim; statute of limitations is not applicable. State v. Stanton County, 100 Neb. 747, 161 N.W. 264 (1917).
25-219.
Actions upon liability created by federal statute.All actions upon a liability created by a federal statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty, for which actions no period of limitations is provided in such statute shall be commenced within three years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.
Source:Laws 1943, c. 49, § 1, p. 200; R.S.1943, § 25-219.
Annotations
Claim for reimbursement from estate of recipient of old age assistance did not accrue until death of recipient. Boone County Old Age Assistance Board v. Myhre, 149 Neb. 669, 32 N.W.2d 262 (1948).
This section was applicable to federal civil rights claim of former guidance counselor in action against school district on allegations dismissal was due to his race and his exercise of First Amendment rights. Chambers v. Omaha Public School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976).
Summons issued before time allowed by statute of limitations has expired will give court jurisdiction even though served after time has expired. Sandobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1970).
Under former law, section 43-666, R.R.S.1943, is not sufficiently analogous to 20 U.S.C. section 1415 for its statute of limitation to apply to actions under that federal statute. However, the statute of limitations under either section 25-212 or 25-219, R.R.S.1943, appears to be more appropriate. Monahan v. State of Neb., 491 F.Supp. 1074 (D. Neb. 1980).
The statute of limitation for commencement of suits under the federal civil rights act, which guarantees equal rights under the law, is the three-year statute of limitation set by this section. Metcalf v. Omaha Steel Casting Co., 476 F.Supp. 870 (D. Neb. 1979).
25-220.
Repealed. Laws 1959, c. 264, § 1.
25-221.
Statute of limitations; trial procedure.In any action in which it is claimed by one or more of the defendants that the action is barred by the statute of limitations any party may move that the issue raised by the statute of limitations be tried separately and determined before any other issues in the case. Issues of fact raised by the statute of limitations shall be tried before a jury unless trial by jury is waived by all parties. Issues of law raised by the statute of limitations shall be determined by the court without a jury. If the issue raised by the statute of limitations is determined by the jury or the court in favor of the plaintiff the remaining issues shall then be tried. If the issue raised by the statute of limitations is determined by the jury or the court in favor of the defendant the action or actions barred by the statute of limitations shall be dismissed.
Annotations
The Legislature has the right to decide the terms under which it will waive its sovereign and governmental immunity for tort actions against the State or its political subdivisions. Because a jury trial is not one of the terms of the State’s waiver of governmental immunity under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, a party is not entitled to a jury trial on its claim that a defendant is not a political subdivision employee, even if that fact determines whether the statute of limitations on a plaintiff’s claim has expired. Jacobson v. Shresta, 288 Neb. 615, 849 N.W.2d 515 (2014).
The plain language of this section states that a jury trial on the statute of limitations issue is required only when issues of fact are raised; issues of law are to be determined by the court without a jury. If there are only conclusions of law asserted on the statute of limitations issue, a separate hearing to address the statute of limitations issue is not required under this section. Blankenau v. Landess, 261 Neb. 906, 626 N.W.2d 588 (2001).
This section provides for preliminary rulings by the court on statute of limitations questions. Gillam v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 241 Neb. 414, 489 N.W.2d 289 (1992).
The special bifurcation of a trial pursuant to this section does not create a separate judgment when the trial court determines the action is not barred by the statute of limitations. Interlocutory orders may be modified at subsequent terms provided the court still has not rendered a final decision in matters still pending. City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989).
An order denying a plea of the statute of limitations after a separate hearing on that issue is not appealable. Wulf v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 188 Neb. 258, 196 N.W.2d 164 (1972).
Where claim that action is barred by the statute of limitations is raised by motion to try that issue separately, the court shall determine it before trying other issues in the case. Mattice v. Messer, 493 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1974).
25-222.
Actions on professional negligence.Any action to recover damages based on alleged professional negligence or upon alleged breach of warranty in rendering or failure to render professional services shall be commenced within two years next after the alleged act or omission in rendering or failure to render professional services providing the basis for such action; Provided, if the cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such two-year period, then the action may be commenced within one year from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier; and provided further, that in no event may any action be commenced to recover damages for professional negligence or breach of warranty in rendering or failure to render professional services more than ten years after the date of rendering or failure to render such professional service which provides the basis for the cause of action.
Annotations
1. Constitutionality
2. Computation of time
3. Continuous treatment or relationship
4. Applicability
5. Miscellaneous
1. Constitutionality
Defining substantive rights is a valid exercise of legislative power, and thus, this section does not violate the open courts provision of the Nebraska Constitution. Schendt v. Dewey, 246 Neb. 573, 520 N.W.2d 541 (1994).
The ten-year period of repose contained in this section is constitutional. Williams v. Kingery Constr. Co., 225 Neb. 235, 404 N.W.2d 32 (1987); Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982).
No constitutional objection lies where seven years intervenes between enactment of period of limitations and bringing of action. Cedars Corp. v. Swoboda, 210 Neb. 180, 313 N.W.2d 276 (1981).
2. Computation of time
The discovery exception of this section is a tolling provision which permits the filing of an action after the 2-year statute of limitations only in those circumstances where the cause of action was not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered within that period. Carruth v. State, 271 Neb. 433, 712 N.W.2d 575 (2006).
Nebraska follows the occurrence rule, under which a professional negligence suit accrues at the time the act or omission in rendering or failing to render professional services takes place. In a professional negligence case, "discovery of the act or omission" occurs when the party knows of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the knowledge of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action. In a cause of action for professional negligence, legal injury is the wrongful act or omission which causes the loss; it is not damage, which is the loss resulting from the misconduct. A lack of knowledge of the extent of damages is not the equivalent of a lack of discovery of a cause of action as set out in this section. Gering - Ft. Laramie Irr. Dist. v. Baker, 259 Neb. 840, 612 N.W.2d 897 (2000).
The discovery exception permits an action to be commenced within 1 year from discovery where the cause of action could not have reasonably been discovered during the 2-year limitation period of this section. If facts are discovered that constitute the basis of a cause of action within 2 years from the alleged act of negligence, the discovery exception to the statute of limitations is inapplicable. Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 256 Neb. 442, 590 N.W.2d 380 (1999).
If the facts constituting a malpractice claim are not and could not be reasonably discovered within the 2-year limitation period, the claim may be brought within 1 year from the date of discovery or within 1 year from the date the plaintiff acquires facts that would lead to such discovery. World Radio Labs. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 251 Neb. 261, 557 N.W.2d 1 (1996).
The 1-year discovery exception provided for in this section tolls the statute of limitations, permitting an injured party to bring an action beyond the time limitation for bringing the action in those cases in which the injured party did not discover and could not reasonably have discovered the existence of the cause of action within the applicable statute of limitations. The 1-year discovery exception provided for in this section does not apply in actions governed under section 25-208 if the injured party knew or could reasonably have discovered the cause of action within the time set forth in section 25-208. In actions governed under section 25-208, the 1-year discovery exception provided for in that section only applies if the injured party did not know or could not reasonably have discovered the existence of the cause of action within the time period provided for in that section. Berntsen v. Coopers & Lybrand, 249 Neb. 904, 546 N.W.2d 310 (1996).
Under discovery principle, cause of action for professional negligence accrues and 1-year discovery provision begins to run when there has been discovery of facts constituting basis of cause of action or existence of facts sufficient to put person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to discovery; it is not necessary that plaintiff have knowledge of exact nature or source of problem, but only knowledge that problem existed. If professional malpractice action is not to be considered time barred, plaintiff must either file within 2 years of alleged act or omission or show that its action falls within exceptions of this section as to its discovery of defendant's alleged negligence. Zion Wheel Baptist Church v. Herzog, 249 Neb. 352, 543 N.W.2d 445 (1996).
Under the discovery principle, a cause of action accrues and the 1-year discovery provision of this section begins to run, when there has been discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery. It is not necessary that the plaintiff have knowledge of the exact nature or source of the problem, but only knowledge that the problem existed. Board of Regents v. Wilscam Mullins Birge, 230 Neb. 675, 433 N.W.2d 478 (1988).
If action is not to be considered time-barred, plaintiff must either file within two years of alleged act or omission or show that its action falls within the exceptions of this section as to its discovery of defendant's alleged negligence. Kelly Klosure v. Johnson Grant & Co., 229 Neb. 369, 427 N.W.2d 44 (1988).
A cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the act or omission which is alleged to be the professional negligence that is the basis for the cause of action. Tiwald v. Dewey, 221 Neb. 547, 378 N.W.2d 671 (1985).
A statute of limitations may begin to run before the full extent of damages is sustained. Suzuki v. Holthaus, 221 Neb. 72, 375 N.W.2d 126 (1985).
This section requires that the action for malpractice be commenced within two years after the alleged act or omission and contains a provision for deferred commencement if the cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such two-year period. Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 357 N.W.2d 186 (1984).
Ten-year statute of repose runs from time of physician's treatment rather than the date of the termination of the physician-patient relationship. Smith v. Dewey, 214 Neb. 605, 335 N.W.2d 530 (1983).
A cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the aggrieved party has the right to institute and maintain suit, even though such a plaintiff may be ignorant of the existence of the cause of action. These matters are determined from the facts of each case. Interholzinger v. Estate of Dent, 214 Neb. 264, 333 N.W.2d 895 (1983).
The 1-year discovery exception in this section is a tolling provision, but it applies only in those cases in which
the plaintiff did not discover, and could not have reasonably discovered, the existence of the cause of action within
the applicable statute of limitations. Walz v. Harvey, 28 Neb. App. 7, 938 N.W.2d 110 (2020).
Nebraska has a 2-year statute of limitations for actions for professional negligence except that causes of action not discovered, and which could not have been reasonably discovered until after the limitations period has run, can be filed within 1 year of discovery, with an overall limitation of 10 years after the date of rendering or failing to render such professional service which provides the basis for the cause of action. Anonymous v. Vasconcellos, 15 Neb. App. 363, 727 N.W.2d 708 (2007).
Under the 1-year discovery provision of this section, it is not necessary that the plaintiff have knowledge of the exact nature or source of the problem, but only knowledge that the problem existed. Anonymous v. Vasconcellos, 15 Neb. App. 363, 727 N.W.2d 708 (2007).
In considering whether the discovery exception to the professional negligence statute of limitations applies, a court may consider the complexity of the documents and whether representations as to the contents of the documents were made in determining whether the case presents a factual question to be determined by the trier of fact. In-Line Suspension v. Weinberg & Weinberg, 12 Neb. App. 908, 687 N.W.2d 418 (2004).
A suit filed against an abstractor was time barred under this section because it was not filed within 1 year of discovery and because it was filed more than 10 years after the omission upon which the claim was based. Cooper v. Paap, 10 Neb. App. 243, 634 N.W.2d 266 (2001).
Section 25-213 tolls the running of the time limitation under this section until an infant reaches the age of majority. Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 679 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1982).
3. Continuous treatment or relationship
The continuous treatment doctrine for limitations in a malpractice action applies only for incorrect treatment based on misdiagnosis or other continuing course of negligent treatment. Bogue v. Gillis, 311 Neb. 445, 973 N.W.2d 338 (2022).
In order for a continuous relationship to toll the statute of limitations regarding a claim for malpractice, there must be a continuity of the relationship and services for the same or related subject matter after the alleged professional negligence. Bellino v. McGrath North, 274 Neb. 130, 738 N.W.2d 434 (2007).
A claim for malpractice against a hospital based upon the negligence of its nursing staff accrues when the patient is discharged from the hospital and the continuing treatment doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations for subsequent admissions at the hospital authorized by the patient's affiliated but independent physician. Casey v. Levine, 261 Neb. 1, 621 N.W.2d 482 (2001).
A plaintiff seeking to extend the tolling of the 2-year statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case must prove facts which indicate that the physician continued to treat him or her after the allegedly wrongful act or omission and that the treatment was related to the alleged negligence. Casey v. Levine, 261 Neb. 1, 621 N.W.2d 482 (2001).
In order for a continuous relationship to toll the statute of limitations regarding a claim for malpractice, there must be a continuity of the relationship and services for the same or related subject matter after the alleged professional negligence. Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 256 Neb. 442, 590 N.W.2d 380 (1999).
If an action is not to be considered time barred, plaintiff must either file within 2 years of the alleged act or omission or show that the action falls within the exceptions of this section as to the discovery of defendant's alleged negligence. A cause of action accrues for negligence in professional services when the alleged act or omission in rendering or failure to render professional services takes place. The continuous representation rule, which tolls the running of the statute of limitations, is inapplicable where the claimant discovers the alleged negligence prior to the termination of the professional relationship. Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Universal Surety Co., 246 Neb. 495, 519 N.W.2d 530 (1994).
The continuous treatment or representation rule is inapplicable where the claimant discovers the alleged negligence prior to the termination of the professional relationship. The 2-year statute of limitations is not tolled where the plaintiff discovers the alleged negligence within 2 years of the allegedly negligent act or omission, and therefore, a professional negligence action is barred unless filed within 2 years of the occurrence of such act or omission. Economy Housing Co. v. Rosenberg, 239 Neb. 267, 475 N.W.2d 899 (1991).
In order for a continuous relationship to toll the statute of limitations regarding a claim for malpractice, there must be a continuity of the relationship and services for the same or related subject matter after the alleged professional negligence. McCook Equity Exch. v. Cooperative Serv. Co., 230 Neb. 758, 433 N.W.2d 509 (1988); Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, 215 Neb. 289, 338 N.W.2d 594 (1983).
4. Applicability
Abstracters' performing title searches render "professional services" and are subject to the limitations periods in this section for claims arising from these functions. Mai v. German, 313 Neb. 187, 983 N.W.2d 114 (2023).
A massage therapist is not a "professional" for the purpose of application of the professional negligence statute of limitations; while a massage therapist is required to be licensed, the licensing requirements do not require long
and intensive training or preparation, including instruction in skills and methods as well as in the scientific,
historical, or scholarly principles underlying such skills and methods, which would be comparable to that of a
college degree, and the standards for membership in the occupation of massage therapy did not include high
standards of achievement. Wehrer v. Dynamic Life Therapy & Wellness, 302 Neb. 1025, 926 N.W.2d 107 (2019).
Each of the elements set forth in the Tylle definition of "profession" are considered to be necessary and not merely
possible factors for consideration; therefore, to constitute a "profession" within the meaning of this section, a
particular type of endeavor must meet all of the principal elements. Wehrer v. Dynamic Life Therapy & Wellness,
302 Neb. 1025, 926 N.W.2d 107 (2019).
Great emphasis is placed on college degrees in considering whether a particular occupation is a "profession" for
the purpose of applying this section. Wehrer v. Dynamic Life Therapy & Wellness, 302 Neb. 1025, 926 N.W.2d 107 (2019).
In analyzing whether a particular group or organization meets the definition of a "profession" for purposes of the professional negligence statute of limitations, each of the following principal elements must be demonstrated, as an
occupation is not a "profession" unless: (1) The profession requires specialized knowledge; (2) the profession
requires long and intensive preparation; (3) preparation must include instruction in skills and methods of the
profession; (4) preparation must include scientific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying the skills and methods of the profession; (5) membership in a professional organization is required; (6) a professional organization or concerted opinion within an organization regulates and enforces standards for membership; (7) the standards for
membership include high standards of achievement; (8) the standards for membership include high standards of
conduct; (9) its members are committed to continued study; (10) its members are committed to a specific kind of
work; and (11) the specific kind of work has for its primary purpose the rendering of a public service. Wehrer v. Dynamic Life Therapy & Wellness, 302 Neb. 1025, 926 N.W.2d 107 (2019).
A license, the preparation and training required to procure the license, work performed to render a professional service, continuing education requirements, and a professional disciplinary authority all indicate a person is a “professional.” Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., 285 Neb. 759, 830 N.W.2d 53 (2013).
A plaintiff brought an action after being injured when she stepped from the last step of an aboveground pool onto a puddle. She was in the pool for physical therapy treatment, and her physical therapist directed her to leave the pool. The injuries arose while the plaintiff was receiving professional services, and this section applied to the action. Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., 285 Neb. 759, 830 N.W.2d 53 (2013).
Physical therapists are “professionals” under this section. Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., 285 Neb. 759, 830 N.W.2d 53 (2013).
Causes of action or theories of recovery that are premised on excessive fees concern professional misconduct, and thus, this section applies. Nuss v. Alexander, 269 Neb. 101, 691 N.W.2d 94 (2005).
Agents of broker-dealers in securities are not professionals for purposes of the statute of limitations under this section. Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, 268 Neb. 499, 684 N.W.2d 543 (2004).
The definition of "profession" for purposes of the professional negligence statute of limitations under this section is (1) a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive preparation including instruction in skills and methods as well as in the scientific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying such skills and methods, (2) maintaining by force of organization or concerted opinion high standards of achievement and conduct, and (3) committing its members to continued study and to a kind of work which has for its prime purpose the rendering of a public service. Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, 268 Neb. 499, 684 N.W.2d 543 (2004).
Where a party's claims are for professional malpractice, whether pled in tort or contract, the statute of limitations for professional negligence contained in this section applies. Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, 268 Neb. 499, 684 N.W.2d 543 (2004).
If claims are for professional malpractice, whether pled in tort or contract, the statute of limitations for professional negligence contained in this section applies. A cause of action for professional negligence accrues when the alleged act or omission in rendering or failing to render professional services takes place. Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 256 Neb. 442, 590 N.W.2d 380 (1999).
A profession is no longer defined as an occupation involving specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, which labor and skill is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual; a profession is now defined as a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive preparation including instruction in skills and methods as well as in the scientific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying such skills and methods, maintaining by force of organization or concerted opinion high standards of achievement and conduct, and committing its members to continued study and to a kind of work which has for its prime purpose the rendering of a public service. Jorgensen v. State Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 255 Neb. 241, 583 N.W.2d 331 (1998).
An action against a physician to recover damages for an injury sustained while the physician is adjusting the examination chair is within the professional negligence statute of limitations. Olsen v. Richards, 232 Neb. 298, 440 N.W.2d 463 (1989).
Any professional misconduct or any unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or fiduciary duties is malpractice and comes within the professional or malpractice statute of limitations. Olsen v. Richards, 232 Neb. 298, 440 N.W.2d 463 (1989).
Architects and engineers are professionals for the purposes of this section. Board of Regents v. Wilscam Mullins Birge, 230 Neb. 675, 433 N.W.2d 478 (1988).
The 2-year statute of limitations in this section, applicable to an architect who has the responsibility to design a building and a duty to inspect throughout construction, begins to run when the construction is completed. Board of Regents v. Wilscam Mullins Birge, 230 Neb. 675, 433 N.W.2d 478 (1988).
Engineers are professionals for the purposes of this section, and this section applies to an action against such a professional, even though the professional services rendered by the engineer amount to an improvement to real property. Georgetowne Ltd. Part. v. Geotechnical Servs., 230 Neb. 22, 430 N.W.2d 34 (1988).
Within the meaning of this section, the professional negligence statute of limitations, a profession rendering professional services is defined as a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive preparation, including instruction in skills and methods as well as in the scientific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying such skills and methods, maintaining by force of organization or concerted opinion high standards of achievement and conduct, and committing its members to continued study and to a kind of work which has for its prime purpose the rendering of a public service. Georgetowne Ltd. Part. v. Geotechnical Servs., 230 Neb. 22, 430 N.W.2d 34 (1988).
Real estate brokerage is not a profession and, therefore, is not to be afforded protection under the statute of limitations governing actions for professional negligence. Tylle v. Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 412 N.W.2d 438 (1987).
Where an architect has a professional responsibility to supervise construction and to see that all walls are in fact constructed, his failure to do so is a professional act to which this section applies. Williams v. Kingery Constr. Co., 225 Neb. 235, 404 N.W.2d 32 (1987).
Architects and engineers are professionals for the purposes of this section. Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 362 N.W.2d 35 (1985).
The period of repose applicable to an architect who has a duty to inspect throughout construction is contained in this section and begins to run when construction is completed. Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 362 N.W.2d 35 (1985).
The period of repose applicable to an engineer who has no duty other than to provide a design to an architect is contained in this section and begins to run when the design is delivered to the architect. Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 362 N.W.2d 35 (1985).
Abstractors are professionals for the purposes of this section. Cooper v. Paap, 10 Neb. App. 243, 634 N.W.2d 266 (2001).
5. Miscellaneous
In a professional negligence action, a physician did not waive and was not estopped from asserting as a defense the statute of limitations set forth in this section, where the physician engaged in discovery after a complaint was filed rather than immediately moving to dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. Bonness v. Armitage, 305 Neb. 747, 942 N.W.2d 238 (2020).
The claim of a conflict of interest is a cause of professional malpractice limited by the 2-year statute of limitations for professional negligence. Egan v. Stoler, 265 Neb. 1, 653 N.W.2d 855 (2002).
The statute of limitations defense is waived if it is not asserted in the pleadings. Welsch v. Graves, 255 Neb. 62, 582 N.W.2d 312 (1998).
Equitable estoppel arises from a failure to disclose material information when a fiduciary or confidential relationship exists between a physician and a patient. Schendt v. Dewey, 252 Neb. 979, 568 N.W.2d 210 (1997).
The doctrine of fraudulent concealment estops a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense when the defendant has, either by deception or by violation of a duty, concealed from the plaintiff material facts which prevent the plaintiff from discovering malpractice. Equitable estoppel arises from active or affirmative efforts to conceal malpractice. Schendt v. Dewey, 252 Neb. 979, 568 N.W.2d 210 (1997).
When prisoner filed grievance with corrections department and threatened legal action for injury suffered during tooth extraction, injury was discovered under this statute. Gordon v. Connell, 249 Neb. 769, 545 N.W.2d 722 (1996).
Nondiscovery of all damages is not the equivalent of nondiscovery of a cause of action. Seevers v. Potter, 248 Neb. 621, 537 N.W.2d 505 (1995).
A client has knowledge of his attorney's alleged negligence at the time the client signs the contract. Nichols v. Ach, 233 Neb. 634, 447 N.W.2d 220 (1989).
For the statute to begin running, it is not necessary that the plaintiff have knowledge of the exact nature or source of the problem, but only knowledge that a problem existed. The plaintiff need not have suffered actual damages, but there must be an invasion of a legally protected interest. Nichols v. Ach, 233 Neb. 634, 447 N.W.2d 220 (1989).
Discovery, as applied to statutes of limitations, refers to the fact that one knows of the existence of an injury or damage and not that he or she has a legal right to seek redress in court. Norfolk Iron & Metal v. Behnke, 230 Neb. 414, 432 N.W.2d 18 (1988).
Discovery, as used in reference to a statute of limitations, means that an individual acquires knowledge of a fact which existed but which was previously unknown to the discoverer. Norfolk Iron & Metal v. Behnke, 230 Neb. 414, 432 N.W.2d 18 (1988).
Nondiscovery of all damages is not the equivalent of nondiscovery of a cause of action as set out in this section relating to the statute of limitations for professional negligence. Norfolk Iron & Metal v. Behnke, 230 Neb. 414, 432 N.W.2d 18 (1988).
The alleged failure to communicate an offer of settlement in a dissolution action cannot be made the basis of a claimed act of professional negligence absent evidence that the proposed settlement was not unconscionable and would therefore likely have been approved by the district court. Smith v. Ganz, 219 Neb. 432, 363 N.W.2d 526 (1985).
A person under a legal disability described in section 25-213 is exempted from the provisions of this section until the legal disability is removed. Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 817, 341 N.W.2d 326 (1983).
Death of doctor before two-year statute of limitations expires does not extinguish negligence claim against his estate. Davies v. Reese, 197 Neb. 320, 248 N.W.2d 344 (1977).
If the cause of action for professional negligence is not discovered and could not reasonably be discovered within two years, an action may be commenced within one year from the date of discovery, or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier. Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 244 N.W.2d 201 (1976).
Special two-year statute of limitations controlled action against doctor based on erroneous blood typing by his employee. Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. 651, 240 N.W.2d 24 (1976).
Plaintiff had a reasonable time after this act which reduced limitation period was passed and became effective to file its action, and having failed to do so within such time, the action is barred. Educational Service Unit No. 3 v. Mammel, O., S., H. & S., Inc., 192 Neb. 431, 222 N.W.2d 125 (1974).
If all of a plaintiff's claims are based upon a single professional relationship, whether pled in tort or contract, the statute of limitations for professional negligence applies and cannot be circumvented by separating the claims into various parts to allow different periods of limitation to apply. Gering - Ft. Laramie Irr. Dist. v. Baker, 8 Neb. App. 1001, 606 N.W.2d 826 (2000).
Federal courts were not precluded from consideration of statutory vagueness by Nebraska decision as to retrospective impact, and motion to dismiss action against architects and engineers for professional negligence appropriately raised statute of limitations defense where plaintiff did not allege facts to invoke exception to it for causes of action which could not reasonably be discovered within two-year limitation period. Horn v. Burns & Roe, 536 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1976).
25-223.
Action on breach of warranty on improvements to real property.(1) Any action to recover damages based on any alleged breach of warranty on improvements to real property or based on any alleged deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, except improvements to real property subject to the Nebraska Condominium Act, shall be commenced within four years after any alleged act or omission constituting such breach of warranty or deficiency. If such cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such four-year period, or within one year preceding the expiration of such four-year period, then the cause of action may be commenced within two years from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier. In no event may any action be commenced to recover damages for an alleged breach of warranty on improvements to real property or deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property more than ten years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.
(2)(a) Any action to recover damages based on any alleged breach of warranty on improvements to real property or based on any alleged deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property that is a condominium or part of a condominium project subject to the Nebraska Condominium Act shall be commenced within two years after any alleged act or omission constituting such breach of warranty or deficiency. If such cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such two-year period, or within one year preceding the expiration of such two-year period, then the cause of action may be commenced within one year from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier. In no event may any action be commenced to recover damages for an alleged breach of warranty on improvements to real property or deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property more than five years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.
(b) Any action brought under this section shall also comply with section 76-890.
Cross References
Nebraska Condominium Act, see section 76-825.
Annotations
When homeowners contract with individual contractors for separate construction projects, the 4-year statute of limitations begins to run against each contractor on the date it substantially completes its project. McCaulley v. C L Enters., 309 Neb. 141, 959 N.W.2d 225 (2021).
If a contract is divisible, breaches of its severable parts give rise to separate causes of action, and the statute of limitations will generally begin to run at the time of each breach. If, however, a contract is indivisible, an action can be maintained on it only when a breach occurs or the contract is in some way terminated, and the statute of limitations will begin to run from that time only. Fuelberth v. Heartland Heating & Air Conditioning, 307 Neb. 1002, 951 N.W.2d 758 (2020).
Where there is no claim that a builder failed to make repairs when requested to do so pursuant to an express warranty and the claim is based on the defective construction itself, the express warranty does not extend the statute of limitations. Adams v. Manchester Park, 291 Neb. 978, 871 N.W.2d 215 (2015).
This section is a special statute of limitations applying to builders and contractors making improvements to real property. Andres v. McNeil Co., 270 Neb. 733, 707 N.W.2d 777 (2005).
The statute of limitations in this section applies only to actions brought against contractors or builders. Murphy v. Spelts-Schultz Lumber Co., 240 Neb. 275, 481 N.W.2d 422 (1992).
Under this section, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when there has been discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery. Smith v. Butler Manuf. Co., 230 Neb. 734, 433 N.W.2d 493 (1988).
Under the discovery principle, a cause of action accrues and the 2-year discovery provision of this section begins to run when there has been discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery. It is not necessary that the plaintiff have knowledge of the exact nature or source of the problem, but only knowledge that the problem existed. Board of Regents v. Lueder Constr. Co., 230 Neb. 686, 433 N.W.2d 485 (1988).
The 10-year period of repose contained in this section is constitutional. Williams v. Kingery Constr. Co., 225 Neb. 235, 404 N.W.2d 32 (1987).
This section applies to an action in tort for personal injuries caused by the negligent construction of a building. Williams v. Kingery Constr. Co., 225 Neb. 235, 404 N.W.2d 32 (1987).
The period of repose applicable to a general contractor is found in this section and begins to run when construction of the structure is completed. Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 362 N.W.2d 35 (1985).
Where the plaintiff knew of a leaky roof problem more than four years before bringing suit, the cause of action was barred. Kearney Clinic Bldg. Corp. v. Weaver, 211 Neb. 499, 319 N.W.2d 95 (1982).
The statute of limitation for an action based on alleged deficiencies in improvements to real property does not run during the time when the plaintiff reasonably could not discover the existence of the cause of action. Grand Island School Dist. #2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603 (1979).
25-224.
Actions on product liability.(1) All product liability actions, except one governed by subsection (5) of this section, shall be commenced within four years next after the date on which the death, injury, or damage complained of occurs.
(2)(a) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section or any other statutory provision to the contrary, any product liability action, except one governed by section 2-725, Uniform Commercial Code or by subsection (5) of this section, shall be commenced as follows:
(i) For products manufactured in Nebraska, within ten years after the date the product which allegedly caused the personal injury, death, or damage was first sold or leased for use or consumption; or
(ii) For products manufactured outside Nebraska, within the time allowed by the applicable statute of repose, if any, of the state or country where the product was manufactured, but in no event less than ten years. If the state or country where the product was manufactured does not have an applicable statute of repose, then the only limitation upon the commencement of an action for product liability shall be as set forth in subsection (1) of this section.
(b) If the changes made to this subsection by Laws 2001, LB 489, are declared invalid or unconstitutional, this subsection as it existed prior to September 1, 2001, shall be deemed in full force and effect and shall apply to all claims in which a final order has not been entered.
(3) The limitations contained in subsection (1), (2), or (5) of this section shall not be applicable to indemnity or contribution actions brought by a manufacturer or seller of a product against a person who is or may be liable to such manufacturer or seller for all or any portion of any judgment rendered against a manufacturer or seller.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section, any cause of action or claim which any person may have on July 22, 1978, may be brought not later than two years following such date.
(5) Any action to recover damages based on injury allegedly resulting from exposure to asbestos composed of chrysotile, amosite, crocidolite, tremolite, anthrophyllite, actinolite, or any combination thereof, shall be commenced within four years after the injured person has been informed of discovery of the injury by competent medical authority and that such injury was caused by exposure to asbestos as described herein, or within four years after the discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier. No action commenced under this subsection based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort shall be commenced or maintained against any seller of a product which is alleged to contain or possess a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the buyer, user, or consumer unless such seller is also the manufacturer of such product or the manufacturer of the part thereof claimed to be defective. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to permit an action to be brought based on an injury described in this subsection discovered more than two years prior to August 30, 1981.
Annotations
1. Constitutionality
2. Computation of time
3. Miscellaneous
1. Constitutionality
Subsection (2) of this section is constitutional. Gillam v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 241 Neb. 414, 489 N.W.2d 289 (1992).
Nebraska's products liability 10-year statute of repose does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Nebraska or U.S. Constitutions and does not violate the open courts provision of the Nebraska Constitution. Radke v. H.C. Davis Sons' Mfg. Co., 241 Neb. 21, 486 N.W.2d 204 (1992).
The 10-year period of repose contained in this section is constitutional. Spilker v. City of Lincoln, 238 Neb. 188, 469 N.W.2d 546 (1991).
2. Computation of time
Subsection (2) of this section is not tolled by a person's status as a minor pursuant to section 25-213. Budler v. General Motors Corp., 268 Neb. 998, 689 N.W.2d 847 (2004).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the statute of repose should be recommenced when a product has been refurbished. To determine whether a product has been refurbished, courts must first determine whether the refurbishing resulted in a "new product." To determine whether the product should be considered "new," courts must inquire whether the refurbishing has lengthened the product's useful life beyond what was contemplated when the product was first sold. Second, even if the product is considered "new," the suit will still be time barred unless the refurbishing was defective and proximately caused the injury. Divis v. Clarklift of Nebraska, Inc., 256 Neb. 384, 590 N.W.2d 696 (1999).
The 10-year statute of repose found in subsection (2) of this section begins to run when the product is first relinquished for use or consumption. Where the injury occurs within the 10-year period, and a claimant commences his or her action after the 10 years have passed, an action accrues but is barred. Where the injury occurs outside the 10-year period, no substantive cause of action ever accrues, and a claimant's actions are likewise barred. Gillam v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 241 Neb. 414, 489 N.W.2d 289 (1992).
The 1981 amendment to subsections (2) and (5) of this section cannot be retroactively applied to revive causes of action which had been extinguished by the provisions of the 1978 enactment of subsection (2) of this section. Immunity granted by a completed statutory bar is a vested right which cannot be impaired by a subsequent legislative act. Givens v. Anchor Packing, 237 Neb. 565, 466 N.W.2d 771 (1991).
Time periods for bringing suit are extended by section 25-213. Lawson v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Neb. 725, 408 N.W.2d 256 (1987).
The statute of repose applicable to the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product is contained in this section and begins to run when possession of the product is first relinquished for ultimate use or consumption, not when it is first placed into the stream of commerce by the manufacturer. Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 362 N.W.2d 35 (1985).
One who wrongfully conceals a material fact necessary to the accrual of a cause of action against him, and such concealment causes the opposite party to delay the filing of suit, cannot avail himself of the statute of limitations as a defense. MacMillen v. A. H. Robins Co., 217 Neb. 338, 348 N.W.2d 869 (1984).
The 4-year statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the party who holds the cause of action discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of the injury or damage. Condon v. A. H. Robins Co., 217 Neb. 60, 349 N.W.2d 622 (1984).
Regarding an infant's cause of action for products liability, section 25-213 tolls the statute of limitations contained in subsection (4) of this section. Macku v. Drackett Products Co., 216 Neb. 176, 343 N.W.2d 58 (1984).
3. Miscellaneous
Because the repose provisions in this section apply to "product liability actions," they necessarily apply to claims against manufacturers, sellers, and lessors of products. Ag Valley Co-op v. Servinsky Engr., 311 Neb. 665, 974 N.W.2d 324 (2022).
"The product," as used in this section, refers to the completed product that is placed on the market and sold or leased for consumer use, and necessarily includes all of the product's original component parts. Ag Valley Co-op v. Servinsky Engr., 311 Neb. 665, 974 N.W.2d 324 (2022).
The effect of the 10-year statute of repose in subsection (2) of this section can be to prevent what might otherwise be a cause of action from ever arising. Farber v. Lok-N-Logs, Inc., 270 Neb. 356, 701 N.W.2d 368 (2005).
The language, "first sold or leased for use or consumption," contained in subsection (2) of this section refers to when a product is first surrendered or relinquished to the individual or entity. Farber v. Lok-N-Logs, Inc., 270 Neb. 356, 701 N.W.2d 368 (2005).
Upon the passage of the 10-year repose period in subsection (2) of this section, the defendant acquires a substantive right protected by statute. Farber v. Lok-N-Logs, Inc., 270 Neb. 356, 701 N.W.2d 368 (2005).
When a party brings a suit which is characterized as a suit in tort alleging negligence in the performance of a contract, the applicable statute of limitations is that which is applied to actions in tort. Thomas v. Countryside of Hastings, 246 Neb. 907, 524 N.W.2d 311 (1994).
25-225.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 529, § 58.
25-226.
Cause of action against a common carrier; limitation.A cause of action for a freight damage claim, a rate overcharge, a claim for damages resulting from a delay in transportation, or a claim for a lost shipment against a common carrier shall be barred unless it is filed with a court having jurisdiction of the amount in dispute within two years after the date such action accrues. A cause of action for a rate overcharge accrues on the date the overcharge is paid. A cause of action for a freight damage claim, damages resulting from a delay in transportation, or a shortage in a shipment accrues on the date of delivery or tender of delivery of the freight by the common carrier. A cause of action for a lost shipment accrues on the date the lost shipment was delivered to the common carrier.
25-227.
Action to enforce obligation to pay certificate of deposit; when.(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) Account agreement means one or more written instruments that establish when a certificate of deposit is payable;
(b) Certificate of deposit means a deposit or share account at a depository institution that:
(i) Is payable by the depository institution at the expiration of a specified time; and
(ii) May be transferable or nontransferable, negotiable or nonnegotiable, and renewable or nonrenewable;
(c) Depository institution means a state-chartered or federally chartered financial institution located in this state that is authorized to maintain certificates of deposit; and
(d) Maturity date means the time specified in an account agreement when a certificate of deposit is first payable, without taking into account any agreement regarding renewals.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, an action to enforce the obligation of a depository institution to pay all or part of the balance of a certificate of deposit shall be commenced by the earlier of:
(a) The time that an action to enforce an obligation under subsection (e) of section 3-118, Uniform Commercial Code, must be commenced if the certificate of deposit is subject to such section; or
(b) Seven years after the later of:
(i) The maturity date of the certificate of deposit;
(ii) The due date of the certificate of deposit indicated in the depository institution's last written notice of renewal of the certificate of deposit, if any;
(iii) The date of the last written communication from the depository institution recognizing the depository institution's obligation with respect to the certificate of deposit; or
(iv) The last day of the taxable year for which a person identified in the certificate of deposit last reported interest income earned on the certificate of deposit on a federal or state income tax return.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section, an action to enforce the obligation of a depository institution to pay all or part of the balance of an automatically renewing certificate of deposit in existence on July 1, 2008, shall be commenced by the later of:
(a) Seven years after the later of:
(i) The maturity date of the certificate of deposit;
(ii) The due date of the certificate of deposit indicated in the depository institution's last written notice of renewal of the certificate of deposit, if any;
(iii) The date of the last written communication from the depository institution recognizing the depository institution's obligation to pay the certificate of deposit; or
(iv) The last day of the taxable year for which a person identified in the certificate of deposit last reported interest income earned on the certificate of deposit on a federal or state income tax return; or
(b) One year after July 1, 2008.
(4) This section applies to all certificates of deposit that are in existence on or after July 1, 2008.
Annotations
An action commenced on November 30, 2009, was time barred by this section, because it was past the 7 years after the maturity date of the certificate of deposit and more than a year since July 1, 2008. Swift v. Norwest Bank-Omaha West, 285 Neb. 619, 828 N.W.2d 755 (2013).
The maturity date of a certificate of deposit was 9 months after the date issued, and the maturity date did not extend for 9 additional months every time the certificate of deposit automatically renewed. Swift v. Norwest Bank-Omaha West, 285 Neb. 619, 828 N.W.2d 755 (2013).
25-228.
Action by victim of sexual assault of a child; when.(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law:
(a) There shall not be any time limitation for an action against the individual or individuals directly causing an injury or injuries suffered by a plaintiff when the plaintiff was a victim of a violation of section 28-319.01 or 28-320.01 if such violation occurred (i) on or after August 24, 2017, or (ii) prior to August 24, 2017, if such action was not previously time barred; and
(b) An action against any person or entity other than the individual directly causing an injury or injuries suffered by a plaintiff when the plaintiff was a victim of a violation of section 28-319.01 or 28-320.01 may only be brought within twelve years after the plaintiff's twenty-first birthday.
(2) Criminal prosecution of a defendant under section 28-319.01 or 28-320.01 is not required to maintain a civil action for violation of such sections.
Annotations
This section does not apply to an action that was already barred under the existing statutes of limitations at the time this section was enacted in 2012. Doe v. McCoy, 297 Neb. 321, 899 N.W.2d 899 (2017).
25-229.
Action against real estate licensee; when.(1) For purposes of this section, real estate licensee means a broker or salesperson who is licensed under the Nebraska Real Estate License Act.
(2) Any action to recover damages based on any act or omission of a real estate licensee relating to real estate brokerage services shall be commenced within two years after whichever of the following occurs first with respect to such brokerage services: (a) A transaction is completed or closed; (b) an agency agreement is terminated; or (c) an unconsummated transaction is terminated or expires. Such two-year period shall not be reduced by agreement and shall not apply to disciplinary actions initiated by the State Real Estate Commission.
(3) If the cause of action described in subsection (2) of this section is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within the two-year period described in such subsection, then the action may be commenced within one year from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier, except that in no event may any such action be commenced more than ten years after the date of rendering or failing to render the brokerage services which provide the basis for the cause of action.
Cross References
Nebraska Real Estate License Act, see section 81-885.
Annotations
A parent in a juvenile action does not need to follow the intervention procedures set forth in this section and sections 25-328 and 25-330 in order to participate in juvenile proceedings involving the parent's child. In re Interest of Sloane O., 291 Neb. 892, 870 N.W.2d 110 (2015).
25-301.
Real party in interest.Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest except as otherwise provided in section 25-304. An action shall not be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for joinder or substitution of the real party in interest. Joinder or substitution of the real party in interest shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced by the real party in interest.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 29, p. 398; R.S.1913, § 7582; C.S.1922, § 8525; C.S.1929, § 20-301; R.S.1943, § 25-301;
Laws 1999, LB 48, § 1.
Annotations
1. General
2. Specific cases
3. Miscellaneous
1. General
Because a sanitary and improvement district cannot hold private property for purposes of a takings claim against its own parent state, it cannot be the real party in interest to such a takings claim. SID No. 67 v. State, 309 Neb. 600, 961 N.W.2d 796 (2021).
The purpose of the real party in interest requirement is to ensure that actions are prosecuted only by persons who have some real interest in the cause of action or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of a controversy. SID No. 67 v. State, 309 Neb. 600, 961 N.W.2d 796 (2021).
The purpose of the "real party in interest" statute is to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons who have no right, title, or interest in the cause. Cattle Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Watson, 293 Neb. 943, 880 N.W.2d 906 (2016).
Under this section, every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided in section 25-304, R.R.S.1943. Redding v. Gibbs, 203 Neb. 727, 280 N.W.2d 53 (1979).
Real party in interest is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Dafoe v. Dafoe, 160 Neb. 145, 69 N.W.2d 700 (1955).
Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Uptegrove v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 145 Neb. 51, 15 N.W.2d 220 (1944).
Real party in interest is the person entitled to the avails of the suit. Kinsella v. Sharp, 47 Neb. 664, 66 N.W. 634 (1896).
The court has continuing jurisdiction when the real party in interest is substituted for another party. Walker v. Probandt, 29 Neb. App. 704, 958 N.W.2d 459 (2021).
2. Specific cases
Third-party-beneficiary theory is a common-law doctrine that allows a nonparty to a contract to enforce an interest owed by a promisor under the contract, provided the nonparty was an intended beneficiary whose rights and interest were apparently contemplated by the contract's language itself. Equestrian Ridge v. Equestrian Ridge Estates II, 308 Neb. 128, 953 N.W.2d 16 (2021).
The plaintiff was the real party in interest where the defendant's legal malpractice caused harm to the plaintiff's company and where throughout litigation, the parties acknowledged and recognized the plaintiff's interest in the judgment. LeRette v. Howard, 300 Neb. 128, 912 N.W.2d 706 (2018).
The assignee of a chose in action is the proper and only party who can maintain the suit thereon; the assignor loses all right to control or enforce the assigned right against the obligor. Midwest Renewable Energy v. American Engr. Testing, 296 Neb. 73, 894 N.W.2d 221 (2017).
Where insurance company settled and paid insureds' loss in full and they make no demand on defendant feeling that no additional amount is owing them, insurance company would be real party in interest in suit upon assignment to it of insureds' cause of action. Jelinek v. Nebraska Nat. Gas Co., 196 Neb. 488, 243 N.W.2d 778 (1976).
Fact that property passes the same by will as by deed conclusive of issue that neither executor nor other beneficiaries of will have standing to be real party in interest under this section. Scholting v. Alley, 185 Neb. 549, 178 N.W.2d 273 (1970).
Plaintiffs not real parties in interest where conditions precedent to representative or derivative suit on behalf of a public corporation were not met. Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 184 Neb. 172, 166 N.W.2d 411 (1969).
Interested parties may appeal to district court from action of county superintendent in dissolving school district. Board of Education v. Winne, 177 Neb. 431, 129 N.W.2d 255 (1964).
Defense of action by real party in interest was proper. Anest v. Chester B. Brown Co., 169 Neb. 330, 99 N.W.2d 615 (1959).
Party in whose name sheep feeding operations were conducted was the real party in interest. Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
Owner of truck was real party in interest to recover for violation of Installment Loan Act. McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957).
Person for whom bond was tendered was real party in interest in action to compel approval of bond. Summit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Nimtz, 158 Neb. 762, 64 N.W.2d 803 (1954).
Where action is brought by party designated by statute for that purpose, it meets the requirement that all actions shall be brought by the real party in interest. Boone County Old Age Assistance Board v. Myhre, 149 Neb. 669, 32 N.W.2d 262 (1948).
An action by assignee of claim under Fair Labor Standards Act is brought by the real party in interest. Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947).
Joinder of cause of action by plaintiff in his own right with cause of action assigned for collection is not permitted. Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946).
Action may be continued by assignee of claim in name of original party. Exchange Elevator Co. v. Marshall, 147 Neb. 48, 22 N.W.2d 403 (1946).
Only beneficiary, or one suing on his behalf, can maintain suit against trustee to enforce trust or enjoin or obtain redress for breach of trust. In re Estate of Reynolds, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480 (1936).
School district was ultimate beneficiary but not necessarily the real party in interest hereunder. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Nemaha County Bank, 124 Neb. 883, 248 N.W. 650 (1933).
Administratrix is proper party hereunder to sue for damages for death of employee; compensation act merely relates to distribution of proceeds. Goeres v. Goeres, 124 Neb. 720, 248 N.W. 75 (1933).
Tax Commissioner exercising constitutional powers, as the real party in interest in absence of express statutory prohibition, is authorized to carry on proceedings in name of state. State v. Odd Fellows Hall Assn., 123 Neb. 440, 243 N.W. 616 (1932).
Person injured by negligent acts of policeman in discharge of official duty may sue on policeman's bond, although same runs to city as obligee. Curnyn v. Kinney, 119 Neb. 478, 229 N.W. 894 (1930).
Bank, although in hands of State Banking Superintendent, may sue. First State Bank of Herrick v. Conant, 117 Neb. 562, 221 N.W. 691 (1928).
Husband and wife jointly may sue concerning real estate owned by either. Coon v. O'Brien, 107 Neb. 427, 186 N.W. 340 (1922).
Tenant may sue in action upon contract for joint benefit of landlord and tenant concerning crop. Hurley v. Manchester, 107 Neb. 299, 185 N.W. 974 (1921).
Purchaser from consignee, after transportation has ended, cannot maintain action against carrier for damage in transit without procuring assignment of claim from consignee. Meyer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 101 Neb. 756, 164 N.W. 1048 (1917).
Trustee for minor child of insured, designated as beneficiary in policy, is proper plaintiff. Ward v. Bankers Life Co., 99 Neb. 812, 157 N.W. 1017 (1916).
A joint obligee in an appeal bond may maintain an action thereon in his own name when he has purchased the interest of his joint obligee. Harker v. Burbank, 68 Neb. 85, 93 N.W. 949 (1903).
Third person for whose benefit promise is made may maintain action thereon, though not party to consideration. Goos v. Goos, 57 Neb. 294, 77 N.W. 687 (1898); Morrill v. Skinner, 57 Neb. 164, 77 N.W. 375 (1898).
Assignee of chose in action is the proper and only party who can maintain an action thereon. Crum v. Stanley, 55 Neb. 351, 75 N.W. 851 (1898).
Action on replevin bond must be brought by the party who, by the judgment in replevin, is awarded a recovery. Pilger v. Marder, Luse & Co., 55 Neb. 113, 75 N.W. 559 (1898).
Consignee is proper party to sue for failure to deliver goods. Union P. Ry. Co. v. Metcalf, 50 Neb. 452, 69 N.W. 961 (1897).
Where party with whom subscription contract was made assigned his interest to another, he was not a real party in interest. Gerner v. Church, 43 Neb. 690, 62 N.W. 51 (1895).
A partnership may be plaintiff in action for fraud in purchase of real estate, although title is taken in name of individual partner. Peaks & Co. v. Graves, 25 Neb. 235, 41 N.W. 151 (1888).
Tenants in common may or may not join in action against mere trespasser. Mattis v. Boggs, 19 Neb. 698, 28 N.W. 325 (1886).
A private person, to be a real party in interest, in bringing an action to abate a public nuisance must show special injury to himself. Kittle v. Fremont, 1 Neb. 329 (1871).
Once a party files a bankruptcy petition, all of his property, including choses in action, become property of the bankruptcy estate, and the bankruptcy trustee becomes the real party in interest with respect to such choses in action, until such time as the trustee may abandon the chose in action. Forrest v. Eilenstine, 5 Neb. App. 77, 554 N.W.2d 802 (1996).
Where the State brought an action for mother's medical expenses on behalf of child, the State failed to properly state a claim for such expenses. State on behalf of Dunn v. Wiegand, 2 Neb. App. 580, 512 N.W.2d 419 (1994).
3. Miscellaneous
Under this section, an amendment joining the real parties in interest relates back to the date of the original pleading. Fisher v. Heirs & Devisees of T.D. Lovercheck, 291 Neb. 9, 864 N.W.2d 212 (2015).
An agreement to assign all proceeds, if any, of an insurance policy does not operate to divest a plaintiff of the capacity to bring an action. Craig v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 239 Neb. 271, 476 N.W.2d 529 (1991).
A plaintiff's cause of action cannot be split, and having settled with defendant for injuries, he cannot bring action upon claim of insurance company against defendant for money paid plaintiff under a collision policy. Schmidt v. Henke, 192 Neb. 408, 222 N.W.2d 114 (1974).
The Attorney General may bring an action for a declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of a statute which the Tax Commissioner proposed to implement and enforce. State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 199 N.W.2d 738 (1972).
An issue that plaintiff is not the real party in interest must be specially pleaded. Neill v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369, 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963).
This section applies to forcible entry and detainer cases. Gregory v. Pribbeno, 143 Neb. 379, 9 N.W.2d 485 (1943).
This section applies to forcible detainer cases. Towles v. Hamilton, 94 Neb. 588, 143 N.W. 935 (1913).
If plaintiff's name imports a corporation, it is not necessary to allege its corporate capacity in terms. Fletcher v. Co-operative Pub. Co., 58 Neb. 511, 78 N.W. 1070 (1899).
Plaintiff suing on account should do so by Christian name. Small v. Sandall, 48 Neb. 318, 67 N.W. 156 (1896); Fisk v. Gulliford, 1 Neb. Unof. 31, 95 N.W. 494 (1901).
Where pleadings disclose cause of action against defendant personally, super-added words, as "agent" or "ex-executor," etc., are mere descriptio personae. Thomas v. Carson, 46 Neb. 765, 65 N.W. 899 (1896).
Where a contract of guaranty is transferred by assignment, assignee may sue in his own name. Weir v. Anthony, 35 Neb. 396, 53 N.W. 206 (1892).
A party has no standing to sue if the party has assigned all of its rights in the property which is the subject of the assignment. Sherman v. Sherman, 16 Neb. App. 766, 751 N.W.2d 168 (2008).
An assignee of a chose in action may sue on it in his own name and right. State Securities Co. v. Federated Mut. Imp. & Hard. Ins. Co., 204 F.Supp. 207 (D. Neb. 1960).
25-302.
Assignee of a thing in action.The assignee of a thing in action may maintain an action thereon in the assignee's own name and behalf, without the name of the assignor.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 30, p. 398; R.S.1913, § 7583; C.S.1922, § 8526; C.S.1929, § 20-302; R.S.1943, § 25-302;
Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 9.
Annotations
1. Assignee may bring action in own name
2. Miscellaneous
1. Assignee may bring action in own name
An assignee of a chose in action may maintain an action thereon in the assignee's own name when the assignment
being sued upon is in writing. Hawley v. Skradski, 304 Neb. 488, 935 N.W.2d 212 (2019).
A party who has in fact become the owner of a chose in action by assignment may bring action thereon in his own name without naming the assignor. Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946).
One furnishing labor or supplies to highway contractor may sue in his own name on surety bond as made for his benefit. West v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 118 Neb. 544, 225 N.W. 673 (1929).
Assignee may maintain action in own name to recover funds due from school district to building contractor. Stansberry Lumber Co. v. School Dist. of McCook, 94 Neb. 24, 142 N.W. 302 (1913).
An attorney to whom claims are unconditionally assigned may sue in his own name. Huddleson v. Polk, 70 Neb. 483, 97 N.W. 624 (1903).
Assignee of nonnegotiable promissory note may maintain an action thereon in his own name. Barry v. Wachosky, 57 Neb. 534, 77 N.W. 1080 (1899).
The assignee of a chose in action is the proper and only party who can maintain a suit thereon. Crum v. Stanley, 55 Neb. 351, 75 N.W. 851 (1898); Mills v. Murry, 1 Neb. 327 (1871).
A contract of guaranty is assignable, and the assignee may maintain an action thereon in his own name. Weir v. Anthony, 35 Neb. 396, 53 N.W. 206 (1892).
A mechanic's lien is assignable, and the assignee can maintain an action to foreclose the lien in his own name. Rogers v. Omaha Hotel Co., 4 Neb. 54 (1875).
2. Miscellaneous
A written assignment must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Hawley v. Skradski, 304 Neb. 488, 935 N.W.2d 212 (2019).
Assignment of a negotiable instrument may be made on a separate sheet of paper, but transferee is not protected against defenses which might be shown against payee. Plattsmouth State Bank v. Redding, 128 Neb. 268, 258 N.W. 661 (1935).
A claim for earned official salary against county may be assigned, and such assignment is binding on county when county board is advised of such assignment. Woods v. Brown County, 125 Neb. 692, 251 N.W. 839 (1933).
25-303.
Assignee; defenses and counterclaims available.An action by the assignee of a thing in action shall be without prejudice to any counterclaim or defense existing between the original parties; but this section shall not apply to negotiable bonds, promissory notes, or bills of exchange, transferred in good faith, and upon good consideration before due.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 31, p. 398; R.S.1913, § 7584; C.S.1922, § 8527; C.S.1929, § 20-303; R.S.1943, § 25-303.
Annotations
1. General
2. Promissory notes
3. Miscellaneous
1. General
The assignee of a chose in action acquires no greater rights than those of the assignor, and takes it subject to all the defenses existent at the time. Midwest Renewable Energy v. American Engr. Testing, 296 Neb. 73, 894 N.W.2d 221 (2017).
The fundamental test to be applied in ascertaining whether the plaintiff is the real party in interest is whether or not the prosecution of the action will save the defendant from further harassment or vexation at the hands of other claimants to the same demand. Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947).
Defenses arising against the assignor, after notice of the assignment, cannot be set off against the claim of the assignee. Cronkleton v. Hastings Theatre and Realty Corp., 134 Neb. 168, 278 N.W. 144 (1938).
2. Promissory notes
Where promissory note was purchased after maturity, it was subject to any set-off or other defense against prior holder. Wilbur v. Jeep, 37 Neb. 604, 56 N.W. 198 (1893).
An endorsement of a promissory note not for value, but for the purpose of collection, does not cut off defenses of maker defendant. Roberts v. Snow, 27 Neb. 425, 43 N.W. 241 (1889).
A promissory note assigned by a separate writing rather than by endorsement is not transferred within the meaning of this section and the maker's defense of usury is available against the assignee. Doll v. Hollenbeck, 19 Neb. 639, 28 N.W. 286 (1886).
The purchaser of a note after maturity takes it subject to any set-off good between the original parties. Davis v. Neligh, 7 Neb. 78 (1878).
3. Miscellaneous
Purchaser of village warrants takes same subject to any equities existing against holder. Union Nat. Bank of Fremont v. Village of Beemer, 123 Neb. 778, 244 N.W. 303 (1932).
Account cannot be assigned free from right of set-off. Olsen v. Marquis, 88 Neb. 610, 130 N.W. 267 (1911).
Future earnings or profits under an existing contract are assignable. First Nat. Bank of Madison v. School Dist. No. 1, 77 Neb. 570, 110 N.W. 349 (1906).
In action on certificate of deposit transferred after due, maker may set off any cross-demand against original payee which existed at time of transfer. First Nat. Bank of Rapid City v. Security Nat. Bank of Sioux City, 34 Neb. 71, 51 N.W. 305 (1892).
25-304.
Parties to actions.An executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a person with whom or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another, or a person expressly authorized by statute, may bring an action without joining the person for whose benefit it is prosecuted. Officers may sue and be sued in such name as is authorized by law and official bonds may be sued upon the same way. Assignees of choses in action assigned for the purpose of collection may sue on any claim assigned in writing.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 32, p. 398; Laws 1913, c. 166, § 1, p. 509; R.S.1913, § 7585; C.S.1922, § 8528; C.S.1929, § 20-304; R.S.1943, § 25-304;
Laws 2003, LB 19, § 1.
Annotations
1. Assignees
2. Executors, administrators, and guardians
3. Trustees
4. Officers
5. Contracts made for benefit of another
6. Miscellaneous
1. Assignees
An assignee can establish standing to bring an action in its own name, and thus show the court had subject matter jurisdiction, if it proves by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a written assignment. Western Ethanol Co. v. Midwest Renewable Energy, 305 Neb. 1, 938 N.W.2d 329 (2020).
A written assignment must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Hawley v. Skradski, 304 Neb. 488, 935 N.W.2d 212 (2019).
An assignee of a chose in action may maintain an action thereon in the assignee's own name when the assignment being sued upon is in writing. Hawley v. Skradski, 304 Neb. 488, 935 N.W.2d 212 (2019).
An assignee of a chose in action to whom the legal title has been assigned for the purpose of collection is a proper party plaintiff and may maintain an action as the real party in interest. Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947).
An assignee of a chose in action assigned for collection is a proper party plaintiff but is not the real party in interest as to the cause of action. Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946).
Action is properly brought by assignee of creditor. Seybolt v. Waters, 109 Neb. 99, 189 N.W. 980 (1922).
2. Executors, administrators, and guardians
Plaintiff, describing himself as guardian, presumed to sue in representative capacity. Bennett v. Bennett, 65 Neb. 432, 91 N.W. 409 (1902), affirmed on rehearing 65 Neb. 441, 96 N.W. 994 (1903).
Federal court had jurisdiction on ground of diversity of citizenship by Kansas resident, even though plaintiff had been appointed administratrix by Nebraska court. Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1962).
3. Trustees
When certain devisees under will appoint a trustee who brings action in their behalf, they are all bound thereby. Glissmann v. McDonald, 128 Neb. 693, 260 N.W. 182 (1935).
Trustee for bondholders is entitled to maintain appeal. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Nebraska Elec. Co., 106 Neb. 255, 183 N.W. 546 (1921).
Trustee for minor son of insured, so designated as beneficiary in policy, may bring action thereon. Ward v. Bankers Life Co., 99 Neb. 812, 157 N.W. 1017 (1916).
Where trustee refuses to carry out terms of trust, parties beneficially interested may maintain action to enforce trust and obtain benefit thereunder. Goble v. Swobe, 64 Neb. 838, 90 N.W. 919 (1902).
Trustee of express trust, who is obligee on injunction bond, may maintain action thereon in own name. Gyger v. Courtney, 59 Neb. 555, 81 N.W. 437 (1900).
Consignor of goods is not trustee of an express trust. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Metcalf & Wood, 50 Neb. 452, 69 N.W. 961 (1897).
County is proper party to bring an action analogous to that of trustee for all funds, except those of the county proper, where county treasurer is in default. Thorne v. Adams County, 22 Neb. 825, 36 N.W. 515 (1888).
4. Officers
School district treasurer or successor may maintain action for recovery of district's money deposited in bank. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Nemaha County Bank, 124 Neb. 883, 248 N.W. 650 (1933).
Tax Commissioner exercising constitutional powers as the real party in interest, in absence of express statutory prohibition, is authorized to carry on proceedings in the name of the state. State v. Odd Fellows Hall Assn., 123 Neb. 440, 243 N.W. 616 (1932).
Action may be brought in name of bank as plaintiff, although it is in hands of State Bank Superintendent. First State Bank of Herrick v. Conant, 117 Neb. 562, 221 N.W. 691 (1928).
State Board may bring action where authorized by statute. State ex rel. Board of Transportation v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 29 Neb. 550, 45 N.W. 785 (1890).
5. Contracts made for benefit of another
Action may be brought by person in whose name a contract was made for benefit of another. Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
Party in whose name contract is made for benefit of another may bring action without joining such other person. Coe v. Nebraska B. & I. Co., 110 Neb. 322, 193 N.W. 708 (1923).
This section constitutes exception to statutory rule that all parties united in interest must join as plaintiffs. Owner of fractional interest in real estate is proper plaintiff in action upon contract executed in his name for benefit of all interests. O'Shea v. North American Hotel Co., 109 Neb. 317, 191 N.W. 321 (1922).
Person holding legal title, although property is in fact owned by another, may maintain action in own name. Chamberlain v. Woolsey, 66 Neb. 149, 95 N.W. 38 (1903).
Party, holding legal title to chose in action for the benefit of another, may sue in own name. Meeker v. Waldron, 62 Neb. 689, 87 N.W. 539 (1901).
Where legal title was taken in name of plaintiff, suit was authorized by her for wrongful sale of land. Alexander v. Overton, 36 Neb. 503, 54 N.W. 825 (1893).
Where contract is made for benefit of another, action can be maintained in name of contracting party. Ley v. Miller, 28 Neb. 822, 45 N.W. 174 (1890).
Where a promissory note is made to an agent in his own name as promisee, he may maintain an action thereon without joining the person beneficially interested in the note. Stoll v. Sheldon, 13 Neb. 207, 13 N.W. 201 (1882).
6. Miscellaneous
An agreement requiring the purchase of construction fund warrants, regardless of the holder of the warrants, may be enforced by the party that made the agreement and is authorized to make the demand for purchase. Chiles, Heider & Co. v. Pawnee Meadows, 217 Neb. 315, 350 N.W.2d 1 (1984).
Under this section, Nebraska has not recognized "consent" as being an exception to the requirement under section 25-301, R.R.S.1943, that an action be prosecuted by the real party in interest. Redding v. Gibbs, 203 Neb. 727, 280 N.W.2d 53 (1979).
The Attorney General may bring an action for a declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of a statute which the Tax Commissioner proposes to implement and enforce. State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 199 N.W.2d 738 (1972).
Tenant who had settled with landowner for landowner's share of loss was entitled to recover the entire damages caused to crops by defendant. Ristine v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals, 188 Neb. 550, 198 N.W.2d 199 (1972).
Party in whose name contract was made could bring action for violation of Installment Loan Act. McNish v. Grand Island Finance Co., 164 Neb. 543, 83 N.W.2d 13 (1957); McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957).
Attorney General may bring action of injunction under Installment Loan Act without joining borrowers as parties. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956).
Person for whom bond was tendered did not fall within exceptions. Summit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Nimtz, 158 Neb. 762, 64 N.W.2d 803 (1954).
The real party in interest is the person entitled to the avails of the suit. Uptegrove v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 145 Neb. 51, 15 N.W.2d 220 (1944).
Defendant interposing counterclaim was not real party in interest where loss, if any, would fall on owner of bonds not joined as defendant in the action. Continental Nat. Bank of Lincoln v. Wilkinson, 124 Neb. 675, 247 N.W. 604 (1933).
25-305.
Married woman.A woman may while married sue and be sued in the same manner as if she were unmarried.
Source:Laws 1871, § 3, p. 68; R.S.1913, § 7586; C.S.1922, § 8529; C.S.1929, § 20-305; R.S.1943, § 25-305.
Annotations
Common-law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is abrogated; husband or wife is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by the reason of that relationship. This case overrules Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927). Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979).
Action by wife against husband for personal injuries is not authorized. Emerson v. Western Seed & Irr. Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927), overruled by Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979).
Statute of limitations runs against women during coverture. Murphy v. Evans City Steam Laundry Co., 52 Neb. 593, 72 N.W. 960 (1897).
Married woman may maintain action for personal injuries in her own home. City of Chadron v. Glover, 43 Neb. 732, 62 N.W. 62 (1895).
Wife may maintain action against husband for use and occupation of her real estate. Skinner v. Skinner, 38 Neb. 756, 57 N.W. 534 (1894).
Married woman, served with process, was bound by court's decree in registration proceedings under Torrens Act. Jones v. York County, 26 F.2d 623 (8th Cir. 1928).
Wife may maintain action for loss of consortium. Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F.Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953).
25-306.
Wife's right to defend.If a husband and wife be sued together, the wife may defend for her own right; and if the husband neglect to defend, she may defend for his right also.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 35, p. 398; R.S.1913, § 7587; C.S.1922, § 8530; C.S.1929, § 20-306; R.S.1943, § 25-306.
25-307.
Suit by infant, guardian, or next friend; exception; substitution by court.Except as provided by the Nebraska Probate Code, section 43-104.05, and sections 43-4801 to 43-4812, the action of an infant shall be commenced, maintained, and prosecuted by his or her guardian or next friend. Such actions may be dismissed with or without prejudice by the guardian or next friend only with approval of the court. When the action is commenced by his or her next friend, the court has power to dismiss it, if it is not for the benefit of the infant, or to substitute the guardian of the infant, or any person, as the next friend. Any action taken pursuant to this section shall be binding upon the infant.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 36, p. 398; R.S.1913, § 7588; C.S.1922, § 8531; C.S.1929, § 20-307; R.S.1943, § 25-307;
Laws 1975, LB 480, § 1; Laws 1975, LB 481, § 10; Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 10; Laws 2018, LB714, § 13; Laws 2022, LB741, § 1.
Cross References
Nebraska Probate Code, see section 30-2201.
Annotations
1. Guardian or next friend
2. Miscellaneous
1. Guardian or next friend
Trial court has power, for cause, to substitute next friend in place of guardian. Workman v. Workman, 167 Neb. 857, 95 N.W.2d 186 (1959).
Next friend may be incompetent to testify to transaction with deceased person. Fincham v. Mueller, 166 Neb. 376, 89 N.W.2d 137 (1958).
Minor should be represented by guardian ad litem or a next friend. Cass v. Pense, 155 Neb. 792, 54 N.W.2d 68 (1952).
Where infants have been disinherited or deprived of valuable property rights by will, near relative or other person interested in their welfare may institute proceedings as next friend, to contest will, negotiate for compromise, and execute contract of settlement for infants' benefit, and such contract, if approved by court, is binding on infants and all parties thereto. In re Shierman's Estate, 129 Neb. 230, 261 N.W. 155 (1935).
Under authority hereof, guardian or next friend might sue to protect rights of minor cestui que trust as against testamentary trustee. In re Frerichs' Estate, 120 Neb. 462, 233 N.W. 456 (1930).
Intervention by infants, through next friend, in probate proceedings is authorized hereunder; appointment of guardian ad litem is not required. In re Bayer's Estate, 116 Neb. 670, 218 N.W. 746 (1928).
This section is not in derogation of right of next friend to maintain action on behalf of one incapable of conducting his own affairs through age or weakness. Stephan v. Prairie Life Ins. Co., 113 Neb. 469, 203 N.W. 626 (1925).
Infants have a right to sue by guardian or next friend to recover damages for injuries due to tortious acts. Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903).
Next friend may bring suit for an insane party. Wager v. Wagoner, 53 Neb. 511, 73 N.W. 937 (1898).
Where seventeen-year-old minor brought suit by next friend, as authorized by law, for injunction against enforcement of statute requiring parents' consent for abortion, motion for appointment of guardian ad litem was denied. Doe v. Exon, 416 F.Supp. 716 (D. Neb. 1976).
2. Miscellaneous
If a minor lacks the capacity to bring an action, the court acquires no jurisdiction over the matter. Carlos H. v. Lindsay M., 283 Neb. 1004, 815 N.W.2d 168 (2012).
This section recognizes the common law that an infant lacks the legal capacity to sue. Carlos H. v. Lindsay M., 283 Neb. 1004, 815 N.W.2d 168 (2012).
Owner of life estate in portion of larger tract may maintain partition against cotenant holding fee simple. Nitz v. Widman, 106 Neb. 736, 184 N.W. 172 (1921).
One for whom a conservator has been appointed possesses the power to sue in his own name. Rogers v. Bates, 431 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1970).
25-308.
Action by guardian, conservator, or next friend; liability for costs; security; witness.The guardian, conservator, or next friend is liable for the costs of the action brought by the guardian, conservator, or next friend, and when he or she is insolvent, the court may require security for the costs of the action. The guardian, conservator, or next friend may be a witness in an action brought by the guardian, conservator, or next friend.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 37, p. 399; R.S.1913, § 7589; C.S.1922, § 8532; C.S.1929, § 20-308; R.S.1943, § 25-308;
Laws 1975, LB 481, § 11; Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 11.
Annotations
Costs cannot be taxed against guardian ad litem in a case brought by another against a minor or incompetent. White v. Ogier, 175 Neb. 883, 125 N.W.2d 68 (1963).
A guardian or next friend is liable for the costs of an action brought by him. Peterson v. Skiles, 173 Neb. 470, 113 N.W.2d 628 (1962).
Liability for costs may cause next friend to be incompetent to testify as to transaction with deceased person. Fincham v. Mueller, 166 Neb. 376, 89 N.W.2d 137 (1958).
An action of an infant must be brought by his guardian or next friend, who alone is liable for costs, and the infant is not liable to a judgment therefor. Kleffel v. Bullock, 8 Neb. 336 (1879).
25-309.
Suit against infant; guardian for suit; when appointed; exception.Except as provided by the Nebraska Probate Code and section 43-104.05, the defense of an infant must be by a guardian for the suit, who may be appointed by the court in which the action is prosecuted, or by a judge thereof, or by a county judge. The appointment cannot be made until after service of the summons in the action as directed by this code.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 38, p. 399; R.S.1913, § 7590; C.S.1922, § 8533; C.S.1929, § 20-309; R.S.1943, § 25-309;
Laws 1975, LB 481, § 12; Laws 2022, LB741, § 2.
Cross References
Nebraska Probate Code, see section 30-2201.
Annotations
1. Appointment of guardian
2. Miscellaneous
1. Appointment of guardian
An infant must be defended in a lawsuit by a guardian. Carlos H. v. Lindsay M., 283 Neb. 1004, 815 N.W.2d 168 (2012).
The defense of an infant must be made by a guardian for the suit. Omey v. Stauffer, 174 Neb. 247, 117 N.W.2d 481 (1962).
The defense of a minor must be made by a guardian ad litem. Peterson v. Skiles, 173 Neb. 470, 113 N.W.2d 628 (1962).
Appointment of guardian ad litem should not be made until after service of process in the action. Marsh v. Marsh, 173 Neb. 282, 113 N.W.2d 323 (1962).
Appointment of guardian ad litem was proper. Cass v. Pense, 155 Neb. 792, 54 N.W.2d 68 (1952).
Failure of court to appoint guardian ad litem for minor, under circumstances disclosed, was not prejudicial error. Kuhlman v. Schacht, 130 Neb. 511, 265 N.W. 549 (1936).
Where partition suit is brought by father against minor children under fourteen, service on minors and plaintiff as father and guardian is sufficient to confer jurisdiction to appoint guardian ad litem. Beadle v. Beadle, 102 Neb. 73, 165 N.W. 953 (1917).
Where minor acquires title to subject matter of action while it is pending, failure to appoint guardian ad litem will not invalidate judgment. Shelby v. St. James Orphan Asylum, 66 Neb. 40, 92 N.W. 155 (1902).
Failure to appoint guardian ad litem was merely error; it does not render void the judgment entered. Manfull v. Graham, 55 Neb. 645, 76 N.W. 19 (1898).
2. Miscellaneous
This section refers to the defense of infants, rather than to affirmative action on their behalf. In re Bayer's Estate, 116 Neb. 670, 218 N.W. 746 (1928).
Guardian should resist payment of illegal attorney fees out of estate of ward. Ress v. Shepherd, 84 Neb. 268, 120 N.W. 1132 (1909).
25-310.
Suit against infant; guardian; how appointed.The appointment may be made upon the application of the infant, if he be of the age of fourteen years, and apply within twenty days after the return of the summons. If he be under the age of fourteen or neglect so to apply, the appointment may be made upon the application of any friend of the infant, or on that of plaintiff in the action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 39, p. 399; R.S.1913, § 7591; C.S.1922, § 8534; C.S.1929, § 20-310; R.S.1943, § 25-310.
Annotations
Minor over fourteen has the right to apply for appointment of guardian, and objection that no guardian was appointed comes too late after verdict. Kuhlman v. Schacht, 130 Neb. 511, 265 N.W. 549 (1936).
Where partition suit is brought by father against minor children under fourteen years of age, service on minors and plaintiff as father and guardian is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on court to appoint guardian ad litem. Beadle v. Beadle, 102 Neb. 73, 165 N.W. 953 (1917).
25-311.
Joinder of plaintiffs.All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 40, p. 399; R.S.1913, § 7592; C.S.1922, § 8535; C.S.1929, § 20-311; R.S.1943, § 25-311;
Laws 1998, LB 234, § 1.
Annotations
1. Joinder
2. Miscellaneous
1. Joinder
Multiple plaintiffs may join in one suit to enjoin a nuisance so long as the alleged nuisance interferes with the rights of each plaintiff joined; however, multiple plaintiffs seeking monetary damages for an alleged nuisance would be misjoined where any one plaintiff has no interest in the monetary relief demanded by each of the other plaintiffs. Goeke v. National Farms, Inc., 245 Neb. 262, 512 N.W.2d 626 (1994).
Mortgagees of cattle were proper party plaintiffs with owner in suit on indemnity bond of livestock commission company. Oss v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 130 Neb. 311, 264 N.W. 897 (1936).
To authorize joinder of parties as defendants, they must be under joint liability or claiming some right in subject matter of action. Stull Bros. v. Powell, 70 Neb. 152, 97 N.W. 249 (1903).
Successive mortgagees, merely as such, and even though possession has not been had on any of the mortgages, may join in replevying the property. Trompen v. Yates, 66 Neb. 525, 92 N.W. 647 (1902).
City may join as party plaintiff in tax foreclosure proceedings by county, but is not required to do so. County of Lancaster v. Rush, 35 Neb. 119, 52 N.W. 837 (1892).
Two parties having separate and distinct claims to the possession of the same property may unite such claims and in their joint or combined names maintain an action of replevin therefor. Earle v. Burch, 21 Neb. 702, 33 N.W. 254 (1887).
Tenants in common may join in an action for the possession of real estate held by one without title. Mattis v. Boggs, 19 Neb. 698, 28 N.W. 325 (1886).
An attorney who has perfected his lien upon money due from defendant in a pending action has such an interest therein to be made a coplaintiff. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 10 Neb. 574, 7 N.W. 322 (1880).
2. Miscellaneous
Interested parties may appeal to district court from action of county superintendent in dissolving school district. Board of Education v. Winne, 177 Neb. 431, 129 N.W.2d 255 (1964).
Objection that plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue must be made, if at all, by party to suit. Miller v. Willis, 15 Neb. 13, 16 N.W. 840 (1883).
In an action brought upon a judgment against a principal debtor, in behalf of a surety who has paid off and satisfied the same and taken an assignment thereof, the original plaintiffs are not proper parties. Eaton v. Lambert, 1 Neb. 339 (1871).
25-312.
Defendants; how designated; misnomer; when immaterial.(1) In all actions upon bills of exchange or promissory notes, or other written instruments, and in all actions described in subsection (2) of this section, it is sufficient to designate any defendant by the name or part of name by which he or she is designated in the instrument upon which action is brought, or by which he or she appears of record to have some interest, right, title, estate in or lien upon the property involved in such action or proceeding, and for all the purposes of such action or proceeding such name shall be considered the real name of such defendant.
(2) This section applies to (a) actions brought under section 25-401, 25-402, or 25-403 and (b) actions which relate to, or the subject of which is, real or personal property in this state, if the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, in such property, or the relief demanded consists wholly or partially in excluding the defendant from any interest in such property, and such defendant is a nonresident of the state or is a foreign corporation.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 23, p. 397; R.S.1913, § 7593; Laws 1921, c. 220, § 34, p. 795; C.S.1922, § 8536; C.S.1929, § 20-312; R.S.1943, § 25-312;
Laws 1997, LB 1, § 1.
Annotations
Action upon promissory note may be brought against maker in name by which he signed note hereunder. Bresee v. Snyder, 94 Neb. 384, 143 N.W. 219 (1913).
A cause of action collateral to the instrument, and not based thereon, is not within the purview of this section. Gillian v. McDowall, 66 Neb. 814, 92 N.W. 991 (1902).
Where note and chattel mortgage are assigned to purchaser by his initials, he comes within exception and may sue and foreclose by action without giving full name. Richardson v. Opelt, 60 Neb. 180, 82 N.W. 377 (1900).
Prescribed mode of procedure must be closely followed. Church v. Callihan, 49 Neb. 542, 68 N.W. 932 (1896).
Misnomer in action may be taken advantage of any time before judgment. Small v. Sandall, 48 Neb. 318, 67 N.W. 156 (1896).
Where plaintiff is designated in the pleadings and process by initials, court may allow amendment to insert full name. Real v. Honey, 39 Neb. 516, 58 N.W. 136 (1894).
25-312.01.
Dissolved corporation; suit authorized.Any dissolved corporation may be sued by its corporate name upon any cause of action accrued against such corporation or which but for such dissolution would have accrued, with the same effect as if it had not been dissolved.
25-313.
Company, partnership, or unincorporated association; designation.Any company or association of persons formed for the purpose of (1) carrying on any trade or business, (2) holding any species of property in this state, or (3) representing employees in collective bargaining with employers, and not incorporated, may sue and be sued by such usual name as such company, partnership or association may have assumed to itself or be known by. It shall not be necessary in such case to set forth in the process or pleadings or to prove at the trial the names of the persons composing such company.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 24, p. 397; R.S.1913, § 7594; C.S.1922, § 8537; C.S.1929, § 20-313; R.S.1943, § 25-313; Laws 1947, c. 82, § 1, p. 256.
Annotations
1. Carrying on trade or business
2. Holding property
3. Labor unions
4. Miscellaneous
1. Carrying on trade or business
Pleading must show that partnership was formed for carrying on trade or business or for holding property in this state. McJunkin v. Placek & Fitl, 80 Neb. 373, 114 N.W. 411 (1907).
Unincorporated company, organized and doing business in another state, cannot sue here in firm name. Weisz & Mall Co. v. Davey, 28 Neb. 566, 44 N.W. 470 (1890).
Alleging that company is actually carrying on business in state is sufficient. Jansen & Co. v. Mundt, 20 Neb. 320, 30 N.W. 53 (1886).
Allegation that partnership is organized and doing business in State of Nebraska is sufficient to authorize carrying on of action in firm name. Chamberlain Banking House v. Noyes, Norman & Co., 3 Neb. Unof. 550, 92 N.W. 175 (1902); Biddle v. Spatz & Miner, 1 Neb. Unof. 175, 95 N.W. 354 (1901).
In suit to enjoin violation of federal statute by members of partnership, federal district court for Missouri, wherein members resided, had jurisdiction although place of partnership's business was in Nebraska. Sutherland v. United States, 74 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1934).
Partnership may sue in firm name on cause of action which accrued in the course of the partnership business. Shoaff v. Gage, 168 F.Supp. 161 (D. Neb. 1958).
2. Holding property
Allegation that company is formed to carry on some trade or business or to hold some species of property in this state and that it is not incorporated is essential to maintenance of action. Burlington & Missouri River Railroad Company in Nebraska v. Dick & Son, 7 Neb. 242 (1878).
3. Labor unions
Prior to 1947 amendment, where unincorporated association was not formed to carry on some trade or business, or to hold some species of property in this state, service of process could not be properly made on such association in this state. Hurley v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 147 Neb. 781, 25 N.W.2d 29 (1946).
4. Miscellaneous
An unincorporated association may represent employees in collective bargaining but must comply with section 25-314, R.R.S.1943, [now section 25-530.08], before it can bring an action in court. Nebraska Council of Educational Leaders v. Nebraska Dept. of Education, 189 Neb. 811, 205 N.W.2d 537 (1973).
Where name of plaintiff and right to sue are improperly stated, the defect is waived if not objected to. Champlin Bros. v. Sperling, 84 Neb. 633, 121 N.W. 976 (1909).
Partnership may sue or be sued in firm name. Stelling v. Peddicord, 78 Neb. 779, 111 N.W. 793 (1907).
This section is special in character, and prescribed course of procedure must be closely followed. Meyer v. Omaha Furniture & Carpet Co., 76 Neb. 405, 107 N.W. 767 (1906).
When the original action is against a partnership and during its pendency an amended petition is filed against the individual members, that is an abandonment or a discontinuance of the action against the firm. Wigton & Whitham v. Smith, 57 Neb. 299, 77 N.W. 772 (1899).
Section is to be strictly construed. Church v. Callihan, 49 Neb. 542, 68 N.W. 932 (1896).
If the plaintiff's petition sets out fully the names of the parties suing and then recites "late partners under the firm name . . ." the action is not brought within the provisions of this section. Smith v. Gregg, 9 Neb. 212, 2 N.W. 459 (1879).
So long as the defendant can be identified as the one against whom the judgment was rendered, he is as much bound by the judgment, and those claiming under the judgment are as much entitled to its benefits, to all intents and purposes, as if the defendant had been sued by his right name. Toulousaine de Distrib. v. Tri-State Seed & Grain, 2 Neb. App. 937, 520 N.W.2d 210 (1994).
Even though stock yard companies were separate legal entities, doctrine of primary jurisdiction was not applicable to oust federal court of jurisdiction. McCleneghan v. Union Stock Yards Co., 298 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1962).
Disbarment proceedings did not operate to deprive lawyer of equal protection of the law under this section. Niklaus v. Simmons, 196 F.Supp. 691 (D. Neb. 1961).
25-314.01.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-315.
Partnership or unincorporated association; security for costs.In cases where a company shall sue in its partnership name, such company shall procure the writ to be endorsed by a responsible surety, who is a resident of the county, for costs, or otherwise give security for costs.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 26, p. 397; R.S.1913, § 7596; C.S.1922, § 8539; C.S.1929, § 20-315; R.S.1943, § 25-315.
Annotations
In action against partners individually, upon a judgment obtained against firm, petition must allege partnership property is insufficient to satisfy judgment. Leach v. Milburn Wagon Co., 14 Neb. 106, 15 N.W. 232 (1883); Ruth v. Lowrey & Upton, 10 Neb. 260, 4 N.W. 977 (1880).
Security should be given before delivery of summons for service. Haskins v. Citizens Bank, 12 Neb. 39, 10 N.W. 466 (1881).
Security for costs is an essential prerequisite to maintenance of action. Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Dick & Son, 7 Neb. 242 (1878).
25-316.
Company, partnership, or unincorporated association; member's individual property; how subjected to satisfaction of judgment.If the plaintiff, in any judgment so rendered against any company or partnership, seeks to charge the individual property of the persons composing such company or firm, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff to file a bill in equity against the several members thereof, setting forth his or her judgment and the insufficiency of the partnership property to satisfy the same, and to have a decree for the debt and an award of execution against all such persons or any of them as may appear to have been members of such company, association, or firm.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 27, p. 397; R.S.1913, § 7597; C.S.1922, § 8540; C.S.1929, § 20-316; R.S.1943, § 25-316;
Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 12.
Annotations
As a condition precedent to bringing an action against individual partners to satisfy the debts of a partnership, this section contemplates that there must be a prior judgment against the partnership. Security State Bank v. McCoy, 219 Neb. 132, 361 N.W.2d 514 (1985).
The right of action preserved by this section is assignable in like manner and with like effect as other choses in action. Wood v. Carter, 67 Neb. 133, 93 N.W. 158 (1903).
A member of an unincorporated religious society not founded for the purpose of gain or pecuniary profit is not individually liable for its debts, unless he authorized the incurring of the obligation or subsequently ratified the same. First Nat. Bank of Plattsmouth v. Rector, 59 Neb. 77, 80 N.W. 269 (1899).
To entitle plaintiff to recover from individual partner, it was necessary to allege and prove that the partnership property was insufficient to satisfy the judgment. Ruth v. Lowrey & Upton, 10 Neb. 260, 4 N.W. 977 (1880).
A fundamental condition precedent to the bringing of a bill in equity pursuant to this section against individual partners is a prior judgment against the partnership. Under the doctrine of res judicata, an order by a bankruptcy court allowing an administrative expense claim is a prior judgment within the meaning of this section. Metco, Inc. v. Huffman, 2 Neb. App. 506, 511 N.W.2d 780 (1994).
25-317.
Repealed. Laws 1998, LB 234, § 12.
25-318.
Necessary joinder; involuntary joinder; procedure.Of the parties to the action, those who are united in interest shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants; but if the consent of one who should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a defendant, the reason being stated in the complaint.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 42, p. 399; R.S.1913, § 7599; C.S.1922, § 8542; C.S.1929, § 20-318; R.S.1943, § 25-318;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 6.
Annotations
1. Joinder
2. Miscellaneous
1. Joinder
Joint obligees must sue jointly in actions ex contractu. Hecker v. Ravenna Bank, 237 Neb. 810, 468 N.W.2d 88 (1991).
This section states general rule as to joinder, to which there are statutory exceptions. O'Shea v. North Am. Hotel Co., 109 Neb. 317, 191 N.W. 321 (1922).
Liability of defendants was joint and other parties interested with them should have been joined. Wolfenbarger v. Britt, 105 Neb. 773, 181 N.W. 932 (1921).
Voluntary release of one of two joint makers of promissory note will release the other; demurrer for misjoinder. Banking House of A. Castetter v. Rose, 78 Neb. 693, 111 N.W. 590 (1907).
In action on appeal bond running to joint obligees, failure by one obligee to join co-obligee as party justified dismissal of action. Harker v. Burbank, 68 Neb. 85, 93 N.W. 949 (1903).
Alleging that a person is joined as defendant because he refused to join as plaintiff is sufficient. Union P. Ry. Co. v. Vincent, 58 Neb. 171, 78 N.W. 457 (1899).
Parties jointly liable must be joined as defendants. Bowen v. Crow, 16 Neb. 556, 20 N.W. 850 (1884); Fox v. Abbott, 12 Neb. 328, 11 N.W. 303 (1882).
Widow may bring action alone or jointly with her children for damage against all persons jointly and severally who furnish liquor causing damage. Kerkow v. Bauer, 15 Neb. 150, 18 N.W. 27 (1883); Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304, 2 N.W. 715 (1879).
2. Miscellaneous
Assuming that plaintiff and guardian ad litem for incompetent defendant were united in interest, taxation of fee for guardian ad litem against plaintiff was unauthorized. Johnson v. Munsell, 170 Neb. 749, 104 N.W.2d 314 (1960).
This section is applicable to appellate proceedings. Donisthorpe v. Vavra, 134 Neb. 157, 278 N.W. 151 (1938).
Where assignment to plaintiff was of undivided interest in claim, subject to contingencies, plaintiff did not make separate case against defendant, in view of this section. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. United States Nat. Bank, 13 F.2d 36 (8th Cir. 1926).
25-319.
Class actions; representation.When the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are very numerous, and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 43, p. 399; R.S.1913, § 7600; C.S.1922, § 8543; C.S.1929, § 20-319; R.S.1943, § 25-319.
Annotations
1. Class action proper
2. Class action improper
3. Miscellaneous
1. Class action proper
Class action was proper for recovery of erroneous deductions from salaries of policemen and firemen for pension purposes. Gant v. City of Lincoln, 193 Neb. 108, 225 N.W.2d 549 (1975).
Class suit to determine rights to appropriation of water was authorized. Hickman v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 173 Neb. 428, 113 N.W.2d 617 (1972).
Class action may apply to proceedings for school district reorganization. Keedy v. Reid, 165 Neb. 519, 86 N.W.2d 370 (1957).
Class action to enjoin collection of void tax is authorized. Gamboni v. County of Otoe, 159 Neb. 417, 67 N.W.2d 489 (1954).
Class action was properly brought to determine disposition of assets of religious corporation. In re Estate of Harrington, 151 Neb. 81, 36 N.W.2d 577 (1949).
Plaintiffs are entitled to sue for themselves and all other members of fraternal insurance corporation similarly situated. Folts v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 117 Neb. 723, 223 N.W. 797 (1929).
2. Class action improper
A prison inmate, who sought to bring class action claims for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that conditions at the Nebraska State Penitentiary, including overcrowding, cell assignments, flooding, and inadequate showering conditions, violated his rights, lacked commonality with members of the purported class, and thus the inmate was unqualified to represent the class, where claims became moot after he was transferred to another correctional facility. Nesbitt v. Frakes, 300 Neb. 1, 911 N.W.2d 598 (2018).
An individual who cannot maintain his or her individual cause of action against a defendant is unqualified to represent a purported class in a class action. Lynch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 275 Neb. 136, 745 N.W.2d 291 (2008).
The general rule is that an action to recover taxes illegally assessed cannot be maintained as a class action. In re 1983-84 County Tax Levy, 220 Neb. 897, 374 N.W.2d 235 (1985).
When there is potential for conflicting interests within a class, in that some members of the class own property in both sending and receiving school districts, a suit against the receiving school districts may not be maintained as a class action. In re 1983-84 County Tax Levy, 220 Neb. 897, 374 N.W.2d 235 (1985).
A former policyholder who has terminated his insurance policy is not the proper representative for a class consisting of policyholders where there are actual and potential conflicts between the interests of the former and present policyholders. It is appropriate to dispose of the class aspect of such a case upon motion for summary judgment. Sarratt v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 212 Neb. 436, 323 N.W.2d 81 (1982).
Generally, a suit cannot be maintained by one taxpayer on behalf of himself and others similarly situated to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed, but each taxpayer must bring action on his own behalf. Riha Farms, Inc. v. County of Sarpy, 212 Neb. 385, 322 N.W.2d 797 (1982).
A party having an interest adverse to the interests of those sought to be represented may not sue as representative of a class. Blankenship v. Omaha P. P. Dist., 195 Neb. 170, 237 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
Class action cannot be maintained by persons having interests adverse to those of parties purported to be represented. Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 185 Neb. 464, 176 N.W.2d 679 (1970).
Suit by assignee of claims under Fair Labor Standards Act is not a class action within the purview of this section. Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947).
3. Miscellaneous
In order to justify class status treatment, there must exist both a question of common or general interest and numerous parties so as to make it impracticable to bring all the parties before the court. Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d 223 (1994).
Where a class action is attempted, considerable discretion is vested with the trial court in determining if a class action is proper, even if the class technically fulfills statutory requirements. Berkshire & Andersen v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, 200 Neb. 113, 262 N.W.2d 449 (1978).
It was not necessary, in special proceedings to confirm validity of reclamation district, to make all landowners parties. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950).
Where a number of persons contribute to the erection of a church edifice, it is not necessary for all persons who contributed to join in an action to restrain a sale or transfer thereof. Avery v. Baker, 27 Neb. 388, 43 N.W. 174 (1889).
25-319.01.
Class action litigation; unpaid
residue; payment by defendant.(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that the
unpaid residuals in class action litigation are distributed, to the extent
possible, in a manner designed to promote justice for all citizens of this
state. The Legislature finds that the use of funds collected by state courts
pursuant to this section for these purposes is in the public interest, is
a proper use of the funds, and is consistent with essential public and governmental
purposes.
(2) Prior to the entry of
any judgment or order approving settlement in a class action described in
section 25-319, the court shall determine the total amount that will be payable
to all class members if all class members are paid the amount to which they
are entitled pursuant to the judgment or settlement. The court shall also
set a date when the parties shall report to the court the total amount that
was actually paid to the class members. After the report is received, the
court, unless it orders otherwise to further the purposes of the underlying
cause of action, shall direct the defendant to pay the sum of the unpaid residue
to the Legal Aid and Services Fund.
25-320.
Permissive joinder of defendants.All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 44, p. 399; R.S.1913, § 7601; C.S.1922, § 8544; C.S.1929, § 20-320; R.S.1943, § 25-320;
Laws 1998, LB 234, § 2.
Annotations
The maker and guarantor of a note are not liable upon the same obligation, so as to be sued together. Ayres v. West, 86 Neb. 297, 125 N.W. 583 (1910); Mowery v. Mast, 9 Neb. 445, 4 N.W. 69 (1880).
Parties who are severally liable upon a written contract may be impleaded in one action thereon. Champlin Bros. v. Sperling, 84 Neb. 633, 121 N.W. 976 (1909).
Any or all of persons severally liable on promissory note may be included in action at option of plaintiff. Palmer v. McFarlane, 73 Neb. 178, 102 N.W. 256 (1905).
Where written guarantee constitutes endorsement also, maker and endorsers may be sued jointly in action on note. Weitz v. Wolfe, 28 Neb. 500, 44 N.W. 485 (1890).
Maker and several endorsers may be sued together in one action. Pearson v. Kansas Mfg. Co., 14 Neb. 211, 15 N.W. 346 (1883).
Joinder of several defendants under state statute, notwithstanding several liability, does not create joint liability so as to preclude removal to federal court by nonresident defendant. Des Moines Elevator & Grain Co. v. Underwriters' Grain Assn., 63 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1933).
Statute does not prevent removal to federal court of action on note; statute does not make obligations, which are several, joint. Stewart v. Nebraska Tire & Rubber Co., 39 F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1930), affirming Stewart v. Heisler, 32 F.2d 519 (N.D. Iowa 1929).
25-321.
Unknown defendants; how designated.When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of the defendant, such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, or any name and description, followed by the words, "real name unknown". In any such case the person intended shall thereupon be regarded as a defendant in such action or proceeding and as sufficiently identified therein for all purposes, including service of summons or constructive service when authorized and as prescribed in Chapter 25. In any action wherein it is alleged in the complaint or other pleading that there are persons who have or that there are persons who claim or appear to have some interest in, right or title to, or lien upon any real or personal property within this state involved in such action, and that the ownership of, interest in, rights or title to, or lien upon such property of such persons, does not appear of record, in or by their respective names, in the county wherein such property is situated, and that the plaintiff or person in whose behalf such allegations are made, after diligent investigation and inquiry, is unable to ascertain and does not know the names or whereabouts if in this state, or the residence of such persons, such action may proceed against all such persons designated as "all persons having or claiming any interest in" such property which shall be accurately and definitely described, followed by the words, "real names unknown".
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 148, p. 416; R.S.1913, § 7602; Laws 1915, c. 142, § 1, p. 310; Laws 1917, c. 138, § 1, p. 325; Laws 1921, c. 226, § 1, p. 815; C.S.1922, § 8545; C.S.1929, § 20-321; R.S.1943, § 25-321;
Laws 1983, LB 447, § 17; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 7.
Annotations
1. Designation of defendants
2. Service
3. Miscellaneous
1. Designation of defendants
In suit to quiet title against all persons having or claiming interest in designated lands, a default decree is conclusive against all persons not in possession or record holders thereof. State ex rel. Conkey v. Ryan, 136 Neb. 334, 285 N.W. 923 (1939).
Legal name of defendant includes his first Christian name, and surname or patronymic; affidavit and published summons must contain these, not initials. Nelson v. Sughrue, 93 Neb. 480, 140 N.W. 800 (1913); Butler v. Smith, 84 Neb. 78, 120 N.W. 1106 (1909); Herbage v. McKee, 82 Neb. 354, 117 N.W. 706 (1908); Stull v. Masilonka, 74 Neb. 309, 104 N.W. 188 (1905), rehearing denied, 74 Neb. 322, 108 N.W. 166 (1906); Gillian v. McDowall, 66 Neb. 814, 92 N.W. 991 (1902); Enewold v. Olsen, 39 Neb. 59, 57 N.W. 765 (1894).
In constructive notice in suit to foreclose mortgage, legal name includes first Christian name and surname. McCabe v. Equitable Land Co., 88 Neb. 453, 129 N.W. 1018 (1911); Butler v. Smith, 84 Neb. 78, 120 N.W. 1106 (1909).
2. Service
Service by publication did not bind parties in actual possession of land. Thomas v. Flynn, 169 Neb. 458, 100 N.W.2d 37 (1959).
Where statute has been followed, service by publication is conclusive against all persons except those in actual possession. Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959).
Parties in actual possession of easement were not subject to service under this section. Jurgensen v. Ainscow, 155 Neb. 701, 53 N.W.2d 196 (1952).
Where there is no service, or insufficient service, judgment against the person is void. Henze v. Mitchell, 93 Neb. 278, 140 N.W. 149 (1913).
A court acquires jurisdiction over defendant by personal service of process, even though he be defectively described therein. Wm. Krotter & Co. v. Norton, 84 Neb. 137, 120 N.W. 923 (1909).
Where defendant sued by his initials only files answer, it is waiver of defect in service. Scarborough v. Myrick, 47 Neb. 794, 66 N.W. 867 (1896).
Applies to given name and surname; where either is unknown, there must be actual personal service. Enewold v. Olsen, 39 Neb. 59, 57 N.W. 765 (1894).
3. Miscellaneous
Statement must be made in verification to petition or affidavit that plaintiff could not discover true name. Stratton v. McDermott, 89 Neb. 622, 131 N.W. 949 (1911).
To be ignorant of either the given name or a surname of a person is to be ignorant of a person's name within this section. McNamara v. Gunderson, 89 Neb. 112, 131 N.W. 183 (1911).
25-322.
Substitution of parties; death; disability; transfer of interest.An action does not abate by the death or other disability of a party, or by the transfer of any interest therein during its pendency, if the cause of action survives or continues. In the case of the death or other disability of a party, the court may allow the action to continue by or against his or her representative or successor in interest. In case of any other transfer of interest, the action may be continued in the name of the original party or the court may allow the person to whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 45, p. 399; R.S.1913, § 7603; C.S.1922, § 8546; C.S.1929, § 20-322; R.S.1943, § 25-322;
Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 13.
Annotations
1. Survival of cause of action
2. Transfer of interest
3. Miscellaneous
1. Survival of cause of action
Divorce suit does not survive death of party before decree becomes final. Williams v. Williams, 146 Neb. 383, 19 N.W.2d 630 (1945).
Cause of action for widow's allowance does not survive; hence cannot be revived. In re Samson's Estate, 142 Neb. 556, 7 N.W.2d 60 (1942).
Foreclosure action brought by trustees did not abate on death of one trustee. Kennedy v. Potts, 128 Neb. 213, 258 N.W. 471 (1935).
When plaintiff dies from injuries for which he brought suit, administrator is entitled to recover for benefit of estate what plaintiff would have been entitled to if he had survived. Murray v. Omaha Transfer Co., 95 Neb. 175, 145 N.W. 360 (1914), on rehearing, 98 Neb. 482, 153 N.W. 488 (1915).
Where action proceeds to decree after death of plaintiff without substitution of personal representative, decree is not open to collateral attack. Wardrobe v. Leonard, 78 Neb. 531, 111 N.W. 134 (1907).
Where party becomes incapacitated after commencement of action, it is duty of court to protect his interests. Simmons v. Kelsey, 72 Neb. 534, 101 N.W. 1 (1904).
An action on a single contract debt, for which a man's heirs as such are not liable, cannot be continued against such heirs. Buck v. Hogeboom, 63 Neb. 672, 88 N.W. 857 (1902).
Substitution of heir at law for administrator is not equivalent to bringing new action, within meaning of statute of limitations. Tecumseh Nat. Bank v. McGee, 61 Neb. 709, 85 N.W. 949 (1901).
Pending action for personal injury does not abate by death of plaintiff. Webster v. City of Hastings, 59 Neb. 563, 81 N.W. 510 (1900).
Action does not abate by the removal or discharge of an administrator as plaintiff during its pendency. Edney v. Baum, 2 Neb. Unof. 173, 96 N.W. 167 (1901).
2. Transfer of interest
The transfer of interest after an action is commenced does not prevent the action from being continued to final termination in the name of the original plaintiff. Eli's, Inc. v. Lemen, 256 Neb. 515, 591 N.W.2d 543 (1999).
Where there was a transfer of interest, action could be continued in name of original party defendant. Anest v. Chester B. Brown Co., 169 Neb. 330, 99 N.W.2d 615 (1959).
Transfer of interest after action has been commenced does not prevent action from being continued to final termination in name of original party. Exchange Elevator Co. v. Marshall, 147 Neb. 48, 22 N.W.2d 403 (1946).
Transfer of interest pending appeal is not ground for dismissal of appeal. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Lincoln Hail Ins. Co., 133 Neb. 496, 276 N.W. 169 (1937).
One who purchases choses in action during the pendency of a suit thereon may carry on the suit in the name of the original plaintiff, and may maintain an action in the name of the original plaintiff and obligee in a redelivery bond given to secure the return of property attached in the suit. Commercial Nat. Bank of Kearney v. Faser, 99 Neb. 105, 155 N.W. 601 (1915).
Where suit was properly commenced by mortgagees, it was properly prosecuted to final decree in their names notwithstanding transfer of interest pending litigation. Burns v. Hockett, 91 Neb. 546, 136 N.W. 348 (1912).
Substitution of one party plaintiff for another in a pending action is a continuation of the original rather than the commencement of a new action. State Bank of Gothenburg v. Carroll, 81 Neb. 484, 116 N.W. 276 (1908).
Stay filed before transfer of interest may be availed of by transferee. Jenkins Land & Live Stock Co. v. Attwood, 80 Neb. 806, 115 N.W. 305 (1908).
Substitution of parties does not modify the issues, and evidence taken before such transfer should be considered in the same manner as if there had been no change in parties. Munger v. Yeiser, 80 Neb. 285, 114 N.W. 166 (1907).
Action commenced by receiver may be continued in his name notwithstanding sale of his interest. Schaberg v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 493, 83 N.W. 737 (1900).
Substitution of parties on transfer of interest does not release surety on appeal bond. Howell v. Alma Milling Co., 36 Neb. 80, 54 N.W. 126 (1893).
3. Miscellaneous
Statutory provisions regarding revivor of actions apply to cases in which a party dies pending an appeal, and any order of revivor or substitution must be had in the court having jurisdiction at the time of the party's death. Muller v. Weeder, 313 Neb. 639, 986 N.W.2d 38 (2023).
Although an attorney of a deceased client may have a duty to protect the client's interests by alerting a legal representative of his or her pending claim, absent a contractual agreement to the contrary, an attorney's representation of a client generally ends upon the death of that client. A deceased party's representative or successor in interest must either seek a conditional order of revival under Chapter 25, article 14, of the Nebraska Revised Statutes or seek a court's substitution order under this section before an action or proceeding can continue. In re Conservatorship of Franke, 292 Neb. 912, 875 N.W.2d 408 (2016).
An attorney's unauthorized actions on the part of a deceased client are a nullity. So, unless a deceased client's legal representative or the client's contractual agreement authorizes the attorney to take or continue an action for the client, an attorney cannot take any further valid action in the matter. In re Conservatorship of Franke, 292 Neb. 912, 875 N.W.2d 408 (2016).
In this section, the Legislature anticipated that a substitution of a legal representative or successor in interest is required when a party dies before the action can continue. This substitution is required because a deceased person cannot maintain a right of action against another or defend a legal interest in an action or proceeding. In re Conservatorship of Franke, 292 Neb. 912, 875 N.W.2d 408 (2016).
An order reviving an action, whether the order was entered in proceedings under this section or under sections 25-1403 to 25-1420, is not a final order from which an appeal may immediately be taken. The order may be reviewed after final judgment in the case. Platte Valley Nat. Bank v. Lasen, 273 Neb. 602, 732 N.W.2d 347 (2007).
When sole plaintiff in foreclosure proceedings dies, no further proceedings can be had until action is revived. Vybiral v. Schildhauer, 144 Neb. 114, 12 N.W.2d 660 (1944).
Permitting assignee to intervene and become, in fact, a party plaintiff was not prejudicial, in view of this section. Rea v. Pierson, 114 Neb. 173, 206 N.W. 760 (1925).
This section applies to the prosecution of a claim against an estate in probate proceedings. Harman v. Harman, 62 Neb. 452, 87 N.W. 177 (1901).
Right of revivor under this section rests in discretion of trial court and is governed by equitable principles. Hayden v. Huff, 62 Neb. 375, 87 N.W. 184 (1901).
This section is not applicable to plaintiff in an action of replevin. Flanders v. Lyon & Healy, 51 Neb. 102, 70 N.W. 524 (1897).
It is proper practice to revive an action to file supplemental pleadings and issue summons. Rakes v. Brown, 34 Neb. 304, 51 N.W. 848 (1892).
25-323.
Necessary parties; brought into suit.The court may determine any controversy between parties before it when it can be done without prejudice to the rights of others or by saving their rights; but when a determination of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court shall order them to be brought in.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 46, p. 400; R.S.1913, § 7604; C.S.1922, § 8547; C.S.1929, § 20-323; R.S.1943, § 25-323;
Laws 1995, LB 411, § 1; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 8; Laws 2023, LB157, § 2.
Annotations
1. Necessary parties
2. Unnecessary parties
3. Miscellaneous
1. Necessary parties
When an indispensable party is absent, the court has a duty under this section to require that the indispensable party be brought into the action. Williams v. Williams, 311 Neb. 772, 973 N.W.2d 523 (2022).
In an action for grandparent visitation, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make a determination as to grandparent visitation rights where the noncustodial father was not made a party to the action and not given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Davis v. Moats, 308 Neb. 757, 956 N.W.2d 682 (2021).
Necessary parties are parties who have an interest in the controversy, and should ordinarily be joined unless their interests are separable so that the court can, without injustice, proceed in their absence. Indispensable parties are parties whose interest is such that a final decree cannot be entered without affecting them, or that termination of controversy in their absence would be inconsistent with equity. Midwest Renewable Energy v. American Engr. Testing, 296 Neb. 73, 894 N.W.2d 221 (2017).
This section imposes a duty on the court to require an indispensable party be added to the litigation sua sponte when one is absent and statutorily deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy absent the presence of all indispensable parties. Midwest Renewable Energy v. American Engr. Testing, 296 Neb. 73, 894 N.W.2d 221 (2017).
The presumed father of a child conceived and born during the marriage to the child's mother is an indispensable party to a suit initiated by the putative biological father to establish his paternity and obtain custody of the child. Helter v. Williamson, 239 Neb. 741, 478 N.W.2d 6 (1991).
The Code of Civil Procedure declares if a determination of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of the parties, the court must order them to be brought into the litigation. Koch v. Koch, 226 Neb. 305, 411 N.W.2d 319 (1987).
Indispensable parties to a suit are those who not only have an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also have an interest of such a nature that a formal decree cannot be made without affecting their interests, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. Johnson v. Mays, 216 Neb. 890, 346 N.W.2d 401 (1984).
In an action involving the disbursement of county funds, the county has a great, if not exclusive, interest, and is a necessary party to the action. Shepoka v. Knopik, 197 Neb. 651, 250 N.W.2d 619 (1977).
Lienholders were necessary parties but their claims having been paid subsequently, the refusal to order them added was error without prejudice. LaPuzza v. Prom Town House Motor Inn, Inc., 191 Neb. 687, 217 N.W.2d 472 (1974).
Where validity of tax levy for nonresident high school tuition is attacked, all receiving high school districts are necessary parties. Werth v. Buffalo County Board of Equalization, 187 Neb. 119, 188 N.W.2d 442 (1971).
When determination of a controversy cannot be had without the presence of new parties to the suit, the court should order them brought in. Whitaker v. Gering Irr. Dist., 183 Neb. 290, 160 N.W.2d 186 (1968).
In case to determine title of United States to public land, where United States is not a party to the action, no judgment or decree which could be entered could be binding in any manner on United States. Summerville v. Scotts Bluff County, 182 Neb. 311, 154 N.W.2d 517 (1967).
Where a determination of a controversy cannot be had without the presence of a new party, the court may order the new party brought into the suit. Midwest Laundry Equipment Corp. v. Berg, 174 Neb. 747, 119 N.W.2d 509 (1963).
Beneficiaries of trust could be ordered by the court to be brought into the case as parties. Workman v. Workman, 167 Neb. 857, 95 N.W.2d 186 (1959).
State was proper party to suit to reform deed. Rumbel v. Ress, 167 Neb. 359, 92 N.W.2d 904 (1958).
Court should bring in new parties when controversy cannot be determined without their presence. Burke Lumber & Coal Co. v. Anderson, 162 Neb. 551, 76 N.W.2d 630 (1956).
In declaratory judgment proceeding, court should order all necessary parties brought in or refuse to enter judgment. Redick v. Peony Park, 151 Neb. 442, 37 N.W.2d 801 (1949).
The court is only required to order new parties brought in when a determination of the controversy cannot be had without their presence. Dent v. City of North Platte, 148 Neb. 718, 28 N.W.2d 562 (1947).
When the determination of a controversy cannot be had without the presence of new parties to the suit, the court should order them brought in. Cunningham v. Brewer, 144 Neb. 218, 16 N.W.2d 533 (1944).
Court, on own motion, is authorized to make a necessary party defendant in equity suit. Toop v. Palmer, 108 Neb. 850, 189 N.W. 394 (1922).
Court must order necessary new parties brought in. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 87 Neb. 626, 127 N.W. 1069 (1910).
Section does not prevent court ordering in necessary parties at any time. Brown v. Brown, 71 Neb. 200, 98 N.W. 718 (1904).
Supreme Court may remand equity case to have necessary parties brought in. Smith v. Shaffer, 29 Neb. 656, 45 N.W. 936 (1890).
Court will not decide rights of absent parties. Koenig v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 27 Neb. 699, 43 N.W. 423 (1889).
The language of this section tracks the traditional distinction between the necessary and indispensable parties. Panhandle Collections v. Singh, 28 Neb. App. 924, 949 N.W.2d 554 (2020).
The first clause of this section makes the inclusion of necessary parties discretionary when a controversy of interest to them is severable from their rights. The second clause, however, mandates that the district court order indispensable parties to be brought into the controversy. All persons interested in the contract or property involved in an action are necessary parties, whereas all persons whose interests therein may be affected by a decree in equity are indispensable parties. The absence of an indispensable party to a controversy deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction to determine the controversy and cannot be waived. When it appears that all indispensable parties to a proper and complete determination of an equity cause were not before the court, an appellate court will remand the cause for the purpose of having such parties brought in. In re Trust Created by Augustin, 27 Neb. App. 593, 935 N.W.2d 493 (2019).
2. Unnecessary parties
The stepfather of a child born out of wedlock is not an indispensable party in a filiation proceeding against the putative biological father for support. State on behalf of J.R. v. Mendoza, 240 Neb. 149, 481 N.W.2d 165 (1992).
Department of Environmental Control and county zoning officials are not indispensable parties in a suit against a licensee for a solid waste disposal area where the suit is to enjoin against alleged violation of a county zoning ordinance. Omaha Fish and Wildlife Club, Inc. v. Community Refuse, Inc., 208 Neb. 110, 302 N.W.2d 379 (1981).
Court may determine rights between parties before it when it can be done without prejudice to rights of others or by saving their rights. Bailey v. McCoy, 187 Neb. 618, 193 N.W.2d 270 (1971).
Lessee was not necessary party to complete determination of quo warranto suit between state and lessor. State ex rel. Johnson v. Conservative Savings & Loan Assn., 143 Neb. 805, 11 N.W.2d 89 (1943).
Controversy could be determined without joinder of party who had sold interest in contract of purchase. Pollard v. Larson, 115 Neb. 136, 211 N.W. 998 (1927).
In action for personal injuries, one who may be liable to defendant as indemnitor need not be made additional defendant. Kaplan v. City of Omaha, 100 Neb. 567, 160 N.W. 960 (1916).
3. Miscellaneous
The lis pendens statute set forth at section 25-531 controls over this more general statute requiring the joinder of necessary and indispensable parties. Wilkinson Development v. Ford & Ford Investments, 311 Neb. 476, 973 N.W.2d 349 (2022).
Fact that someone other than defendant operator owned property involved does not necessarily make the owner an indispensable party in action to abate nuisance. City of Omaha v. Danner, 186 Neb. 701, 185 N.W.2d 869 (1971).
In mortgage foreclosure proceeding, court may determine controversy between parties as to ownership of land covered by the mortgage. Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes, 143 Neb. 58, 8 N.W.2d 545 (1943).
Cited in action in nature of creditor's bill to set aside certain conveyances. Robinson v. Williams, 136 Neb. 253, 285 N.W. 574 (1939).
Purchaser of choses in action during pendency of suit may proceed in name of original plaintiff. Commercial Nat. Bank of Kearney v. Faser, 99 Neb. 105, 155 N.W. 601 (1915).
Failure to dismiss for misjoinder of plaintiffs in equity is not prejudicial; court may decide rights between parties severally. Hamilton v. Allen, 86 Neb. 401, 125 N.W. 610 (1910).
Plaintiff cannot complain because court did not order in party who might intervene. Gamble v. Wilson, 33 Neb. 270, 50 N.W. 3 (1891).
Claim for damages for breach of warranty can be determined in replevin action. Smith v. Kinney, 32 Neb. 162, 49 N.W. 341 (1891).
25-324.
Actions for recovery of real or personal property; interest in property; intervention.When, in an action for the recovery of real or personal property, any person having an interest in the property applies to be made a party, the court may order it to be done.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 47, p. 400; R.S.1913, § 7605; C.S.1922, § 8548; C.S.1929, § 20-324; R.S.1943, § 25-324.
Annotations
A bidder at judicial sale, whose bid has been accepted, may appeal from an order setting the sale aside. Dawson County v. Whaley, 134 Neb. 509, 279 N.W. 164 (1938).
Mere fact that party claims to be owner of attached property does not give him right to intervene in the attachment and thus have question of his ownership determined in attachment suit. Geis v. Geis, 125 Neb. 394, 250 N.W. 252 (1933).
A mere contingent liability to answer to defendant is not sufficient ground for intervention. Omaha Southern Ry. Co. v. Beeson, 36 Neb. 361, 54 N.W. 557 (1893).
Must claim some interest in subject of action; title to land attached, in action against maker of note, is insufficient. Kimbro v. Clark, 17 Neb. 403, 22 N.W. 788 (1885).
25-325.
Interpleader by order of court upon affidavit of defendant.Upon the affidavit of a defendant, before answer in an action upon contract or for the recovery of personal property, that some third party, without collusion with the defendant, has or makes a claim to the subject of the action, and that the defendant is ready to pay or dispose of the same as the court may direct, the court may make an order for the safekeeping, or for the payment, or deposit in court, or delivery of the subject of the action, to such person as it may direct, and an order requiring such third party to appear in a reasonable time and maintain or relinquish his or her claim against the defendant. If such third party, being served with a copy of the order by the sheriff or such other person as the court may direct, fails to appear, the court may declare such third party barred of all claim in respect to the subject of the action against the defendant therein. If such third party appears, he or she shall be allowed to make himself or herself the defendant in the action in lieu of the original defendant, who shall be discharged from all liability to either of the other parties in respect to the subject of the action, upon compliance by the defendant with the order of the court for the payment, deposit, or delivery thereof.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 48, p. 400; R.S.1913, § 7606; C.S.1922, § 8549; C.S.1929, § 20-325; R.S.1943, § 25-325;
Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 14.
Annotations
1. Payment into court
2. Interpleader
3. Miscellaneous
1. Payment into court
Stakeholder should pay or offer to pay fund into court so that disposition thereof may be made effective. Burke Lumber & Coal Co. v. Anderson, 162 Neb. 551, 76 N.W.2d 630 (1956).
Where one owing debt claimed by several persons files application in district court making respective claimants parties, brings money into court, and prays for determination of ownership, proceeding is interpleader under statute. Citizens Nat. Bank of Wisner v. McNamara, 120 Neb. 252, 231 N.W. 781 (1930).
This section protects depository or escrow holder, who interpleads in good faith, from vexation and expense of litigation. Farming Corp. v. Bridgeport Bank, 113 Neb. 323, 202 N.W. 911 (1925).
Where not otherwise ordered, failure to bring money into court subjects defendant to interest. Elkhorn Valley Lodge No. 57, I.O.O.F. v. Hudson, 59 Neb. 672, 81 N.W. 859 (1900).
2. Interpleader
A defendant may interplead in a declaratory judgment proceeding. United Services Automobile Assn. v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, 109 N.W.2d 174 (1961).
One who precipitated litigation cannot maintain interpleader. Strasser v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 157 Neb. 570, 60 N.W.2d 672 (1953).
A bill of interpleader is an equitable remedy whereby a disinterested stockholder in possession of a fund or other property claimed by each of rival claimants may require them to litigate the issue of ownership without embroiling him. Provident Savings & Loan Assn. v. Booth, 138 Neb. 424, 293 N.W. 293 (1940).
Remedy provided by this section is a substitute for the equity remedy, although somewhat broader. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 50 Neb. 236, 69 N.W. 782 (1897).
Bailee may not interplead bailor and third party. Schellenberg v. Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co., 45 Neb. 487, 63 N.W. 859 (1895).
3. Miscellaneous
In an interpleader suit between two assignees of claim against county, party who first filed notice with county was entitled to fund. Greeley County v. First Nat. Bank of Cozad, 126 Neb. 872, 254 N.W. 502 (1934).
Purchaser may protect himself from double payment by interpleading real owner and vendor. Jaques v. Dawes, 3 Neb. Unof. 752, 92 N.W. 570 (1902).
25-326.
Interpleader; when sheriff or other officer defendant.The provisions of section 25-325 shall be applicable to an action brought against a sheriff, or other officer, for the recovery of personal property taken by him or her under execution or for the proceeds of such property so taken and sold by him or her. The defendant in such action shall be entitled to the benefit of those provisions against the party in whose favor the execution issued, upon exhibiting to the court the process under which the defendant acted, with his or her affidavit that the property or its proceeds was taken under such process.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 49, p. 400; R.S.1913, § 7607; C.S.1922, § 8550; C.S.1929, § 20-326; R.S.1943, § 25-326;
Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 15.
25-327.
Substitution; plaintiff in execution for sheriff or other officer.In an action against a sheriff or other officer for the recovery of property taken under an execution, and replevied by the plaintiff in such action, the court may, upon application of the defendant and of the party in whose favor the execution issued, permit the latter to be substituted as the defendant, security for the costs being given.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 50, p. 400; R.S.1913, § 7608; C.S.1922, § 8551; C.S.1929, § 20-327; R.S.1943, § 25-327.
Annotations
When garnishee answers that he has money belonging to judgment debtor, one may intervene who claims money and who is not a party to proceedings, and contest right of plaintiff. Farrington v. Fleming Comm. Co., 94 Neb. 108, 142 N.W. 297 (1913).
Court cannot order substitution after final judgment. Hicklin v. Nebraska City National Bank, 8 Neb. 463, 1 N.W. 135 (1879).
25-328.
Intervention; right; procedure.Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties to an action, or against both, in any action pending or to be brought in any of the courts of the State of Nebraska, may become a party to an action between any other persons or corporations, either by joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the defendants in resisting the claim of the plaintiff, or by demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and defendant, either before or after issue has been joined in the action, and before the trial commences.
Source:Laws 1887, c. 100, § 2, p. 655; R.S.1913, § 7609; C.S.1922, § 8552; C.S.1929, § 20-328; R.S.1943, § 25-328;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 9.
Annotations
1. Right of intervention
2. Procedure
1. Right of intervention
A temporary guardian has standing to intervene in adoption proceedings concerning the child. In re Adoption of Faith F., 313 Neb. 491, 984 N.W.2d 640 (2023).
Under this section, an intervenor must have a direct and legal interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct operation and legal effect of the judgment that may be rendered in the action. In re Adoption of Amea R., 282 Neb. 751, 807
N.W.2d 736 (2011).
The interest required as a prerequisite to intervention is a direct and legal interest in the controversy, which is an interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct operation and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered in the action. Koch v. Aupperle, 274 Neb. 52, 737 N.W.2d 869 (2007).
In order to intervene under this section, the intervenor must have a direct and legal interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct operation and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered in the action. Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 271 Neb. 578, 713 N.W.2d 489 (2006).
Under equity principles, laches, or unreasonable delay, is a proper reason to deny intervention. Merz v. Seeba, 271 Neb. 117, 710 N.W.2d 91 (2006).
A direct and legal interest is an interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct operation and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered in the action. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001 v. Johanns, 269 Neb. 664, 694 N.W.2d 668 (2005).
As a prerequisite to intervention under this section, the intervenor must have a direct and legal interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct operation and legal effect of the judgment that may be rendered in the action. A noncustodial parent whose parental rights have not been terminated and who has been involved in his or her minor child's life has a direct and legal interest in such minor child's name-change proceeding. In re Change of Name of Davenport, 263 Neb. 614, 641 N.W.2d 379 (2002).
A foster parent does not have an interest in the placement of an adjudicated child sufficient to warrant intervention in juvenile proceedings as a matter of right, but is entitled to notice and an opportunity to participate in all court reviews pertaining to a child in foster care placement. In re Interest of Destiny S., 263 Neb. 255, 639 N.W.2d 400 (2002).
This section requires only that an intervenor have a direct and legal interest in the matter in litigation, and no exception is made for a party already adequately represented. Ruzicka v. Ruzicka, 262 Neb. 824, 635 N.W.2d 528 (2001).
Mere possibility of benefit upon liquidation of a charity held not sufficient interest to support intervention as a matter of right. Colman v. Colman Foundation, Inc., 199 Neb. 263, 258 N.W.2d 128 (1977).
No third party has right to intervene in a criminal case and appeal of news media from restrictive order is dismissed. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
Anyone having an interest in the result of pending litigation may intervene as a matter of right. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hall County Museum Board, 186 Neb. 615, 185 N.W.2d 671 (1971).
Uninsured motorist's insurance carrier generally has right to intervene in litigation between insured and uninsured tort-feasor. Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d 606 (1969).
A party having an interest in a suit to establish a trust may intervene before trial begins. Workman v. Workman, 174 Neb. 471, 118 N.W.2d 764 (1962).
To be filed as a matter of right, a petition in intervention must be filed before trial. Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (1959).
Taxpayers are not qualified to intervene in matters of public interest prosecuted or defended in good faith for a governmental subdivision by its proper officials. Noble v. City of Lincoln, 158 Neb. 457, 63 N.W.2d 475 (1954).
Landowners damaged by construction of ditch had right to intervene. Lackaff v. Bogue, 158 Neb. 174, 62 N.W.2d 889 (1954).
One having an interest in the result of pending litigation may intervene as a matter of right. Gilbert v. First Nat. Bank of Minatare, 154 Neb. 404, 48 N.W.2d 401 (1951).
Ordinarily there is no right of intervention by third parties in an action for divorce. Harris v. Harris, 151 Neb. 191, 36 N.W.2d 849 (1949).
To authorize intervention, interest in litigation must be direct and immediate. Best & Co., Inc. v. City of Omaha, 149 Neb. 868, 33 N.W.2d 150 (1948).
A senior appropriator of water has an absolute right to intervene to protect his interest in injunction suit by junior appropriator against officials charged with administration of irrigation laws. Platte Valley Irr. Dist. v. Tilley, 142 Neb. 122, 5 N.W.2d 252 (1942).
One having an interest in the result of pending litigation may intervene as a matter of right. Allen v. City of Omaha, 136 Neb. 620, 286 N.W. 916 (1939).
Creditors have a right to intervene in suit to recover stockholder's liability. Hoffman v. Geiger, 134 Neb. 643, 279 N.W. 350 (1938).
Party seeking to intervene must have such a direct and immediate interest in matter in litigation that he will either lose or gain by direct operation and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered in the action. Cornhusker Electric Co. v. City of Fairbury, 131 Neb. 888, 270 N.W. 482 (1936).
To authorize party to intervene, he must have an interest of such a direct and immediate character that he will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of and effect of the judgment. City of Omaha v. Douglas County, 125 Neb. 640, 251 N.W. 262 (1933).
Mere fact that party claims to be owner of attached property does not give him right to intervene in the attachment and thus have question of his ownership determined in attachment suit. Geis v. Geis, 125 Neb. 394, 250 N.W. 252 (1933).
Taxpayer's suit to have deposit of school district declared preferred claim, where classified by bank receiver as general claim only, and where district officers neglect or refuse to prosecute claim further, was proper hereunder. State ex rel. Sorensen v. American Bank of Mitchell, 121 Neb. 862, 238 N.W. 753 (1931).
State may intervene to resist demands of those claiming estate of decedent. In re O'Connor's Estate, 117 Neb. 636, 222 N.W. 57 (1928).
Section should be liberally construed; but where intervener's pleading failed to show any interest in controversy, he has no standing; mere assertion is not sufficient. Parker v. City of Grand Island, 115 Neb. 892, 215 N.W. 127 (1927).
Where interested person is not made party, ordinarily he may intervene as matter of right. Webb v. Patterson, 114 Neb. 346, 207 N.W. 522 (1926).
Intervention under this section is matter of right, but equity courts may also allow intervention after trial has begun. Engdahl v. Laverty, 110 Neb. 672, 194 N.W. 862 (1923).
Any person claiming interest may intervene, as matter of right, in probate proceedings. In re Estate of Keller, 101 Neb. 115, 162 N.W. 511 (1917).
Parties not owners of real estate in proposed drainage district are not entitled to intervene in proceedings. Latham v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 100 Neb. 173, 158 N.W. 923 (1916).
All interested in estate are parties to probate proceedings whether named or not. In re Estate of Sweeney, 94 Neb. 834, 144 N.W. 902 (1913).
Mortgagor who conveyed by warranty deed may intervene to plead usury in action to foreclose. Pitman v. Ireland, 64 Neb. 675, 90 N.W. 540 (1902).
The shareholders may intervene in pending suits for the purpose of protecting their own interests, where the officers of a corporation fail and refuse to protect and conserve the corporate property. State ex rel. Bugbee v. Holmes, 60 Neb. 39, 82 N.W. 109 (1900).
Creditor may not ordinarily intervene in action by receivers against stockholders of bank. Brown v. Brink, 57 Neb. 606, 78 N.W. 280 (1899).
Receiver of corporation may intervene to defend action. Andrews v. Steele City Bank, 57 Neb. 173, 77 N.W. 342 (1898).
Subsequent attaching creditor may intervene to have priority of levies decided. Deere, Wells & Co. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 49 Neb. 385, 68 N.W. 504 (1896).
A mere contingent liability to answer over to the defendant, without any privity with the plaintiff, is not sufficient interest in the controversy to entitle a third person to intervene. Omaha Southern Ry. Co. v. Beeson, 36 Neb. 361, 54 N.W. 557 (1893).
Assignee chosen by creditors should intervene where assigned property is attached. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Nebraska State Bank, 33 Neb. 292, 50 N.W. 157 (1891).
Assignee of note may intervene in replevin of goods by mortgagee. Harman v. Barhydt, 20 Neb. 625, 31 N.W. 488 (1886).
The interest required as a prerequisite to intervention under this section is a direct and legal interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct operation and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered in the action. In re Interest of Jamie P., 12 Neb. App. 261, 670 N.W.2d 814 (2003).
Although a party may not intervene after judgment as a matter of right, a court of equity may allow intervention after judgment. However, intervention should not be allowed after judgment where the party seeking to intervene had an opportunity to intervene at an earlier time, yet delayed in doing so. Association of Commonwealth Claimants v. Hake, 2 Neb. App. 123, 507 N.W.2d 665 (1993).
2. Procedure
For a court as a preliminary matter to permit intervention as a matter of right, the intervenor must plead some interest in the subject matter of the litigation to give him or her standing in court, describing the ultimate facts evidencing the intervenor's interest in the matter of litigation; otherwise, the intervenor is a mere interloper and wholly incompetent to challenge the contentions of the opposing parties. Carroll v. Gould, 308 Neb. 12, 952 N.W.2d 1 (2020).
Where no motion is filed under Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112, a hearing and ruling on a complaint to intervene is not required any more than it would be for any other complaint, though the Supreme Court has indicated that a court may exercise sua sponte its authority to exclude from the case an intervenor whose pleadings do not disclose a direct interest in the matter in litigation. Carroll v. Gould, 308 Neb. 12, 952 N.W.2d 1 (2020).
While intervention under this section is a matter of right, the court may make a preliminary determination whether the complaint in intervention sufficiently alleges the requisite interest, assuming the allegations set forth in the complaint are true. Carroll v. Gould, 308 Neb. 12, 952 N.W.2d 1 (2020).
A parent in a juvenile action does not need to follow the intervention procedures set forth in this section and sections 25-329 and 25-330 in order to participate in juvenile proceedings involving the parent's child. In re Interest of Sloane O., 291 Neb. 892, 870 N.W.2d 110 (2015).
Intervention after judgment cannot be obtained as a matter of right under this section. Leave to intervene after the entry of a final decree is not allowable as a matter of right and should seldom be granted, but equity sometimes requires a departure from the general rule; however, the burden of persuasion in such a case is a heavy one. Jeffrey B. v. Amy L., 283 Neb. 940, 814 N.W.2d 737 (2012).
The plain language of this section makes clear that intervention as a matter of right is allowed only before trial begins. Jeffrey B. v. Amy L., 283 Neb. 940, 814 N.W.2d 737 (2012).
A petition in intervention under this section must be filed before the trial. American Nat. Bank v. Medved, 281 Neb. 799, 801 N.W.2d 230 (2011).
The existence of a statutory right of intervention before trial does not prevent a court of equity from allowing intervention after judgment. Meister v. Meister, 274 Neb. 705, 742 N.W.2d 746 (2007).
A party cannot appeal from an order or judgment which was made with his consent, directly or through his counsel, or upon that party's application. Reindertson v. Long, 198 Neb. 397, 253 N.W.2d 40 (1977).
Right to intervene may be exercised at any time before trial commences. Pribil v. French, 179 Neb. 602, 139 N.W.2d 356 (1966).
A petition in intervention may be filed as a matter of right before trial. Lincoln Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 179 Neb. 367, 138 N.W.2d 462 (1965).
Existence of statutory right of intervention before trial does not prevent a court of equity from allowing intervention after judgment. State ex rel. City of Grand Island v. Tillman, 174 Neb. 23, 115 N.W.2d 796 (1962).
Striking of petition of intervention of landlord in suit by tenant against elevator company was erroneous. Anest v. Chester B. Brown Co., 169 Neb. 330, 99 N.W.2d 615 (1959).
Petition in intervention must state such facts as, if conceded to be true, will entitle applicant to some relief. Ash v. City of Omaha, 152 Neb. 393, 41 N.W.2d 386 (1950).
The right of a party to intervene in an action is absolute, provided he exhibits a pleading containing allegations which demonstrate a right in the subject matter being litigated. Wightman v. City of Wayne, 146 Neb. 944, 22 N.W.2d 294 (1946).
Party may intervene in tax foreclosure proceedings and make increased bid before confirmation of judicial sale. County of Nance v. Thomas, 146 Neb. 640, 20 N.W.2d 925 (1945).
An intervener who is not an indispensable party cannot change the position of the original parties or change the nature and form of the action or the issues presented therein. State ex rel. Nelson v. Butler, 145 Neb. 638, 17 N.W.2d 683 (1945).
Trial court may, in its discretion, permit intervention after commencement of trial. Conkey v. Knudsen, 143 Neb. 5, 8 N.W.2d 538 (1943).
An intervener must take the suit as he finds it, is bound by previous proceedings in the case, and cannot complain of the form of the action or of informalities or defects in the proceedings between the original parties. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Lincoln County v. Kirkpatrick-Pettis Co., 140 Neb. 530, 300 N.W. 582 (1941).
The courts recognize two methods by which intervention may be accomplished; one statutory, the other as a matter of equitable discretion where necessary to administer complete relief between all parties. Department of Banking v. Stenger, 132 Neb. 576, 272 N.W. 403 (1937).
Court of equity may, in exercise of its discretion and furtherance of justice, allow intervention after judgment to protect inherent rights in the foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co. v. Omaha Safe Deposit Co., 126 Neb. 744, 254 N.W. 507 (1934).
Leave to intervene should be denied where proposed intervener has no interest in subject matter different from any other taxpayer and where there is no charge that State Treasurer is not defending action in good faith. State ex rel. Randall v. Hall, 125 Neb. 236, 249 N.W. 756 (1933).
To intervene as matter of right under this section, petition must be filed before trial. State v. Farmers State Bank of Decatur, 103 Neb. 194, 170 N.W. 901 (1919).
Petition of intervener, who has become party to action, cannot be dismissed until determination on merits. Montgomery v. Dresher, 97 Neb. 112, 149 N.W. 314 (1914).
Party may intervene after void judgment is entered; time for appeal dates from dismissal of petition of intervention. Shold v. Van Treeck, 82 Neb. 99, 117 N.W. 113 (1908).
Intervener's right must be affected by direct legal operation of judgment; he may not contest grounds of attachment. Danker v. Jacobs, 79 Neb. 435, 112 N.W. 579 (1907).
Section does not prevent court ordering in necessary parties. Brown v. Brown, 71 Neb. 200, 98 N.W. 718 (1904).
Party may intervene in election contest before dismissal. Moore v. Waddington, 69 Neb. 615, 96 N.W. 279 (1903).
Attorney may intervene in proceedings to revive judgment and enforce lien; petition is notice of lien. Greek v. McDaniel, 68 Neb. 569, 94 N.W. 518 (1903).
May become party to suit without leave of court. Spalding v. Murphy, 63 Neb. 401, 88 N.W. 489 (1901).
Person claiming title to subject matter may intervene any time before trial. McConniff v. Van Dusen, 57 Neb. 49, 77 N.W. 348 (1898).
Objection to intervention of stranger may be waived. Chadron Banking Co. v. Mahoney, 43 Neb. 214, 61 N.W. 594 (1895).
Alleged father's petition to intervene in child dependency proceeding was timely filed; the petition was filed less than 1 month after adjudication, prior to the first disposition and placement hearing. In re Interest of Sarah H., 21 Neb. App. 441, 838 N.W.2d 389 (2013).
Intervention after judgment cannot be obtained as a matter of right. Miller v. Commercial Contractors Equip., 14 Neb. App. 606, 711 N.W.2d 893 (2006).
Where application to intervene is not filed before trial, proposed interveners are not entitled thereto as matter of right. Draver v. Greenshields & Everest Co., 29 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1928).
Bankruptcy trustee is entitled to sue in federal court to set aside foreclosure on ground of fraud, where adjudication in bankruptcy came too late to permit intervention in foreclosure suit. Stefan v. Raabe, 1 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1924).
25-329.
Intervention; judgment; costs.The court shall determine upon the intervention at the same time that the action is decided, and if the claim of the intervenor is not sustained, the intervenor shall pay all costs of the intervention.
Source:Laws 1887, c. 100, § 2, p. 655; R.S.1913, § 7610; C.S.1922, § 8553; C.S.1929, § 20-329; R.S.1943, § 25-329;
Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 16.
Annotations
Only after a motion to dismiss or judgment on the pleadings attacking a complaint in intervention has been overruled on the grounds that the complaint met the requirements of section 25-328 will the question later be determined, when the action is finally decided, whether the allegations in the pleadings are true and that the proof establishes the party seeking to intervene has an actual interest in the subject of the controversy. Carroll v. Gould, 308 Neb. 12, 952 N.W.2d 1 (2020).
A parent in a juvenile action does not need to follow the intervention procedures set forth in this section and sections 25-328 and 25-330 in order to participate in juvenile proceedings involving the parent's child. In re Interest of Sloane O., 291 Neb. 892, 870 N.W.2d 110 (2015).
District court may rule on sufficiency of petition of intervention before trial. Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (1959).
Costs are taxed to interveners and relators where they are unsuccessful in a mandamus case. State ex rel. Nelson v. Butler, 145 Neb. 638, 17 N.W.2d 683 (1945).
Determination whether intervener has an actual interest in the subject of the controversy is a necessary preliminary question for the trial court's decision and is determinable when the action is finally decided. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Lincoln County v. Kirkpatrick-Pettis Co., 140 Neb. 530, 300 N.W. 582 (1941).
Intervention was unknown at common law and is creature of statute. Geis v. Geis, 125 Neb. 394, 250 N.W. 252 (1933).
Section should be liberally construed, but intervener must plead and prove actual interest or be regarded as mere interloper. Parker v. City of Grand Island, 115 Neb. 892, 215 N.W. 127 (1927).
A person may intervene as matter of right before trial. In re Estate of Keller, 101 Neb. 115, 162 N.W. 511 (1917).
Petition of intervener cannot be dismissed until determination on merits. Montgomery v. Dresher, 97 Neb. 112, 149 N.W. 314 (1914).
Petition may be dismissed without prejudice. Lincoln Upholstering Co. v. Baker, 82 Neb. 592, 118 N.W. 321 (1908).
25-330.
Intervention; complaint; other pleadings.The intervention shall be by complaint, which shall set forth the facts on which the intervention rests, and all the pleadings therein shall be governed by the same rules as other pleadings provided for in Chapter 25. If such complaint is filed during term, the court shall direct the time in which answers thereto shall be filed.
Source:Laws 1887, c. 100, § 4, p. 656; R.S.1913, § 7611; C.S.1922, § 8554; C.S.1929, § 20-330; R.S.1943, § 25-330;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 10.
Annotations
A parent in a juvenile action does not need to follow the intervention procedures set forth in this section and sections 25-328 and 25-329 in order to participate in juvenile proceedings involving the parent's child. In re Interest of Sloane O., 291 Neb. 892, 870 N.W.2d 110 (2015).
Seeking leave to intervene by motion, and not by complaint, is not a procedural bar to intervention under this section. State ex rel. Lanman v. Board of Cty. Commissioners, 277 Neb. 492, 763 N.W.2d 392 (2009).
One of the purposes of requiring a petition by a third party to a litigation to intervene is that the petition will frame the issues and interests regarding the intervening party. In re Interest of Kiana T., 262 Neb. 60, 628 N.W.2d 242 (2001).
An intervener must plead some interest in the subject matter of the litigation; a mere denial of plaintiff's right is not sufficient to give him standing in court. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Lincoln County v. Kirkpatrick-Pettis Co., 140 Neb. 530, 300 N.W. 582 (1941).
Statute should be liberally construed but must be substantially followed and applicant must bring himself within its provisions. Geis v. Geis, 125 Neb. 394, 250 N.W. 252 (1933).
Section should be liberally construed, but intervener must plead and prove actual interest or be regarded as mere interloper. Parker v. City of Grand Island, 115 Neb. 892, 215 N.W. 127 (1927).
May intervene as matter of right before trial. In re Estate of Keller, 101 Neb. 115, 162 N.W. 511 (1917).
An intervener whose petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and who does not pray for any judgment which the court has jurisdiction to render, should be dismissed from the action. Iodence v. Peters, 64 Neb. 425, 89 N.W. 1041 (1902).
Where filed without leave, court may decide question of intervention with main issue. State ex rel. Bugbee v. Holmes, 59 Neb. 503, 81 N.W. 512 (1900).
25-331.
Third-party action; procedure.(1)(a) A defending party may, as a third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty:
(i) Who is or may be liable to the defending party for all or part of the claim against the defending party; or
(ii) Whose negligence was or may have been a proximate cause of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim and who is not precluded by section 25-21,185.11 from being made a party.
(b) The third-party plaintiff shall, by motion, obtain the court's leave if the third-party plaintiff files the third-party complaint more than fourteen days after serving its original answer.
(c) The person served with the summons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, has all the rights and obligations of a defendant, including those created by this section and by the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to sections 25-801.01 and 25-1273.01.
(d) The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any defense that the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant may also assert against the plaintiff any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff.
(e) The plaintiff may assert against the third-party defendant any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff.
(f) A defending party may assert against the third-party defendant a claim that the third-party defendant is liable to the defending party for all or part of the claim against the defending party.
(g) A third-party defendant may bring in a nonparty if subdivision (1)(a) of this section would allow a defending party to do so.
(h) Any party may move to strike the third-party claim, to sever it, or try it separately.
(2) When a claim is asserted against a plaintiff, the plaintiff may bring in a nonparty if subdivision (1)(a) of this section would allow a defending party to do so.
Annotations
A motion to sever a third-party claim is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and an order granting or denying such motion is reviewed by an appellate court for an abuse of discretion. Hradecky v. State, 264 Neb. 771, 652 N.W.2d 277 (2002).
This section requires leave of the trial court before filing a third-party complaint, and whether to grant such leave is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. A third-party claim under this section may be asserted when a third party's liability is in some way dependent upon the outcome of the main claim or when the third party is secondarily liable to the defendant. Denial of leave to join a third-party defendant is not a final, appealable order because it does not determine the action and prevent a judgment. The term "defendant" in section 25-21,185.10 includes a third-party defendant brought into an action pursuant to this section. Slaymaker v. Breyer, 258 Neb. 942, 607 N.W.2d 506 (2000).
A third-party claim under this section may be asserted when a third party's liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim or when the third party is secondarily liable to the defendant. Dammann v. Litty, 234 Neb. 664, 452 N.W.2d 522 (1990).
The granting of leave to file a third-party complaint under this section is within the discretion of the trial court. Employers Reins. Corp. v. Santee Pub. Sch. Dist. No. C-5, 231 Neb. 744, 438 N.W.2d 124 (1989).
A third-party action should be dismissed if the evidence adduced at trial establishes that the third party could not be liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. Life Investors Ins. Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Wisner, 223 Neb. 663, 392 N.W.2d 771 (1986).
At any time after the commencement of the action, a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. A third-party claim may be asserted only when the third party's liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim or when the third party is secondarily liable to defendant. AgriStor Credit Corp. v. Radtke, 218 Neb. 386, 356 N.W.2d 856 (1984).
A third-party claim may be asserted under this section when a third party's liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim or when the third party is secondarily liable to the defendant. Church of the Holy Spirit v. Bevco, Inc., 215 Neb. 299, 338 N.W.2d 601 (1983).
The granting of leave to file a third-party complaint is a matter entirely within the discretion of the trial court. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., 189 Neb. 30, 199 N.W.2d 729 (1972).
25-401.
Local actions involving real estate.All actions to recover damages for any trespass upon or any injury to real estate shall be brought only in the county where such real estate or some part thereof is situated, but such actions may be brought against corporations owning or operating any line of railroad in the state in any county where service of summons can be had, and all actions for the following causes must be brought in the county in which the subject of the action is situated, except as provided in section 25-402: (1) For the recovery of real property or of an estate or interest therein; (2) for the partition of real property; and (3) for the sale of real property under a mortgage lien or other encumbrance or charge.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 51, p. 401; Laws 1889, c. 29, § 1, p. 376; Laws 1911, c. 167, § 1, p. 543; R.S.1913, § 7612; C.S.1922, § 8555; C.S.1929, § 20-401; R.S.1943, § 25-401.
Cross References
For provisions on designation of defendants, see section 25-312.
Annotations
1. Trespass
2. Foreclosure
3. Damages
4. General
1. Trespass
Jurisdiction of action to enjoin trespass on land is vested in district court for county in which land is situated. Fenster v. Isley, 143 Neb. 888, 11 N.W.2d 822 (1943).
Action for damages for trespass upon real estate can be brought alone in county where lands are located. Jacobson v. Lynn, 54 Neb. 794, 75 N.W. 243 (1898).
2. Foreclosure
Action to foreclose a real estate mortgage must be brought in county where land lies. Boehmer v. Heimen, 138 Neb. 376, 293 N.W. 237 (1940).
In foreclosure of real estate mortgage, a court having jurisdiction over subject matter, under its broad equity powers, may determine the rights of all persons claiming any interest therein, when properly before it. Department of Banking v. Stenger, 132 Neb. 576, 272 N.W. 403 (1939).
Action to foreclose real estate mortgage may be brought only in district court sitting in county where mortgaged realty, or some part thereof, is situated. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 123 Neb. 578, 243 N.W. 842 (1932).
Action to establish equitable mortgage on real estate is properly brought in county where land is located. Miles v. Martin, 103 Neb. 261, 171 N.W. 907 (1919).
Action to foreclose mortgage can only be brought in county where land is situated. Eayrs v. Nason, 54 Neb. 143, 74 N.W. 408 (1898).
3. Damages
Drainage district may be sued to recover damages for injury to real estate in county where real estate or some part thereof is situated. Cooper v. Sanitary Dist. No. 1 of Lancaster County, 146 Neb. 412, 19 N.W.2d 619 (1945).
Action for damages for injury to realty may be brought only in county where realty is situated. Triplett v. Western Public Service Co., 128 Neb. 835, 260 N.W. 387 (1935).
Action for damage to land by drainage ditch must be brought in county where land is located. Dryden v. Peru Bottom Drain. Dist., 99 Neb. 837, 158 N.W. 54 (1916).
Action for injury to land from overflow by negligent construction of bridge is transitory. Omaha & R. V. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 29 Neb. 492, 46 N.W. 39 (1890).
4. General
The district court for the county wherein real estate is situated is not without jurisdiction to hear and determine actions to quiet title to, or partition same. Page v. Buchfinck, 196 Neb. 135, 242 N.W.2d 610 (1976).
District court has jurisdiction to entertain action to quiet title even though construction of will is required. Hahn v. Verret, 143 Neb. 820, 11 N.W.2d 551 (1943).
Venue of action to establish that title to land held by plaintiff is held by him in trust, and that the terms of the trust require a sale thereof before an accounting can be had, is the county in which the land lies. Stuckey v. Stuckey, 143 Neb. 610, 10 N.W.2d 458 (1943).
Mandamus action is properly brought to compel an irrigation district to build a bridge across one of its canals in county where land is, even though irrigation district is situated and has its principal office or place of business in another county. State ex rel. Johnson v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 140 Neb. 471, 300 N.W. 379 (1941).
Where one of two courts having concurrent jurisdiction takes cognizance of a case and thereafter loses jurisdiction over the res, the other is no longer deprived of its right to assume jurisdiction over it. Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Fuller, 132 Neb. 677, 273 N.W. 14 (1937).
Accounting suit was properly brought even though it involved real estate situated in another county. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. Yeast, 117 Neb. 344, 220 N.W. 573 (1928).
Action to contest city bond election and enjoin bonds must be brought in county where election is held. Russell v. City of Indianola, 105 Neb. 207, 179 N.W. 927 (1920).
Action to quiet title must be brought in county where land lies. Rakow v. Tate, 93 Neb. 198, 140 N.W. 162 (1913).
Interest includes any right, title or estate in, or lien on land. Johnson v. Samuelson, 82 Neb. 201, 117 N.W. 470 (1908).
Action by wife to appropriate land of nonresident husband for alimony may be brought where land is. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 78 Neb. 495, 111 N.W. 122 (1907).
Action of ejectment may be brought against nonresident and service obtained by publication. Lantry v. Parker, 37 Neb. 353, 55 N.W. 962 (1893).
If action affects title or possession of real estate, action should be brought in county where land lies. Pacific Ry. Co. v. Perkins, 36 Neb. 456, 54 N.W. 845 (1893).
Service by publication may be had in actions brought under this section where any or all of the defendants reside out of the state. Brown v. Rice, 30 Neb. 236, 46 N.W. 489 (1890).
This section does not prevent action being brought against railroad in county where it has property or credits, under other provisions of this article. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Drayton, 292 F. 15 (8th Cir. 1923).
25-402.
Local actions involving real estate located in more than one county.If the real property, the subject of the action, be an entire tract, and situated in two or more counties, or if it consists of separate tracts situated in two or more counties, the action may be brought in any county in which any tract or part thereof is situated, unless it be an action to recover the possession thereof. And if the property be an entire tract, situated in two or more counties, an action to recover the possession thereof may be brought in either of such counties; but if it consists of separate tracts in different counties, the possession of such tracts must be recovered by separate actions brought in the counties where they are situated.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 52, p. 401; R.S.1913, § 7613; C.S.1922, § 8556; C.S.1929, § 20-402; R.S.1943, § 25-402.
Cross References
For provisions on designation of defendants, see section 25-312.
Annotations
The district court for the county wherein real estate is situated is not without jurisdiction to hear and determine actions to quiet title to, or partition same. Page v. Buchfinck, 196 Neb. 135, 242 N.W.2d 610 (1976).
Where none of the defendants have or claim any interest adverse to plaintiff in the property situated in the county in which the action is brought, the court has no jurisdiction over land of such defendants in another county. Lippincott v. Wolski, 147 Neb. 930, 25 N.W.2d 747 (1947).
An action to foreclose a mortgage on the entire tract may be brought in any county in which any part thereof is situated. State Bank of Nebraska v. Green & Redick, 11 Neb. 303, 9 N.W. 36 (1881).
Section is discussed. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Drayton, 292 F. 15 (8th Cir. 1923).
25-403.
Action for specific performance of land contract.An action to compel the specific performance of a contract of sale of real estate may be brought in the county where the defendants or any of them reside; but if all the defendants are nonresidents of the state, it may be brought in the county where the real estate or some part thereof is situated.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 53, p. 401; R.S.1913, § 7614; C.S.1922, § 8557; C.S.1929, § 20-403; R.S.1943, § 25-403.
Cross References
For provisions on designation of defendants, see section 25-312.
Annotations
Action for specific performance was properly brought where defendants resided. Smith v. Hornkohl, 166 Neb. 702, 90 N.W.2d 347 (1958).
The word "may" in this statute does not mean "must," and suit for specific performance may be brought in any county where parties are properly before the court. Department of Banking v. Stenger, 132 Neb. 576, 272 N.W. 403 (1937).
Specific performance is transitory; may be brought in any county where necessary parties properly before court. Pollard v. Larson, 115 Neb. 136, 211 N.W. 998 (1927).
Action to cancel contract for purchase of corporate stock is transitory; although part of relief asked relates to mortgages, action need not be brought in county where mortgaged land is located. Scow v. Bankers Fire Ins. Co., 109 Neb. 241, 190 N.W. 858 (1922).
Defendant residing where action is brought must be necessary party. Behr v. Willard, 11 Neb. 601, 10 N.W. 525 (1881).
Section is discussed. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Drayton, 292 F. 15 (8th Cir. 1923).
25-403.01.
Actions; venue; transfer; payment of expenses.Any action, other than the actions mentioned in sections 25-401 to 25-403, may be brought (1) in the county where any defendant resides, (2) in the county where the cause of action arose, (3) in the county where the transaction or some part of the transaction occurred out of which the cause of action arose, or (4) if all defendants are nonresidents of this state, in any county. When an action has been commenced in any other county, the court in which the action has been commenced shall have jurisdiction over the action, but upon timely motion by a defendant, the court shall transfer the action to the proper court in a county in which such action might have been properly commenced. The court in the county to which the action is transferred, in its discretion, may order the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney to pay to the defendant all reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the defendant because of the improper venue or in proceedings to transfer the action.
25-403.02.
Venue; residency; determination.For purposes of venue, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) Any private corporation organized under the laws of this state and any foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state is a resident of any county in which it has its registered office or other office or is doing business. A foreign corporation not authorized to transact business in this state is not a resident of this state;
(2) A partnership sued in its firm name is a resident of any county in which any partner resides or in which the partnership has an office or is doing business. If all partners are nonresidents of this state and the partnership does not have an office or do business in this state, the partnership is not a resident of this state;
(3) A voluntary unincorporated association sued in its own name is a resident of any county in which the association has an office or in which any officer of the association resides. If it has no office in this state and no officer resides in this state, the voluntary unincorporated association is not a resident of this state; and
(4) A limited liability company organized under the laws of this state and any foreign limited liability company authorized to transact business in this state is a resident of any county in which it has its registered office or other office or is doing business. A foreign limited liability company not authorized to transact business in this state is not a resident of this state.
25-404.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 529, § 58.
25-405.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 529, § 58.
25-406.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 529, § 58.
25-407.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 529, § 58.
25-408.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 529, § 58.
25-409.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 529, § 58.
25-410.
Transfer of actions; clerk of transferor court; duties; clerk of transferee court; duties; certain support orders; how treated.(1) For the convenience of the parties and witnesses or in the interest of justice, a district court of any county, the transferor court, may transfer any civil action to the district court of any other county in this state, the transferee court. The transfer may occur before or after the entry of judgment, and there shall be no additional fees required for the transfer.
(2) To transfer a civil action, the transferor court shall order transfer of the action to the specific transferee court requested. The clerk of the transferor court shall file with the transferee court within ten days after the entry of the transfer order a certification of the case file and costs. The clerk of the transferor court shall certify any judgment and payment records of such judgments in the action maintained by the transferor court.
(3) Upon the filing of such documents by the clerk of the transferor court, the clerk of the transferee court shall enter any judgment in the action on the judgment index of the transferee court. The judgment, once filed and entered on the judgment index of the transferee court, shall be a lien on the property of the debtor in any county in which such judgment is filed. Transfer of the action shall not change the obligations of the parties under any judgment entered in the action regardless of the status of the transfer.
(4) If the transferred civil action involves a support order that has payment records maintained by the Title IV-D Division as defined in section 43-3341, the transferor court order shall notify the division to make the necessary changes in the support payment records. Support payments shall commence in the transferee court on the first day of the month following the order of transfer, payments made prior to such date shall be considered payment on a judgment entered by the transferor court, and payments made on and after such date shall be considered payment on a judgment entered by the transferee court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 61, p. 402; G.S.1873, c. 57, § 61, p. 532; R.S.1913, § 7621; C.S.1922, § 8564; C.S.1929, § 20-410; R.S.1943, § 25-410;
Laws 1971, LB 576, § 8; Laws 2010, LB712, § 1; Laws 2018, LB193, § 6.
Annotations
1. Abuse of discretion
2. Bias or prejudice
3. Authority to transfer actions
1. Abuse of discretion
Where record does not show abuse of discretion, a ruling on motion to transfer hereunder will not be disturbed. Johnsen v. Parks, 189 Neb. 712, 204 N.W.2d 804 (1973).
Failure to grant change of venue in equity case was immaterial on appeal, since case was for trial de novo in reviewing court. Lippincott v. Lippincott, 144 Neb. 486, 13 N.W.2d 721 (1944).
Where only showing made in support of motion for change of venue is affidavit which was not offered in evidence and was not incorporated in bill of exceptions, error cannot be predicated on appeal from order overruling motion. Dunlap v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 136 Neb. 11, 284 N.W. 742 (1939).
Supreme Court will not disturb ruling of lower court on motion for change of venue unless abuse of discretion is shown. Markel v. Glassmeyer, 132 Neb. 716, 273 N.W. 33 (1937).
Ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless discretion is abused. Boyd v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 97 Neb. 238, 149 N.W. 818 (1914).
Unless abuse of discretion is shown, ruling on motion should not be disturbed. Hinton v. Atchison & Nebraska R. R. Co., 83 Neb. 835, 120 N.W. 431 (1909).
2. Bias or prejudice
Where fair and impartial trial cannot be had, court must change; if fair trial cannot be had in adjoining county, change should be made to other county in district. Gandy v. Bissell's Estate, 81 Neb. 102, 115 N.W. 571 (1908).
Ruling will not be reversed unless prejudice is shown by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Smith, 77 Neb. 824, 110 N.W. 557 (1906).
Judge is not disqualified to sit in contempt case to try violation of own order. Back v. State, 75 Neb. 603, 106 N.W. 787 (1906).
Court on own motion cannot transfer case for trial to another county. Lefferts v. Bell, 57 Neb. 248, 77 N.W. 680 (1898).
This section does not authorize district court, on its own motion, to order a change of venue. Fisk v. Thorpe, 51 Neb. 1, 70 N.W. 498 (1897).
Bias or prejudice of judge preventing fair and impartial trial is ground for change. Le Hane v. State, 48 Neb. 105, 66 N.W. 1017 (1896).
When it appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had where suit is pending, change of venue should be granted. Omaha S. Ry. Co. v. Todd, 39 Neb. 818, 58 N.W. 289 (1894).
3. Authority to transfer actions
A court which never acquires jurisdiction permitting it to act has no authority to transfer venue. Jackson v. Jensen, 225 Neb. 671, 407 N.W.2d 758 (1987).
25-411.
Change of venue; procedure; effect; expenses.When an order is made transferring a cause for trial, as provided in section 25-410, the clerk of the court must transmit the pleadings and papers therein to the clerk of the court to which it is transferred; and in every such case, all expenses of such trial which would be chargeable to the county in which the suit originated had the cause been tried therein, as determined by the district judge of the county to which said cause has been transferred, shall be a charge upon the county in which the suit was commenced. The court to which an action is transferred shall have and exercise over the same the like jurisdiction as if it had been originally commenced therein.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 3, p. 712; R.S.1913, § 7622; C.S.1922, § 8565; C.S.1929, § 20-411; Laws 1935, c. 43, § 1, p. 162; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-411; R.S.1943, § 25-411.
25-412.
Change of venue in local actions involving real estate; transfer and entry of judgment.When an action affecting the title or possession of real estate has been brought in or transferred to any court of a county, other than the county in which the real estate or some portion of it is situated, the clerk of such court must, after final judgment therein, certify such judgment under his or her seal of office, and transmit the same to the corresponding court of the county in which the real estate affected by the action is situated. The clerk receiving such copy must file and record such judgment in the records of the court, briefly designating it as a judgment transferred from ......... court (naming the proper court).
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 4, p. 712; R.S.1913, § 7623; C.S.1922, § 8566; C.S.1929, § 20-412; R.S.1943, § 25-412;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 7.
25-412.01.
Criminal cases; counties of 4,000 population or less; inadequate facilities; change of venue.Any criminal case pending in either the county court or the district court in any county having a population of four thousand or less and not having adequate facilities for the trial of jury cases acceptable to the county and district judges may be tried in any adjoining county with the same effect as if tried in the county where the offense was committed.
25-412.02.
Civil cases; counties of 4,000 population or less; inadequate facilities; change of venue.Any civil case pending in either the county court, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, or the district court in any county having a population of four thousand or less and not having adequate facilities for the trial of jury or other contested cases may be tried in any adjoining county with the same effect as if tried in the county in which the case was filed or venued.
25-412.03.
County board; agreements for criminal and civil trials.The county board of any county described in section 25-412.01 or 25-412.02 may enter into an agreement under the Interlocal Cooperation Act with the county board of another county or other counties for the trial of all contested criminal and civil cases, whether or not a jury trial has been requested. Any case subject to any such agreement shall be subject to the applicable provisions of law relating to changes of venue except as provided in section 25-412.04.
Cross References
Interlocal Cooperation Act, see section 13-801.
25-412.04.
Criminal and civil trials; agreements for change of venue; jury; selection.The jury for any case to be tried pursuant to an agreement entered into under section 25-412.03 shall be selected from the county in which the case was first filed. The jury shall be selected in the manner prescribed in the Jury Selection Act. The summons shall direct attendance before the court by which the case is to be tried and the return thereof shall be made to the same court.
25-413.
State, defined.As used in sections 25-413 to 25-417, unless the context otherwise requires, state shall mean any foreign nation, and any state, district, commonwealth, territory or insular possession of the United States.
Source:Laws 1969, c. 179, § 1, p. 769.
25-414.
Choice of forum; jurisdiction; conditions.(1) If the parties have agreed in writing that an action on a controversy may be brought in this state and the agreement provides the only basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, a court of this state will entertain the action if (a) the court has power under the law of this state to entertain the action; (b) this state is a reasonably convenient place for the trial of the action; (c) the agreement as to the place of the action was not obtained by misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other unconscionable means; and (d) the defendant, if within the state, was served as required by law of this state in the case of persons within the state or, if without the state, was served either personally or by certified mail directed to his last-known address.
(2) This section does not apply to cognovit clauses, to arbitration clauses, or to the appointment of an agent for the service of process pursuant to statute or court order.
Source:Laws 1969, c. 179, § 2, p. 769.
Annotations
This section applies where the court would have no jurisdiction but for the fact that the parties have consented to its exercise by the choice of forum agreement. Ameritas Invest. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005).
This section raises a jurisdictional barrier to the enforcement of a contractual choice of forum clause that does not meet the requirements of the Model Uniform Choice of Forum Act. Ameritas Invest. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005).
This section was intended to prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction where that exercise would result in injustice or in substantial inconvenience to the parties. Ameritas Invest. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005).
Although employee's contract specifically made Nebraska the exclusive venue for legal proceedings, employee did not breach venue clause of contract by bringing suit in another state, since Nebraska was not a reasonably convenient place for the action. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Puccio, 1 Neb. App. 478, 499 N.W.2d 85 (1993).
Subsection (1) of this section is an inherent part of every contract made in Nebraska. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Puccio, 1 Neb. App. 478, 499 N.W.2d 85 (1993).
25-415.
Choice of forum in another state; action pending in this state; procedure.If the parties have agreed in writing that an action on a controversy shall be brought only in another state and it is brought in a court of this state, the court will dismiss or stay the action, as appropriate, unless (1) the court is required by statute to entertain the action; (2) the plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other state, for reasons other than delay in bringing the action; (3) the other state would be a substantially less convenient place for the trial of the action than this state; (4) the agreement as to the place of the action was obtained by misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other unconscionable means; or (5) it would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable to enforce the agreement.
Source:Laws 1969, c. 179, § 3, p. 769.
Annotations
A forum is seriously inconvenient only if one party would be effectively deprived of a meaningful day in court. Polk Cty. Rec. Assn. v. Susquehanna Patriot Leasing, 273 Neb. 1026, 734 N.W.2d 750 (2007).
A forum selection clause can be avoided for fraud only when the fraud relates to procurement of the forum selection clause itself, standing independently from the remainder of the agreement. Polk Cty. Rec. Assn. v. Susquehanna Patriot Leasing, 273 Neb. 1026, 734 N.W.2d 750 (2007).
A party seeking to avoid a contractual forum selection clause bears a heavy burden of showing that the clause should not be enforced, and, accordingly, the party seeking to avoid the forum selection clause bears the burden of proving that one of the statutory exceptions applies. Polk Cty. Rec. Assn. v. Susquehanna Patriot Leasing, 273 Neb. 1026, 734 N.W.2d 750 (2007).
Aside from factual findings, a ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to this section is subject to de novo review. Where the trial court's decision is based upon the complaint and its own determination of disputed factual issues, an appellate court reviews the factual findings under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Polk Cty. Rec. Assn. v. Susquehanna Patriot Leasing, 273 Neb. 1026, 734 N.W.2d 750 (2007).
In the absence of one of the five listed exceptions, this section requires dismissal of an action only when the forum selection clause is mandatory. If the forum selection clause is permissive rather than mandatory, this section does not require dismissal of the Nebraska action. Polk Cty. Rec. Assn. v. Susquehanna Patriot Leasing, 273 Neb. 1026, 734 N.W.2d 750 (2007).
The proper procedure in Nebraska courts for a party to enforce a forum selection clause naming another state as a forum is to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to this section. Polk Cty. Rec. Assn. v. Susquehanna Patriot Leasing, 273 Neb. 1026, 734 N.W.2d 750 (2007).
A forum selection clause which specifically references this section is not contrary to public policy and does not deny courts their inherent authority to consider appropriate matters presented to them. A trial court may refuse to dismiss an action where the facts are consistent with this section's limitations. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Yelich, 250 Neb. 345, 549 N.W.2d 172 (1996).
A forum selection clause in an insurance contract between a surety and a contractor is enacted in accordance with the statute, and therefor valid, enforceable, and not contrary to public policy. Haakinson & Beaty Co. v. Inland Ins. Co., 216 Neb. 426, 344 N.W.2d 454 (1984).
25-416.
Sections, how construed.Sections 25-413 to 25-417 shall be so construed as to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact them.
Source:Laws 1969, c. 179, § 4, p. 770.
25-417.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-413 to 25-417 may be cited as the Model Uniform Choice of Forum Act.
Source:Laws 1969, c. 179, § 5, p. 770.
25-501.
Actions; how commenced.A civil action must be commenced by filing a complaint in the office of the clerk of a proper court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 62, p. 403; Laws 1869, § 2, p. 63; Laws 1871, § 1, p. 111; R.S.1913, § 7624; C.S.1922, § 8567; C.S.1929, § 20-501; R.S.1943, § 25-501;
Laws 1971, LB 576, § 9; Laws 1979, LB 510, § 2; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 12.
Cross References
When action is deemed commenced, see section 25-217.
Workers' compensation cases, petition, filing, contents, see section 48-173.
Annotations
When disbarred attorney commenced action, dismissal was proper. Niklaus v. Abel Construction Co., 164 Neb. 842, 83 N.W.2d 904 (1957).
A writ of replevin which is quashed or dismissed does not give the court jurisdiction to continue with the action. Tiedtke v. Whalen, 133 Neb. 301, 275 N.W. 79 (1937).
It is not essential that action be denominated either in law or in equity; if facts pleaded constitute cause of action or defense, courts will award relief. Rhoads v. Columbia Fire Underwriters Agency, 128 Neb. 710, 260 N.W. 174 (1935).
Cited in case involving amendment of summons on appeal from compensation award. Keil v. Farmers Irr. Dist., 119 Neb. 503, 229 N.W. 898 (1930).
Action is deemed commenced as to defendant, at date of summons which is served upon him. Ramirez v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 116 Neb. 740, 219 N.W. 1 (1928).
One not served with process in an action, who does not appear in person, or by attorney, is not bound by judgment rendered therein. Lipps v. Panko, 93 Neb. 469, 140 N.W. 761 (1913).
New summons is unnecessary on amendment of petition if same causes of action are preserved. Schuyler Nat. Bank v. Bollong, 28 Neb. 684, 45 N.W. 164 (1890).
25-502.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-502.01.
Praecipe for summons.The plaintiff shall file with the clerk of the court a praecipe for summons stating the name and address of each party to be served and the manner of service for each party. Upon written request of the plaintiff, separate or additional summonses shall be issued.
25-503.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-503.01.
Summons.(1) The summons shall be directed to the defendant or defendants, and contain the names of the parties and the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, otherwise the address of the plaintiff. It shall notify defendant that in order to defend the lawsuit an appropriate written response shall be filed with the court within thirty days after service, and that upon failure to do so the court may enter judgment for the relief demanded in the complaint.
(2) A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from that demanded in the complaint. If only special damages are demanded a judgment by default shall not exceed the amount demanded in the complaint.
Cross References
Workers' compensation cases, court issues summons, see sections 48-174 and 48-190.
25-504.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-504.01.
Summons and complaint; service.A copy of the complaint shall be served with the summons, except when service is by publication. The plaintiff shall deliver to the clerk sufficient copies of the complaint at the time it is filed.
25-505.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-505.01.
Service of
summons; methods; State Court
Administrator; maintain list.(1) Unless
otherwise limited by statute or by the court, a plaintiff may elect to have
service made by any of the following methods:
(a) Personal service which shall be made by leaving the summons
with the individual to be served;
(b) Residence service which shall be made by leaving the summons
at the usual place of residence of the individual to be served, with some
person of suitable age and discretion residing therein;
(c) Certified mail service which shall be made by (i) within
ten days of issuance, sending the summons to the defendant by certified mail
with a return receipt requested showing to whom and where delivered and the
date of delivery, and (ii) filing with the court proof of service with the
signed receipt attached; or
(d) Designated
delivery service which shall be made by (i) within ten days of issuance, sending
the summons by a designated delivery service to the defendant, (ii) obtaining
a signed delivery receipt showing to whom and where delivered and the date
of delivery, and (iii) filing with the court proof of service with a copy
of the signed delivery receipt attached. As used in this subdivision, a designated
delivery service means a delivery service designated as such pursuant to 26
U.S.C. 7502(f) and a signed delivery receipt includes an electronic or facsimile
receipt with an image of the recipient's signature.
(2) Failure to make service by the method elected by the plaintiff
does not affect the validity of the service.
(3) The State
Court Administrator shall maintain on the website of the Supreme Court a
list of designated delivery services.
Annotations
This section does not require service to be sent to the defendant's residence or restrict delivery to the addressee. But service must still comply with the due process requirement that notice be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them the opportunity to present their objections. Doe v. Board of
Regents, 280 Neb. 492, 788 N.W.2d 264 (2010).
Plaintiff may elect to have service made by any of the methods specified in the statute. West Town Homeowners Assn. v. Schneider, 221 Neb. 674, 380 N.W.2d 265 (1986).
Although this section does not require service to be sent to the defendant's residence or restrict delivery to the addressee, due process requires notice to be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them the opportunity to present their objections. Capital One Bank v. Lehmann, 23 Neb. App. 292, 869 N.W.2d 917 (2015).
Personal service at work rather than at home, despite the designation on the praecipe of where service should be effected, is nonetheless valid service. Hatcher v. McShane, 12 Neb. App. 239, 670 N.W.2d 638 (2003).
25-506.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-506.01.
Process; by
whom served.(1) Unless the plaintiff has elected
certified mail service or designated
delivery service, the summons shall be served by the sheriff of
the county where service is made, by a person authorized by section 25-507
or otherwise authorized by law, or by a person, corporation, partnership,
or limited liability company not a party to the action specially appointed
by the court for that purpose.
(2) Certified mail service or
designated delivery service shall be made by the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney.
Source:Laws 1983, LB 447, § 23; Laws 1994, LB 1224, § 36; Laws 1999, LB 319, § 1; Laws 2009, LB35, § 7; Laws 2011, LB669, § 8.
25-507.
Process server; requirements; bond; cost.(1) In any county which does not have a person contracted as a constable pursuant to section 25-2229, any person twenty-one years of age or older or a corporation, partnership, or limited liability company that satisfies the requirements of subsection (2) of this section shall have the same power as a sheriff to execute any service of process or order.
(2) Any person or entity may exercise the powers provided in subsection (1) of this section if such person or entity (a) is not a party to the action, (b) is not related to a party to the action, (c) does not have an interest in the action, (d) is not a public official employed by the county where service is made whose duties include service of process, and (e) furnishes a good and sufficient corporate surety bond in the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, such bond being conditioned upon such person or entity faithfully and truly performing the duties of process server.
(3) Evidence of the corporate surety bond shall be provided to the clerk of each court in which such person or entity executes service of process or orders. Such person or entity is not required to furnish more than one bond to execute service of process or orders in any state court in the State of Nebraska. When service of process is made by such person or entity authorized by this section, proof of such service of process shall be shown by an affidavit.
(4) The cost of service of process is taxable as a court cost, and when service of process is made by such person or entity other than a sheriff the cost taxable as a court cost is the lesser of the actual amount incurred for service of process or orders or the statutory fee set for sheriffs in section 33-117.
25-507.01.
Summons; proof
of service; return date.(1) Within twenty days
after the date of issue, the person serving the summons, other than by certified
mail service or designated
delivery service, shall make proof of service to the court stating
the time, place, including the address if applicable, name of the person with
whom the summons was left, and method of service, or return the unserved summons
to the court with a statement of the reason for the failure to serve.
(2) When service is by certified mail service or designated delivery service, the plaintiff
or plaintiff's attorney shall file proof of service within ten days after the signed receipt is received or is available electronically,
whichever occurs first.
(3) Failure to make proof of service or delay in doing so
does not affect the validity of the service.
25-508.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-508.01.
Service on
individual.(1) An individual party, other than
a person under the age of fourteen years, may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service.
(2) A party under the age of fourteen years may be served
by personal, residence, certified
mail, or designated delivery service
upon an adult person with whom the minor resides and who is the minor's parent or guardian or the person having care of
the minor. If none of these can be found, a party under the age of fourteen
years may be served by personal service.
(3) If the person to be served is an incapacitated person
for whom a conservator or guardian has been appointed or is confined in any
institution, notice of the service shall be given to the conservator or guardian or the superintendent or similar
official of the institution. Failure to give such notice does not affect the
validity of the service on the incapacitated person.
Annotations
Department of Health and Human Services employees were not properly served in their individual capacities where the summonses were sent via certified mail to their place of employment, the certified mail receipts were signed for by an employee who was not authorized to sign on behalf of the employees, and the summonses were not received by the employees. Anthony K. v. State, 289 Neb. 523, 855 N.W.2d 802 (2014).
Although subsection (3) of this section requires that where summons is served on an incapacitated person, notice of such service shall be given to the guardian, it also provides that failure to give such notice will not affect the validity of the service. In re Interest of A.M.K., 227 Neb. 888, 420 N.W.2d 718 (1988).
25-509.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-509.01.
Service on
corporation.A corporation may be served by personal,
residence, certified
mail, or designated delivery service
upon any officer, director, managing agent, or registered agent, or by leaving
the process at the corporation's registered office with a person employed
therein, or by certified mail or
designated delivery service to the corporation's registered office.
25-510.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-510.01.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-510.02.
Service on
state or political subdivision.(1) The State
of Nebraska, any state agency as defined in section 81-8,210, and any employee
of the state as defined in section 81-8,210 sued in an official capacity may
be served by leaving the summons at the office of the Attorney General with
the Attorney General, deputy attorney general, or someone designated in writing
by the Attorney General, or by certified mail or designated delivery service addressed to
the office of the Attorney General.
(2) Any county, city, or village of this state may be served
by personal, residence, certified
mail, or designated delivery service
upon the chief executive officer or
clerk.
(3) Any political subdivision of this state, as defined in
subdivision (1) of section 13-903, other than a county, city, or village,
may be served by personal, residence, certified
mail, or designated delivery service
upon the chief executive officer, clerk, secretary, or other official whose
duty it is to maintain the official records, or any member of the governing
board or body, or by certified mail or
designated delivery service to the principal office of the political
subdivision.
Annotations
In analyzing the service of an agency, as when analyzing the option to serve an individual through certified mail under section 25-508.01, appellate courts look to section 25-505.01(1)(c) for the requirements of service by certified mail. Omaha Expo. & Racing v. Nebraska State Racing Comm., 307 Neb. 172, 949 N.W.2d 183 (2020).
When this section applies, a summons must be served on the Attorney General in order to institute judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, sections 84-901 through 84-920. Concordia Teachers College v. Neb. Dept. of Labor, 252 Neb. 504, 563 N.W.2d 345 (1997).
This section provides the acceptable methods of service of summons upon the Attorney General, but although some discretion is granted as to the mode of service, no discretion is granted as to the entity to be served. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys. v. Dept. of Health, 249 Neb. 405, 543 N.W.2d 466 (1996).
When this section applies, in order to institute judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, service must be had on the Attorney General. Becker v. Nebraska Acct. & Disclosure Comm., 249 Neb. 28, 541 N.W.2d 36 (1995).
In cases in which this section applies, a summons must be served on the Attorney General in order to institute judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. Glass v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 248 Neb. 501, 536 N.W.2d 344 (1995).
Pursuant to subsection (1), when a party commences an action against the State, that party's service must be served in one of the four following ways to be effective: (1) By leaving summons at the Attorney General's office with the Attorney General, (2) by leaving summons at the Attorney General's office with a deputy attorney general, (3) by leaving summons at the Attorney General's office with someone designated in writing by the Attorney General to receive summons, or (4) by sending summons by certified mail addressed to the Attorney General's office. Twiss v. Trautwein, 247 Neb. 535, 529 N.W.2d 24 (1995).
A county board of equalization is not a political subdivision "other than" a county, and service upon a county board of equalization must be accomplished pursuant to the requirements of subsection (2) rather than subsection (3) of this section. Hilt v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 30 Neb. App. 425, 970 N.W.2d 113 (2021).
This section provides that the plain meaning of the phrase "may be served," when viewed in the context of the service statutes, modifies the method of acceptable service, not the entity to be served. Hilt v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 30 Neb. App. 425, 970 N.W.2d 113 (2021).
Pursuant to this section, the Attorney General must be served on behalf of the committee and that service may be accomplished by one of the methods for which provision is made in subsection (1). Ray v. Nebraska Crime Victim's Reparations Comm., 1 Neb. App. 130, 487 N.W.2d 590 (1992).
25-511.
Service on employee of the state.Any employee of the state, as defined in section 81-8,210, sued in an individual capacity for an act or omission occurring in connection with duties performed on the state's behalf, regardless of whether the employee is also sued in an official capacity, must be served by serving the employee under section 25-508.01 and also by serving the state under section 25-510.02.
25-511.01.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-511.02.
Service on
dissolved corporation.A dissolved corporation
may be served by personal, residence, certified
mail, or designated delivery service
upon any appointed receiver. If there is no receiver, a dissolved corporation
may be served by personal, residence, certified
mail, or designated delivery service
upon any person who at the time of dissolution was an officer, director, managing
agent, or registered agent, or upon any officer or director designated in
the last annual report filed with the Secretary of State.
25-512.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-512.01.
Service on
partnership.A partnership or limited partnership
may be served by personal, residence, certified
mail, or designated delivery service
upon any partner except a limited partner, or by certified mail or designated delivery service
at its usual place of business, or the process may be left at its usual place
of business with an employee of the partnership or limited partnership.
Cross References
Registration and agent for service of process of foreign limited partnerships, see section 67-281.
25-513.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-513.01.
Service on
unincorporated association.An unincorporated
association may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service upon an officer
or managing agent, or by certified mail or
designated delivery service to the association at its usual place
of business, or by leaving the process at its usual place of business with
an employee of the unincorporated association.
25-514.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-514.01.
Service on
agent.Any party may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service
upon an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
25-515.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-516.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-516.01.
Service; voluntary appearance; defenses.(1) The voluntary appearance of the party is equivalent to service.
(2) A defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process may be asserted only under the procedure provided in the pleading rules adopted by the Supreme Court. If any of those defenses are asserted either by motion or in a responsive pleading and the court overrules the defense, an objection that the court erred in its ruling will be waived and not preserved for appellate review if the party asserting the defense either (a) thereafter files a demand for affirmative relief by way of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim or (b) fails to dismiss a demand for such affirmative relief that was previously filed. If any of those defenses are asserted either by motion or in a responsive pleading and the court overrules the defense, an objection that the court erred in its ruling on any issue, except an objection to the court's ruling on personal jurisdiction, will be waived and not preserved for appellate review if the party asserting the defense thereafter participates in proceedings on any issue other than those defenses.
(3) The filing of a suggestion of bankruptcy is not an appearance and does not waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process.
Annotations
"Appearance of Counsel" filed by the defendant's attorneys was not a voluntary appearance which waived service of the complaint because it did not request general relief from the court on an issue other than sufficiency of service or process or personal jurisdiction. Stone Land & Livestock Co. v. HBE, 309 Neb. 970, 962 N.W.2d 903 (2021).
The voluntary appearance of a party is equivalent to service of process for purposes of personal jurisdiction; parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court by waiving statutory requirements for a court to obtain jurisdiction through a voluntary appearance. J.S. v. Grand Island Public Schools, 297 Neb. 347, 899 N.W.2d 893 (2017).
Judicially noticed filings and the bill of exceptions in a prior modification proceeding between the parties showed that the defendant made a general appearance in the subsequent modification proceeding by asking the trial court to vacate an order, to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel, and to strike the complaint. Burns v. Burns, 293 Neb. 633, 879 N.W.2d 375 (2016).
A voluntary appearance is the equivalent to service that waives a defense of insufficient service or process if the party requests general relief from the court on an issue other than sufficiency of service or process, or personal jurisdiction. Carlson v. Allianz Versicherungs-AG, 287 Neb. 628, 844 N.W.2d 264 (2014).
A voluntary appearance signed the day before a complaint or petition is filed waives service of process if filed simultaneously with or after the petition. Johnson v. Johnson, 282 Neb. 42, 803 N.W.2d 420 (2011).
A voluntary appearance of a party is equivalent to service and, in effect, is another mode of service. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys. v. Dept. of Health, 249 Neb. 405, 543 N.W.2d 466 (1996).
By filing a suggestion in bankruptcy and an amended suggestion in bankruptcy, the party asked the court to bring its powers into action on a matter other than the question of jurisdiction, thus making a general appearance and waiving any defects in the service of process. Bayliss v. Clason, 26 Neb. App. 195, 918 N.W.2d 612 (2018).
Intended defendant's father, who bore same name as defendant without distinction of "Sr." or "Jr.," had no obligation to assert affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction or insufficient service either in answer or by motion, in plaintiff's action for personal injuries, as grounds for permitting plaintiff to serve intended defendant rather than dismissing complaint with prejudice; trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over father when father was served, and there was no objection to service of summons on father. Rudd v. Debora, 20 Neb. App. 850, 835 N.W.2d 765 (2013).
An action stood dismissed by operation of law upon the passing of 6 months after the filing of the petition, where the defendants were not served process and their voluntary appearances were entered more than 6 months after the date the petition was filed. Vopalka v. Abraham, 9 Neb. App. 285, 610 N.W.2d 433 (2000).
25-517.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-517.01.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-517.02.
Substitute and constructive service.Upon motion and showing by affidavit that service cannot be made with reasonable diligence by any other method provided by statute, the court may permit service to be made (1) by leaving the process at the defendant's usual place of residence and mailing a copy by first-class mail to the defendant's last-known address, (2) by publication, or (3) by any manner reasonably calculated under the circumstances to provide the party with actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
Cross References
Actions against unknown defendants, see section 25-321.
Actions to quiet title, see section 25-21,112 et seq.
Annotations
Substitute service cannot be effectively completed by using certified mail; this section allows only for the use of first-class mail. Thornton v. Thornton, 13 Neb. App. 912, 704 N.W.2d 243 (2005).
Substituted service based upon a false and misleading affidavit may be nullified. Where a parent was not given proper statutory notification of an adoption proceeding, the county court lacked jurisdiction to grant the adoption decree and the adoption was set aside. In re Adoption of Leslie P., 8 Neb. App. 954, 604 N.W.2d 853 (2000).
25-518.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-518.01.
Service by publication.Service may be made by publication (1) when such service is elsewhere provided for by statute or (2) when ordered by the court.
25-519.
Service by publication; how made; contents.The publication shall be made once in each week for three successive weeks in some newspaper printed in the county where the complaint is filed if there is any printed in such county and, if there is not, in some newspaper printed in this state of general circulation in that county. It shall contain a summary statement of the claim for relief of the complaint, mention the court wherein it is filed, and notify the person or persons thus to be served when they are required to answer.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 79, p. 405; R.S.1913, § 7642; C.S.1922, § 8585; C.S.1929, § 20-519; R.S.1943, § 25-519;
Laws 1971, LB 47, § 1; Laws 1996, LB 299, § 19; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 16.
Annotations
1. How made
2. Contents
3. Miscellaneous
1. How made
In the case of substitute service by publication under this section, service is not "made" until the third publication, and prior to the third publication, a defendant is "not served" under section 25-217. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 268 Neb. 439, 684 N.W.2d 14 (2004).
Where service by publication has been approved, a defendant is not served within 6 months from the date the petition was filed under section 25-217 unless the third publication under this section has occurred within 6 months from the date the petition was filed. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 268 Neb. 439, 684 N.W.2d 14 (2004).
Publication seven times in semi-weekly newspaper was not sufficient in foreclosure of tax lien. Davis v. American Inv. & Trust Co., 94 Neb. 427, 143 N.W. 464 (1913).
Publications need not be on same day of week; "week" defined. Burr v. Finch, 91 Neb. 417, 136 N.W. 72 (1912).
Notice must be published in all regular issues during week. Smith v. Potter, 90 Neb. 298, 133 N.W. 437 (1911); Claypool v. Robb, 90 Neb. 193, 133 N.W. 178 (1911).
Notice takes place of summons; publication requiring defendant to answer on second Monday is irregular and may be set aside on motion. Calkins v. Miller, 55 Neb. 601, 75 N.W. 1108 (1898).
Four weekly publications are sufficient. Taylor v. Coots, 32 Neb. 30, 48 N.W. 964 (1891); Fouts v. Mann, 15 Neb. 172, 18 N.W. 64 (1883).
Notice requiring defendant to answer in forenoon is valid; but has whole day to answer. Armstrong v. Middlestadt, 22 Neb. 711, 36 N.W. 151 (1888).
Notice once each week for four successive weeks is completed upon distribution of last publication. Davis v. Huston, 15 Neb. 28, 16 N.W. 820 (1883).
2. Contents
Publication notice must contain a summary statement of the object and prayer of the petition, mention the court wherein it is filed, and notify the person or persons to be served when they are required to answer. Coffin v. Maitland, 146 Neb. 477, 20 N.W.2d 310 (1945).
Plaintiff's cause of action is not required to be set out in notice. Smith v. Potter, 92 Neb. 39, 137 N.W. 854 (1912).
Notice stating that action was for "partition" of lands was sufficient without reciting "partition or sale." McCormick v. Paddock, 20 Neb. 486, 30 N.W. 602 (1886).
Notice in attachment containing general description of property attached is not void. Grebe v. Jones, 15 Neb. 312, 18 N.W. 81 (1883).
3. Miscellaneous
Notice to nonresident herein complied with this section. Armstrong v. Bates, 94 Neb. 462, 143 N.W. 477 (1913).
25-520.
Service by publication; when complete; how proved; affidavit of publication.Service by publication shall be deemed complete when it shall have been made in the manner and for the time prescribed in section 25-519; and such service shall be proved by the affidavit of the printer or his foreman or principal clerk, or other person knowing the same.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 80, p. 406; R.S.1913, § 7643; C.S.1922, § 8586; C.S.1929, § 20-520; R.S.1943, § 25-520.
Annotations
In tax foreclosure case, section is strictly construed. Armstrong v. Griffith, 94 Neb. 515, 143 N.W. 461 (1913).
Service is complete upon distribution of paper containing its fourth successive weekly insertion. Claypool v. Robb, 90 Neb. 193, 133 N.W. 178 (1911).
Any one having actual knowledge of facts may make affidavit. Taylor v. Coots, 32 Neb. 30, 48 N.W. 964 (1891).
Court may permit amendment of affidavit to conform to facts. Britton v. Larson, 23 Neb. 806, 37 N.W. 681 (1888).
25-520.01.
Service by publication; mailing of published notice; requirements; waiver; when mailing not required.(1) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, in any action or proceeding of any kind or nature, as defined in section 25-520.02, where a notice by publication is given as authorized by law, a party instituting or maintaining the action or proceeding with respect to notice or such party's attorney shall within five days after the first publication of notice send by United States mail a copy of such published notice or, if applicable, the notice described in subsection (4) of this section, to each and every party appearing to have a direct legal interest in such action or proceeding whose name and post office address are known to such party or attorney.
(2) Proof by affidavit of the mailing of such notice shall be made by the party or such party's attorney and shall be filed with the officer with whom filings are required to be made in such action or proceeding within ten days after mailing of such notice. Such affidavit of mailing of notice shall further be required to state that such party and such party's attorney, after diligent investigation and inquiry, were unable to ascertain and do not know the post office address of any other party appearing to have a direct legal interest in such action or proceeding other than those to whom notice has been mailed in writing.
(3) It shall not be necessary to serve the notice prescribed by this section upon any competent person, fiduciary, partnership, or corporation, who has waived notice in writing, has entered a voluntary appearance, or has been personally served with summons or notice in such proceeding.
(4) In the case of a lien for a special assessment imposed by any city or village, in lieu of sending a copy of published notice, the city or village may instead send by United States mail, to each and every party appearing to have a direct legal interest in such action or proceeding whose name and post office address are known to the city or village or its attorney, a notice containing the amount owed, the date due, and the date the board of equalization meets in case of an appeal.
Annotations
1. Notice not required
2. Miscellaneous
1. Notice not required
First cousins of testator were not prima facie heirs-at-law, and hence were not required to be notified by mail of pending probate of will. Estate of Colman v. Redford, 179 Neb. 270, 137 N.W.2d 822 (1965).
Notice by mail is not required to be given to the holder of a claim for unliquidated damages. Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner, 175 Neb. 94, 120 N.W.2d 537 (1963).
Notice by mail was not required to be given to property owner of intention by municipality to pass resolution of necessity for constructing sewer system. Jones v. Village of Farnam, 174 Neb. 704, 119 N.W.2d 157 (1963).
Notice was not required to be sent to all owners of land within school district of proceedings to change boundaries thereof. Lindgren v. School Dist. of Bridgeport, 170 Neb. 279, 102 N.W.2d 599 (1960).
A decedent's potential liability for an automobile accident, without establishment of liability and amount of damages, does not constitute a direct legal interest in the estate such that notice by mail must be sent to the potential creditor. Mach v. Schmer, 4 Neb. App. 819, 550 N.W.2d 385 (1996).
2. Miscellaneous
A personal representative must prove that it complied with the requirement that it mail published notice to reasonably ascertainable creditors by showing that the personal representative made a reasonably diligent search, such as a reasonably prudent person would make in view of the circumstances and must extend to those places where information is likely to be obtained and to those persons who would be likely to have information regarding a decedent's creditors. In re Estate of Loder, 308 Neb. 210, 953 N.W.2d 541 (2021).
Because the appellant did not file an affidavit that complied with this section, the appellant's constructive service was improper and the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the appellee. Francisco v. Gonzalez, 301 Neb. 1045, 921 N.W.2d 350 (2019).
Section 30-2483 requires notice to be sent to the Department of Health and Human Services under certain circumstances. To comply with this requirement, notice must be sent in accordance with this section. In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).
The 3-year limitations period of section 30-2485(a)(2) applied to the Department of Health and Human Services' Medicaid estate recovery claim because the personal representative failed to send notice to the department within 5 days of the date on which notice to creditors was first published, as required by section 30-2483 and this section. In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).
The requirements of this section apply to a publication of notice given under section 25-1529 governing sales on execution. KLH Retirement Planning v. Okwumuo, 263 Neb. 760, 642 N.W.2d 801 (2002).
County court which obtained jurisdiction of res of estate upon filing of petition retains jurisdiction until service of notice is perfected or until matter is abandoned. Fischer v. Lingle, 195 Neb. 108, 237 N.W.2d 110 (1975).
A mortgagor in a foreclosure proceeding is not entitled to personal service of the published notice of sale. Hollstein v. Adams, 187 Neb. 781, 194 N.W.2d 216 (1972).
Copy of notice, mailed hereunder, that a will and codicil are being offered for probate is sufficient to put party upon inquiry as to documents offered. Flint v. Panter, 187 Neb. 615, 193 N.W.2d 279 (1970).
This section does not apply to notice of dissolution of corporation. Christensen v. Boss, 179 Neb. 429, 138 N.W.2d 716 (1965).
25-520.02.
Action or proceeding, defined.The term action or proceeding means all actions and proceedings in any court and any action or proceeding before the governing bodies of municipal corporations, public corporations, and political subdivisions for the equalization of special assessments or assessing the cost of any public improvement.
Source:Laws 1957, c. 80, § 2, p. 326.
Annotations
The act, of which this section is a part, is not amendatory, but is new and independent legislation. Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner, 175 Neb. 94, 120 N.W.2d 537 (1963).
Resolution of necessity for constructing a sewer system was not within purview of this section. Jones v. Village of Farnam, 174 Neb. 704, 119 N.W.2d 157 (1963).
Statute does not contemplate personal notice must be given to a class on matters of general public concern. Lindgren v. School Dist. of Bridgeport, 170 Neb. 279, 102 N.W.2d 599 (1960).
25-520.03.
Sections, how construed.Sections 25-520.01 to 25-520.03 are intended by the Legislature to be cumulative and supplemental to existing legislation. They are deemed to be a matter of general statewide concern. Such sections apply to all parties authorized by law to give notice by publication, including the State of Nebraska, its governmental subdivisions, and all public and municipal corporations.
Source:Laws 1957, c. 80, § 3, p. 326.
Annotations
The act, of which this section is a part, is not amendatory, but is new and independent legislation. Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner, 175 Neb. 94, 120 N.W.2d 537 (1963).
25-520.04.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 735, § 1.
25-521.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-522.
Service by publication; designation of newspaper.It shall be the lawful right of any plaintiff or petitioner in any suit, action or proceeding, pending or prosecuted in any of the courts of this state, in which it is necessary to publish in a newspaper any notice or copy of an order, growing out of, or connected with, such action or proceeding, either by himself or his attorney of record, to designate in what newspaper such notice or copy of order shall be published; and it shall be the duty of the judges of the district court, county judges, or any other officer charged with the duty of ordering, directing or superintending the publication of any of such notices, or copies of orders, to strictly comply with such designations when made in accordance with the provisions of this section.
Source:Laws 1909, c. 94, § 1, p. 399; R.S.1913, § 7645; C.S.1922, § 8588; C.S.1929, § 20-522; R.S.1943, § 25-522.
25-523.
Legal newspaper, defined; prior publications legalized.No newspaper shall be considered a legal newspaper for the publication of legal and other official notices unless the same shall have a bona fide circulation of at least three hundred paid subscriptions weekly, and shall have been published within the county for fifty-two successive weeks prior to the publication of such notice, and be printed, either in whole or in part, in an office maintained at the place of publication; Provided, that nothing in this section shall invalidate the publication in a newspaper which has suspended publication or been printed outside of the county, on account of fire, flood or other unavoidable accident, for not to exceed ten weeks, in the year last preceding the first publication of a legal notice, advertising or publication; provided further, that all publications made prior to May 22, 1941, in a newspaper which has, on account of flood, fire or other unavoidable accident, suspended publication or been printed in an office outside of the county, are hereby legalized; provided further, that all newspapers, otherwise complying herewith, which have, on account of flood, fire or other unavoidable accident, suspended publication or been printed in an office outside of the county, for not to exceed ten weeks in any year, are hereby legalized; and provided further, that the publication of legal or other official notices in the English language in foreign language newspapers published within the county for fifty-two successive weeks prior to the publication of such a notice, and printed either in whole or in part in an office maintained at the place of publication, shall also be legal.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 221, § 1, p. 490; Laws 1919, c. 133, § 1, p. 309; C.S.1922, § 8589; C.S.1929, § 20-523; Laws 1935, c. 40, § 1, p. 157; Laws 1941, c. 31, § 1, p. 139; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-523; Laws 1943, c. 44, § 1(1), p. 189; R.S.1943, § 25-523;
Laws 1972, LB 661, § 17.
Annotations
Mechanical act of printing legal newspaper may be performed outside county of place of publication. Wymore Arbor State, Inc. v. Korinek, 182 Neb. 557, 156 N.W.2d 24 (1968).
Particular requirements of this section need not be recited in printer's proof of publication. Seymour v. Lawson, 111 Neb. 770, 197 N.W. 623 (1926).
25-524.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-525.
Judgment on constructive service; how opened; procedure.A party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service than by publication in a newspaper may, at any time within five years after the date of entry of the judgment or order, have the same opened to allow the applicant to appear in court and make a defense. Before the judgment or order is opened, the applicant shall give notice to the adverse party of the intention to make such application and shall file a full answer to the petition or complaint, pay all costs, if the court requires them to be paid, and make it appear to the satisfaction of the court, by affidavit, that during the pendency of the action the applicant had no actual notice thereof in time to appear in court and make a defense. The title to any property, the subject of the judgment or order sought to be opened, which by it, or in consequence of it, has passed to a purchaser in good faith, shall not be affected by any proceedings under this section, nor shall the proceedings affect the title of any property sold before judgment under an attachment. The adverse party, on the hearing of an application to open a judgment or order, as provided by this section, shall be allowed to present counter-affidavits, to show that during the pendency of the action the applicant had notice thereof in time to appear in court and make a defense.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 82, p. 406; R.S.1913, § 7646; C.S.1922, § 8590; C.S.1929, § 20-525; R.S.1943, § 25-525;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 3; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 17.
Annotations
1. Sufficiency of application
2. Notice to plaintiff
3. Title to conveyed property
4. Miscellaneous
1. Sufficiency of application
Before party can have judgment opened, it must appear that he had no actual notice of the pendency of the action in time to make defense. McNally v. McNally, 152 Neb. 845, 43 N.W.2d 170 (1950).
Verified petition filed by parties seeking to open up judgment under this section was equivalent to affidavit and answer required thereunder. Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N.W. 640 (1925).
Application was sufficient to authorize vacation of judgment. Eno v. Lampshire, 108 Neb. 265, 187 N.W. 782 (1922).
Ordinarily only party can make affidavit, but may be made by attorney where party is nonresident. Cass v. Nitsch, 81 Neb. 228, 115 N.W. 753 (1908).
On application, defendant cannot contest sufficiency of original petition; "full answer" means meritorious answer. Oakes v. Ziemer, 62 Neb. 603, 87 N.W. 350 (1901).
To permit a defendant to open up decree, full answer to the merits must be presented. Oakes v. Ziemer, 61 Neb. 6, 84 N.W. 409 (1900).
Defendant must show he did not have actual notice of suit in time to make defense; adverse party may present counteraffidavits. Stover v. Hough, 47 Neb. 789, 66 N.W. 825 (1896).
Party seeking to have judgment opened up must allege and prove bona fides. McGregor v. Eastern B. & L. Assn., 5 Neb. Unof. 563, 99 N.W. 509 (1904).
Motion to vacate judgment after term must tender valid defense which court will adjudge prima facie valid. Waters v. Raker, 1 Neb. Unof. 830, 96 N.W. 78 (1901).
2. Notice to plaintiff
Appearance by party to resist motion to vacate waives notice. Scarborough v. Myrick, 47 Neb. 794, 66 N.W. 867 (1896).
Proceeding is continuation of original action; service of notice on plaintiff's attorney is sufficient. Merriam v. Gordon, 17 Neb. 325, 22 N.W. 563 (1885).
3. Title to conveyed property
Good faith purchaser of land at judicial sale is protected in event judgment reversed under this section. Pauley v. Knouse, 109 Neb. 716, 192 N.W. 195 (1923); Warren v. Dick, 17 Neb. 241, 22 N.W. 462 (1885).
Title of purchaser cannot be litigated in action, except perhaps where bad faith is charged. Security Abstract of Title Co. v. Longacre, 56 Neb. 469, 76 N.W. 1073 (1898).
A purchaser of land under a judgment subsequently opened is not a purchaser pendente lite. Scudder v. Sargent, 15 Neb. 102, 17 N.W. 369 (1883).
4. Miscellaneous
One seeking to open up a judgment secured by constructive service must act within five years and must, by a preponderance of the evidence, show that he had no notice prior to judgment and he must file a meritorious answer. Wittwer v. Dorland, 198 Neb. 361, 253 N.W.2d 26 (1977).
This section has no relation to filing of claims against estate. Supp v. Allard, 162 Neb. 563, 76 N.W.2d 459 (1956).
This section has no reference to a void judgment. Hassett v. Durbin, 132 Neb. 315, 271 N.W. 867 (1937).
Action to redeem from tax foreclosure was commenced in time hereunder. Walter v. Union R. E. Co., 107 Neb. 144, 185 N.W. 323 (1921).
Section is not applicable to proceedings before drainage district board. Richardson County ex rel. Sheehan v. Drainage Dist., 96 Neb. 169, 147 N.W. 205 (1914).
Relief may be granted after five years if proper petitions are presented before expiration of time. Affidavits are amendable. Rine v. Rine, 91 Neb. 248, 135 N.W. 1051 (1912).
Section does not relate to void judgments. Herman v. Barth, 85 Neb. 722, 124 N.W. 135 (1910); Hayes County v. Wileman, 82 Neb. 669, 118 N.W. 478 (1908).
Owner of land sold under scavenger tax law is not entitled to benefits of this section as matter of right. State v. Several Parcels of Land, 75 Neb. 538, 106 N.W. 663 (1906).
Defendant who conveyed his interest by quitclaim deed cannot move to vacate judgment. Browne v. Palmer, 66 Neb. 287, 92 N.W. 315 (1902).
Acknowledgment on summons is actual personal service; judgment cannot be opened. Cheney v. Harding, 21 Neb. 65, 31 N.W. 255 (1887).
Affidavit by an attorney who has personal knowledge of the want of "actual notice" will be sufficient to open the judgment in absence of counteraffidavits. In re Reed v. Estate of Thompson, 19 Neb. 397, 27 N.W. 391 (1886).
Opening judgment upon complying with the requirements of the statute is a matter of right. Brown v. Conger, 10 Neb. 236, 4 N.W. 1009 (1880).
25-526.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-527.
Procedure when defendants not all served.Where the action is against two or more defendants, and one or more shall have been served, but not all of them, the plaintiff may proceed as follows: (1) If the action be against defendants jointly indebted upon contract, he may proceed against the defendant served, unless the court otherwise direct; (2) if the action be against defendants severally liable, he may, without prejudice to his rights against those not served, proceed against the defendants served in the same manner as if they were the only defendants.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 84, p. 407; R.S.1913, § 7648; C.S.1922, § 8592; C.S.1929, § 20-527; R.S.1943, § 25-527.
Annotations
Action being for joint and several liability, it could proceed as to the defendants served, under this section. Bourne v. Baer, 107 Neb. 255, 185 N.W. 408 (1921).
Section is applicable to proceedings to revive joint judgment. Thornhill v. Hargreaves, 76 Neb. 582, 107 N.W. 847 (1906); Clark v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Columbus, 68 Neb. 764, 94 N.W. 958 (1903).
Where principal on injunction bond could not be found in county, it was proper to proceed against surety alone. Gyger v. Courtney, 59 Neb. 555, 81 N.W. 437 (1900).
Obligors on joint bond must be joined; may proceed against those served. Perkins County v. Miller, 55 Neb. 141, 75 N.W. 577 (1898); Young v. Joseph Bros. & Davidson, 5 Neb. Unof. 559, 99 N.W. 522 (1904).
25-528.
Personal service upon appointed resident agent; appointment invalidates constructive service, when.It shall be lawful for any person, association or corporation, owning or claiming any interest in or lien upon any real estate lying within this state, to make and file in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which such real estate is situated an appointment, in writing, of some person, who shall be a resident of the county in which said lands lie, upon whom process may be served in any suit, action or proceeding, concerning or affecting such real estate, to which such owner or claimant shall be made a party. Such appointment shall be acknowledged in the manner provided by law for the acknowledgment of deeds, and shall specifically describe the lands affected by such appointment. From and after the filing of such appointment as herein provided, service of any writ, summons, order or notice, in any suit, action or proceeding, concerning or affecting such real estate, shall be made upon the person so appointed and designated in such manner as may be provided by law for the service of process upon persons found in this state, and shall be held and taken to be a valid and effectual service upon such owner or claimant. A copy of such appointment, or of the record thereof, duly certified by the said register of deeds, shall be deemed sufficient evidence thereof. No service made by publication shall be valid in respect to any such owner or claimant, who shall have filed an appointment under the provisions of this article; Provided, such appointment may be at any time revoked by such owner or claimant, but such revocation shall be in writing duly acknowledged, and shall specifically describe the lands affected by such appointment, and filed and recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which any such real property is situated.
Source:Laws 1877, § 1, p. 17; R.S.1913, § 7649; C.S.1922, § 8593; Laws 1927, c. 65, § 1, p. 227; C.S.1929, § 20-528; R.S.1943, § 25-528.
25-529.
Personal service
upon appointed resident agent; appointment; recording and indexing; fees.The register of deeds of each county shall record such appointment
as shall be filed under the provisions of section 25-528 and any revocation
thereof in the Miscellaneous Record, shall enter such instruments in the numerical
index against the lands described therein, and shall be entitled to demand
and receive fees as provided in section 33-109.
Source:Laws 1877, § 2, p. 18; R.S.1913, § 7650; C.S.1922, § 8594; Laws 1927, c. 65, § 2, p. 228; C.S.1929, § 20-529; R.S.1943, § 25-529;
Laws 1984, LB 679, § 11; Laws 2012, LB14, § 1.
25-530.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-530.01.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-530.02.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-530.03.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-530.04.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-530.05.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-530.06.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-530.07.
Repealed. Laws 1983, LB 447, § 104.
25-530.08.
Company, firm, or unincorporated association; appointment of agent; execution on judgment; fees.When a company, firm, or unincorporated association described in section 25-313 has its principal place of business or activity outside of this state and does not have a usual place of doing business or activity within the state or a clerk or general agent within the state, such company, firm, or unincorporated association shall appoint an agent or agents in this state, and before it is authorized to engage in any kind of business or activity in this state, such company, firm, or unincorporated association shall file in the office of the Secretary of State a certified statement setting forth that such company, firm, or unincorporated association is doing business or conducting activities in the State of Nebraska, stating the nature of the business or activity, and designating an agent or agents within the State of Nebraska upon whom process or other legal notice of the commencement of any legal proceeding or in the prosecution thereof may be served. Executions issued on any judgments rendered in such proceedings shall be levied only on property of the company, firm, or unincorporated association. A fee of five dollars shall be paid for filing the certified statement with the Secretary of State. If there is a change of the agent or agents or if there is a change of street address, a statement shall be filed with the Secretary of State stating the name of the new agent or agents or the new street address or both. A filing fee of three dollars shall be paid for the filing of such statement. This section shall not apply to domestic limited partnerships and foreign limited partnerships governed by the Nebraska Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 25, p. 397; R.S.1913, § 7595; C.S.1922, § 8538; C.S.1929, § 20-314; R.S.1943, § 25-314; Laws 1947, c. 82, § 2, p. 257; Laws 1959, c. 96, § 1, p. 414; Laws 1961, c. 109, § 1, p. 346;
Laws 1974, LB 951, § 1; Laws 1983, LB 447, § 16; R.S.Supp.,1984, § 25-314;
Laws 1989, LB 482, § 5.
Cross References
Nebraska Uniform Limited Partnership Act, see section 67-296.
Annotations
1. Right to serve
2. Procedure
3. Miscellaneous
1. Right to serve
An unincorporated association to represent employees in collective bargaining must comply with this section before it may bring an action in court. Nebraska Council of Educational Leaders v. Nebraska Dept. of Education, 189 Neb. 811, 205 N.W.2d 537 (1973).
Prior to 1947 amendment, where unincorporated association was not formed to carry on some trade or business, or to hold some species of property in this state, service of process could not be properly made on such association in this state. Hurley v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 147 Neb. 781, 25 N.W.2d 29 (1946).
Nonresident firm of attorneys, not having office in this state, was not subject to service of process under this section. State ex rel. Johnson v. Tautges, Rerat & Welch, 146 Neb. 439, 20 N.W.2d 232 (1945).
Where the members of a partnership reside in another state and are not within this state, service of summons upon the firm cannot be made in a county where it has no usual place of business. Stelling v. Peddicord, 78 Neb. 779, 111 N.W. 793 (1907).
To authorize summons to another county, nonresident must be bona fide defendant. Stull Bros. v. Powell, 70 Neb. 152, 97 N.W. 249 (1903).
Section is cumulative, and does not prevent service on individual members of partnership. Herron v. Cole Bros., 25 Neb. 692, 41 N.W. 765 (1889).
In suit to enjoin violation of federal statute by members of partnership, federal district court for Missouri, wherein members resided, had jurisdiction although place of partnership's business was in Nebraska. Sutherland v. United States, 74 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1934).
2. Procedure
Defendant having given other reasons for refusing to recognize plaintiff as negotiating agent could not change ground after litigation started and base refusal on tardy filing of certificate designating agent. Orleans Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Orleans, 193 Neb. 675, 229 N.W.2d 172 (1975).
In suit against a partnership, filing of a petition by individual partners to remove suit to federal court is not a general appearance but a special appearance only. Security State Bank of Norfolk v. Jackson Bros., Boesel & Co., 130 Neb. 562, 265 N.W. 747 (1936).
Service in an action against a partnership may be made by copy left at the usual place of business. Wittstruck v. Temple, 58 Neb. 16, 78 N.W. 456 (1899).
Where action is brought against firm in the individual names of its members and one member is absent from state, service upon the others is sufficient. Winters v. Means, 25 Neb. 241, 41 N.W. 157 (1888).
Service on partnership at usual place of business is sufficient. Rosenbaum & Co. v. Hayden & Co., 22 Neb. 744, 36 N.W. 147 (1888).
3. Miscellaneous
Service of process in an action against individual members of a partnership is not governed by this section. Hanna v. Emerson, 45 Neb. 708, 64 N.W. 229 (1895).
25-531.
Lis pendens; notice;
where filed; contents; recording; cancellation; filing fee.When the summons has been served or publication made, the action
is pending so as to charge third persons with notice of pendency. While the
action is pending no interest can be acquired by third persons in the subject
matter thereof, as against the plaintiff's title. In all actions brought to
affect the title to real property, the plaintiff may either at the time of
filing his or her complaint or afterwards, file, or in case any defendant
sets up an affirmative cause of action and demands relief which shall affect
the title to real estate, he or she may, at the time of filing such answer
or at any time afterwards, file with the clerk or register of deeds of each
county in which the real estate thus to be affected, or any part thereof,
is situated, a notice of the pendency of such action. The notice shall contain
the names of the parties, the object of the action, and a description of the
property in such county sought to be affected thereby. If the action is for
foreclosure of a mortgage, such notice shall contain the date of the mortgage,
the parties thereto, and the time and place of recording the same. The clerk
or register of deeds of such county shall record the notice thus filed and
enter the same upon the numerical index of all lands, any part of which is
included in the description in the notice, for which he or she shall be entitled
to receive filing fees in accordance with section 33-109, to be paid by the person filing such notice, and which
shall be taxed as part of the costs in the action. From the time of filing
such notice the pendency of such action shall be constructive notice to any
purchaser or encumbrancer to be affected thereby. Every person whose conveyance
or encumbrance is subsequently executed or subsequently recorded shall be
deemed to be a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer and shall be bound by
all proceedings taken in the action after the filing of such notice to the
same extent as if he or she were made a party to the action. The court in
which such action was commenced or any judge thereof may at any time thereafter
on the application of any person aggrieved, on good cause shown, and on such
notice as the court or judge may determine, order the notice to be canceled
by the clerk or register of deeds of any county in which the notice may have
been filed or recorded by filing a notice of release. In actions in which
such notice is filed in a county or counties, other than the county in which
the action is pending, the county clerk or the register of deeds of the county
in which the action was begun may cancel such notice by executing a written
release under his or her hand and seal by reason of the order of the court
or judge, and forward such release by mail to the county clerk or register
of deeds of the county in which the notice has been filed or recorded, and
which certificate such county clerk or register of deeds shall record in the
records of his or her office. At any time after such notice of pendency is
recorded, the party on whose behalf the same was filed or the party's attorney
of record may cause the notice to be canceled in the office of the county
clerk or register of deeds of any county in which the notice has been filed
or recorded. Such cancellation may be made by written release in the same
manner as such cancellations are entered on order of the court. For the service
required by this section, the county clerk or register of deeds shall be entitled
to charge and receive fees in accordance with section 33-109, to be paid by the party causing
the service to be performed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 85, p. 407; Laws 1887, c. 92, § 1, p. 643; R.S.1913, § 7651; C.S.1922, § 8595; C.S.1929, § 20-531; R.S.1943, § 25-531; Laws 1959, c. 140, § 1, p. 544; Laws 1963, c. 140, § 1, p. 517; Laws 1969, c. 181, § 1, p. 772;
Laws 1971, LB 90, § 1; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 18; Laws 2012, LB14, § 2.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Subsequent purchasers
3. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
The lis pendens statute is a specific statute that controls over section 25-323, which is the more general statute requiring the joinder of necessary and indispensable parties. Wilkinson Development v. Ford & Ford Investments, 311 Neb. 476, 973 N.W.2d 349 (2022).
The purpose and nature of the property and the intent of the parties determines whether buildings or other items located on leased land affect the title to real property. Ondrak v. Matis, 270 Neb. 46, 699 N.W.2d 367 (2005).
Lis pendens has no application to independent titles, not derived from any of the parties to the suit nor in succession to them. Coffin v. Old Line Life Ins. Co., 138 Neb. 857, 295 N.W. 884 (1941).
Claims based upon deed made after lis pendens is filed are subordinated to and determined by the judgment in mortgage foreclosure suit. Hadley v. Corey, 137 Neb. 204, 288 N.W. 826 (1939).
Notice of pendency of suit, while preventing other than parties to the suit from acquiring interest in subject matter pendente lite, does not affect existing rights or prevent the court from their adjudication. First Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Young, 124 Neb. 598, 247 N.W. 586 (1933).
In action to wind up farm lease partnership, intervening creditors of one partner, having constructive notice hereunder of their debtor's limited interest, must share with other partner in distribution of debtor's property. Sacks v. Lytle, 119 Neb. 642, 230 N.W. 501 (1930).
Filing lis pendens at commencement of quiet title action gives constructive notice of plaintiff's claims. Gwynne v. Goldware, 102 Neb. 260, 166 N.W. 625 (1918).
Filing lis pendens does not impound property for plaintiff not having general or specific lien. Purchaser after action is started is not bound by rights subsequently set up by amendment. Hulen v. Chilcoat, 79 Neb. 595, 113 N.W. 122 (1907).
Section does not refer to rights of third parties not derived through parties to suit. Merrill v. Wright, 65 Neb. 794, 91 N.W. 697 (1902).
Lessee under lease made during suit is subject to decree against lessor. McLean v. McCormick, 4 Neb. Unof. 187, 93 N.W. 697 (1903).
Lis pendens applies only to specific property pointed out by pleadings, and must be definite. Hillebrand v. Nelson, 1 Neb. Unof. 783, 95 N.W. 1068 (1901).
Nonresident assignee of note and mortgage, failing to record his assignment, is bound by decree canceling mortgage. Heck v. Nicholas, 6 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1925).
2. Subsequent purchasers
The lis pendens statute does not operate to prevent a subsequent purchaser from fully participating as a party in a quiet title action affecting the subject property. Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co., 297 Neb. 541, 900 N.W.2d 765 (2017).
The court having jurisdiction, a party cannot, while the action is pending, dispose of the property and avoid the effect of the final judgment in the case. Stanton v. Stanton, 146 Neb. 71, 18 N.W.2d 654 (1945).
A purchaser pendente lite need not be made a party to a mechanic's lien foreclosure proceeding. Johnson v. Olson, 132 Neb. 778, 273 N.W. 201 (1937).
One failing to record deed until after lis pendens filed in action to set aside deeds is subsequent purchaser and bound by proceedings. Justice v. Shaw, 103 Neb. 423, 172 N.W. 253 (1919).
Amendment of 1887 cutting off prior unrecorded interests was constitutional; purpose of amendment stated. Munger v. Beard & Bro., 79 Neb. 764, 113 N.W. 214 (1907).
Mortgagee acquiring rights after levy of attachment took subject thereto even though petition in attachment suit was thereafter amended. Nagle v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 57 Neb. 552, 77 N.W. 1074 (1899).
Purchaser pendente lite is bound by decree. Clark v. Charles, 55 Neb. 202, 75 N.W. 563 (1898); Lincoln Rapid Transit Co. v. Rundle, 34 Neb. 559, 52 N.W. 563 (1892).
Judgment is superior to mortgage executed during term, though recorded before judgment. Norfolk State Bank v. Murphy, 40 Neb. 735, 59 N.W. 706 (1894).
Purchaser after summons served is subject to judgment. Shuman v. Willets, 17 Neb. 478, 23 N.W. 358 (1885).
3. Miscellaneous
The perceived merits of the underlying action are not "good cause" to cancel a notice of lis pendens under this section. Kelliher v. Soundy, 288 Neb. 898, 852 N.W.2d 718 (2014).
25-532.
Notice of judgment when property situated in more than one county.When any part of the real property, the subject matter of an action, is situated in any other county or counties than the one in which the action is brought, a certified copy of the judgment in such action must be recorded in the clerk's office of such other county or counties before it shall operate therein as a notice, so as to charge third persons as provided in section 25-531. It shall operate as such notice without record in the county where it is rendered; but this section shall not apply to actions or proceedings under any statute now in force which does not require such record.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 86, p. 407; R.S.1913, § 7652; C.S.1922, § 8596; C.S.1929, § 20-532; R.S.1943, § 25-532.
25-533.
Attachment and execution issued from another county; sheriff file notice.No levy of attachment or execution on real estate issued from any other county shall be notice to a subsequent vendee or encumbrancer in good faith, unless the sheriff has filed a notice on the record that the land, describing it, has been so attached or levied on, the cause in which it was so attached, and when it was done.
Source:Laws 1895, c. 73, § 2, p. 314; R.S.1913, § 7653; C.S.1922, § 8597; C.S.1929, § 20-533; R.S.1943, § 25-533;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 8.
25-534.
Order, motion, or notice; service; delivery.Whenever in any action or proceeding, any order, motion, notice, or other document, except a summons, is required by statute or rule of the Supreme Court to be served upon or given to any party, the service or delivery shall be made in accordance with the rules of pleading in civil actions promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to section 25-801.01.
Annotations
This section did not apply when the defendant in a paternity action did not appear in the action. State v. Buckhalter, 273 Neb. 443, 730 N.W.2d 340 (2007).
Service of agency's final decision was completed upon mailing pursuant to this section rather than upon receipt of decision by petitioner's attorney. Roubal v. State, 14 Neb. App. 554, 710 N.W.2d 359 (2006).
Notice was satisfied when address used was correct but included wrong office designation and no evidence showed notice was not received. City of Lincoln v. MJM, Inc., 9 Neb. App. 715, 618 N.W.2d 710 (2000).
25-535.
Person, defined.As used in sections 25-535 to 25-541, person includes an individual, executor, administrator, personal representative, corporation, partnership, limited liability company, association, or other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this state and whether or not organized under the laws of this state.
Annotations
Under this and succeeding sections where copies of complaint, summons, and interrogatories were sent by registered mail to limited partnership defendant at its foreign office, Nebraska long-arm statute was satisfied. Blum v. Kawaguchi, Ltd., 331 F.Supp. 216 (D. Neb. 1971).
25-536.
Jurisdiction over a person.A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person:
(1) Who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person:
(a) Transacting any business in this state;
(b) Contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(c) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(d) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if the person regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state;
(e) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state; or
(f) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting; or
(2) Who has any other contact with or maintains any other relation to this state to afford a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
Cross References
Resident agent appointment in real estate matters, see section 25-528.
Service on foreign corporations, registered agent, see sections 21-19,152 and 21-19,155.
Service on foreign insurance corporations, see sections 44-135, 44-2009 to 44-2013, and 44-5507.
Workers' compensation cases, additional method of jurisdiction exists, see sections 48-146, 48-175, 48-175.01, and 48-190.
Annotations
1. Scope of jurisdiction
2. Subject to jurisdiction
3. Not subject to jurisdiction
4. Miscellaneous
1. Scope of jurisdiction
Nebraska's long-arm statute extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. It was the intention of the Legislature to provide for the broadest allowable jurisdiction over nonresidents under Nebraska's long-arm statute, and when a
state construes its long-arm statute to confer jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally permitted, the inquiry collapses into the single question of whether jurisdiction comports with due process. Yeransian v. Willkie Farr, 305 Neb. 693, 942 N.W.2d 226 (2020).
Nebraska's long-arm statute extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Thus, courts need only look to the Due Process Clause when determining personal jurisdiction. Lanham v. BNSF Railway Co., 305 Neb. 124, 939 N.W.2d 363 (2020).
If a Nebraska court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, it is authorized by subsection (2) of this section. Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions v. Lone Star Steakhouse, 298 Neb. 705, 905 N.W.2d 644 (2018).
Nebraska's long-arm statute extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. S.L. v. Steven L., 274 Neb. 646, 742 N.W.2d 734 (2007); Ameritas Invest. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005); Brunkhardt v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 269 Neb. 222, 691 N.W.2d 147 (2005); Quality Pork Internat. v. Rupari Food Servs., 267 Neb. 474, 675 N.W.2d 642 (2004).
Nebraska's long-arm statute is to be interpreted broadly in view of the rationale and philosophy underlying its adoption. Quality Pork Internat. v. Rupari Food Servs., 267 Neb. 474, 675 N.W.2d 642 (2004).
Concept of due process in Nebraska's long-arm statute is at least as broad as the constitutional standard of due process. Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Gelt, 558 F.2d 1303 (8th Cir. 1977).
Nebraska long-arm statute is limited only by the constitutional constraints imposed by the minimum contacts rule. Vergara v. Aeroflot Soviet Airlines, 390 F.Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975).
2. Subject to jurisdiction
An appellate court generally finds minimum contacts supporting specific personal jurisdiction where there has been protracted business related to the action involving substantial and numerous purchases and communications, but a single contract may be sufficient to support specific personal jurisdiction where it creates a substantial ongoing relationship or where the nonresident defendant acts as a guarantor for the transaction. Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, 313 Neb. 135, 983 N.W.2d 134 (2023).
Because minimum contacts depend on the activities of the defendant related to the operative facts of the litigation and not on the unilateral actions taken by someone else, direct contacts between the independent contracting parties, which the intermediary is not involved in, do not create minimum contacts for the intermediary. Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, 313 Neb. 135, 983 N.W.2d 134 (2023).
Nebraska's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over a noncustodial parent who removes a minor child from the child's Nebraska home under the guise of exercising visitation rights in another jurisdiction and then intentionally subjects the child to harm before returning her to this state. S.L. v. Steven L., 274 Neb. 646, 742 N.W.2d 734 (2007).
A parent company had sufficient minimum contacts with Nebraska for a Nebraska court to exercise personal jurisdiction where the parent company contracted with its Nebraska subsidiary, coordinated the exchange of equipment between the subsidiary and other centers, prepared all tax reports, provided all forms necessary for operations in Nebraska, and operated a toll-free telephone number and Website accessible from Nebraska. Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., 274 Neb. 236, 738 N.W.2d 453 (2007).
This section expressly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Crete Carrier Corp. v. Red Food Stores, Inc., 254 Neb. 323, 576 N.W.2d 760 (1998).
This section expressly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. The fiduciary shield doctrine is not a bar to personal jurisdiction over a corporate agent or employee when the agent or employee has sufficient minimum contacts of his own with Nebraska to satisfy federal due process requirements. Crystal Clear Optical v. Silver, 247 Neb. 981, 531 N.W.2d 535 (1995).
This section explicitly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Wagner v. Unicord Corp., 247 Neb. 217, 526 N.W.2d 74 (1995).
Nonresident defendant's conduct and connection with the State of Nebraska was such that it reasonably should have anticipated being haled into court over plaintiff's cause of action for the return of its loan application fee. 24th and Dodge Ltd. v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 243 Neb. 98, 497 N.W.2d 386 (1993).
In order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if the defendant is not within the territory of the forum, due process requires that such defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. McGowan Grain v. Sanburg, 225 Neb. 129, 403 N.W.2d 340 (1987).
The establishment of a marital relationship in this state from which a nonresident has left is sufficient minimum contact with this state to permit a court of this state to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident in an action to dissolve that marriage. York v. York, 219 Neb. 883, 367 N.W.2d 133 (1985).
Company having an interest in, using or possessing real property in this state at a time when it was transacting business in this state was subject to jurisdiction of court in this state and its special appearance was properly overruled. Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Development Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974).
Nonresident manufacturer comes under long-arm statute when it places its products in the stream of commerce expecting delivery in Nebraska. Stoehr v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 429 F.Supp. 763 (D. Neb. 1977).
By statute, defendant is under state jurisdiction when defendant contracts for sale of motorcycles in Nebraska. Hetrick v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 429 F.Supp. 116 (D. Neb. 1976).
Where after defendant Illinois corporation entered into distributorship agreement for Nebraska, area contacts were numerous and continuous. Nebraska corporation's antitrust cause of action arose out of interrelated acts allegedly indicating unfair competition; sufficient contacts existed to permit in personam jurisdiction. Morton Buildings of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Buildings, Inc., 333 F.Supp. 187 (D. Neb. 1971).
Where the delivery, installation, operation, and alleged injury resulting from defective machine occurred in Nebraska, the manufacturer who had shipped same indirectly was subject to Nebraska jurisdiction. Blum v. Kawaguchi, Ltd., 331 F.Supp. 216 (D. Neb. 1971).
3. Not subject to jurisdiction
A Nebraska-based client will not provide a sufficient basis for specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident attorney absent the solicitation of Nebraska-based clients or something else linking the attorney to the state. Central States Dev. v. Friedgut, 312 Neb. 909, 981 N.W.2d 573 (2022).
Nebraska courts lacked personal jurisdiction over a nonresident attorney and out-of-state law firm where the attorney sought a federal agency's approval of a federal program for a Nebraska-based client. Central States Dev. v. Friedgut, 312 Neb. 909, 981 N.W.2d 573 (2022).
Neither an act of sexual intercourse between consenting adults nor the failure of a putative father to support his child is an act "causing tortious injury" under the terms of the Nebraska long-arm statute. State ex rel. Larimore v. Snyder, 206 Neb. 64, 291 N.W.2d 241 (1980).
For tortious act in other state, jurisdiction for damage action in Nebraska not supported by telephone calls, travel to Nebraska, and unspecified acts which induced victim to travel to other state. Von Seggern v. Saikin, 187 Neb. 315, 189 N.W.2d 512 (1971).
An ongoing relationship, by itself, is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. The quality and nature of the ongoing business relationship is important, not just the fact that a business relationship exists. Roth Grading v. Martin Bros. Constr., 25 Neb. App. 928, 916 N.W.2d 70 (2018).
The existence of a contract with a party in a forum state or the mere use of interstate facilities, such as telephones and mail, does not, in and of itself, provide the necessary contacts for personal jurisdiction. Roth Grading v. Martin Bros. Constr., 25 Neb. App. 928, 916 N.W.2d 70 (2018).
Nebraska courts lacked personal jurisdiction over a wife to adjudicate personal matters that were incidences of the parties' marriage, such as child custody, parenting time, child support, and division of property and debts, where the wife and children never had contact with Nebraska, and the parties were married, had children, and separated in Canada. Metzler v. Metzler, 25 Neb. App. 757, 913 N.W.2d 733 (2018).
Where defendants maintained no offices, salespersons, or agents in Nebraska; where contracts neither executed nor performed in Nebraska; where goods neither came from or to Nebraska; the Nebraska contracts insufficient to attach jurisdiction under long-arm statutes. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1977) affirming, Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1977).
National Trailer Leasing Company under facts of case not subject to jurisdiction under this section which requires actual presence in state plus additional requirement of regular or persistent course of conduct. Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1969).
Where the activities of a physician and hospital in administering chemotherapy treatment were localized and confined to the State of Iowa, there were insufficient contacts with Nebraska for purposes of application of the Nebraska long-arm statute in a wrongful death action against the physician and hospital, notwithstanding the foreseeability of alleged effects occurring in Nebraska where the patient resided. Glover v. Wagner, 462 F.Supp. 308 (D. Neb. 1978).
Where purchase contracts were executed outside Nebraska by nonresident sellers for shipment of goods to other states, and defendants did not transact nor solicit business in Nebraska, buyers' Nebraska residence did not give federal court in Nebraska personal jurisdiction in this suit under Bankruptcy Act. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 418 F.Supp. 674 (D. Neb. 1976).
4. Miscellaneous
The provisions of this section requiring notice of homestead exemption rights do not apply to foreclosure of a tax lien represented by a tax sale certificate. Destiny 98 TD v. Miodowski, 269 Neb. 427, 693 N.W.2d 278 (2005).
The benchmark for determining if the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process is whether the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. The existence of a Nebraska choice-of-law clause is a factor to be considered in determining whether a party should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Nebraska. Castle Rose v. Philadelphia Bar & Grill of Arizona, Inc., 254 Neb. 299, 576 N.W.2d 192 (1998).
While language of this section does not cover divorce in specific words, it indicates the legislative intention to apply the minimum contacts rule where it does not offend traditional concepts of fair play and substantial justice. Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971).
To determine whether a defendant's contract supplies the contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction in a forum state, a court is to consider the parties' prior negotiations and future contemplated consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing. Roth Grading v. Martin Bros. Constr., 25 Neb. App. 928, 916 N.W.2d 70 (2018).
Out-of-state seller, who allegedly sold heifers to a cow-calf operation that were unfit for breeding purposes, did not have continuous and systematic business contact with Nebraska sufficient to warrant the exercise of personal general jurisdiction over seller. There was no evidence that seller designated an agent for service of process, held a license in the state, had employees in the state, or was incorporated in the state. South Dakota cattle seller's sending industry directories, in which it had placed advertisements to buyer, and maintaining 800 number, was not purposeful availment to the laws of Nebraska, as was required to warrant exercise of specific jurisdiction over seller in buyers' action alleging that seller breached warranty that heifers were fit for breeding purposes. Higgins v. Rausch Herefords, 9 Neb. App. 212, 609 N.W.2d 712 (2000).
Question of whether in personam jurisdiction is acquired under Nebraska long-arm statute depends primarily on the quantity, nature, and quality of the parties' contacts with the forum state. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1977).
It is a nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state that are of interest in determining if in personam jurisdiction exists, not its contacts with the resident plaintiff. Gendler v. General Growth Properties, 461 F.Supp. 434 (D. Neb. 1978).
Under facts in this case, defendant was amenable to service, and when copy of complaint and a summons were served by registered mail with signed receipt required, requirements of due process were met. General Leisure Products Corp. v. Gleason Corp., 331 F.Supp. 278 (D. Neb. 1971).
25-537.
Service outside state.When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by sections 25-535 to 25-541, service may be made outside this state.
Source:Laws 1967, c. 143, § 3, p. 439.
Annotations
Unless defendant transacts some business in Nebraska, jurisdiction over him may not be obtained hereunder by service outside the state. Conner v. Southern, 186 Neb. 164, 181 N.W.2d 446 (1970).
Concept of due process in Nebraska's long-arm statute is at least as broad as the constitutional standard of due process. Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Gelt, 558 F.2d 1303 (8th Cir. 1977).
25-538.
Action in another forum; stay or dismissal of action.When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.
Source:Laws 1967, c. 143, § 4, p. 439.
Annotations
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss case on basis of forum non conveniens. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Kight, 246 Neb. 619, 522 N.W.2d 155 (1994).
The district court considered the public interest factors of forum non conveniens and dismissed the plaintiff's action, concluding that New York was a better forum. However, the district court failed to also consider the unique circumstances of the case, namely, that a New York court had already dismissed the plaintiff's case because it determined that the case should be heard in Nebraska pursuant to a forum selection clause in the parties' contract; the New York court did not address the public interest factors of forum non conveniens in its decision. Given the unique circumstances, rather than dismissing the action, the district court should have stayed the action on the condition that the case is filed in and accepted by the New York courts. Milmar Food Group II v. Applied Underwriters, 29 Neb. App. 714, 958 N.W.2d 920 (2021).
Where diverse parties to a contract have agreed in writing that the defendant will assume the burden of litigating an action on the contract in the plaintiff's home jurisdiction, and where there is no evidence of fraud or duress or any other action by the plaintiff that would retroactively render void the contractual forum selection, this section does not authorize a court to arbitrarily amend the contract by nullifying the forum selection clause and reassigning to the plaintiff the burden of litigating an action on the contract in a foreign jurisdiction. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Walker, 1 Neb. App. 882, 510 N.W.2d 439 (1993).
25-539.
Jurisdiction authorized.A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any other basis authorized by law.
Source:Laws 1967, c. 143, § 5, p. 440.
Annotations
In personam jurisdiction may be acquired over a nonresident defendant in a divorce action by extra-territorial personal service of process made in accordance with a statute of this state if there exists sufficient contacts between the defendant and this state relevant to the cause of action to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantive justice. In this case, defendant's last marital domicile was in Nebraska and no showing was made that it was later superseded by a new domicile. Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971).
25-540.
Service outside state; manner.(1) When the law of this state authorizes service outside this state, the service, when reasonably calculated to give actual notice, may be made:
(a) In the manner prescribed for service within this state;
(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is made for service in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction;
(c) As directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory; or
(d) As directed by the court.
(2) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the individual who made the service or in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place in which the service is made for proof of service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction.
Cross References
Workers' compensation cases, additional nonresident jurisdiction and method of proof of service exists, see section 48-175.01.
Annotations
When service of process is made outside of the state by mail, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of personal delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court. Lydick v. Smith, 201 Neb. 45, 266 N.W.2d 208 (1978).
Proof of service by mail must include a receipt signed by the addressee, or other satisfactory evidence of personal delivery, and an affidavit to be considered on appeal must be offered in evidence and preserved in the bill of exceptions. Anderson v. Autocrat Corp., 194 Neb. 278, 231 N.W.2d 560 (1975).
Where affidavit showed service personally upon defendant Reiff individually and as district manager of defendant corporation, and by certified mail, return receipt requested upon individual defendants in their office in Morton, Illinois, together with return receipts showing that copies of summons and complaint were served upon each, the process was in conformity with this section. Morton Buildings of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Buildings, Inc., 333 F.Supp. 187 (D. Neb. 1971).
25-541.
Sections, how construed.Sections 25-535 to 25-541 do not repeal or modify any other law of this state permitting another procedure for service.
Source:Laws 1967, c. 143, § 7, p. 440.
25-542.
Service of process; applicability.Unless specifically provided to the contrary or the context otherwise requires, the provisions of Chapter 25, article 5, on service of process, as such provisions may from time to time be amended, shall apply to all civil proceedings in all courts of this state and to all proceedings under any statute which refers to or incorporates the general provisions on process or service of process.
25-543.
Repealed. Laws 1999, LB 43, § 30.
25-601.
Dismissal without prejudice.An action may be dismissed without prejudice to a future action (1) by the plaintiff, before the final submission of the case to the jury, or to the court where the trial is by the court; (2) by the court where the plaintiff fails to appear at the trial; (3) by the court for want of necessary parties; (4) by the court on the application of some of the defendants where there are others whom the plaintiff fails to diligently prosecute; (5) by the court for disobedience by the plaintiff of an order concerning the proceedings in the action. In all other cases on the trial of the action the decision must be upon the merits.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 430, p. 465; R.S.1913, § 7654; C.S.1922, § 8598; C.S.1929, § 20-601; R.S.1943, § 25-601.
Annotations
1. Before final submission
2. After final submission
3. Want of necessary parties
4. Disobedience by plaintiff
5. Miscellaneous
1. Before final submission
Under this section, a plaintiff has the right to dismiss an action without prejudice any time before final submission of the case, so long as no counterclaim or setoff has been filed by an opposing party. HBI, L.L.C. v. Barnette, 305 Neb. 457, 941 N.W.2d 158 (2020).
A plaintiff has the right to dismiss the action it has brought at any time prior to final submission. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 225 Neb. 218, 403 N.W.2d 383 (1987).
An order sustaining a demurrer is not a final order. Therefor, an action may be dismissed as a matter of right upon plaintiff's motion following the demurrer. Koll v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 207 Neb. 425, 299 N.W.2d 435 (1980).
Plaintiff had right hereunder to dismiss his claim for reinstatement in union and could then pursue claim for damages for wrongful discharge without exhausting administrative remedies. Poppert v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 187 Neb. 297, 189 N.W.2d 469 (1971).
Right of plaintiff to dismiss action is not a matter of judicial grace or discretion. In divorce action, until trial court enters an order imposing some obligation, plaintiff has unqualified right to dismiss regardless of nature of pleadings on file. Werner v. Werner, 186 Neb. 558, 184 N.W.2d 646 (1971).
County attorney may dismiss action in juvenile court before trial without leave of court. In re Interest of Moore, 186 Neb. 67, 180 N.W.2d 917 (1970).
Plaintiff may dismiss action as a matter of right at any time before final submission of case. Gebhart v. Tri-State G. & T. Assn., 181 Neb. 457, 149 N.W.2d 41 (1967).
An action may be dismissed without prejudice by a plaintiff as a matter of right at any time before final submission of the case. Giesler v. City of Omaha, 175 Neb. 706, 123 N.W.2d 650 (1963).
Section applies to dismissal of counterclaim before final submission. Harbert v. Mueller, 156 Neb. 838, 58 N.W.2d 221 (1953).
A counterclaim may be dismissed as a matter of right at any time before final submission. Feight v. Mathers, 153 Neb. 839, 46 N.W.2d 492 (1950).
Plaintiff may dismiss without prejudice to take advantage of amended venue statutes and bring action in another county. Grosc v. Bredthauer, 136 Neb. 43, 284 N.W. 869 (1939).
The right of the plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice before final submission applies in appeals from the Workmen's Compensation Court to district court. Chilen v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 135 Neb. 619, 283 N.W. 366 (1939).
Before final submission of a case to the jury or court, a dismissal by plaintiff without prejudice to a future action is not a matter of judicial grace or discretion, but is a statutory right. Duffy v. Cody, 129 Neb. 737, 262 N.W. 828 (1935).
Before final submission plaintiff may dismiss as a matter of right. Reams v. Sinclair, 97 Neb. 542, 150 N.W. 826 (1915); Snyder v. Collier, 85 Neb. 552, 123 N.W. 1023 (1909).
One of several plaintiffs has right to dismiss action so far as he is concerned; informality in dismissal is cured where cause proceeds to final determination between remaining parties. Henkel v. Boudreau, 94 Neb. 338, 143 N.W. 236 (1913).
Plaintiff may, as a matter of right, dismiss his action without prejudice at any time before its final submission. Snyder v. Collier, 85 Neb. 552, 123 N.W. 1023 (1909).
Plaintiff has absolute right to dismiss without prejudice before final submission of cause. Beals v. Western Union Tel. Co., 53 Neb. 601, 74 N.W. 54 (1898); Sharpless v. Giffen, 47 Neb. 146, 66 N.W. 285 (1896).
Where property was not taken or has been returned, plaintiff in replevin may dismiss. Saussay v. Lemp Brew. Co., 52 Neb. 627, 72 N.W. 1026 (1897).
Plaintiff in replevin, who has taken property, cannot dismiss without defendant's consent. Vose v. Muller, 48 Neb. 602, 67 N.W. 598 (1896).
Plaintiff in replevin, who has obtained possession of property under the writ, cannot dismiss without consent of defendant. Garber v. Palmer, Blanchard & Co., 47 Neb. 699, 66 N.W. 656 (1896).
Trial court has no authority to enter involuntary nonsuit and judgment of dismissal. Proper practice is to instruct jury to return verdict for defendant. Zittle v. Schlesinger, 46 Neb. 844, 65 N.W. 892 (1896).
Refusal of court to dismiss is not final order. Supreme Court will not reinstate action when plaintiff has dismissed. Grimes v. Chamberlain, 27 Neb. 605, 43 N.W. 395 (1889).
Plaintiff may dismiss as to one defendant during trial though answer pleads misjoinder of defendants. Morrissey v. Schindler, 18 Neb. 672, 26 N.W. 476 (1886).
An action may be dismissed without prejudice to a future action by the plaintiff before the final submission of the case to the court where the trial is by the court, and it is generally a right of the plaintiff that is not a matter of judicial grace or discretion. In re Guardianship of David G., 18 Neb. App. 918, 798 N.W.2d 131 (2011).
This section applies to a case on appeal from the small claims court pending in district court, if there has not been final submission to the district court judge. Sutherland v. Shoemaker, 6 Neb. App. 157, 570 N.W.2d 375 (1997).
2. After final submission
After defendant moves for a directed verdict and arguments of both parties are completed, a case is under submission and plaintiff loses absolute right to dismiss without prejudice. Any time before final submission of the case to the fact finder, plaintiff may dismiss an action, without prejudice, as a matter of right. Collection Specialists v. Vesely, 238 Neb. 181, 469 N.W.2d 549 (1991).
When a case has been submitted upon a motion for a directed verdict, plaintiff's absolute right to dismiss without prejudice is lost, but when the motion is overruled there is no longer a final submission where issues remain to be determined by the jury and have not been submitted to it. Miller v. Harris, 195 Neb. 75, 236 N.W.2d 828 (1975).
Where plaintiff presented her case and rested, the defendant moved for dismissal, and the court took the matter under advisement, the case was submitted and plaintiff had lost her right to dismiss without prejudice. Gydesen v. Gydesen, 188 Neb. 538, 197 N.W.2d 67 (1972).
After final submission, dismissal without prejudice requires leave of court. Tuttle v. Wyman, 149 Neb. 769, 32 N.W.2d 742 (1948).
When defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's action at close of plaintiff's evidence, he admits plaintiff's testimony to be true, together with every conclusion that may fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom, and court must thereupon determine as question of law whether plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to support judgment for plaintiff. Schroeder v. Bartlett, 129 Neb. 645, 262 N.W. 447 (1935).
Dismissal is not demandable as a right after the cause has been fully tried and unconditionally submitted to the court. Pettegrew v. Pettegrew, 128 Neb. 783, 260 N.W. 287 (1935).
Final submission of action contemplates its submission upon both law and fact. Plattsmouth Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. Sedlak, 128 Neb. 509, 259 N.W. 367 (1935).
Trial court's ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss jury was final submission hereunder so that plaintiff could not dismiss the case without prejudice thereafter. Stungis v. Wavecrest Realty Co., 124 Neb. 769, 248 N.W. 78 (1933).
Dismissal after final submission must be by order of court entered on journal. Knaak v. Brown, 115 Neb. 260, 212 N.W. 431 (1927).
Plaintiff may dismiss without prejudice after reversal and remand for new trial. Bancroft Drainage Dist. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 102 Neb. 455, 167 N.W. 731 (1918).
Court may permit dismissal after submission. Nelson v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 93 Neb. 154, 139 N.W. 860 (1913).
Plaintiff appealing to district court may dismiss action. Dismissal is not affirmance of judgment below, and is not res judicata. Thornhill v. Hargreaves, 76 Neb. 582, 107 N.W. 847 (1906).
Absolute right to dismiss is lost after submission on demurrer to evidence. Fronk v. Evans City Steam Laundry Co., 70 Neb. 75, 96 N.W. 1053 (1903).
When a case has been submitted upon a demurrer to the evidence, and the demurrer sustained, plaintiff's absolute right to dismiss without prejudice is lost. Bee Building Co. v. Dalton, 68 Neb. 38, 93 N.W. 930 (1903).
Court may impose reasonable terms or refuse dismissal. Horton v. State ex rel. Hayden, 63 Neb. 34, 88 N.W. 146 (1901).
Involuntary nonsuit for failure of proof is unauthorized; it is error, without prejudice, where directed verdict would have been proper. Thompson v. Missouri P. Ry., 51 Neb. 527, 71 N.W. 61 (1897).
Plaintiff cannot dismiss after cause has been submitted to court or jury. State ex rel. Board of Supervisors of Holt County v. Hazelet, 41 Neb. 257, 59 N.W. 891 (1894).
Appellant from justice court may dismiss without consent of appellee. Eden Musee Co. v. Yohe, 37 Neb. 452, 55 N.W. 866 (1893).
Equity rule prevails; court may excuse payment of costs in first action as prerequisite to maintaining second. Union P. Ry. Co. v. Mertes, 35 Neb. 204, 52 N.W. 1099 (1892).
After a demurrer to plaintiff's petition has been sustained, plaintiff cannot afterwards dismiss the action. State ex rel. Burlington & M. River R. R. Co. v. Scott, 22 Neb. 628, 36 N.W. 121 (1888).
After submission, a trial court has no authority to dismiss a case without prejudice on the basis that a plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his or her claims. Holling v. Holling, 16 Neb. App. 394, 744 N.W.2d 479 (2008).
Plaintiff's privilege of dismissal without prejudice is not demandable as of right after cause has been submitted, but may be granted in exercise of discretion. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co. v. Daniels, 63 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1933).
3. Want of necessary parties
Action may be dismissed by court for want of necessary parties. Dempster v. Ashton, 125 Neb. 535, 250 N.W. 917 (1933).
Where motion is made to dismiss for want of prosecution, defendant must serve notice on plaintiff. Berggren v. Berggren, 24 Neb. 764, 40 N.W. 284 (1888).
4. Disobedience by plaintiff
A civil action may be dismissed if, absent a showing of good cause, a litigant fails to prosecute the action in compliance with the Nebraska Supreme Court's Case Progression Standards for civil actions in district courts. Billups v. Jade, Inc., 240 Neb. 494, 482 N.W.2d 269 (1992).
Pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, it is within the discretion of the district court to dismiss a petition without prejudice for disobedience by the plaintiff of a reasonable order concerning the proceedings in the action. Kerndt v. Ronan, 236 Neb. 26, 458 N.W.2d 466 (1990).
It is within the sound discretion of the district court to dismiss a petition without prejudice for disobedience by the plaintiff of a reasonable order concerning the proceedings in the action. Vodehnal v. Grand Island Daily Independent, 191 Neb. 836, 218 N.W.2d 220 (1974).
Action may be dismissed without prejudice for failure of plaintiff to appear at pretrial conference. Pressey v. State, 173 Neb. 652, 114 N.W.2d 518 (1962).
Failure or refusal of plaintiff to comply with a proper order of court with respect to amendment of petition may be valid ground for dismissal of the action. Bushnell v. Thompson, 133 Neb. 115, 274 N.W. 453 (1937).
Court has power to dismiss, with prejudice, for plaintiff's failure to comply with rules or orders. Ferson v. Armour & Co., 109 Neb. 648, 192 N.W. 125 (1923).
District court has discretionary power to dismiss petition without prejudice for disobedience of reasonable order. Howell v. Malmgren, 79 Neb. 16, 112 N.W. 313 (1907).
5. Miscellaneous
A will contest is an in rem proceeding and is not an action for purposes of civil procedure statutes governing voluntary dismissal, including this section and section 25-602. In re Estate of Ryan, 313 Neb. 970, 987 N.W.2d 634 (2023).
After one of several claims has been finally submitted, a plaintiff retains the right to voluntarily dismiss other claims that have not yet been finally submitted, but the plaintiff loses the statutory right to voluntarily dismiss the entire action. Schaaf v. Schaaf, 312 Neb. 1, 978 N.W.2d 1 (2022).
The district court's authority to reinstate a case following its grant of partial summary judgment on one of several claims was unaffected by the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of the entire action, to which the plaintiffs were not statutorily entitled. Schaaf v. Schaaf, 312 Neb. 1, 978 N.W.2d 1 (2022).
A motion for summary judgment can be a final submission that will prevent voluntary dismissal under this section. Millard Gutter Co. v. American Family Ins. Co., 300 Neb. 466, 915 N.W.2d 58 (2018).
No case addressing the right of a party to dismiss pursuant to this section has required the party to pay costs pursuant to section 25-602. Without a motion for attorney fees pending, such fees would not be a part of the costs to be paid under either this section or section 25-602. Kansas Bankers Surety Co. v. Halford, 263 Neb. 971, 644 N.W.2d 865 (2002).
Where wife dismissed her suit to dissolve marriage, husband had no right to notice, hearing, or right to attach conditions to dismissal because he did not file a request for affirmative relief on merits of cause. Temporary orders perished with dismissal because nothing remained to invoke jurisdiction. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 223 Neb. 684, 392 N.W.2d 787 (1986).
The right of a plaintiff to dismiss is not a matter of judicial grace or discretion, but may be made subject to condition, such as reimbursement of costs, where equity so requires. Dawson v. Papio Nat. Resources Dist., 210 Neb. 100, 313 N.W.2d 242 (1981).
District court has jurisdiction to enter judgment of dismissal without prejudice upon sustaining of demurrer. Akins v. Chamberlain, 164 Neb. 428, 82 N.W.2d 632 (1957).
Filing of petition for probate of will is not an action. Hill v. Humlicek, 156 Neb. 61, 54 N.W.2d 366 (1952).
Practice of entering "nonsuit" upon conclusion of opening statements by counsel to jury is disapproved. Temple v. Cotton Transfer Co., 126 Neb. 287, 253 N.W. 349 (1934).
Proceedings under writ ad quod damnum are included in term "action" used in this section, providing for dismissal. Blue River Power Co. v. Hronik, 116 Neb. 405, 217 N.W. 604 (1928).
Filing petition for appointment of administrator is not an "action" hereunder. In re Estate of Glover, 104 Neb. 151, 175 N.W. 1017 (1920).
Where the only relief is against a nominal defendant who did not appear and upon whom the record fails to show service of process, dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action by court is proper. Elmore v. McMillan, 79 Neb. 621, 113 N.W. 165 (1907).
Court cannot adjudge that new action shall not be subject to defense of statute of limitations. Linton v. Cooper, 75 Neb. 167, 106 N.W. 170 (1905).
Dismissal does not operate as estoppel; before action is recommenced, court may require payment of costs in first. Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank, 74 Neb. 734, 105 N.W. 287 (1905).
Where one of two plaintiffs had judgment in replevin, the other cannot dismiss without defendant's consent. Houck v. Linn, 56 Neb. 743, 77 N.W. 51 (1898).
A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice. In re Guardianship of David G., 18 Neb. App. 918, 798 N.W.2d 131 (2011).
25-602.
Dismissal without prejudice; by plaintiff in vacation; exceptions; payment of costs.The plaintiff in any case pending in the district court or Supreme Court of the state, when no counterclaim or setoff has been filed by the opposite party, has the right in the vacation of any of such courts to dismiss such action without prejudice, upon payment of costs, which dismissal shall be, by the clerk of any of such courts, entered upon the record and take effect from and after the date thereof.
Source:Laws 1867, § 1, p. 51; R.S.1913, § 7655; C.S.1922, § 8599; C.S.1929, § 20-602; R.S.1943, § 25-602;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 9.
Annotations
A will contest is an in rem proceeding and is not an action for purposes of civil procedure statutes governing voluntary dismissal, including section 25-601 and this section. In re Estate of Ryan, 313 Neb. 970, 987 N.W.2d 634 (2023).
No case addressing the right of a party to dismiss pursuant to section 25-601 has required the party to pay costs pursuant to this section. Without a motion for attorney fees pending, such fees would not be a part of the costs to be paid under either section 25-601 or this section. Kansas Bankers Surety Co. v. Halford, 263 Neb. 971, 644 N.W.2d 865 (2002).
Plaintiff had right to dismiss without prejudice to take advantage of amended statute on venue of action. Grosc v. Bredthauer, 136 Neb. 43, 284 N.W. 869 (1939).
Dismissal after final submission of case must be by order of court entered on journal. Knaak v. Brown, 115 Neb. 260, 212 N.W. 431 (1927).
Filing petition for appointment of administrator is not an "action." In re Estate of Glover, 104 Neb. 151, 175 N.W. 1017 (1920).
Section is applicable to election contest; cannot set aside dismissal without notice to contestant, to allow another to intervene. Moore v. Waddington, 69 Neb. 615, 96 N.W. 279 (1903).
Dismissal before appearance by defendant ends case. Sims v. Davis, 48 Neb. 720, 67 N.W. 765 (1896).
Right to dismiss is not absolute, but depends upon payment of costs. Sheedy v. McMurtry, 44 Neb. 499, 63 N.W. 21 (1895).
After case is submitted, power to dismiss without prejudice ceases. Sharp v. Brown, 34 Neb. 406, 51 N.W. 1030 (1892).
Where there is no setoff or counterclaim, and costs are paid, court cannot at next term permit intervention. Harris v. Cronk, 17 Neb. 475, 23 N.W. 341 (1885).
25-603.
Dismissal without prejudice; trial on setoff or counterclaim.In any case where a setoff or counterclaim has been presented, the defendant shall have the right of proceeding to the trial of his claim, although the plaintiff may have dismissed the action or failed to appear.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 431, p. 465; R.S.1913, § 7656; C.S.1922, § 8600; C.S.1929, § 20-603; R.S.1943, § 25-603.
Annotations
A cross-appeal is an appeal perfected by a second party to the action filed subsequent to a prior appeal by an adverse party. Gebhart v. Tri-State G. & T. Assn., 181 Neb. 457, 149 N.W.2d 41 (1967).
Where a setoff or counterclaim has been presented, a defendant has the right to proceed to trial on his claim, although plaintiff may have dismissed his action. Giesler v. City of Omaha, 175 Neb. 706, 123 N.W.2d 650 (1963).
Dismissal of counterclaim did not prevent plaintiff from proceeding on set-off against same. Feight v. Mathers, 153 Neb. 839, 46 N.W.2d 492 (1951).
Where plaintiff in action to foreclose first mortgage dismissed case before final submission, a defendant filing a cross-petition for foreclosure of second mortgage is entitled to trial of his cross-complaint. Plattsmouth Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. Sedlak, 128 Neb. 509, 259 N.W. 367 (1935).
Plaintiff has no right to dismiss as to defendants who have pleaded facts entitling them to affirmative relief. Toop v. Palmer, 108 Neb. 850, 189 N.W. 394 (1922).
Plaintiff on appeal to district court cannot by dismissing action defeat judgment on set-off below. Hess v. Hess, 78 Neb. 347, 110 N.W. 999 (1907).
Right of plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice does not affect the right of defendant to proceed to trial on cross-petition. Adams v. Osgood, 55 Neb. 766, 76 N.W. 446 (1898).
25-701.
Joinder of claims.A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal or equitable, as the party has against an opposing party.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 87, p. 407; Laws 1867, § 3, p. 71; R.S.1913, § 7657; C.S.1922, § 8601; C.S.1929, § 20-701; R.S.1943, § 25-701;
Laws 1998, LB 234, § 3.
Annotations
1. Same transaction
2. Contracts
3. Trustees
4. Recovery of property
5. Other actions
1. Same transaction
For application of res judicata a petition in quantum meruit is a restatement of the earlier cause of action on express contract where both petitions are based on same services. Vantage Enterprises, Inc. v. Caldwell, 196 Neb. 671, 244 N.W.2d 678 (1976).
Damages for loss of possession of lease and loss of crops could be joined. Dinkel v. Hagedorn, 156 Neb. 419, 56 N.W.2d 464 (1953).
In suit to enjoin nuisance, damages may be recovered. Brchan v. The Crete Mills, 155 Neb. 505, 52 N.W.2d 333 (1952).
Plaintiff may unite a cause of action growing out of breach of promise to marry, and another in damages for seduction, where both causes arise out of the same transaction. Ryan v. Oswald, 134 Neb. 265, 278 N.W. 508 (1938).
Malicious prosecution and false imprisonment arising out of same transaction may be joined. Scott v. Flowers, 60 Neb. 675, 84 N.W. 81 (1900).
Causes of action in tort, all growing out of and connected with the same transaction, may be joined. Dinges v. Riggs, 43 Neb. 710, 62 N.W. 74 (1895).
2. Contracts
Amendment of petition allowed to include action in quantum meruit with action on express contract. Associated Wrecking v. Wiekhorst Bros., 228 Neb. 764, 424 N.W.2d 343 (1988).
Agreement to pay principal of debt at one time and interest thereon at another gives rise to separate causes of action which plaintiff may join or not at his pleasure. Peters v. Meyer, 131 Neb. 847, 270 N.W. 312 (1936).
Action on quantum meruit may be joined with action on express contract. Stout v. Omaha, L. & B. Ry. Co., 97 Neb. 816, 151 N.W. 295 (1915).
Action to foreclose mortgage and on unsecured note cannot be joined. McCague Sav. Bank v. Croft, 80 Neb. 702, 115 N.W. 315 (1908).
Action to foreclose mortgage and for deficiency judgment may be joined. Commercial Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Grant, 73 Neb. 435, 103 N.W. 68 (1905).
Action to correct official bond and for damages for breach of bond may be joined. Stewart v. Carter, 4 Neb. 564 (1876).
3. Trustees
Action to enforce trust agreement under which defendant purchased plaintiff's property at judicial sale, and action based upon alleged invalidity of sale may be joined. Williams v. Lowe, 4 Neb. 382 (1876).
4. Recovery of property
Under prior law, under subsection (6) of this section, plaintiff may seek rents and profits in an ejectment action. Wicker v. Waldemath, 238 Neb. 515, 471 N.W.2d 731 (1991).
Action for conversion of corporate assets may be joined with one for statutory liability of stockholders on account of failure to publish notice of amount of corporate indebtedness. Malm v. Stock, 99 Neb. 374, 156 N.W. 656 (1916).
Action by stockholder to enforce lien for money ordered paid by court in setting aside fraudulent conveyance to officers, and for appointment of receiver may be joined. Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 75 N.W. 46 (1898).
Actions to recover illegal fees and for statutory penalty were joinable. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. King, 52 Neb. 562, 72 N.W. 855 (1897).
Ejectment and action for rents and profits may be joined. Fletcher v. Brown, 35 Neb. 660, 53 N.W. 577 (1892); Harrall v. Gray, 12 Neb. 543, 11 N.W. 851 (1882).
5. Other actions
Causes of action involving different defendants cannot be joined unless each cause affects all defendants and they have a joint or common liability or interest. Gould v. Orr, 244 Neb. 163, 506 N.W.2d 349 (1993); S.I.D. No. 272 of Douglas County v. Marquardt, 233 Neb. 39, 443 N.W.2d 877 (1989).
Under the provisions of sections 25-701 and 25-702, R.R.S.1943, the joinder in a single action of the cause against an uninsured motorist with the insurer carrying the uninsured motorist coverage for the claimant is not permissible. Eich v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 208 Neb. 714, 305 N.W.2d 621 (1981).
If the plaintiff does not choose to unite several causes of action in one petition and the defendant does not successfully require joinder, there is no legal requirement that distinct causes of action be joined in one suit. Suhr v. City of Scribner, 207 Neb. 24, 295 N.W.2d 302 (1980).
Plaintiff cannot join an individual cause of action with a representative cause of action. Niklaus v. Abel Construction Co., 164 Neb. 842, 83 N.W.2d 904 (1957).
Causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act may be united in one action. Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947).
Cause which might have been joined may be added by amendment. Freeman v. Webb, 21 Neb. 160, 31 N.W. 656 (1887).
Actions against the principal and sureties on separate bonds for a default of the official occurring after the execution of the second bond may be properly joined. Holeran v. School Dist. No. 17, Adams County, 10 Neb. 406, 6 N.W. 472 (1880).
Damages for breach of covenant and for quiet enjoyment of lease may be joined. Herpolsheimer v. Funke, 1 Neb. Unof. 471, 95 N.W. 688 (1901).
25-702.
Repealed. Laws 1998, LB 234, § 12.
25-703.
Consolidation of actions; motion and notice.Whenever two or more actions are pending in the same court which might have been joined, the defendant may, on motion and notice to the adverse party, require him to show cause why the same shall not be consolidated, and if no such cause be shown, the said several actions shall be consolidated.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 150, p. 416; R.S.1913, § 7659; C.S.1922, § 8603; C.S.1929, § 20-703; R.S.1943, § 25-703.
Annotations
If the plaintiff does not choose to unite several causes of action in one petition and the defendant does not successfully require joinder, there is no legal requirement that distinct causes of action be joined in one suit. Suhr v. City of Scribner, 207 Neb. 24, 295 N.W.2d 302 (1980).
Right of consolidation under this section is dependent upon an application by a defendant. Bruno v. Kramer, 176 Neb. 597, 126 N.W.2d 885 (1964).
Two or more actions pending in the same court which might have been joined, may, upon application, be consolidated. Peters v. Meyer, 131 Neb. 847, 270 N.W. 312 (1936).
Consolidating actions for trial is inherent power of equity court. Butler v. Secrist, 84 Neb. 85, 120 N.W. 1109 (1909).
Where plaintiffs who should have joined bring separate actions, motion to consolidate is proper. Downey v. Coykendall, 81 Neb. 648, 116 N.W. 503 (1908).
Actions must be such as might have been joined. Weeks v. Wheeler, 41 Neb. 200, 59 N.W. 554 (1894).
Plaintiff is not required to join distinct claims in one action but may be required to consolidate actions. Beck v. Devereaux, 9 Neb. 109, 2 N.W. 365 (1879).
Five actions on separate policies and an action to enjoin encumbrances on three more policies may be consolidated. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Wert, 102 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1939).
25-704.
Consolidation of actions; order.The order for consolidation may be made by the court or by a judge thereof in vacation.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 151, p. 417; R.S.1913, § 7660; C.S.1922, § 8604; C.S.1929, § 20-704; R.S.1943, § 25-704.
25-705.
Joinder; procedures; misjoinder.(1) This section applies when an action involves multiple parties or more than one cause of action.
(2) A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief and against one or more of the defendants according to their respective liabilities.
(3) The court may make such orders as will prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom the party asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against the party and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.
(4) Persons other than those made parties to the original action may be made parties to a counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance with section 25-311 or 25-320.
(5) Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
Annotations
Pursuant to this section, an order that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties will constitute a final, appealable order only if the trial court expressly directs the entry of a final judgment as to the party or parties adjudicated and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 260 Neb. 372, 617 N.W.2d 806 (2000).
Where multiple causes of action are alleged, the resolution of one cause of action constitutes a final, appealable order only if the trial court expressly directs the entry of a final judgment on that one issue and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Chief Indus., Inc. v. Great Northern Ins. Co., 259 Neb. 771, 612 N.W.2d 225 (2000).
25-801.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-801.01.
Rules of pleading; Supreme Court; promulgate.(1) By January 1, 2003, the Supreme Court shall have rules of pleading in civil actions promulgated which are not in conflict with the statutes governing such matters.
(2) For all civil actions filed on or after January 1, 2003:
(a) The rules of pleading promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply;
(b) The plaintiff's initial pleading shall be a petition when that designation is provided elsewhere by statutes. In all other civil actions the plaintiff's initial pleading shall be a complaint;
(c) The cross-petition, cross-bill, and cross-suit are abolished. Demurrers to a pleading and special appearances shall not be used. The plea in bar, plea in abatement, and other dilatory pleas shall not be used in civil actions; and
(d) All pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice.
Annotations
Pleas in abatement are not provided for in civil actions. State ex rel. Comm. on Unauth. Prac. of Law v. Hansen, 286 Neb. 69, 834 N.W.2d 793 (2013).
25-802.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-803.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-804.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-805.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-806.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-807.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-808.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-809.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-810.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-811.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-812.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-813.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-814.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-815.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-816.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-817.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-818.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-819.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-820.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-821.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-822.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-823.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-824.
Pleadings; use in other actions; frivolous pleading; effect; effect of signature; frivolous actions; award of attorney's fees and costs.(1) A pleading shall not be used against a party in any criminal prosecution or action or proceeding for a penalty or forfeiture as proof of a fact admitted or alleged in such pleading. If a pleading is frivolous or made in bad faith, it may be stricken. The signature of a party or of an attorney on a pleading constitutes a certificate by him or her that he or she has read the pleading; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground for the filing of the pleading; and that it is not interposed for delay.
(2) Except as provided in subsections (5) and (6) of this section, in any civil action commenced or appealed in any court of record in this state, the court shall award as part of its judgment and in addition to any other costs otherwise assessed reasonable attorney's fees and court costs against any attorney or party who has brought or defended a civil action that alleges a claim or defense which a court determines is frivolous or made in bad faith.
(3) When a court determines reasonable attorney's fees or costs should be assessed, it shall allocate the payment of such fees or costs among the offending attorneys and parties as it determines most just and may charge such amount or portion thereof to any offending attorney or party.
(4) The court shall assess attorney's fees and costs if, upon the motion of any party or the court itself, the court finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action or any part of an action that was frivolous or that the action or any part of the action was interposed solely for delay or harassment. If the court finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceedings by other improper conduct, including, but not limited to, abuses of civil discovery procedures, the court shall assess attorney's fees and costs.
(5) No attorney's fees or costs shall be assessed if a claim or defense was asserted by an attorney or party in a good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law in this state or if, after filing suit, a voluntary dismissal is filed as to any claim or action within a reasonable time after the attorney or party filing the dismissal knew or reasonably should have known that he or she would not prevail on such claim or action.
(6) No party who is appearing without an attorney shall be assessed attorney's fees unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably should have known that his or her action or defense or any part of such action or defense was frivolous or made in bad faith, except that this subsection shall not apply to any situation in which an attorney licensed to practice law in the state is appearing without an attorney, in which case he or she shall be held to the standards for attorneys prescribed in this section.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 113, p. 412; R.S.1913, § 7684; Laws 1915, c. 144, § 1, p. 313; C.S.1922, § 8628; C.S.1929, § 20-824; R.S.1943, § 25-824; Laws 1969, c. 182, § 1, p. 774;
Laws 1983, LB 277, § 1; Laws 1987, LB 261, § 1.
Annotations
1. Verification
2. Frivolous or bad faith pleading
3. Attorney's fees
4. Miscellaneous
1. Verification
The failure of a party to sign an answer is waived if not raised before trial. Schaneman v. Wright, 238 Neb. 309, 470 N.W.2d 566 (1991).
Want of verification is not a jurisdictional defect. Northup v. Bathrick, 80 Neb. 36, 113 N.W. 808 (1907).
Verification is not necessary to petition in error. Newlove v. Woodward, 9 Neb. 502, 4 N.W. 237 (1880).
Failure to verify is not ground for dismissal. Fritz v. Barnes, 6 Neb. 435 (1877).
Verification on belief of affiant is sufficient. Harden v. Atchison & N. R. R. Co., 4 Neb. 521 (1876).
Agent or attorney may make verification. Cropsey v. Wiggerhorn, 3 Neb. 108 (1873).
2. Frivolous or bad faith pleading
Arguments to vacate an arbitrator's award, although not meritorious, were not frivolous when the district court had not explored what a party must show to demonstrate that an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers under the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act or whether an arbitration award governed by the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act could be vacated on the grounds that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
A claim or defense that was not frivolous at its commencement may become frivolous over the course of discovery and in light of pretrial rulings. McGill Restoration v. Lion Place Condo. Assn., 309 Neb. 202, 959 N.W.2d 251 (2021).
A cognizable claim brought with a reasonable belief that discovery would support its allegations is not frivolous. George Clift Enters. v. Oshkosh Feedyard Corp., 306 Neb. 775, 947 N.W.2d 510 (2020).
A frivolous action is one in which a litigant asserts a legal position wholly without merit; that is, the position is without rational argument based on law and evidence to support the litigant's position. The term "frivolous" connotes an improper motive or legal position so wholly without merit as to be ridiculous. TFF, Inc. v. SID No. 59, 280 Neb. 767, 790 N.W.2d 427 (2010).
Any doubt about whether a legal position is frivolous or taken in bad faith should be resolved in favor of the one whose legal position is in question. TFF, Inc. v. SID No. 59, 280 Neb. 767, 790 N.W.2d 427 (2010).
A frivolous action is one in which a litigant asserts a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence to support the litigant's position. Cornett v. City of Omaha Police & Fire Ret. Sys., 266 Neb. 216, 664 N.W.2d 23 (2003).
The term frivolous, as used in subsection (2) of this section, connotes an improper motive or legal position so wholly without merit as to be ridiculous. Cornett v. City of Omaha Police & Fire Ret. Sys., 266 Neb. 216, 664 N.W.2d 23 (2003); Peter v. Peter, 262 Neb. 1017, 637 N.W.2d 865 (2002); Behrens v. American Stores Packing Co., 236 Neb. 279, 460 N.W.2d 671 (1990).
"Frivolous" means an attempt to relitigate the same issues resolved in prior proceedings with the same parties or a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence to support a litigant's position. Cox v. Civil Serv. Comm. of Douglas Cty., 259 Neb. 1013, 614 N.W.2d 273 (2000).
Although appellant's burden of proof on appeal was difficult, the appeal was not considered frivolous, and therefore, there was no basis for an award of attorney fees pursuant to this section because appellant did not attempt to relitigate the same issues resolved in prior proceedings with the same parties and appellant's argument was not wholly without merit. Schuelke v. Wilson, 255 Neb. 726, 587 N.W.2d 369 (1998).
A party forced to defend a frivolous action may recover his or her attorney fees; a frivolous action is one in which a litigant asserts a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence. Zimmerman v. FirsTier Bank, 255 Neb. 410, 585 N.W.2d 445 (1998).
For the purposes of subsection (2) of this section, "frivolousness" is defined as being "a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence to support a litigant's position". Foiles v. Midwest Street Rod Assn. of Omaha, Inc., 254 Neb. 552, 578 N.W.2d 418 (1998).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, in determining sanctions, the court uses its discretion in determining the appropriate cost or fee permitted by this section. Malicky v. Heyen, 251 Neb. 891, 560 N.W.2d 773 (1997).
As used in subsection (2) of this section, "frivolous" means a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence to support litigant's position in the lawsuit. Surratt v. Watts Trucking, 249 Neb. 35, 541 N.W.2d 41 (1995).
For the purpose of this section, "frivolous" is defined as being a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence to support a litigant's position in the lawsuit. First Nat. Bank in Morrill v. Union Ins. Co., 246 Neb. 636, 522 N.W.2d 168 (1994).
As used in subsection (2) of this section concerning allowance of an attorney fee, "frivolous" means a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence to support a litigant's position in the lawsuit. Nebraska Pub. Emp. v. City of Omaha, 244 Neb. 328, 506 N.W.2d 686 (1993).
A legal position is frivolous if the position is wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence to support a litigant's position in the lawsuit. Sports Courts of Omaha v. Meginnis, 242 Neb. 768, 497 N.W.2d 38 (1993).
Under subsection (2) of this section, the Supreme Court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard to district court decisions concerning the imposition of sanctions for frivolous lawsuits. Millard v. Hyplains Dressed Beef, 237 Neb. 907, 468 N.W.2d 124 (1991).
The attorney fees generated in defending against a frivolous appeal are authorized under subsection (2) of this section regardless of the fact that the fees were not requested or ordered in the trial court. First Nat. Bank v. Chadron Energy Corp., 236 Neb. 199, 459 N.W.2d 736 (1990).
The term "frivolous," as used in this section, connotes an improper motive or legal position wholly without merit. Peterson v. Don Peterson & Assoc. Ins. Agency, 234 Neb. 651, 452 N.W.2d 517 (1990).
A city's defense to a hospital's action to recover for services was frivolous where the hospital sought to recover for services rendered to indigent prisoners and the Nebraska Supreme Court had held that the city was liable in an earlier suit. Lutheran Medical Center v. City of Omaha, 229 Neb. 802, 429 N.W.2d 347 (1988).
All doubts as to whether an action is frivolous should be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Sanctions should not be imposed except in the clearest cases. Shanks v. Johnson Abstract & Title, 225 Neb. 649, 407 N.W.2d 743 (1987).
This section is authority for granting fees to a party defendant when the party initiating the court proceeding does so vexatiously. Stratman v. Hagen, 221 Neb. 157, 376 N.W.2d 3 (1985).
But for the fact that the amendment to this section permitting the assessment of reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, to attorneys is new, a portion of the attorney fee awarded to the defendants would have been taxed to the plaintiffs' attorneys. Graham v. Waggener, 219 Neb. 907, 367 N.W.2d 707 (1985).
The term "frivolous," as used in this section, providing for the award of attorney fees for the bringing of a frivolous claim, connotes an improper motive or legal position so wholly without merit as to be ridiculous. Shandera v. Schultz, 23 Neb. App. 521, 876 N.W.2d 667 (2016).
An argument that a referendum vote repealing a statute was retroactive to the statute's effective date, where the Nebraska Supreme Court had previously held that the operation of the statute had not been suspended pending the referendum vote, was not frivolous. Haskell v. Madison Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 0001, 17 Neb. App. 669, 771 N.W.2d 156 (2009).
An appeal from an order overruling a pretrial motion to dismiss was not frivolous and did not entitle the appellee to an award of attorney fees or costs where no prior Nebraska case had addressed the finality of such an order. Qwest Bus. Resources v. Headliners—1299 Farnam, 15 Neb. App. 405, 727 N.W.2d 724 (2007).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees under subsection (2) of this section even though the plaintiff's suit was wrongly commenced, because the suit was not frivolous. Pipe and Piling Supplies (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Betterman & Katelman, 8 Neb. App. 475, 596 N.W.2d 24 (1999).
The term "frivolous," as used in subsection (2) of this section, means a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without a rational argument based on law and evidence to support the litigant's position in the lawsuit. Janet K. v. Kevin B., 5 Neb. App. 169, 556 N.W.2d 270 (1996).
3. Attorney's fees
Attorney fees may be assessed when a party persists in asserting a claim after it knows or reasonably should know
it would not prevail on the claim. George Clift Enters. v. Oshkosh Feedyard Corp., 306 Neb. 775, 947 N.W.2d 510
(2020).
A trial court's decision awarding or denying attorney fees under this section will be upheld absent an abuse of
discretion. Seldin v. Estate of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 939 N.W.2d 768 (2020).
Under subsection (2) of this section, attorney fees shall be awarded against a party who alleged a claim or defense
that the court determined was frivolous, interposed any part of the action solely for delay or harassment, or
unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct. Seldin v. Estate of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185,
939 N.W.2d 768 (2020).
When a motion for attorney fees under this section is made prior to the judgment of the court in which the attorney's services were rendered, the judgment will not become final and appealable until the court has ruled upon that motion. Murray v. Stine, 291 Neb. 125, 864 N.W.2d 386 (2015).
A motion for attorney fees pursuant to this section must be made prior to the judgment of the court in which the attorney's services were rendered. When a motion for attorney fees is made prior to judgment, the judgment will not become final and appealable until the court has ruled upon the motion. Salkin v. Jacobsen, 263 Neb. 521, 641 N.W.2d 356 (2002).
In an action for modification of a marital dissolution decree, the award of attorney fees is discretionary with the trial court, is reviewed de novo on the record, and will be affirmed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Peter v. Peter, 262 Neb. 1017, 637 N.W.2d 865 (2002).
An award of fees under this section may be taxed against an offending attorney. Cedars Corp. v. Sun Valley Dev. Co., 253 Neb. 999, 573 N.W.2d 467 (1998).
On appeal, a trial court's decision allowing or disallowing an attorney fee will be upheld in the absence of the trial court's abuse of discretion. Lincoln Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 248 Neb. 221, 533 N.W.2d 898 (1995); Sports Courts of Omaha v. Meginnis, 242 Neb. 768, 497 N.W.2d 38 (1993); Janet K. v. Kevin B., 5 Neb. App. 169, 556 N.W.2d 270 (1996).
Subsection (2) of this section provides generally that a court can award reasonable attorney fees and court costs against any attorney or party who has brought or defended a civil action that alleges a claim or defense that a court determines is frivolous or made in bad faith. In re Guardianship of Aimee S., 26 Neb. App. 380, 920 N.W.2d 18 (2018).
A jury's special finding does not abrogate the trial court's discretion to determine whether a party is entitled to attorney fees under subsection (2) of this section. Harrington v. Farmers Union Co-op. Ins. Co., 13 Neb. App. 484, 696 N.W.2d 485 (2005).
Construing subsection (2) of this section in pari materia with section 25-824.01, the use of the term "shall" in this subsection is directory, rather than mandatory; Nebraska's statutory scheme requires the trial court to "exercise its sound discretion" in determining whether to award attorney fees, and whether a claim or defense was made in bad faith is but one factor to be considered by the trial court. Harrington v. Farmers Union Co-op. Ins. Co., 13 Neb. App. 484, 696 N.W.2d 485 (2005).
4. Miscellaneous
Where an attorney pursues a motion for recusal that is frivolous or made in bad faith, the district court has jurisdiction to enter a sanction under this statute when it is timely requested, regardless of whether the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the underlying dispute. State of Florida v. Countrywide Truck Ins. Agency, 294 Neb. 400, 883 N.W.2d 69 (2016).
A proposed order dismissing a case with qualifications or conditions does not constitute a “voluntary dismissal” within the meaning of subsection (5) of this section. White v. Kohout, 286 Neb. 700, 839 N.W.2d 252 (2013).
Under code, an answer, except so far as statements therein may involve admissions against interest, has been wholly deprived of the characteristics of evidence. Marshall v. Rowe, 126 Neb. 817, 254 N.W. 480 (1934).
25-824.01.
Frivolous actions; attorney's fees; costs; determination of amount.In determining the amount of a cost or an attorney's fee award pursuant to subsection (2) of section 25-824, the court shall exercise its sound discretion. When granting an award of costs and attorney's fees, the court shall specifically set forth the reasons for such award and shall, in determining whether to assess attorney's fees and costs and the amount to be assessed against offending attorneys and parties, consider the following factors, including, but not limited to: (1) The extent to which any effort was made to determine the validity of any action or claim before the action was asserted; (2) the extent of any effort made after the commencement of an action to reduce the number of claims or defenses being asserted or to dismiss claims or defenses that have been found not to be valid; (3) the availability of facts to assist the party to determine the validity of a claim or defense; (4) the relative financial position of the parties involved; (5) whether or not the action was prosecuted or defended in whole or in part in bad faith; (6) whether or not issues of fact, determinative of the validity of a party's claim or defense, were reasonably in conflict; (7) the extent to which the party prevailed with respect to the amount of and number of claims in controversy; (8) the amount or conditions of any offer of judgment or settlement in relation to the amount or conditions of the ultimate relief granted by the court; (9) the extent to which a reasonable effort was made to determine prior to the time of filing of a claim that all parties sued or joined were proper parties owing a legally defined duty to the plaintiff or defendant; and (10) the extent of any effort made after the commencement of an action to reduce the number of parties in the action.
Annotations
The two requirements of this section, one mandating a court to specifically set forth the reasons for the award and the other requiring the court to consider enumerated factors, are separate and distinct. White v. Kohout, 286 Neb. 700, 839 N.W.2d 252 (2013).
In determining whether to assess attorney fees and costs and the amount to be assessed against offending attorneys
and parties, the court considers a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the 10 factors listed in this section.
In re Guardianship of Aimee S., 26 Neb. App. 380, 920 N.W.2d 18 (2018).
Nebraska's statutory scheme requires the trial court to "exercise its sound discretion" in determining whether to award attorney fees, and whether a claim or
defense was made in bad faith is but one factor to be considered by the trial court. Harrington v. Farmers Union Co-op. Ins. Co., 13 Neb. App. 484, 696 N.W.2d 485 (2005).
25-824.02.
Frivolous actions; actual attorney's fee; effect of award; stipulations authorized.Nothing in sections 25-824 to 25-824.03 shall be construed to prevent an attorney and his or her client from negotiating the actual fee which the client is to pay the attorney. Nothing in such sections shall be intended to limit the authority of the court to approve written stipulations filed with the court or oral stipulations in open court agreeing to no award of attorney's fees or costs or an award of attorney's fees or costs in a manner different than that provided in such sections.
25-824.03.
Frivolous actions; applicability of sections.Sections 25-824 to 25-824.03 shall apply unless attorney's fees are otherwise specifically provided by law, in which case the provision allowing the greater award shall prevail.
25-825.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 182, § 2.
25-826.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 182, § 2.
25-827.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 182, § 2.
25-828.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 182, § 2.
25-829.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 182, § 2.
25-830.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 182, § 2.
25-831.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 182, § 2.
25-832.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-833.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-834.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-835.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-836.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-837.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-838.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-839.
Libel or slander; how sufficiently pleaded; burden of proof.In an action for a libel or slander it shall be sufficient to state, generally, that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of the plaintiff, and if the allegation be denied, the plaintiff must prove on the trial the facts, showing that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of him.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 131, p. 414; R.S.1913, § 7699; C.S.1922, § 8643; C.S.1929, § 20-839; R.S.1943, § 25-839.
Annotations
In an action for a libel or slander it shall be sufficient to state, generally, that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of the plaintiff, and if the allegation is denied, the plaintiff must prove on the trial the facts, showing that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of him. White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 Neb. 11, 430 N.W.2d 27 (1988).
Words to be slanderous per se must not only charge an offense which is actionable, but also the nature thereof. Nelson v. Rosenberg, 135 Neb. 34, 280 N.W. 229 (1938).
Writing libelous per se defined. Bigley v. National Fid. & Casualty Co., 94 Neb. 813, 144 N.W. 810 (1913).
Where publication is not libelous per se, special damages must be pleaded. Callfas v. World Pub. Co., 93 Neb. 108, 139 N.W. 830 (1913).
It is not necessary in action for slander to allege the name of the person to whom the words were spoken. Fitzgerald v. Young, 89 Neb. 693, 132 N.W. 127 (1911).
This section abrogates common law rule requiring facts and circumstances to be stated, connecting plaintiff with publication. Sheibley v. Huse, 75 Neb. 811, 106 N.W. 1028 (1906).
Words imputing indictable offense are actionable per se. Herzog v. Campbell, 47 Neb. 370, 66 N.W. 424 (1896).
Words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning. World Pub. Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126, 61 N.W. 108 (1894).
Words, which in effect charge embezzlement, are libelous per se and special damage need not be alleged. Pokrok Zapadu Pub. Co. v. Zizkovsky, 42 Neb. 64, 60 N.W. 358 (1894).
25-840.
Libel or slander; truth as defense; effect of actual malice.In the actions mentioned in section 25-839, the defendant may allege the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, prove the same and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, or prove either. The truth in itself and alone shall be a complete defense unless it shall be proved by the plaintiff that the publication was made with actual malice. Actual malice shall not be inferred or presumed from publication.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 132, p. 414; R.S.1913, § 7700; C.S.1922, § 8644; C.S.1929, § 20-840; R.S.1943, § 25-840; Laws 1957, c. 83, § 1, p. 329.
Annotations
A defendant's allegedly defamatory statement being true is a complete defense to a claim of defamation unless the plaintiff proves the statement was made with actual malice. Choice Homes v. Donner, 311 Neb. 835, 976 N.W.2d 187 (2022).
In an action for libel or slander, a defendant may allege the truth of the matter charged as defamatory. The truth in itself and alone shall be a complete defense unless it shall be proved by the plaintiff that the publication was made with actual malice. Actual malice shall not be inferred or presumed from publication. White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 Neb. 11, 430 N.W.2d 27 (1988).
As a general rule, in a case of alleged libel or slander, truth is a complete defense absent proof of actual malice. Turner v. Welliver, 226 Neb. 275, 411 N.W.2d 298 (1987).
For failure to allege, as ordered by the court, whether or not publication was malicious and whether defendant gave notice and requested correction, the petition was properly dismissed. Vodehnal v. Grand Island Daily Independent, 191 Neb. 836, 218 N.W.2d 220 (1974).
Plaintiff has burden of proving actual malice. Whitcomb v. Nebraska State Education Assn., 184 Neb. 31, 165 N.W.2d 99 (1969).
Defendant cannot prove truth of defamatory charge under general denial. Murten v. Garbe, 93 Neb. 589, 141 N.W. 146 (1913).
In action for libel, truth is not complete defense; good motives, etc., are necessary. Sheibley v. Fales, 81 Neb. 795, 116 N.W. 1035 (1908); Pokrok Zapadu Pub. Co. v. Zizkovsky, 42 Neb. 64, 60 N.W. 358 (1894).
Insofar as slander is concerned, truth is complete defense. Larson v. Cox, 68 Neb. 44, 93 N.W. 1011 (1903).
25-840.01.
Libel; invasion of privacy; damages; retraction; effect.(1) In an action for damages for the publication of a libel or for invasion of privacy as provided by section 20-204 by any medium, the plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless correction was requested as herein provided and was not published. Within twenty days after knowledge of the publication, plaintiff shall have given each defendant a notice by certified or registered mail specifying the statements claimed to be libelous or to have invaded privacy as provided by section 20-204 and specifically requesting correction. Publication of a correction shall be made within three weeks after receipt of the request. It shall be made in substantially as conspicuous a manner as the original publication about which complaint was made. A correction, published prior to receipt of a request therefor, shall have the same force and effect as if published after such request. The term special damages, as used in this section, shall include only such damages as plaintiff alleges and proves were suffered in respect to his or her property, business, trade, profession, or occupation as the direct and proximate result of the defendant's publication.
(2) This section shall not apply if it is alleged and proved that the publication was prompted by actual malice, and actual malice shall not be inferred or presumed from the publication.
Annotations
The plaintiff's failure to request a retraction under this section constitutes an affirmative defense which must be raised by the defendant prior to trial. Funk v. Lincoln-Lancaster Cty. Crime Stoppers, 294 Neb. 715, 885 N.W.2d 1 (2016).
For failure to allege, as ordered by the court, whether or not publication was malicious and whether defendant gave notice and requested correction, the petition was properly dismissed. Vodehnal v. Grand Island Daily Independent, 191 Neb. 836, 218 N.W.2d 220 (1974).
Where no attempt to comply with this section made, assumption is that cause of action predicated on actual malice. Whitcomb v. Nebraska State Education Assn., 184 Neb. 31, 165 N.W.2d 99 (1969).
25-840.02.
Broadcasting stations; liability.(1) The owner, licensee, or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee, or operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, by any person other than such owner, licensee, or operator, or an agent or employee thereof, unless it is alleged and proved by the complaining party that such owner, licensee, or operator, or such agent or employee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance of such statement in such broadcast.
(2) In no event shall any owner, licensee, or operator, or an agent or employee thereof, be held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of the visual or sound radio broadcasting station or network by any person other than such owner, licensee, or operator, or an agent or employee thereof, by, on behalf of, or against any candidate for public office.
(3) In any action for damages for any defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, the complaining party shall be allowed only such actual damages as such party has alleged and proved.
Cross References
Limitation on cause of action, see section 20-209.
25-841.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-842.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-843.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-844.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-845.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-846.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-847.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-848.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-849.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-850.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-851.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-852.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-853.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-854.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-855.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-856.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-901.
Offer of judgment before trial; procedure; effect.The defendant in an action for the recovery of money only may, at any time before the trial, serve upon the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney an offer in writing to allow judgment to be taken against the defendant for the sum specified therein. If the plaintiff accepts the offer and gives notice thereof to the defendant or the defendant's attorney, within five days after the offer was served, the offer and an affidavit that the notice of acceptance was delivered in the time limited may be filed by the plaintiff or the defendant may file the acceptance, with a copy of the offer verified by affidavit. In either case, the offer and acceptance shall be entered upon the record, and judgment shall be rendered accordingly. If the notice of acceptance is not given in the period limited, the offer shall be deemed withdrawn and shall not be given in evidence or mentioned on the trial. If the plaintiff fails to obtain judgment for more than was offered by the defendant, the plaintiff shall pay the defendant's cost from the time of the offer.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 565, p. 493; R.S.1913, § 7717; C.S.1922, § 8661; C.S.1929, § 20-901; R.S.1943, § 25-901;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 10.
Annotations
1. Offer and acceptance
2. Miscellaneous
1. Offer and acceptance
When read in conjunction with this section, section 44-359 prohibits an award of attorney fees to a plaintiff, in a suit against the plaintiff's insurer, who rejects an offer of judgment and later fails to recover more than the amount offered. Dutton-Lainson Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 279 Neb. 365, 778 N.W.2d 433 (2010).
For an insurer to take advantage of the protection of this section, the insurer must expressly comply with the requirement that an offer to allow judgment be made. Young v. Midwest Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Neb. 385, 722 N.W.2d 13 (2006).
Read together, this section and section 44-359 prohibit an award of attorney fees to a plaintiff, in a suit against the plaintiff's insurer, who rejects an offer to allow judgment and later fails to recover more than the amount offered. Young v. Midwest Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Neb. 385, 722 N.W.2d 13 (2006).
This section applies to offers to allow judgment against a defendant, which, under the plain meaning of this section, are not equivalent to settlement offers. Young v. Midwest Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Neb. 385, 722 N.W.2d 13 (2006).
An offer to confess judgment, and its acceptance pursuant to section 25-901, require the entry of a judgment according to the offer and acceptance. Jaixen v. Turner, 204 Neb. 123, 281 N.W.2d 404 (1979).
If notice of acceptance is not given within five days, offer may be withdrawn; judgment on later acceptance vacated. Becker v. Breen, 68 Neb. 379, 94 N.W. 614 (1903).
Plaintiff should be taxed with all costs from time of offer. Wachsmuth v. Orient Ins. Co., 49 Neb. 590, 68 N.W. 935 (1896).
Offer must be made in open court or served on plaintiff though filed. Rose v. Peck, 18 Neb. 529, 26 N.W. 363 (1886).
2. Miscellaneous
This section does not apply to condemnation proceedings, because they are not “for the recovery of money only.” Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion, 286 Neb. 322, 836 N.W.2d 588 (2013).
Settlement agreement at former trial did not establish liability and as it constituted a question of fact was not binding as law of case in subsequent trial on the merits. System Meat Co. v. Stewart, 190 Neb. 682, 211 N.W.2d 902 (1973).
Tender by insurance company of a sum of money, accompanied by demand for execution of receipt and formal release and return of policy, was not absolute and unconditional. Baird v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 104 Neb. 352, 177 N.W. 156 (1920).
Negotiations for settlement between litigants cannot be disclosed to jury. Tankersley v. Lincoln Traction Co., 101 Neb. 578, 163 N.W. 850 (1917).
Section is not applicable to proceedings in ad quod damnum. Johnson v. Sutliff, 17 Neb. 423, 23 N.W. 9 (1885).
25-902.
Offer of judgment; no cause for continuance or postponement.The making of an offer pursuant to the provisions contained in section 25-901 shall not be a cause for a continuance of an action, or a postponement of a trial.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 566, p. 493; R.S.1913, § 7718; C.S.1922, § 8662; C.S.1929, § 20-902; R.S.1943, § 25-902.
25-903.
Submitting controversy without action; procedure.Parties to a question which might be the subject of a civil action may without action agree upon a case containing the facts upon which the controversy depends, and present a submission of the same to any court which would have jurisdiction if an action had been brought. But it must appear by affidavit that the controversy is real, and the proceedings in good faith, to determine the rights of the parties. The court shall, thereupon, hear and determine the case, and render judgment as if an action were pending.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 567, p. 493; R.S.1913, § 7719; C.S.1922, § 8663; C.S.1929, § 20-903; R.S.1943, § 25-903.
Annotations
If interests are adverse, case is not moot, though it is friendly suit. State v. First Catholic Church of Lincoln, 88 Neb. 2, 128 N.W. 657 (1910).
It is the duty of Supreme Court to act when controversy is submitted under this section. In re Groff, 21 Neb. 647, 33 N.W. 426 (1887).
25-904.
Record; what constitutes.The case, the submission and the judgment shall constitute the record.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 568, p. 494; R.S.1913, § 7720; C.S.1922, § 8664; C.S.1929, § 20-904; R.S.1943, § 25-904.
25-905.
Judgment; effect.The judgment shall be with costs, may be enforced, and shall be subject to reversal, in the same manner as if it had been rendered in an action, unless otherwise provided in the submission.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 569, p. 494; R.S.1913, § 7721; C.S.1922, § 8665; C.S.1929, § 20-905; R.S.1943, § 25-905.
25-906.
Confession of judgment after action brought; effect.After an action for the recovery of money is brought, the defendant may offer in court to confess judgment for part of the amount claimed, or part of the causes involved in the action. Whereupon, if the plaintiff, being present, refuses to accept such confession of judgment in full of his demands against the defendant in the action, or, having had such notice that the offer would be made, of its amount and of the time of making it, as the court shall deem reasonable, fail to attend, and on the trial do not recover more than was so offered to be confessed, such plaintiff shall pay all the costs of the defendant incurred after the offer. The offer shall not be deemed to be an admission of the cause of action or amount to which the plaintiff is entitled, nor be given in evidence upon the trial.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 570, p. 494; R.S.1913, § 7722; C.S.1922, § 8666; C.S.1929, § 20-906; R.S.1943, § 25-906.
Annotations
In order that a confession of judgment may be binding on the plaintiff, it is essential that he, either expressly or impliedly, assent thereto; if it is made without his request, knowledge, or consent, and entered at the instance of the debtor alone, it will have no validity unless the creditor ratifies or accepts it. In re Estate of Redpath, 224 Neb. 845, 402 N.W.2d 648 (1987).
No compliance was had with requirements for confession of judgment. James v. Hogan, 154 Neb. 306, 47 N.W.2d 847 (1951).
An offer to confess judgment, incorporated in an answer, should not be referred to in the instructions. Hammang v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 107 Neb. 684, 186 N.W. 991 (1922).
Offer must be made in open court or served on plaintiff though filed. Rose v. Peck, 18 Neb. 529, 26 N.W. 363 (1886).
This section is not applicable to proceedings in ad quod damnum. Johnson v. Sutliff, 17 Neb. 423, 23 N.W. 9 (1885).
25-907.
Confession of judgment before action brought; effect.Before an action for the recovery of money is brought against any person, he may go into the court of the county of his residence, or of that in which the person having the cause of action resides, which would have jurisdiction of the action, and offer to confess judgment in favor of such person for a specified sum on such cause of action. Whereupon, if such person, having had such notice that the offer would be made, of its amount and of the time and place of making it, as the court shall deem reasonable, does not attend to accept the confession, or attending, refuses to accept it, and should afterward commence an action upon such cause, and not recover more than the amount so offered to be confessed, he shall pay all the costs of the action; and on the trial thereof, the offer shall not be deemed to be an admission of the cause of action or amount to which the plaintiff is entitled, nor be given in evidence.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 571, p. 494; R.S.1913, § 7723; C.S.1922, § 8667; C.S.1929, § 20-907; R.S.1943, § 25-907.
25-908.
Motion, defined.A motion is an application for an order addressed to the court or a judge in vacation, by any party to a suit or proceeding, or one interested therein.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 572, p. 495; R.S.1913, § 7724; C.S.1922, § 8668; C.S.1929, § 20-908; R.S.1943, § 25-908.
Annotations
Application or motion to set aside order vacating decree of divorce, and to reinstate decree, was after the term and required notice. Carmony v. Carmony, 112 Neb. 651, 200 N.W. 830 (1924).
Application for deficiency judgment may be made by motion. Crary v. Buck, 1 Neb. Unof. 596, 95 N.W. 839 (1901).
25-909.
Motion; several objects authorized.Several objects may be included in the same motion, if they all grow out of or are connected with the action or proceeding in which it is made.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 573, p. 495; R.S.1913, § 7725; C.S.1922, § 8669; C.S.1929, § 20-909; R.S.1943, § 25-909.
25-910.
Notice of motion; contents.Where notice of a motion is required, it must be in writing and shall state (1) the names of the parties to the action or proceeding in which it is to be made, (2) the name of the court or judge before whom it is to be made, (3) the place where and the day on which it will be heard, (4) the nature and terms of the order or orders to be applied for, and (5) if affidavits are to be used on the hearing, the notice shall state that fact. It shall be served a reasonable time before the hearing.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 574, p. 495; R.S.1913, § 7726; C.S.1922, § 8670; C.S.1929, § 20-910; R.S.1943, § 25-910.
Annotations
Orders for alimony may be modified for good cause shown but nunc pro tunc decree entered without notice is a nullity. Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976).
Application or motion to set aside order vacating decree of divorce, and to reinstate decree, was after the term and required notice. Carmony v. Carmony, 112 Neb. 651, 200 N.W. 830 (1924).
Notice not under seal of court is process in nature of summons. Fowler v. Brown, 51 Neb. 414, 71 N.W. 54 (1897).
What is reasonable notice stated. Sterling Mfg. Co. v. Hough, 49 Neb. 618, 68 N.W. 1019 (1896).
This section requires that when notice of a motion is required and if affidavits are to be used on the hearing, the notice shall state that fact. Galaxy Telecom v. SRS, Inc., 13 Neb. App. 178, 689 N.W.2d 866 (2004).
25-911.
Repealed. Laws 1961, c. 284, § 1.
25-912.
Repealed. Laws 1961, c. 284, § 1.
25-913.
Motion to strike pleadings and papers from files; notice, when.Motions to strike pleadings and papers from the files may be made with or without notice, as the court or judge shall direct.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 577, p. 495; R.S.1913, § 7729; C.S.1922, § 8673; C.S.1929, § 20-913; R.S.1943, § 25-913.
Annotations
Motions to strike filed under this section are aimed at petitions filed in violation of a court's order or a rule of practice or procedure prescribed either by statute or by the court in which the petition is filed. Motions to strike under this section may also be filed when a party declines to amend the petition or refuses to follow the court's orders. Nuss ex rel. Estate of Nuss v. Alexander, 257 Neb. 36, 595 N.W.2d 263 (1999).
A motion to strike a petition is not a substitute for a demurrer or a motion to strike or make more definite and certain, and may be directed only to a petition filed in violation of a court's order or a rule of practice or procedure prescribed either by statute or by the court in which the petition is filed. Hecker v. Ravenna Bank, 237 Neb. 810, 468 N.W.2d 88 (1991).
Petition may be stricken on motion if fatal defects extend to the pleading as a whole, or if the plaintiff, in filing it, ignored an order of court. Ferson v. Armour & Co., 109 Neb. 648, 192 N.W. 125 (1923).
This section, as construed by the Supreme Court of Nebraska, applies in actions at law in federal courts, and petition failing to state cause of action may be stricken on motion. Jack v. Armour & Co., 291 F. 741 (8th Cir. 1923).
25-914.
Order, defined.Every direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing and not included in a judgment, is an order.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 578, p. 495; R.S.1913, § 7730; C.S.1922, § 8674; C.S.1929, § 20-914; R.S.1943, § 25-914.
Annotations
A docket entry/journal entry contained in the "Judges Notes" constituted an interlocutory order disposing of the
party's motion to alter or amend; it did not need to be a separate file-stamped document. Pearce v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 28 Neb. App. 410, 945 N.W.2d 516 (2020).
An unsigned journal entry without a file stamp can constitute an interlocutory order; but it cannot constitute a
final, appealable order, particularly when it does not dispose of all issues. Pearce v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 28
Neb. App. 410, 945 N.W.2d 516 (2020).
25-915.
Orders out of court; record.Orders made out of court shall be forthwith entered by the clerk in the record of the court in the same manner as orders made in term.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 579, p. 495; R.S.1913, § 7731; C.S.1922, § 8675; C.S.1929, § 20-915; R.S.1943, § 25-915;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 11.
25-1001.
Attachment; grounds.The plaintiff, in a civil action for the recovery of money, may, at or after the commencement thereof, have an attachment against the property of the defendant when the defendant or one of several defendants (1) has absconded with the intent to defraud his or her creditors; (2) has left the county of his or her residence to avoid the service of a summons; (3) so conceals himself or herself that a summons cannot be served upon him or her; (4) is about to remove his or her property, or a part thereof, out of the county in which the property is located, with the intent to defraud his or her creditors; (5) is about to convert his or her property, or a part thereof, into money, for the purpose of placing it beyond the reach of his or her creditors; (6) has property, or rights, in action, which he or she conceals; (7) has assigned, removed or disposed of, or is about to dispose of his or her property, or a part thereof, with the intent to defraud his or her creditors; or (8) fraudulently contracted the debt or incurred the obligation for which suit is about to be or has been brought. The grounds for attachment on a claim before it is due are set forth in section 25-1049.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 198, p. 424; Laws 1911, c. 168, § 1, p. 544; R.S.1913, § 7732; Laws 1915, c. 145, § 1, p. 314; C.S.1922, § 8676; C.S.1929, § 20-1001; R.S.1943, § 25-1001; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 1.
Annotations
1. Nonresident
2. Absconded
3. Removal of property
4. Fraudulent conveyance
5. Other grounds
6. Commencement of action
1. Nonresident
Property of nonresident may be attached at or after commencement of suit. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Hughes, 137 Neb. 454, 289 N.W. 866 (1940).
Actual residence and not domicile determines status of debtor. Webb v. Wheeler, 79 Neb. 172, 112 N.W. 369 (1907).
A nonresident defendant cannot attack the jurisdiction of the court upon the sole ground that he is not the owner of the property seized under the writ. Kneeland v. Weigley, 76 Neb. 276, 107 N.W. 574 (1906).
One absent from state on business or pleasure is not nonresident, residence question of fact. Johnson v. May, 49 Neb. 601, 68 N.W. 1032 (1896).
Husband becoming resident here, wife is not nonresident though she remains in former state. Swaney v. Hutchins, 13 Neb. 266, 13 N.W. 282 (1882).
One actually residing here is not nonresident, though permanent legal domicile is elsewhere. Olmstead v. Rivers, 9 Neb. 234, 2 N.W. 366 (1879).
2. Absconded
"Abscond" means to hide, conceal or absent oneself clandestinely to avoid process; not necessary to leave state. Gandy v. Jolly, Swan, Dew & Hardin, 34 Neb. 536, 52 N.W. 376 (1892).
3. Removal of property
Even though property is removed from state, fraudulent intent is essential. Hunter v. Soward, 15 Neb. 215, 18 N.W. 58 (1883).
Removal is immaterial unless coupled with intent to defraud. Steele v. Dodd, 14 Neb. 496, 16 N.W. 909 (1883).
4. Fraudulent conveyance
Creditors may attach property fraudulently conveyed, whether debtor is resident or nonresident. Ainsworth v. Roubal, 74 Neb. 723, 105 N.W. 248 (1905).
Real estate fraudulently conveyed may be attached though record title is in another. Coulson v. Galtsman, 1 Neb. Unof. 502, 96 N.W. 349 (1901).
5. Other grounds
While the U.S. Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1991), stated that any given exigency requirement alone would not necessarily protect a statutory attachment scheme from due process challenges, we find that this requirement in our statutes, in conjunction with the bond, affidavit, and discharge hearing provisions, does comply with due process under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Andrews v. Schram, 252 Neb. 298, 562 N.W.2d 50 (1997).
Grounds for attachment and garnishment are set out in this section. Insurance Co. of North America v. Maxim's of Nebraska, 178 Neb. 274, 132 N.W.2d 885 (1965).
Statutory provisions relating to garnishment before judgment have no application to registration and enforcement of foreign judgment. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 168 Neb. 850, 97 N.W.2d 348 (1959).
Action for damages for breach of brokerage contract authorized attachment. National Reefer Service, Inc. v. Felman, 164 Neb. 783, 83 N.W.2d 547 (1957).
Mere insolvency of a debtor is not a ground for attachment. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Mulder, 135 Neb. 133, 280 N.W. 454 (1938).
In absence of fraud or collusion, no garnishable debt arises from contract for personal services paid for in advance. Salyers Auto Co. v. De Vore, 116 Neb. 317, 217 N.W. 94 (1927).
Affidavit is sufficient that sets forth nature of claim, that it is just, the amount plaintiff ought to recover, and existence of statutory grounds for attachment. McDonald v. Marquardt, 52 Neb. 820, 73 N.W. 288 (1897).
Property of insolvent bank before receiver appointed is not exempt from attachment. Arnold v. Weimer, 40 Neb. 216, 58 N.W. 709 (1894).
Action on breach of warranty in deed is for a debt, which may be recovered by attachment. Cheney v. Straube, 35 Neb. 521, 53 N.W. 479 (1892).
Attachment may lie on bond for attachment, though damages are unliquidated. Withers & Kolls v. Brittain, Smith & Co., 35 Neb. 436, 53 N.W. 375 (1892).
Preference of bona fide creditors is not ground for attachment. Britton v. Boyer, 27 Neb. 522, 43 N.W. 356 (1889).
An order of attachment covering a cause of action upon a debt not fraudulently contracted coupled with a cause of action upon a debt fraudulently contracted issued on affidavit alleging fraudulently contracted debt is subject to proper discharge. Meyer v. Evans, 27 Neb. 367, 43 N.W. 109 (1889).
Debt is not fraudulently contracted where damage is due merely to negligence in performing services. Rawlings v. Powers, 25 Neb. 681, 41 N.W. 651 (1889).
Action upon contract express or implied will sustain attachment. Hart v. Barnes, 24 Neb. 782, 40 N.W. 322 (1888).
At least one of causes enumerated must exist; insolvency is insufficient. Walker v. Hagerty, 20 Neb. 482, 30 N.W. 556 (1886).
Debt incurred by false representations is ground for attachment. Young & Co. v. Cooper, 12 Neb. 610, 12 N.W. 91 (1882).
Writ of attachment held unconstitutional because issued on conclusive affidavit, without bond, and without judicial supervision. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Berman, 431 F.Supp. 847 (D. Neb. 1977).
6. Commencement of action
Neither county judge nor Supreme Court Judges can allow attachment in action pending in district court when district judge is present in county. Ferson v. Armour & Co., 103 Neb. 809, 174 N.W. 425 (1919).
Provision requiring plaintiff in action on claim other than contract to be bona fide resident for six months does not violate federal Constitution. Tanner v. DeVinney, 101 Neb. 46, 161 N.W. 1052 (1917).
Action is deemed commenced, so attachment writ may issue, when petition filed and summons issued with intent to serve same. Johnson v. Larson, 96 Neb. 193, 147 N.W. 476 (1914); Hoagland v. Wilcox, 42 Neb. 138, 60 N.W. 376 (1894); Coffman v. Brandhoeffer, 33 Neb. 279, 50 N.W. 6 (1891).
Attachment is not allowed in proceeding to revive judgment. Farak v. First Nat. Bank of Schuyler, 67 Neb. 463, 93 N.W. 682 (1903).
Affidavit can be filed simultaneously with bringing of suit. McCord, Brady & Co. v. Bowen, 51 Neb. 247, 70 N.W. 950 (1897).
Order of attachment can properly issue before summons is served. Coffman v. Brandhoeffer, 33 Neb. 279, 50 N.W. 6 (1891).
Attachment is a provisional remedy. Shoaff v. Gage, 163 F.Supp. 179 (D. Neb. 1958).
25-1002.
Attachment; affidavit of plaintiff; contents.An order of attachment shall be approved by a judge of any district court or county court only after there has been presented to him or her an affidavit or affidavits based upon personal knowledge (1) that the facts set forth in plaintiff's complaint which state a valid cause of action and the amount plaintiff is entitled to recover are true, (2) describing the existence and approximate value of any of defendant's property known to the plaintiff to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and (3) stating specific facts demonstrating reasonable cause that one or more of the grounds for an attachment enumerated in section 25-1001 exist.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 199, p. 425; Laws 1911, c. 168, § 2, p. 545; R.S.1913, § 7733; C.S.1922, § 8677; C.S.1929, § 20-1002; R.S.1943, § 25-1002; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 2;
Laws 1984, LB 13, § 36; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 42;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 19.
Annotations
1. By whom made
2. Nature of claim
3. Miscellaneous
1. By whom made
In affidavit for garnishment affiant should swear to the fact that he is plaintiff, agent or attorney. Crawford State Bank v. Murphy, 142 Neb. 795, 7 N.W.2d 762 (1943).
Affidavit taken before plaintiff's attorney is bad, but is amendable. Dobry v. Western Mfg. Co., 57 Neb. 228, 77 N.W. 656 (1898).
Affidavit must distinctly show it was made by natural person. Clements & Co. v. Puckett, 1 Neb. Unof. 356, 95 N.W. 796 (1901).
2. Nature of claim
Where attachment is issued for total claimed in five counts, and one count is dismissed, attachment should be dissolved. First Nat. Bank of Greenwood v. Van Doren, 68 Neb. 142, 93 N.W. 1017 (1903).
Slight variance in amounts claimed in petition and affidavit is immaterial. Grotte v. Nagle, 50 Neb. 363, 69 N.W. 973 (1897).
Affidavit in language of statute is sufficient. Burnham v. Ramge, 47 Neb. 175, 66 N.W. 277 (1896).
Where several grounds are joined, should be alleged in conjunctive. Tessier v. Englehart & Co., 18 Neb. 167, 24 N.W. 734 (1885).
Affidavit need not state cause of action; condensed statement of nature of claim is sufficient. Dorrington v. Minnick, 15 Neb. 397, 19 N.W. 456 (1884).
Affidavit upon a promissory note described in petition was sufficient. Livingston v. Coe, 4 Neb. 379 (1876).
Mere statement that defendant is nonresident of this state is sufficient. Citizens State Bank of Wood River v. Porter, 4 Neb. Unof. 73, 93 N.W. 391 (1903).
3. Miscellaneous
Affidavit of attachment is required in garnishment proceedings. Insurance Co. of North America v. Maxim's of Nebraska, 178 Neb. 274, 132 N.W.2d 885 (1965).
Burden rests upon plaintiff to sustain requirements of statute. National Reefer Service, Inc. v. Felman, 164 Neb. 783, 83 N.W.2d 547 (1957).
Amendable even after motion to quash. Clarke Banking Co. v. Wright, 37 Neb. 382, 55 N.W. 1060 (1893).
Attachment may be obtained pending appeal. Strickler v. Hargis, 34 Neb. 468, 51 N.W. 1039 (1892).
Plaintiff may supply defects in affidavit for publication of service. Miller v. Eastman, 27 Neb. 408, 43 N.W. 179 (1889).
One affidavit is sufficient to cover successive orders of attachment. Thompson v. Stetson, 15 Neb. 112, 17 N.W. 368 (1883).
Omission of venue cannot be attacked in collateral action. Crowell v. Johnson, 2 Neb. 146 (1873).
25-1003.
Attachment; plaintiff's undertaking; bond; amount.(1) The judge to whom the affidavit described in section 25-1002 is presented shall determine the amount of an undertaking the plaintiff shall be required to file. The judge shall also approve the sufficiency of one or more sureties of the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff presents, by affidavit or otherwise, specific facts demonstrating that no sureties are necessary to protect the defendant from loss.
(2) In determining the amount of the bond described in subsection (1) of this section, the judge shall be guided by the amount of probable damage that will be suffered by the defendant if his or her property is wrongfully attached. In estimating the probable damage the defendant would suffer, the judge shall consider all the circumstances presented to him or her in the plaintiff's affidavits, including the value of any of the defendant's property described therein.
(3) After determining the amount of the plaintiff's undertaking, along with necessary sureties, the judge shall, if an order of attachment is otherwise proper under section 25-1002, direct the clerk to issue, after the necessary bond is filed, an order of attachment in an amount determined by the judge to approximate the amount of the claim and the costs of the action including the costs of the attachment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 200, p. 425; Laws 1911, c. 168, § 3, p. 545; R.S.1913, § 7734; C.S.1922, § 8678; C.S.1929, § 20-1003; R.S.1943, § 25-1003; Laws 1969, c. 183, § 1, p. 775; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 3.
Cross References
State officers and departments, not required to give attachment bond, see section 25-21,216.
Annotations
1. Bond
2. Nonresident or foreign corporation
3. Sureties
4. Miscellaneous
1. Bond
Statute required plaintiff to comply with the provisions of the general statute on attachment as to necessary allegations, and with the bond provisions of this section. VonSeggern v. Willman, 244 Neb. 565, 508 N.W.2d 261 (1993).
Foreign corporation which has domesticated or obtained certificate of authority to do business is not subject to waiver of bond provisions. Schreiner v. Irby Constr. Co., 184 Neb. 222, 166 N.W.2d 121 (1969).
Bond to protect against wrongful attachment is required. Insurance Co. of North America v. Maxim's of Nebraska, 178 Neb. 274, 132 N.W.2d 885 (1965).
In attachment proceedings bond is required in all cases except where defendant is nonresident or foreign corporation, but if defendant fails to assail the validity of the attachment and, for a consideration, agrees that money in hands of garnishee be paid into court to abide judgment, he ratifies and confirms such attachment proceedings though no bond was given. Vanburg v. Mauel, 131 Neb. 685, 269 N.W. 626 (1936).
Action on bond and for malicious attachment are not inconsistent remedies. Simons v. Fagen, 62 Neb. 287, 87 N.W. 21 (1901).
Bond is valid where plaintiff fails to sign, though he is not liable thereon. Storz v. Finklestein, 50 Neb. 177, 69 N.W. 856 (1897).
Attaching creditor need not sign attachment bond. It is sufficient if signed by surety alone. Storz v. Finklestein, 48 Neb. 27, 66 N.W. 1020 (1896).
2. Nonresident or foreign corporation
Filing of a bond is not jurisdictional to the right to have an attachment issued against a nonresident defendant for a debt not due. Gutterson v. Meyer, 68 Neb. 767, 94 N.W. 969 (1903).
3. Sureties
Surety is not liable if sheriff seizes property of third person. Hopewell v. McGrew, 50 Neb. 789, 70 N.W. 397 (1897).
Defendant in action on bond may set off debt due from plaintiff to principal. Field v. Maxwell, 44 Neb. 900, 63 N.W. 62 (1895).
Partnership may sign as surety; attorney should not, but bond is valid. Tessier v. Crowley, 17 Neb. 207, 22 N.W. 422 (1885).
Surety is liable for all damages sustained until property is returned. McReady v. Rogers, 1 Neb. 124 (1871).
4. Miscellaneous
In the absence of malice, an action for the wrongful suing out of an attachment can be maintained alone on the attachment bond. Carlson v. Schroeder, 164 Neb. 443, 82 N.W.2d 416 (1957).
Attachment procured in action brought without plaintiff's authority is "wrongfully obtained." Bauer v. Mitchell, 80 Neb. 187, 113 N.W. 986 (1907).
On general denial burden is on plaintiff to negative grounds alleged; dissolution of attachment not alone sufficient. Jandt v. Deranleau, 57 Neb. 497, 78 N.W. 22 (1899); Storz v. Finklestein, 50 Neb. 177, 69 N.W. 856 (1897).
Obligation of bond is for payment of damages, and liability upon it occurs when the damages accrue. Waller v. Deranleau, 4 Neb. Unof. 497, 94 N.W. 1038 (1903).
25-1004.
Attachment; order; contents; service; manner.The order of attachment shall (1) require the sheriff to attach the lands, tenements, goods, chattels, stocks, or interest in stocks, rights, credits, money, and effects of the defendant in his or her county not exempt by law from being applied to the payment of the plaintiff's claim, or so much thereof as will satisfy the amount stated in the order of attachment; (2) inform the defendant of his or her right to obtain redelivery of the property attached by executing a redelivery bond in accordance with sections 25-1009 and 25-1024; and (3) inform the defendant of his or her right under section 25-1040, to move to discharge the attachment after service of the order upon him or her and of the plaintiff's obligation under section 25-1041, to prove the grounds upon which the attachment order was issued by a preponderance of the evidence if such a motion to discharge is made.
The order of attachment shall be directed and delivered to the sheriff and shall be served on the defendant in any manner authorized by statute for service of a summons.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 201, p. 426; R.S.1913, § 7735; C.S.1922, § 8679; C.S.1929, § 20-1004; R.S.1943, § 25-1004; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 4.
Annotations
Indebtedness of maker upon promissory note, before maturity, is not the subject of attachment. Fisher v. O'Hanlon, 93 Neb. 529, 141 N.W. 157 (1913).
Writ is limited to seizure of property sufficient to satisfy amount plaintiff claims to be entitled to recover and probable costs. First Nat. Bank of Greenwood v. Van Doren, 68 Neb. 142, 93 N.W. 1017 (1903).
Stock owned by defendant in domestic corporation may be reached by garnishment. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Mosher, 63 Neb. 130, 88 N.W. 552 (1901).
Order need not state nature of claim. Tessier v. Englehart & Co., 18 Neb. 167, 24 N.W. 734 (1885).
Order need not recite filing of affidavit and bond. Tessier v. Crowley, 16 Neb. 369, 20 N.W. 264 (1884).
25-1005.
Attachment; several and successive orders; issuance to several counties; costs; taxation.Orders of attachment may be issued to the sheriffs of different counties; and several of them may, at the option of the plaintiff, be issued at the same time or in succession; but such only as have been executed shall be taxed in the costs, unless otherwise directed by the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 202, p. 426; R.S.1913, § 7736; C.S.1922, § 8680; C.S.1929, § 20-1005; R.S.1943, § 25-1005.
Annotations
While order of attachment may issue to another county, garnishee summons cannot. Benedict v. T. L. V. Land & Cattle Co., 66 Neb. 236, 92 N.W. 210 (1902).
Several orders of attachment may be issued at the same time, or in succession; but in such case only a simple affidavit is necessary. Thompson v. Stetson, 15 Neb. 112, 17 N.W. 368 (1883).
25-1006.
Attachment; order; return day.The return day of the order of attachment, when issued at the commencement of the action, shall be the same as that of the summons; when issued afterwards, it shall be twenty days after it issued.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 203, p. 426; R.S.1913, § 7737; C.S.1922, § 8681; C.S.1929, § 20-1006; R.S.1943, § 25-1006.
Annotations
Action commenced when petition is filed and summons issued is bona fide. Coffman v. Brandhoeffer, 33 Neb. 279, 50 N.W. 6 (1891).
25-1007.
Attachment; several orders against same defendant; time of service.When there are several orders of attachment against the same defendant, they shall be executed in the order in which they are received by the sheriff.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 204, p. 426; R.S.1913, § 7738; C.S.1922, § 8682; C.S.1929, § 20-1007; R.S.1943, § 25-1007.
Annotations
First levy has priority. Moore v. Fedewa, 13 Neb. 379, 14 N.W. 170 (1882).
25-1008.
Attachment; order; execution; inventory; appraisement.The order of attachment shall be executed by the sheriff without delay. He shall go to the place where defendant's property may be found, and there, in the presence of two residents of the county, declare that by virtue of said order he attaches said property at the suit of such plaintiff; and the officer, with the said residents, who shall be first sworn or affirmed by the officer, shall make a true inventory and appraisement of all the property attached, which shall be signed by the officer and residents and returned with the order. Where the property attached is real property, the officer shall leave with the occupant thereof, or, if there be no occupant, in a conspicuous place thereon, a copy of the order. Where it is personal property, and accessible, he shall take the same into his custody, and hold it subject to the order of the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 205, p. 426; R.S.1913, § 7739; C.S.1922, § 8683; C.S.1929, § 20-1008; R.S.1943, § 25-1008.
Cross References
Appraisers' fees, mileage, see section 33-122.
Annotations
1. Order
2. Inventory
3. Appraisement
4. Miscellaneous
1. Order
Where order of attachment was not executed in presence of two witnesses, dissolution of attachment was proper. Carlson v. Schroeder, 164 Neb. 443, 82 N.W.2d 416 (1957).
Order must be strictly followed; witnesses must be disinterested. Ames v. Parrott, 61 Neb. 847, 86 N.W. 503 (1901).
Leaving copy with occupant is sufficient, though he is not owner or lessee of land. Westervelt v. Hagge, 61 Neb. 647, 85 N.W. 852 (1901).
Levy in absence of witnesses is void. Citizens State Bank of Wood River v. Porter, 4 Neb. Unof. 73, 93 N.W. 391 (1903).
2. Inventory
Inventory and appraisement are admissible in evidence in action against sheriff for conversion. Maul v. Drexel, 55 Neb. 446, 76 N.W. 163 (1898).
3. Appraisement
Appraisement is neither limited to net value of interest of attachment debtors nor is such interest therein required to be separately appraised. Federal Farm Mort. Corp. v. Hughes, 137 Neb. 820, 291 N.W. 475 (1940).
Where several writs are levied, one appraisement is sufficient. Connelly and Duffy v. Edgerton and Miller, 22 Neb. 82, 34 N.W. 76 (1887).
4. Miscellaneous
Sheriff's failure to take crop of standing corn into possession as required hereunder was excused by reason of snowstorm; judgment of contempt sustained. Leadabrand v. State, 121 Neb. 836, 238 N.W. 656 (1931).
In action for failure to levy, burden is on plaintiff to show debtor had seizable property and sheriff negligently failed to levy. Conway v. Magill, 53 Neb. 370, 73 N.W. 702 (1898).
Sheriff must take and keep possession of personal property or sureties are liable for loss. Deering & Co. v. Wisherd, 46 Neb. 720, 65 N.W. 788 (1896).
Posting copy where there is an occupant is void as to third persons. Shoemaker v. Harvey, 43 Neb. 75, 61 N.W. 109 (1894).
Failure to return order of attachment physically to the court file does not defeat the court's jurisdiction. Shoaff v. Gage, 163 F.Supp. 179 (D. Neb. 1958).
25-1009.
Attachment or garnishment; delivery of property to defendant or garnishee; conditions.(1) The sheriff shall deliver the property attached to the person in whose possession it was found, and property or money seized in garnishment, to the defendant in the attachment proceedings, if the defendant be the true owner thereof, upon the delivery by such person, either to the sheriff at any time before the return of the sheriff of the attachment or garnishment process or to the clerk of the court, after the return by the sheriff to the court, of an undertaking to the plaintiff, with one or more sufficient sureties resident in the county, or a bonding company authorized to do business in the State of Nebraska, to the effect that the parties to the same are bound, in the amount of the appraised value thereof, or in the case of garnishment, in the amount of the value of the property or money in the hands of the garnishee, that the property or its appraised value in money shall be forthcoming to answer the judgment of the court in the action; but if it shall appear to the court that any part of said property has been lost or destroyed by unavoidable accident, the value thereof shall be remitted to the person so bound. In case of garnishment, the garnishee shall be discharged upon the approval of said bond.
(2) If the defendant presents to the court, by affidavit or otherwise, specific facts demonstrating that no sureties are necessary to insure that the property or its appraised value in money shall be forthcoming to answer the judgment of the court in the action, the court may allow the undertaking to be executed by the defendant alone.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 206, p. 426; R.S.1913, § 7740; Laws 1915, c. 146, § 1, p. 316; C.S.1922, § 8684; C.S.1929, § 20-1009; R.S.1943, § 25-1009; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 5.
Annotations
Defendant who has given "forthcoming bond" under this section may move to dissolve attachment. Burnham-Munger-Root D. G. Co. v. Strahl, 102 Neb. 142, 166 N.W. 266 (1918).
Principal in redelivery bond is estopped, in action thereon, to deny that he is owner of the attached property. Commercial Nat. Bank of Kearney v. Faser, 99 Neb. 105, 155 N.W. 601 (1915).
After property is returned to officer, party may claim title in proper action. Runquist v. Anderson, 64 Neb. 755, 90 N.W. 760 (1902).
Principal in bond is estopped to claim title to property. Cooper v. Davis Mill Co., 48 Neb. 420, 67 N.W. 178 (1896).
Only officer holding writ may approve. Dewey & Stone v. Kavanaugh, 45 Neb. 233, 63 N.W. 396 (1895).
Sureties are not liable unless bond is approved and property delivered; need not indorse approval on bond; implied approval. Cortelyou v. Maben, 40 Neb. 512, 59 N.W. 94 (1894).
Defendant may move to dissolve attachment after redelivery bond is given. Wilson v. Shepherd, 15 Neb. 15, 16 N.W. 826 (1883).
Must allege order of sale had been made. Young v. Joseph Bros. & Davidson, 5 Neb. Unof. 559, 99 N.W. 522 (1904).
25-1010.
Attachment; garnishment; affidavit; summons; answer; duties of garnishee; written interrogatories; financial institution; service of process; designated location; Department of Banking and Finance; immunity.(1) When an affidavit is filed in a civil action containing the necessary allegations of an affidavit of attachment and in addition allegations that the affiant has good reason to and does believe that any person, partnership, limited liability company, or corporation to be named has property of and is indebted to the defendant, describing such property, in his or her possession that cannot be levied upon by attachment, a judge of any district court or county court may direct the clerk to issue a summons and order requiring such person, partnership, limited liability company, or corporation as garnishee to answer written interrogatories, to be furnished by the plaintiff and attached to such summons and order, respecting the matters set forth in section 25-1026. All answers must be given in writing but do not need to be verified or given under oath. All answers so given will be deemed to be true and subject to all of the penalties of perjury in the event of willful falsification.
(2) The summons and order referred to in subsection (1) of this section shall be returnable within five days from the date of the issuance thereof and shall require the garnishee to answer within ten days from the date of service upon him or her. The order shall inform the garnishee (a) of the penalties that may be imposed in the event of willful falsification, (b) that he or she is obligated to hold the property of every description and the credits of the defendant in his or her possession or under his or her control at the time of the service of the order and the interrogatories until further direction from the court, (c) of his or her ability to obtain discharge from liability to the defendant under section 25-1027, and (d) of the ability of the court to enter judgment against him or her upon failure to answer the interrogatories as provided in section 25-1028. If the answers to the interrogatories identify property of the defendant in the possession of the garnishee, the clerk shall mail to the last-known address of the defendant copies of the garnishment summons and answers to interrogatories within five days after the return of the answers to the interrogatories.
(3) Prior to final judgment in an action, no order of garnishment shall issue for wages due from an employer to an employee.
(4)(a) In any case involving service of a garnishment summons on a financial institution where deposits are received within this state, the financial institution shall (i) if its main chartered office is located in this state, designate its main chartered office for the service of summons or (ii) if its main chartered office is located in another state, designate any one of its offices or branches or its agent for service of process in this state for service of summons. The designation of a main chartered office or an office or branch or the agent for service of process under this subdivision shall be made by filing a notice of designation with the Department of Banking and Finance, shall contain the physical address of the main chartered office or the office or branch or the agent for service of process designated, and shall be effective upon placement on the department website. The department shall post the list of such designated main chartered offices and offices or branches or agents for service of process on its website for access by the public. A financial institution may modify or revoke a designation made under this subdivision by filing the modification or revocation with the department. The modification or revocation shall be effective when the department's website has been updated to reflect the modification or revocation, except that the judgment creditor may rely upon the designation that was modified or revoked during the thirty-day period following the effective date of the modification or revocation if the summons is timely served upon the financial institution. The department shall update its website to reflect a filing by a financial institution pursuant to this subdivision or a modification or revocation filed by a financial institution pursuant to this subdivision within ten business days following the filing by the financial institution. The department website shall reflect the date its online records for each financial institution have most recently been updated.
(b) If a financial institution where deposits are received has designated its main chartered office or one of its offices or branches or its agent for service of process for the service of summons, service made on the main chartered office or the office or branch or the agent for service of process so designated shall be valid and effective as to any property or credits of the defendant in the possession or control of the main chartered office of the financial institution in this state and any of the financial institution offices or branches located within this state. If service of summons is not made on the main chartered office or the office or branch or the agent for service of process designated by the financial institution, but instead is made at another office or branch of the financial institution located in Nebraska, the financial institution, in its discretion, and without violating any obligation to its customer, may elect to treat the service of summons as valid and effective as to any property or credits of the defendant in the possession or control of the main chartered office of the financial institution in this state and any of the financial institution offices or branches located within this state. In the absence of such an election, the financial institution shall file a statement with the interrogatories that the summons was not served at the financial institution's designated location for receiving service of summons and, therefore, was not processed, and shall provide the address at which the financial institution is to receive service of summons.
(c) For purposes of this subsection, financial institution means a bank, savings bank, building and loan association, savings and loan association, or credit union whether chartered by the United States, the Department of Banking and Finance, or a foreign state agency.
(d) The notice of designation, modification, or revocation shall be made by a financial institution on forms prescribed by the department.
(e) The Department of Banking and Finance, any employee of the department, or any person acting on behalf of the department shall be immune from civil and criminal liability for any acts or omissions which occur as a result of the requirements of this subsection.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 207, p. 427; R.S.1913, § 7741; C.S.1922, § 8685; C.S.1929, § 20-1010; R.S.1943, § 25-1010; Laws 1951, c. 67, § 1, p. 202; Laws 1955, c. 85, § 1, p. 254; Laws 1959, c. 101, § 1, p. 422;
Laws 1971, LB 834, § 1; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 6;
Laws 1984, LB 13, § 37; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 43;
Laws 1993, LB 121, § 168; Laws 2015, LB195, § 1.
Annotations
1. Property subject to garnishment
2. Property not subject to garnishment
3. Miscellaneous
1. Property subject to garnishment
Liability of insurance company, which has taken charge of defense of insured against action for damages for death of latter's employee, is subject to garnishment if insured is insolvent. Elliott v. AEtna Life Ins. Co., 100 Neb. 833, 161 N.W. 579 (1917).
Stock of attachment defendant in domestic corporation may be garnished. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Mosher, 63 Neb. 130, 88 N.W. 552 (1901).
Stock subscription, due and payable, may be garnished by creditor of corporation. Bohrer v. Adair, 61 Neb. 824, 86 N.W. 495 (1901).
Garnishee alone can raise defense, and may waive. Sturtevant Co. v. Bohn Sash & Door Co., 59 Neb. 82, 80 N.W. 273 (1899).
Mortgagee in possession may be garnished for interest of mortgagor in chattels. Meyer v. Miller, 51 Neb. 620, 71 N.W. 315 (1897).
Excess of pledge property may be garnished in hands of pledgee and an accounting for the surplus may be secured. AEtna Ins. Co. v. Bank of Wilcox, 48 Neb. 544, 67 N.W. 449 (1896).
Equity of redemption in mortgaged personalty is subject to garnishment, even after condition broken. Burnham v. Doolittle, 14 Neb. 214, 15 N.W. 606 (1883).
2. Property not subject to garnishment
Debtor can be garnished only in state where debt is payable, if creditor resides there. Bullard & Hoagland v. Chaffee, 61 Neb. 83, 84 N.W. 604 (1900).
Receiver is not subject to garnishment. Veith v. Ress, 60 Neb. 52, 82 N.W. 116 (1900).
Money in custody of law, as in hands of clerk for distribution under decree, cannot be garnished. Sturtevant Co. v. Bohn Sash & Door Co., 57 Neb. 671, 78 N.W. 265 (1899).
Money held by clerk of court in official capacity is in custody of law. Baker v. Peterson, 57 Neb. 375, 77 N.W. 774 (1899).
Order cannot be issued outside county where principal action brought. So. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank of Fremont, 45 Neb. 29, 63 N.W. 128 (1895).
"In custody of law" applies only where sheriff must pay money in hand to execution plaintiff. Oppenheimer & Co. v. Marr, 31 Neb. 811, 48 N.W. 818 (1891).
Maker of negotiable note cannot be garnished if same has been transferred. Edney v. Willis, 23 Neb. 56, 36 N.W. 300 (1888).
Foreign corporation having no property of defendant in state or money payable to him here is not subject to garnishment. Wright v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 19 Neb. 175, 27 N.W. 90 (1886).
Under former law, county cannot be garnished. State ex rel. Crawford v. Eberly, 12 Neb. 616, 12 N.W. 96 (1882).
Under former law, city is not subject to garnishment proceedings. People ex rel. Spaun v. Mayor of Omaha, 2 Neb. 166 (1873).
3. Miscellaneous
In garnishment proceedings under this section, a bond must be given. Insurance Co. of North America v. Maxim's of Nebraska, 178 Neb. 274, 132 N.W.2d 885 (1965).
There is no unconstitutional discrimination between garnishment before judgment and statutory procedure to enforce foreign judgment. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 168 Neb. 850, 97 N.W.2d 348 (1959).
Section does not require that written notice which officer leaves with garnishee shall be issued and signed by officer. Crawford State Bank v. Murphy, 142 Neb. 795, 7 N.W.2d 762 (1943).
After judgment, summons in garnishment in aid of execution from one county to another is unauthorized. Hinds State Bank v. Loffler, 113 Neb. 110, 202 N.W. 465 (1925).
Garnishee must be resident of county; defendant may be nonresident of state. Hargreaves v. Tennis, 63 Neb. 356, 88 N.W. 486 (1901).
Affidavit must be filed before notice issues. State ex rel. Austrian, Wise & Co. v. Duncan, 37 Neb. 631, 56 N.W. 214 (1893).
Interpleader action in federal court did not preclude maintenance of state court garnishment proceedings. Globe v. Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Viele, 110 F.Supp. 889 (D. Neb. 1958).
25-1011.
Garnishment; service upon garnishee;
forms; notice; hearing.(1) The summons and order of garnishment
and the interrogatories in duplicate, a notice to judgment debtor form, and
a request for hearing form shall be served upon the garnishee in the manner
provided for service of a summons in a civil action.
(2) The judgment creditor or his or her agent or attorney shall send
to the judgment debtor by certified mail to the last-known address of the
judgment debtor a copy of the summons and order of garnishment, a notice to
judgment debtor form, and a request for hearing form within seven business
days after issuance by the court
and shall certify in writing to the court the date of the mailing.
(3) The Supreme Court by rule of court shall promulgate uniform garnishment
forms for use in all courts in this state. The forms shall include the summons and
order of garnishment, the garnishment interrogatories, a notice to judgment
debtor form, and a request for hearing form.
(4) The notice to judgment debtor form shall include the following information:
(a) That certain funds are exempt from garnishment if such funds are
from certain government benefits and other sources;
(b) That wages are exempt up to a certain level and the amount that
can be garnished varies if the judgment debtor is the head of a family;
(c) That if the judgment debtor believes the court should not allow
a garnishment either because the funds sought are exempt or because the amount
is not owed on the judgment, the judgment debtor is entitled to a hearing
within ten days after a request by the judgment
debtor to determine such issues; and
(d) That if the judgment debtor wishes a hearing as prescribed in subdivision
(c) of this subsection, the judgment debtor shall make a request by filling
out the request for hearing form and file the form with the court within three
business days after receipt of the notice
to judgment debtor form by the judgment debtor.
(5) If the judgment debtor in a garnishment proceeding requests a hearing,
the court shall grant the hearing within ten days of the request.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 208, p. 427; R.S.1913, § 7742; C.S.1922, § 8686; C.S.1929, § 20-1011; R.S.1943, § 25-1011; Laws 1951, c. 67, § 2, p. 203; Laws 1955, c. 85, § 2, p. 255; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 7;
Laws 1983, LB 447, § 39; Laws 1984, LB 845, § 23; Laws 1988, LB 1030, § 14; Laws 2010, LB1085, § 1.
Annotations
No substantial right was affected where the judgment debtor unsuccessfully objected to a garnishment pursuant to this section. Shawn E. on behalf of Grace E. v. Diane S., 300 Neb. 289, 912 N.W.2d 920 (2018).
This section not applicable when garnishee is a foreign insurance company which has complied with statutory provisions to obtain certificate of authority to do business. Pupkes v. Sailors, 183 Neb. 784, 164 N.W.2d 441 (1969).
Cannot serve nonresident or firm not doing business in state; service on person in possession. Mathews, Tootle & Maule v. Smith & Crittenden, 13 Neb. 178, 12 N.W. 821 (1882).
25-1012.
Repealed. Laws 1980, LB 597, § 18.
25-1012.01.
Garnishment; public officers and employees.All provisions, including provisions for a continuing lien prescribed in section 25-1056, requirements, conditions, and exemptions of the garnishment laws of the State of Nebraska shall apply to all state, county, municipal, municipally owned corporation, township, and school district officers and employees to the same extent and effect as such laws apply under the existing statutes of the State of Nebraska to officers and employees of private corporations. Consent is hereby given for garnishment proceedings against the State of Nebraska and against all counties, townships, municipal corporations, municipally owned corporations, and school districts in the same manner and under the same procedure as is now provided by law for bringing such suits and proceedings against corporations and individuals. This section shall apply only in case it is sought to hold and apply the earnings of such officers and employees, which earnings have been earned or are to be earned by personal services rendered to the state or to any county, township, municipal corporation, municipally owned corporation, or school district.
25-1012.02.
Garnishment; public officers and employees; procedure; process; answer.Such proceedings may be brought against the State of Nebraska or any county, township, municipal corporation, municipally owned corporation, or school district as garnishee defendant, and process shall be served in the manner provided for service of a summons in a civil action, except that certified mail service may not be used. It shall be the duty of the garnishee defendant to answer any garnishment summons served under the provisions of this section and section 25-1012.01 in the same manner as is now provided by law for the answer of corporations, and such defendant shall abide the order of the court issuing the garnishment, with regard to paying into court any amount ordered, not in excess of the amount earned by the officer or employee garnished, to the date of the answer. Such defendant may submit a written answer by United States mail to the clerk of the court issuing the summons. Such answer in garnishment shall in addition to any other matters stated therein state the amount of money due the officer or employee whose earnings are sought to be held to the answer day as shown in such summons, but shall not include the amount of any check or warrant which has been drawn and signed at the time of the service of garnishment summons.
25-1013.
Repealed. Laws 1980, LB 597, § 18.
25-1014.
Several attachments of same property; inventory and appraisement.Different attachments of the same property may be made by the same officer, and one inventory and appraisement shall be sufficient, and it shall not be necessary to return the same with more than one order.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 209, p. 427; R.S.1913, § 7743; C.S.1922, § 8687; C.S.1929, § 20-1014; R.S.1943, § 25-1014.
Annotations
One appraisement is sufficient. Connelly and Duffy v. Edgerton and Miller, 22 Neb. 82, 34 N.W. 76 (1887).
25-1015.
Attached property; subsequent orders; procedure.When the property is under attachment, it shall be attached under subsequent orders as follows: (1) If it is real property, it shall be attached in the manner prescribed in section 25-1008; (2) if it is personal property, it shall be attached as in the hands of the officer and subject to any previous attachment; and (3) if the same person or corporation be made a garnishee, a copy of the order and notice shall be left with him in the manner prescribed in section 25-1011.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 210, p. 427; R.S.1913, § 7744; C.S.1922, § 8688; C.S.1929, § 20-1015; R.S.1943, § 25-1015; Laws 1959, c. 102, § 1, p. 425.
Annotations
Cannot levy subsequent orders after property is taken from control by replevin. Merrill v. Wedgwood, 25 Neb. 283, 41 N.W. 149 (1888).
25-1016.
Order of attachment; return; contents.The officer shall return upon every order of attachment what he or she has done under it. The return must show when and how the defendant was served, and the property attached and the time it was attached. When garnishees are served, their names and the time each was served must be stated. The officer shall also return with the order all undertakings given under it.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 211, p. 427; R.S.1913, § 7745; C.S.1922, § 8689; C.S.1929, § 20-1016; R.S.1943, § 25-1016; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 8.
Annotations
Return not describing appraisement is sufficient after judgment. Grebe v. Jones, 15 Neb. 312, 18 N.W. 81 (1883).
Irregular to permit amendment without showing, so as to release property. Griffith v. Short, 14 Neb. 259, 15 N.W. 335 (1883).
Return should state if redelivery bond was given, etc. Hilton v. Ross, 9 Neb. 406, 2 N.W. 862 (1879).
25-1017.
Order of attachment; effect; lien of consignee; interest and other costs; how computed.An order of attachment binds the property attached from the time of service, and the garnishee shall stand liable to the plaintiff in attachment for all property, money, and credits in his hands, or due from him to defendant, from the time he is served with the written notice mentioned in section 25-1011, notwithstanding the money or debt owing by such garnishee, and which is sought to be attached, may be payable at the place of residence of a nonresident defendant; but where the property is attached in the hands of a consignee, his lien thereon shall not be affected by the attachment.
At the time of the issuance of the order of attachment, all interest and other costs due, as of that date, shall be computed. All interest and other costs which accrue after such date shall be specified on a per day basis or such other basis for assessment as may exist. Upon delivery of the attached property by the garnishee, such garnishee shall not be liable for interest or costs other than those specified in the order of attachment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 212, p. 427; Laws 1911, c. 168, § 4, p. 546; R.S.1913, § 7746; C.S.1922, § 8690; C.S.1929, § 20-1017; R.S.1943, § 25-1017; Laws 1959, c. 102, § 2, p. 425;
Laws 1978, LB 670, § 1.
Annotations
1. Scope of lien
2. Priorities
3. Miscellaneous
1. Scope of lien
Proceedings in garnishment are in the nature of notice of attachment to party in possession who becomes trustee. Crawford State Bank v. Murphy, 142 Neb. 795, 7 N.W.2d 762 (1943).
Debt owing by one Illinois corporation to another on contract payable in that state may, by attachment and garnishment in Nebraska, be subjected to payment of debt owing to resident of Iowa. Morrison v. Illinois C. R. R. Co., 101 Neb. 49, 161 N.W. 1032 (1917).
Lien of garnishment of debt due insolvent is subject to bankruptcy law. Hall v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 88 Neb. 20, 128 N.W. 645 (1910).
Attachment lien merges in judgment lien. Lincoln Upholstering Co. v. Baker, 82 Neb. 592, 118 N.W. 321 (1908).
Lien is not lost by taking money judgment without order for sale. Coulson v. Saltsman, 71 Neb. 495, 98 N.W. 1055 (1904).
Plaintiff does not acquire full lien but right to hold garnishee personally liable for property or value. Benedict v. T. L. V. Land & Cattle Co., 66 Neb. 236, 92 N.W. 210 (1902).
Lien by garnishment may attach to property held by fraudulent grantee of debtor. Glover v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 62 Neb. 483, 87 N.W. 170 (1901).
Attachment creditors of grantee of fraudulent conveyance acquire no valid lien against creditors of grantor. Westervelt v. Hagge, 61 Neb. 647, 85 N.W. 852 (1901).
Plaintiff by service of writ becomes entitled to all rights of defendant against garnishee. Cahn v. Carpless Co., 61 Neb. 512, 85 N.W. 538 (1901); Chamberlain Banking House v. Reliance Ins. Co., 59 Neb. 195, 80 N.W. 822 (1899).
Plaintiff has lien only to extent of defendant's actual interest. Barnes v. Cox, 58 Neb. 675, 79 N.W. 550 (1899); Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 58 Neb. 548, 78 N.W. 1064 (1899).
Lien of attachment on insolvent bank is not vacated by appointment of receiver. Arnold v. Weimer, 40 Neb. 216, 58 N.W. 709 (1894).
Garnishment does not affect vendor's rights of stoppage in transit. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Painter & Sons, 15 Neb. 394, 19 N.W. 488 (1884).
Deed executed after attachment levied is subject to judgment. Wright v. Smith, 11 Neb. 341, 7 N.W. 537 (1881).
2. Priorities
Garnishment is subject to prior bona fide assignments of debt. Cockins v. Bank of Alma, 84 Neb. 624, 122 N.W. 16 (1909).
Rights of holder of prior unrecorded deed stated. Naudain v. Fullenwider, 72 Neb. 221, 100 N.W. 296 (1904).
Attachment lien is prior to rights of vendor under unrecorded conditional sale contract. New Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Beals, 44 Neb. 816, 62 N.W. 1092 (1895).
3. Miscellaneous
This section is designed to supplement and implement general attachment statute. Insurance Co. of North America v. Maxim's of Nebraska, 178 Neb. 274, 132 N.W.2d 885 (1965).
Lien may be enforced by creditor's bill. Hargreaves v. Tennis, 63 Neb. 356, 88 N.W. 486 (1901).
Officer holding personal property under lawful attachment levy may be charged as garnishee and the property bound from the time of the service of summons in garnishment on him. Pitkin v. Burnham, 62 Neb. 385, 87 N.W. 160 (1901).
Purchaser after attachment is bound by adjudication as to validity of attachment. Nagle v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 57 Neb. 552, 77 N.W. 1074 (1899).
Property is in custody of law after garnishee is summoned. Meyer v. Miller, 51 Neb. 620, 71 N.W. 315 (1897).
Judgment debtor may be garnished; but not under writ from another court. Scott v. Rohman, 43 Neb. 618, 62 N.W. 46 (1895).
25-1018.
Attachment; receiver; appointment; oath; bond; accounting.The court, or any judge thereof during vacation, may, on the application of the plaintiff and on good cause shown, appoint a receiver, who shall take an oath faithfully to discharge his duty, and shall give an undertaking to the State of Nebraska in such sum as the court or judge may direct and with such security as shall be approved by the clerk of the court for the faithful performance of his duty as such receiver, and to pay over all money, and account for all property which may come into his hands by virtue of his appointment, at such times and in such manner as the court may direct.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 213, p. 428; R.S.1913, § 7747; C.S.1922, § 8691; C.S.1929, § 20-1018; R.S.1943, § 25-1018.
Cross References
For other bond provisions, see section 25-1084.
Annotations
Court may appoint receiver where garnishee abandons property to defendant. Northfield Knife Co. v. Shapleigh, 24 Neb. 635, 39 N.W. 788 (1888).
25-1019.
Attachment; receiver; powers and duties; actions by.Such receiver shall take possession of all notes, due bills, books of account, accounts and all other evidences of debt, that have been taken by the sheriff or other officer as the property of the defendant in attachment, and shall proceed to settle and collect the same. For that purpose, he may commence and maintain actions in his own name as such receiver but in such actions no right of defense shall be impaired or affected.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 214, p. 428; R.S.1913, § 7748; C.S.1922, § 8692; C.S.1929, § 20-1019; R.S.1943, § 25-1019.
Annotations
Accounts due defendant are subject to attachment. Sloan v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 58 Neb. 713, 79 N.W. 728 (1899).
25-1020.
Attachment; receiver; appointment; notice to debtors of defendant in attachment; effect.Such receiver shall forthwith give notice of his appointment to the persons indebted to the defendant in attachment. The notice shall be written or printed, and shall be served on the debtor or debtors by copy personally or by copy left at the residence. From the date of such service the debtors shall stand liable to the plaintiff in attachment for the amount of money and credits in their hands, or due from them to the defendant in attachment, and shall account therefor to the receiver.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 215, p. 428; R.S.1913, § 7749; C.S.1922, § 8693; C.S.1929, § 20-1020; R.S.1943, § 25-1020.
25-1021.
Attachment; receiver; reports; custody of property; duties.Such receiver shall, when required, report his proceedings to the court, and hold all money collected by him and property which may come into his hands subject to the order of the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 216, p. 428; R.S.1913, § 7750; C.S.1922, § 8694; C.S.1929, § 20-1021; R.S.1943, § 25-1021.
25-1022.
Attachment; sheriff; powers when no receiver appointed; bond.When a receiver is not appointed by the court or a judge thereof, as provided in section 25-1018, the sheriff or other officer attaching the property shall have all the powers and perform all the duties of a receiver appointed by the court or judge, and may, if necessary, commence and maintain actions in his own name as such officer. He may be required to give security other than his official undertaking.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 217, p. 428; R.S.1913, § 7751; C.S.1922, § 8695; C.S.1929, § 20-1022; R.S.1943, § 25-1022.
25-1023.
Attached property; preservation; sale; proceeds.The court shall make proper orders for the preservation of the property during the pendency of the suit. It may direct the sale of property when, because of its perishable nature or the costs of keeping it, a sale will be for the benefits of the parties. In vacation, such sale may be ordered by the judge of the court. The sale shall be public, after such advertisement as is prescribed for the sale of like property on execution, and shall be made in such manner, and upon such terms of credit, with security, as the court or judge, having regard to the probable duration of the action, may direct. The proceeds, if collected by the sheriff, with all the money received by him from garnishees, shall be held and paid over by him under the same requirement and responsibilities of himself and sureties as are provided in respect to money deposited in lieu of bail.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 218, p. 429; R.S.1913, § 7752; C.S.1922, § 8696; C.S.1929, § 20-1023; R.S.1943, § 25-1023.
25-1024.
Attachment; discharge; bond; effect; restitution of property or proceeds.(1) If the defendant, or any other person on his or her behalf, at any time before judgment, causes an undertaking to be executed to the plaintiff by one or more sureties resident in the county, to be approved by the court, in the amount of the plaintiff's claim as stated in his or her affidavit, to the effect that the defendant shall perform the judgment of the court, the attachment in such action shall be discharged and restitution made of any property taken under it or the proceeds thereof. Such undertaking shall also discharge the liability of a garnishee in such action for any property of the defendant in his or her hands.
(2) If the defendant presents to the court, by affidavit or otherwise, specific facts demonstrating that no sureties are necessary to insure satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim, the court may allow the undertaking to be executed by the defendant alone.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 219, p. 429; R.S.1913, § 7753; C.S.1922, § 8697; C.S.1929, § 20-1024; R.S.1943, § 25-1024; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 9.
Annotations
Upon dissolution of an attachment, ordinarily all property should be returned to the defendant. Ceres Fertilizer, Inc. v. Beekman, 209 Neb. 447, 308 N.W.2d 347 (1981).
Failure to return property upon order dissolving attachment may create liability on attachment bond. Schneider v. Daily, 148 Neb. 413, 27 N.W.2d 550 (1947).
After defendant in attachment proceedings has given "forthcoming" bond, he may move to dissolve attachment, but not if he gives "discharge" bond, because approval of same ipso facto discharges writ. Burnham-Munger-Root Dry Goods Co. v. Strahl, 102 Neb. 142, 166 N.W. 266 (1918).
25-1025.
Attachment; discharge; bond, how executed.The undertaking mentioned in subsection (1) of section 25-1024 may, in vacation, be executed in the presence of the sheriff having the order of attachment in his or her hands, or, after the return of the order, before the clerk, with the same effect as if executed in court, the sureties in either case to be approved by the officer before whom the undertaking is executed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 220, p. 429; R.S.1913, § 7754; C.S.1922, § 8698; C.S.1929, § 20-1025; R.S.1943, § 25-1025; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 10.
25-1026.
Garnishee; answer; interrogatories; filing fee; costs.The garnishee shall answer, under oath, all the interrogatories put to him touching the property of every description and credits of the defendant in his possession or under his control at the time of the service of the summons and interrogatories, and he shall disclose truly the amount owing by him to the defendant, whether due or not, and, in case of a corporation, any stock therein held by or for the benefit of the defendant, at the time of the service of the summons and interrogatories. The fee for filing of answer may be taxed and collected in the same manner as other costs in such proceedings.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 221, p. 429; Laws 1877, § 1, p. 10; R.S.1913, § 7755; C.S.1922, § 8699; C.S.1929, § 20-1026; R.S.1943, § 25-1026; Laws 1951, c. 67, § 3, p. 203; Laws 1959, c. 101, § 2, p. 423.
Annotations
A garnishee who serves as the plan administrator for a judgment debtor's employee benefit plan must comply with this section and disclose any property of the judgment debtor that it possesses or controls, regardless of whether the property is subject to garnishment. Florence Lake Investments v. Berg, 312 Neb. 183, 978 N.W.2d 308 (2022).
As a general rule, a garnishee owes a duty to act in good faith and answer fully and truthfully all proper interrogatories presented to him. Petersen v. Central Park Properties, 275 Neb. 220, 745 N.W.2d 884 (2008).
Failure to tender garnishee fee excuses failure to appear but does not discharge garnishee from liability. Crawford State Bank v. Murphy, 142 Neb. 795, 7 N.W.2d 762 (1943).
After stating substance of this section, comment made that while garnishee appeared in person to answer questions, he did not file written answer. Hilton v. Clements, 137 Neb. 791, 291 N.W. 483 (1940).
Stock of domestic corporation for which certificate has been issued and delivered to purchaser is deemed to be in possession of corporation subject to attachment or garnishment proceedings. Danbom v. Danbom, 132 Neb. 858, 273 N.W. 502 (1937).
A nonresident whose property has been seized under a writ of attachment may, without making a general appearance, demand relief to which want of jurisdiction entitles him. McCartney v. McCartney, 128 Neb. 671, 260 N.W. 184 (1935).
After judgment, summons in garnishment from one county to another in aid of execution, is unauthorized. Hinds State Bank v. Loffler, 113 Neb. 110, 202 N.W. 465 (1925).
Section applies to all garnishment proceedings; unless fees are tendered, garnishee need not appear. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Van Cleave, 52 Neb. 67, 71 N.W. 971 (1897).
Where garnishee after answer receives notice of assignment made before levy, he should make supplemental answer. Coleman v. Scott, 27 Neb. 77, 42 N.W. 896 (1889).
Prepayment is waived by appearance and answer without objection. Pope v. Kingman & Co., 2 Neb. Unof, 184, 96 N.W. 519 (1901).
Where insurance company denies indebtedness to judgment debtor in answer to garnishee summons, judgment creditor should be remitted to action for unsatisfactory disclosure. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mackechnie, 114 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1940).
25-1027.
Garnishee; payment into court; effect; costs.A garnishee may pay the money owing to the defendant by him into court. He shall be discharged from liability to the defendant for any money so paid not exceeding the plaintiff's claim. He shall not be subjected to costs beyond those caused by his resistance of the claim against him; and if he disclose the property in his hands, or the true amount owing by him, and deliver or pay the same according to the order of the court, he shall be allowed his costs.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 222, p. 430; R.S.1913, § 7756; C.S.1922, § 8700; C.S.1929, § 20-1027; R.S.1943, § 25-1027; Laws 1951, c. 67, § 4, p. 204.
Annotations
Garnishee may pay money into court. Scott v. McDonald, 125 Neb. 803, 252 N.W. 323 (1934).
Where money is voluntarily paid into court by defendant's debtor upon attempted garnishment, court's order to apply it upon plaintiff's judgment will not be set aside because of insufficiency in garnishment proceeding. Ryan v. Bullion, 100 Neb. 705, 161 N.W. 167 (1916).
Payment into court in good faith protects garnishee though made before defendant was summoned. Scott v. Kirschbaum, 47 Neb. 331, 66 N.W. 443 (1896).
25-1028.
Garnishee; failure to answer; presumption; judgment.If the garnishee fails to answer, as required by section 25-1026, he shall be presumed to be indebted to the defendant in the full amount of the claim of plaintiff. Upon notice to the garnishee given within such time and in such manner as the court shall direct, judgment may be entered for such amount as the court may find due from the garnishee.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 223, p. 430; R.S.1913, § 7757; C.S.1922, § 8701; C.S.1929, § 20-1028; R.S.1943, § 25-1028; Laws 1951, c. 67, § 5, p. 204.
Annotations
If the garnishee fails to answer interrogatories, it is presumed that the garnishee is indebted to the judgment debtor in the full amount of the judgment creditor's claim. This is a rebuttable presumption. Petersen v. Central Park Properties, 275 Neb. 220, 745 N.W.2d 884 (2008).
A presumption of indebtedness arising under this section is rebuttable. Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, 264 Neb. 365, 647 N.W.2d 615 (2002).
A notice did not inform the garnishee that if it failed to appear, default judgment would be taken against it. Lee Sapp Leasing v. Ciao Caffe & Espresso, Inc., 10 Neb. App. 948, 640 N.W.2d 677 (2002).
25-1029.
Garnishment; property; delivery into court; bond in lieu of delivery.If the garnishee answers that, at the time of the service of the summons and interrogatories upon him or her, he or she was possessed of any property of the defendant or was indebted to him or her, the court may order the delivery of such property and the payment of the amount owing by the garnishee into court; or the court may permit the garnishee to retain the property or the amount owing, upon the execution of an undertaking to the plaintiff by one or more sufficient sureties to the effect that the amount shall be paid or the property forthcoming as the court may direct. If the garnishee presents to the court, by affidavit or otherwise, specific facts demonstrating that no sureties are necessary to insure that the amount owing by the garnishee shall be paid, or the property forthcoming, the court may allow the undertaking to be executed by the garnishee alone.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 224, p. 430; R.S.1913, § 7758; C.S.1922, § 8702; C.S.1929, § 20-1029; R.S.1943, § 25-1029; Laws 1951, c. 67, § 6, p. 204; Laws 1959, c. 101, § 3, p. 423; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 11.
Annotations
Where original judgment on which garnishment proceedings are based is made ineffective by bankruptcy of judgment debtor, the garnishment summons and power and rights thereunder cease; garnishee is released from liability on summons although court made no order. Savard v. Physicians Casualty Co., 124 Neb. 627, 247 N.W. 567 (1933).
In absence of fraud or collusion, no garnishable debt arises from contract for personal services paid for in advance. Salyers Auto Co. v. De Vore, 116 Neb. 317, 217 N.W. 94 (1927).
Where garnishment proceedings are void, money should be returned to garnishee. Yeiser v. Cathers, 73 Neb. 317, 102 N.W. 612 (1905).
Judgment debtor is liable to process of garnishment when the two actions are brought in the same court. Scott v. Rohman, 43 Neb. 618, 62 N.W. 46 (1895).
Garnishee, not making full disclosure, is liable over to creditor. Smith v. Ainscow, 11 Neb. 476, 9 N.W. 646 (1881).
Garnishee, not making full disclosure, defendant have judgment, if appeal is taken. Dolby v. Tingley, 9 Neb. 412, 2 N.W. 866 (1879).
Liability of garnishee is to be determined by status of fund when answer is taken. First Nat. Bank of Pawnee City v. Manning, 2 Neb. Unof. 3, 95 N.W. 1128 (1901).
25-1030.
Garnishee; answer; controvert; allegations; liability; release.If the garnishee appears and answers and his or her disclosure is not satisfactory to the plaintiff, or if he or she fails to comply with the order of the court, by delivering the property and paying the money owing into court, or giving the undertaking required in section 25-1029, the plaintiff may file an application within twenty days for determination of the liability of the garnishee. The application may controvert the answer of the garnishee, or may allege facts showing the existence of indebtedness of the garnishee to the defendant or of the property and credits of the defendant in the hands of the garnishee. The answer of the garnishee, if one has been filed, and the application for determination of the liability of the garnishee shall constitute the pleadings upon which trial of the issue of the liability of the garnishee shall be had. If the plaintiff fails to file such application within twenty days, the garnishee shall be released and discharged.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 225, p. 430; R.S.1913, § 7759; C.S.1922, § 8703; C.S.1929, § 20-1030; R.S.1943, § 25-1030; Laws 1951, c. 67, § 7, p. 204; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 12.
Annotations
1. Proceedings
2. Liability of garnishee
1. Proceedings
If a garnishor fails to file an application to determine the garnishee's liability within 20 days of when the garnishee's answers to interrogatories are filed, this section prescribes an unequivocal and mandatory conclusion that the garnishee shall be released and discharged. Huntington v. Pedersen, 294 Neb. 294, 883 N.W.2d 48 (2016).
The purpose of this section is to create an expedited garnishment proceeding. ML Manager v. Jensen, 287 Neb. 171, 842 N.W.2d 566 (2014).
This section does not require a garnishee to serve its interrogatory answers or to provide any notice to the garnishor. ML Manager v. Jensen, 287 Neb. 171, 842 N.W.2d 566 (2014).
In a garnishment proceeding, the answers to interrogatories and the application to determine garnishee liability are the only pleadings for disposition of the liability issue. An answer to interrogatories which states that the garnishee has no property, money, or credit due and owing to the judgment debtor acts as a denial of all issues presented by the application to determine garnishee liability filed by the garnishor. Torrison v. Overman, 250 Neb. 164, 549 N.W.2d 124 (1996).
If a garnisher is dissatisfied with a garnishee's answer but does not controvert or traverse the answer given, then the garnishee's answer is the only filed pleading containing allegations or statements about property, funds, or credits of a judgment debtor, a solitary pleading which is taken as true and conclusive. NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., 228 Neb. 306, 422 N.W.2d 542 (1988).
Where a garnishee in its answer to a garnisher's interrogatories denies liability to the garnisher, and no application for determination of liability is filed, the answer of the garnishee is the solitary pleading before the court and must be taken as true and conclusive. Failure to proceed as required by this section constitutes an abandonment or discontinuance of garnishment proceedings. NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., 219 Neb. 296, 363 N.W.2d 362 (1985).
Where answer of garnishee denies owing judgment debtor, remedy is provided by this section by filing of petition for unsatisfactory disclosure. Searcey v. Badgett, 137 Neb. 185, 288 N.W. 537 (1939).
Court having obtained jurisdiction, can give relief by rendering money judgment against garnishee if no other remedy is available. Ternes v. Watke, 134 Neb. 798, 279 N.W. 718 (1938).
Stock subscription to capital stock of a corporation may be garnished by a creditor of the corporation. Bohrer v. Adair, 61 Neb. 824, 86 N.W. 495 (1901).
Finding of court in main action is not conclusive upon rights or liabilities of garnishee. Hollingsworth v. Fitzgerald, 16 Neb. 492, 20 N.W. 836 (1884).
If personal judgment against garnishee is desired, plaintiff must proceed under this section. Clark v. Foxworthy, 14 Neb. 241, 15 N.W. 342 (1883).
Rights of creditor are no greater than rights of attachment debtor against garnishee. Fitzgerald v. Hollingsworth, 14 Neb. 188, 15 N.W. 345 (1883).
Execution need not have been returned unsatisfied in garnishment before judgment. Pope v. Kingman & Co., 2 Neb. Unof. 184, 96 N.W. 519 (1901).
2. Liability of garnishee
A garnishee who serves as the plan administrator for a judgment debtor's employee benefit plan cannot be found personally liable for the judgment debtor's debt for failing to disclose the plan pursuant to section 25-1026, because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act bars the assignment or alienation of pension benefits. Florence Lake Investments v. Berg, 312 Neb. 183, 978 N.W.2d 308 (2022).
Failure to prove that original answer was false does not defeat action but does relieve from liability for costs. Western Smelting & Refining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 150 Neb. 477, 35 N.W.2d 116 (1948).
One obtaining goods under "Bulk Sales Law" was liable as trustee for benefit of creditors of his vendor and liable as garnishee. Damicus v. Kelly, 120 Neb. 588, 234 N.W. 416 (1931).
Garnishee, turning property over to defendant pending action, is liable to plaintiff. Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. Mosher, 68 Neb. 713, 94 N.W. 1003 (1903), judgment below affirmed on rehearing, 68 Neb. 724, 100 N.W. 133 (1904).
It was duty of bank, when garnished, to set up claimed lien under chattel mortgage. Grainger v. First Nat. Bank of Sutton, 63 Neb. 46, 88 N.W. 121 (1901).
Garnishee is not liable unless defendant had right of action against him for legal demand due or to become due. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Van Cleave, 52 Neb. 67, 71 N.W. 971 (1897).
Garnishee is liable if answer is not made in good faith, fully and unequivocally. Work v. Brown, 38 Neb. 498, 56 N.W. 1082 (1893).
Failure to prove answer incomplete is no bar to action; but relieves garnishee of costs. Burden is on garnishee to prove right to property. Cornish & Tibbets v. Russell, 32 Neb. 397, 49 N.W. 379 (1891).
Garnishee is mere stakeholder; and is protected only when money is paid into court. Russell v. Lau, 30 Neb. 805, 47 N.W. 193 (1890).
Insurance company is liable to judgment creditor for unsatisfactory disclosure, when it has issued valid policy, in force and effect, to pay judgment recovered against the judgment debtor. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mackechnie, 114 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1940).
25-1030.01.
Garnishee; application; notice; manner of service.Upon filing an application for determination of liability of the garnishee, the plaintiff shall give the garnishee and the defendant in the original action notice of the filing thereof and of the time and place of trial thereon. The notice shall be given within such time and in such manner as the court shall direct.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 67, § 8, p. 205.
Annotations
A notice of hearing for the determination of garnishee liability was given as required by this section where the county court entered an order setting the hearing on garnishee liability and requiring "due service" of the order on the parties, and notice of hearing as originally set and notice of continued hearing were sent to same address as the initial summons and garnishment interrogatories. General Serv. Bureau v. Moller, 12 Neb. App. 288, 672 N.W.2d 41 (2003).
This section does not require that notice of a garnishee liability hearing be given in a manner consistent with service of process on corporations. General Serv. Bureau v. Moller, 12 Neb. App. 288, 672 N.W.2d 41 (2003).
25-1030.02.
Garnishee; trial; liability; judgment.The trial of the determination of the liability of the garnishee shall be conducted the same as in a civil action. If it shall appear upon the trial of the liability of the garnishee that the garnishee was (1) indebted to the defendant, or (2) had any property or credits of the defendant, in his possession or under his control at the time of being served with the notice of garnishment, he shall be liable to the plaintiff, in case judgment is finally recovered by plaintiff against the defendant, to the full amount thereof, or to the amount of such indebtedness or property held by the garnishee. The plaintiff in such event may have a judgment against the garnishee (1) for the amount of money due from the garnishee to the defendant in the original action, or (2) for the delivery to the sheriff or to the clerk of the court of any property in the garnishee's hands belonging to the defendant in the original action within a time to be fixed by the court, or for the value of the same as fixed in the judgment if not delivered within the time fixed.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 67, § 9, p. 205.
Annotations
In determining the liability of a garnishee to a garnishor, the test is whether, as of the time the summons in garnishment was served, the facts would support a recovery by the garnishor's judgment debtor against the garnishee. Florence Lake Investments v. Berg, 312 Neb. 183, 978 N.W.2d 308 (2022).
In a trial pursuant to this section, a garnishee may present evidence to rebut a presumption of indebtedness arising under section 25-1028. Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, 264 Neb. 365, 647 N.W.2d 615 (2002).
The garnishee is not liable unless the defendant had a right of action against him for a legal demand due or to become due. In an action to determine the liability of the garnishee, the plaintiff has the burden to establish why the garnishee was liable to the defendant at the time notice of garnishment was served. Gerdes v. Klindt, 253 Neb. 260, 570 N.W.2d 336 (1997).
In determining the liability of a garnishee to a garnishor, the test is whether, as of the time the summons in garnishment was served, the facts would support a recovery by the garnishor's judgment debtor against the garnishee. Davis Erection Co. v. Jorgensen, 248 Neb. 297, 534 N.W.2d 746 (1995).
Material issues of fact in a contested garnishment proceeding are triable by jury unless waived. Christiansen v. Moore, 184 Neb. 818, 172 N.W.2d 620 (1969).
A garnishee is not liable to the plaintiff unless the judgment debtor had a right of action against the garnishee. Lee Sapp Leasing v. Ciao Caffe & Espresso, Inc., 10 Neb. App. 948, 640 N.W.2d 677 (2002).
Federal court would retain fund until state garnishment proceedings were completed. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Viele, 110 F.Supp. 889 (D. Neb. 1953).
25-1030.03.
Garnishment; ownership of property; intervention; trial.Any person claiming ownership of any money or property sought to be reached in the possession or under the control of the garnishee as the property of the defendant in the original action may intervene in the garnishment proceedings by a suitable pleading and set up facts showing that the debt or the property with which it is sought to charge the garnishee is the property of such intervenor. The defendant in the original action may by a suitable pleading filed in the garnishment proceedings set up facts showing that the debt or the property with which it is sought to charge the garnishee is (1) exempt from execution, or (2) for any other reason is not liable for plaintiff's claim. If issue on such intervention or on such pleading by the defendant in the original action is joined by the plaintiff, it shall be tried with the issues as to the garnishee's liability. If such debt or property or any part thereof is found to be the property of the intervenor, or is found to be exempt or not liable, the garnishee shall be discharged as to that part which is exempt or not liable.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 67, § 10, p. 206.
Annotations
Trial of an issue of fact should be treated as a trial between a plaintiff and a defendant. Christiansen v. Moore, 184 Neb. 818, 172 N.W.2d 620 (1969).
25-1031.
Garnishee; final judgment; when rendered; effect; discharge by delivery of property; costs.Final judgment shall not be rendered against the garnishee until the action against the defendant in the original action has been determined. If in such action judgment be rendered for the defendant, the garnishee shall be discharged and recover costs. If the plaintiff shall recover against the defendant in the original action, and the garnishee shall deliver up all the property, money, and credits of the defendant in his possession and pay all the money from him due as the court may order, the garnishee shall be discharged, and the costs of the proceedings against him shall be paid out of the property and money so surrendered, or as the court may think right and proper.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 226, p. 431; R.S.1913, § 7760; C.S.1922, § 8704; C.S.1929, § 20-1031; R.S.1943, § 25-1031; Laws 1951, c. 67, § 11, p. 206.
Annotations
Action under this section is a special proceeding. Western Smelting & Refining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 150 Neb. 477, 35 N.W.2d 116 (1948).
Order upon garnishee as to disposition of property awaits final judgment against defendant. Reed v. Fletcher, 24 Neb. 435, 39 N.W. 437 (1888).
Order of court is not conclusive on garnishee, and he may contest his liability. Hollingsworth v. Fitzgerald, 16 Neb. 492, 20 N.W. 836 (1884).
Order discharging garnishee is final order and reviewable. Turpin v. Coates, 12 Neb. 321, 11 N.W. 300 (1882).
25-1031.01.
Garnishment; judgment; effect.The judgment in the garnishment action shall be conclusive between the garnishee, plaintiff, defendant, and any intervenor.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 67, § 12, p. 206.
Annotations
A specific holding, in a prior garnishment action by a creditor against a bank's insurer under a blanket employee dishonesty bond, that the bank did not suffer a loss within the coverage of such bond is res judicata in a subsequent suit brought by the bank to recover under the bond and cannot be relitigated. Bank of Mead v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 202 Neb. 403, 275 N.W.2d 822 (1979).
25-1031.02.
Garnishment; costs; fee.(1) The party seeking garnishment shall advance the costs of transcript and filing the matter in the district court.
(2) The district court shall be entitled to the following fee in civil matters: For issuance of a writ of execution, restitution, garnishment, attachment, and examination in aid of execution, a fee of five dollars each.
25-1032.
Attachment; judgment for defendant; effect; return of property or proceeds.If judgment is rendered in the action for the defendant, the attachment shall be discharged, and the property attached, or its proceeds, shall be returned to him.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 227, p. 431; R.S.1913, § 7761; C.S.1922, § 8705; C.S.1929, § 20-1032; R.S.1943, § 25-1032.
Annotations
Order discharging garnishee ipso facto discharges attachment. Alpirn v. Goodman, 3 Neb. Unof. 397, 91 N.W. 530 (1902).
25-1033.
Attachment; judgment for plaintiff; how satisfied; return of surplus.If judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, it shall be satisfied as follows: So much of the property remaining in the hands of the officer, after applying the money arising from the sale of perishable property, and so much of the personal property and lands and tenements, if any, whether held by legal or equitable title, as may be necessary to satisfy the judgment, shall be sold by order of the court, under the same restrictions and regulations as if the same had been levied on by execution; and the money arising therefrom, with the amount which may be recovered from the garnishee, shall be applied to satisfy the judgment and costs. If there is not enough to satisfy the same, the judgment shall stand, and execution may issue thereon for the residue in all respects as in other cases. Any surplus of the attached property, or its proceeds, shall be returned to the defendant.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 228, p. 431; R.S.1913, § 7762; C.S.1922, § 8706; C.S.1929, § 20-1033; R.S.1943, § 25-1033.
Annotations
Attached property should be sold the same as if levied on by execution. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Hughes, 137 Neb. 820, 291 N.W. 475 (1940).
Purchaser at sale is protected from collateral attack based on defective publication of notice. Brown v. Bose, 55 Neb. 200, 75 N.W. 536 (1898).
Same rule applies as to sales on execution; notice was defective. Helmer v. Rehm, 14 Neb. 219, 15 N.W. 344 (1883).
Judgment was informal, but not subject to collateral attack. Crowell v. Johnson, 2 Neb. 146 (1873).
25-1034.
Attached property; delivery to sheriff; power of court to compel.The court may compel the delivery to the sheriff, for sale, of any of the attached property for which an undertaking may have been given, and may proceed summarily on such undertaking to enforce the delivery of the property or the payment of such sum as may be due upon the undertaking, by rules and attachments, as in cases of contempt.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 229, p. 431; R.S.1913, § 7763; C.S.1922, § 8707; C.S.1929, § 20-1034; R.S.1943, § 25-1034.
25-1035.
Attached property out of sheriff's possession; repossession; power of court to order.The court may order the sheriff to repossess himself, for the purpose of selling it, of any of the attached property which may have passed out of his hands without having been sold or converted into money; and the sheriff shall, under such order, have the same power to take the property as he would have under an order of attachment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 230, p. 431; R.S.1913, § 7764; C.S.1922, § 8708; C.S.1929, § 20-1035; R.S.1943, § 25-1035.
25-1036.
Attachment; intervening claimants; proceeding to ascertain title.If personal property which has been attached be claimed by any person other than the defendant, it shall be the duty of the officer to have the validity of such claim tried, and such proceedings must be had thereon, with the like effect, as in case the property had been seized upon execution and claimed by a third person.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 231, p. 431; R.S.1913, § 7765; C.S.1922, § 8709; C.S.1929, § 20-1036; R.S.1943, § 25-1036.
Annotations
Sheriff may bring suit hereunder to try claim of party to personal property attached by him. Leadabrand v. State, 121 Neb. 836, 238 N.W. 656 (1931).
25-1037.
Several attachments; same property; reference.Where several attachments are executed on the same property, or the same persons are made garnishees, the court, on the motion of any of the plaintiffs, may order a reference to ascertain and report the amounts and priorities of the several attachments.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 232, p. 432; R.S.1913, § 7766; C.S.1922, § 8710; C.S.1929, § 20-1037; R.S.1943, § 25-1037.
Annotations
Mere fact that party claims to be owner of attached property does not give him right to intervene in attachment suit and thus have question of his ownership determined in such suit. Geis v. Geis, 125 Neb. 394, 250 N.W. 252 (1933).
Second attaching creditor may intervene to try priority of liens. Deere, Wells & Co. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 49 Neb. 385, 68 N.W. 504 (1896).
Court has authority to adjudicate priorities between attaching creditors. State ex rel. Austrian, Wise & Co. v. Duncan, 37 Neb. 631, 56 N.W. 214 (1893).
25-1038.
Repealed. Laws 1980, LB 597, § 18.
25-1039.
Attachment; additional security; right of defendant to require.The defendant may, at any time before judgment, after reasonable notice to the plaintiff, move the court for additional security on the part of the plaintiff; and if, on such motion, the court is satisfied that the surety in the plaintiff's undertaking has removed from this state, or is not sufficient for the amount thereof, it may vacate the order of attachment and direct restitution of any property taken under it, unless in a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, sufficient security is given by the plaintiff.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 234, p. 432; R.S.1913, § 7768; C.S.1922, § 8712; C.S.1929, § 20-1039; R.S.1943, § 25-1039.
25-1040.
Attachment; motion to discharge; right of defendant.The defendant may, at any time before judgment, upon reasonable notice to the plaintiff, move to discharge an attachment, as to the whole or part of the property attached.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 235, p. 432; R.S.1913, § 7769; C.S.1922, § 8713; C.S.1929, § 20-1040; R.S.1943, § 25-1040.
Annotations
1. Motion to discharge
2. Issues determined
1. Motion to discharge
Upon dissolution of an attachment, ordinarily all property should be returned to the defendant. Ceres Fertilizer, Inc. v. Beekman, 209 Neb. 447, 308 N.W.2d 347 (1981).
Defendant who has given "forthcoming bond" may move to dissolve attachment, but not if he has given "discharge bond." Burnham-Munger-Root D. G. Co. v. Strahl, 102 Neb. 142, 166 N.W. 266 (1918).
Defendant cannot move to discharge attachment on ground that property is not his. Kneeland v. Weigley, 76 Neb. 276, 107 N.W. 574 (1906).
Mortgagee of attached property cannot move to discharge. Meyer, Bannerman & Co. v. Keefer, 58 Neb. 220, 78 N.W. 506 (1899).
Court cannot hear motion to discharge attachment filed before, but not submitted until after judgment. Herman v. Hayes, 58 Neb. 54, 78 N.W. 365 (1899).
Defendant may move to discharge attachment although, prior to levy, he has sold interest therein. Kountze v. Scott, 52 Neb. 460, 72 N.W. 585 (1897).
Issue on motion to discharge is not whether defendant owns property attached, but grounds for attachment. South Park Imp. Co. v. Baker, 51 Neb. 392, 70 N.W. 952 (1897).
Hearing of motion to discharge in attachment is a trial. Gibson v. Sidney, 50 Neb. 12, 69 N.W. 314 (1896).
Subsequent attaching creditors cannot move to dissolve attachment, but may intervene to have priorities determined. Deere, Well & Co. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 49 Neb. 385, 68 N.W. 504 (1896).
Validity of mortgage executed by defendant cannot be determined on motion to discharge attachment. Landauer v. Mack, 43 Neb. 430, 61 N.W. 597 (1895).
Filing motion does not excuse failure to plead to petition. Stutzner v. Printz, 43 Neb. 306, 61 N.W. 620 (1895).
Motion must be made before judgment; but where submitted, court may rule on same after judgment for plaintiff. Stutzner v. Printz, 43 Neb. 306, 61 N.W. 620 (1895); Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co. v. Curtis, 38 Neb. 520, 57 N.W. 161 (1893).
2. Issues determined
In a hearing under this section, the burden is upon the plaintiff to sustain by a preponderance of the evidence one or more of the grounds on which attachment is claimed. Ceres Fertilizer, Inc. v. Beekman, 205 Neb. 768, 290 N.W.2d 199 (1980).
Defendant, by filing answer to merits and motion to dissolve attachment on sufficiency and truthfulness of affidavit, made general appearance which waived defects in original summons. Johnson v. Larson, 96 Neb. 193, 147 N.W. 476 (1914).
Debtor alone can question grounds on which attachment is issued. Wagner v. Wolf, 75 Neb. 780, 106 N.W. 1024 (1906).
Defendant may contest, though he had disposed of all interest in property. Symns Gro. Co. v. Snow, 58 Neb. 516, 78 N.W. 1066 (1899).
Merits of case cannot be adjudicated on hearing to dissolve. McDonald v. Marquardt, 52 Neb. 820, 73 N.W. 288 (1897).
Plaintiff is estopped to deny interest of defendant to oppose attachment. Kountze v. Scott, 52 Neb. 460, 72 N.W. 585 (1897); McCord, Brady & Co. v. Bowen, 51 Neb. 247, 70 N.W. 950 (1897).
"Reasonable notice" defined. Sterling Mfg. Co. v. Hough, 49 Neb. 618, 68 N.W. 1019 (1896).
25-1041.
Attachment; motion to discharge; evidence.The hearing of the motion to discharge shall be a trial of the issue of the existence, at the time of the issuance of the order, of one or more of the grounds of attachment listed in section 25-1001, as alleged in the affidavits under section 25-1002. The court shall discharge an order of attachment unless the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence one of the grounds alleged under section 25-1001 upon which the writ was issued. The court may order that the evidence at the hearing of the motion to discharge be presented, in whole or part, by affidavits in the form prescribed by section 25-1334, for affidavits in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. In all cases in which the court does not so order, evidence presented at the hearing of the motion to discharge shall be governed by the Nebraska Evidence Rules.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 236, p. 432; R.S.1913, § 7770; C.S.1922, § 8714; C.S.1929, § 20-1041; R.S.1943, § 25-1041; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 13.
Cross References
Nebraska Evidence Rules, see section 27-1103.
Annotations
Where grounds are denied, burden is on plaintiff. Malcolm Savings Bank v. Cronin, 80 Neb. 231, 116 N.W. 150 (1908).
Affidavits sworn to before attorney in case, if objected to, cannot be used. Malcolm Savings Bank v. Cronin, 80 Neb. 228, 114 N.W. 158 (1907).
Whether plaintiff may use oral evidence is discretionary with trial court. Kountze v. Scott, 52 Neb. 460, 72 N.W. 585 (1897).
Hearing on motion to discharge is a "trial," for which justice may charge fee. Gibson v. Sidney, 50 Neb. 12, 69 N.W. 314 (1896).
Plaintiff must prove grounds to satisfaction of court; may open and close, in discretion of court. Citizens State Bank v. Baird, 42 Neb. 219, 60 N.W. 551 (1894).
Affidavits constitute pleadings; plaintiff opens and closes and has burden of proof. Jordan v. Dewey, 40 Neb. 639, 59 N.W. 88 (1894).
Findings of trial court should not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. Fremont Brewing Co. v. Pekarek, 4 Neb. Unof. 531, 95 N.W. 12 (1903).
Manner of taking evidence on hearing is discretionary with trial court. Dittman Boot & Shoe Co. v. Graff, 3 Neb. Unof. 165, 91 N.W. 188 (1902).
25-1042.
Attachment; county court; procedure.Sections 25-1039 to 25-1041 shall apply to actions before county courts.
Source:Laws 1875, § 1, p. 44; R.S.1913, § 7771; C.S.1922, § 8715; C.S.1929, § 20-1042; R.S.1943, § 25-1042;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 126.
25-1043.
Attachment of lands in another county; copy to be filed with register of deeds.Whenever an attachment shall issue to any other county than the one in which the action is brought, and any lands shall be attached by virtue thereof, it shall be the duty of the officer attaching such property to make out a true copy of the order of attachment, and file the same in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the lands so attached are situated. He shall also certify upon the copy of said order of attachment that the same is a true copy of the original writ received by him, and he shall also endorse thereon the description of the property attached, and the time when the same was attached, under and by virtue of the original order of attachment.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 1, p. 714; R.S.1913, § 7772; C.S.1922, § 8716; C.S.1929, § 20-1043; R.S.1943, § 25-1043.
25-1044.
Attachment of lands in another county; writ and certificate; recording constitutes notice.It shall be the duty of the register of deeds of the county, when the copy of the order of attachment has been filed as provided in section 25-1043, to record the same in the miscellaneous record, together with the certificate of the officers heretofore mentioned, and such copy of said orders of attachment and certificates so filed and recorded shall be sufficient notice to subsequent purchasers of the land so attached.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 2, p. 714; R.S.1913, § 7773; C.S.1922, § 8717; C.S.1929, § 20-1044; R.S.1943, § 25-1044.
25-1045.
Attachment; discharge; duty of clerk to certify; duty of register of deeds to record.If the order of attachment is discharged it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court in which the action is brought to certify that fact, together with the time when the order was discharged, to the register of deeds in whose office the copy of the order has been recorded as aforesaid, whereupon such register shall file such certificate and write across the record of such copy the word "discharged," and also the time of discharge as shown in the certificate.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 3, p. 714; R.S.1913, § 7774; C.S.1922, § 8718; C.S.1929, § 20-1045; R.S.1943, § 25-1045.
25-1046.
Attachment; copy of order; taxation as costs.The officer, for making out said copy of the same, shall receive such compensation as is now allowed by law for similar services, to be taxed in the costs, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 4, p. 714; R.S.1913, § 7775; C.S.1922, § 8719; C.S.1929, § 20-1046; R.S.1943, § 25-1046.
25-1047.
Attachment; order of discharge; when and how superseded.When an order is made discharging an attachment and any party affected thereby shall except to such order, the court or judge shall thereupon fix a time, not exceeding twenty days thereafter, within which such party may file his petition in error or perfect an appeal from such order during which time the attached property shall remain in the hands of the sheriff or other officer; Provided, no such appeal or petition in error shall operate to supersede such order unless such appellant or plaintiff in error shall, within the time so fixed, execute to the adverse party an undertaking, with sureties to be approved by the clerk or judge and conditioned for the payment of all damage which may be sustained by such adverse party, in consequence of such appeal or petition in error, in the event that such attachment be finally discharged as having been unlawfully issued.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 1, p. 715; R.S.1913, § 7776; C.S.1922, § 8720; C.S.1929, § 20-1047; R.S.1943, § 25-1047.
Annotations
1. Bond
2. Miscellaneous
1. Bond
This section does not violate due process under the second prong of the test stated in the U.S. Supreme Court case Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1991), because it allows continued attachment of the property at issue in only those instances in which the plaintiff posts a bond to protect the defendant from any damages suffered in the event that the order of discharge is affirmed on appeal. Andrews v. Schram, 252 Neb. 298, 562 N.W.2d 50 (1997).
Filing petition and approval of bond in proper time continues lien; summons is not condition to superseding judgment. McDonald v. Bowman, 40 Neb. 269, 58 N.W. 704 (1894).
If petition and bond are not filed in twenty days, garnishee is discharged. Lehnoff & Soennichsen v. Fisher, 32 Neb. 107, 48 N.W. 821 (1891).
Bond is necessary only to preserve lien. Adams County Bank v. Morgan, 26 Neb. 148, 41 N.W. 993 (1889).
Property must be returned at end of twenty days unless petition in error and bond filed. State ex rel. Rieschick v. Cunningham, 9 Neb. 146, 1 N.W. 1011 (1879).
Party giving bond cannot deny property belonged to defendants. Metcalf v. Bockoven, 1 Neb. Unof. 822, 96 N.W. 406 (1901).
2. Miscellaneous
Motion that attachment writ be quashed, in form of special appearance, and order sustaining motion, entitle plaintiff to appeal. National Surety Co. v. Love, 102 Neb. 633, 168 N.W. 597 (1918); Legan v. Smith, 98 Neb. 682, 154 N.W. 228 (1915).
Appeal continues lien and brings ruling of justice discharging attachment to district court for review. Rhodes v. Samuels, 67 Neb. 1, 93 N.W. 148 (1903).
Applies to all courts. Osborne v. Canfield, 33 Neb. 330, 50 N.W. 167 (1891).
Order overruling motion to discharge is not final order. Wilson v. Shepherd, 15 Neb. 15, 16 N.W. 826 (1883).
25-1048.
Attachment; order of discharge; appeal; original action unaffected.The original action shall proceed to trial and judgment in every other respect as though no writ of error has been prosecuted.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 2, p. 715; R.S.1913, § 7777; C.S.1922, § 8721; C.S.1929, § 20-1048; R.S.1943, § 25-1048.
Annotations
Proper dissolution of an attachment issued on a contractual obligation not yet due terminates action. McCartney v. McCartney, 128 Neb. 671, 260 N.W. 184 (1935).
Justice may proceed with original action though error proceedings taken on attachment. Rhodes v. Samuels, 67 Neb. 1, 93 N.W. 148 (1903).
25-1049.
Attachment; claims not due; action authorized; when.A creditor may bring an action on a claim before it is due and have an attachment against the property of the debtor (1) where a debtor has sold, conveyed, or otherwise disposed of his property, with the fraudulent intent to cheat or defraud his creditors, or to hinder or delay them in the collection of their debts; (2) where he is about to make such sale, conveyance, or disposition of his property with such fraudulent intent; or (3) where he is about to remove his property, or a material part thereof, with the intent or to the effect of cheating or defrauding his creditors, or of hindering and delaying them in the collection of their debts.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 237, p. 432; R.S.1913, § 7778; C.S.1922, § 8722; C.S.1922, § 20-1049; R.S.1943, § 25-1049.
Annotations
In an action on a claim before it is due, an attachment is allowable only on grounds and conditions prescribed by statute. McCartney v. McCartney, 128 Neb. 671, 260 N.W. 184 (1935).
Surety paying note before due may attach, if payee could. Danker v. Jacobs, 79 Neb. 435, 112 N.W. 579 (1907).
When a debtor has committed any one of the fraudulent acts enumerated in this section, creditor may maintain an action on a claim before it is due. Cox & Cornell v. Peoria Mfg. Co., 42 Neb. 660, 60 N.W. 933 (1894).
An action can be maintained on a claim before it is due only in the exceptional cases enumerated in this section. Caulfield v. Bittenger, 37 Neb. 542, 56 N.W. 302 (1893).
Filing of affidavit is a request to grant writ and written application in addition is unnecessary. Winchell v. McKinzie, 35 Neb. 813, 53 N.W. 975 (1892).
25-1050.
Attachment; claims not due; procedure; affidavit required.The attachment authorized by section 25-1049 may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof, or by the county judge of the county; but before such action shall be brought or such attachment shall be granted, an affidavit or affidavits shall be presented to the judge; such affidavits shall be based upon personal knowledge and shall state specific facts demonstrating (1) that plaintiff will possess a valid cause of action against the defendant when the claim becomes due, (2) the date when the claim shall be due, (3) the amount of the claim, (4) a description of the existence and approximate value of any of defendant's property known to the plaintiff to be within the jurisdiction of the court and not exempt from attachment, and (5) the existence of any one of the grounds for attachment enumerated in section 25-1049.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 238, p. 433; R.S.1913, § 7779; C.S.1922, § 8723; C.S.1929, § 20-1050; R.S.1943, § 25-1050; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 14.
Annotations
Neither county judge nor Supreme Judges can allow attachment in district court action when district judge is present in county. Ferson v. Armour & Co., 103 Neb. 809, 174 N.W. 425 (1919).
Subsequent attaching creditors may intervene and contest attachment made without order. Deere, Wells & Co. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 49 Neb. 385, 68 N.W. 504 (1896).
Affidavit, not petition, must show grounds for attachment. Cox & Cornell v. Peoria Mfg. Co., 42 Neb. 660, 60 N.W. 933 (1894).
Order allowing attachment is judicial act, and void if made on holiday. Merchants Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Jaffray, 36 Neb. 218, 54 N.W. 258 (1893).
Order authorizing attachment is not void though seal of court is omitted; it is amendable. Winchell v. McKinzie, 35 Neb. 813, 53 N.W. 975 (1892).
An attachment on debt before due can only be had in exceptional cases, and jurisdictional steps must be taken. Gamble v. Wilson, 33 Neb. 270, 50 N.W. 3 (1891).
It is unnecessary for affiant to state he is plaintiff, agent, or attorney. Reed, Jones & Co. v. Bagley, 24 Neb. 332, 38 N.W. 827 (1888).
Affidavit should state facts and not be merely in language of statute. Seidentopf v. Annabil, 6 Neb. 524 (1877).
25-1051.
Attachment order in actions on claims not due; refusal requires dismissal of action.If the court or judge refuse to grant an order of attachment as provided in sections 25-1049 and 25-1050, the action shall be dismissed, but without prejudice to a future action; and in all such actions application for an attachment must be made.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 239, p. 433; R.S.1913, § 7780; C.S.1922, § 8724; C.S.1929, § 20-1051; R.S.1943, § 25-1051.
Annotations
Dissolution of attachment terminates main action. Dayton Spice-Mills Co. v. Sloan, 49 Neb. 622, 68 N.W. 1040 (1896).
Action depends upon attachment. Cox & Cornell v. Peoria Mfg. Co., 42 Neb. 660, 60 N.W. 933 (1894).
25-1052.
Attachment order in actions on claims not due; amount; specification.The order of the court or judge granting the attachment shall specify the amount for which it is allowed, not exceeding a sum sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim and the probable costs of the action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 240, p. 433; R.S.1913, § 7781; C.S.1922, § 8725; C.S.1929, § 20-1052; R.S.1943, § 25-1052.
Annotations
Order need not appear on face of writ. Armstrong v. Lynch, 29 Neb. 87, 45 N.W. 274 (1890).
25-1053.
Repealed. Laws 1980, LB 597, § 18.
25-1054.
Attachment in actions on claims not due; judgment; when rendered.The plaintiff in such action shall not have judgment on his claim before it becomes due, and the proceedings on attachment may be conducted without delay.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 242, p. 433; R.S.1913, § 7783; C.S.1922, § 8727; C.S.1929, § 20-1054; R.S.1943, § 25-1054.
Annotations
Attachment will not support creditor's bill to set aside fraudulent conveyance. Ainsworth v. Roubal, 74 Neb. 723, 105 N.W. 248 (1905).
Judgment cannot be entered before claim is due. Cox & Cornell v. Peoria Mfg. Co., 42 Neb. 660, 60 N.W. 933 (1894).
Purchase-money mortgage given to secure particular debt remains valid in equity regardless of form the debt may assume, if it can be traced. Troyer v. Mundy, 60 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1932).
25-1055.
Attachment in actions on claims not due; procedure in general.The proceedings under general attachment provided for in sections 25-1004 to 25-1041, so far as they are applicable, shall regulate the attachments authorized on claims before due.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 243, p. 433; R.S.1913, § 7784; R.S.1922, § 8728; C.S.1929, § 20-1055; R.S.1943, § 25-1055.
Annotations
Previous sections of this article regulate attachments before judgment. Insurance Co. of North America v. Maxim's of Nebraska, 178 Neb. 274, 132 N.W.2d 885 (1965).
25-1056.
Garnishment in aid of execution; when issued; procedure; continuing lien; when invalid; priority; financial institution; service of process; designated location; Department of Banking and Finance; immunity.(1) In all cases when a judgment has been entered by any court of record and the judgment creditor or his or her agent or attorney has filed an affidavit setting forth the amount due on the judgment, interest, and costs in the office of the clerk of the court where the judgment has been entered and that he or she has good reason to and does believe that any person, partnership, limited liability company, or corporation, naming him, her, or it, has property of and is indebted to the judgment debtor, the clerk shall issue a summons which shall set forth the amount due on the judgment, interest, and costs as shown in the affidavit and require such person, partnership, limited liability company, or corporation, as garnishee, to answer written interrogatories to be furnished by the plaintiff and to be attached to such summons respecting the matters set forth in section 25-1026. The summons shall be returnable within ten days from the date of its issuance and shall require the garnishee to answer within ten days from the date of service upon him or her. Except when wages are involved, the garnishee shall hold the property of every description and the credits of the defendant in his or her possession or under his or her control at the time of the service of the summons and interrogatories until the further order of the court. If the only property in the possession or under the control of the garnishee at the time of the service of the summons and interrogatories is credits of the defendant and the amount of such credits is not in dispute by the garnishee, then such garnishee shall only hold the credits of the defendant in his or her possession or under his or her control at the time of the service of the summons and interrogatories to the extent of the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs set forth in the summons until further order of the court. When wages are involved, the garnishee shall pay to the employee all disposable earnings exempted from garnishment by statute, and any disposable earnings remaining after such payment shall be retained by the garnishee until further order of the court. Thereafter, the service of the summons and interrogatories and all further proceedings shall be in all respects the same as is provided for in sections 25-1011 and 25-1026 to 25-1031.01 unless inconsistent with this section.
(2) If it appears from the answer of the garnishee that the judgment debtor was an employee of the garnishee, that the garnishee otherwise owed earnings to the judgment debtor when the garnishment order was served, or that earnings would be owed within sixty days thereafter and there is not a successful written objection to the order or the answer of the garnishee filed, on application by the judgment creditor, the court shall order that the nonexempt earnings, if any, withheld by the garnishee after service of the order be transferred to the court for delivery to the judgment creditor who is entitled to such earnings. Except for garnishments in support of a person, the payments may be made payable to the judgment creditor or assignee and shall be forwarded to the issuing court to record the judgment payment prior to the court delivering the payment to the judgment creditor or assignee. The court shall, upon application of the judgment creditor, further order that the garnishment is a continuing lien against the nonexempt earnings of the judgment debtor. An order of continuing lien on nonexempt earnings entered pursuant to this section shall require the garnishee to continue to withhold the nonexempt earnings of the judgment debtor for as long as the continuing lien remains in effect.
Beginning with the pay period during which the writ was served and while the continuing lien remains in effect, the garnishee shall deliver the nonexempt earnings to the court from which the garnishment was issued for each pay period or on a monthly basis if the garnishee so desires and shall deliver to the judgment debtor his or her exempt earnings for each pay period.
(3) A continuing lien ordered pursuant to this section shall be invalid and shall have no force and effect upon the occurrence of any of the following:
(a) The underlying judgment is satisfied in full or vacated or expires;
(b) The judgment debtor leaves the garnishee's employ for more than sixty days;
(c) The judgment creditor releases the garnishment;
(d) The proceedings are stayed by a court of competent jurisdiction, including the United States Bankruptcy Court;
(e) The judgment debtor has not earned any nonexempt earnings for at least sixty days;
(f) The court orders that the garnishment be quashed; or
(g) Ninety days have expired since service of the writ. The judgment creditor may extend the lien for a second ninety-day period by filing with the court a notice of extension during the fifteen days immediately prior to the expiration of the initial lien, and the continuing lien in favor of the initial judgment creditor shall continue for a second ninety-day period.
(4)(a) To determine priority, garnishments and liens shall rank according to time of service.
(b) Garnishments, liens, and wage assignments which are not for the support of a person shall be inferior to wage assignments for the support of a person. Garnishments which are not for the support of a person and liens shall be inferior to garnishments for the support of a person.
(5) Only one order of continuing lien against earnings due the judgment debtor shall be in effect at one time. If an employee's wages are already being garnished pursuant to a continuing lien at the time of service of a garnishment upon an employer, the answer to garnishment interrogatories shall include such information along with the date of termination of such continuing lien and the title of the case from which such garnishment is issued. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, a continuing lien obtained pursuant to this section shall have priority over any subsequent garnishment or wage assignment.
(6)(a) In any case involving service of a garnishment summons on a financial institution where deposits are received within this state, the financial institution shall (i) if its main chartered office is located in this state, designate its main chartered office for the service of summons or (ii) if its main chartered office is located in another state, designate any one of its offices or branches or its agent for service of process in this state for service of summons. The designation of a main chartered office or an office or branch or the agent for service of process under this subdivision shall be made by filing a notice of designation with the Department of Banking and Finance, shall contain the physical address of the main chartered office or the office or branch or the agent for service of process designated, and shall be effective upon placement on the department website. The department shall post the list of such designated main chartered offices and offices or branches or agents for service of process on its website for access by the public. A financial institution may modify or revoke a designation made under this subdivision by filing the modification or revocation with the department. The modification or revocation shall be effective when the department's website has been updated to reflect the modification or revocation, except that the judgment creditor may rely upon the designation that was modified or revoked during the thirty-day period following the effective date of the modification or revocation if the summons is timely served upon the financial institution. The department shall update its website to reflect a filing by a financial institution pursuant to this subdivision or a modification or revocation filed by a financial institution pursuant to this subdivision within ten business days following the filing by the financial institution. The department website shall reflect the date its online records for each financial institution have most recently been updated.
(b) If a financial institution where deposits are received has designated its main chartered office or one of its offices or branches or its agent for service of process for the service of summons, service made on the main chartered office or the office or branch or the agent for service of process so designated shall be valid and effective as to any property or credits of the defendant in the possession or control of the main chartered office of the financial institution in this state and any of the financial institution offices or branches located within this state. If service of summons is not made on the main chartered office or the office or branch or the agent for service of process designated by the financial institution, but instead is made at another office or branch of the financial institution located in Nebraska, the financial institution, in its discretion, and without violating any obligation to its customer, may elect to treat the service of summons as valid and effective as to any property or credits of the defendant in the possession or control of the main chartered office of the financial institution in this state and any of the financial institution offices or branches located within this state. In the absence of such an election, the financial institution shall file a statement with the interrogatories that the summons was not served at the financial institution's designated location for receiving service of summons and, therefore, was not processed, and shall provide the address at which the financial institution is to receive service of summons.
(c) For purposes of this subsection, financial institution means a bank, savings bank, building and loan association, savings and loan association, or credit union whether chartered by the United States, the Department of Banking and Finance, or a foreign state agency.
(d) The notice of designation, modification, or revocation shall be made by a financial institution on forms prescribed by the department.
(e) The Department of Banking and Finance, any employee of the department, or any person acting on behalf of the department shall be immune from civil and criminal liability for any acts or omissions which occur as a result of the requirements of this subsection.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 244, p. 433; R.S.1913, § 7785; C.S.1922, § 8729; C.S.1929, § 20-1056; R.S.1943, § 25-1056; Laws 1953, c. 68, § 1, p. 219; Laws 1955, c. 85, § 3, p. 255; Laws 1959, c. 101, § 4, p. 423;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 127; Laws 1974, LB 737, § 1; Laws 1980, LB 597, § 15;
Laws 1988, LB 1030, § 17; Laws 1993, LB 121, § 169; Laws 1995, LB 420, § 1; Laws 1996, LB 1048, § 1; Laws 1997, LB 771, § 1; Laws 2015, LB195, § 2.
Annotations
1. Affidavit
2. Summons
3. Proceedings
4. When section is not applicable
5. Miscellaneous
1. Affidavit
Affidavit upon mere belief is sufficient. Clarke v. Neb. Nat. Bank, 57 Neb. 314, 77 N.W. 805 (1899).
Affidavit purporting not to be that of an individual is void; fact of agency should be sworn to. Jeary v. American Exchange Bank, 2 Neb. Unof. 657, 89 N.W. 771 (1902).
2. Summons
Acknowledgment on back of summons is equivalent to service. Scott v. McDonald, 125 Neb. 803, 252 N.W. 323 (1934).
After judgment, summons in garnishment from one county to another in aid of execution is unauthorized. Hinds State Bank v. Loffler, 113 Neb. 110, 202 N.W. 465 (1925).
Where summons is issued same day execution is returned, it will be presumed latter was returned first. Brunke v. Gruben, 84 Neb. 806, 122 N.W. 37 (1909).
If summons is issued before judgment, proceedings are void. Whitcomb v. Atkins, 40 Neb. 549, 59 N.W. 86 (1894).
Return of officer "nulla bona" is conclusive for purposes of garnishment. Wilson v. Burney, 8 Neb. 39 (1878).
3. Proceedings
Garnishment requires a judgment, and the dismissal of a suit pursuant to a settlement agreement does not suffice to allow a garnishment action to enforce the settlement. J.K. v. Kolbeck, 257 Neb. 107, 595 N.W.2d 875 (1999).
Procedure for garnishment after domestic judgment and procedure for enforcement of foreign judgment compared. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 168 Neb. 850, 97 N.W.2d 348 (1959).
Where garnishee denies indebtedness by answer and interrogatories are not propounded, garnishee should be discharged. Searcey v. Badgett, 137 Neb. 185, 288 N.W. 537 (1939).
In a garnishment proceeding in aid of execution, the answer and evidence of garnishee only are admissible in response to the summons in garnishment. Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. North, 135 Neb. 39, 280 N.W. 272 (1938).
Law of garnishment is purely statutory and will be interpreted more strongly against garnishor. Central Market v. King, 132 Neb. 380, 272 N.W. 244 (1937).
In garnishment proceedings in aid of execution the answer or evidence of the garnishee only may be taken by the court. Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. North, 125 Neb. 723, 251 N.W. 895 (1933).
If judgment is afterwards set aside, garnishment proceedings are dissolved. Clough v. Buck, 6 Neb. 343 (1877).
This section authorizes garnishments in aid of execution and, by incorporating other statutes, expressly authorizes assertion in garnishment proceedings of exemptions applicable to executions. ARL Credit Servs. v. Piper, 15 Neb. App. 811, 736 N.W.2d 771 (2007).
4. When section is not applicable
A garnishee bank waives its right of setoff if after notice of garnishment it permits the depositor to draw on the garnished account, reducing the account balance below the balance at the time of service or, if that balance is greater than the amount of judgment, below the amount of the judgment. United Seeds v. Eagle Green Corp., 223 Neb. 360, 389 N.W.2d 571 (1986).
This section not applicable when garnishee is a foreign insurance company which has complied with statutory provisions to obtain certificate of authority to do business. Pupkes v. Sailors, 183 Neb. 784, 164 N.W.2d 441 (1969).
5. Miscellaneous
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act's anti-alienation statute bars creditors from collecting undistributed funds in a judgment debtor's employee benefit plan through postjudgment garnishment in aid of execution proceedings. Florence Lake Investments v. Berg, 312 Neb. 183, 978 N.W.2d 308 (2022).
Garnishment in aid of execution of a judgment is proper in Nebraska only when the garnishee has property of and is indebted to the judgment debtor, and the test for determining the liability of the garnishee defendant to the garnisheeing plaintiff is whether or not the facts would support a recovery by the principal defendant against the garnishee. Darr v. Long, 210 Neb. 57, 313 N.W.2d 215 (1988).
Judgment creditor of insolvent corporation cannot put himself in preferred position over other creditors. State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bank of Omaha, 136 Neb. 880, 287 N.W. 762 (1939).
A judicial order on a garnishee to turn over money or property in aid of execution can only be made upon an unqualified admission by him of a present indebtedness which execution debtor would be entitled to but for the garnishment. Shonsey Co. v. Belgrade-Hord Co., 133 Neb. 886, 277 N.W. 597 (1938); Early v. Belgrade-Hord Co., 133 Neb. 884, 277 N.W. 596 (1938).
Indebtedness of maker upon promissory note, before maturity, is not the subject of attachment; his obligation is not to payee but to holder, whoever he may be. Fisher v. O'Hanlon, 93 Neb. 529, 141 N.W. 157 (1913).
25-1057.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 68, § 2.
25-1058.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 68, § 2.
25-1059.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 68, § 2.
25-1060.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 68, § 2.
25-1061.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 68, § 2.
25-1062.
Injunction, defined.The injunction provided by this code is a command to refrain from a particular act. It may be the final judgment in an action or may be allowed as a provisional remedy, subject to the provisions of sections 25-1062 to 25-1080, and when so allowed it shall be by order. The writ of injunction is abolished.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 250, p. 435; R.S.1913, § 7791; C.S.1922, § 8735; C.S.1929, § 20-1062; Laws 1941, c. 29, § 2, p. 133; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1062; R.S.1943, § 25-1062.
Annotations
An injunction to stay proceedings at law is not properly directed against a court or statutory tribunal before which the matter is pending, but lies solely against the parties to such proceeding. Massman Constr. Co. v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 141 Neb. 270, 3 N.W.2d 639 (1942).
An injunction is a command to refrain from a particular act. Conrad v. Kaup, 137 Neb. 900, 291 N.W. 687 (1940).
The term injunction includes restraining order. Behrens v. Smith Baking Co., 130 Neb. 651, 266 N.W. 61 (1936).
Order restrains only party against whom directed and subordinates. Boyd v. State, 19 Neb. 128, 26 N.W. 925 (1886).
Because injunctions are provided for in this section of Chapter 25, a suit for an injunction is an action and not a special proceeding. O'Connor v. Kaufman, 6 Neb. App. 382, 574 N.W.2d 513 (1998).
25-1062.01.
Director of Natural Resources, defined; notice to appropriator; how given.(1) The words Director of Natural Resources as used in this section and in sections 25-1064, 25-2159, and 25-2160 mean the Director of Natural Resources, State of Nebraska, his or her successor in office, or any agent, servant, employee, or officer of the State of Nebraska, now or hereafter exercising any powers or duties with respect to the administration of the irrigation water in the state, who may be a party in any court of the state in an action when the relief demanded involves the delivery of irrigation water.
(2) Whenever notice by either registered or certified letter to an appropriator is required in such sections, the address of the appropriator shall be that recorded in the office of the Department of Natural Resources under section 46-230.
Source:Laws 1941, c. 29, § 1, p. 133; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-10,111; R.S.1943, § 25-1062.01; Laws 1957, c. 242, § 14, p. 828; Laws 1957, c. 365, § 1, p. 1232;
Laws 1986, LB 516, § 10; Laws 2000, LB 900, § 65.
25-1063.
Temporary injunction; issuance; grounds.When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief or any part thereof consists in restraining the commission or continuance of some act, the commission or continuance of which during the litigation would produce great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff, or when, during the litigation, it appears that the defendant is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action and tending to render the judgment ineffectual, a temporary injunction may be granted to restrain such act, subject to the limitations of sections 25-1062 to 25-1080. It may also be granted in any case specially authorized by statute.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 251, p. 435; R.S.1913, § 7792; C.S.1922, § 8736; C.S.1929, § 20-1063; Laws 1941, c. 29, § 3, p. 134; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1063; R.S.1943, § 25-1063;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 20.
Annotations
1. Grounds
2. Miscellaneous
1. Grounds
Installment Loan Act specially provides for a temporary injunction. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956).
Where part of relief sought is to enjoin disposal of notes given for property, action may be brought in county where notes are held in escrow, and summons sent to other county. Bushee v. Keller, 96 Neb. 736, 148 N.W. 902 (1914).
Landowner will be enjoined from building fence without useful purpose, to annoy neighbor. Bush v. Mockett, 95 Neb. 552, 145 N.W. 1001 (1914).
Authorities should not ordinarily be enjoined from constructing necessary drains along highways. Wachter v. Lange, 94 Neb. 290, 143 N.W. 207 (1913).
Injunctions will be granted against repeated or continued acts of trespass. Ayers v. Barnett, 93 Neb. 350, 140 N.W. 634 (1913); Munger v. Yeiser, 80 Neb. 285, 114 N.W. 166 (1907); Jacobson v. Van Boening, 48 Neb. 80, 66 N.W. 993 (1896); Shaffer v. Stull, 32 Neb. 94, 48 N.W. 882 (1891).
Injunction is proper to protect enjoyment of easement. Ballinger v. Kinney, 87 Neb. 342, 127 N.W. 239 (1910).
Injunction is properly granted to restrain enforcement of void order taxing costs and remove cloud on title. Weiler v. Fischer, 86 Neb. 614, 126 N.W. 296 (1910).
Injunction will lie to restrain intruder interfering with incumbent of office. Hotchkiss v. Keck, 86 Neb. 322, 125 N.W. 509 (1910).
Injunction does not lie to prevent passage of city or village ordinance. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 85 Neb. 733, 124 N.W. 142 (1910).
Injunction is proper to restrain road overseer taking land for road prior to condemnation proceedings. Johnson v. Peterson, 85 Neb. 83, 122 N.W. 683 (1909).
Injunction is proper to prevent collection of exempt wages under order of garnishment. Jones v. Union P. R. R. Co., 84 Neb. 121, 120 N.W. 946 (1909).
Injunction is proper to restrain use of premises as disorderly house. Seifert v. Dillon, 83 Neb. 322, 119 N.W. 686 (1909).
Injunction will be granted against waste by tenant for years or by his servants. Hayman v. Rownd, 82 Neb. 598, 118 N.W. 328 (1908).
Injunction will not lie to restrain commission of single act of trespass. Cox v. Sheen, 82 Neb. 472, 118 N.W. 125 (1908).
Injunction lies to restrain public officer from illegally creating debt or obligation. Roberts v. Thompson, 82 Neb. 458, 118 N.W. 106 (1908).
Injunction will be granted to restrain illegal assessment of special taxes by city council. Barkley v. City of Lincoln, 82 Neb. 181, 117 N.W. 398 (1908).
Injunction is not proper to restrain breach of contract where terms are in doubt or uncertain. Platte County Independent Tel. Co. v. Leigh Independent Tel. Co., 80 Neb. 41, 113 N.W. 799 (1907).
Injunction will be allowed to prevent removal of buildings and fences. Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb. 541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903); Pohlman v. Evangelical Lutheran Trinity Church, 60 Neb. 364, 83 N.W. 201 (1900).
Injunction lies to prevent the obstruction or interference with irrigation ditch. Castle Rock Irrig. Canal & Water Power Co. v. Jurisch, 67 Neb. 377, 93 N.W. 690 (1903); Park v. Ackerman, 60 Neb. 405, 83 N.W. 173 (1900).
Mandamus allowed in proper case to compel vacation. State ex rel. Cohn v. Jessen, 66 Neb. 515, 92 N.W. 584 (1902); Reynolds v. Graves, 66 Neb. 17, 92 N.W. 144 (1902).
Where plain and adequate remedy may be had by motion in original proceedings, injunction to stay proceedings will not lie. Carson v. Jansen, 65 Neb. 423, 91 N.W. 398 (1902).
Injunction will, in proper case, be allowed to prevent nuisance. Lowe v. Prospect Hill Cemetery Assn., 58 Neb. 94, 78 N.W. 488 (1899); Farrell v. Cook, 16 Neb. 483, 20 N.W. 720 (1884).
Injunction should not be allowed to restrain enforcement of judgment when plaintiff has negligently failed to make defense at law. Losey v. Neidig, 52 Neb. 167, 71 N.W. 1067 (1897).
Injunction is not proper remedy to test legality of municipal organization. Osborn v. Village of Oakland, 49 Neb. 340, 68 N.W. 506 (1896).
Injunction will be allowed against unlawful establishing of highway through plaintiff's land. Welton v. Dickson, 38 Neb. 767, 57 N.W. 559 (1894).
Injunction is not proper to restrain collection of taxes for mere irregularity. Touzalin v. City of Omaha, 25 Neb. 817, 41 N.W. 796 (1889).
Injunction cannot be used to control discretion of public officer. School Dist. No. 1 of Red Willow Co. v. Wheeler, 25 Neb. 199, 41 N.W. 143 (1888).
2. Miscellaneous
Injunction can issue against void occupation tax. Best & Co., Inc. v. City of Omaha, 149 Neb. 868, 33 N.W.2d 150 (1948).
Enforcement of rights should be sought by peaceable legal procedure, not by force or stealth. Wallace v. Kruzer, 95 Neb. 615, 146 N.W. 984 (1914).
Restraining order is in aid only, and not part of main action. State ex rel. Keefe v. Graves, 82 Neb. 282, 117 N.W. 717 (1908).
"Irreparable injury" defined. Cole v. Manners, 76 Neb. 454, 107 N.W. 777 (1906); Eidemiller Ice Co. v. Guthrie, 42 Neb. 238, 60 N.W. 717 (1894).
Injunction does not lie to enforce bare legal right. Mohat v. Hutt, 75 Neb. 732, 106 N.W. 659 (1906).
Affidavits must set forth the acts constituting the violation; general allegation not sufficient. Back v. State, 75 Neb. 603, 106 N.W. 787 (1906).
Power of district court to punish for contempt discussed. Lowe v. Prospect Hill Cemetery Assn., 75 Neb. 85, 106 N.W. 429 (1905); Zimmerman v. State, 46 Neb. 13, 64 N.W. 375 (1895).
Order of court without jurisdiction, or in excess of powers is void. State ex rel. Ellingsworth v. Carlson, 72 Neb. 837, 101 N.W. 1004 (1904).
It is the duty of judge sitting at chambers to fix amount of supersedeas bond on entry of order of dissolution or modification. State ex rel. Plattsmouth Tel. Co. v. Baker, 62 Neb. 840, 88 N.W. 124 (1901); State ex rel. Downing v. Greene, 48 Neb. 327, 67 N.W. 162 (1896).
There is a distinction between order of injunction and temporary restraining order. State ex rel. Plattsmouth Tel. Co. v. Baker, 62 Neb. 840, 88 N.W. 124 (1901).
Petition should disclose with definiteness and particularity the threatened injury. Wabaska Elec. Co. v. City of Wymore, 60 Neb. 199, 82 N.W. 626 (1900); State Bank of Neb. of Seward v. Rohren, 55 Neb. 223, 75 N.W. 543 (1898).
One who knowingly disobeys injunction, though he would have been entitled to vacate order, is liable to punishment for contempt. Hydock v. State, 59 Neb. 296, 80 N.W. 902 (1899); Zimmerman v. State, 46 Neb. 13, 64 N.W. 375 (1895); Wilber v. Woolley, 44 Neb. 739, 62 N.W. 1095 (1895).
Adequate remedy at law discussed. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 53 Neb. 44, 73 N.W. 269 (1897); Welton v. Dickson, 38 Neb. 767, 57 N.W. 559 (1894).
Order may be dissolved on security. State ex rel. Downing v. Greene, 48 Neb. 327, 67 N.W. 162 (1896); State ex rel. Beecher v. Wakeley, 28 Neb. 431, 44 N.W. 488 (1890).
Restraining order ceases to be operative on the expiration of the date fixed by its terms. State ex rel. Downing v. Greene, 48 Neb. 327, 67 N.W. 162 (1896).
Pleadings must state facts; threatened acts must be alleged. Blakeslee v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 43 Neb. 61, 61 N.W. 118 (1894); Lininger v. Glenn, 33 Neb. 187, 49 N.W. 1128 (1891).
A mandatory injunction should not be granted except to prevent failure of justice, and only when right is clearly established. Buettgenbach v. Gerbig, 2 Neb. Unof. 889, 90 N.W. 654 (1902).
25-1064.
Temporary injunctions and restraining orders; courts and judges empowered to issue; conditions; temporary restraining order granted without notice; requirements; actions involving irrigation water; notice, how given.(1) The injunction may be granted at the time of commencing the action or at any time afterward before judgment by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court or any judge thereof. No restraining order or temporary injunction should be granted at the time of the commencement of the action if the relief demanded involves the delivery of irrigation water and the Director of Natural Resources, as defined in section 25-1062.01, is a party except in accordance with the procedure prescribed in subsection (5) of this section.
(2) No temporary injunction may be granted without notice to the adverse party.
(3) Any judge of the district court, except when the relief demanded involves the delivery of irrigation water and the director is a party, may grant a temporary restraining order without notice to the adverse party or his or her attorney only if (a) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or his or her attorney can be heard in opposition and (b) the applicant or his or her attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give such notice and the reasons supporting the applicant's claim that such notice shall not be required.
Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall: (i) Be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance; (ii) be filed immediately in the office of the clerk of the district court and entered of record; (iii) define the injury and state why the injury is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and (iv) expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, as the court fixes unless within such fixed time period the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents to an extension for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of record. If a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the motion for a temporary injunction shall be heard at the earliest possible time in the district court and shall take precedence over all matters except older matters of the same character. When the motion for a temporary injunction comes up for hearing, the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall proceed with the application for a temporary injunction, and if he or she does not do so, the district court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. On two days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice or on such shorter notice to such party as the district court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move for the dissolution or modification of the order, and in that event, the court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
(4) In the absence from the county of the district judges, any judge of the county court, except when the relief demanded involves the delivery of irrigation water and the director is a party, may grant a temporary restraining order without notice to the adverse party or his or her attorney only if (a) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or his or her attorney can be heard in opposition and (b) the applicant or his or her attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give such notice and the reasons supporting the applicant's claim that such notice shall not be required. The judge of the county court shall direct that reasonable notice be given to the party against whom the temporary restraining order is issued to attend at a specified time or place before the district court or any judge thereof to show cause why a temporary injunction should not be issued.
Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall: (i) Be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance; (ii) be filed immediately in the office of the clerk of the district court and entered of record; (iii) define the injury and state why the injury is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and (iv) expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, as the judge of the county court fixes unless within such fixed time period the order, for good cause shown, is extended by the district court for a like period or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents to an extension for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of record.
(5) The Supreme Court or any judge thereof, the Court of Appeals or any judge thereof, the district court or any judge thereof, or a judge of the county court, if and when he or she has jurisdiction, shall have no power, when the relief demanded involves the delivery of irrigation water and the director is a party, to grant a restraining order or temporary injunction at the time of the commencement of the action, except when notice by either registered or certified letter has been mailed seventy-two hours prior to the time of hearing to the director and the division supervisor in the water division created by section 61-212 in which the action is brought and, in the manner provided in section 25-1062.01, to all appropriators whose rights to the delivery of irrigation water might in any manner be affected, of the time and place of the hearing. At the hearing on the restraining order or temporary injunction, the director, appropriators, or riparian owners shall be entitled to be heard, in person or by their attorney or attorneys, on the question of whether the restraining order should be granted and, if so, in what amount the bond or undertaking is to be fixed.
(6) Any person, natural or artificial, injured or likely to be injured by the granting of a restraining order may intervene in the action at any stage of the proceedings and become a party to the litigation if it involves the delivery of irrigation water and the director is a party.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 252, p. 435; Laws 1913, c. 65, § 1, p. 198; R.S.1913, § 7793; C.S.1922, § 8737; C.S.1929, § 20-1064; Laws 1941, c. 29, § 4, p. 134; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1064; R.S.1943, § 25-1064; Laws 1955, c. 87, § 1, p. 260; Laws 1957, c. 242, § 15, p. 828; Laws 1957, c. 365, § 2, p. 1232;
Laws 1986, LB 516, § 11; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 44;
Laws 2000, LB 900, § 66.
Annotations
Notwithstanding section 24-517(5), the district court has jurisdiction in injunctive actions to enforce zoning ordinances. Village of Springfield v. Hevelone, 195 Neb. 37, 236 N.W.2d 811 (1975).
Supreme Court may grant a temporary injunction in proceedings by state under Installment Loan Act. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956).
District judge has power to allow temporary injunction, notwithstanding provisions of this section. State ex rel. Hahler v. Grimes, 96 Neb. 719, 148 N.W. 942 (1914).
Affidavit not stating Supreme Judges were absent is sufficient to allow county judge to act, latter cannot issue perpetual injunction. State ex rel. Minden-Edison Light & Power Co. v. Dungan, 89 Neb. 738, 132 N.W. 305 (1911).
County judge may grant temporary restraining order if district judge is absent. State ex rel. Downing v. Greene, 48 Neb. 327, 67 N.W. 162 (1896).
Violation of injunction allowed by county judge is contempt for district court. Wilber v. Woolley, 44 Neb. 739, 62 N.W. 1095 (1895).
County judge cannot punish for contempt of violation of restraining order. Johnson v. Bouton, 35 Neb. 898, 53 N.W. 995 (1892).
Judge of Supreme Court may grant temporary injunction. Calvert v. State, 34 Neb. 616, 52 N.W. 687 (1892).
District judge cannot grant injunction out of district unless judge therein is absent or unable to act; injunction void. Ellis v. Karl, 7 Neb. 381 (1878).
Order granted by county judge before petition filed is valid, where both filed forthwith. Commercial State Bank of Crawford v. Ketcham, 3 Neb. Unof. 839, 92 N.W. 998 (1902).
25-1064.01.
Order granting an injunction; restraining order; requirements.Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall: (1) Set forth the reasons for its issuance; (2) be specific in terms; (3) describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the pleading or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and (4) be binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
25-1064.02.
Sections, how construed.Sections 25-1062.01 and 25-1064 to 25-1064.02 shall in no way limit a person's right to an injunction or temporary restraining order if such remedies are specifically authorized by statute.
25-1065.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 516, § 17.
25-1066.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 516, § 17.
25-1067.
Injunctions; security.No injunction, unless provided by special statute, shall operate until the party obtaining the same shall give an undertaking, executed by one or more sufficient sureties, who shall justify as provided in sections 25-2222 and 25-2223. The undertaking shall be approved by the clerk of the court granting such injunction, in an amount to be fixed by the court or judge allowing the same, to secure to the party enjoined the damages he may sustain, if it be finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 255, p. 435; R.S.1913, § 7796; C.S.1922, § 8740; C.S.1929, § 20-1067; Laws 1941, c. 29, § 7, p. 136; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1067; R.S.1943, § 25-1067.
Cross References
State officers and departments, not required to give injunction bond, see section 25-21,216.
Annotations
1. Filing and approval of bond
2. Effect of order
3. Dissolution of order
4. Suit on bond
5. Miscellaneous
1. Filing and approval of bond
Injunction is not effective for any purpose until bond is given and approved. Johnson v. Bouton, 35 Neb. 898, 53 N.W. 995 (1892).
If bond is not given, adverse party may disregard order. Baker v. Meisch, 29 Neb. 227, 45 N.W. 685 (1890).
2. Effect of order
Dissolution of injunction is adjudication that same ought not to have been granted; sureties cannot complain that order is broader than application. Gibson v. Reed, 54 Neb. 309, 75 N.W. 1085 (1898).
3. Dissolution of order
Where injunction against collection of judgment was dissolved, measure of damages in suit on bond was reduction in amount collectible, not amount of judgment. Stull Bros. v. Beddeo, 78 Neb. 119, 112 N.W. 315 (1907).
When order is dissolved, action accrues on bond; striking cause from files for failure to revive, dissolves. Humfeldt v. Moles, 63 Neb. 448, 88 N.W. 655 (1902).
Expenses of unsuccessful attempt to dissolve injunction are not recoverable. Pollock v. Whipple, 57 Neb. 82, 77 N.W. 355 (1898).
Attorney's fees for dissolution of restraining order are generally not recoverable. Carnes v. Heimrod, 45 Neb. 364, 63 N.W. 809 (1895).
4. Suit on bond
A party enjoined may recover damages on a temporary injunction bond only if it be finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. State ex rel. Douglas v. Ledwith, 204 Neb. 6, 281 N.W.2d 729 (1979).
In absence of statute authorizing court to assess damages resulting to defendant from issuance of restraining order on dissolving such order, defendant must resort to independent action on plaintiff's bond. Higgins v. Adelson, 131 Neb. 820, 270 N.W. 502 (1936).
Voluntary dismissal entitles defendant to sue on bond. Gyger v. Courtney, 59 Neb. 555, 81 N.W. 437 (1900).
5. Miscellaneous
Attorneys' fees cannot be recovered as damages in suit on bond where injunction proceedings are only auxiliary to main case. Williams v. Hallgren, 149 Neb. 621, 31 N.W.2d 737 (1948).
Attorney's fees in trial of case are not recoverable on bond where injunction is ancillary; limited to fees for dissolving injunction. Darling v. McBride, 86 Neb. 481, 125 N.W. 1088 (1910).
No action can be maintained on temporary injunction bond until final decree in cause wherein bond is given. Johnson v. Bouton, 56 Neb. 626, 77 N.W. 57 (1898).
25-1068.
Service of order of injunction; when not required.The order of injunction shall be addressed to the party enjoined, shall state the injunction, and shall be issued by the clerk. Where the injunction is allowed at the commencement of the action, the clerk shall endorse upon the summons injunction allowed, and it shall not be necessary to issue the order of injunction; nor shall it be necessary to issue the same where notice of the application therefor has been given to the party enjoined. The service of the summons so endorsed, or the notice of the application for an injunction, shall be notice of its allowance.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 256, p. 436; R.S.1913, § 7797; C.S.1922, § 8741; C.S.1929, § 20-1068; R.S.1943, § 25-1068.
Cross References
For endorsement by sheriff showing time he or she received the summons, see section 23-1701.05.
Annotations
Summons endorsed, injunction allowed, is sufficient notice of order. State ex rel. Minden-Edison Light & Power Co. v. Dungan, 89 Neb. 738, 132 N.W. 305 (1911).
25-1069.
Service of order; return.Where the injunction is allowed during litigation and without notice of the application therefor, the order of injunction shall be issued, and the sheriff shall forthwith serve the same upon each party enjoined, in the manner prescribed for serving a summons, and make return thereof without delay.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 257, p. 436; R.S.1913, § 7798; C.S.1922, § 8742; C.S.1929, § 20-1069; R.S.1943, § 25-1069.
25-1070.
Injunctions; when binding.An injunction binds the party from the time he has notice thereof and the undertaking required of the applicant therefor is executed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 258, p. 436; R.S.1913, § 7799; C.S.1922, § 8743; C.S.1929, § 20-1070; R.S.1943, § 25-1070.
25-1071.
Injunctions not granted; when.No injunction shall be granted by a judge, after a motion therefor has been overruled on the merits of the application by this court; and where it has been refused by the court in which the action is brought, or a judge thereof, it shall not be granted to the same applicant by a court of inferior jurisdiction or any judge thereof.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 259, p. 436; R.S.1913, § 7800; C.S.1922, § 8744; C.S.1929, § 20-1071; R.S.1943, § 25-1071.
25-1072.
Enforcement; disobedience; punishment.An injunction granted by a judge may be enforced as the act of the court. Disobedience of an injunction may be punished as a contempt by the court, or by any judge who might have granted it in vacation. An attachment may be issued by the court or judge, upon being satisfied by affidavit of the breach of the injunction, against the party guilty of the same; and he may be required, in the discretion of the court or judge, to pay a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, for the use of the county, to make immediate restitution to the party injured, and give further security to obey the injunction; or, in default thereof, he may be committed to close custody, until he shall fully comply with such requirements, or be otherwise legally discharged.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 260, p. 436; R.S.1913, § 7801; C.S.1922, § 8745; C.S.1929, § 20-1072; R.S.1943, § 25-1072.
Annotations
1. Enforcement
2. Miscellaneous
1. Enforcement
In a civil contempt proceeding, a district court has inherent power to order compensatory relief when a contemnor has violated its order or judgment; overruling Kasparek v. May, 174 Neb. 732, 119 N.W.2d 512 (1963). Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010).
In determining whether a party is in contempt of an order, a court may not expand an earlier order's prohibitory or mandatory language beyond a reasonable interpretation considering the purposes for which the order was entered. Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010).
A party who disobeys an injunction may be required, in the discretion of the court, to make immediate restitution to the party injured. Kasparek v. May, 178 Neb. 425, 133 N.W.2d 614 (1965).
Violation of injunction against unlawful practice of law could be punished as contempt of court. State ex rel. Beck v. Lush, 170 Neb. 376, 103 N.W.2d 136 (1960).
Operators of motion picture theatres who had been enjoined from operating lottery referred to as "bank night" were guilty of contempt by carrying on similar scheme known as "prosperity night." State ex rel. Hunter v. Omaha Motion Picture Exhibitors Assn., 139 Neb. 312, 297 N.W. 547 (1941).
Disobedience of an injunction must be willful before a breach thereof may be punished as a contempt. Whipple v. Nelson, 138 Neb. 514, 293 N.W. 382 (1940).
Information must be specific; court may fine and imprison; judge at chambers cannot imprison. Back v. State, 75 Neb. 603, 106 N.W. 787 (1906).
Judge in vacation may punish for contempt. Nebraska Children's Home Society v. State, 57 Neb. 765, 78 N.W. 267 (1899).
Void injunction is not enforceable by contempt proceedings; is only voidable contra. Wilber v. Woolley, 44 Neb. 739, 62 N.W. 1095 (1895).
2. Miscellaneous
A court of equity has the power to interpret its own injunctive decree if a party later claims that a provision is unclear. Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010).
This section is invalid and unenforceable as a limitation upon the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt. State ex rel. Beck v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 174 Neb. 172, 116 N.W.2d 281 (1962).
Procedure is authorized for punishment for violation of mandatory injunction. Meier v. Nelsen, 156 Neb. 666, 57 N.W.2d 273 (1953).
One who is in privity with party enjoined and has knowledge of the injunction is bound thereby. Wilcox v. Ashford, 131 Neb. 338, 268 N.W. 81 (1936).
Conviction under contempt proceedings can be reviewed in Supreme Court only by filing petition in error. Gentle v. Pantel Realty Co., 120 Neb. 630, 234 N.W. 574 (1931).
Contempt proceeding is in nature of criminal action; reviewable on error. Zimmerman v. State, 46 Neb. 13, 64 N.W. 375 (1895).
A county judge has no power to commit for contempt a party who has violated an injunction allowed by him in an action in district court. Johnson v. Bouton, 35 Neb. 898, 53 N.W. 995 (1892).
25-1073.
Motion for additional security; vacation.A party enjoined may, at any time before judgment, upon reasonable notice to the party who has obtained the injunction, move the court for additional security; and if it appears that the surety in the undertaking has removed from the state, or is insufficient, the court may vacate the injunction, unless in a reasonable time sufficient security be given.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 261, p. 436; R.S.1913, § 7802; C.S.1922, § 8746; C.S.1929, § 20-1073; R.S.1943, § 25-1073.
25-1074.
Hearings; affidavits.On the hearing of an application for an injunction, each party may read affidavits. All affidavits shall be filed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 262, p. 437; R.S.1913, § 7803; C.S.1922, § 8747; C.S.1929, § 20-1074; R.S.1943, § 25-1074.
Annotations
This section permits affidavits on application for injunction, but not on final hearing. Francisco v. Furry, 82 Neb. 754, 118 N.W. 1102 (1908).
25-1075.
Injunction without notice; vacation; modification; notice.If the injunction is granted without notice, the defendant, at any time before the trial, may apply, upon notice, to the court in which the action is brought or any judge thereof, to vacate or modify the same. The application may be made upon the complaint or petition and affidavits upon which the injunction is granted, or upon affidavits on the part of the party enjoined, with or without answer. The order of the judge allowing, dissolving, or modifying an injunction shall be returned to the office of the clerk of the court in which the action is brought and recorded and obeyed as if made by the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 263, p. 437; R.S.1913, § 7804; C.S.1922, § 8748; C.S.1929, § 20-1075; R.S.1943, § 25-1075;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 22.
Annotations
Judge at chambers cannot dispose of main case. Browne v. Edwards & McCullough Lumber Co., 44 Neb. 361, 62 N.W. 1070 (1895).
25-1076.
Injunction without notice; showing and counter-showing; affidavits.If the application be made upon affidavits on the part of the defendant, but not otherwise, the plaintiff may oppose the same by affidavits or other evidence, in addition to that on which the injunction was granted.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 264, p. 437; R.S.1913, § 7805; C.S.1922, § 8749; C.S.1929, § 20-1076; R.S.1943, § 25-1076.
Annotations
Plaintiff should be allowed reasonable time to procure counter affidavits. Armstrong v. Sweeney, 65 Neb. 676, 91 N.W. 570 (1902).
25-1077.
Counterclaim; injunction upon.A defendant may obtain an injunction upon an answer in the nature of a counterclaim. He shall proceed in the manner prescribed in sections 25-1062 to 25-1080.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 265, p. 437; R.S.1913, § 7806; C.S.1922, § 8750; C.S.1929, § 20-1077; R.S.1943, § 25-1077.
25-1078.
Temporary injunction; modification; dissolution; supersedeas bond.In case of the dissolution or modification by any court, or any judge at chambers, of any temporary order of injunction which has been or may hereafter be granted, the court or judge so dissolving or modifying said order of injunction shall, at the same time, fix a reasonable sum as the amount of a supersedeas bond, which the person or persons applying for said injunction may give, and prevent the doing of the act or acts, the commission of which was, or may be sought to be restrained by the injunction so dissolved and modified.
Source:Laws 1889, c. 27, § 1, p. 373; R.S.1913, § 7807; C.S.1922, § 8751; C.S.1929, § 20-1078; R.S.1943, § 25-1078.
Annotations
Temporary restraining order cannot be continued in effect by supersedeas bond after denial of permanent injunction. Harbin v. Love, 119 Neb. 76, 227 N.W. 145 (1929).
Supersedeas is allowable on dissolution of temporary injunction. State ex rel. Minden-Edison Light & Power Co. v. Dungan, 89 Neb. 738, 132 N.W. 305 (1911).
Supersedeas should not be allowed on dissolution of temporary restraining order. State ex rel. Beecher v. Wakeley, 28 Neb. 431, 44 N.W. 488 (1890).
Order dissolving injunction is appealable only after final judgment in action. Horst v. Board of Supervisors of Dodge County, 5 Neb. Unof. 410, 98 N.W. 822 (1904).
Order which does not render first less effective does not modify injunction. State ex rel. Plattsmouth Telephone Co. v. Fawcett, 2 Neb. Unof. 503, 89 N.W. 273 (1902).
25-1079.
Temporary injunction; modification; dissolution; supersedeas bond; when executed; form; contents.Such supersedeas bond shall be executed on or before twenty days from the time of the order dissolving or modifying such injunction, shall be signed by one or more sufficient sureties to be approved by the clerk of the court, and shall be conditioned that the party or parties who obtained such injunction shall pay to the defendant, or defendants, all damages, which he or they shall sustain by reason of said injunction, if it be finally decided that such injunction ought not to have been granted.
Source:Laws 1889, c. 27, § 2, p. 374; R.S.1913, § 7808; C.S.1922, § 8752; C.S.1929, § 20-1079; R.S.1943, § 25-1079.
Annotations
All reasonable damages may be recovered by an enjoined party if the injunction was granted in error. Reasonable attorney fees incurred in dissolving the bond may also be recovered. Koch v. Aupperle, 277 Neb. 560, 763 N.W.2d 415 (2009).
25-1080.
Temporary injunction; modification; dissolution; supersedeas bond; effect.Such supersedeas bond shall stay the doing of the act or acts sought to be restrained by the suit, and continue such injunction in force until the case is heard and finally determined by the judgment, decree or final order of the court in term time.
Source:Laws 1889, c. 27, § 3, p. 374; R.S.1913, § 7809; C.S.1922, § 8753; C.S.1929, § 20-1080; R.S.1943, § 25-1080.
25-1081.
Appointment of receiver; grounds.A receiver may be appointed by the district court (1) in an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase of property, by a creditor to subject any property or fund to his or her claim, or between partners, limited liability company members, or others jointly owning or interested in any property or fund on the application of any party to the suit when the property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, (2) in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage or in an action to foreclose a trust deed as a mortgage when the mortgaged property or property subject to the trust deed is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured or is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt secured by the mortgage or trust deed, (3) in connection with the exercise of the power of sale under a trust deed and following the filing of a notice of default under the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act when the property subject to the trust deed is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured or is probably insufficient to discharge the debt secured by the trust deed, (4) in an action brought pursuant to section 52-1705 to enforce a written assignment of rents provision contained in any agreement and the agreement provides for the appointment of a receiver, (5) in any other case in which a mortgagor or trustor has agreed in writing to the appointment of a receiver, (6) after judgment or decree to carry the judgment into execution, to dispose of the property according to the decree or judgment, or to preserve it during the pendency of an appeal, (7) in an action under the Foreign-owned Real Estate National Security Act, (8) in all cases provided for by special statutes, and (9) in all other cases when receivers have heretofore been appointed by the usages of courts of equity.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 266, p. 437; R.S.1913, § 7810; C.S.1922, § 8754; C.S.1929, § 20-1081; R.S. 1943, § 25-1081; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 45;
Laws 1993, LB 121, § 170; Laws 1994, LB 884, § 53; Laws 2007, LB99, § 1; Laws 2024, LB1301, § 2. Operative Date: January 1, 2025
Cross References
Attachment, receiver appointed, when, see sections 25-1018 to 25-1022.
Foreclosure of mortgages, see sections 25-2137 to 25-2155.
Foreign-owned Real Estate National Security Act, see section 76-3701.
Judgment debtor, receiver of property, when, see section 25-1573.
Nebraska Trust Deeds Act, see section 76-1018.
Annotations
1. Power to appoint
2. Mortgage foreclosure
3. Insolvent corporation
4. Miscellaneous
1. Power to appoint
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a request to appoint a receiver for under-secured debt in the absence of other evidence that the party's interest in the property were in jeopardy. McCook Nat. Bank v. Myers, 243 Neb. 853, 503 N.W.2d 200 (1993).
Appointment of receiver during pendency of foreclosure action sustained as warranted by the facts and was not an abuse of the court's discretion. O'Neill Production Credit Assn. v. Putnam Ranches, Inc., 198 Neb. 145, 251 N.W.2d 884 (1977).
Supreme Court may appoint a receiver in proceedings by state under Installment Loan Act. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956).
District court cannot appoint receiver to carry out mandatory injunction. Frese v. Michalec, 151 Neb. 57, 36 N.W.2d 494 (1949).
Request for appointment of receiver is addressed to sound, equitable discretion of court. Cressman v. Bonham, 129 Neb. 201, 260 N.W. 818 (1935).
Receivership is provisional and ancillary; generally dependent upon main action. Smiley v. Sioux Beet Syrup Co., 71 Neb. 586, 101 N.W. 253 (1904).
Petition for receiver is addressed to sound discretion of court. McKenzie v. Beaumont, 70 Neb. 179, 97 N.W. 225 (1903).
Appointment of receiver is in nature of equitable execution. Sanford v. Anderson, 69 Neb. 249, 95 N.W. 632 (1903).
Judge at chambers may appoint. Morris v. Linton, 62 Neb. 731, 87 N.W. 958 (1901).
Section is merely declaratory of power existing in court; no receiver in ejectment. Smith v. White, 62 Neb. 56, 86 N.W. 930 (1901).
Application usually should be made to district court and not to Supreme Court. Eastman v. Cain, 45 Neb. 48, 63 N.W. 123 (1895).
Grounds should exist at time of appointment; should not appoint in final decree. Chadron Banking Co. v. Mahoney, 43 Neb. 214, 61 N.W. 594 (1895).
Plaintiff may have receiver appointed, pending appeal from part of decree. Benedict v. T. L. V. Land & Cattle Co., 4 Neb. Unof. 471, 94 N.W. 962 (1903).
Authority of receiver appointed by court of competent jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked. Miller v. Brown, 1 Neb. Unof. 754, 95 N.W. 797 (1901).
2. Mortgage foreclosure
Where receiver is appointed in mortgage foreclosure proceedings, rents and profits collected from the mortgaged premises by receiver may be applied to satisfaction of mortgage debt. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Ganser, 146 Neb. 635, 20 N.W.2d 689 (1945).
Where mortgage was in excess of reasonable value of land, appointment of receiver was justified. Modisett v. Campbell, 144 Neb. 222, 13 N.W.2d 126 (1944).
Ordinarily a receiver will not be appointed in foreclosure suit when mortgaged property is homestead of mortgagor. First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Bauer, 128 Neb. 725, 260 N.W. 194 (1935).
Receiver in mortgage foreclosure proceeding is appointed for the purpose only of conserving the mortgaged property and applying the rents and profits to the satisfaction of the debt. Wells v. Farmers State Bank of Overton, 124 Neb. 386, 246 N.W. 714 (1933).
Appointment of receiver in foreclosure action hereunder is ancillary to main action and such appointment must be made in the foreclosure proceeding by the court having jurisdiction thereof. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 123 Neb. 578, 243 N.W. 842 (1932).
Court is not authorized to appoint receiver in foreclosure action for property of mortgagor bank already in custody of another receiver in control of bank's entire assets. Wells v. Farmers' State Bank of Overton, 121 Neb. 462, 237 N.W. 402 (1931), overruled in part in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 123 Neb. 578, 243 N.W. 842 (1932).
Where land is insufficient to pay mortgage, and security is endangered by unpaid taxes, appointment of receiver is justified. Lackey v. Yekel, 113 Neb. 382, 203 N.W. 542 (1925); Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Oyler, 61 Neb. 702, 85 N.W. 899 (1901).
Mortgagee in possession under agreement to manage premises may not apply for receiver. Hayes v. Christiansen, 105 Neb. 586, 181 N.W. 379 (1921).
Court may appoint receiver to collect rents for some mortgagees in action and not for others. Goddard v. Clarke, 81 Neb. 373, 116 N.W. 41 (1908).
Appointment may be made pending appeal from confirmation of sale. Buck v. Stuben, 63 Neb. 273, 88 N.W. 483 (1901).
Solvency of mortgagor is immaterial, where property insufficient to pay mortgage debt; mortgagee entitled to collect out of his security, and not to be forced to other remedies. Waldron v. First Nat. Bank of Greenwood, 60 Neb. 245, 82 N.W. 856 (1900); Philadelphia M. & T. Co. v. Goos, 47 Neb. 804, 66 N.W. 843 (1896).
Appointment of receiver is only method of reaching rents and profits pending foreclosure. Huston v. Canfield, 57 Neb. 345, 77 N.W. 763 (1899).
Receiver should not be granted against widow of mortgagor of homestead, under statute relating to homestead rights of survivor. Joslin v. Williams, 3 Neb. Unof. 194, 93 N.W. 701 (1903).
Receiver should be denied where mortgaged property is homestead. Johnson v. Young, 1 Neb. Unof. 28, 95 N.W. 497 (1901).
3. Insolvent corporation
This section was incorporated by reference in procedure for liquidation of insolvent bank. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Nebraska State Bank of Bloomfield, 124 Neb. 449, 247 N.W. 31 (1933).
Where receiver of insolvent bank was appointed pursuant to notice, and receiver qualified and performed legal duties, validity of appointment cannot be collaterally questioned. Brownell v. Adams, 121 Neb. 304, 236 N.W. 750 (1931).
Court of equity has power to appoint receiver for corporation operating at loss with insufficient assets to pay preferred stockholders in full. Miller v. M. E. Smith Bldg. Co., 118 Neb. 5, 223 N.W. 277 (1929).
May appoint receiver for insurance company dissolved under statute. State ex rel. Barton v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 90 Neb. 664, 134 N.W. 284 (1912).
Receiver for corporation should not be appointed on complaint of minority stockholder, who alleges mismanagement by corporate officers. Miller v. Kitchen, 73 Neb. 711, 103 N.W. 297 (1905).
Court may appoint receiver for insolvent corporation where receivers have been so appointed by the usages of courts of equity. Williams v. Turner, 63 Neb. 575, 88 N.W. 668 (1902).
Where fraudulent mismanagement of property of corporation by its officers is shown, receiver may be appointed. Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 75 N.W. 46 (1898).
4. Miscellaneous
An order that issues further directions to a previously appointed receiver that was never discharged is not an order appointing a receiver. Seid v. Seid, 310 Neb. 626, 967 N.W.2d 253 (2021).
Appointment of receiver upon application of a simple contract creditor who has not reduced his claim to judgment is void. Gentsch, Inc. v. Burnett, 173 Neb. 820, 115 N.W.2d 446 (1962).
Word "creditor" does not apply to holder of tax certificate. Walker v. Fitzgerald, 69 Neb. 52, 95 N.W. 32 (1903).
Defendant liable for deficiency judgment may apply for receiver. Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Oyler, 61 Neb. 702, 85 N.W. 899 (1901).
Injunction is not a bar to appointment of receiver by another court where parties are not the same. Carter v. Dime Savings Bank, 61 Neb. 587, 86 N.W. 29 (1901).
A receiver for a partnership may be appointed in cases of insolvency, dissention, probability of waste, or when dissolution is necessary. Veith v. Ress, 60 Neb. 52, 82 N.W. 116 (1900).
Receivers should not be allowed for insolvency of debtor where property is then sufficient. Laune v. Hauser, 58 Neb. 663, 79 N.W. 555 (1899).
Ill will and hostility between joint owners is insufficient. Lamaster v. Elliott, 53 Neb. 424, 73 N.W. 925 (1898).
25-1082.
Notice of application for appointment; service.No receiver shall be appointed except in a suit actually commenced and pending, and after notice to all parties to be affected thereby, of the time and place of the application, the names of the proposed receiver, and of his or her proposed sureties, and of the proposed sureties of the applicant. Such notice shall state upon what papers the application is based, and be served at least five days before the proposed hearing upon the adverse party in the manner provided for service of a summons in a civil action or upon the adverse party's attorney in the manner provided for service of a notice on an attorney.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 267, p. 438; R.S.1913, § 7811; C.S.1922, § 8755; Laws 1927, c. 49, § 1, p. 199; C.S.1929, § 20-1082; Laws 1939, c. 17, § 1, p. 96; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1082; R.S.1943, § 25-1082;
Laws 1983, LB 447, § 40.
Annotations
1. Notice
2. Miscellaneous
1. Notice
Validity of order of appointment of bank receiver cannot be collaterally questioned, where receiver was appointed pursuant to notice and qualified and performed legal duties. Brownell v. Adams, 121 Neb. 304, 236 N.W. 750 (1931).
Where action for foreclosure of mortgage and application for receiver combined in one petition, and defendant joins issue, no other notice is required. Lackey v. Yekel, 113 Neb. 382, 203 N.W. 542 (1925).
Court is without power to appoint even temporary receiver for solvent corporation without notice to stockholders, where officers, who were the only parties notified, are charged with misuse of corporate powers. Furrer v. Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co., 108 Neb. 698, 189 N.W. 359 (1922).
Where record shows judge made appointment prior to date set in notice it is void. Gibson v. Sexson, 82 Neb. 475, 118 N.W. 77 (1908).
Appointment without notice is void. Smiley v. Sioux Beet Syrup Co., 71 Neb. 581, 99 N.W. 263 (1904); Johnson v. Powers, 21 Neb. 292, 32 N.W. 62 (1887).
Service of notice may be made on attorney of record, who may waive time required by statute, and authorize court to proceed to immediate hearing. Murphy v. Fidelity Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 69 Neb. 489, 95 N.W. 1022 (1903).
Statutory notice may be waived. Veith v. Ress, 60 Neb. 52, 82 N.W. 116 (1900).
Notice is waived where appointment is opposed on other grounds. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Holstein v. German Nat. Bank of Lincoln, 59 Neb. 229, 80 N.W. 820 (1899).
2. Miscellaneous
This section contains conditions precedent to valid appointment of a receiver. Gentsch, Inc. v. Burnett, 173 Neb. 820, 115 N.W.2d 446 (1962).
It is error for a trial court in a foreclosure action to appoint a receiver for defendant's homestead interest in real estate. Federal Credit Co. v. Reynolds, 132 Neb. 495, 272 N.W. 397 (1937).
This section applies to appointment of receivers for banks. Holcomb v. Tierney, 79 Neb. 660, 113 N.W. 204 (1907).
Action must be one in which main relief sought is independent of receivership. Mann v. German-American Investment Co., 70 Neb. 454, 97 N.W. 600 (1903).
Court may permit amendments of pleading upon notice. McCord, Brady & Co. v. Weil, 29 Neb. 682, 46 N.W. 152 (1890).
"Parties to be affected" means those having interest in possession or immediate custody of property or immediate disposition of rents and profits therefrom. Chambers v. Barker, 2 Neb. Unof. 523, 89 N.W. 388 (1902).
Petition need not propose name of person as receiver. Defects in notice are waived by appearance. Robertson v. Ostrom, 1 Neb. Unof. 200, 95 N.W. 469 (1901).
25-1083.
Property; possession by sheriff; when authorized; restitution.Should the delay occasioned by the giving of the notice provided for in section 25-1082 be hazardous to the rights of any party, the court or judge may, by order, direct the sheriff of the county in which such action is pending to take temporary possession of the property, and shall appoint an early day for the hearing of the application, and if at such hearing the application is refused, restitution shall be made of the property to the party from whom the same was taken.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 268, p. 438; R.S.1913, § 7812; C.S.1922, § 8756; C.S.1929, § 20-1083; R.S.1943, § 25-1083.
Annotations
Levy of attachment on portion of property without leave of court is not void in absence of objection by sheriff as custodian. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 50 Neb. 54, 69 N.W. 388 (1896).
25-1084.
Applicants for receiver; bonds required; contents; filing.Every order appointing a receiver shall require the applicant to give a good and sufficient bond, conditioned to pay all damages which the other parties to the suit or any of them may sustain by reason of the appointment of a receiver, in case it shall be finally decided that the order ought not to have been granted, and shall also require the receiver to give a bond conditioned to faithfully discharge his duties as receiver and obey all orders of the court. The bonds shall each run to the defendant and all adverse parties in interest, shall be for the use of any party to the suit, shall be in a penal sum to be fixed by the court, but not, however, to be in excess of a sum equal to double the value of the property in question, shall be executed by one surety where such surety is an incorporated surety company authorized by the laws of this state to transact such business, and by two or more sureties where such sureties are natural persons, to be approved by the court or judge making the appointment, and shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court; nor shall the same be considered executed until they are so filed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 269, p. 438; Laws 1875, § 1, p. 36; Laws 1897, c. 89, § 1, p. 370; R.S.1913, § 7813; C.S.1922, § 8757; Laws 1923, c. 102, § 1, p. 257; C.S.1929, § 20-1084; R.S.1943, § 25-1084.
Cross References
Other bond provisions, see section 25-1018.
State officers, departments, or receivers appointed on application of state, not required to give bond, see section 25-21,216.
Trust companies, see section 8-211.
Annotations
Defect in or total failure to approve bond does not invalidate it. Modisett v. Campbell, 144 Neb. 222, 13 N.W.2d 126 (1944).
Action will lie against receiver for deceit for making false statements in purchasing claims of creditors. State v. Merchants Bank, 81 Neb. 710, 120 N.W. 157 (1909).
Measure of damages for wrongful appointment is rental value of premises and counsel fees on vacation of order. Joslin v. Williams, 76 Neb. 594, 107 N.W. 837 (1906), affirmed on rehearing, 76 Neb. 602, 112 N.W. 343 (1907).
25-1085.
Application; form; content.If a complainant desires the appointment of a receiver at the commencement of the action, the complainant shall request such appointment in the complaint. If the occasion for a receiver arises while the suit is pending, the application shall be made by a motion setting forth the facts and circumstances making such appointment necessary or proper.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 270, p. 438; R.S.1913, § 7814; C.S.1922, § 8758; C.S.1929, § 20-1085; R.S.1943, § 25-1085;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 23.
Annotations
Appointment of receiver is purely ancillary remedy and cannot be maintained in proceeding instituted solely for that purpose. Cressman v. Bonham, 129 Neb. 201, 260 N.W. 818 (1935).
Verification is not jurisdictional, and may be waived. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Holstein v. German Nat. Bank of Lincoln, 59 Neb. 229, 80 N.W. 820 (1899).
25-1086.
Qualifications of receiver; sureties; objections; nomination by other parties.Any party to the suit may, upon the hearing of the application, show, by affidavit or otherwise, objections to the proposed sureties and to the proposed receiver, and what is the value of the property to be taken possession of, and that a receiver ought not to be appointed. He may also nominate a person to be receiver, giving at the same time the names of his proposed sureties. No person shall be appointed receiver who is party, solicitor, counsel, or in any manner interested in the suit.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 271, p. 439; R.S.1913, § 7815; C.S.1922, § 8759; C.S.1929, § 20-1086; R.S.1943, § 25-1086.
Annotations
Attorney for party is not proper counsel for receiver. Veith v. Ress, 60 Neb. 52, 82 N.W. 116 (1900).
25-1087.
Order of appointment; special directions.Every order appointing a receiver shall contain special directions in respect to his powers and duties, and upon application of any party to the suit, after due notice thereof, such further directions may be made in that behalf by the court or judge as may in the further progress of the cause become proper.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 272, p. 439; R.S.1913, § 7816; C.S.1922, § 8760; C.S.1929, § 20-1087; R.S.1943, § 25-1087.
Annotations
A court may consider a party's oral request for interim relief, which requires further action by a previously appointed receiver, as an application for further directions. Seid v. Seid, 310 Neb. 626, 967 N.W.2d 253 (2021).
Order appointing receiver should contain special directions with respect to his powers and duties. Frese v. Michalec, 151 Neb. 57, 36 N.W.2d 494 (1949).
A judicial order appointing a receiver to liquidate affairs of insolvent state bank includes power of receiver to sue executive officer of bank and surety on his bond to recover losses sustained by bank for acts in violation of the bond. Luikart v. Flannigan, 130 Neb. 901, 267 N.W. 165 (1936).
This section was incorporated by reference in procedure for liquidation by court of affairs of insolvent bank. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Nebraska State Bank of Bloomfield, 124 Neb. 449, 247 N.W. 31 (1933).
Orders will not be modified unless abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Bank of Rushville, 57 Neb. 608, 78 N.W. 281 (1899).
Receiver may sue for and collect unpaid stock subscriptions that are called for by the directors of the corporation before it is put in the hands of a receiver. Wyman v. Williams, 53 Neb. 670, 74 N.W. 48 (1898).
25-1088.
Receivers; extent of representation.Every receiver shall be considered the receiver of any party to the suit, and no others.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 273, p. 439; R.S.1913, § 7817; C.S.1922, § 8761; C.S.1929, § 20-1088; R.S.1943, § 25-1088.
Annotations
Court has no power to appoint even temporary receiver for solvent corporation without notice to stockholders, where officers, who were the only parties notified, were charged with misuse of corporate powers. Furrer v. Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co., 108 Neb. 698, 189 N.W. 359 (1922).
Parties are not liable for receiver's wrongful acts. City Savings Bank v. Carlon, 87 Neb. 266, 127 N.W. 161 (1910).
Bond holders who are not parties to suit are not bound by acts of receiver. Smiley v. Sioux Beet Syrup Co., 71 Neb. 581, 99 N.W. 263 (1904).
25-1089.
Appointment of receiver without notice; void; suspension of order, when.Every order appointing a receiver without the notice provided for herein shall be void, and every such order heretofore made, under which the appointee has not possessed himself of the property in question, shall be suspended until an order shall have been made and the bonds executed and filed in accordance with the provisions of sections 25-1081 to 25-1092.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 274, p. 439; R.S.1913, § 7818; C.S.1922, § 8762; C.S.1929, § 20-1089; R.S.1943, § 25-1089.
Annotations
An order that issues further directions to an appointed receiver is not within this section. Seid v. Seid, 310 Neb. 626, 967 N.W.2d 253 (2021).
Requirement of giving of notice of application for receiver is mandatory, but may be waived. Modisett v. Campbell, 144 Neb. 222, 13 N.W.2d 126 (1944).
Statutory notice to interested parties is jurisdictional. Furrer v. Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co., 108 Neb. 698, 189 N.W. 359 (1922).
Where record shows receiver was appointed before day set in notice, it is void and may be collaterally attacked. Gibson v. Sexson, 82 Neb. 475, 118 N.W. 77 (1908).
Taking possession of bank by receiver is sufficient notice to protect from collateral attack. Holcomb v. Tierney, 79 Neb. 660, 113 N.W. 204 (1907).
Appointment without notice is void not voidable. Smiley v. Sioux Beet Syrup Co., 71 Neb. 581, 99 N.W. 263 (1904); Johnson v. Powers, 21 Neb. 292, 32 N.W. 62 (1887).
Notice may be waived by resisting appointment on other grounds; court may appoint one not named, without further notice. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Holstein v. German Nat. Bank of Lincoln, 59 Neb. 229, 80 N.W. 820 (1899).
Order, regular on its face, is prima facie valid, and protects receiver. Edee v. Strunk, 35 Neb. 307, 53 N.W. 70 (1892).
25-1090.
Inconclusive decree; appointment of master; disposition of property; orders; appeal.When a decree is rendered in a suit in which a receiver has been appointed and such decree does not finally determine the rights of the parties, any one of them may apply to the court for the possession of the property and proceeds thereof in the receiver's hands. If such application is resisted, the matter may be referred to a master to take and report to the court the testimony of the parties. Upon the filing of the report, the court shall, by its order, award the possession of the property and the proceeds thereof to the party entitled thereto, and thereupon the receiver shall surrender the property and the proceeds thereof to such party. All orders appointing receivers, giving them further directions, and disposing of the property may be appealed to the Court of Appeals in the same manner as final orders and decrees.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 275, p. 439; R.S.1913, § 7819; C.S.1922, § 8763; C.S.1929, § 20-1090; R.S.1943, § 25-1090; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 46.
Cross References
For appeals to Court of Appeals, see section 25-1911 et seq.
Annotations
1. Appeal
2. Supersedeas
1. Appeal
An order confirming a public sale is a final order, because it both is an order disposing of receivership property and gives the receiver directions. Priesner v. Starry, 300 Neb. 81, 912 N.W.2d 249 (2018).
An order of further direction to the receiver to release liens before continuing with the public sale is a final order. Priesner v. Starry, 300 Neb. 81, 912 N.W.2d 249 (2018).
An order appointing a receiver is a final, appealable order. Floral Lawns Memorial Gardens Assn. v. Becker, 284 Neb. 532, 822 N.W.2d 692 (2012).
The appointment of a receiver may be treated as a final order. Robertson v. Southwood, 233 Neb. 685, 447 N.W.2d 616 (1989).
An order confirming a sale by a receiver is a final order from which an appeal can be taken. Lewis v. Gallemore, 173 Neb. 441, 113 N.W.2d 595 (1962).
This section was incorporated by reference in procedure for liquidation of insolvent banks. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Nebraska State Bank of Bloomfield, 124 Neb. 449, 247 N.W. 31 (1933).
Order of court appointing receiver is final and appealable hereunder. State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bank of Minatare, 123 Neb. 109, 242 N.W. 278 (1932).
Statute authorizes appeal from order appointing receiver; appointment of receiver sustained. Howell v. Poff, 122 Neb. 793, 241 N.W. 548 (1932).
Order to receiver to sell real estate is appealable. State ex rel. German Sav. Bank v. Fawcett, 58 Neb. 371, 78 N.W. 636 (1899).
Objections are available on appeal from final decree. Seeds Dry-Plate Co. v. Heyn Photo-Supply Co., 57 Neb. 214, 77 N.W. 660 (1898).
Bank may appeal from order directing suit against its stockholders. State v. German Savings Bank, 50 Neb. 734, 70 N.W. 221 (1897).
Appointment is final order; appealable before final judgment. McCord, Brady & Co. v. Weil, 33 Neb. 868, 51 N.W. 300 (1892).
A summary judgment in a receiver's favor finding that he is not liable to an intervenor for a claim is a "direction" to a receiver from which an appeal is allowable; such summary judgment is "final" because it fully and completely determines the dispute between the intervenor and the receiver. Sutton v. Killham, 19 Neb. App. 842, 820 N.W.2d 292 (2012).
2. Supersedeas
Whether order may be superseded is discretionary with court, and court may fix terms and conditions thereof. Lowe v. Riley, 57 Neb. 252, 77 N.W. 758 (1898).
Order appointing receiver cannot be superseded pending appeal, as matter of right. State ex rel. Heinzelman v. Stull, 49 Neb. 739, 69 N.W. 101 (1896).
25-1091.
Receivers; disobedience of orders; punishment; sheriff may act.Whenever, in the exercise of their authority, the court or judge shall have ordered the deposit or delivery of money or other things, and the order is disobeyed, the court or judge, in addition to punishing such disobedience as for contempt, may make an order requiring the sheriff to take the money or thing, and deposit or deliver it, in conformity with the direction of the court or judge.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 276, p. 439; Laws 1899, c. 82, § 1, p. 337; R.S.1913, § 7820; C.S.1922, § 8764; C.S.1929, § 20-1091; R.S.1943, § 25-1091.
25-1092.
Receivers; compensation.Receivers shall receive for their services such compensation as the court may award, subject to the following restrictions:
(1) Receivers appointed for the purpose of preserving and protecting property pending litigation, or for the purpose of continuing the business of the debtor or corporation pending litigation, or when financially embarrassed, may be awarded a salary or lump sum;
(2) Receivers appointed for the purpose of winding up the affairs of a debtor or corporation, reducing the assets to cash and distributing them, shall be awarded as compensation for such services a percentage upon the cash received and properly accounted for by them, which percentage may be increased where extraordinary services have been performed, and correspondingly reduced where the services have not been meritoriously performed.
Source:Laws 1899, c. 33, § 1, p. 169; R.S.1913, § 7821; C.S.1922, § 8765; C.S.1929, § 20-1092; R.S.1943, § 25-1092.
Annotations
Allowance to receiver of lump sum rather than percentage of cash received was proper where receiver was primarily appointed to conserve assets. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 168 Neb. 298, 96 N.W.2d 55 (1959).
Exercise of power to appoint receiver for winding up affairs of corporation was contemplated by this section. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Nebraska State Bank, 124 Neb. 449, 247 N.W. 31 (1933).
Compensation is in discretion of court; and order will not be modified unless discretion was abused. State v. Nebraska Savings & Exchange Bank, 61 Neb. 496, 85 N.W. 391 (1901).
25-1093.
Replevin; delivery of property; notice, when required.The plaintiff in an action to recover the possession of specific personal property may, at the commencement of the suit, or any time before answer, request the delivery of such property as provided by sections 25-1093 to 25-1098, 25-10,109, and 25-10,110. In a replevin action under the Grain Warehouse Act, notice shall be given as provided in section 88-547.02.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 181, p. 421; R.S.1913, § 7822; C.S.1922, § 8766; C.S.1929, § 20-1093; R.S.1943, § 25-1093;
Laws 1973, LB 474, § 1; Laws 2005, LB 492, § 1.
Cross References
Grain Warehouse Act, see section 88-525.
Annotations
Where both parties contemplated that payment for cattle would be made by draft drawn on the buyer by the seller, the transaction was a cash sale and seller could properly reclaim the cattle from the buyer following buyer's dishonor of the draft drawn on buyer by seller pursuant to the parties' agreement. Peck v. Augustine Bros. Co., 203 Neb. 574, 279 N.W.2d 397 (1979).
Action of replevin is in part a proceeding in rem, and trial de novo is authorized in district court on appeal. Lemer v. Hunyak, 104 Neb. 2, 175 N.W. 605 (1919).
Replevin action may proceed to trial and judgment without the property being delivered to the plaintiff. Hudelson v. First Nat. Bank of Tobias, 56 Neb. 247, 76 N.W. 570 (1898).
Replevin cannot be had for exempt property until inventory and selection by debtor. Mann v. Welton, 21 Neb. 541, 32 N.W. 599 (1887).
25-1093.01.
Request delivery of property; affidavit; contents.The plaintiff may request the delivery of property as specified in section 25-1093 by filing in the office of the clerk of the court in which the action is filed an affidavit of the plaintiff or his or her agent or attorney showing (1) a description of the property claimed, (2) that the plaintiff is the owner of the property or has a special ownership or interest therein, stating the facts in relation thereto, and that he or she is entitled to the possession of the same, (3) that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, and (4) that it was not taken in execution on any order or judgment against such plaintiff, or for the payment of any fine, tax, or amercement assessed against him or her or by virtue of an order of delivery issued under Chapter 25, or any other mesne or final process issued against him or her, except that such affidavit may omit the first and last clause of this subdivision and, in lieu thereof, show that the property was taken on execution on a judgment or order other than an order of delivery in replevin, and that the same is exempt from such execution or attachment under the laws of this state. The provisions of Chapter 25, article 10, shall extend to and apply as well to proceedings in replevin had before county courts. Attached to such affidavit shall be a specific request for the delivery of the property and the issuance of an order by the court to that effect.
Annotations
Replevin properly lies to recover chattels unlawfully detained, regardless of whether the original taking was wrongful. White Motor Credit Corp. v. Sapp Bros. Truck Plaza, Inc., 197 Neb. 421, 249 N.W.2d 489 (1977).
25-1093.02.
Affidavit; filing; service; temporary order; effect; hearing; when.Upon the filing of such affidavit and request for delivery, if the defendant with full knowledge of the allegations and effect of the plaintiff's request agrees that such delivery in replevin be had, he may execute a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver under oath of his rights to notice and hearing, in which event the court shall order that all further proceedings shall be suspended and the property being replevied delivered to the plaintiff forthwith, otherwise upon the filing of such affidavit and request for delivery required by section 25-1093.01, the court shall issue a temporary order addressed to the defendant that he shall hold the property described in the affidavit in his possession, unimpaired and unencumbered, and in all respects in the same state and condition as at the time of receipt of the order, until further order of the court. The temporary order shall also notify such defendant that if he fails to comply with the temporary order he shall be subject to the full contempt powers of the court. Attached to such temporary order shall be a notice that a hearing will be had and specifying the date, time, and place of such hearing, at which hearing will be determined plaintiff's right to possession of the goods described in plaintiff's affidavit and request for delivery, pending final determination of the merits. At such hearing the defendant shall be required to show cause why the possession of the goods should not be delivered to the plaintiff. Unless otherwise determined and ordered by the court, the date of such hearing shall be seven days after service of the order upon the defendant, but in no event later than fourteen days after service.
Annotations
A temporary order entered pursuant to this provision, which requires the defendant in replevin action to hold the property unimpaired and unencumbered until hearing which must take place within fourteen days after service and at which court determines plaintiff's right to possession pending final resolution on the merits, results in a deprivation of property rights sufficient to trigger due process protection. Lewis Service Center, Inc. v. Mack Financial Corp., 696 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1982).
25-1093.03.
Affidavit; temporary order; notice; hearing; summons; service.If filed at the commencement of suit, such affidavit and request for delivery and such temporary order containing the notice of hearing shall be served by the sheriff or other officer with the summons. If filed after the commencement of suit but before answer, they shall be served separately from the summons, but as soon after their filing and issuance as practicable. The summons shall be served within three days, excluding nonjudicial days, after the date of issuance.
25-1093.04.
Order for delivery of property.If the court finds at such hearing that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property, it shall order the clerk to issue an order for delivery of the property to the plaintiff, and deliver such order for delivery to the sheriff or other officer to be served and returned according to sections 25-1096 and 25-1097. The order of the court required by this section shall conform to the content requirements of section 25-1094.
25-1094.
Order for delivery; contents.An order for the delivery of personal property to the plaintiff shall be made by the clerk of the court in which the action is brought only upon the filing in his office of an order of the court showing (1) a description of the property claimed; (2) that the plaintiff has raised a bona fide issue as to whether he is the owner of the property, or whether he has a special ownership or interest therein, but that it appears sufficiently probable to the court that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits; and (3) that there is a bona fide issue as to whether the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant and that the plaintiff is entitled to the immediate delivery of the property.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 182, p. 421; Laws 1877, § 1, p. 9; R.S.1913, § 7823; C.S.1922, § 8767; C.S.1929, § 20-1094; R.S.1943, § 25-1094;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 128; Laws 1973, LB 474, § 6.
Annotations
1. Affidavit
2. Ownership
3. Detention
4. Miscellaneous
1. Affidavit
Affidavit used as evidence in district court cannot be considered on appeal unless preserved in and made a part of the bill of exceptions. Spidel Farm Supply, Inc. v. Line, 165 Neb. 664, 86 N.W.2d 789 (1957).
Affidavit in replevin must show that plaintiff is the owner of the property or has a special interest therein, that he is entitled to the immediate possession thereof, and that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant. Hickman-Williams Agency v. Haney, 152 Neb. 219, 40 N.W.2d 813 (1950).
Action, without delivery of property, may proceed without affidavit. Racine-Sattley Co. v. Meinen, 79 Neb. 33, 114 N.W. 602 (1908).
Affidavit is prerequisite to order of delivery; order nullity otherwise, and set aside on motion. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Rosso, 78 Neb. 184, 110 N.W. 686 (1907).
May permit amendment of affidavit to allegation of ownership in amended petition. Tackaberry v. Gilmore, 57 Neb. 450, 78 N.W. 32 (1899).
Writ issued on petition containing necessary allegations of affidavit, sworn to upon belief, is voidable, not void. Lewis v. Connolly, 29 Neb. 222, 45 N.W. 622 (1890).
Affidavit does not take place of petition or bill of particulars. School Dist. No. 36 in York Co. v. McIntie, 14 Neb. 46, 14 N.W. 656 (1883).
Filing affidavit is a proceeding, not a pleading; amendable even after motion to dismiss. Wilson v. Macklin, 7 Neb. 50 (1878).
2. Ownership
To maintain an action for conversion of personal property, a party must have had actual possession of the property or the right of possession. Coulter v. Cummings, 93 Neb. 646, 142 N.W. 109 (1913).
Mortgagee must allege facts showing special ownership and right to possession. Pennington County Bank v. Bauman, 81 Neb. 782, 116 N.W. 669 (1908); Paxton v. Learn, 55 Neb. 459, 75 N.W. 1096 (1898).
Averment of agency is not one of the conditions upon which clerk is authorized to issue order of delivery. Hudelson v. First Nat. Bank of Tobias, 56 Neb. 247, 76 N.W. 570 (1898).
Allegation of special ownership is not sustained by proof of general ownership. Suckstorf v. Butterfield, 54 Neb. 757, 74 N.W. 1076 (1898).
Allegation of general ownership is not sustained by proof of special ownership. Wilson v. City Nat. Bank of Kearney, 51 Neb. 87, 70 N.W. 501 (1897).
Petition must show facts creating special ownership. Griffing v. Curtis, 50 Neb. 334, 69 N.W. 968 (1897).
3. Detention
Where plaintiff did not file a security agreement or lien and did not simultaneously have legal title and physical possession as required by section 60-105, R.R.S.1943, it did not meet its burden of proof for a replevin action. The Cornhusker Bank of Omaha v. McNamara, 205 Neb. 504, 288 N.W.2d 287 (1980).
One having custody of property in dispute is proper defendant. Engel v. Dado, 66 Neb. 400, 92 N.W. 629 (1902).
Wrongful detention is essential. Affidavit may be aided by petition, and is amendable. Hudelson v. First Nat. Bank of Tobias, 51 Neb. 557, 71 N.W. 304 (1897).
Replevin will not lie against one not in possession. Depriest v. McKinstry, 38 Neb. 194, 56 N.W. 806 (1893).
4. Miscellaneous
The United States Supreme Court Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, decision concerning the validity of prejudgment replevin statutes will not be applied retroactively to a replevin action commenced in 1967. Peck v. Augustine Bros. Co., 203 Neb. 574, 279 N.W.2d 397 (1979).
Property held under void judgment may be replevined. Muller v. Plue, 45 Neb. 701, 64 N.W. 232 (1895).
Allegation that property was not taken on execution, etc., is not sustained by proof that property was exempt. Eikenbary v. Clifford, 34 Neb. 607, 52 N.W. 377 (1892).
Replevin cannot be maintained for property levied upon and claimed to be exempt until after inventory is filed and appraisement and selection made. Mann v. Welton, 21 Neb. 541, 32 N.W. 599 (1887).
25-1095.
Order for delivery; contents.The order for the delivery of the property to the plaintiff shall be addressed and delivered to the sheriff. It shall state the names of the parties, the court in which the action is brought, and command the sheriff to take the property, describing it, and deliver it to the plaintiff, and to make return of the order on a day to be named therein.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 183, p. 422; R.S.1913, § 7824; C.S.1922, § 8768; C.S.1929, § 20-1095; R.S.1943, § 25-1095.
Annotations
Where writ is made returnable on holiday or Sunday, succeeding day is return day. Ostertag v. Galbraith, 23 Neb. 730, 37 N.W. 637 (1888).
25-1096.
Order for delivery; when returnable.The return day for the order of delivery shall be twenty days after
its issuance unless a later
date is specified in the order of delivery, in which case the return date
shall be the date specified in the order of delivery.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 184, p. 422; R.S.1913, § 7825; C.S.1922, § 8769; C.S.1929, § 20-1096; R.S.1943, § 25-1096;
Laws 1973, LB 474, § 7; Laws 2012, LB734, § 1.
25-1097.
Order for delivery; how executed.The sheriff shall execute the order of delivery by taking the property therein mentioned. He shall also deliver a copy of the order of delivery to the person charged with the unlawful detention of the property or leave such copy at his usual place of residence.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 185, p. 422; R.S.1913, § 7826; C.S.1922, § 8770; C.S.1929, § 20-1097; R.S.1943, § 25-1097;
Laws 1973, LB 474, § 8.
Annotations
Cannot seize property in possession of third party claiming ownership in good faith. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Robertson, 87 Neb. 542, 127 N.W. 866 (1910).
Seizure on Sunday is void. Bryant v. State, 16 Neb. 651, 21 N.W. 406 (1884).
Leaving copy at usual place of business is insufficient. Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Steinan, 8 Neb. 109 (1879).
Failure to serve copy is mere irregularity. Baker v. Daily, 6 Neb. 464 (1877).
25-1098.
Delivery of property to plaintiff; bond; contents; return; redelivery bond.The sheriff, or other officer, shall not deliver to the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, the property so taken, until there has been executed by one or more sufficient sureties of the plaintiff a written undertaking to the defendant, in at least double the value of the property taken, to the effect that the plaintiff shall duly prosecute the action and pay all costs and damages which may be awarded against him, and return the property to the defendant, in case judgment for a return of such property is rendered against him. The undertaking shall be returned with the order.
If, before the actual delivery to the plaintiff, the defendant executes within twenty-four hours from the time of the levy, by one or more sufficient sureties a written undertaking to the plaintiff, in at least double the value of the property, to the effect that the defendant shall duly defend the action and pay all costs and damages which may be awarded against him, and deliver the property to the plaintiff, in case judgment for delivery of such property is rendered against him, the undertaking shall be returned with the order by the officer, who shall return the property to the defendant.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 186, p. 422; G.S.1873, c. 57, § 186, p. 553; R.S.1913, § 7827; C.S.1922, § 8771; C.S.1929, § 20-1098; R.S.1943, § 25-1098; Laws 1965, c. 119, § 1, p. 452.
Annotations
In forma pauperis status does not excuse the litigant from paying the cost of a premium for a replevin bond pursuant to this section. Jacob v. Schlichtman, 261 Neb. 169, 622 N.W.2d 852 (2001).
A successful plaintiff in replevin is entitled to recover the reasonable cost of the bond required of it by this section. Barelmann v. Fox, 239 Neb. 771, 478 N.W.2d 548 (1992).
Bond runs to defendant alone. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Robertson, 87 Neb. 542, 127 N.W. 866 (1910).
Bond entitles plaintiff to property pending action. Jenkins v. State, 60 Neb. 205, 82 N.W. 622 (1900).
Sureties liable to defendant for whom judgment is rendered. Pilger v. Marder, 55 Neb. 113, 75 N.W. 559 (1898).
After obtaining property plaintiff cannot refuse to prosecute and enjoin defendant from prosecuting. Kinkaid v. Hiatt, 24 Neb. 562, 39 N.W. 600 (1888).
Bond omitting requirement to "return the property," is binding as to other provisions. Hicklin v. Nebr. City National Bank, 8 Neb. 463, 1 N.W. 135 (1879).
25-1099.
Bond; amount; determination; appraisal.For the purpose of fixing the amount of the undertaking, the value of the property taken shall be ascertained by the oath of two or more responsible persons, whom the sheriff or other officer shall swear truly to assess the value thereof.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 187, p. 422; R.S.1913, § 7828; C.S.1922, § 8772; C.S.1929, § 20-1099; R.S.1943, § 25-1099.
Annotations
Testimony as to valuation placed on property in appraisement was incompetent. Dempster Mill Mfg. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Holdrege, 49 Neb. 321, 68 N.W. 477 (1896).
Appraisement is not admissible as evidence generally. Barlass v. Braash, 27 Neb. 212, 42 N.W. 1028 (1889).
25-10,100.
Failure to furnish bond; duty and liability of officer; return of property to defendant.If the undertaking required by section 25-1098 is not given within twenty-four hours from the taking of the property under said order, the sheriff or other officer shall return the property to the defendant. If the sheriff or other officer delivers any property so taken to the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, or keeps the same from the defendant, without taking such security within the time aforesaid, or if he takes insufficient security, he shall be liable to the defendant in damages.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 188, p. 422; R.S.1913, § 7829; C.S.1922, § 8773; C.S.1929, § 20-10,100; R.S.1943, § 25-10,100.
Annotations
Where bond is not given in twenty-four hours, it is duty of officer to return property to defendant. Barlass v. Braash, 27 Neb. 212, 42 N.W. 1028 (1889).
Officer need not accept nonresidents of county as sureties. State ex rel. Sornborger v. Wait, 23 Neb. 166, 36 N.W. 380 (1888).
25-10,101.
Bond; objections to sureties; waiver; liability of officer.The defendant may, within twenty-four hours from the time the undertaking referred to in section 25-10,100 is given by the plaintiff, give notice to the sheriff that he excepts to the sufficiency of the sureties. If he fails to do so, he must be deemed to have waived all objections to them. When the defendant excepts, the sureties must justify upon notice as in the case of bail on arrest. The sheriff or other officer shall be responsible for the sufficiency of the sureties, until the objection to them is waived as above provided or until they justify. The property shall be delivered to the plaintiff when the undertaking required by section 25-1098 has been given.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 189, p. 423; R.S.1913, § 7830; C.S.1922, § 8774; C.S.1929, § 20-10,101; R.S.1943, § 25-10,101.
Annotations
Objection must be made within forty-eight hours from time property was seized. Where objections are waived, officer's good faith in accepting sureties is immaterial. Barton v. Shull, 70 Neb. 324, 97 N.W. 292 (1903).
Subsequent seizure by plaintiff on execution is defense pro tanto. Shull v. Barton, 67 Neb. 311, 93 N.W. 132 (1903).
Where objection is made, officer, failing to have sureties justify, is liable for insufficiency. Barton v. Shull, 62 Neb. 570, 87 N.W. 322 (1901).
Surety, whose want of power to sign is palpable, is not estopped because property was delivered to plaintiff. Sturdevant v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Rushville, 62 Neb. 472, 87 N.W. 156 (1901).
This section was not rendered inoperative by repeal of legislation providing for release of debtor from arrest. Shull v. Barton, 58 Neb. 741, 79 N.W. 732 (1899).
Constable is liable for taking insufficient bond though objections were not made thereto. Busch v. Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co., 52 Neb. 83, 71 N.W. 947 (1897).
Provision requiring notice of insufficiency of sureties is inapplicable to action before justice of the peace. Thomas v. Edgerton, 40 Neb. 25, 58 N.W. 551 (1894).
Defendant must except to sufficiency of sureties on replevin bond within time specified. Haynes v. Aultman, Miller & Co., 36 Neb. 257, 54 N.W. 511 (1893).
25-10,102.
Judgment against plaintiff upon dismissal; failure of plaintiff to prosecute; procedure.If the property has been delivered to the plaintiff, and he suffers a voluntary or involuntary dismissal, or if he otherwise fails to prosecute his action to final judgment, the court shall, on application of the defendant or his attorney, impanel a jury to inquire into the right of property and right of possession of the defendant to the property taken. If the jury shall be satisfied that said property was the property of the defendant at the commencement of the action, or if they shall find that the defendant was entitled to the possession only of the same at such time, then, and in either case, they shall assess such damages for the defendant as are right and proper; for which, with costs of suit, the court shall render judgment for the defendant.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 190, p. 423; R.S.1913, § 7831; C.S.1922, § 8775; C.S.1929, § 20-10,102; R.S.1943, § 25-10,102; Laws 1959, c. 103, § 1, p. 427.
Annotations
1. Failure to prosecute
2. Burden of proof
3. Miscellaneous
1. Failure to prosecute
Upon failure of plaintiff to prosecute appeal, defendant has right to have title to and right of possession of property adjudicated. Rice v. McGrath, 162 Neb. 511, 76 N.W.2d 428 (1956).
Failing to prosecute by refusing to amend, defendant is entitled to judgment and trial to assess damages. Pennington County Bank v. Bauman, 87 Neb. 25, 126 N.W. 654 (1910).
2. Burden of proof
Burden rests on plaintiff in replevin to establish facts necessary to recover. Alliance Loan & Inv. Co. v. Morgan, 154 Neb. 745, 49 N.W.2d 593 (1951).
Party cannot be substituted for plaintiff. Meyer v. Omaha Furniture & Carpet Co., 76 Neb. 405, 107 N.W. 767 (1906).
3. Miscellaneous
An action in replevin is properly triable to a jury. First State Bank of Scottsbluff v. Bear, 172 Neb. 504, 110 N.W.2d 83 (1961).
Where action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, judgment for return of property or value cannot be given. Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. Panska, 56 Neb. 195, 78 N.W. 534 (1898).
Plaintiff cannot dismiss and defeat defendant's right to possession, without trial. Vose v. Muller, 48 Neb. 602, 67 N.W. 598 (1896).
Defendant is entitled to judgment, unless plaintiff proves title. Garber v. Palmer, Blanchard & Co., 47 Neb. 699, 66 N.W. 656 (1896).
Requirement that judgment be in the alternative is mandatory. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Dunham, 33 Neb. 686, 50 N.W. 1122 (1892).
Plaintiff may not dismiss without prejudice. Aultman & Co. v. Reams, 9 Neb. 487, 4 N.W. 81 (1880).
Plaintiff cannot dismiss to escape liability to defendant. Cook v. Vaughn, 1 Neb. Unof. 244, 95 N.W. 333 (1901).
25-10,103.
Verdict for defendant; further findings required; damages.In all cases, when the property has been delivered to the plaintiff, where the jury shall find upon issue joined for the defendant, they shall also find whether the defendant had the right of property or the right of possession only, at the commencement of the suit; and if they find either in his favor, they shall assess such damages as they think right and proper for the defendant; for which with costs of suit, the court shall render judgment for the defendant.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 191, p. 423;
R.S.1913, § 7832; C.S.1922, § 8776; C.S.1929, § 20-10,103; R.S.1943, § 25-10,103.
Annotations
1. Right of property
2. Right of possession
3. Damages
4. Miscellaneous
1. Right of property
Facts necessary to entitle plaintiff to recover in replevin action must exist at time action is commenced. Alliance Loan & Inv. Co. v. Morgan, 154 Neb. 745, 49 N.W.2d 593 (1951).
Section is mandatory; court must determine rights as they existed at time action was commenced. Brown v. Hogan, 49 Neb. 746, 69 N.W. 100 (1896).
Where verdict and judgment are silent as to ownership of property, question remains unadjudicated. Fuller v. Brownell, 48 Neb. 145, 67 N.W. 6 (1896).
Finding of general value is unnecessary where defendant claimed special interest only. Earle v. Burch, 21 Neb. 702, 33 N.W. 254 (1887).
2. Right of possession
Failure of plaintiff to prosecute action cannot deprive defendant of right to have the right to possession of the property determined. Rice v. McGrath, 162 Neb. 511, 76 N.W.2d 428 (1956).
Where defendant's right of possession arose by virtue of a lien for truck repairs, judgment should provide for return of property or value of possession. Jackson v. Arndt-Snyder Motor Co., 122 Neb. 276, 240 N.W. 279 (1932).
Where defendant is entitled to possession only, value of same and not of property should be assessed. Tyson v. Bryan, 84 Neb. 202, 120 N.W. 940 (1909).
Failure to find right to possession does not render judgment void. Ayres v. Duggan, 57 Neb. 750, 78 N.W. 296 (1899).
Failure to find value of defendant's right of possession is not an error of which plaintiff can complain. Jameson v. Kent, 42 Neb. 412, 60 N.W. 879 (1894).
Under chattel mortgage, value of possession is amount of lien not exceeding value of property. Cruts v. Wray, 19 Neb. 581, 27 N.W. 634 (1886).
Under execution, value of right of possession is amount of execution and costs. Welton v. Beltezore, 17 Neb. 399, 23 N.W. 1 (1885).
Right to possession entitles defendant to nominal damages at least. Frey v. Drahos, 7 Neb. 194 (1878).
3. Damages
Where there is a wrongful taking in replevin of property held by sheriff under attachment, measure of damages is sale value at time, considering manner in which officer could have sold same. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Omaha v. McDonald, 63 Neb. 363, 88 N.W. 492 (1901), rehearing denied, 63 Neb. 377, 89 N.W. 770 (1902).
Measure of damages for detention of property is the value of the use, where in excess of interest. Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N.W. 1085 (1901).
Party must recover all damages for unlawful detention in replevin actions. Teel v. Miles, 51 Neb. 542, 71 N.W. 296 (1897).
In estimating damages to defendant, jury should be permitted to take into consideration length of time intervening between levy and restoration to possession. Schars v. Barnd, 27 Neb. 94, 42 N.W. 906 (1889).
Where property is ordered returned to defendant, and plaintiff, pending appeal, again converts property by lien and sale, the conversion may be shown as a means of estimating damages. Deck v. Smith, 12 Neb. 389, 11 N.W. 852 (1882).
Measure of damages is amount of writ where value of goods exceeds that sum. Kersenbrock v. Martin, 12 Neb. 374, 11 N.W. 462 (1882).
4. Miscellaneous
An action in replevin is properly triable to a jury. First State Bank of Scottsbluff v. Bear, 172 Neb. 504, 110 N.W.2d 83 (1961).
Verdict for defendant in replevin case is basis for entry of judgment in alternative. Clark v. Oldham, 166 Neb. 672, 90 N.W.2d 329 (1958).
When property is not returned in reasonable time, and depreciates, defendant may refuse same and sue for value, costs and interest. Wallace v. Cox, 92 Neb. 354, 138 N.W. 578 (1912).
General finding for defendant, without finding as to value, is error. Foss v. Marr, 40 Neb. 559, 59 N.W. 122 (1894).
Section is mandatory, whether defendant pleads general denial, new matter, or prays for damages. School Dist. No. 2 of Merrick County v. Shoemaker, 5 Neb. 36 (1876).
Defendant may recover judgment for return, under general denial without prayer for return. Voorheis, Miller & Co. v. Leisure, 1 Neb. Unof. 601, 95 N.W. 676 (1901).
25-10,104.
Judgment for defendant; irregularity in process or jurisdictional defect; restoration of status quo.(1) The judgment in the cases mentioned in sections 25-10,102 and 25-10,103 shall be for a return of the property or the value thereof in case a return cannot be had, or the value of the possession of the same, and for damages for withholding said property and costs of suit.
(2) In all instances wherein a trial of the merits of an action is prevented by reason of irregularity in process or for any jurisdictional reason, the court upon a proper showing shall be empowered to place the parties in status quo by ordering a return of the property replevied. A defendant whose property has been replevied shall be entitled to seek such relief without submitting his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 7, p. 713; R.S.1913, § 7833; C.S.1922, § 8777; C.S.1929, § 20-10,104; R.S.1943, § 25-10,104; Laws 1959, c. 103, § 2, p. 428.
Annotations
1. Return of property or value thereof
2. Value of possession
3. Damages
4. Miscellaneous
1. Return of property or value thereof
Property which cannot be returned in a replevin action is to be valued as of time of trial. Community Credit Co. v. Gillham, 191 Neb. 198, 214 N.W.2d 384 (1974).
Where plaintiff did not identify replevied cows to contract of purchase, judgment was reversed and remanded with directions to order return of cows to defendant and determine his damages. Putnam Ranches, Inc. v. Corkle, 189 Neb. 533, 203 N.W.2d 502 (1973).
Judgment that "defendant recover property replevined, or the sum of seven hundred ninety-four dollars and further sum of thirty-nine dollars and ninety-nine cents as damages," is in thereof in case a return cannot be had. Clark v. Oldham, 166 Neb. 672, 90 N.W.2d 329 (1958).
Judgment for return of property only was erroneous. Rice v. McGrath, 162 Neb. 511, 76 N.W.2d 428 (1956).
The alternative money judgment affords a measure of relief only when the property cannot be returned. Barstow v. Wolff, 148 Neb. 14, 26 N.W.2d 390 (1947).
Where verdict in replevin is for defendant, judgment should be entered in the alternative for the return of the property or its value if it cannot be returned and damages for detention. Landis Machine Co. v. Omaha Merchants Transfer Co., 142 Neb. 397, 9 N.W.2d 198 (1943).
Where property has been taken under writ of replevin and delivered to plaintiff and verdict is in favor of defendant, judgment must be in alternative for return of property or for its value, or for value of defendant's possession if it cannot be returned, and for damages for illegal detention. Securities Inv. Corp. v. Krejci, 128 Neb. 763, 260 N.W. 396 (1935).
"Value thereof" is instead of return, when return cannot be made, and is equivalent of the property as it was at time of trial. If judgment is affirmed on appeal and property returned to defendant pursuant thereto, he cannot recover on appeal bond for damages occurring prior to original judgment. Wallace v. Cox, 100 Neb. 601, 160 N.W. 992 (1916).
Judgment for defendant in replevin case must be in the alternative for a return of the property or the value thereof. Sullivan v. Hansen, 95 Neb. 779, 146 N.W. 983 (1914); Jameson v. Kent, 42 Neb. 412, 60 N.W. 879 (1894).
Judgment for return of property is unnecessary where evidence shows property cannot be returned. Ulrich v. McConaughey, 63 Neb. 10, 88 N.W. 150 (1901).
Election to return or pay value is left practically to plaintiff. Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N.W. 1085 (1901).
Judgment where verdict does not fix value of property is erroneous. Brownell & Co. v. Fuller, 57 Neb. 368, 77 N.W. 775 (1899).
Section is mandatory; judgment must be in the alternative. Martin v. Foltz, 54 Neb. 162, 74 N.W. 418 (1898).
Where verdict does not find value of property, no judgment can be entered. Goodwin v. Potter, 40 Neb. 553, 58 N.W. 1128 (1894).
County judge cannot commit for contempt of district court. Johnson v. Bouton, 35 Neb. 898, 53 N.W. 995 (1892).
Provision for form of judgment is for benefit of plaintiff as well as defendant. Manker v. Sine, 35 Neb. 746, 53 N.W. 734 (1892).
Where plaintiff made tender of chattels at place replevined, collection of money judgment could be enjoined. Reavis v. Horner, 11 Neb. 479, 9 N.W. 643 (1881).
Before plaintiff can complain of omission he must show that property can be returned. Goodman v. Kennedy, 10 Neb. 270, 4 N.W. 987 (1880).
Doubts should be resolved against remedy by injunction. Stone v. Snell, 4 Neb. Unof. 430, 94 N.W. 525 (1903).
If there is no alternative judgment for value, and property cannot be returned, plaintiff cannot complain of the alternative. Skow v. Locke, 3 Neb. Unof. 176, 91 N.W. 204 (1902).
2. Value of possession
Where judgment is for right of possession only, judgment amount should be value of such possession in case a return of property cannot be had, together with damages for withholding property, and costs. Jackson v. Arndt-Snyder Motor Co., 122 Neb. 276, 240 N.W. 279 (1932).
Verdict for defendant claiming under lien, failing to find value of possession, is erroneous. Creighton v. Haythorn, 49 Neb. 526, 68 N.W. 934 (1896).
3. Damages
Damages for depreciation in value of property may only be recovered if property is returned. Alliance Loan & Inv. Co. v. Morgan, 154 Neb. 745, 49 N.W.2d 593 (1951).
Plaintiff cannot complain that judgment for defendant was rendered only for damages for withholding property. Scott v. Burrill, 44 Neb. 755, 62 N.W. 1093 (1895).
Where verdict is silent on amount of damages, courts cannot render judgment therefor. Search v. Miller, 9 Neb. 26, 1 N.W. 975 (1879).
Where action proceeds as one for damages, it is not necessary for judgment to provide for return of property. McCarty v. Morgan, 2 Neb. Unof. 274, 96 N.W. 489 (1902).
4. Miscellaneous
Verdict held sufficient. Heffley v. Hunger, 54 Neb. 776, 75 N.W. 53 (1898).
Case will be remanded to have proper judgment entered on verdict. Roberson v. Reiter, 38 Neb. 198, 56 N.W. 877 (1893).
25-10,105.
Judgment for plaintiff; damages; costs.In all cases when the property has been delivered to the plaintiff, where the jury shall find for the plaintiff, on an issue joined, or on inquiry of damages upon a judgment by default, they shall assess adequate damages to the plaintiff for the illegal detention of the property; for which with costs of suit, the court shall render judgment for plaintiff.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 192, p. 423; R.S.1913, § 7834; C.S.1922, § 8778; C.S.1929, § 20-10,105; R.S.1943, § 25-10,105.
Annotations
1. Damages
2. Costs
3. Miscellaneous
1. Damages
The owner of personal property in a replevin action has the duty to mitigate damages the same as any other litigant. Ordinarily, the plaintiff in a replevin action may recover the interest on the value of the property during the period it was wrongfully detained; however, where the value of the loss of use of the property during such period exceeds the amount of such interest, then, instead of interest, the plaintiff may recover the value of the loss of use of the property. Where special damages are not shown, damages for wrongful detention are limited to the extent of interest on the value of the property during the time it was wrongfully detained. Allemang v. Kearney Farm Ctr., 251 Neb. 68, 554 N.W.2d 785 (1996).
Under this section, where a plaintiff in a replevin action recovers his property, the finder of fact must assess adequate damages to the plaintiff, including damages for loss of use of the wrongfully withheld property, if such property has value for use. Morfeld v. Bernstrauch, 216 Neb. 234, 343 N.W.2d 880 (1984).
Plaintiff entitled to damages based on the depreciated and deteriorated value of a chattel during detention, where defendant unlawfully detained a chattel in which plaintiff held a superior security interest. White Motor Credit Corp. v. Sapp Bros. Truck Plaza, Inc., 197 Neb. 421, 249 N.W.2d 489 (1977).
Where defendant has disposed of property in bad faith, plaintiff may recover damages. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Robertson, 87 Neb. 542, 127 N.W. 866 (1910).
Where verdict is for plaintiff, need only assess adequate damages for illegal detention, and costs. Mueller v. Parcel, 71 Neb. 795, 99 N.W. 684 (1904).
Cannot recover damages if defendant was not in possession when issued. Burr v. McCallum, 59 Neb. 326, 80 N.W. 1040 (1899).
Where no finding as to damages, judgment therefor is erroneous. Gordon v. Little, 41 Neb. 250, 59 N.W. 783 (1894).
Where finding is for plaintiff, only judgment provided is for damages for detention and costs. Nollkamper v. Wyatt, 27 Neb. 565, 43 N.W. 357 (1889).
2. Costs
Defendant is not liable for costs where he came into possession rightly and no demand was made before action started. Peters v. Parsons, 18 Neb. 191, 24 N.W. 687 (1885).
3. Miscellaneous
An action in replevin is properly triable to a jury. First State Bank of Scottsbluff v. Bear, 172 Neb. 504, 110 N.W.2d 83 (1961).
Demand is waived where defendant asserts right of possession. Tilden v. Stilson, 49 Neb. 382, 68 N.W. 478 (1896).
Demand is unnecessary where defendant came into possession wrongfully. Wilcox v. Beitel, 43 Neb. 457, 61 N.W. 722 (1895).
General denial does not waive demand. Littlefield v. Wilson, 1 Neb. Unof. 581, 95 N.W. 677 (1901).
Verdict finding right of possession in plaintiff and damages, need not find value of property or special interest. Keller v. Van Brunt, 1 Neb. Unof. 301, 95 N.W. 668 (1901).
25-10,106.
Property not taken or returned to defendant; judgment for plaintiff; nature and amount.When the property claimed has not been taken, or has been returned to the defendant by the sheriff for want of the undertaking required by section 25-1098, the action may proceed as one for damages only, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to such damages as are right and proper; but if the property be returned for want of the undertaking required by such section, the plaintiff shall pay all costs made by taking the same.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 193, p. 423; R.S.1913, § 7835; C.S.1922, § 8779; C.S.1929, § 20-10,106; R.S.1943, § 25-10,106.
Annotations
1. Possession
2. Damages
3. Miscellaneous
1. Possession
While there can be no recovery of damages for property of which defendant had no possession or control when action was instituted, evidence of possession prior to commencement may be presumed to continue and form basis for judgment. Tesar v. Bartels, 149 Neb. 889, 32 N.W.2d 911 (1948).
Damages cannot be awarded where property has passed into the lawful possession of a trustee in bankruptcy, unless actual possession of the property remained in the defendant or had been returned to him at time replevin action was brought. Omaha U. S. Employees' Federal Credit Union v. Brunson, 147 Neb. 439, 23 N.W.2d 717 (1946).
Action is not changed to trover; recovery depends on rights at commencement of action. Wilkins v. Redding, 70 Neb. 182, 97 N.W. 238 (1903).
In replevin the plaintiff cannot recover damages for property which was not in defendant's possession, or under his control, at the beginning of the suit. Heidiman-Benoist Saddlery Co. v. Schott, 59 Neb. 20, 80 N.W. 47 (1899).
2. Damages
If property is not returned, the measure of damages is the value of the property together with interest from the date of the unlawful taking. Hickman-Williams Agency v. Haney, 152 Neb. 219, 40 N.W.2d 813 (1950).
In an action properly commenced this section provides a remedy where the property has not been taken under the writ. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Robertson, 87 Neb. 542, 127 N.W. 866 (1910).
Where property cannot be found, taken, and delivered to plaintiff, or where bond is not given, action may proceed for damages. Hopkins v. State ex rel. Omaha Cooperage Co., 64 Neb. 10, 89 N.W. 401 (1902).
Measure of damages is market value and interest from time taken. Honaker v. Vesey, 57 Neb. 413, 77 N.W. 1100 (1899).
Where defendant parts with possession of property before suit is brought, action can proceed for damages. Lininger & Metcalf Co. v. Mills, 29 Neb. 297, 45 N.W. 463 (1890).
Where plaintiff fails to give bond, measure of damages is value of property at time taken with seven percent interest; judgment for return of property is error without prejudice. Sloan v. Fist, 2 Neb. Unof. 664, 89 N.W. 760 (1902).
3. Miscellaneous
Plaintiff may dismiss action without prejudice. Saussay v. Lemp Brewing Co., 52 Neb. 627, 72 N.W. 1026 (1897).
25-10,107.
Order for delivery of property; directed to other counties; successive orders; taxation of costs.An order may be directed to any other county than the one in which the action is brought, for the delivery of the property claimed. Several orders may issue at the same time, or successively, at the option of the plaintiff; but only one of them shall be taxed in the costs, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 194, p. 424; R.S.1913, § 7836; C.S.1922, § 8780; C.S.1929, § 20-10,107; R.S.1943, § 25-10,107.
Annotations
Order may be enforced by mandamus against warden of penitentiary. Hopkins v. State ex rel. Omaha Cooperage Co., 64 Neb. 10, 89 N.W. 401 (1902).
25-10,108.
Order of delivery; execution; powers of officer.The sheriff or other officer, in the execution of the order of delivery, may break open any building or enclosure in which the property claimed, or any part thereof, is concealed; but not until he has been refused an entrance into said building or enclosure and the delivery of the property, after having demanded the same.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 195, p. 424; R.S.1913, § 7837; C.S.1922, § 8781; C.S.1929, § 20-10,108; R.S.1943, § 25-10,108.
Annotations
There is no place, office or institution where officers of law cannot go to make service of order. Hopkins v. State ex rel. Omaha Cooperage Co., 64 Neb. 10, 89 N.W. 401 (1902).
25-10,109.
Suits on undertakings; when brought.No suit shall be instituted on the undertaking given under section 25-1098 before an execution issued on a judgment in favor of the plaintiff or defendant in the action shall have been returned, that sufficient property whereon to levy and make the amount of such judgment cannot be found in the county.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 196, p. 424; R.S.1913, § 7836; C.S.1922, § 8782; C.S.1929, § 20-10,109; R.S.1943, § 25-10,109;
Laws 1972, LB 1049, § 4.
Annotations
It is sufficient that plaintiff fails to return property and execution on money judgment is returned unsatisfied. Eickhoff v. Eikenbary, 52 Neb. 332, 72 N.W. 308 (1897).
Return of execution unsatisfied is prerequisite to action and petition must so allege. Hershiser v. Jordan, 25 Neb. 275, 41 N.W. 147 (1888).
Judgment against sureties on bond cannot be rendered in replevin action. Lininger v. Raymond, 9 Neb. 40, 2 N.W. 359 (1879).
25-10,110.
Order for delivery of property; issuance without court order; effect; taxation of costs.Any order for the delivery of property issued under section 25-1094 without the order of the court required thereby shall be set aside at the cost of the clerk issuing the same, and such clerk, as well as the plaintiff, shall also be liable in damages to the party injured.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 197, p. 424; R.S.1913, § 7839; C.S.1922, § 8783; C.S.1929, § 20-10,110; R.S.1943, § 25-10,110;
Laws 1973, LB 474, § 9.
Annotations
If order of delivery is issued without affidavit, the order may be set aside. Racine-Sattley Co. v. Meinen, 79 Neb. 33, 114 N.W. 602 (1908).
Affidavit is prerequisite; without it, order is nullity and may be set aside on proper application. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Rosso, 78 Neb. 184, 110 N.W. 686 (1907).
25-1101.
Issues; kinds.Issues arise on the pleadings where a fact or conclusion of law is maintained by one party and controverted by the other. They are of two kinds: (1) Of law; (2) of fact.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 277, p. 440; R.S.1913, § 7840; C.S.1922, § 8784; C.S.1929, § 20-1101; R.S.1943, § 25-1101.
Annotations
The pleadings before the trial court at the time of decision form the issues of the case. State ex rel. Douglas v. Schroeder, 212 Neb. 562, 324 N.W.2d 391 (1982).
25-1102.
Issue of fact; how formed.An issue of fact arises upon a material allegation in a pleading that is denied by a responsive pleading or that is considered as denied or avoided because no responsive pleading is required or permitted.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 278, p. 440; R.S.1913, § 7841; C.S.1922, § 8785; C.S.1929, § 20-1102; R.S.1943, § 25-1102;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 24.
Annotations
A general denial in answer puts in issue only such pleaded facts as are necessary to enable plaintiff to recover. Luikart v. Bank of Benkelman, 132 Neb. 501, 272 N.W. 324 (1937).
Party is as much entitled to be heard in trial court upon questions of law as upon issues of fact. Wagener v. Whitmore, 79 Neb. 558, 113 N.W. 238 (1907).
Where facts, though not conflicting, would cause impartial minds to draw different conclusions, question to be determined is not one of law for court, but one of fact. Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. Fries, 1 Neb. Unof. 691, 96 N.W. 71 (1901).
25-1103.
Trial, defined.A trial is a judicial examination of the issues, whether of law or of fact in an action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 279, p. 440; R.S.1913, § 7842; C.S.1922, § 8786; C.S.1929, § 20-1103; R.S.1943, § 25-1103.
Annotations
Hearing on a motion to dissolve an attachment is a trial. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Sorenson, 166 Neb. 364, 88 N.W.2d 902 (1958).
A trial is a judicial examination of the issues, whether of law or fact. Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 151 Neb. 663, 38 N.W.2d 533 (1949).
Where court decides case upon merits, after introduction of evidence, it is a trial. Shipley v. McNeel, 149 Neb. 790, 32 N.W.2d 639 (1948).
Hearing of motion to dissolve an attachment is a trial. Gibson v. Sidney, 50 Neb. 12, 69 N.W. 314 (1896).
Trial of an impeachment does not include preferring of charges. State v. Hill, 37 Neb. 80, 55 N.W. 794 (1893).
25-1104.
Issues; how tried generally; court and jury.Issues of law must be tried by the court, unless referred as provided in section 25-1129. Issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money or of specific real or personal property, shall be tried by a jury unless a jury trial is waived or a reference be ordered as hereinafter provided.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 280, p. 440; R.S.1913, § 7843; C.S.1922, § 8787; C.S.1929, § 20-1104; R.S.1943, § 25-1104.
Annotations
1. Trial to jury
2. Trial to court
3. Waiver of jury trial
4. Miscellaneous
1. Trial to jury
A landlord's causes of action for breach of contract, breach of guaranty, and unjust enrichment against a commercial tenant and its personal guarantors raised issues of fact arising in actions for recovery of money, and as such, they were legal in nature, entitling tenant and guarantors to a jury trial unless waived. 132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, 313 Neb. 45, 982 N.W.2d 778 (2022).
Cited in determining that material issues of fact in contested garnishment proceedings are triable to jury. Christiansen v. Moore, 184 Neb. 818, 172 N.W.2d 620 (1969).
The value of an attorney's services is a jury question. Neighbors & Danielson v. West Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 162 Neb. 816, 77 N.W.2d 667 (1956).
Ejectment is law action and triable to a jury, unless waived, notwithstanding equitable defenses are interposed. Foltz v. Brakhage, 151 Neb. 216, 36 N.W.2d 768 (1949).
Trial by jury is mandatory only when the inherent nature of the issues to be determined, or the express terms of statutes which may be involved, so require. In re Guardianship of Warner, 137 Neb. 25, 288 N.W. 39 (1939).
In cases in equity and those involving both law and equity, court may submit all issues of fact to jury, but it is not error to refuse to separate legal from equitable and try former to jury and latter to court. Rath v. Wilgus, 110 Neb. 810, 195 N.W. 115 (1923); Alter v. Bank of Stockham, 53 Neb. 223, 73 N.W. 667 (1897).
A law action is not triable without a jury because there are issues incidental to main one which are equitable in their nature. Alter v. Skiles, 93 Neb. 597, 141 N.W. 187 (1913).
Action on account of waste and conversion of property was triable to jury. Gandy v. Wiltse, 79 Neb. 280, 112 N.W. 569 (1907).
Prosecutions under search and seizure law are not within the provisions of this section requiring jury trial. Sothman v. State, 66 Neb. 302, 92 N.W. 303 (1902).
In suit on county treasurer's bond, to recover money embezzled, defendant was entitled to jury trial, although accounting was asked. Kuhl v. Pierce County, 44 Neb. 584, 62 N.W. 1066 (1895).
2. Trial to court
An action to enforce an attorney's charging lien is equitable in nature and will not be tried before a jury. Barber v. Barber, 207 Neb. 101, 296 N.W.2d 463 (1980).
Where a cause of action for equitable relief is stated and the plaintiff prays for equitable relief, a jury trial cannot be demanded as a matter of right by the defendant, even if defendant pleads legal defenses or has made a counterclaim for damages. Kuhlman v. Cargile, 200 Neb. 150, 262 N.W.2d 454 (1978).
Where mortgage foreclosure proceeding is properly brought, questions of title arising therein can be litigated without a jury. Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes, 143 Neb. 58, 8 N.W.2d 545 (1943).
Party cannot demand jury on adverse possession issue in quiet title suit. Krumm v. Pillard, 104 Neb. 335, 177 N.W. 171 (1920).
Issues raised by equitable counterclaim in law action are triable to court. Hotaling v. Tecumseh Nat. Bank, 55 Neb. 5, 75 N.W. 242 (1898).
When a cause of action for equitable relief is stated, a jury cannot be demanded as a matter of right. Sharmer v. McIntosh, 43 Neb. 509, 61 N.W. 727 (1895).
Cannot demand jury in mechanic's lien foreclosure. Dohle v. Omaha Foundry & Machine Co., 15 Neb. 436, 19 N.W. 644 (1884).
Party is not entitled to general jury trial in actions quia timet. Roggencamp v. Converse, 15 Neb. 105, 17 N.W. 361 (1883); Harral & Uhl v. Gray, 10 Neb. 186, 4 N.W. 1040 (1880).
Charge of contempt of court is not for jury. Gandy v. State, 13 Neb. 445, 14 N.W. 143 (1882).
3. Waiver of jury trial
A commercial tenant and its personal guarantors did not waive their right to a jury trial on a landlord's causes of action for breach of contract, breach of guaranty, and unjust enrichment by failing to demand a jury trial for a previously and separately tried cause of action for forcible entry and detainer. 132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, 313 Neb. 45, 982 N.W.2d 778 (2022).
A party’s waiver of a jury trial in district court is statutorily governed by section 25-1126, because it sets reasonable limits on a constitutional right. Section 25-1126 provides an exclusive list of the manners in which a waiver occurs. Unless a party’s conduct falls into one of that section’s three categories, a court will not find a waiver of a constitutional right. Section 25-1126 does not provide that a party waives the right to jury trial by failing to demand one. Jacobson v. Shresta, 288 Neb. 615, 849 N.W.2d 515 (2014).
Cases in which the parties tried issues of fact to the court without objection or asked for a directed verdict should be construed as falling into the “oral consent” category of waivers. Such conduct is inconsistent with demanding a jury trial, and the trial court’s judgment operates as its assent to the procedure. Jacobson v. Shresta, 288 Neb. 615, 849 N.W.2d 515 (2014).
Merely failing to object, before trial, to a defendant’s request for a bench trial on a bifurcated affirmative defense is not oral consent in open court to waive a jury trial. Jacobson v. Shresta, 288 Neb. 615, 849 N.W.2d 515 (2014).
A jury trial is not required by this section in an action to foreclose a mortgage on personal property and for a deficiency judgment. State Securities Co. v. Corkle, 191 Neb. 578, 216 N.W.2d 879 (1974).
Where the constitutional right to a trial by jury exists, the cause cannot be referred in the absence of waiver of that right. Yager v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Hastings, 52 Neb. 321, 72 N.W. 211 (1897).
Waiver of jury is presumed to be general and not for a particular term. Boslow v. Shenberger, 52 Neb. 164, 71 N.W. 1012 (1897).
Form in which issues are made up is waived, unless objected to. Hay v. Miller, 48 Neb. 156, 66 N.W. 1115 (1896); Downie v. Ladd, 22 Neb. 531, 35 N.W. 388 (1887).
Where issues of fact are tried by court without objection appearing of record, presumption is that jury was waived. Davis v. Snyder, 45 Neb. 415, 63 N.W. 789 (1895).
4. Miscellaneous
This section fails to specify that a school district reorganization case is entitled to jury trial. Schroeder v. Oeltjen, 184 Neb. 8, 165 N.W.2d 81 (1969).
Appeal from action of county superintendents in reorganization of school districts was triable de novo. Roy v. Bladen School Dist. No. R-31, 165 Neb. 170, 84 N.W.2d 119 (1957).
After overruling of motion for summary judgment, case is retained for trial as in any other civil action. Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 59 N.W.2d 614 (1953).
Practice of nonsuiting plaintiff at close of opening statements to jury disapproved. Temple v. Cotton Transfer Co., 126 Neb. 287, 253 N.W. 349 (1934).
Nature of action is determined from pleadings. Lett v. Hammond, 59 Neb. 339, 80 N.W. 1042 (1899).
25-1105.
Issues of fact triable to court.All other issues of fact shall be tried by the court, subject to its power to order any issue or issues to be tried by a jury, or referred as provided in this code.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 281, p. 441; R.S.1913, § 7844; C.S.1922, § 8788; C.S.1929, § 20-1105; R.S.1943, § 25-1105.
Annotations
Claims brought under this section may be equitable in nature, and in such case the court may submit questions of fact to the jury, but the jury's determination is only an advisory one. In re Estate of Layton, 212 Neb. 518, 323 N.W.2d 817 (1982).
Appeals in guardianship matters are heard de novo in Supreme Court. Cass v. Pense, 155 Neb. 792, 54 N.W.2d 68 (1952).
Contest over sufficiency of election by widow to take under statute was triable de novo in Supreme Court. In re Estate of Bergren, 154 Neb. 289, 47 N.W.2d 582 (1951).
In suits not triable by jury as of right, a verdict of a jury is advisory only. In re Guardianship of Warner, 137 Neb. 25, 288 N.W. 39 (1939).
Jury cannot be demanded on adverse possession issue in suit to quiet title. Krumm v. Pillard, 104 Neb. 335, 177 N.W. 171 (1920).
Verdict in equity case on issue of fact is advisory only. Bank of Stockham v. Alter, 61 Neb. 359, 85 N.W. 300 (1901).
Issues in equity causes are triable to the court without a jury. Smith v. Perry, 52 Neb. 738, 73 N.W. 282 (1897).
Power of court of equity to obtain verdict of jury on issues of fact is preserved by the code. Omaha Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 50 Neb. 580, 70 N.W. 30 (1897).
25-1106.
Formation of jury; applicability of law.The general mode of summoning, impaneling, challenging and swearing the jury is not changed by this code.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 282, p. 441; R.S.1913, § 7845; C.S.1922, § 8789; C.S.1929, § 20-1106; R.S.1943, § 25-1106.
Annotations
Peremptory challenges and challenges for cause are provided to safeguard constitutional right of trial by jury in criminal case. Oden v. State, 166 Neb. 729, 90 N.W.2d 356 (1958).
In examination of venireman upon voir dire, he will not be deemed to have deceived counsel as to relations with opposing counsel, when he admits relations and answers questions truthfully. Blakely v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 94 Neb. 119, 142 N.W. 525 (1913).
Error cannot be predicated upon overruling of challenge to juror for cause when record does not show that complaining party has exhausted all his peremptory challenges. Olmstead v. Noll, 82 Neb. 147, 117 N.W. 102 (1908).
That juror has served on another case growing out of same state of facts does not necessarily disqualify him. Granite State Fire Ins. Co. v. Buckstaff Bros. Mfg. Co., 53 Neb. 123, 73 N.W. 544 (1897).
The improper excusing of a juror will not work a reversal unless all peremptory challenges are used. Smith v. Meyers, 52 Neb. 70, 71 N.W. 1006 (1897).
Selection of talesmen is entrusted to the discretion of the sheriff. Pflueger v. State, 46 Neb. 493, 64 N.W. 1094 (1895).
25-1107.
Order of trial.When the jury has been sworn the trial shall proceed in the following order, unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs:
(1) The plaintiff must briefly state his claim, and may briefly state the evidence by which he expects to sustain it.
(2) The defendant must then briefly state his defense, and may briefly state the evidence he expects to offer in support of it.
(3) The party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side must first produce his evidence; the adverse party will then produce his evidence.
(4) The parties will then be confined to rebutting evidence unless the court, for good reasons in furtherance of justice, permits them to offer evidence in their original case.
(5) When the evidence is concluded, either party may request instructions to the jury on points of law, which shall be refused or given by the court; which instructions shall be reduced to writing if either party requires it.
(6) The parties may then submit or argue the case to the jury. In argument, the party required first to produce his evidence shall have the opening and conclusion. If several defendants have separate defenses and appear by different counsel, the court shall arrange their relative order.
(7) The court may again charge the jury after the argument is concluded.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 283, p. 441; R.S.1913, § 7846; C.S.1922, § 8790; C.S.1929, § 20-1107; R.S.1943, § 25-1107.
Annotations
1. Opening statements
2. Production of evidence
3. Instructions
4. Closing arguments
5. Miscellaneous
1. Opening statements
Statute does not require plaintiff's attorney to state a "cause of action" in opening statement to jury, nor a statement of all evidence intended to be relied on. Temple v. Cotton Transfer Co., 126 Neb. 287, 253 N.W. 349 (1934).
Counsel is allowed considerable latitude in opening statement; mere fact that he fails to prove all that he expected does not mean statement intentionally false. Yechout v. Tesnohlidek, 97 Neb. 387, 150 N.W. 199 (1914).
2. Production of evidence
Party required first to produce evidence has the right to open argument. Redman Industries, Inc. v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 179 Neb. 406, 138 N.W.2d 708 (1965).
Burden of proving damage in eminent domain proceedings rests on landowner. Rath v. Sanitary District No. One of Lancaster County, 156 Neb. 444, 56 N.W.2d 741 (1953).
Party on whom rests burden of proof must first produce evidence and rest; contrary rule by trial court was not prejudicial error in principal case. Olson v. Hansen, 122 Neb. 492, 240 N.W. 551 (1932).
Party who would be defeated if no evidence produced has burden. Grosvenor v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 102 Neb. 629, 168 N.W. 596 (1918).
Party having burden of proof first produces evidence and opens; no discretion in court. Sheibley v. Fales, 81 Neb. 795, 116 N.W. 1035 (1908).
Right to open and close evidence and arguments follows burden of proof. Refusal is prejudicial error. Brumback v. American Bank of Beatrice, 53 Neb. 714, 74 N.W. 264 (1898).
If party having burden of proof permits others to first introduce evidence, he waives right to open and close. Brooks v. Dutcher, 22 Neb. 644, 36 N.W. 128 (1888).
3. Instructions
Proper time to submit requested instructions is as early in trial as possible; not later than close of evidence. Whitehall v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 125 Neb. 16, 248 N.W. 692 (1933).
4. Closing arguments
In jury trial, the party who, by the pleadings, is required to first produce evidence is entitled to open and close argument to jury. J. I. Case Co. v. Hrubesky, 125 Neb. 588, 251 N.W. 169 (1933).
Party who, by pleadings, is first required to produce evidence is entitled to opening and closing arguments. Bennington State Bank v. Petersen, 114 Neb. 420, 207 N.W. 673 (1926).
Improper argument, rebuked by trial court, will not justify reversal, unless Supreme Court believes statement prejudicially influenced jury. Court on own motion should interfere to prevent improper appeal to jury. Krum v. Sullivan & Schaberg Transfer & Fuel Co., 97 Neb. 491, 150 N.W. 640 (1915); Cowan v. Ertel, 95 Neb. 380, 145 N.W. 841 (1914).
Whether defendant can deprive plaintiff of reply by refusing to argue is discretionary with court. Henry v. Dussell, 71 Neb. 691, 99 N.W. 484 (1904).
The right to open and close is determined by an inspection of the pleadings. Zweibel v. Myers, 69 Neb. 294, 95 N.W. 597 (1903).
If any material facts in petition are not admitted, but denied, directly or argumentatively, plaintiff opens. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 68 Neb. 483, 94 N.W. 540 (1903).
Denial of damage alone, plaintiff opens. Summers v. Simms, 58 Neb. 579, 79 N.W. 155 (1899).
Waiver of right to open is not waiver of right to reply to defendant's argument. Hickman v. Layne, 47 Neb. 177, 66 N.W. 298 (1896).
On trial by court, denial of right to open is not error, if party is not prejudiced thereby. Citizens State Bank v. Baird, 42 Neb. 219, 60 N.W. 551 (1894); See Olds Wagon Co. v. Benedict, 25 Neb. 372, 41 N.W. 254 (1889).
Where insanity was pleaded as defense to suit on note, defendant had right to open and close. Rea v. Bishop, 41 Neb. 202, 59 N.W. 555 (1894).
Denial of right to open and close is prejudicial error. Johnson v. Nelson, 3 Neb. Unof. 260, 91 N.W. 526 (1902).
5. Miscellaneous
Suggestion of amount of recovery was not improper. Yount v. Seager, 181 Neb. 665, 150 N.W.2d 245 (1967).
Order of trial presented by this section controls reading of testimony taken at former trial. Mills v. Mills, 130 Neb. 881, 266 N.W. 759 (1936).
Aggravated misconduct of counsel in argument may require reversal. Hansen v. Mallett, 101 Neb. 339, 163 N.W. 145 (1917).
Where both parties move for directed verdict, finding of court takes place of verdict. Krecek v. Supreme Lodge of F. U. A., 95 Neb. 428, 145 N.W. 859 (1914).
Order of trial is governed by state of pleadings at beginning of trial, not by admissions in trial. Kraus v. Clark, 81 Neb. 575, 116 N.W. 164 (1908).
An action, including a counterclaim, should be tried as an entirety, and not as separate suits. Miller v. McGannon, 79 Neb. 609, 113 N.W. 170 (1907).
To review ruling on misconduct of attorney, parties must object and except to ruling. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 54 Neb. 127, 74 N.W. 454 (1898).
25-1107.01.
Jurors; permitted to take notes; use; destruction.Jurors shall be permitted, but not required, to take notes. The notes may be used during the jury's deliberations and shall be treated as confidential between the juror making them and the other jurors. The notes shall not be preserved in any form. The trial judge shall ensure the confidentiality of the notes during the course of the trial and the jury's deliberations and shall instruct the bailiff to immediately mutilate and destroy such notes upon return of the verdict.
25-1108.
View of property or place by jury.Whenever, in the opinion of the court, it is proper for the jury to have a view of property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body, under charge of the bailiff, to the place, which shall be shown to them by the bailiff, an individual appointed by the court for that purpose, or both. While the jury are thus absent, no person other than the bailiff or individual so appointed shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 284, p. 442; R.S.1913, § 7847; C.S.1922, § 8791; C.S.1929, § 20-1108; R.S.1943, § 25-1108;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 38.
Annotations
1. Propriety
2. Effect
3. Miscellaneous
1. Propriety
A motion to inspect the premises under this section is, by the terms of the statute, left to the discretion of the trial court. Kopecky v. National Farms, Inc., 244 Neb. 846, 510 N.W.2d 41 (1994).
A trial judge has the same power to view the premises as a jury, and such inspection is entitled to same effect in both cases. Birdwood Irr. Dist. v. Brodbeck, 148 Neb. 824, 29 N.W.2d 621 (1947).
Statute implies that trial judge may examine the premises involved in any case where a view would have been warranted had the case been tried before a jury. Taxpayer's League of Wayne County v. Wightman, 139 Neb. 212, 296 N.W. 886 (1941).
This section is merely confirmatory of power generally recognized as existing in trial court apart from any statute. Carter v. Parsons, 136 Neb. 515, 286 N.W. 696 (1939).
It is proper for the jury, properly cautioned, to view the mechanism of a street car for closing the rear door. Denison v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 135 Neb. 307, 280 N.W. 905 (1938).
Refusal to allow jury to view the place where a material fact occurred, in absence of abuse of discretion, is not reversible error hereunder. Large v. Johnson, 124 Neb. 821, 248 N.W. 400 (1933).
Court may require jury to view property. Beck v. Staats, 80 Neb. 482, 114 N.W. 633 (1908).
2. Effect
Jury may take into account the result of their observations at the locus in quo and make it, in connection with the other evidence, the basis of their verdict. Rundall v. Grace, 132 Neb. 490, 272 N.W. 398 (1937).
Where jury is permitted to view the premises, the result of its observations is evidence which, in arriving at a verdict, it may consider only in connection with other competent evidence. Stull v. Department of Roads and Irrigation, 129 Neb. 822, 263 N.W. 148 (1935).
Jury is to take into account result of observations at the locus in quo, in connection with other evidence. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Farwell, 60 Neb. 322, 83 N.W. 71 (1900).
View of premises in dispute by jury is evidence, and not merely means of enabling jury to better connect evidence. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Farwell, 59 Neb. 544, 81 N.W. 440 (1900), reversed on rehearing, 60 Neb. 322, 83 N.W. 71 (1900).
3. Miscellaneous
View of premises must be made in presence of person appointed by the court. Larsen v. Omaha Transit Co., 168 Neb. 205, 95 N.W.2d 554 (1959).
Where there was a change in conditions, view of premises was properly denied. Pospichal v. Wiley, 163 Neb. 236, 79 N.W.2d 275 (1956).
Where abuse of discretion is not shown, refusal to view premises is not error. Ricenbaw v. Kraus, 157 Neb. 723, 61 N.W.2d 350 (1953).
Language of court in sending jury to inspect premises was in compliance with statute. Drollinger v. Hastings & N. W. R. R. Co., 98 Neb. 520, 153 N.W. 619 (1915).
Viewing of property may, in discretion of court, be made before all evidence has been introduced. Alberts v. Husenetter, 77 Neb. 699, 110 N.W. 657 (1906).
25-1109.
Cause submitted; action and conduct of jury.When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire, they must be kept together in some convenient place, under the charge of an officer, until they agree upon a verdict, or are discharged by the court, subject to the discretion of the court to permit them to separate temporarily at night and at their meals. The officer having them under his charge shall not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, unless by order of the court, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 285, p. 442; R.S.1913, § 7848; C.S.1922, § 8792; C.S.1929, § 20-1109; R.S.1943, § 25-1109.
Annotations
Where bailiff in charge of jury learned that certain juror was voting for acquittal and thereupon went into jury room and by his attitude and statements influenced juror, a new trial was required. Bramlett v. State, 129 Neb. 180, 261 N.W. 166 (1935).
Allowing jury to separate temporarily during the night is a salutary provision for comfort of jury and permissible at discretion of trial judge. Wiegand v. Lincoln Traction Co., 123 Neb. 766, 244 N.W. 298 (1932).
Fact that there were law reports, with markers therein at cases similar to the case in trial, in jury room, was not error in absence of showing that some juror read them. In re Estate of Wilson, 114 Neb. 593, 208 N.W. 961 (1926).
It is duty of jury to follow instructions given by court. Union State Bank v. Hutton, 62 Neb. 664, 87 N.W. 533 (1901); Barton v. Shull, 62 Neb. 570, 87 N.W. 322 (1901).
It was error for juror to state to fellow jurors facts within his own knowledge. Ewing v. Hoffine, 55 Neb. 131, 75 N.W. 537 (1898).
It is not reversible error to leave jury in charge of deputy sheriff not specially sworn for that purpose. Deranlieu v. Jandt, 37 Neb. 532, 56 N.W. 299 (1893).
25-1110.
Jury; separation; admonition of court.If the jury are permitted to separate either during the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse with or suffer themselves to be addressed by any other person on the subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express any opinion thereon until the cause is finally submitted to them.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 286, p. 442; R.S.1913, § 7849; C.S.1922, § 8793; C.S.1929, § 20-1110; R.S.1943, § 25-1110.
Annotations
This section does not apply to criminal prosecutions. Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W.2d 689 (1951).
25-1111.
Instructions by court; requested instructions; requirements.It shall be the duty of the judges of the several district courts, in all cases, both civil and criminal, to reduce their charges or instructions to the jury to writing, before giving the same to the jury, unless the so giving of the same is waived by the counsel in the case in open court, and so entered in the record of said case; and either party may request instructions to the jury on points of law, which shall be given or refused by the court. All instructions asked shall be in writing.
Source:Laws 1875, § 1, p. 77; R.S.1913, § 7850; C.S.1922, § 8794; C.S.1929, § 20-1111; R.S.1943, § 25-1111.
Annotations
1. Duty to instruct
2. Failure to instruct
3. Oral instructions
4. Waiver
5. Directed verdict
6. Written instructions
7. Miscellaneous
1. Duty to instruct
Whether requested to do so or not, a trial court has the duty to instruct the jury on issues presented by the pleadings and the evidence, and it must, on its own motion, correctly instruct on the law. State v. Brennauer, 314 Neb. 782, 993 N.W.2d 305 (2023).
In criminal prosecution where evidence connecting defendant with offense is circumstantial, court should, upon request, give a proper instruction to guide jury in determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction. Vinciquerra v. State, 127 Neb. 541, 256 N.W. 78 (1934).
It is error to refuse requested instruction warranted by evidence and correctly stating law, unless principles involved covered by other instructions. Hyndshaw v. Mills, 108 Neb. 250, 187 N.W. 780 (1922).
2. Failure to instruct
It is not error to fail to instruct on contributory negligence, where no such instruction requested, nor evidence offered. Wilson v. Morris & Co., 108 Neb. 255, 187 N.W. 805 (1922).
3. Oral instructions
Where the record clearly shows an oral request for a jury instruction, and there is a full understanding of the requested instruction by the court, review of the court's ruling on the instruction will not be precluded by a failure to reduce the request to writing. State v. Hegwood, 202 Neb. 379, 275 N.W.2d 605 (1979).
Oral explanation on effect of unavoidable accident was erroneous. Owen, Admr. v. Moore, 166 Neb. 226, 88 N.W.2d 759 (1958).
Oral instruction as to manner of preparing a verdict and effect thereof was reversible error. Anderson v. Evans, 164 Neb. 599, 83 N.W.2d 59 (1957).
Giving oral instructions on law applicable is reversible error, where written instructions are not waived. Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb. 271, 231 N.W. 747 (1930), 74 A.L.R. 5 (1930).
It is error to give or modify instructions orally, if exception is taken. Hartwig v. Gordon, 37 Neb. 657, 56 N.W. 324 (1893).
In order to obtain relief concerning oral instructions, the appellant must demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the trial court's actions. State v. McDaniel, 17 Neb. App. 725, 771 N.W.2d 173 (2009).
4. Waiver
Waiver in civil case by stipulation filed. Kuhn v. Nelson, 61 Neb. 224, 85 N.W. 56 (1901); Burns v. City of Fairmont, 28 Neb. 866, 45 N.W. 175 (1890).
Entry of waiver should be made upon record. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 16 Neb. 413, 20 N.W. 269 (1884).
5. Directed verdict
Mandatory instruction to return a verdict in favor of one of the parties need not be in writing. Alloway v. Aiken, 146 Neb. 714, 21 N.W.2d 495 (1946).
It is error to refuse defendant's request for directed verdict, where evidence is insufficient to support verdict for plaintiff. Hoxie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 102 Neb. 442, 167 N.W. 557 (1918); Halsted v. Shackelton, 98 Neb. 13, 151 N.W. 954 (1915); Shlik v. Armour & Co., 97 Neb. 101, 149 N.W. 308 (1914); Schmidt v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 95 Neb. 43, 144 N.W. 1044 (1914).
Court is not required to make special findings when directing verdict. First Nat. Bank of Sutton v. Schiermeyer, 99 Neb. 704, 157 N.W. 617 (1916).
Where both parties request directed verdict, court may pronounce judgment without submission to jury. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Austin, 96 Neb. 137, 147 N.W. 126 (1914); Schmidt v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 95 Neb. 43, 144 N.W. 1044 (1914).
Direction to return verdict for party may be oral. Salisbury v. Press Pub. Co., 76 Neb. 849, 108 N.W. 136 (1906).
6. Written instructions
Although this section directs that a requested instruction be in writing, when the record demonstrates that a trial court understood the nature of the orally requested jury instruction, an appellate court may review the trial court's refusal to give the orally requested instruction. State v. Grant, 242 Neb. 364, 495 N.W.2d 253 (1993).
Requested instructions must be submitted in writing. State v. Maxwell, 193 Neb. 807, 229 N.W.2d 195 (1975).
An instruction to the jury must be in writing unless the requirement is waived in open court. Omey v. Stauffer, 174 Neb. 247, 117 N.W.2d 481 (1962).
Statements of court on voir dire examination of jury are not instructions required to be in writing. Lee v. State, 147 Neb. 333, 23 N.W.2d 316 (1946).
7. Miscellaneous
Advising jury as to limited purpose for which testimony was introduced was not violation of this section. Grandsinger v. State, 161 Neb. 419, 73 N.W.2d 632 (1955).
Explanatory statements on voir dire examination were not instructions. Rakes v. State, 158 Neb. 55, 62 N.W.2d 273 (1954).
Issues and facts should not be involved, confused or incumbered by recital of unnecessary pleadings or surplusage, in instructions. Lang v. Omaha & C. B. Str. Railway Co., 96 Neb. 740, 148 N.W. 964 (1914).
25-1112.
Requested instruction; how modified.If the court refuses a written instruction, as demanded, but gives the same with a modification, which the court may do, such modification shall not be by interlineation or erasure, but shall be well defined and shall follow some such characterizing words as "changed thus," which words shall themselves indicate that the same was refused as demanded.
Source:Laws 1875, § 2, p. 77; R.S.1913, § 7851; C.S.1922, § 8795; C.S.1929, § 20-1112; R.S.1943, § 25-1112.
Annotations
Where trial court refuses to give a proffered instruction, and so indicates on the margin thereof, it is not interlineation or erasure to embody statements therefrom in one of the court's instructions. Merritt v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 136 Neb. 52, 285 N.W. 97 (1939).
Modification of requested instruction; exception must be noted, not to modification merely, but to manner of making same. Hunt v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 95 Neb. 746, 146 N.W. 986 (1914).
Action of trial court in modifying instruction may not be reviewed in absence of exception. Denise v. Omaha, 49 Neb. 750, 69 N.W. 119 (1896).
25-1113.
Given or refused instructions; how indicated; requirements.The court must read over all the instructions which it intends to give, and none others, to the jury, and must announce them as given, and shall announce as refused, without reading to the jury, all those which are refused, and must write the words given, or refused, as the case may be, on the margin of each instruction.
Source:Laws 1875, § 3, p. 77; R.S.1913, § 7852; C.S.1922, § 8796; C.S.1929, § 20-1113; R.S.1943, § 25-1113.
Annotations
Endorsement on instruction "given as modified" was not in accord with statute, but was not prejudicial. Asher v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961).
Instructions given should be so endorsed by trial judge. Segebart v. Gregory, 160 Neb. 64, 69 N.W.2d 315 (1955).
Giving of oral instruction was reversible error. Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb. 271, 231 N.W. 747 (1930), 74 A.L.R. 5 (1930).
Instructions must be read to jury in open court. Taulborg v. Andresen, 119 Neb. 273, 228 N.W. 528 (1930), 67 A.L.R. 642 (1930).
Failure to write word "given" on instruction read to jury is not ground for reversal when not prejudicial. Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903); McClellan v. Hein, 56 Neb. 600, 77 N.W. 120 (1898); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Decker, 55 Neb. 346, 75 N.W. 841 (1898).
Instructions must be considered together. To review alleged errors in refusing instructions they must be called to attention of trial court by motion for new trial. Schmitt & Bros. Co. v. Mahoney, 60 Neb. 20, 82 N.W. 99 (1900).
Disregard of provisions is ground of reversal if excepted to. Tracey v. State, 46 Neb. 361, 64 N.W. 1069 (1895); Omaha & Florence L. & T. Co. v. Hansen, 32 Neb. 449, 49 N.W. 456 (1891); Gillen v. Riley, 27 Neb. 158, 42 N.W. 1054 (1889).
Record must show ruling on instruction, or action of court will not be reviewed. It is not error to fail to mark "given" or "refused." Jolly v. State, 43 Neb. 857, 62 N.W. 300 (1895); City of Chadron v. Glover, 43 Neb. 732, 62 N.W. 62 (1895).
Failure to read instructions to jury is reversible error. McDuffie v. Bentley, 27 Neb. 380, 43 N.W. 123 (1889).
A trial court's failure to mark a jury instruction as "given" or "refused" pursuant to this section is not available as
error on appeal in the absence of an objection made on these statutory grounds at trial. Schuemann v. Menard, Inc.,
27 Neb. App. 977, 938 N.W.2d 378 (2020).
25-1114.
Instructions; paragraphing; numbering; filing; record.If the giving or refusal be excepted to, the same may be without any stated reason therefor, and all instructions demanded, as well as all instructions given to the jury by the court on its own motion, must be plainly and legibly written in consecutively numbered paragraphs, and filed by the clerk before being read to the jury by the court; and such instructions shall be preserved as part of the record of the cause in which they were given.
Source:Laws 1875, § 4, p. 77; R.S.1913, § 7853; C.S.1922, § 8797; C.S.1929, § 20-1114;
R.S.1943, § 25-1114.
Annotations
1. Writing and filing
2. Tender
3. Objections and exceptions
4. Miscellaneous
1. Writing and filing
Instructions must be filed before being read to the jury. Segebart v. Gregory, 160 Neb. 64, 69 N.W.2d 315 (1955).
Statute requires all instructions to be in writing and filed by the clerk before being read to the jury. Whitehall v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 125 Neb. 16, 248 N.W. 692 (1933).
That instructions were not filed before read is not available error unless excepted to. Minzer v. William Mercantile Co., 59 Neb. 410, 81 N.W. 307 (1899); Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Ruby, 58 Neb. 730, 79 N.W. 723 (1899).
An objection that jury instructions were not filed by the clerk before being read to the jury as required by this
section must be made when or before the instructions are read, or the objection is waived. Schuemann v. Menard,
Inc., 27 Neb. App. 977, 938 N.W.2d 378 (2020).
2. Tender
Before error can be based upon failure to instruct, proper instruction must be prepared and tendered by court. Weber Bros. v. Whetstone, 53 Neb. 371, 73 N.W. 695 (1898).
3. Objections and exceptions
Where instruction did not fully state law, but did not misstate it, attention of trial court must be called to omission, or not reversible error. Edwards & Bradford Lumber Co. v. Lamb, 95 Neb. 263, 145 N.W. 703 (1914).
Under former statute instructions were not reviewed where no exceptions taken during trial. Acme Harvesting Machine Co. v. Brigham, 95 Neb. 62, 144 N.W. 1035 (1914); Union P. R. R. Co. v. Meyer, 76 Neb. 549, 107 N.W. 793 (1906).
Party not objecting to instructions is presumed to be satisfied therewith. Beckwith v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 75 Neb. 349, 106 N.W. 442 (1905).
Errors in ruling on instructions must be separately assigned in motion for new trial. Globe Oil Co. v. Powell, 56 Neb. 463, 76 N.W. 1081 (1898); Kloke v. Martin, 55 Neb. 554, 76 N.W. 168 (1898); McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Courtright, 54 Neb. 18, 74 N.W. 418 (1898); Karnes v. Dovey, 53 Neb. 725, 74 N.W. 311 (1898).
Objections to instructions must be presented to the trial court by motion for new trial. Hake v. Woolner, 55 Neb. 471, 75 N.W. 1087 (1898); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Schellak, 35 Neb. 701, 53 N.W. 605 (1892).
Error in giving oral instructions is not reversible unless excepted to. Elliott v. Carter White-Lead Co., 53 Neb. 458, 73 N.W. 948 (1898).
Failure to except to instruction does not waive exception taken to evidence on same point. Rosenthal v. Ogden, 50 Neb. 218, 69 N.W. 779 (1897).
4. Miscellaneous
Instructions should cover issues where supported by evidence. Hessig-Ellis Drug Co. v. Harley Drug Co., 95 Neb. 267, 145 N.W. 716 (1914).
Refusal to direct verdict against plaintiff at close of his case is waived by introduction of evidence by defendant. Mack v. Parkieser, 53 Neb. 528, 74 N.W. 38 (1898).
Instructions based on evidence cannot be reviewed in absence of bill of exceptions. Sunday Creek Coal Co. v. Burnham, 52 Neb. 364, 72 N.W. 487 (1897).
25-1115.
Instructions; oral explanation prohibited; failure to reduce instructions to writing; failure of court to perform duty; effect.No oral explanation of any instruction authorized by the preceding sections shall, in any case, be allowed, and any instruction or charge, or any portion of a charge or instructions, given to the jury by the court and not reduced to writing, as aforesaid, or a neglect or refusal on the part of the court to perform any duty enjoined by the preceding sections, shall be error in the trial of the case, and sufficient cause for the reversal of the judgment rendered therein.
Source:Laws 1875, § 5, p. 77; R.S.1913, § 7854; C.S.1922, § 8798; C.S.1929, § 20-1115; R.S.1943, § 25-1115.
Annotations
1. Error
2. Miscellaneous
1. Error
A directive from the court to a deadlocked jury to keep deliberating which is given orally without notice to the parties or their counsel violates this section and section 25-1116 and is improper. State v. Thomas, 262 Neb. 985, 637 N.W.2d 632 (2002).
An oral explanation of an instruction is not allowed. Omey v. Stauffer, 174 Neb. 247, 117 N.W.2d 481 (1962).
Oral explanation of instruction in negligence action was error. Owen, Admr. v. Moore, 166 Neb. 226, 88 N.W.2d 759 (1958).
To predicate error on giving of oral instruction, objection must be made at the time of giving thereof. Danze v. Stange, 165 Neb. 227, 85 N.W.2d 295 (1957).
The giving of oral instructions in regard to principles of law applicable is reversible error. Anderson v. Evans, 164 Neb. 599, 83 N.W.2d 59 (1957).
Trial court's oral statement to jury out of presence of counsel that negligence of defendant must be concurrent, and that the jury could not apportion damages, was erroneous as "oral instruction." Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb. 271, 231 N.W. 747 (1930), 74 A.L.R. 5 (1930).
At conclusion of charge, court said "The instruction asked by defendant is refused"; this was not prejudicial. McMartin v. State, 95 Neb. 292, 145 N.W. 695 (1914).
2. Miscellaneous
Directing a jury to reread properly given instructions is not an instruction as contemplated by this section. In re Petition of Omaha Pub. Power. Dist., 268 Neb. 43, 680 N.W.2d 128 (2004).
Court may orally advise jury as to limited purpose for which testimony is received. Grandsinger v. State, 161 Neb. 419, 73 N.W.2d 632 (1955).
Prohibition against oral instructions was not violated. Segebart v. Gregory, 160 Neb. 64, 69 N.W.2d 315 (1955).
Trial court's explanation of legal term on voir dire examination of jury was not required to be in writing. Rakes v. State, 158 Neb. 55, 62 N.W.2d 273 (1954).
Statements of court herein were not oral modifications of instructions. Grammer v. State, 103 Neb. 325, 172 N.W. 41 (1919).
Section is mandatory; applies to both civil and criminal cases. Ehrlich v. State, 44 Neb. 810, 63 N.W. 35 (1895).
Where giving of written instructions is waived, objection will not be considered on appeal. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 16 Neb. 413, 20 N.W. 269 (1884).
Judge should not make oral statement to jury during trial. Republican Valley R. R. Co. v. Arnold, 13 Neb. 485, 14 N.W. 478 (1882).
In order to obtain relief concerning oral instructions, the appellant must demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the trial court's actions. State v. McDaniel, 17 Neb. App. 725, 771 N.W.2d 173 (2009).
This section has not been construed so as to require a trial court to reduce to writing all the admonitions which it may be proper to give the jury while the trial is in progress. State v. Claycamp, 14 Neb. App. 675, 714 N.W.2d 455 (2006).
If a judge delivers to a jury an Allen charge orally and without notice to the parties or their counsel, then the State bears the burden of proving that the defendant was not prejudiced by the improper communication between judge and jury. State v. Owen, 1 Neb. App. 1060, 510 N.W.2d 503 (1993).
25-1116.
Instructions after retirement.After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there be a disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed as to any part of the law arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them to the court where the information upon the point of law shall be given, and the court may give its recollection as to the testimony on the point in dispute in the presence of or after notice to the parties or their counsel.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 287, p. 442; R.S.1913, § 7855; C.S.1922, § 8799; C.S.1929, § 20-1116; R.S.1943, § 25-1116.
Annotations
1. Testimony or instructions
2. Presence of parties or counsel
3. Miscellaneous
1. Testimony or instructions
Heightened procedures are required when a court considers a jury’s request under this section to rehear testimony that was presented in the form of an audio or video recording. State v. Vandever, 287 Neb. 807, 844 N.W.2d 783 (2014).
“Testimony” for purposes of this section encompasses evidence authorized as “testimony” under section 25-1240, that is, as live testimony at trial by oral examination or by some substitute for live testimony, including but not limited to, affidavit, deposition, or video recording of an examination conducted prior to the time of trial for use at trial. State v. Vandever, 287 Neb. 807, 844 N.W.2d 783 (2014).
Reading by court reporter of portions testimony requested was compliance with statute. Graves v. Bednar, 171 Neb. 499, 107 N.W.2d 12 (1960).
Court may permit reading of testimony by official court reporter. Shiers v. Cowgill, 157 Neb. 265, 59 N.W.2d 407 (1953).
If trial judge substantially misstates the testimony in giving his recollection, it is error, but to predicate error on failure to make a complete statement, request should be made for a further or fuller statement. Barton v. Shull, 70 Neb. 324, 97 N.W. 292 (1903).
At request of jury, court may give its recollection of evidence; if misstated, it is error. Official reporter may, at request of jury, and in presence of court read testimony. Darner v. Daggett, 35 Neb. 695, 53 N.W. 608 (1892); Stephens & Roberts v. Patterson, 29 Neb. 697, 46 N.W. 154 (1890).
Trial court on its own motion may recall jury and give additional instruction. Jessen v. Donahue, 4 Neb. Unof. 838, 96 N.W. 639 (1903).
2. Presence of parties or counsel
The failure of the court to notify counsel of a jury's question is reversible error only if prejudice results. Facilities Cost Mgmt. Group v. Otoe Cty. Sch. Dist., 298 Neb. 777, 906 N.W.2d 1 (2018).
If it becomes necessary to give further instructions to the jury during deliberation, the proper practice is to call the jury into open court and to give any additional instructions in writing in the presence of the parties or their counsel. State v. Gutierrez, 272 Neb. 995, 726 N.W.2d 542 (2007).
If it becomes necessary to give further instructions to the jury during deliberation, the proper practice is to call the jury into open court and to give any additional instructions in writing in the presence of the parties or their counsel. State v. Jackson, 264 Neb. 420, 648 N.W.2d 282 (2002).
A directive from the court to a deadlocked jury to keep deliberating which is given orally without notice to the parties or their counsel violates section 25-1115 and this section and is improper. State v. Thomas, 262 Neb. 985, 637 N.W.2d 632 (2002).
When it becomes necessary for the court to give further instruction to the jury while it is deliberating, the proper practice is to call the jury into open court and to give any additional instructions in writing in the presence of the parties or their counsel. Nebraska Depository Inst. Guar. Corp. v. Stastny, 243 Neb. 36, 497 N.W.2d 657 (1993).
Although trial court technically violated section by giving written reply to jury's request for definition out of presence of counsel, appellant could not show prejudice and thus error was harmless error. In re Estate of Corbett, 211 Neb. 335, 318 N.W.2d 720 (1982).
The reading by an official court reporter, after the jury has retired for deliberation, of testimony of a witness examined on trial is proper so long as such action is in the presence of or after notice to the parties or their counsel. Bakhit v. Thomsen, 193 Neb. 133, 225 N.W.2d 860 (1975).
Further instructions to or communications with jury after it has retired should be in open court in presence of parties or counsel. Taulborg v. Andresen, 119 Neb. 273, 228 N.W. 528 (1930), 67 A.L.R. 642 (1930).
If a judge delivers to a jury an Allen charge orally and without notice to the parties or their counsel, then the State bears the burden of proving that the defendant was not prejudiced by the improper communication between judge and jury. State v. Owen, 1 Neb. App. 1060, 510 N.W.2d 503 (1993).
3. Miscellaneous
If, in answer to request, further instructions are sent to jury room, record should show consent. Martin v. Martin, 76 Neb. 335, 107 N.W. 580 (1906).
25-1117.
Jury; when discharged.The jury may be discharged by the court on account of the sickness of a juror, or other accident or calamity requiring their discharge, or by consent of both parties, or after they have been kept together until it satisfactorily appears that there is no probability of their agreeing.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 288, p. 442; R.S.1913, § 7856; C.S.1922, § 8800; C.S.1929, § 20-1117; R.S.1943, § 25-1117.
25-1118.
Jury; retrial on discharge.In all cases where the jury are discharged during the trial, or after the cause is submitted to them, it may be tried again immediately or at a future time as the court may direct.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 289, p. 442; R.S.1913, § 7857; C.S.1922, § 8801; C.S.1929, § 20-1118; R.S.1943, § 25-1118.
25-1119.
Assessment of amount of recovery.When, by the verdict, either party is entitled to recover money of the adverse party, the jury in their verdict must assess the amount of recovery.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 295, p. 443; R.S.1913, § 7858; C.S.1922, § 8802; C.S.1929, § 20-1119; R.S.1943, § 25-1119.
Annotations
Verdict for the plaintiff in amount of "no money" is in effect no verdict at all. Bushey v. French, 171 Neb. 809, 108 N.W.2d 237 (1961).
Where jury finds for plaintiff on its cause of action, and also for defendant on its counterclaim or setoff, verdict must show amount of each finding. Horse Shoe Lake Drainage Dist. v. Crane Co., 112 Neb. 323, 199 N.W. 526 (1924).
Court cannot disregard verdict and enter such judgment as evidence warrants; if verdict is not sustained by evidence, remedy is by motion for new trial. Kenesaw Mill & E. Co. v. Aufdenkamp, 106 Neb. 246, 183 N.W. 294 (1921).
Court may in action of debt add interest when such appears from verdict to be so intended by jury. Wiruth v. Lashmett, 85 Neb. 286, 123 N.W. 427 (1909).
Verdict may assess different amounts against different defendants. Lininger & Metcalf Co. v. Webb, 51 Neb. 10, 70 N.W. 519 (1897).
Failure to include in judgment interest allowed by jury on verdict was not prejudicial to defendant. Wiseman v. Ziegler, 41 Neb. 886, 60 N.W. 320 (1894).
25-1120.
Special verdict; controls general verdict.When the special finding of facts is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former controls the latter, and the court may give judgment accordingly.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 294, p. 443; R.S.1913, § 7859; C.S.1922, § 8803; C.S.1929, § 20-1120; R.S.1943, § 25-1120.
Annotations
1. Construction
2. Inconsistency
3. Miscellaneous
1. Construction
Special findings that testatrix was incompetent and that will was procured by undue influence do not invalidate a general verdict denying validity of will. Anderson v. Claussen, 196 Neb. 787, 246 N.W.2d 586 (1976).
Special finding of facts controls verdict. Carlson v. Hanson, 166 Neb. 96, 88 N.W.2d 140 (1958).
Court will, when possible, construe special findings as consistent with general verdict. Havlik v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 87 Neb. 427, 127 N.W. 248 (1910).
Special findings, to be in conflict with general verdict, must be clearly so; special finding on irrelevant issue will be disregarded. Citizens National Bank of Grand Island v. Wedgwood, 45 Neb. 143, 63 N.W. 375 (1895).
2. Inconsistency
General verdict is not required where a special verdict is submitted. Baum v. County of Scotts Bluff, 172 Neb. 225, 109 N.W.2d 295 (1961).
Special verdict controls general verdict in case of conflict. Sohler v. Christensen, 151 Neb. 843, 39 N.W.2d 837 (1949).
Special finding of fact controls general verdict; if difference between two, it is proper and necessary to require remittitur of such difference as condition on which case affirmed. McGrew Machine Co. v. One Spring Alarm Clock Co., 124 Neb. 93, 245 N.W. 263 (1932).
Special findings control general verdict, where inconsistent as to liability of each of two defendants. Walker v. McCabe, 110 Neb. 398, 193 N.W. 761 (1923).
In equitable action judgment will be reversed if essential special findings are in conflict with general findings, and former are sufficiently supported by evidence. Carpenter Paper Co. v. News Pub. Co., 63 Neb. 59, 87 N.W. 1050 (1901).
Where special findings establish contributory negligence they are inconsistent with general verdict for plaintiff. Norfolk Beet-Sugar Co. v. Preuner, 55 Neb. 656, 75 N.W. 1097 (1898).
Special findings to warrant judgment, notwithstanding general verdict to contrary, must include all facts from which such judgment results as a necessary legal conclusion. Omaha Life Assn. v. Kettenbach, 55 Neb. 330, 75 N.W. 827 (1898).
General verdict will be set aside if in irreconcilable conflict with special findings on a material fact. Culbertson I. & W. P. Co. v. Olander, 51 Neb. 539, 71 N.W. 298 (1897).
Special findings control general verdict. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. McGinnis, 49 Neb. 649, 68 N.W. 1057 (1896); Johnston v. Milwaukee & Wyoming Inv. Co., 49 Neb. 68, 68 N.W. 383 (1896).
3. Miscellaneous
A general verdict cannot rectify improper or erroneous special findings. Wagner v. State, 176 Neb. 589, 126 N.W.2d 853 (1964).
It is error for court, after jury discharged, to vacate special finding and enter judgment on general verdict. Story v. Sramek, 108 Neb. 440, 187 N.W. 881 (1922).
Motion for judgment on special findings is not waiver of right to be heard on motion for new trial. Kafka v. Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha, 87 Neb. 331, 127 N.W. 129 (1910).
New trial will not be allowed for failure of jury to answer questions not material to issues. Modlin v. Jones & Co., 84 Neb. 551, 121 N.W. 984 (1909).
Special findings, unsupported by evidence, will not support judgment. American Fire Ins. Co. v. Buckstaff Bros. Mfg. Co., 52 Neb. 676, 72 N.W. 1047 (1897).
25-1121.
Special verdicts; when allowed; procedure; filing; record.In every action for the recovery of money only or specific real property, the jury, in their discretion, may render a general or special verdict. In all other cases the court may direct the jury to find a special verdict, in writing, upon all or any of the issues and in all cases may instruct them, if they render a general verdict, to find upon particular questions of fact to be stated in writing, and may direct a written finding thereon. The special verdict or finding must be filed with the clerk and entered upon the record.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 293, p. 443; R.S.1913, § 7860; C.S.1922, § 8804; C.S.1929, § 20-1121; R.S.1943, § 25-1121;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 13.
Annotations
1. Special verdict
2. Trial court discretion
3. Miscellaneous
1. Special verdict
Under circumstances of case, rendition of special verdict was proper. Baum v. County of Scotts Bluff, 172 Neb. 225, 109 N.W.2d 295 (1961).
Special findings, based upon conflicting evidence, will not be disturbed. Norfolk Beet-Sugar Co. v. Hight, 59 Neb. 100, 80 N.W. 276 (1899).
2. Trial court discretion
Trial court may submit special verdict in negligence action. Carlson v. Hanson, 166 Neb. 96, 88 N.W.2d 140 (1958).
Court may direct submission of special issues to jury, or jury may render special verdict without direction from the court. McGrew Machine Co. v. One Spring Alarm Clock Co., 124 Neb. 93, 245 N.W. 263 (1932).
Submission of special findings is within the discretion of trial court. Buel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 81 Neb. 430, 116 N.W. 299 (1908); American Fire Ins. Co. v. Landfare, 56 Neb. 482, 76 N.W. 1068 (1898); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. King, 52 Neb. 562, 72 N.W. 855 (1897); Hedrick v. Strauss, Uhlman & Guthman, 42 Neb. 485, 60 N.W. 928 (1894); Reed v. McRill, 41 Neb. 206, 59 N.W. 775 (1894).
3. Miscellaneous
This section has no application to criminal trials. State v. Bradley, 210 Neb. 882, 317 N.W.2d 99 (1982).
Quotient verdict is not void in absence of previous agreement that it should be controlling. Herbert v. Katzberg, 104 Neb. 395, 177 N.W. 650 (1920).
Objection that special findings are not signed is waived unless made before they are received and recorded. Thompson v. Thompson, 49 Neb. 157, 68 N.W. 372 (1896).
It is error for court to enter judgment on general verdict when material special findings are returned unanswered. Sandwich Enterprise Co. v. West, 42 Neb. 722, 60 N.W. 1012 (1894); Doom v. Walker, 15 Neb. 339, 18 N.W. 138 (1884).
In absence of abuse of discretion, refusal to submit special findings is not error. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lawler, 40 Neb. 356, 58 N.W. 968 (1894).
25-1122.
General and special verdicts; definitions; form of special verdicts generally.The verdict of a jury is either general or special. A general verdict is that by which they pronounce, generally, upon all or any of the issues either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant. A special verdict is that by which the jury finds the facts only. It must present the facts as established by the evidence, and not the evidence to prove them; and they must be so presented that nothing remains to the court but to draw from them conclusions of law.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 292, p. 443; R.S.1913, § 7861; C.S.1922, § 8805; C.S.1929, § 20-1122; R.S.1943, § 25-1122.
Annotations
Where the jury returned a general verdict in favor of an injured railroad employee on his claims for lost earnings and benefits, it was presumed on appeal that the jury found in favor of the employee on all issues, including lost wages. Heckman v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., 286 Neb. 453, 837 N.W.2d 532 (2013).
A special verdict is one by which the jury finds the facts only. Baum v. County of Scotts Bluff, 172 Neb. 225, 109 N.W.2d 295 (1961).
Where special verdict found that negligence of plaintiff was more than slight and negligence of defendant less than gross, dismissal of action was proper. Carlson v. Hanson, 166 Neb. 96, 88 N.W.2d 140 (1958).
Where jury finds amount of principal debt, court can compute interest thereon and render judgment for amount due. Wiruth v. Lashmett, 85 Neb. 286, 123 N.W. 427 (1909).
Error cannot be predicated, in absence of proper request, on failure to submit additional questions. Town v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 50 Neb. 768, 70 N.W. 402 (1897).
Where special finding is a conclusion or an inference drawn from others, it may be disregarded. Johnston v. Milwaukee & Wyoming Inv. Co., 49 Neb. 68, 68 N.W. 383 (1896).
Where special findings do not cover entire case, court may refuse to submit same. First Nat. Bank of North Bend v. Miltonberger, 33 Neb. 847, 51 N.W. 232 (1892).
25-1123.
Verdict; form; correction.The verdict shall be written, signed by the foreman, and read by the clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. If any juror disagrees, the jury must be sent out again; but if no disagreement be expressed, and neither party requires the jury to be polled, the verdict is complete, and the jury discharged from the case. If, however, the verdict be defective in form only, the same may, with the assent of the jury before they are discharged, be corrected by the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 291, p. 443; R.S.1913, § 7862; C.S.1922, § 8806; C.S.1929, § 20-1123; R.S.1943, § 25-1123.
Annotations
1. Procedure
2. Irregularities
3. Amendment
4. Miscellaneous
1. Procedure
Provision that verdict be read by clerk to jury and inquiry made whether it is their verdict is directory merely. Bryan v. Manchester, 111 Neb. 748, 197 N.W. 425 (1924).
This section applies only to case where juror dissents when polled; it does not deprive court of power to send jury out again to reconsider verdict which erroneously attempts to apportion damages between defendants jointly liable. Forslund v. Swenson, 110 Neb. 188, 192 N.W. 649 (1923).
Court cannot disregard verdict and enter such judgment as the evidence warrants; where verdict is not sustained by evidence, remedy is motion for new trial. Kenesaw Mill & Elevator Co. v. Aufdenkamp, 106 Neb. 246, 183 N.W. 294 (1921).
Objection to form of verdict is to be taken when rendered, except when incomplete or material issues are ignored. Wiruth v. Lashmett, 85 Neb. 286, 123 N.W. 427 (1909).
It is not error for foreman to sign verdict in open court. Clough v. State, 7 Neb. 320 (1878).
Where the jurors are polled by the court and discovered to be in disagreement, a jury verdict form incorrectly signed by all 12 jurors is not a defect of form only. Bailey v. AMISUB, 1 Neb. App. 56, 489 N.W.2d 323 (1992).
2. Irregularities
The requirement that assent occur before a jury is discharged is to assure that the jury is assembled together and agrees that there was in fact a defect in the form of its verdict and is met by reassembly of the jury. Harmon Cable Communications v. Scope Cable Television, 237 Neb. 871, 468 N.W.2d 350 (1991).
Defects in a verdict which are matters of substance must be corrected before the jury is discharged; therefor, the trial court could not reassemble the jury, interrogate it as to its intended verdict, and then modify the amount of the verdict. Eich v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 208 Neb. 714, 305 N.W.2d 621 (1981).
Mere irregularities, not objected to, are waived. Jones v. Driscoll, 46 Neb. 575, 65 N.W. 194 (1895).
A verdict, "we the jury find for plaintiff," will not authorize judgment for any sum whatever. Bowers v. Rice, 19 Neb. 576, 27 N.W. 646 (1886).
Verdict need not be entitled. Morrissey v. Schindler, 18 Neb. 672, 26 N.W. 476 (1886).
Verdict is not to be rejected because jury adds provisions for costs; such words are mere surplusage. McEldon v. Patton, 4 Neb. Unof. 259, 93 N.W. 938 (1903).
3. Amendment
Defective verdict may be amended by jury or court with consent of jury. Davis v. Neligh, 7 Neb. 78 (1878).
4. Miscellaneous
In action by servant against master and foreman jointly, verdict against master alone will not be set aside because not also against foreman, where principal negligence was that of master. Usher v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 97 Neb. 526, 150 N.W. 814 (1915).
The verdict of a jury whose finding is based upon conjecture and not on evidence cannot be permitted to stand. Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Hruby, 70 Neb. 5, 96 N.W. 998 (1903).
25-1124.
Rendition of verdict; polling of jury.When the jury have agreed upon their verdict, they must be conducted into court, their names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by the foreman. When the verdict is announced, either party may require the jury to be polled, which is done by the clerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If any one answer in the negative, the jury must again be sent out for further deliberation.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 290, p. 443; R.S.1913, § 7863; C.S.1922, § 8807; C.S.1929, § 20-1124; R.S.1943, § 25-1124.
Annotations
Verdict of jury should be received only when judge is present and the court open for the transaction of business; objection to verdict on ground that it was irregularly received by trial court cannot be properly raised for first time in appellate court. In re Estate of Lodge, 123 Neb. 531, 243 N.W. 781 (1932).
Provision that names of jurors must be called by clerk is directory merely. Bryan v. Manchester, 111 Neb. 748, 197 N.W. 425 (1924).
This section does not apply to a criminal prosecution. Evers v. State, 84 Neb. 708, 121 N.W. 1005 (1909).
Mere statement by foreman in open court that jury has agreed, without stating nature of decision, is not a verdict. Union P. R. R. Co. v. Connolly, 77 Neb. 254, 109 N.W. 368 (1906).
Where upon reading of sealed verdict same is challenged by a juror and jury is subsequently unable to agree, it was properly discharged. Lincoln Trac. Co. v. Heller, 72 Neb. 127, 100 N.W. 197 (1904).
By agreement, jury may after agreeing, seal verdict and deliver to officer in charge; when opened in their presence, if defective, jury may be sent out to correct. Rogers v. Sample, 28 Neb. 141, 44 N.W. 86 (1889).
When polling the jury, the trial court is not required to go beyond the procedure specified in this section by inquiring into the basis for the jury's determination of the percentage of a party's negligence, because such inquiry would invade the province of the jury. Anis v. BryanLGH Health System, 14 Neb. App. 372, 707 N.W.2d 60 (2005).
25-1125.
Five-sixths verdict; jurors to sign.In all trials in civil actions in any court in this state, a verdict shall be rendered if five-sixths or more of the members of the jury concur therein, and such verdict shall have the same force and effect as though agreed to by all members of the jury; Provided, that a verdict concurred in by less than all members of the jury shall not be rendered until the jury shall have had an opportunity for deliberation and consideration of the case for a period of not less than six hours after the same is submitted to said jury. If a verdict be concurred in by all the members of the jury, the foreman alone may sign it, but if rendered by a less number, such verdict shall be signed by all the jurors who shall agree to the verdict.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 124, § 1, p. 534; C.S.1922, § 8808; C.S.1929, § 20-1125; R.S.1943, § 25-1125.
Annotations
A juror is free to deliberate and vote on each issue presented to the jury, even if the juror has dissented from the majority on a previous issue. Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., 265 Neb. 918, 663 N.W.2d 43 (2003).
Even though a juror, who disagreed on the question of who was liable, provided the 10th vote necessary on the damages and apportionment questions, the verdict was valid. Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., 265 Neb. 918, 663 N.W.2d 43 (2003).
Length of time devoted to meals cannot be shown to prove that jury did not deliberate six hours. Cartwright & Wilson Constr. Co. v. Smith, 155 Neb. 431, 52 N.W.2d 274 (1952).
The presumption is in favor of the regularity of the proceeding of the district court and that the jury deliberated six hours before returning the verdict by ten jurors. Lovelace v. Boatsman, 113 Neb. 145, 202 N.W. 418 (1925).
25-1126.
Jury trial; waiver.The trial by jury may be waived by the parties in actions arising on contract and with assent of the court in other actions (1) by the consent of the party appearing, when the other party fails to appear at the trial by himself or herself or by attorney, (2) by written consent, in person or by attorney, filed with the clerk, and (3) by oral consent in open court entered upon the record.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 296, p. 444; R.S.1913, § 7864; C.S.1922, § 8809; C.S.1929, § 20-1126; R.S.1943, § 25-1126;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 14.
Annotations
1. Waiver
2. Oral Consent
3. Written consent
4. Miscellaneous
1. Waiver
Where the parties agreed that a hearing to set trial was not conducted on the record and no record was available for review on appeal, and where a commercial tenant and its guarantors opted not to present their own case in chief or move for a directed verdict at trial on damages, instead continuing their objection to the trial going forward without a jury, there was no "oral consent in open court entered upon the record" operating to waive commercial tenant's and guarantors' right to a jury trial. 132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, 313 Neb. 45, 982 N.W.2d 778 (2022).
The client is bound by the attorney's choice to waive a jury trial in a civil action. McGill Restoration v. Lion Place Condo. Assn., 309 Neb. 202, 959 N.W.2d 251 (2021).
A party’s waiver of a jury trial in district court is statutorily governed by this section because it sets reasonable limits on a constitutional right. This section provides an exclusive list of the manners in which a waiver occurs. Unless a party’s conduct falls into one of this section’s three categories, a court will not find a waiver of a constitutional right. It does not provide that a party waives the right to jury trial by failing to demand one. Jacobson v. Shresta, 288 Neb. 615, 849 N.W.2d 515 (2014).
2. Oral Consent
The rule that when parties try issues of fact to the court without objection or ask for a directed verdict it should be construed as a waiver of jury trial by "oral consent" applies individually to bifurcated trials. 132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, 313 Neb. 45, 982 N.W.2d 778 (2022).
Cases in which the parties tried issues of fact to the court without objection or asked for a directed verdict should be construed as falling into the “oral consent” category of waivers under this section. Such conduct is inconsistent with demanding a jury trial, and the trial court’s judgment operates as its assent to the procedure. Jacobson v. Shresta, 288 Neb. 615, 849 N.W.2d 515 (2014).
Merely failing to object, before trial, to a defendant’s request for a bench trial on a bifurcated affirmative defense is not oral consent in open court to waive a jury trial. Jacobson v. Shresta, 288 Neb. 615, 849 N.W.2d 515 (2014).
3. Written Consent
A written waiver of jury trial signed by defense counsel in criminal case and acquiesced in by defendant is a valid waiver. State v. Klatt, 192 Neb. 219, 219 N.W.2d 761 (1974).
4. Miscellaneous
It is within discretion of trial court to permit a waiver of trial by jury to be withdrawn. McKinney v. County of Cass, 180 Neb. 685, 144 N.W.2d 416 (1966).
In a will contest in district court on appeal, contestant not appearing, proponent may waive jury trial. Shelby v. St. James Orphan Asylum, 66 Neb. 40, 92 N.W. 155 (1902).
Where jury trial is waived, order of argument is subject to discretion of court. Citizens State Bank v. Baird, 42 Neb. 219, 60 N.W. 551 (1894).
Waiver of jury trial may be made in replevin, with assent of court. Baker v. Daily, 6 Neb. 464 (1877).
25-1127.
Trial by court; general finding; findings of fact; conclusions of law.Upon the trial of questions of fact by the court, it shall not be necessary for the court to state its finding, except, generally, for the plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties request it, with a view of excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in the trial; in which case the court shall state in writing the conclusions of fact found separately from the conclusions of law.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 297, p. 444; R.S.1913, § 7865; C.S.1922, § 8810; C.S.1929, § 20-1127; R.S.1943, § 25-1127.
Annotations
1. Request
2. Sufficiency
3. Refusal to give
4. Miscellaneous
1. Request
The trial court was not required to make a specific determination regarding which driver had the right-of-way where no party requested specific findings by the court. Hall v. County of Lancaster, 287 Neb. 969, 846 N.W.2d 107 (2014).
In the absence of a specific request by a party, a trial court is not required to make detailed findings of fact. Lange Indus. v. Hallam Grain Co., 244 Neb. 465, 507 N.W.2d 465 (1993).
In a case tried to the court without a jury, a motion for specific findings of fact must be made before final submission of the case to the court. Stuczynski v. Stuczynski, 238 Neb. 368, 471 N.W.2d 122 (1991).
Purpose of statute is to enable parties to question the rulings of the trial court upon legal questions involved. Such conclusions of fact and law are mandatory when requested in a law action, but are merely helpful in equity actions since the Supreme Court reviews the record de novo and reaches conclusions independent of the trial court. Under this section the court is not obliged to answer specific interrogatories propounded to it by a litigant. Fee v. Fee, 223 Neb. 128, 388 N.W.2d 122 (1986).
This section does not require the court to reply to specific interrogatories propounded to it by a litigant but only to provide, when requested, such findings of fact as the court concludes are appropriate and necessary to resolve the action. Lindgren v. City of Gering, 206 Neb. 360, 292 N.W.2d 921 (1980).
The court need only state its finding generally unless one of the parties timely requests conclusions of fact. Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 239 N.W.2d 772 (1976).
Special findings are unnecessary unless requested. Bailey v. McCoy, 187 Neb. 618, 193 N.W.2d 270 (1971).
After court has announced decision, request made for separate findings of fact and conclusions of law came too late. In re Estate of Wiley, 150 Neb. 898, 36 N.W.2d 483 (1949).
Special findings are not required when no request therefor is made. Mogil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 147 Neb. 1087, 26 N.W.2d 126 (1947).
When a request is properly made of the court for separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, the provisions of this section are mandatory. Dormer v. Dreith, 145 Neb. 742, 18 N.W.2d 94 (1945).
Where a jury is waived, request by one of the parties is a prerequisite to special findings of fact. Condon Co. v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 135 Neb. 284, 281 N.W. 31 (1938).
Request for special findings of fact and separate conclusions of law, in trial of a cause to the court without a jury, must be made before the final submission of the case to render compliance therewith compulsory. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Mitchell Irr. Dist., 129 Neb. 586, 262 N.W. 543 (1935).
Request for statement of court's conclusions of law and fact is effective if made within reasonable time before action is required thereon. Henley v. Live Stock Nat. Bank, 127 Neb. 857, 257 N.W. 244 (1934).
It is mandatory in law action, without jury, that court shall, on request, separately state conclusions of fact and of law. Carl v. Wentz, 116 Neb. 880, 219 N.W. 390 (1928); Lyman v. Waterman, 51 Neb. 283, 70 N.W. 921 (1897).
Purpose of requiring separate findings of fact and conclusions of law is to enable parties to question the rulings of the court upon legal questions involved. Modern Woodmen of America v. Lane, 62 Neb. 89, 86 N.W. 943 (1901).
Separate findings must be requested. Sheibley v. Dixon County, 61 Neb. 409, 85 N.W. 399 (1901).
Request must be made not later than final submission of case. Ross v. Barker, 58 Neb. 402, 78 N.W. 730 (1899).
Request to find separately as to certain matters is not request for separate findings. Axthelm v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 2 Neb. Unof. 444, 89 N.W. 313 (1902).
2. Sufficiency
Under this section, in the absence of a request by a party for specific findings, a trial court is not required to make detailed findings of fact and need only make its findings generally for the prevailing party. Cullinane v. Beverly Enters. - Neb., 300 Neb. 210, 912 N.W.2d 774 (2018); Lesser v. Eagle Hills Homeowners' Assn., 20 Neb. App. 423, 824 N.W.2d 77 (2012).
The failure by the trial court separately to state findings of fact or conclusions of law under this section is not reversible error where the record affirmatively shows that such failure worked no injury to appellant. D & R Realty v. Bender, 230 Neb. 301, 431 N.W.2d 920 (1988).
General finding is sufficient in absence of request for special findings. Mueller v. Keeley, 165 Neb. 243, 85 N.W.2d 309 (1957).
Where facts were not disputed and court made findings covering important points in case, failure to find additional facts was not reversible error. National Bond & Investment Co. v. Haas, 124 Neb. 631, 247 N.W. 563 (1933).
Omission of facts conclusively established, treated as found, on appeal. Lancaster County v. Fitzgerald, 86 Neb. 676, 126 N.W. 141 (1910).
Finding that "all the equities are with plaintiff," is one of law and insufficient to support judgment. Ganow v. Denny, 68 Neb. 706, 94 N.W. 959 (1903).
If the court finds all of the facts from which the law will infer a fraudulent intent, a decree based thereon will not be reversed as contrary to law because the court failed to state in its finding that the fraudulent intent existed. Cochran v. Cochran, 62 Neb. 450, 87 N.W. 152 (1901).
When the court makes special findings of fact and they are silent as to a material issue, such omissions will be construed against the party on whom rested the burden of establishing such issue. Farrell v. Bouck, 61 Neb. 874, 86 N.W. 907 (1901).
General finding for plaintiff by justice of peace is sufficient to sustain judgment on error proceedings. Coad v. Read, 48 Neb. 40, 66 N.W. 1002 (1896).
General finding is in lieu of verdict, and need be no more specific. Rhodes v. Thomas, 31 Neb. 848, 48 N.W. 886 (1891).
In the absence of any special or general findings on issues properly presented, no judgment can stand. Foster v. Devinney, 28 Neb. 416, 44 N.W. 479 (1890).
This section does not require findings of fact to be separately stated but only separated from conclusions of law. Haller v. Blaco, 14 Neb. 195, 15 N.W. 348 (1883).
If finding be vague, uncertain, or indefinite, judgment is voidable but not void. Sprick v. Washington County, 3 Neb. 253 (1874).
3. Refusal to give
Court may refuse a request for separate findings of fact and conclusions of law which are improper in form. Donald v. Heller, 143 Neb. 600, 10 N.W.2d 447 (1943).
Where evidence is not in conflict upon any issue necessary to support judgment, a failure by the trial court to state separately findings of fact or conclusions of law, even though request is made therefor, is not a reversible error. In re Guardianship of Lyon, 140 Neb. 159, 299 N.W. 322 (1941).
Refusal of request for special findings made after judgment entered is not error. Austin v. Diffendaffer, 96 Neb. 747, 148 N.W. 907 (1914).
It is error for the court to refuse to make special findings, and the error is not cured by assigning findings on overruling a motion for a new trial. Wiley v. Shars, 21 Neb. 712, 33 N.W. 418 (1887).
4. Miscellaneous
This section does not apply to criminal cases. State v. Osborn, 250 Neb. 57, 547 N.W.2d 139 (1996); State v. Dake, 247 Neb. 579, 529 N.W.2d 46 (1995).
This section has no application to criminal proceedings. State v. Franklin, 241 Neb. 579, 489 N.W.2d 552 (1992).
As a judicial practice, a specific finding for the prevailing party is desirable; however, such is not required and, in the absence of a request for such findings, we examine the judgment as recorded. Havelock Bank v. Woods, 219 Neb. 57, 361 N.W.2d 197 (1985).
Where neither party requested findings hereunder, the court presumes that controverted facts were decided by the trial court in favor of the successful party. Burgess v. Curly Olney's, Inc., 198 Neb. 153, 251 N.W.2d 888 (1977).
Judgment not based on general or specific findings is erroneous, but not necessarily void. Maryott v. Gardner, 50 Neb. 320, 69 N.W. 837 (1897).
It is error for court to enter decree annulling title without either a special or general finding against defendant. Edwards v. Reid, 39 Neb. 645, 58 N.W. 202 (1894).
This section applies to justice practice. Crossley v. Steele, 13 Neb. 219, 13 N.W. 175 (1882).
Unsolicited, specific findings recited by the trial court during the hearing on a motion for new trial, and written by the court in the order denying that motion, may supplant the general finding made in the initial judgment. C. Goodrich, Inc. v. Thies, 14 Neb. App. 170, 705 N.W.2d 451 (2005).
If there be a conflict between the general and special findings made by the trial court, the special findings will control. Citizens Bank of Humphrey v. Stockslager, 1 Neb. Unof. 799, 96 N.W. 591 (1901).
25-1128.
Trial by the court; provisions for jury trials applicable.The provisions of this Chapter respecting trials by jury, apply, so far as they are in their nature applicable, to trials by the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 320, p. 448; R.S.1913, § 7866; C.S.1922, § 8811; C.S.1929, § 20-1128; R.S.1943, § 25-1128.
Annotations
Trial court had authority to vacate judgment it had entered for plaintiff after trial to the court, and to then enter judgment for defendants on motion couched in terms of section 25-1315.02. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 196 Neb. 158, 241 N.W.2d 674 (1976).
In case tried to judge, handwriting may be compared by him with genuine writing of the same person. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cutright, 189 Neb. 805, 205 N.W.2d 542 (1973).
Special findings of fact inconsistent with general findings of court control. Carl v. Wentz, 116 Neb. 880, 219 N.W. 390 (1928).
Procedure upon hearing is assimilated to equity practice; right to open and close is determined by pleadings. Citizens State Bank v. Baird, 42 Neb. 219, 60 N.W. 551 (1894).
25-1129.
Reference by consent; when allowed.All or any of the issues in the action, whether of fact or law or both, may be referred to a referee upon the written consent of the parties or upon their oral consent in court entered upon the record.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 298, p. 444; R.S.1913, § 7867; C.S.1922, § 8812; C.S.1929, § 20-1129; R.S.1943, § 25-1129;
Laws 2008, LB1014, § 10; Laws 2018, LB193, § 15.
Annotations
A referee's factual findings are entitled to some deference, but no such deference is owed to the referee's conclusions or recommendations. Becher v. Becher, 299 Neb. 206, 908 N.W.2d 12 (2018).
The question of the defendant's agency was within the issue of receivership and therefor within the authority given the referee, and the filing of a supplemental report which recommended appointment of a receiver was proper in this case. Beavers v. Graham, 209 Neb. 556, 308 N.W.2d 826 (1981).
Special master appointed by court is a referee. Gentsch, Inc. v. Burnett, 173 Neb. 820, 115 N.W.2d 446 (1962).
Supreme Court has inherent power to refer original cases. State ex rel. Broatch v. Moores, 56 Neb. 1, 76 N.W. 530 (1898).
Party participating in proceedings before referee is estopped to deny consent to reference. Morris v. Haas, 54 Neb. 579, 74 N.W. 828 (1898).
Court will presume consent was given to action to a referee when record fails to show that objections were made. Hosford v. Stone, 6 Neb. 378 (1877).
25-1130.
Reference by court order; when allowed.When the parties do not consent, the court may, upon application of either, or of its own motion, direct a reference in any equity matter to a referee appointed by the court. The court shall direct a reference to a referee only when caseload and time constraints require such reference, and a referee shall not be appointed to conduct any hearing involving an issue of law and not equity that could result in the exercise of the right to a trial before a jury.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 299, p. 444; R.S.1913, § 7868; C.S.1922, § 8813; C.S.1929, § 20-1130; R.S.1943, § 25-1130;
Laws 2008, LB1014, § 11.
Annotations
Trial court can make a reference of an accounting to a referee. Corn Belt Products Co. v. Mullins, 172 Neb. 561, 110 N.W.2d 845 (1961).
Interlocutory order that plaintiff is entitled to account is unnecessary. Bennett v. Baum, 90 Neb. 320, 133 N.W. 439 (1911).
Right to jury cannot be defeated because of issues as to equitable rights. Yager v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Hastings, 52 Neb. 321, 72 N.W. 211 (1897).
Purely legal action cannot be referred, except on consent of parties. Kinkaid v. Hiatt, 24 Neb. 562, 39 N.W. 600 (1888).
Court may refer in partition without consent for taking of account. Mills v. Miller, 3 Neb. 87 (1873).
Where equitable counterclaim is filed in legal action it is not error to overrule general objection to reference of whole cause. Brown v. Keith, 1 Neb. Unof. 649, 96 N.W. 59 (1901).
25-1131.
Trial by referee; procedure; findings of fact; conclusions of law; effect.The trial before referees is conducted in the same manner as a trial by the court. They have the same power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses, to administer all necessary oaths in the trial of the case, and to grant adjournments, as the court upon such trial. They must state the facts found and the conclusions of law, separately, and their decision must be given, and may be excepted to and reviewed in like manner. The report of the referees upon the whole issue stands as the decision of the court, and judgment may be entered thereon in the same manner as if the action had been tried by the court. When the reference is to report the facts, the report has the effect of a special verdict.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 300, p. 445; R.S.1913, § 7869; C.S.1922, § 8814; C.S.1929, § 20-1131; R.S.1943, § 25-1131.
Annotations
1. Trial
2. Findings
3. Exceptions
4. Miscellaneous
1. Trial
Referee appointed solely to take testimony and report cannot rule on admissibility of evidence. Brotherton v. Brotherton, 14 Neb. 186, 15 N.W. 347 (1883).
Report cannot be set aside except for cause as in granting new trials. Tingley v. Dolby, 13 Neb. 371, 14 N.W. 146 (1882).
Referee cannot grant motion for new trial. Murray v. School Dist. No. 3 of Platte County, 11 Neb. 438, 9 N.W. 573 (1881).
Motion for new trial is necessary to review decision. Light v. Kennard, 11 Neb. 129, 7 N.W. 539 (1881).
2. Findings
A district court is not required to make specific findings that a referee's factual findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. Becher v. Becher, 299 Neb. 206, 908 N.W.2d 12 (2018).
The recommended factual findings of a special master have the effect of a special verdict, and the report upon questions of fact, like the verdict of a jury, will not be set aside unless clearly against the weight of the evidence. Larkin v. Ethicon, Inc., 251 Neb. 169, 556 N.W.2d 44 (1996).
Unchallenged findings cannot be disputed on appeal. Chicago Lumber Co. v. Bancroft, 64 Neb. 176, 89 N.W. 780 (1902).
The failure to state findings of fact or conclusions of law is an irregularity that may be waived. Burkland v. Johnson, 50 Neb. 858, 70 N.W. 388 (1897).
Findings like verdict may be set aside on motion for new trial. School Dist. No. 1 of Harlan County v. Bishop, 46 Neb. 850, 65 N.W. 902 (1896).
Referee must state facts and conclusions separately, must give his decision, shall sign any true exceptions taken, and return same with his report. Gibson v. Gibson, 24 Neb. 394, 39 N.W. 450 (1888).
Court has power to modify findings and enter judgment on special findings, where inconsistent with general. Gillespie v. Brown & Ryan Bros., 16 Neb. 457, 20 N.W. 632 (1884).
The report of a referee upon questions of fact, like the verdict of a jury, will not be set aside unless clearly against the weight of the evidence. Brown v. O'Brien, 4 Neb. 195 (1876).
Findings on conflicting evidence are not disturbed on appeal. Creedon v. Patrick, 3 Neb. Unof. 459, 91 N.W. 872 (1902).
3. Exceptions
Where no exceptions are filed to findings of fact of a referee prior to confirmation, such findings are binding on all parties. Corn Belt Products Co. v. Mullins, 172 Neb. 561, 110 N.W.2d 845 (1961).
Where no exceptions are filed to report, judgment should be entered as on verdict. State v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 63 Neb. 95, 88 N.W. 175 (1901).
4. Miscellaneous
Section applies to arbitrators. In re Arbitration of Johnson, 87 Neb. 375, 127 N.W. 133 (1910).
This section is applicable to arbitration proceedings. City of O'Neill v. Clark, 57 Neb. 760, 78 N.W. 256 (1899).
Referee's power expires at time set for filing report; but if filed later, is irregularity, and court may act thereon. Creedon v. Patrick, 3 Neb. Unof. 459, 91 N.W. 872 (1902).
Report has no judicial force until confirmed. Citizens Bank of Humphrey v. Stockslager, 1 Neb. Unof. 799, 96 N.W. 591 (1901).
25-1132.
Referees; how chosen; number.In all cases of reference, the parties, except when an infant may be a party, may agree upon a suitable person or persons, not exceeding three, and the reference shall be ordered accordingly; and if the parties do not agree, the court shall appoint one or more referees, not exceeding three, who shall be free from exception.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 301, p. 445; R.S.1913, § 7870; C.S.1922, § 8815; C.S.1929, § 20-1132; R.S.1943, § 25-1132.
Annotations
Failure to object to qualifications of referee until after approval of report precluded attack on that ground. Corn Belt Products Co. v. Mullins, 172 Neb. 561, 110 N.W.2d 845 (1961).
25-1133.
Repealed. Laws 2008, LB 1014, § 80.
25-1134.
Trial by referee; exceptions; report.It shall be the duty of the referees to sign any true exceptions taken to any order or decision by them made in the case and return the same with their report to the court making the reference.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 303, p. 445; R.S.1913, § 7872; C.S.1922, § 8817; C.S.1929, § 20-1134; R.S.1943, § 25-1134.
Annotations
Referee, and not judge, must settle bill of exceptions. Bennett v. Baum, 90 Neb. 320, 133 N.W. 439 (1911).
This section confers authority upon a referee to sign a bill of exceptions. State ex rel. Dunterman v. Gaslin, 30 Neb. 651, 46 N.W. 917 (1890).
25-1135.
Reference in vacation; written consent required.A judge in vacation, upon the written consent of the parties, may make any order of reference which the court, of which he is a member, could make in term time. In such case, the order of reference shall be made on the written agreement of the parties to refer, and shall be filed with the clerk of the court with the other papers in the case.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 304, p. 445; R.S.1913, § 7873; C.S.1922, § 8818; C.S.1929, § 20-1135; R.S.1943, § 25-1135.
25-1136.
Referees; oath or affirmation.The referees must be sworn or affirmed well and faithfully to hear and examine the cause, and to make a just and true report therein according to the best of their understanding. The oath may be administered by any person authorized to take depositions.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 305, p. 445; R.S.1913, § 7874; C.S.1922, § 8819; C.S.1929, § 20-1136; R.S.1943, § 25-1136.
Annotations
Failure to take oath is an irregularity waived by proceeding to trial without objection. Lamaster v. Scofield and Cowperthwait, 5 Neb. 148 (1876).
25-1137.
Referees; compensation.The referees shall be allowed such compensation for their services as the court may deem just and proper, which shall be taxed as a part of the costs in the case.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 306, p. 445; R.S.1913, § 7875; C.S.1922, § 8820; C.S.1929, § 20-1137; R.S.1943, § 25-1137.
Annotations
Referee's fees are taxed as part of the costs. Corn Belt Products Co. v. Mullins, 172 Neb. 561, 110 N.W.2d 845 (1961).
25-1138.
Exception, defined.An exception is an objection taken to a decision of the court upon a matter of law.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 307, p. 445; R.S.1913, § 7876; C.S.1922, § 8821; C.S.1929, § 20-1138; R.S.1943, § 25-1138.
25-1139.
Taking and noting of exceptions; unnecessary, when.Every litigant in any court or in any proceeding to which he is a party before any judge, magistrate, referee, board or tribunal, shall be deemed and taken, both in the trial court and before such judge, magistrate, referee, board or tribunal as well on appeal or error therefrom, as excepting to any judgment, order or other ruling, including the giving or refusal of instructions to the jury, made by such court, judge, magistrate, referee, board or tribunal at any stage of the case or proceeding, that is material and prejudicial to the substantial rights of the litigant and he shall not be required in order to preserve his rights actually to take, or to cause to be noted upon the record, any such exception.
Source:R.S.1867, Code §§ 308, 309, 310, 312, and 313, p. 446; Laws 1877, § 1, p. 11; R.S.1913, § 7877; Laws 1915, c. 147, § 1, p. 317; C.S.1922, § 8822; C.S.1929, § 20-1139; R.S.1943, § 25-1139.
Annotations
An instruction to which no exception is noted on the record when given may be reviewed on appeal, former rule having been changed by statute. Derr v. Gunnell, 127 Neb. 708, 256 N.W. 725 (1934).
Bill of exceptions was sufficient hereunder to protect rights of accused. Scott v. State, 121 Neb. 232, 236 N.W. 608 (1931).
Order of court in foreclosure suit, after evidence concluded, requiring defendant to file first brief, must be taken as excepted to, under this section. Quesner v. Novotny, 113 Neb. 827, 205 N.W. 566 (1925).
25-1140.
Bill of exceptions; filing of request; further proceedings governed by rules of court.Upon appeal from the district court, the party appealing may order a bill of exceptions by filing in the office of the clerk of the district court a praecipe therefor within the time allowed for filing a notice of appeal. The procedure for preparation, settlement, signature, allowance, certification, filing, and amendment of the bill of exceptions shall be regulated and governed by rules of practice prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 311, p. 446; Laws 1877, § 2, p. 11; Laws 1881, c. 27, § 2, p. 202; Laws 1895, c. 72, § 1, p. 311; R.S.1913, § 7880; C.S.1922, § 8823; Laws 1923, c. 114, § 1, p. 273; C.S.1929, § 20-1140; R.S.1943, § 25-1140; Laws 1947, c. 83, § 1(1), p. 257; Laws 1959, c. 104, § 1, p. 431; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 47;
Laws 1992, LB 360, § 4.
Annotations
1. Preparation and filing
2. Extension of time
3. Failure to obtain
4. Miscellaneous
1. Preparation and filing
In order for the appellate court to consider evidence, the evidence must be marked, identified, and made a part of the bill of exceptions at the trial court. Bohling v. Bohling, 304 Neb. 968, 937 N.W.2d 855 (2020).
Bill of exceptions was properly settled under statute in force at time of settlement. Lindgren v. School Dist. of Bridgeport, 170 Neb. 279, 102 N.W.2d 599 (1960).
On appeal to Supreme Court from district court in workmen's compensation case, bill of exceptions must be prepared, served, settled and filed in accordance with this section. Adkisson v. Gamble, 143 Neb. 417, 9 N.W.2d 711 (1943).
Court reporter's transcript or certificate of affidavit on motion for new trial is not essential. State ex rel. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. of Nebraska v. Colby, 107 Neb. 372, 186 N.W. 355 (1922).
Bill of exceptions is necessary to review action of board of equalization of metropolitan water district. McCague Inv. Co. v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Omaha, 101 Neb. 820, 165 N.W. 158 (1917).
Bill of exceptions is required on error proceedings to review action of State Banking Board in granting or refusing bank charter. State ex rel. White v. Morehead, 101 Neb. 37, 161 N.W. 1040 (1917).
Where it was obvious that the word "testimony" was used with reference to the evidence, certificate signed by judge that bill of exceptions contained all the testimony was sufficient. Woolworth v. Parker, 57 Neb. 417, 77 N.W. 1090 (1899).
Procedure in law and equity actions is the same. Uhling v. Schellenberg, 12 Neb. 609, 12 N.W. 272 (1882).
2. Extension of time
The party appealing has the responsibility of including within the bill of exceptions matters from the record which the party believes are material to the issues presented for review. State v. Saylor, 294 Neb. 492, 883 N.W.2d 334 (2016).
Time allowed by extension by its terms covered both preparation and serving of bill of exceptions, and reduced time for preparation. Benedict v. State, 166 Neb. 295, 89 N.W.2d 82 (1958).
Party must apply to trial judge for extension though his term has expired; successor cannot grant. Hanscom v. Lantry, 48 Neb. 665, 67 N.W. 762 (1896).
3. Failure to obtain
Where the bill of exceptions was patently incomplete on appeal, the Supreme Court disregarded it and affirmed orders of both lower courts on the basis that the pleadings supported the judgment granted below. Boosalis v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 198 Neb. 148, 251 N.W.2d 885 (1977).
Where a municipal court judgment was reversed in district court, then appealed without a certified bill of exceptions, the Supreme Court limits its review to whether the pleadings support the judgment entered by the district court. Allgood v. Nebraska Humane Society, 197 Neb. 373, 248 N.W.2d 778 (1977).
In absence of bill of exceptions on a motion for new trial, judgment denying writ of habeas corpus will be affirmed where return to writ states a defense. McQueen v. Jones, 150 Neb. 853, 36 N.W.2d 271 (1949).
Where bill of exceptions is stricken because of failure to settle same, only question presented is whether or not the pleadings support the judgment. Dryden & Jensen v. Mach, 150 Neb. 629, 35 N.W.2d 497 (1949).
Where, upon appeal in a divorce case, the husband fails to comply with order to pay costs of appeal, resulting in failure to have bill of exceptions settled within time, decree may be reversed. Bonzo v. Bonzo, 138 Neb. 92, 292 N.W. 61 (1940).
Where the record contains no bill of exceptions and the pleadings are sufficient to support the judgment, the judgment will be affirmed. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Carlson, 134 Neb. 574, 279 N.W. 162 (1938).
4. Miscellaneous
Statute places the burden on the appellant to file a praecipe identifying the matter to be contained in the bill of exceptions. State v. Blue, 223 Neb. 379, 391 N.W.2d 102 (1986).
Rule 7, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court 1974, enacted pursuant to this section, govern bills of exceptions on appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court. State v. Jacobsen, 194 Neb. 105, 230 N.W.2d 219 (1975).
The bill of exceptions is the only vehicle for bringing evidence before the Supreme Court on appeal. Everts v. School Dist. No. 16 of Fillmore County, 175 Neb. 310, 121 N.W.2d 487 (1963).
The preparation and certification of bill of exceptions are governed by rule of the Supreme Court. Leu v. Swenson, 174 Neb. 591, 119 N.W.2d 68 (1962).
Rules of Supreme Court for preparation of bill of exceptions are authorized by this section. Hilligas v. Farr, 171 Neb. 105, 105 N.W.2d 578 (1960).
Time for settling bill of exceptions provided by this section applies to proceedings in error in criminal case. Bryant v. State, 153 Neb. 490, 45 N.W.2d 169 (1950).
Affidavits used in district court in support of motion to set aside default judgment must be embodied in a bill of exceptions for purposes of review. Benson v. General Implement Corporation, 151 Neb. 234, 37 N.W.2d 223 (1949).
Sufficient exceptions were taken on behalf of accused. Scott v. State, 121 Neb. 232, 236 N.W. 608 (1931).
"Case stated," under Supreme Court rule is equivalent to bill of exceptions; must be certified by trial judge and filed with clerk. Bank of Benson v. Gordon, 101 Neb. 162, 162 N.W. 419 (1917).
Expense of bill of exceptions is taxable as costs in district court. Pettis v. Green River Asphalt Co., 71 Neb. 513, 99 N.W. 235, 101 N.W. 333 (1904).
Purpose is to bring into record matters that would not otherwise appear. Mandell v. Weldin, 59 Neb. 699, 82 N.W. 6 (1900).
A bill of exceptions settled in one case cannot be made the bill of exceptions in another case solely by stipulation. Murphy v. Warren, 55 Neb. 220, 75 N.W. 575 (1898).
Remedy for reporter's delay is motion for new trial. Mathews v. Mulford, 53 Neb. 252, 73 N.W. 661 (1898).
It is only in the exceptional cases enumerated that clerk of district court is authorized to sign and allow bill of exceptions. Glass v. Zutavern, 43 Neb. 334, 61 N.W. 579 (1895).
25-1140.01.
Repealed. Laws 1959, c. 104, § 3.
25-1140.02.
Repealed. Laws 1959, c. 104, § 3.
25-1140.03.
Repealed. Laws 1959, c. 104, § 3.
25-1140.04.
Repealed. Laws 1959, c. 104, § 3.
25-1140.05.
Repealed. Laws 1959, c. 104, § 3.
25-1140.06.
Repealed. Laws 1959, c. 104, § 3.
25-1140.07.
Repealed. Laws 1959, c. 104, § 3.
25-1140.08.
Bill of exceptions; boards and tribunals; filing of request; further proceedings governed by rules of court.This section shall apply to all appeals and error proceedings where specific provision is not made by law for a bill of exceptions. Any reporter approved by the officer, board, or tribunal from which the appeal or error proceeding is taken may attend and record the trial or proceedings. Upon the filing of a praecipe therefor by any party within the time allowed for filing of notice of appeal or petition in error, the reporter shall prepare a bill of exceptions. The procedure for preparation, settlement, signature, allowance, certification, filing, and amendment shall be regulated and governed by rules of practice prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 311, p. 446; Laws 1877, § 2, p. 11; Laws 1881, c. 27, § 2, p. 202; Laws 1895, c. 72, § 1, p. 311; R.S.1913, § 7880; C.S.1922, § 8823; Laws 1923, c. 114, § 1, p. 273; C.S.1929, § 20-1140; R.S.1943, § 25-1140; Laws 1947, c. 83, § 1(9), p. 260; Laws 1959, c. 104, § 2, p. 431.
Annotations
1. Workers' Compensation Court
2. Public Service Commission
3. County board
4. County court
5. Miscellaneous
1. Workers' Compensation Court
A bill of exceptions on appeal from the district court in a workmen's compensation case must be prepared, served, settled and filed in accordance with this section. Gilmore v. State, 148 Neb. 10, 26 N.W.2d 296 (1947); Ratay v. Wylie, 147 Neb. 201, 22 N.W.2d 622 (1946).
2. Public Service Commission
This section does not apply to bill of exceptions on appeals from the State Railway Commission. In re Application of Moritz v. State Railway Commission, 147 Neb. 400, 23 N.W.2d 545 (1946).
3. County board
A bill of exceptions may be preserved from the county court. State v. Allen, 159 Neb. 314, 66 N.W.2d 830 (1954).
In case before county board, bill of exceptions must be authenticated by county clerk. Union P. R. R. Co. v. Colfax County, 84 Neb. 778, 122 N.W. 29 (1909).
4. County court
Procedure in county court as to bill of exceptions is same as in justice court. Sedgwick v. Durham, 45 Neb. 86, 63 N.W. 142 (1895).
In term case in county court, judge may sign bill any time during term. Osborne v. Canfield, 33 Neb. 330, 50 N.W. 167 (1891).
5. Miscellaneous
Requirement of bill of exceptions is applicable to review action of State Board of Equalization. State ex rel. U. P. R. R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 81 Neb. 139, 115 N.W. 789 (1908).
Bill of exceptions should be obtained to review ruling of county board of equalization. Field v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 74 Neb. 419, 104 N.W. 932 (1905).
Referee may certify, where trial before him; judge or clerk cannot. Disbrow & Co. v. McNish, 52 Neb. 309, 72 N.W. 216 (1897).
25-1140.09.
Bill of exceptions; preparation; court reporter; fees; procedure for preparation; taxation of cost.On the application of the county attorney or any party to a suit in which a record of the proceedings has been made, upon receipt of the notice provided in section 29-2525, or upon the filing of a praecipe for a bill of exceptions by an appealing party in the office of the clerk of the district court as provided in section 25-1140, the court reporter shall prepare a transcribed copy of the proceedings so recorded or any part thereof. The reporter shall be entitled to receive, in addition to his or her salary, a per-page fee as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the original copy and each additional copy, to be paid by the party requesting the same except as otherwise provided in this section.
When the transcribed copy of the proceedings is required by the county attorney, the fee therefor shall be paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid. When the defendant in a criminal case, after conviction, makes an affidavit that he or she is unable by reason of his or her poverty to pay for such copy, the court or judge thereof may, by order endorsed on such affidavit, direct delivery of such transcribed copy to such defendant, and the fee shall be paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are allowed and paid. When such copy is prepared in any criminal case in which the sentence adjudged is capital, the fees therefor shall be paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are allowed or paid.
The fee for preparation of a bill of exceptions and the procedure for preparation, settlement, signature, allowance, certification, filing, and amendment of a bill of exceptions shall be regulated and governed by rules of practice prescribed by the Supreme Court. The fee paid shall be taxed, by the clerk of the district court, to the party against whom the judgment or decree is rendered except as otherwise ordered by the presiding district judge.
Source:Laws 1879, § 49, p. 93; Laws 1907, c. 43, § 1, p. 182; R.S.1913, § 1200; C.S.1922, § 1123; Laws 1925, c. 67, § 1, p. 225; C.S.1929, § 27-339; R.S.1943, § 24-342; Laws 1949, c. 45, § 1, p. 150; Laws 1957, c. 107, § 5, p. 380; Laws 1961, c. 104, § 1, p. 336; Laws 1961, c. 105, § 1, p. 337; Laws 1961, c. 106, § 1, p. 338;
Laws 1971, LB 357, § 1; Laws 1973, LB 146, § 1; Laws 1973, LB 268, § 2; Laws 1974, LB 647, § 2; Laws 1978, LB 271, § 1; Laws 1982, LB 722, § 1; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-342;
Laws 1991, LB 37, § 1; Laws 2005, LB 348, § 3; Laws 2015, LB268, § 4; Referendum 2016, No. 426.
Note: The changes made to section 25-1140.09 by Laws 2015, LB 268, section 4, have been omitted because of the vote on the referendum at the November 2016 general election.
Annotations
1. Poverty affidavit
2. Fees
3. Miscellaneous
1. Poverty affidavit
The determination of defendant's ability to pay for bill of exceptions is within discretion of trial court. State v. Eberhardt, 179 Neb. 843, 140 N.W.2d 802 (1966).
Poverty affidavit must be filed within same period of time as is provided by rule of court for ordering bill of exceptions. Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 348, 102 N.W.2d 620 (1960).
Affidavit of poverty must be filed in district court. Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853 (1960).
Where poverty affidavit is filed, defendant is entitled to bill of exceptions at cost of county unless it is shown that affidavit is untrue or that inability to pay is occasioned by defendant's own willful act. Fisher v. State, 153 Neb. 226, 43 N.W.2d 600 (1950).
When affidavit of poverty, supported by oral evidence sufficient to meet requirements of statute, is filed, court must direct reporter to prepare bill of exceptions at county's expense. Rice v. State, 120 Neb. 641, 234 N.W. 566 (1931).
Request for bill of exceptions at county's expense should be denied where it is shown that the applicant's poverty is untrue or occasioned by own willful act. Altis v. State, 109 Neb. 776, 192 N.W. 327 (1923).
2. Fees
Cost of bill of exceptions is fixed by statute. Anderson v. Evans, 168 Neb. 373, 96 N.W.2d 44 (1959).
Where court reporter charges amount in excess of that authorized by statute, he may be directed to refund overcharge. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 168 Neb. 298, 96 N.W.2d 55 (1959).
Charge for preparation of bill of exceptions was excessive. Young v. Young, 166 Neb. 532, 89 N.W.2d 763 (1958).
Cost of preparation of bill of exceptions is controlled by this section. Pueppka v. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 166 Neb. 203, 88 N.W.2d 657 (1958).
3. Miscellaneous
In criminal cases, bill of exceptions must be prepared within forty days of time petition in error is filed unless time is extended. Benedict v. State, 166 Neb. 295, 89 N.W.2d 82 (1958).
Time to settle bill of exceptions in criminal case commences to run upon filing of petition in error in Supreme Court. Bryant v. State, 153 Neb. 490, 45 N.W.2d 169 (1950).
Transcript of proceedings before Board of Equalization may be compelled by mandamus. Mockett v. State ex rel. Woods, 70 Neb. 518, 97 N.W. 588 (1903).
If transcript cannot be had, relief may be obtained in equity. Holland v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 52 Neb. 100, 71 N.W. 989 (1897).
Section is constitutional and amendment germane to title of original act. State ex rel. Carey v. Cornell, 50 Neb. 526, 70 N.W. 56 (1897).
Transcript will not be ordered by Supreme Court where party has not complied with or sought review of order below. Argabright v. State, 46 Neb. 822, 65 N.W. 886 (1896).
Reporter's notes are not public records and certified copy is inadmissible as evidence. Smith v. State, 42 Neb. 356, 60 N.W. 585 (1894); Jordan v. Howe, 4 Neb. Unof. 667, 95 N.W. 853 (1903).
Party is entitled to rely upon transcript being produced correctly and in time. Curran v. Wilcox, 10 Neb. 449, 6 N.W. 762 (1880).
25-1141.
Testimony; repetition of objections unnecessary.Where an objection has once been made to the admission of testimony and overruled by the court it shall be unnecessary to repeat the same objection to further testimony of the same nature by the same witness in order to save the error, if any, in the ruling of the court whereby such testimony was received.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 245, § 1, p. 566; C.S.1922, § 8824; C.S.1929, § 20-1141; R.S.1943, § 25-1141.
Annotations
This section does not apply to testimony given by a different witness when no objection is made to that witness' testimony. State v. Pope, 305 Neb. 912, 943 N.W.2d 294 (2020).
When a criminal defendant did not object to testimony that a witness saw him with a gun resembling the gun used in a driveby shooting, this section did not apply to preserve any error for appeal, even though the defendant had objected to similar testimony from other witnesses. State v. Castillas, 285 Neb. 174, 826 N.W.2d 255 (2013).
Where incompetent testimony is admitted, failure to object to substantially same incompetent testimony by another witness waives the error in admission of testimony of first witness. Shamburg v. Folkers, 187 Neb. 169, 188 N.W.2d 723 (1971).
Section has no application to testimony of same nature by other witnesses. Rakes v. State, 158 Neb. 55, 62 N.W.2d 273 (1954).
Where former objection was made and overruled it was unnecessary to repeat the same objection to the later testimony of the same nature by the same witness in order to save error, if any. In re House's Estate, 145 Neb. 866, 18 N.W.2d 500 (1945); Triplett v. Western Public Service Co., 129 Neb. 799, 263 N.W. 229 (1935).
If the question relates to the same identical transaction or conversation, and calls for testimony of the same nature, it is not necessary that the objection be repeated to save the error in the appellate court. In re Vanicek's Estate, 145 Neb. 531, 17 N.W.2d 477 (1945).
Objection to question as incompetent having been overruled, it is not necessary to repeat objection to other questions relating to the same subject. Zediker v. State, 114 Neb. 292, 207 N.W. 168 (1926); Daggett v. State, 114 Neb. 238, 206 N.W. 735 (1925).
This section applies to objections made to the testimony of the same nature by the same witness and therefore
does not apply to objections made to a demonstrative exhibit and/or statements made by the prosecutor during
closing arguments. State v. Howard, 26 Neb. App. 628, 921 N.W.2d 869 (2018).
25-1142.
New trial, defined; grounds.A new trial is a reexamination in the same court of an issue of fact after a verdict by a jury, report of a referee, or a trial and decision by the court. The former verdict, report, or decision shall be vacated and a new trial granted on the application of the party aggrieved for any of the following causes affecting materially the substantial rights of such party: (1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, referee, or prevailing party or any order of the court or referee or abuse of discretion by which the party was prevented from having a fair trial; (2) misconduct of the jury or prevailing party; (3) accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against; (4) excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice; (5) error in the assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large or too small, if the action is upon a contract or for the injury or detention of property; (6) that the verdict, report, or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence or is contrary to law; (7) newly discovered evidence, material for the party applying, which the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial; and (8) error of law occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 314, p. 446; R.S.1913, § 7883; C.S.1922, § 8825; C.S.1929, § 20-1142; R.S.1943, § 25-1142;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 5.
Annotations
1. Irregularity
2. Misconduct
3. Accident or surprise
4. Excessive damages
5. Error in assessment
6. Contrary to evidence or law
7. Newly discovered evidence
8. Error of law
9. Miscellaneous
1. Irregularity
Motion for new trial was properly sustained. Hickman-Williams Agency v. Haney, 152 Neb. 219, 40 N.W.2d 813 (1950).
Granted on first ground only for irregularities specifically assigned. Risse v. Gasch, 43 Neb. 287, 61 N.W. 616 (1895); Spencer v. Thistle, 13 Neb. 201, 13 N.W. 208 (1882).
2. Misconduct
In a motion for new trial, allegations of misconduct by jurors must be substantiated by competent evidence, be related to a disputed matter that is relevant to the issues in the case, and have influenced the jurors in arriving at the verdict. Leavitt ex rel. Leavitt v. Magid, 257 Neb. 440, 598 N.W.2d 722 (1999).
Trial court's refusal to order juror to make affidavits as to occurrence in jury, not amounting to reversible misconduct, is not erroneous. Egan v. State, 97 Neb. 731, 151 N.W. 237 (1915).
Assertion of opinion or of expert knowledge by jurors in jury room inheres in verdict and is not misconduct; but otherwise as to statements by juror of material facts not in evidence but within his personal knowledge. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank v. Ochlare Orchards Co., 97 Neb. 536, 150 N.W. 651 (1915).
Misconduct without knowledge or consent of interested parties will not require reversal, unless verdict affected. Zancanella v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 96 Neb. 596, 148 N.W. 158 (1914).
It is misconduct for juror to base verdict upon independent personal knowledge. Falls City v. Sperry, 68 Neb. 420, 94 N.W. 529 (1903).
Misconduct of counsel in argument may be ground for new trial. Barr v. Post, 56 Neb. 698, 77 N.W. 123 (1898); Bullis v. Drake, 20 Neb. 167, 29 N.W. 292 (1886).
Where it is clear that a verdict of a jury is based on a compromise of the difference of opinion of its individual members and in disregard of the evidence, it is not error to set it aside. Meyer v. Shamp, 51 Neb. 424, 71 N.W. 57 (1897).
Misconduct does not necessarily imply evil or corrupt motive. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. R. Co. v. Deaver, 45 Neb. 307, 63 N.W. 790 (1895).
3. Accident or surprise
Motion to vacate default judgment was in legal effect a motion for new trial. Shipley v. McNeel, 149 Neb. 793, 32 N.W.2d 636 (1948).
A variance between the testimony of a witness at the present trial and at a former trial does not require a new trial on the ground of surprise, where the variance is immaterial. Riesland v. Dawson County Irr. Co., 134 Neb. 773, 279 N.W. 726 (1938).
New trial on third ground will be denied when based upon facts known to moving party during the trial. Matoushek v. Dutcher & Sons, 67 Neb. 627, 93 N.W. 1049 (1903).
In absence of abuse of discretion of trial court, denial of motion for new trial on ground of accident or surprise will not be disturbed. Zimmerer v. Fremont Nat. Bank, 59 Neb. 661, 81 N.W. 849 (1900).
4. Excessive damages
When an amount of recovery is excessive and the excess can be reasonably ascertained and a remittitur granted, the amount of the recovery is no longer too large and a new trial is not required. Barbour v. Jenson Commercial Distributing Co., 212 Neb. 512, 323 N.W.2d 824 (1982).
In order to grant a new trial because of excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice in a personal injury case, the reviewing court must be able to say, as a matter of law, that the amount is excessive. Hickey v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 140 Neb. 665, 1 N.W.2d 304 (1941).
A verdict so clearly excessive as to induce the belief by the reviewing court that it must have been founded on passion and prejudice will be set aside and a new trial awarded. Heiden v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 139 Neb. 754, 298 N.W. 736 (1941).
New trial was properly granted on ground of excessive verdict resulting from passion and prejudice. Stewart v. Weiner, 108 Neb. 49, 187 N.W. 121 (1922); Hutchinson v. Western Bridge & Construction Co., 97 Neb. 439, 150 N.W. 193 (1914).
Passion or prejudice is not necessarily inferable from excessive verdict. Wainwright v. Satterfield, 52 Neb. 403, 72 N.W. 359 (1897); Omaha Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 50 Neb. 580, 70 N.W. 30 (1897).
Verdict of $120,000 for injury to knee resulting in loss of kneecap does not shock the conscience where plaintiff adduced extensive evidence of pain and suffering. Bailey v. AMISUB, 1 Neb. App. 56, 489 N.W.2d 323 (1992).
5. Error in assessment
When the amount of the damages allowed by a jury is inadequate under the evidence in the case, it is error for the trial court to refuse to set aside such verdict. Preston v. Farmers Irr. Dist., 134 Neb. 503, 279 N.W. 298 (1938).
New trial is not ordinarily granted in personal injury actions on ground of inadequacy of amount of verdict alone. Blakely v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 94 Neb. 119, 142 N.W. 525 (1913); O'Reilly v. Hoover, 70 Neb. 357, 97 N.W. 470 (1903).
Error in assessment of amount of recovery cannot be reviewed under assignment in motion of insufficiency of evidence to support verdict. Warner v. Sohn, 85 Neb. 571, 123 N.W. 1054 (1909).
Where amount of recovery awarded by verdict is too small, it may call for a reversal of judgment. Yager v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Hastings, 57 Neb. 310, 77 N.W. 768 (1899).
Error in assessment of amount of recovery must be specifically set forth. Beavers v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 47 Neb. 761, 66 N.W. 821 (1896).
Assignment of error that verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence is insufficient to raise question of error in failing to allow interest. Riverside Coal Co. v. Holmes, 36 Neb. 858, 55 N.W. 255 (1893).
6. Contrary to evidence or law
If a verdict shocks the conscience, it necessarily follows that the verdict was the result of passion, prejudice, mistake, or some other means not apparent in the record. Crewdson v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 234 Neb. 631, 452 N.W.2d 270 (1990).
A trial court may grant a motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence even though no motion for a directed verdict is made. In re Estate of Kinsey, 152 Neb. 95, 40 N.W.2d 526 (1949).
New trial should be granted where verdict is so clearly wrong as to induce belief that it must have resulted from passion, prejudice, mistake, or something not apparent. Burge v. C. F. Adams Co., 98 Neb. 4, 151 N.W. 949 (1915); Fredericks v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 96 Neb. 27, 146 N.W. 1011 (1914); Garfield v. Hodges & Baldwin, 90 Neb. 122, 132 N.W. 923 (1911).
New trial should be allowed where material uncontradicted evidence is clearly disregarded by jury. Hileman v. Maxwell, 97 Neb. 14, 149 N.W. 44 (1914).
Verdict should not be set aside if it can be sustained in any rational view of the evidence. Lammers v. Boehmer, 62 Neb. 159, 86 N.W. 1067 (1901).
Verdict contrary to law should be set aside if unwarranted by pleadings or in evident disregard of instructions. Westinghouse Co. v. Tilden, 56 Neb. 129, 76 N.W. 416 (1898); Wilson v. City Nat. Bank of Kearney, 51 Neb. 87, 70 N.W. 501 (1897).
Verdict clearly and unmistakably against the evidence should be set aside. Lubker v. Grand Detour Plow Co., 53 Neb. 111, 73 N.W. 457 (1897); Norfolk Beet-Sugar Co. v. Koch, 52 Neb. 197, 71 N.W. 1015 (1897).
7. Newly discovered evidence
In order to make a sufficient showing for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the proof in support thereof must show that such evidence is now available which neither the litigant nor counsel could have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence and that the evidence is not merely cumulative, but competent, relevant, and material, and of such character as to reasonably justify a belief that its admission would bring about a different result if a new trial were granted. Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570 (2007).
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion for new trial when any material evidence presented as "newly discovered" could have been discovered and produced at the summary judgment hearing or prior to the entry of summary judgment. Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, 268 Neb. 722, 687 N.W.2d 672 (2004).
New evidence offered in support of a motion for new trial must be so potent that, by strengthening evidence already offered, a new trial would probably result in a new verdict. State v. Koch, 224 Neb. 926, 402 N.W.2d 275 (1987).
A witness' testimony is not newly discovered evidence within the meaning of this section, where plaintiff's counsel knew what the witness' testimony would be but failed to serve a subpoena on the witness and the witness failed to appear at trial. Schroll v. Fulton, 213 Neb. 310, 328 N.W.2d 780 (1983).
Where the record revealed that evidence was in existence prior to trial and that neither the litigant nor his counsel, at the time of trial, could show that he exercised due diligence to discover it, the grounds for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence were not satisfied. Smith v. Erftmier, 210 Neb. 486, 315 N.W.2d 445 (1982).
Under section 25-1144, an application for new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence was required to be supported by affidavit. State v. Belding, 190 Neb. 646, 211 N.W.2d 715 (1973).
New trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be granted after an appeal to Supreme Court has been taken and disposed of. Finnern v. Bruner, 170 Neb. 170, 101 N.W.2d 905 (1960).
Except in extraordinary cases, evidence of facts occurring after the trial will not support a motion for new trial as newly discovered evidence. Wagner v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 150 Neb. 7, 33 N.W.2d 300 (1948).
Newly discovered evidence is not a ground for a new trial where the exercise of due diligence before trial would have produced it. Jensen v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 409, 16 N.W.2d 847 (1944).
In order to obtain a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence alleged to have been newly discovered must be such that the party applying for the new trial could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at the trial. Gate City Co. v. Douglas County, 135 Neb. 531, 282 N.W. 532 (1938).
New evidence must be not merely cumulative but such as to warrant the belief that it might cause a jury to arrive at a different verdict. Miller v. Olander, 133 Neb. 762, 277 N.W. 72 (1938).
Motion for new trial was properly overruled where it was based on ground of newly discovered evidence which consisted of facts known to defendant which she failed to give to her attorney. Breen v. Nugent, 133 Neb. 131, 274 N.W. 379 (1937).
To warrant new trial for newly discovered evidence, it must appear that evidence could not have been discovered by due diligence, that it renders clear what was before uncertain, and that it will probably bring about a different result. Erwin v. Watson Bros. Transfer Co., 129 Neb. 64, 260 N.W. 565 (1935).
Requirement of showing for new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence set forth. Wiegand v. Lincoln Traction Co., 123 Neb. 766, 244 N.W. 298 (1932).
New trial should not be granted for newly discovered evidence where alleged new witness was accessible, no good reason being shown why not produced at trial. Buzzello v. Sramek, 110 Neb. 262, 193 N.W. 743 (1923).
Motion on ground of newly discovered evidence was properly sustained on strong showing that evidence materially affecting amount of recovery, on point not suggested by pleadings, was untrue, and defeated party might not reasonably have anticipated it. Coon v. Drainage Dist. No. 1, Richardson County, 99 Neb. 138, 155 N.W. 799 (1915).
It is indispensable that moving party show diligence. Van Horn v. Cooper & Cole Bros., 88 Neb. 687, 130 N.W. 567 (1911).
New trial should not be allowed for newly discovered evidence merely cumulative in its nature. Parkins v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 79 Neb. 788, 113 N.W. 265 (1907).
Application for new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence must show facts constituting alleged due diligence; statement in language of statute is insufficient. Todd v. City of Crete, 79 Neb. 677, 115 N.W. 307 (1908); Heady v. Fishburn, 3 Neb. 263 (1874).
The newly discovered evidence must be of such controlling nature as probably to change the result. Dickinson v. Aldrich, 79 Neb. 198, 112 N.W. 293 (1907); Williams v. Miles, 73 Neb. 193, 102 N.W. 482 (1905).
Application for new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence should, when practicable, be verified by both party and his attorney. Nebraska Tel. Co. v. Jones, 60 Neb. 396, 83 N.W. 197 (1900); Draper v. Taylor, 58 Neb. 787, 79 N.W. 709 (1899).
Application on ground of newly discovered evidence should be accompanied by affidavit of new witness, or absence accounted for. Nebraska Tel. Co. v. Jones, 60 Neb. 396, 83 N.W. 197 (1900).
8. Error of law
Assignment in motion for new trial that errors of law occurred at the trial does not present correctness of giving or refusing instructions. Drucker v. Goscar, Inc., 184 Neb. 475, 168 N.W.2d 534 (1969).
An error of law occurring at the trial must be raised by appropriate motion or request in the trial court. Zavoral v. Pacific Intermountain Express, 178 Neb. 161, 132 N.W.2d 329 (1965).
Error without prejudice is not sufficient to cause granting of a new trial. Klein v. Wilson, 167 Neb. 779, 94 N.W.2d 672 (1959).
Where refusal to give a requested instruction is not alleged as error in motion for new trial, it may not be asserted as error on appeal. Robinson v. Meyer, 165 Neb. 706, 87 N.W.2d 231 (1957).
An order overruling motion to strike petition or to strike from petition will be reviewed on appeal although not assigned as error in motion for new trial. Weideman v. Peterson's Estate, 129 Neb. 74, 261 N.W. 150 (1935).
Error in giving or refusing instructions must be specifically assigned. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. King, 52 Neb. 562, 72 N.W. 855 (1897).
A motion for new trial should be granted only where there is an error prejudicial to the rights of the unsuccessful party. Cotton v. Gering Pub. Sch., 1 Neb. App. 1036, 511 N.W.2d 549 (1993).
Inadvertent mention of plaintiff's lack of health insurance is not prejudicial error requiring mistrial where it is not shown that jury inferred that plaintiff was incapable of paying expenses. Bailey v. AMISUB, 1 Neb. App. 56, 489 N.W.2d 323 (1992).
9. Miscellaneous
A motion for new trial, under this section, is not an effective motion to terminate the running of time to file notice of an appeal when the court grants a motion for summary judgement. Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 296 Neb. 632, 895 N.W.2d 284 (2017).
A motion which purportedly seeks a "new trial" after an entry of a summary judgment is not a proper motion for new trial. A new trial is a reexamination of an issue of fact by the same court, and a trial court does not resolve factual issues when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, 268 Neb. 722, 687 N.W.2d 672 (2004).
A party seeking to prove that the opposing party was driving a particular vehicle could have, with reasonable diligence, discovered the vehicle's odometer reading prior to a summary judgment hearing on the matter. Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, 268 Neb. 722, 687 N.W.2d 672 (2004).
In reviewing the district court's order granting a new trial, the decision of the trial court will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Bowley v. W.S.A., Inc., 264 Neb. 6, 645 N.W.2d 512 (2002).
The only pleading which tolls the time for the filing of an appeal is a motion for new trial as set out in this section, and the motion must state the statutory grounds found in this section. Breeden v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 257 Neb. 371, 598 N.W.2d 441 (1999).
A motion to vacate an order of dismissal is equivalent to a motion for new trial. Abboud v. Cutler, 238 Neb. 177, 469 N.W.2d 763 (1991).
Motion to correct verdict forms, because it sought not a reexamination of an issue of fact but, rather, an investigation into a possible clerical error of the jury, was not a motion for new trial and thus not subject to the 10-day filing limit imposed by section 25-1143. Harmon Cable Communications v. Scope Cable Television, 237 Neb. 871, 468 N.W.2d 350 (1991).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act does not provide for a motion for new trial in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. Carter v. Weyerhaeuser, 234 Neb. 558, 452 N.W.2d 32 (1990).
A motion for new trial is authorized after a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, during pendency of such motion, suspends or tolls the time limit to comply with requirements for an appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court. Dunn v. Hemberger, 230 Neb. 171, 430 N.W.2d 516 (1988).
Since a new trial is a reexamination in the same court of issues previously decided by it, the constitutional issues not raised by the pleadings may not be raised in the motion for a new trial. State ex rel. Douglas v. Schroeder, 212 Neb. 562, 324 N.W.2d 391 (1982).
None of the grounds for a new trial, except for newly discovered evidence, include remedying a proof defect. Battiato v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 212 Neb. 474, 323 N.W.2d 105 (1982).
The trial court has the power and the authority to grant a new trial where such legal cause or reason therefor appears in the record and timely appropriate motions for a new trial have been filed, notwithstanding the fact that no preliminary motion for a directed verdict has been made. Lockhart v. Continental Cheese, Inc., 203 Neb. 331, 278 N.W.2d 604 (1979).
Diligent discovery before trial requires litigant to attempt examination where on notice that evidence may be relevant. Maddox v. First Westroads Bank, 199 Neb. 81, 256 N.W.2d 647 (1977).
Trial court had authority to vacate judgment it had entered for plaintiff after trial to the court, and to then enter judgment for defendants on motion couched in terms of section 25-1315.02. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 196 Neb. 158, 241 N.W.2d 674 (1976).
On appeal from a county or municipal court, notice of appeal and bond must be filed within ten days after rendition of judgment and this period cannot be prolonged by filing a motion for new trial. Edward Frank Rozman Co. v. Keillor, 195 Neb. 587, 239 N.W.2d 779 (1976).
The constitutionality of the guest statute could not be first raised in the motion for new trial. Zoimen v. Landsman, 192 Neb. 561, 223 N.W.2d 49 (1974).
An issue of constitutionality not raised in the pleadings cannot be raised in a motion for new trial. Hale v. Taylor, 192 Neb. 298, 220 N.W.2d 378 (1974).
If a new trial will involve the reexamination of an issue of fact, the granting thereof is appealable. Morford v. Lipsey Meat Co., Inc., 179 Neb. 420, 138 N.W.2d 653 (1965).
A new trial is a reexamination in the same court of an issue of fact. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Atlantic Nat. Ins. Co., 178 Neb. 226, 132 N.W.2d 758 (1965).
Motion for new trial in divorce action specified four of the eight grounds set forth in this section. Isom v. Isom, 176 Neb. 344, 126 N.W.2d 198 (1964).
A new trial does not involve an original examination of issues, but only re-examination. Otteman v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. Inc., 171 Neb. 148, 105 N.W.2d 583 (1960).
A motion for a new trial within the purview of this section must be for a complete new trial. Harman v. Swanson, 169 Neb. 452, 100 N.W.2d 33 (1959).
Failure of litigant to ascertain facts shown by an existing public record is not reasonable diligence. Wemmer v. Young, 167 Neb. 495, 93 N.W.2d 837 (1958).
Motion for new trial is proper even though ruling thereon does not require a re-examination of an issue of fact. Brasier v. Cribbett, 166 Neb. 145, 88 N.W.2d 235 (1958).
Assignments of error on appeal may not be sufficient although substantially in the language relating to motions for new trial. Backer v. City of Sidney, 165 Neb. 816, 87 N.W.2d 610 (1958).
Motion for new trial by plaintiff was sufficient as to joint defendants. Wisnieski v. Moeller, 165 Neb. 476, 86 N.W.2d 52 (1957).
Assignments of error couched in exact words of motion for new trial generally are insufficient. Wieck v. Blessin, 165 Neb. 282, 85 N.W.2d 628 (1957).
Motion for new trial may be granted although no preliminary motion for directed verdict has been made. Kohl v. Unkel, 163 Neb. 257, 79 N.W.2d 405 (1956).
The grounds for a new trial are statutory. State v. Kubik, 159 Neb. 509, 67 N.W.2d 755 (1954).
Supreme Court may consider on appeal an additional reason for granting of new trial. Danielsen v. Eickhoff, 159 Neb. 374, 66 N.W.2d 913 (1954).
If legal reason exists, court should sustain motion. Pongruber v. Patrick, 157 Neb. 799, 61 N.W.2d 578 (1953).
Assignment of error in language of statute was sufficient. Lund v. Holbrook, 153 Neb. 706, 46 N.W.2d 130 (1951).
Motion filed setting up grounds under this section did not authorize vacation of judgment after term. Nemetz v. Nemetz, 152 Neb. 178, 40 N.W.2d 685 (1950).
A new trial is a reexamination in the same court of an issue of fact. Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 151 Neb. 663, 38 N.W.2d 533 (1949).
To be ground for new trial, error must affect materially the substantial rights of a party. Greenberg v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 150 Neb. 695, 35 N.W.2d 772 (1949).
The remedy provided for errors committed during a trial is a new trial. Schnell v. United Hail Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 768, 18 N.W.2d 112 (1945).
When a general verdict is vacated or set aside by the trial court for errors specified in this section, it should award a new trial. In re George's Estate, 144 Neb. 915, 18 N.W.2d 68 (1945).
It is sufficient to set out grounds for new trial in language of the statute. McCullough v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation, 144 Neb. 92, 12 N.W.2d 639 (1944).
A copy of the provisions of this section is insufficient as an assignment of errors upon appeal. Labs v. Farmers State Bank of Millard, 135 Neb. 130, 280 N.W. 452 (1938).
Power of setting aside a verdict on ground that it is excessive should be used sparingly. Watson v. Miller, 131 Neb. 74, 267 N.W. 230 (1936).
Where defendant's motion for new trial is sustained, former judgment set aside, and judgment of dismissal of cause of action is entered, plaintiff becomes the "aggrieved party" with right to present motion for a new trial. Elfers v. Schuff & Sons Hotel Co., 127 Neb. 236, 254 N.W. 885 (1934).
Statute does not abridge the inherent power of the court to vacate or modify its own judgments during the term. Lyman v. Dunn, 125 Neb. 770, 252 N.W. 197 (1934).
Procedure under tax foreclosure statute necessarily invokes equity jurisdiction, hence motion for new trial hereunder was not required. Douglas County v. Barker Co., 125 Neb. 253, 249 N.W. 607 (1933).
In absence of motion for new trial, the only question presented by record is determination of whether defendant's answer supports judgment entered. Hamaker v. Patrick, 122 Neb. 688, 241 N.W. 537 (1932).
When, in equity case, Supreme Court on appeal directs trial court to enter different judgment, defeated party may file motion for new trial within three days after entry thereof. Ward v. Geary, 115 Neb. 58, 211 N.W. 208 (1926).
Affidavits of jurors are incompetent to show how amount of verdict computed. Palmer v. Parmele, 104 Neb. 30, 175 N.W. 649 (1919).
Section relates only to applications for new trial at same term judgment was rendered. Wunrath v. Peoples Fur. & Carpet Co., 98 Neb. 342, 152 N.W. 736 (1915).
New trial should be granted by equity court where party is deprived of bill of exceptions, because of inability of court reporter to furnish transcript of evidence. Ferber v. Leise, 97 Neb. 795, 151 N.W. 307 (1915).
Where special findings are returned, motion for new trial may be filed within three days from entry of judgment vacating general verdict and entering judgment on special findings. Platte County Bank v. Clark, 81 Neb. 255, 115 N.W. 787 (1908).
Application must be made during same term, and, except on newly discovered evidence, within three days. Carmack v. Erdenberger, 77 Neb. 592, 110 N.W. 315 (1906).
Right to new trial is waived by stay of judgment or decree. Rice v. Parrott, 76 Neb. 501, 107 N.W. 840 (1906), affirmed on rehearing 76 Neb. 505, 111 N.W. 583 (1907); Banks v. Hitchcock, 20 Neb. 315, 30 N.W. 56 (1886).
Where error complained of involves no reexamination of issues of fact, motion for new trial is not a prerequisite to review. Bannard v. Duncan, 65 Neb. 179, 90 N.W. 947 (1902).
Requirement of filing of motion applies only to issues of fact. Horton v. State ex rel. Hayden, 60 Neb. 701, 84 N.W. 87 (1900).
This section does not abridge power of court to vacate its own judgments during term. Bradley v. Slater, 58 Neb. 554, 78 N.W. 1069 (1899).
Motion may not be heard in vacation. Hodgin v. Whitcomb, 51 Neb. 617, 71 N.W. 314 (1897).
Primary purpose of section is to afford trial court the opportunity to correct its own errors. Weber v. Kirkendall, 44 Neb. 766, 63 N.W. 35 (1895).
New trial cannot be granted on grounds other than those prescribed by law. Risse v. Gasch, 43 Neb. 287, 61 N.W. 616 (1895).
Motion does not per se stay execution of judgment or decree. Von Dorn v. Mengedoht, 41 Neb. 525, 59 N.W. 800 (1894).
Additional grounds are not assignable by amendment at subsequent term. Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Leahey, 24 Neb. 286, 38 N.W. 740 (1888).
Motion may be heard at subsequent term. Chadron Loan & Building Assn. v. Scott, 4 Neb. Unof. 694, 96 N.W. 220 (1903).
In a trial to establish custody of a child born out of wedlock, a mother's rights were not substantially affected as a result of the father's failure to answer interrogatories. State on behalf of Keegan M. v. Joshua M., 20 Neb. App. 411, 824 N.W.2d 383 (2012).
Summary judgment is not a trial within the meaning of this section. Vesely v. National Travelers Life Co., 12 Neb. App. 622, 682 N.W.2d 713 (2004).
25-1143.
Repealed. Laws 2000, LB 921, § 38.
25-1144.
New trial;
motion; form.The application for
a new trial shall be by motion, upon
written grounds, filed at the time of making the motion. It shall be sufficient,
however, in assigning the grounds of the motion to assign the same in the
language of the statute and without further or other particularity. The causes
enumerated in subdivisions
(2), (3), and (7) of section 25-1142 shall be sustained by affidavits
showing their truth and
may be controverted by affidavits.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 317, p. 477; R.S.1913, § 7885; C.S.1922, § 8827; C.S.1929, § 20-1144; R.S.1943, § 25-1144;
Laws 2009, LB35, § 9.
Annotations
1. Necessity
2. Form
3. Miscellaneous
1. Necessity
Provisions of this statute as to application for new trial are mandatory. Weideman v. Peterson's Estate, 129 Neb. 74, 261 N.W. 150 (1935); Douglas County v. Barker Co., 125 Neb. 253, 249 N.W. 607 (1933); Weber v. Allen, 121 Neb. 833, 238 N.W. 740 (1931).
Provisions are mandatory. Carmack v. Erdenberger, 77 Neb. 592, 110 N.W. 315 (1906).
Motion is not necessary to raise question of sufficiency of pleading to support judgment. Farris v. State ex rel. Murphy, 46 Neb. 857, 65 N.W. 890 (1896).
Court may set aside verdict on its own motion. Weber v. Kirkendall, 44 Neb. 766, 63 N.W. 35 (1895).
Motion is not necessary to obtain review of equity cases. Swansen v. Swansen, 12 Neb. 210, 10 N.W. 713 (1881).
2. Form
A written motion for new trial specifying ground thereof is mandatory for review of errors of law occurring at the trial of a law action or the sufficiency of the evidence. Parker v. Christensen, 192 Neb. 117, 219 N.W.2d 235 (1974).
It is sufficient to state ground for new trial in language of statute. Johnston Grain Co. v. Tridle, 175 Neb. 859, 124 N.W.2d 463 (1963); State v. Kubik, 159 Neb. 509, 67 N.W.2d 755 (1954); Harsche v. Czyz, 157 Neb. 699, 61 N.W.2d 265 (1953); Lund v. Holbrook, 153 Neb. 706, 46 N.W.2d 130 (1951); McCullough v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation, 144 Neb. 92, 12 N.W.2d 639 (1944); Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Cass County, 51 Neb. 369, 70 N.W. 955 (1897).
Claim of newly discovered evidence must be sustained by affidavit. Powell v. Van Donselaar, 160 Neb. 21, 68 N.W.2d 894 (1955).
Assignment of error in motion for new trial that court erred in giving or refusal to give a group of instructions will be considered only to the extent of ascertaining if any one of instructions should have been given or refused. Anderson v. Nebraska Defense Corporation, 146 Neb. 466, 20 N.W.2d 322 (1946).
When codefendants join in a motion for a new trial, errors assigned which are not good as to all defendants are not good as to any. Thomas v. Fundum, 135 Neb. 728, 283 N.W. 839 (1939).
Assignment in motion of errors of law occurring at trial and duly excepted to is sufficient to review ruling on demurrer. Riverside Coal Co. v. Holmes, 36 Neb. 858, 55 N.W. 255 (1893).
Assignment of errors of law occurring at trial is sufficient to entitle party to review rulings on admission or rejection of testimony. Labaree v. Klosterman, 33 Neb. 150, 49 N.W. 1102 (1891).
3. Miscellaneous
A motion for reconsideration does not toll the time for appeal and is considered nothing more than an invitation to the court to consider exercising its inherent power to vacate or modify its own judgment. Bechtold v. Gomez, 254 Neb. 282, 576 N.W.2d 185 (1998).
Erroneous failure to submit pleaded issues supported by evidence may be availed of by assignment of error in language of the statute. Fries v. Goldsby, 163 Neb. 424, 80 N.W.2d 171 (1956).
Setting out grounds for new trial in language of statute is sufficient for purposes of motion, but is insufficient as assignments of error upon appeal. Labs v. Farmers State Bank of Millard, 135 Neb. 130, 280 N.W. 452 (1938).
Record of trial itself must show how question was presented to and ruled upon by court; cannot be shown by affidavit filed with motion for new trial. Palmer v. Parmele, 104 Neb. 30, 175 N.W. 649 (1919).
Appeal to Supreme Court does not prevent district court from granting new trial. Smith v. Goodman, 100 Neb. 284, 159 N.W. 418 (1916).
Alleged errors of trial court in an action at law, not referred to in motion for new trial, will not be considered. Pennington County Bank v. Bauman, 81 Neb. 782, 116 N.W. 669 (1908).
Affidavits must be filed and preserved in bill of exceptions. Omaha Fire Ins. Co. v. Dierks, 43 Neb. 473, 61 N.W. 740 (1895).
25-1144.01.
New trial; motion; when filed; filing before entry of judgment; treatment.A motion for a new trial shall be filed no later than ten days after the entry of the judgment. A motion for a new trial filed after the announcement of a verdict or decision but before the entry of judgment shall be treated as filed after the entry of judgment and on the day thereof.
Annotations
A motion for new trial filed after the court announced the jury verdict but before the entry of judgment is treated as filed after the entry of judgment and on the day thereof and is an effective terminating motion. Lindsay Internat. Sales & Serv. v. Wegener, 297 Neb. 788, 901 N.W.2d 278 (2017).
The trial court's unsigned journal entry that was sent to both parties was the court's announcement of its decision, and thus, the defendant's motion for new trial, which was filed after the court sent the unsigned journal entry to the parties but before the court entered the marital dissolution decree, was effective under this section. Despain v. Despain, 290 Neb. 32, 858 N.W.2d 566 (2015).
A motion for new trial must be filed within 10 days after an entry of judgment, which occurs when the clerk of the court places the file stamp and date upon the judgment, decree, or final order. Macke v. Pierce, 263 Neb. 868, 643 N.W.2d 673 (2002).
25-1145.
Repealed. Laws 2000, LB 921, § 38.
25-1146.
Damages.Whenever damages are recoverable, the plaintiff may claim and recover any rate of damages to which he may be entitled for the cause of action established.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 319, p. 448; R.S.1913, § 7887; C.S.1922, § 8829; C.S.1929, § 20-1146; R.S.1943, § 25-1146.
Annotations
Public perceptions of a defect when the evidence demonstrates there is none is an improper basis for recovery. de Vries v. L & L Custom Builders, 310 Neb. 543, 968 N.W.2d 64 (2021).
25-1147.
Actions; when triable.Actions shall be triable at the first term of the court after the issues therein, by the times fixed for pleading, are or should have been made up; and when by the times fixed for pleading, the issues are or should have been made up during a term, such action shall be triable at that term. When the issues are or should have been made up, either before or during a term of court, but after the period for preparing the trial docket of such term, the clerk shall place such actions on the trial docket of that term.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 9, p. 713; R.S.1913, § 7888; C.S.1922, § 8830; C.S.1929, § 20-1147; R.S.1943, § 25-1147.
Annotations
Failure to put case on docket does not entitle party to vacate judgment where he is not prejudiced. Shelby v. St. James Orphan Asylum, 66 Neb. 40, 92 N.W. 155 (1902).
Court may pass case or set for trial on future day of term. Connell v. Chambers, 22 Neb. 302, 34 N.W. 636 (1887).
25-1148.
Continuance or adjournment of causes pending; motion; affidavits; oral testimony; order; effect.Whenever application for continuance or adjournment is made by a party or parties to any cause or proceeding pending in the district court of any county, such application shall be by written motion entitled in the cause or proceeding and setting forth the grounds upon which the application is made, which motion shall be supported by the affidavit or affidavits of person or persons competent to testify as witnesses under the laws of this state, in proof of and setting forth the facts upon which such continuance or adjournment is asked. After the filing of such application and the affidavits in support thereof, the adverse party shall have the right to file counter affidavits in the matter. Either party may, upon obtaining leave of the court, introduce oral testimony upon the hearing of such application. The court may, upon the hearing, in its discretion, grant or refuse such application, and no reversal of such cause or proceeding shall be had on account of the action of the court in granting or refusing such application except when there has been an abuse of a sound legal discretion by the court.
Source:Laws 1911, c. 39, § 1, p. 205; R.S.1913, § 7889; C.S.1922, § 8831; C.S.1929, § 20-1148; R.S.1943, § 25-1148; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 48.
Annotations
1. Showing required
2. Discretion of court
3. Miscellaneous
1. Showing required
A court can grant a motion to continue even if the written motion was not filed, so long as the motion is set forth in the record. State v. Brooks, 285 Neb. 640, 828 N.W.2d 496 (2013).
An application for continuance must be in writing and supported by an affidavit which contains factual allegations demonstrating good cause or sufficient reason necessitating postponement of proceedings. Williams v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 443 N.W.2d 577 (1989).
Denial of motion for continuance was proper where no written application and affidavit were filed. Stastny v. Tachovsky, 178 Neb. 109, 132 N.W.2d 317 (1964).
Affidavits for continuance must allege facts and circumstances from which legal conclusions can be drawn. State v. Russell, 173 Neb. 882, 115 N.W.2d 578 (1962).
In reviewing order denying a continuance, it is proper to look to the entire record in the case. Kennedy v. State, 171 Neb. 160, 105 N.W.2d 710 (1960).
Where motion for continuance was not supported, denial was not error. Vasa v. Vasa, 165 Neb. 69, 84 N.W.2d 185 (1957).
In order to be considered by appellate court, affidavits must be preserved by bill of exceptions. Freeman v. City of Neligh, 155 Neb. 651, 53 N.W.2d 67 (1952).
Voluntary or negligent absence of a party to the suit is not a ground for continuance. Kulhanek v. Kulhanek, 134 Neb. 349, 278 N.W. 563 (1938).
Where pleading of party applying for continuance fails to disclose a meritorious cause of action or defense, continuance may be denied. Cornell v. Tuck, 104 Neb. 759, 178 N.W. 612 (1920).
Nonattendance of witnesses subpoenaed by plaintiff when the trial commenced is not of itself sufficient ground for a continuance at the request of defendant who relied upon plaintiff's efforts to procure the attendance of such witnesses. Jackson v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 101 Neb. 456, 163 N.W. 838 (1917).
Counter showing against motion for continuance is properly allowed. Dilley v. State, 97 Neb. 853, 151 N.W. 946 (1915).
Absence of witness is not ground for continuance where testimony would have been inadmissible. Aegerter v. Ronspies, 97 Neb. 656, 150 N.W. 1019 (1915).
Ordinarily failure to have witness subpoenaed and reliance on his promise to appear and testify shows lack of such diligence as requires a continuance in case the witness fails to keep his promise. Life Ins. Clearing Co. v. Altschuler, 55 Neb. 341, 75 N.W. 862 (1898).
An appellate court will assess motions to continue a trial that do not fully comply with the rule governing requests for continuance in the broader context of the parties' substantial rights. State on behalf of Keegan M. v. Joshua M., 20 Neb. App. 411, 824 N.W.2d 383 (2012).
An application for continuance shall state the grounds upon which the application is made and be supported by affidavits of persons competent to testify as witnesses in proof of and setting forth the facts upon which such continuance is asked. State v. Vela-Montes, 19 Neb. App. 378, 807 N.W.2d 544 (2011).
The method by which the State sought a continuance, although not ideal under the requirements of this section, was not in itself a sufficient basis for finding error in the granting of the continuance. State v. Shipler, 17 Neb. App. 66, 758 N.W.2d 41 (2008).
An application for a continuance must be in writing and supported by an affidavit which contains factual allegations demonstrating good cause or sufficient reason necessitating postponement of the proceedings. In re Interest of Azia B., 10 Neb. App. 124, 626 N.W.2d 602 (2001).
The burden of showing an abuse of discretion in refusing a continuance is upon person who asserts it. Rhodes v. Houston, 258 F.Supp. 546 (D. Neb. 1966).
2. Discretion of court
In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance, it is proper for the reviewing court to look at the entire record in the case. State v. Valdez, 239 Neb. 453, 476 N.W.2d 814 (1991).
The failure to file a written motion for continuance supported by affidavit is a factor to be considered in determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance. State v. Santos, 238 Neb. 25, 468 N.W.2d 613 (1991).
Generally, the denial of a motion for a continuance is a matter for the discretion of the trial court whose ruling will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Perez, 235 Neb. 796, 457 N.W.2d 448 (1990).
There is no abuse of discretion by the court in denying a request for a continuance unless it appears that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of that denial. State v. Perez, 235 Neb. 796, 457 N.W.2d 448 (1990).
Where a criminal defendant's motion for continuance is based upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of events within the defendant's own control, denial of such motion generally is not abuse of discretion. State v. Perez, 235 Neb. 796, 457 N.W.2d 448 (1990).
Failure to comply with the requirement that application for continuance shall be by written motion and supported by affidavits is relevant in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance. State v. Carter, 226 Neb. 636, 413 N.W.2d 901 (1987).
A situation in which a party moves to continue the testimony of a physician to the next day in order to permit a physical examination of the injured party, and in which the trial proceeds with testimony from other witnesses, does not amount to a continuance which would require a written motion supported by affidavit. Hoegerl v. Burt, 215 Neb. 752, 340 N.W.2d 428 (1983).
A trial court may, in a proper case, order a continuance on its own motion and in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion, its ruling on a motion for a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Lee, 195 Neb. 348, 237 N.W.2d 880 (1976).
A motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion, a ruling on a motion for continuance will not be disturbed on appeal. Korte v. Betzer, 193 Neb. 15, 225 N.W.2d 30 (1975).
A denial of a party's motion for continuance of a hearing on a motion for new trial is not an abuse of sound legal discretion. Engel v. Mead, 191 Neb. 541, 216 N.W.2d 718 (1974).
In the absence of a showing in conformance with this section, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to grant a continuance. Metschke v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 186 Neb. 197, 181 N.W.2d 843 (1970).
Trial court may in a proper case order a continuance on its own motion. Waite v. State, 169 Neb. 113, 98 N.W.2d 688 (1959).
Application for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. O'Rourke v. State, 166 Neb. 866, 90 N.W.2d 820 (1958).
The granting of a continuance rests in discretion of trial court. Cox v. State, 159 Neb. 811, 68 N.W.2d 497 (1955).
In absence of showing of abuse of discretion, denial of continuance is not error. Hyslop v. State, 159 Neb. 802, 68 N.W.2d 698 (1955).
Where parties agree to continue case beyond day set for trial, and default judgment is entered at request of party violating the agreement for continuance, it is abuse of discretion to overrule motion for new trial. National Cooperative Hail Assn. v. Doran Bros., 121 Neb. 746, 238 N.W. 527 (1931).
There was no abuse of discretion in refusing continuance. Middaugh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 114 Neb. 438, 208 N.W. 139 (1926).
Refusal to grant continuance was abuse of discretion under circumstances of case. Richelieu v. Union P. R. R. Co., 97 Neb. 360, 149 N.W. 772 (1914).
Noncompliance with the clear mandates of this section is merely a factor to be considered in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling upon a motion for continuance. State v. Vela-Montes, 19 Neb. App. 378, 807 N.W.2d 544 (2011).
Courts may grant a continuance when the factual basis for granting the motion is wholly or largely dependent upon the oral statements of the prosecutor where the defense does not object to the procedure. State v. Roundtree, 11 Neb. App. 628, 658 N.W.2d 308 (2003).
Failure to comply with this section is relevant as to whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re Interest of Azia B., 10 Neb. App. 124, 626 N.W.2d 602 (2001).
3. Miscellaneous
Sua sponte judicial delays might be characterized as continuances by the court, but they are not "applications for continuances" as described by section 29-1206 and, accordingly, need not be in conformance with the requirements of this section, which describes a hearing on the application and the necessary form of support for applications for continuances or adjournment "made by a party or parties." State v. Chase, 310 Neb. 160, 964 N.W.2d 254 (2021).
This section and section 29-1206 do not define whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. State v. Turner, 252 Neb. 620, 564 N.W.2d 231 (1997).
25-1149.
Issues; order in which tried; time of hearing.The trial of an issue of fact and the assessment of damages in any case shall be in the order in which they are placed on the trial docket, unless by consent of parties or the order of the court they are continued, placed at the heel of the trial docket, or temporarily postponed. The time of hearing all other cases shall be in the order in which they are placed on the trial docket, unless the court shall otherwise direct. The court may in its discretion hear at any time a motion, may by rule prescribe the time for hearing motions, and may provide for dismissing actions without prejudice for want of prosecution.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 324, p. 448; Laws 1887, c. 94, § 2, p. 648; Laws 1899, c. 83, § 2, p. 339; R.S.1913, § 7890; C.S.1922, § 8832; C.S.1929, § 20-1149; R.S.1943, § 25-1149;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 16.
Annotations
The district court abused its discretion in dismissing, without explanation, an inmate’s complaint for lack of prosecution when the court identified two ways of avoiding dismissal and the inmate timely performed one of the specified actions. Jones v. Jones, 284 Neb. 361, 821 N.W.2d 211 (2012).
A district court has discretionary power to dismiss a case without prejudice for want of prosecution. Such a dismissal is also within the inherent power of the court. Talkington v. Womens Servs., P.C., 256 Neb. 2, 588 N.W.2d 790 (1999).
Even where statute of limitations would bar filing of a new action, district court may dismiss a case for want of prosecution where facts indicate unreasonable delay with no justifiable excuse. Schaeffer v. Hunter, 200 Neb. 221, 263 N.W.2d 102 (1978).
A court may under court rule dismiss cases for lack of progress after a specified time interval. Fanning v. Richards, 193 Neb. 431, 227 N.W.2d 595 (1975).
Court has power to dismiss for want of prosecution. Brown v. Lincoln, 157 Neb. 840, 61 N.W.2d 836 (1954).
Causes are to be tried in the district court in the order in which they are entered upon the trial docket, unless court otherwise directs. Osgood v. Grant, 44 Neb. 350, 62 N.W. 894 (1895).
25-1154.
Legislative purpose and findings.The purpose of sections 25-1154 to 25-1157 is to provide an alternate dispute resolution technique, to be known as the summary jury trial, for use by the parties to civil court actions. The Legislature finds that the procedures set forth in such sections will save valuable court and juror resources, promote prompt resolution of disputes, and increase settlement of disputed actions prior to a jury trial. The Legislature declares that courts should liberally construe such sections and employ summary jury trials in appropriate civil actions to effectuate the purposes and findings set forth in this section.
25-1155.
Motion; when granted; contents.In any civil action, the district court may grant a summary jury trial upon the written motion of all parties or their oral motion in court entered upon the record. The motion for summary jury trial may contain a stipulation of the parties concerning the use or effect of the summary jury verdict.
25-1156.
Trial; how conducted.Summary jury trials shall be conducted in the same manner as any other trial by jury under Chapter 25, article 11, with the following exceptions:
(1) A six-person jury shall be selected from persons whose names appear on the jury list and who qualify as jurors. Examination of the prospective jurors shall be conducted by the judge who shall select the jury subject to each party's right to challenge two jurors;
(2) Each party shall have an equal amount of time to present his or her case as shall be agreed upon by the parties and the judge;
(3) The judge need not preside during the presentation of the case but may give the jury written or oral instructions on the applicable law following the presentation;
(4) The parties shall not present evidence but may present representations or summaries of evidence which would be adduced and admissible at trial. At least ten days prior to trial the parties shall exchange the representations or summaries of evidence which will be presented to the jury. All objections to the evidence shall be made prior to the summary jury trial and shall not be allowed during the trial;
(5) The parties shall attend the summary jury trial. The president, chief executive officer, or any other representative with authority to enter into a binding agreement or make a binding settlement offer from each corporation or association which is a party shall attend; and
(6) The jury may return either a consensus verdict or a special verdict consisting of an anonymous statement of each juror's findings which includes (a) the parties' respective liability, (b) the value of damages, and (c) a general verdict.
25-1157.
Trial; use of verdict; records; not required.Summary jury trials shall not result in a final determination on the merits and shall not be appealable. Neither the fact of the holding of a summary jury trial nor the jurors' verdict nor the presentations by the parties shall be admissible as evidence in any subsequent trial of the action except any documents otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. No record shall be required of the jury selection, the presentation of the parties, or the instructions by the court of the summary jury trial.
25-1201.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1202.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1203.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1204.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1205.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1206.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1207.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1208.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1209.
Witnesses; answer subjecting to civil liability; not privileged.A witness is not excused from answering a question upon the mere ground that he would be thereby subject to a civil liability.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 336, p. 450; R.S.1913, § 7901; C.S.1922, § 8843; C.S.1929, § 20-1209; R.S.1943, § 25-1209.
25-1210.
Witnesses; answer subjecting to criminal liability; disgracing answer; privilege.When the matter sought to be elicited would tend to render the witness criminally liable or to expose him or her to public ignominy, the witness is not compelled to answer, except as provided in section 27-609.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 337, p. 450; R.S.1913, § 7902; C.S.1922, § 8844; C.S.1929, § 20-1210; R.S.1943, § 25-1210;
Laws 2003, LB 19, § 2.
Cross References
For privilege of immunity in proceeding for discovery of property, see section 25-1567.
Annotations
The public ignominy privilege provided in this section cannot be asserted by a witness in a criminal case. State v. Riensche, 283 Neb. 820, 812 N.W.2d 293 (2012).
In dissolution action, trial court's ruling allowing wife to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination was supported by this section. Ritchey v. Ritchey, 208 Neb. 100, 302 N.W.2d 372 (1981).
In determining whether the testimony of a witness who had pleaded guilty to a similar charge but had not been sentenced, who invoked the privilege of self-incrimination during cross-examination may be used against the defendant, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear only on the creditability of the witness and those cases in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry into matters about which the witness testified on direct examination. State v. Bittner, 188 Neb. 298, 196 N.W.2d 186 (1972).
Privilege of refusing to answer may be asserted at time witness is confronted with question or interrogatory. State ex rel. Beck v. Lush, 168 Neb. 367, 95 N.W.2d 695 (1959).
Privilege of witness to refuse to answer on ground answer may tend to incriminate him or expose him to public ignominy must be timely made or it will be deemed to have been waived. State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N.W. 282 (1937).
Questions tending to incriminate or expose witness to public ignominy were improper. Pricer v. Lincoln Gas & Elec. Co., 111 Neb. 209, 196 N.W. 150 (1923).
If witness testified to part, he waives privilege as to whole transaction. Lombard v. Mayberry, 24 Neb. 674, 40 N.W. 271 (1888).
25-1211.
Witnesses; credibility; impeachment.Facts which have heretofore caused the exclusion of testimony, may still be shown for the purpose of lessening its credibility.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 330, p. 450; R.S.1913, § 7903; C.S.1922, § 8845; C.S.1929, § 20-1211; R.S.1943, § 25-1211.
Annotations
State was permitted on cross-examination to interrogate accused as to his prior criminal record. O'Connor v. State, 123 Neb. 471, 243 N.W. 650 (1932).
Evidence of writings made during trial as a basis of comparison for determination of disputed documents was properly admitted. In re Estate of Husa, 121 Neb. 67, 236 N.W. 177 (1931).
Record of conviction may be received to lessen credibility of witness, but such record is not conclusive. Reed v. State, 66 Neb. 184, 92 N.W. 321 (1902).
Previous inconsistent statements of witness may be shown, where proper foundation therefor has been laid. Omaha Loan & Trust Co. v. Douglas County, 62 Neb. 1, 86 N.W. 936 (1901); Tatum v. State, 61 Neb. 229, 85 N.W. 40 (1901).
Evidence of reputation of witness should be confined to reputation at place of residence. Faulkner v. Gilbert, 61 Neb. 602, 85 N.W. 843 (1901).
The record of conviction of an offense below the grade of a felony is not admissible to affect the credibility of a witness. YMCA of Lincoln v. Rawlings, 60 Neb. 377, 83 N.W. 175 (1900).
25-1212.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 62, § 5.
25-1213.
Notarial protest as evidence of dishonor; bill of exchange or promissory note.The usual protest by a notary public, without proof of his signature or notarial seal, is evidence of the dishonor and notice of a bill of exchange or promissory note.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 349, p. 452; R.S.1913, § 7905; C.S.1922, § 8847; C.S.1929, § 20-1213; R.S.1943, § 25-1213.
Annotations
Certificate of notary is evidence of notice as well as protest. Williams v. Parks, 63 Neb. 747, 89 N.W. 395 (1902).
25-1214.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1215.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1216.
Evidence; instrument; written and printed matter; writing controls.When an instrument consists partly of written and partly of printed form, the former controls the latter, where the two are inconsistent.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 340, p. 451; R.S.1913, § 7908; C.S.1922, § 8850; C.S.1929, § 20-1216; R.S.1943, § 25-1216.
Cross References
Commercial paper, see section 3-114, Uniform Commercial Code.
Annotations
In a typed contract, writing subsequent to the typing controls where there is a conflict between the typed and written provisions thereof. Spencer-O'Neill House, Inc. v. Denbeck, 196 Neb. 456, 243 N.W.2d 767 (1976).
Typewriting controls printed form where two are inconsistent. Jacobsen v. Farnham, 155 Neb. 776, 53 N.W.2d 917 (1952).
Typewriting is writing within the contemplation of the statute. Mack Investment Co. v. Dominy, 140 Neb. 709, 1 N.W.2d 295 (1941); New Masonic Temple Assn. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 134 Neb. 731, 279 N.W. 475 (1938).
Sewer contractor could recover for sheeting lumber left in trench by city engineer's order, where payment was provided for in specifications, though contract provided no extras would be allowed for sheeting left in trench. Petersen v. City of Omaha, 120 Neb. 219, 231 N.W. 763 (1930).
Where first paragraph of conditions of builder's bond is in typewriting complete within itself, and inconsistent provisions are in fine print as part of blank form evidently not intended to be used, typewritten part controls. American Surety Co. v. School Dist. No. 64 of Douglas Co., 117 Neb. 6, 219 N.W. 583 (1928).
Where printed part of land contract says "good title of record," but typewritten part says "title satisfactory to attorney" of purchaser, latter prevails. Flower v. Coe, 111 Neb. 296, 196 N.W. 139 (1923).
25-1217.
Agreements; construction of terms.When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he had reason to suppose the other understood it.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 341, p. 451; R.S.1913, § 7909; C.S.1922, § 8851; C.S.1929, § 20-1217; R.S.1943, § 25-1217.
Annotations
1. Construction
2. Reformation
1. Construction
The intention of the parties to an accord and satisfaction is a question of law where the written contract is couched in clear and unambiguous terms and where the evidence creates no conflict as to intention. Meyers v. Frohm Holdings, Inc., 211 Neb. 329, 318 N.W.2d 716 (1982).
In determining the meaning of a written contract, where it is in doubt and dispute, the court will consider all facts and circumstances leading up to and attending its execution, and consider the relation of the parties, the nature and situation of the subject matter, and the apparent purpose of making the contract. Younker Brothers, Inc. v. Westroads, Inc., 196 Neb. 168, 241 N.W.2d 679 (1976).
The meaning of an ambiguity in a contract is a matter of fact to be determined as other questions of fact and summary judgment is precluded. Grantham v. General Tel. Co., 191 Neb. 21, 213 N.W.2d 439 (1973).
Contract for treatment of house for termites was not subject to construction under this section. Hansen v. E. L. Bruce Co., 162 Neb. 759, 77 N.W.2d 458 (1956).
Where one party uses language to which it attaches a certain meaning, and that meaning is made known to the other party and no objection is made thereto, the language will be construed according to the meaning of the party using it. Platte Valley Bank v. Lemke, 141 Neb. 218, 3 N.W.2d 396 (1942).
An agreement that is vague and ambiguous in its terms may be explained by other evidence. Jensen v. Romigh, 133 Neb. 71, 274 N.W. 199 (1937).
When terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the parties to it, that sense will prevail against either party in which he had reason to suppose the other understood it. Elvidge v. Brant, 131 Neb. 1, 267 N.W. 169 (1936); Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Village of Creston, 129 Neb. 850, 263 N.W. 220 (1935).
Evidence of oral agreement is inadmissible where written contract is certain. Smith v. Bailey, 105 Neb. 754, 181 N.W. 926 (1921).
Technical terms should be given nontechnical meaning where one party has reason to suppose other party so understood them. Richey v. Omaha & Lincoln Ry. & Light Co., 100 Neb. 847, 161 N.W. 575 (1917).
Construction of terms of insurance as to word "dwelling," was adopted in accordance with sense that insurer had reason to believe insured understood it. Hamilton v. North American Accident Ins. Co., 99 Neb. 579, 157 N.W. 111 (1916).
Contract prepared by one party should be given construction that party preparing it supposed other would give it. Flory v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 98 Neb. 160, 152 N.W. 295 (1915).
Section was applied to a land contract where parties intended a different meaning. Edmiston v. Hupp, 98 Neb. 84, 152 N.W. 296 (1915).
When agreement between the parties is indefinite and uncertain and intended in a different sense by the parties, it should be construed in the sense plaintiff had reason to suppose defendant understood it to have. Campbell v. Hobbs, 97 Neb. 833, 151 N.W. 929 (1915).
Applied in action for purchase price of land where contract was based on letters. Pottratz v. Piper, 95 Neb. 145, 145 N.W. 265 (1914).
Section applied to stipulation for settlement of controversy. Southern Realty Co. v. Hannon, 89 Neb. 802, 132 N.W. 533 (1911).
Principal is bound by statements of agent as to meaning of terms inducing contract. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Burgert, 88 Neb. 376, 129 N.W. 557 (1911).
Agreement is legal if other party did not understand there was agreement not to prosecute. Griffin v. Chriswisser, 84 Neb. 196, 120 N.W. 909 (1909).
Assignment fell within provisions of this section. Barnes v. Sim, 80 Neb. 213, 117 N.W. 881 (1908).
Where bank president gave customer personal note in lieu of obligation of bank on certificate of deposit, bank was bound by understanding of customer that document was liability of bank. Patterson v. First National Bank of Humboldt, 78 Neb. 228, 110 N.W. 721 (1907).
Guaranty construed to cover any amount that person guaranteed failed to pay to the extent of specified amount. Standard Oil Co. v. Hoese, 57 Neb. 665, 78 N.W. 292 (1899).
Oral evidence to vary or control written agreement is inadmissible, in absence of fraud, ambiguity, or mistake. State Bank of Ceresco v. Belk, 56 Neb. 710, 77 N.W. 58 (1898); Sylvester v. Carpenter Paper Co., 55 Neb. 621, 75 N.W. 1092 (1898).
Terms of health certificate, in application for insurance, construed against insurer. American Order of Prot. v. Stanley, 5 Neb. Unof. 132, 97 N.W. 467 (1903).
Must be construed as party or agent understood it when he signed. People's B., L. & S. Assn. v. Klauber, 1 Neb. Unof. 676, 95 N.W. 1072 (1901).
2. Reformation
Section was applied in case where automobile liability insurance policy was reformed to conform to original contract that it should be issued to cover plaintiff's son as driver. Davis v. Highway Motor Underwriters, 120 Neb. 734, 235 N.W. 325 (1931).
In action for deficiency judgment, grantee, under deed in which he "assumes" mortgage, may show by parol that understanding was he was not to be personally liable. Durland Trust Co. v. Payne, 106 Neb. 135, 182 N.W. 1016 (1921).
Reformation may be had in equity to express agreement as understood. Blair v. Kingman Imp. Co., 82 Neb. 344, 117 N.W. 773 (1908).
25-1218.
Works of history, science, or art; presumptive evidence.Historical works, books of science or art, and published maps or charts, when made by persons indifferent between the parties, are presumptive evidence of facts of general notoriety or interest.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 342, p. 451; R.S.1913, § 7910; C.S.1922, § 8852; C.S.1929, § 20-1218; R.S.1943, § 25-1218.
Annotations
Text books on surgery are not competent evidence except as to matters of general notoriety or interest. Van Skike v. Potter, 53 Neb. 28, 73 N.W. 295 (1897).
Books of science or art are competent evidence when shown to be reputable or standard works. Sioux City & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Finlayson, 16 Neb. 578, 20 N.W. 860 (1884).
25-1219.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1220.
Handwriting; proof by comparison; experts; jury.Evidence respecting handwriting may be given by comparisons made, by experts or by the jury, with writing of the same person which is proved to be genuine.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 344, p. 451; R.S.1913, § 7912; C.S.1922, § 8854; C.S.1929, § 20-1220; R.S.1943, § 25-1220.
Annotations
1. Comparison
2. Miscellaneous
1. Comparison
This section permits comparisons between known genuine writing and the disputed writing to be made by a jury either with or without the aid of experts. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Nielsen, 222 Neb. 92, 382 N.W.2d 328 (1986).
In case tried to judge, handwriting may be compared by him with genuine writing of the same person. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cutright, 189 Neb. 805, 205 N.W.2d 542 (1973).
Court may admit writings made during progress of trial as a basis for comparison. In re Estate of Husa, 121 Neb. 67, 236 N.W. 177 (1931).
Expert testimony of handwriting based wholly on comparison of hands is in nature of circumstantial evidence. Wakeley v. State, 118 Neb. 346, 225 N.W. 42 (1929).
Instrument and signature introduced in evidence was sufficient basis for comparison with signature in question. Harrington v. Vogle, 103 Neb. 677, 173 N.W. 699 (1919).
Where execution of contract was denied, introduction of genuine signatures of deceased in evidence for comparison raised question of fact for jury. Wells v. Cochran, 78 Neb. 612, 111 N.W. 381 (1907).
Proved genuine writings should be admitted in evidence for the purpose of permitting the jury as well as experts to make the necessary comparison. First Nat. Bank of Madison v. Carson, 48 Neb. 763, 67 N.W. 779 (1896).
Comparison may be made by experts or by jury. Grand Island Banking Co. v. Shoemaker, 31 Neb. 124, 47 N.W. 696 (1891).
Only genuine signature admitted or proven can be submitted to jury for comparison with disputed writings. Link v. Reeves, 3 Neb. Unof. 383, 91 N.W. 506 (1902).
2. Miscellaneous
Opinion of handwriting experts on issue of forgery in civil action may be used to contradict testimony of witnesses who saw note executed, and may be sufficient to overturn same. Bank of Commerce of Louisville v. McCarty, 119 Neb. 795, 231 N.W. 34 (1930).
Refusal to permit cross-examination of expert on handwriting was not prejudicial. Schreiner v. Shanahan, 105 Neb. 525, 181 N.W. 536 (1921).
One familiar with handwriting of party denying alleged signature is competent to give opinion. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Lierman, 5 Neb. 247 (1876).
25-1221.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1222.
Private writing; when admissible without proof.Every private writing, except a last will and testament, after being acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner prescribed for the proof or acknowledgment of conveyances of real property, may be read in evidence without further proof.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 347, p. 452; R.S.1913, § 7914; C.S.1922, § 8856; C.S.1929, § 20-1222; R.S.1943, § 25-1222.
Annotations
Letter in answer, if self explanatory, is admissible by itself. New Hampshire Trust Co. v. Korsmeyer Plumbing & Heating Co., 57 Neb. 784, 78 N.W. 303 (1899).
Memorandum made contemporaneously with the facts therein noted, when supplemented by oath of party who made it, is admissible as independent evidence. Imhoff v. Richards, 48 Neb. 590, 67 N.W. 483 (1896).
Proof of preexistence and search for written evidence is essential to admission of secondary evidence. Samuelson v. Gale Mfg. Co., 1 Neb. Unof. 815, 95 N.W. 809 (1901).
25-1222.01.
Advance payment by person or corporation to injured person; not admission against interest; credit for payment; not admissible as evidence at trial.No advance payments or partial payment of damages made by an insurance company or other person, firm, trust, or corporation as an accommodation to an injured person or on his behalf to others or to the heirs at law or dependents of a deceased person made under any liability insurance policy, or other voluntary payments made because of an injury, death claim, property loss, or potential claim against any insured or other person, firm, trust, or corporation thereunder shall be construed as an admission of liability by the insured or other person, firm, trust, or corporation, or the payer's recognition of such liability, with respect to such injured or deceased person or with respect to any other claim arising from the same accident or event. Any such payments shall constitute a credit and be deductible from any final settlement made or judgment rendered with respect to such injured or deceased person. In the event of a trial involving such a claim, the fact that such payments have been made shall not be admissible in evidence or brought to the attention of the jury, and the matter of any credit to be deducted from a judgment shall be determined by the court in a separate hearing or upon the stipulation of the parties.
Annotations
Under this section, a party is entitled to a credit on any judgment rendered against him or her for payments or partial payment of damages made on behalf of such party to an injured person. Maxwell v. Montey, 265 Neb. 335, 656 N.W.2d 617 (2003).
The language and the intent of this section, which provides that an insurance company is entitled to credit on any judgment rendered against an insured for any payments or partial payment of claimed damages made on behalf of such party to an injured person or on his or her behalf to others, include an assignee or subrogee of the injured person. Brockhaus v. Lambert, 259 Neb. 160, 608 N.W.2d 588 (2000).
An insurance company is entitled to credit on a judgment against its insured for payments of claimed damages made on behalf of the injured party to the assignee or subrogee of the injured party. Beeder v. Fleer, 211 Neb. 294, 318 N.W.2d 708 (1982).
Unless the context otherwise requires, an advance payment by an insurer pursuant to a medical payments coverage provision in its insured's automobile liability policy should be applied as a credit to damages awarded against the insured. Murrish v. Burkey, 1 Neb. App. 650, 510 N.W.2d 366 (1993).
25-1222.02.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1223.
Trial subpoena; deposition subpoena; issuance; statement required; by whom served; forms.(1) Upon the request of a party to a civil action or proceeding, a subpoena may be issued to command a person to testify at a trial or deposition. The term trial in reference to a subpoena includes a hearing at which testimony may be taken.
(2) The clerk or a judge of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending shall issue a trial subpoena upon the request of a party. An attorney, as an officer of the court, may issue and sign a trial subpoena on behalf of the court if the attorney is authorized to practice in the court. An attorney who issues a subpoena must file a copy of the subpoena with the court on the day the subpoena is issued.
(3) A person before whom a deposition may be taken may issue a deposition subpoena on behalf of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending. An attorney, as an officer of the court, may issue and sign a deposition subpoena on behalf of the court if the attorney is authorized to practice in the court.
(4) A subpoena shall state the name of the court from which it is issued, the title of the action, and the case number and shall command each person to whom it is directed to appear and testify at the time and place specified in the subpoena.
(5) Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, a trial subpoena that is issued in a civil action or proceeding (a) at the request of an agency of state government or (b) pursuant to section 25-2304 shall contain the following statement: As a witness in [insert name of court], you are entitled to receive a witness fee in the amount of [insert amount from section 33-139] for each day that you are required to be in court and, if you live more than one mile from the courthouse, you are also entitled to receive mileage at the rate that state employees receive. Ask the lawyer or party who subpoenaed you or the clerk of the court for information about what you should do to receive the fees and mileage to which you are entitled.
(6) A trial subpoena in a civil action or proceeding that commands testimony by an employee of the State of Nebraska or a political subdivision thereof or a privately employed security guard, under the circumstances described in section 33-139.01, shall contain the following statement: As a witness in [insert name of court], you are entitled to be compensated for your actual and necessary expenses if you are required to travel outside of your county of residence to testify. Ask the lawyer or party who subpoenaed you or the clerk of the court for information about what you should do to receive compensation, if any, to which you are entitled.
(7) Any other trial subpoena in a civil action or proceeding shall contain the following statement: As a witness in [insert name of court], you are entitled to receive a witness fee in the amount of [insert amount from section 33-139] for each day that you are required to be in court and, if you live more than one mile from the courthouse, you are also eligible to receive mileage at the rate that state employees receive. You should have received your witness fee for one day with this subpoena. Ask the lawyer or party who subpoenaed you or the clerk of the court for information about what you should do to receive the additional fees, if any, and mileage to which you are entitled.
(8) The Supreme Court may promulgate forms for subpoenas for use in civil and criminal actions and proceedings. Any such forms shall not be in conflict with the laws governing such matters.
(9) A subpoena may be served by a sheriff or constable. It may also be served by a person who is twenty-one years of age or older and who is not a party to the action or proceeding.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 350, p. 452; R.S.1913, § 7915; C.S.1922, § 8857; C.S.1929, § 20-1223; R.S.1943, § 25-1223;
Laws 2017, LB509, § 1; Laws 2020, LB912, § 12.
25-1224.
Subpoena; to whom directed; production of documents, information, or tangible things; Supreme Court; powers.(1) A subpoena commanding a person to appear and testify at a trial or deposition may command that at the same time and place specified in the subpoena for the person to appear and testify, the person must produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in the person's possession, custody, or control. The scope of a command to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things pursuant to this section is governed by the rules of discovery in civil cases.
(2) The Supreme Court may promulgate a rule for discovery in civil cases that specifies the procedures to be followed when a party seeks to serve a deposition subpoena that commands the person to produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in the person's possession, custody, or control. Any such rule shall not conflict with the laws governing such matters.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 351, p. 452; R.S.1913, § 7916; C.S.1922, § 8858; C.S.1929, § 20-1224; R.S.1943, § 25-1224;
Laws 2017, LB509, § 2; Laws 2020, LB912, § 13.
Annotations
A DNA sample is not documentary in nature and is not discoverable under this section. State v. McKinney, 273 Neb. 346, 730 N.W.2d 74 (2007).
A subpoena duces tecum for trial imposes a duty upon the witness to bring with him sought-after matter under his control that the law requires him to produce as evidence. City of Omaha v. American Theater Corp., 189 Neb. 441, 203 N.W.2d 155 (1973).
25-1225.
Repealed. Laws 2017, LB509, § 8.
25-1226.
Subpoena; manner of service; time.(1) A subpoena for a trial or deposition may be served by personal service, which is made by leaving the subpoena with the person to be served, or by certified mail service, which is made by sending the subpoena by certified mail with a return receipt requested showing to whom and where delivered and the date of delivery. Service by certified mail is made on the date of delivery shown on the signed receipt.
(2) A subpoena for a trial must be served at least two days before the day on which the person is commanded to appear and testify. A court may shorten the period for service for good cause shown. In determining whether good cause exists, a court may consider all relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to, the need for the testimony, the burden on the person, and the reason why the person was not subpoenaed earlier.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 353, p. 452; R.S.1913, § 7918; Laws 1915, c. 148, § 2, p. 318; C.S.1922, § 8860; C.S.1929, § 20-1226; R.S.1943, § 25-1226; Laws 1953, c. 69, § 1, p. 220; Laws 1957, c. 242, § 16, p. 830;
Laws 2017, LB509, § 3; Laws 2020, LB912, § 14.
Annotations
This section was cited as illustrative of service of process by registered mail. Blauvelt v. Beck, 162 Neb. 576, 76 N.W.2d 738 (1956).
25-1227.
Witnesses in civil cases; compulsory attendance; distance required to travel; fees and expenses allowed.(1) Witnesses in civil cases cannot be compelled to attend a trial out of the state where they are served or at a distance of more than one hundred miles from the place of their residence or from the place where they are served with a subpoena, unless within the same county. Witnesses in civil cases shall not be obliged to attend a deposition outside the county of their residence or outside the county where the subpoena is served.
(2) A district court or county court judge, for good cause shown, may, upon deposit with the clerk of the court of sufficient money to pay the legal fees and mileage and reasonable expenses for hotel and meals of such a witness who attends at points so far removed from his or her residence as to make it reasonably necessary that such expenses be incurred, order a subpoena to issue requiring the trial attendance, but excluding a deposition appearance, of such witness from a greater distance within the state than that provided in subsection (1) of this section. Mileage shall be computed at the rate provided in section 81-1176. The subpoena shall show that it is issued under the provisions hereof. After the appearance of such witness in response to any such subpoena, the judge shall enter an order directing the payment to the witness from such deposit of such legal fees, mileage, and the actual expenses for hotel and meals incurred by such witness. If such deposit is not adequate for such purpose, the judge shall direct the party procuring the issuance of such subpoena to pay to such witness the deficiency.
(3) No other subpoena except from the district court or county court can compel a witness to attend for examination on the trial of a civil action, except in the county of his or her residence, nor to attend to give his or her deposition out of the county where he or she resides, or where he or she may be when the subpoena is served upon him or her.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 354, p. 452; R.S.1913, § 7919; C.S.1922, § 8861; C.S.1929, § 20-1227; R.S.1943, § 25-1227; Laws 1963, c. 142, § 1, p. 521;
Laws 1981, LB 204, § 38; Laws 1998, LB 234, § 5.
Annotations
Section is valid and constitutional. Brannan v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 118 Neb. 503, 223 N.W. 21, 225 N.W. 474 (1929).
Mileage is not allowed except for distance actually and necessarily traveled. Smith v. Bartlett, 78 Neb. 359, 110 N.W. 991 (1907).
This section and Neb. Ct. R. of Discovery 32(a)(3)(B) make distance and whether the witness can be reached by the court's subpoena power the conclusive test of availability, unless the proponent of the testimony arranges the unavailability. Burke v. Harman, 6 Neb. App. 309, 574 N.W.2d 156 (1998).
25-1228.
Trial subpoena; witness fee; return; cost.(1) The witness fee for one day's attendance must be served with a trial subpoena except when the subpoena is issued (a) at the request of an agency of state government or (b) pursuant to section 25-2304.
(2) The person serving the subpoena shall make a return of service stating the name of the person served, the date and method of service, and, if applicable, that the required witness fee was served with the subpoena. The return of service must be by affidavit unless the subpoena was served by a sheriff or constable. If service was made by certified mail, the signed receipt must be attached to the return of service.
(3) The cost of service of a subpoena is taxable as a court cost, and when service of a subpoena is made by a person other than a sheriff or constable, the cost taxable as a court cost is the lesser of the actual amount incurred for service of process or the statutory fee set for sheriffs in section 33-117.
(4) Except as provided in section 25-2304, the party at whose request a trial subpoena is issued in a civil action or proceeding must pay the witness the fees and mileage to which the witness is entitled under section 33-139. Any fees and mileage that were not paid to the witness before the witness testified must be paid to the witness within a reasonable time after the witness testified.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 355, p. 453; R.S.1913, § 7920; C.S.1922, § 8862; C.S.1929, § 20-1228; R.S.1943, § 25-1228; Laws 1976, LB 750, § 1;
Laws 2017, LB509, § 4; Laws 2020, LB912, § 15.
Annotations
There is no provision in this section for a court to compel a postdeposition reimbursement of fees. Bedore v. Ranch Oil Co., 282 Neb. 553, 805 N.W.2d 68 (2011).
Section is not applicable to criminal cases. Huckins v. State, 61 Neb. 871, 86 N.W. 485 (1901).
25-1229.
Subpoena; disobedience; refusal to testify or sign deposition; contempt.Disobedience of a subpoena, or a refusal to be sworn, or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe a deposition, when lawfully ordered, may be punished as a contempt of the court or officer by whom his attendance or testimony is required.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 356, p. 453; R.S.1913, § 7921; C.S.1922, § 8863; C.S.1929, § 20-1229; R.S.1943, § 25-1229.
Annotations
Justice of peace before whom deposition is taken may punish as contempt refusal to be sworn or to answer questions. In re Hammond, 83 Neb. 636, 120 N.W. 203 (1909).
Notary public may commit for contempt witness refusing to answer. Dogge v. State, 21 Neb. 272, 31 N.W. 929 (1887).
25-1230.
Subpoena; disobedience; attachment; undertaking; rule to show cause.When a witness fails to attend in obedience to a subpoena, except in case of a demand and failure to pay his or her fee, the court or officer before whom his or her attendance is required may issue an attachment to the sheriff or coroner of the county commanding him or her to arrest and bring the person therein named before the court or officer, at a time and place to be fixed in the attachment, to give his or her testimony and answer for the contempt. If the attachment is not for immediately bringing the witness before the court or officer, a sum may be fixed in which the witness may give an undertaking with surety for his or her appearance. Such sum shall be endorsed on the back of the attachment, and if no sum is so fixed and endorsed, it shall be one hundred dollars. If the witness is not personally served, the court may, by a rule, order him or her to show cause why attachment should not issue against him or her.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 357, p. 453; R.S.1913, § 7922; C.S.1922, § 8864; C.S.1929, § 20-1230; R.S.1943, § 25-1230;
Laws 1988, LB 1030, § 18.
Annotations
Court upon own motion, or on oral request of prosecutor, may issue attachment. Hanika v. State, 87 Neb. 845, 128 N.W. 526 (1910).
Power to punish for contempt is inherent in every court having common law jurisdiction. Kregel v. Bartling, 23 Neb. 848, 37 N.W. 668 (1888).
25-1231.
Subpoena; disobedience; refusal to testify or sign deposition; punishment of witness for contempt.The punishment for the contempt mentioned in section 25-1229 shall be as follows: When the witness fails to attend in obedience to the subpoena, except in case of a demand and failure to pay his fees, the court or officer may fine the witness in a sum not exceeding fifty dollars. In other cases, the court or officer may fine the witness in a sum not exceeding fifty dollars nor less than five dollars, or may imprison him in the county jail, there to remain until he shall submit to be sworn, to testify or give his deposition. The fine imposed by the court shall be paid into the county treasurer, and that imposed by the officer shall be for the use of the party for whom the witness was subpoenaed. The witness shall also be liable to the party injured for any damages occasioned by his failure to attend, or his refusal to be sworn, to testify or give his deposition.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 358, p. 453; R.S.1913, § 7923; C.S.1922, § 8865; C.S.1929, § 20-1231; R.S.1943, § 25-1231.
Annotations
Notary, on refusal of witness to obey subpoena, may impose fine; but may not commit for contempt. In re Butler, 76 Neb. 267, 107 N.W. 572 (1906).
25-1232.
Subpoena; disobedience; attachment; commitment; form; to whom directed.Every attachment for the arrest or order of commitment to prison of a witness by a court or officer pursuant to sections 25-1230 and 25-1231 shall be under the seal of the court or officer, if he or she has an official seal, and shall specify particularly the cause of the arrest or commitment, and if the commitment is for refusing to answer a question, such question shall be stated in the order. Such order of commitment may be directed to the sheriff or coroner of the county where such witness resides or may be at the time and shall be executed by committing him or her to the jail of such county and delivering a copy of the order to the jailer.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 360, p. 454; R.S.1913, § 7924; C.S.1922, § 8866; C.S.1929, § 20-1232; R.S.1943, § 25-1232;
Laws 1988, LB 1030, § 19.
Annotations
Record of conviction of contempt by refusal to testify must state questions asked that witness refused to answer. Tastee Inn, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., Inc., 167 Neb. 264, 92 N.W.2d 664 (1958).
When a witness is committed for contempt for refusing to testify, the questions asked and refused to be answered must be stated in the order of commitment. Wilcox v. State, 46 Neb. 402, 64 N.W. 1072 (1895).
25-1233.
Prisoner; examination; deposition; production order.(1) A person confined in any prison in this state shall, by order of any court of record, be produced for oral examination in the county where he or she is imprisoned. In all other cases his or her examination must be by deposition.
(2) In civil matters, the court shall notify the Department of Correctional Services of any production order, in which a confined person is the subject, at least fifteen days before the required production. The court shall allow the department to present evidence relating to public safety and security concerns associated with the production of the confined person prior to the required production date. The party who moved for the production order shall be allowed to respond. Based on evidence presented, the court may rescind its production order. If the confined person is produced pursuant to court order, the party who moved for the production order shall pay to the department the actual cost of security and transportation arrangements incurred by the department related to such production.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 361, p. 454; R.S.1913, § 7925; C.S.1922, § 8867; C.S.1929, § 20-1233; R.S.1943, § 25-1233;
Laws 1997, LB 94, § 1.
Annotations
The accused in a criminal prosecution has a right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; however, a criminal defendant does not possess an absolute constitutional right to demand the personal attendance of a prisoner witness incarcerated outside the county of the venue of trial. As a result, this section does not violate the compulsory process clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. State v. Stott, 243 Neb. 967, 503 N.W.2d 822 (1993).
Deposition of a person confined in a penal institution may be taken by the defendant in a criminal action. Rains v. State, 173 Neb. 586, 114 N.W.2d 399 (1962).
Question of whether inmate of penitentiary should be produced for oral examination raised but not decided. Garcia v. State, 159 Neb. 571, 68 N.W.2d 151 (1955).
Section 25-1708 provides no basis for taxing to a defendant in a civil action the costs of transporting a plaintiff who is an incarcerated person and who must be transported pursuant to this section. Jacob v. Schlichtman, 16 Neb. App. 783, 753 N.W.2d 361 (2008).
25-1234.
Prisoner; deposition; manner of taking.While a prisoner's deposition is being taken he shall remain in the custody of the officer having him in charge, who shall afford reasonable facilities for the taking of the deposition.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 362, p. 454; R.S.1913, § 7926; C.S.1922, § 8868; C.S.1929, § 20-1234; R.S.1943, § 25-1234.
25-1235.
Subpoena; nonresident witness; immunity from service of summons.A witness shall not be liable to be sued in a county in which he does not reside, by being served with a summons in such county, while going, returning or attending in obedience to a subpoena.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 363, p. 454; R.S.1913, § 7927; C.S.1922, § 8869; C.S.1929, § 20-1235; R.S.1943, § 25-1235.
Annotations
Nonresident is privileged from service while coming to, going from, and attending trial; and has reasonable time to prepare for his return. Linton v. Cooper, 54 Neb. 438, 74 N.W. 842 (1898), judgment affirmed in 54 Neb. 443, 74 N.W. 961 (1898).
Exemption is a personal privilege which may be waived. Mayer v. Nelson, 54 Neb. 434, 74 N.W. 841 (1898).
25-1236.
Repealed. Laws 2017, LB509, § 8.
25-1237.
Foreign jurisdiction; civil action; subpoena for discovery in Nebraska; powers.(1) When authorized by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the clerk of the district court may issue a subpoena for discovery in Nebraska for a civil proceeding pending in a foreign jurisdiction. Such a subpoena may command a person to testify at a deposition or command a nonparty to provide discovery without a deposition.
(2) The Supreme Court may promulgate rules for subpoenas under this section. The rules may specify the amount of a fee, if any, that must be paid to the clerk of the district court for the issuance of such subpoenas. Any such rules shall not conflict with laws governing such matters.
25-1238.
Subpoena; witness avoiding service; powers of officer.If a witness conceals himself, or in any other manner attempts to avoid being personally served with a subpoena any sheriff or constable, having the subpoena, may use all necessary and proper means to serve the same, and for that purpose may break into any building or other place where the witness is to be found, having first made known his business and demanded admittance.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 397, p. 460; R.S.1913, § 7930; C.S.1922, § 8872; C.S.1929, § 20-1238; R.S.1943, § 25-1238.
25-1239.
Subpoena to party; failure to attend and testify; continuance; costs.In addition to the above remedies, if a party to a suit in his own right on being duly subpoenaed, failed to appear and give testimony, the other party may, at his option, have a continuance of the cause as in cases of other witnesses, and at the cost of the delinquent.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 398, p. 460; R.S.1913, § 7931; C.S.1922, § 8873; C.S.1929, § 20-1239; R.S.1943, § 25-1239.
25-1240.
Testimony; how taken.The testimony of witnesses may be taken in four modes: (1) By affidavit; (2) by deposition; (3) by oral examination; and (4) by videotape of an examination conducted prior to the time of trial for use at trial in accordance with procedures provided by law.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 366, p. 454; R.S.1913, § 7932; C.S.1922, § 8874; C.S.1929, § 20-1240; R.S.1943, § 25-1240;
Laws 1973, LB 504, § 2.
Annotations
A statement made in an unsworn letter is not testimony and cannot be used to support the theory that one has, without reasonable explanation, changed testimony to meet the exigencies of pending litigation. Timothy L. Ashford, PC LLO v. Roses, 313 Neb. 302, 984 N.W.2d 596 (2023).
“Testimony” for purposes of section 25-1116 encompasses evidence authorized as “testimony” under this section, that is, as live testimony at trial by oral examination or by some substitute for live testimony, including but not limited to, affidavit, deposition, or video recording of an examination conducted prior to the time of trial for use at trial. State v. Vandever, 287 Neb. 807, 844 N.W.2d 783 (2014).
A document subscribed and sworn to before a person not authorized by law to administer oaths is not an affidavit and is void as such. State v. Haase, 247 Neb. 817, 530 N.W.2d 617 (1995).
"Testimony" means oral evidence. Woolworth v. Parker, 57 Neb. 417, 77 N.W. 1090 (1899); Columbia Nat. Bank v. German Nat. Bank, 56 Neb. 803, 77 N.W. 346 (1898).
The unsupported assertions of attorneys during court proceedings do not establish the facts asserted unless the other appropriate parties stipulate to such facts. Schroeder v. Barnes, 5 Neb. App. 811, 565 N.W.2d 749 (1997).
25-1241.
Affidavit, defined.An affidavit is a written declaration under oath, made without notice to the adverse party.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 367, p. 455; R.S.1913, § 7933; C.S.1922, § 8875; C.S.1929, § 20-1241; R.S.1943, § 25-1241.
Annotations
In connection with an affidavit, a notary public completes a certificate, known as a jurat, which confirms that the affiant appeared before the notary, attested to the truth of his or her statements, and signed the affidavit. AVG Partners I v. Genesis Health Clubs, 307 Neb. 47, 948 N.W.2d 212 (2020).
Unless required by statute, an omission in a jurat that an affidavit was sworn to will not be fatal if the fact otherwise appears. AVG Partners I v. Genesis Health Clubs, 307 Neb. 47, 948 N.W.2d 212 (2020).
An unsigned affidavit which was not offered until the day of the hearing on the summary judgment motion was properly excluded by the trial court. Medley v. Davis, 247 Neb. 611, 529 N.W.2d 58 (1995).
Requirement met where affiant acknowledged to authorized official that he was affiant and then signed affidavit in official presence. State v. Howard, 184 Neb. 274, 167 N.W.2d 80 (1969).
An affidavit must bear upon its face, by the certificate of the officer before whom it is taken, evidence that it was duly sworn to by the party making the same. Kennedy & Parsons Co. v. Schmidt, 152 Neb. 637, 42 N.W.2d 191 (1950).
Document sworn to before an officer not authorized to administer an oath was not an affidavit. Lanning v. Haases, 89 Neb. 19, 130 N.W. 1008 (1911).
Affidavit drawn by counsel, in language which is ambiguous, will be construed strongly against party in whose behalf it is offered. Nebraska Moline Plow Co. v. Fuehring, 52 Neb. 541, 72 N.W. 1003 (1897).
An affidavit is a declaration in writing sworn to by a party before some person who has authority to administer oaths. Bantley v. Finney, 43 Neb. 794, 62 N.W. 213 (1895).
Sworn statements in question-and-answer format, which were created by questioning an affiant under oath in a nonadversarial context and having a court reporter record the exchange, are written declarations within the purview of this section. Thorne v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 2 Neb. App. 437, 510 N.W.2d 575 (1994).
25-1242.
Deposition, defined.A deposition is a written declaration under oath or a videotape taken under oath in accordance with procedures provided by law, made upon notice to the adverse party for the purpose of enabling him to attend and cross-examine, or made upon written interrogatories.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 368, p. 455; R.S.1913, § 7934; C.S.1922, § 8876; C.S.1929, § 20-1242; R.S.1943, § 25-1242;
Laws 1973, LB 504, § 3.
25-1243.
Oral examination, defined.An oral examination is an examination in the presence of the jury or tribunal which is to decide the fact or act upon it, the testimony being heard by the jury or tribunal from the lips of the witness.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 369, p. 455; R.S.1913, § 7935; C.S.1922, § 8877; C.S.1929, § 20-1243; R.S.1943, § 25-1243.
Annotations
The unsupported assertions of attorneys during court proceedings do not establish the facts asserted unless the other appropriate parties stipulate to such facts. Schroeder v. Barnes, 5 Neb. App. 811, 565 N.W.2d 749 (1997).
25-1244.
Affidavit; when used.An affidavit may be used to verify a pleading, to prove the service of a summons, notice or other process, in an action, to obtain a provisional remedy, an examination of a witness, a stay of proceedings, or upon a motion, and in any other case permitted by law.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 370, p. 455; R.S.1913, § 7936; C.S.1922, § 8878; C.S.1929, § 20-1244; R.S.1943, § 25-1244.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Admission in evidence
3. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
A special appearance, which is preliminary and collateral to determining the merits of an action, is a pleading within this section, and thus, in a hearing on a special appearance, an affidavit may be used to prove or disprove the factual basis for a court's assertion or exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Williams v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 443 N.W.2d 577 (1989).
In judicial sale confirmation hearing, the trial court has broad discretion in determining if affidavits should be considered. Nebraska State Bank & Trust Co. v. Wright, 213 Neb. 822, 331 N.W.2d 535 (1983).
An affidavit may be used to support a special appearance. Erdman v. National Indemnity Co., 180 Neb. 133, 141 N.W.2d 753 (1966).
Section applied in application for liquor license. Benson v. Olson, 97 Neb. 29, 149 N.W. 51 (1914).
Affidavit may be used to impeach officer's return. Johnson v. Carpenter, 77 Neb. 49, 108 N.W. 161 (1906).
Notary public who is an attorney is not permitted to take affidavit of his client for purpose of procuring an attachment. Horkey v. Kendall, 53 Neb. 522, 73 N.W. 953 (1898).
Jurat is no part of affidavit; fact that it was sworn to may be shown by parol. Bantley v. Finney, 43 Neb. 794, 62 N.W. 213 (1895).
Only affidavits verifying pleadings are part of record proper. Frederick v. Ballard, 16 Neb. 559, 20 N.W. 870 (1884).
Affidavit may be used to prove service of process; is no part of bill of exceptions unless presented to trial court. State v. Fawcett, 2 Neb. Unof. 243, 96 N.W. 219 (1901).
2. Admission in evidence
Although an affidavit may be used to prove service of process, such affidavit will not be considered on an appeal of a cause to the Supreme Court unless it was offered in evidence in the trial court and was preserved in and made a part of the bill of exceptions. T. S. McShane Co., Inc., v. Dominion Constr. Co., 203 Neb. 318, 278 N.W.2d 596 (1979).
Proof of service by mail must include a receipt signed by the addressee, or other satisfactory evidence of personal delivery, and an affidavit to be considered on appeal must be offered in evidence and preserved in the bill of exceptions. Anderson v. Autocrat Corp., 194 Neb. 278, 231 N.W.2d 560 (1975).
Affidavits that nonresident firm of attorneys did not have a usual place of doing business and did not maintain an office in this state were admissible in evidence in support of special appearance. State ex rel. Johnson v. Tautges, Rerat & Welch, 146 Neb. 439, 20 N.W.2d 232 (1945).
Affidavit is not admissible to establish facts material to trial of an issue. Banks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 823, 8 N.W.2d 185 (1943).
On hearing of an application for a moratory stay after decree of foreclosure of a mortgage, affidavits may be admitted in evidence as to value of mortgaged land. First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Hickey, 130 Neb. 351, 264 N.W. 888 (1936).
Affidavit which fails to disclose county of officer taking is inadmissible. Albers v. Kozeluh, 68 Neb. 522, 94 N.W. 521 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 68 Neb. 529, 97 N.W. 646 (1903).
Affidavits may be used at hearing on motion. Hamer v. McKinley-Lanning Loan & Trust Co., 52 Neb. 705, 72 N.W. 1041 (1897).
3. Miscellaneous
Affidavit of publication may be impeached by competent proof. Rosewater v. Pinzenscham, 38 Neb. 835, 57 N.W. 563 (1894).
25-1245.
Affidavit; before whom made; attorney at law not disqualified.An affidavit may be made in and out of this state before any person authorized to take depositions, and must be authenticated in the same way. An attorney at law who is attorney for a party in any proceedings in any court of this state shall not be disqualified as the person before whom the affidavit is made by reason of such representation.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 371, p. 455; R.S.1913, § 7937; C.S.1922, § 8879; C.S.1929, § 20-1245; R.S.1943, § 25-1245; Laws 1965, c. 121, § 1, p. 457.
Annotations
Affidavits are not improper or excludable because notarized by one who is attorney of record. Frazier, Inc. v. 20th Century Builders, Inc., 188 Neb. 618, 198 N.W.2d 478 (1972).
Affidavits verified before attorneys for state held competent after being reverified before authorized officer. Baker v. State, 112 Neb. 654, 200 N.W. 876 (1924).
Attorney in case is not competent to act as notary in taking affidavit to be used on hearing. Maroosis v. Catalano, 98 Neb. 284, 152 N.W. 559 (1915); Horkey v. Kendall, 53 Neb. 522, 73 N.W. 953 (1898).
Objections to use of affidavit as evidence are not required to be made in the manner provided for interposing objections to depositions. Malcom Savings Bank v. Cronin, 80 Neb. 231, 116 N.W. 150 (1908).
Affidavit must have attached certificate of officer before whom taken that oath was administered. Sebesta v. Supreme Court of Honor, 77 Neb. 249, 109 N.W. 166 (1906).
Affidavit taken before notary of a sister state or foreign government was properly received. Browne v. Palmer, 66 Neb. 287, 92 N.W. 315 (1902).
There must be authentication by both seal and signature. Holmes v. Crooks, 56 Neb. 466, 76 N.W. 1073 (1898).
25-1246.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1247.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1248.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1249.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1250.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1251.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1252.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1253.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1254.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1255.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1256.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1257.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1258.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1259.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1260.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1261.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1262.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1263.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1264.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1265.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1266.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1267.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1267.01.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.02.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.03.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.04.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.05.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.06.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.07.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.08.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.09.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.10.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.11.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.12.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.13.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.14.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.15.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.16.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.17.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.18.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.19.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.20.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.21.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.22.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.23.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.24.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.25.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.26.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.27.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.28.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.29.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.30.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.31.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.32.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.33.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.34.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.35.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.36.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.37.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.38.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.39.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.40.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.41.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.42.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.43.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.44.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1267.45.
Repealed. Laws 1982, LB 716, § 4.
25-1268.
Discovery; delivery of copies of documents; refusal to deliver; penalty.Either party or his attorney, if required, shall deliver to the other party or his attorney, a copy of any deed, instrument or other writing whereon the action or defense is founded, or which he intends to offer in evidence at the trial. If the plaintiff or defendant shall refuse to furnish the copy or copies required, the party so refusing shall not be permitted to give in evidence, at the trial, the original, of which a copy has been refused. This section shall not apply to any paper a copy of which is filed with a pleading.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 395, p. 459; R.S.1913, § 7961; C.S.1922, § 8902; C.S.1929, § 20-1268; R.S.1943, § 25-1268.
25-1269.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1270.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1271.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1272.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1273.
Nonparty; discovery; subpoena; procedure.When the discovery rules promulgated by the Supreme Court authorize discovery from a nonparty without a deposition, a subpoena shall be issued by the clerk of the court before whom the action is pending upon request of a party. An attorney as an officer of the court may also issue and sign such a subpoena on behalf of a court in which the attorney is authorized to practice. The subpoena shall be served in the time and manner required by the discovery rules. Such discovery rules shall not be construed to permit discovery by subpoena if the information is protected by statute or if that procedure conflicts with any other statute.
25-1273.01.
Rules of procedure.The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of procedure for discovery in civil cases, which rules shall not be in conflict with laws governing such matters. Rules which provide for the admissibility of depositions shall not be considered as conflicting with the Nebraska Evidence Rules.
Cross References
Nebraska Evidence Rules, see section 27-1103.
Annotations
The language of this section, in combination with section 27-802, indicates a clear intention by the Legislature to create an independent avenue to admit deposition testimony. Walton v. Patil, 279 Neb. 974, 783 N.W.2d 438 (2010).
25-1274.
Legal notices; proof of publication.Publications required by law to be made in a newspaper or on a statewide website established and maintained as a repository of public notices by a majority of Nebraska newspapers, may be proved by affidavit of any person having knowledge of the fact, specifying the time when and the paper in which or the website whereon the publication was made, and, if made by publication in a newspaper, that such newspaper is a legal newspaper under the statutes of the State of Nebraska, but such affidavit must, for the purposes now contemplated, be made within six months after the last day of publication, in the office where the original affidavit of publication is required to be filed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 403, p. 461; R.S.1913, § 7967; Laws 1922, Spec. Sess., c. 11, § 1, p. 80; C.S.1922, § 8908; C.S.1929, § 20-1274; R.S.1943, § 25-1274;
Laws 2024, LB287, § 5. Operative Date: April 17, 2024
Annotations
Affidavit need not state particulars as to circulation of newspaper or number of weeks published prior to sale; it is sufficient if in language of this section. Seymour v. Lawson, 111 Neb. 770, 197 N.W. 623 (1924).
Proof of publication must be made within six months after the last day of publication. Lonergan v. City of South Omaha, 72 Neb. 317, 100 N.W. 407 (1904).
Publication affidavit is not sufficiently authenticated if it lacks signature of an officer to the jurat. Holmes v. Crooks, 56 Neb. 466, 76 N.W. 1073 (1898).
Proof of publication of notice or order of sale may be made by affidavit of one who has knowledge of fact. Johnson v. Colby, 52 Neb. 327, 72 N.W. 313 (1897).
25-1275.
Legal notices; proof of posting or service.The posting or service of any notice or other paper required by law may be proved by the affidavit of any competent witness, attached to a copy of said notice or paper, and made within six months of the time of such posting.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 404, p. 461; R.S.1913, § 7968; C.S.1922, § 8909; C.S.1929, § 20-1275; R.S.1943, § 25-1275.
Annotations
Proof by affidavit of posting of public notice is not exclusive. Larimer v. Wallace, 36 Neb. 444, 54 N.W. 835 (1893).
25-1276.
Other facts required to be shown by affidavit; how proved.Any other fact which is required to be shown by affidavit, and which may be required for future use in any action or other proceeding, may be proved by pursuing the course indicated in sections 25-1274 and 25-1275, as nearly as the circumstances of the case will admit.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 405, p. 461; R.S.1913, § 7969; C.S.1922, § 8910; C.S.1929, § 20-1276; R.S.1943, § 25-1276.
25-1277.
Legal notices and other facts provable by affidavit; perpetuation of proof.Proof made as provided in sections 25-1274 to 25-1276, may be perpetuated and preserved for future use by filing the papers above mentioned in the office of the county judge, and the original affidavit appended to the notice or paper, if there be one, and if not the affidavit, by itself, is presumptive evidence of the facts stated therein, but does not preclude other modes of proof permitted by law.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 406, p. 461; R.S.1913, § 7970; C.S.1922, § 8911; C.S.1929, § 20-1277; R.S.1943, § 25-1277.
25-1278.
Field notes or plat of county surveyor; when admissible.A copy of the field notes of any county surveyor, or a plat made by him and certified under oath as correct, may be received as evidence to show the shape or dimensions of a tract of land, or any other fact whose ascertainment requires only the exercise of scientific skill or calculation.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 407, p. 461; R.S.1913, § 7971; C.S.1922, § 8912; C.S.1929, § 20-1278; R.S.1943, § 25-1278.
Cross References
For other provisions for county surveyor's certificate, see section 23-1904.
Annotations
Field notes of county surveyor are admissible. Worm v. Crowell, 165 Neb. 713, 87 N.W.2d 384 (1958).
Field notes and plats of original surveys are presumptively correct and government field notes are admissible. Peterson v. Skjelver, 43 Neb. 663, 62 N.W. 43 (1895); Woods v. West, 40 Neb. 307, 58 N.W. 938 (1894).
25-1279.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1280.
Official records; certified copies; duty of custodian to furnish; fees.Every state, county or political subdivision officer having the custody of a public record or writing is bound to give any person on demand a certified copy thereof on payment of the legal fees therefor. Where fees are not otherwise expressly provided by statute, the fee shall be thirty cents per hundred words if the copy is a typewritten copy, and the cost of the mechanically reproduced copy when the copy is made by photographic or offset process. In addition thereto a fee of one dollar shall be charged for the certificate of the officer.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 409, p. 461; R.S.1913, § 7973; C.S.1922, § 8914; C.S.1929, § 20-1280; R.S.1943, § 25-1280; Laws 1957, c. 86, § 1, p. 335; Laws 1961, c. 454, § 1, p. 1383;
Laws 1977, LB 126, § 1.
Annotations
Prison physician was not obligated to furnish inmate of penitentiary with copy of hospital record. Rhodes v. Meyer, 225 F.Supp. 80 (D. Neb. 1963).
25-1281.
Official records; photographic copies; admissibility; destruction of original records.In all cases in which any instrument or document is required by law to be copied or recorded in any public record in any public office within the State of Nebraska, the officials having charge of the making of such records may employ the use of photographic processes for the reproduction of such instrument or document. This shall be done for the public records and shall be a true copy of the original instrument or document to be so recorded, and may likewise use any such photographic process for the making of certified copies of such public records; Provided, no such photographic processes shall be used for the making of permanent records until it shall have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the officials having charge of such records and the State Records Administrator, that the processes to be used will produce an accurate and permanent record of the instrument or document to be recorded. Any such existing records when reproduced by such photographic processes may be destroyed by the official having charge of the same when approval is given by the State Records Administrator.
Source:Laws 1911, c. 103, § 1, p. 369; R.S.1913, § 7974; C.S.1922, § 8915; C.S.1929, § 20-1281; R.S.1943, § 25-1281; Laws 1957, c. 87, § 1, p. 336; Laws 1969, c. 105, § 5, p. 481.
Annotations
Photostatic copies of county surveyor's records are admissible. Worm v. Crowell, 165 Neb. 713, 87 N.W.2d 384 (1958).
This section does not prevent courts from admitting photographs as secondary evidence; identification of photograph by one who took it not essential; correctness may be shown by knowledge and observation of witness. Nebraska State Bank of Republican City v. Walker, 111 Neb. 203, 196 N.W. 128 (1923).
25-1282.
Official records; proof of lack of record.The certificate of a public officer that he has made diligent and ineffectual search for a paper in his office is of the same efficacy in all cases as if such officer had personally appeared and sworn to such facts.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 410, p. 462; R.S.1913, § 7975; C.S.1922, § 8916; C.S.1929, § 20-1282; R.S.1943, § 25-1282.
Annotations
Where public officer certifies he has been unable to find original record, secondary evidence is admissible. Clough v. North Central Gas Co., 150 Neb. 418, 34 N.W.2d 862 (1948).
Nonexistence of record may be proved by anyone who has made search therefor. Smith v. First Nat. Bank of Chadron, 45 Neb. 444, 63 N.W. 796 (1895); Gutta Percha & Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Village of Ogalalla, 40 Neb. 775, 59 N.W. 513 (1894).
25-1283.
Land office receipts; effect as evidence.The usual duplicate receipt of the receiver of any land office, or, if that be lost or destroyed, or beyond the reach of the party, the certificate of such receiver that the books of his office show the sale of a tract of land to a certain individual is proof of title equivalent to a patent against all but the holder of an actual patent.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 411, p. 462; R.S.1913, § 7976; C.S.1922, § 8917; C.S.1929, § 20-1283; R.S.1943, § 25-1283.
Annotations
Holder of receiver's certificate cannot, when entry is canceled, maintain ejectment. Oldfather v. Ericson, 79 Neb. 1, 112 N.W. 356 (1907); Headley v. Coffman, 38 Neb. 68, 56 N.W. 701 (1893).
Land office receipt is sufficient to protect one in possession against naked claim of superior right. Moore v. Parker, 59 Neb. 29, 80 N.W. 43 (1899); Kinney v. Degman, 12 Neb. 237, 11 N.W. 318 (1882).
Receiver's receipt gives color of title to entire tract described. Draper v. Taylor, 58 Neb. 787, 79 N.W. 709 (1899).
United States land officer's certificate is such color of title as to start statute of limitation running. Carroll v. Patrick, 23 Neb. 834, 37 N.W. 671 (1888).
25-1284.
Official records; signature of custodian; genuineness presumed, when.In the cases contemplated in sections 25-1280, 25-1282 and 25-1283, the signature of the officer shall be presumed to be genuine until the contrary is shown.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 412, p. 462; R.S.1913, § 7977; C.S.1922, § 8918; C.S.1929, § 20-1284; R.S.1943, § 25-1284.
Annotations
Field notes and tract book were sufficiently authenticated. Worm v. Crowell, 165 Neb. 713, 87 N.W.2d 384 (1958).
It is not necessary to prove signature of county clerk accompanying jurat to oath lawfully filed in his office. Merriam v. Coffee, 16 Neb. 450, 20 N.W. 389 (1884).
25-1285.
Judicial records of Nebraska and federal courts; how proved.A judicial record of this state, or of any other federal court of the United States, may be proved by producing the original or a copy thereof, certified by the clerk or the clerk's designee or the person having the legal custody thereof, authenticated by his or her seal of office, if there is one.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 413, p. 462; R.S.1913, § 7978; C.S.1922, § 8919; C.S.1929, § 20-1285; R.S.1943, § 25-1285;
Laws 2007, LB449, § 1.
Annotations
A certified copy of judgment of prior conviction in any federal court or in a court of this state is sufficient proof thereof. State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379, 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975).
Judgment of justice, including copy of complaint embodied therein, was established by competent proof. Osborne v. State, 115 Neb. 65, 211 N.W. 179 (1926).
Judicial record, if properly certified, is admissible to prove its own existence. Sheibley v. Fales, 81 Neb. 795, 116 N.W. 1035 (1908).
Orders or judgments of court of general jurisdiction may be pleaded without alleging jurisdictional facts. Lear v. Brown County, 77 Neb. 230, 109 N.W. 174 (1906).
Records of sister state may be examined to determine court's jurisdiction. Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. 104, 106 N.W. 412 (1905), judgment vacated 75 Neb. 120, 113 N.W. 175 (1907).
Transcript of proceedings, duly certified, of United States court, is competent evidence, though presiding judge failed to sign journal. Stacks v. Crawford, 63 Neb. 662, 88 N.W. 852 (1902).
Recitals in judgment record kept by clerk of district court of transcript from county court are not competent to prove judgment. Burge v. Gandy, 41 Neb. 149, 59 N.W. 359 (1894).
25-1286.
Deleted.
Note: The Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Munn, 212 Neb. 265, 322 N.W.2d 429 (1982), held that "the adoption of the Nebraska Rules of Evidence repealed section 25-1286". The Revisor of Statutes has pursuant to section 49-705 deleted section 25-1286 to harmonize the legislative actions with the Supreme Court decision.
25-1287.
Records of justice of the peace; how proved.The official certificate of a justice of the peace of any of the United States, to any judgment, and the preliminary proceeding before him, supported by the official certificate of the clerk of any court of record within the county in which such justice resides, stating that he is an acting justice of the peace of that county, and that the signature of his certificate is genuine, is sufficient evidence of such proceedings and judgment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 415, p. 462; R.S.1913, § 7980; C.S.1922, § 8921; C.S.1929, § 20-1287; R.S.1943, § 25-1287.
Annotations
Transcript of justice of peace of another state is receivable in evidence if it complies with this section. Gordon Bros. v. Wageman, 77 Neb. 185, 108 N.W. 1067 (1906).
25-1288.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1289.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1290.
Legislative proceedings; how proved.The proceedings of the Legislature of this state, or any state of the Union, or of the United States, or of any foreign government, are proved by the journals of those bodies, respectively, or of either branch thereof, and either by copies officially certified by the clerk of the house in which the proceedings were had, or by a copy purporting to have been printed by their order.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 418, p. 463; R.S.1913, § 7983; C.S.1922, § 8924; C.S.1929, § 20-1290; R.S.1943, § 25-1290.
Annotations
Where entries in journal expressly and unequivocally contradict enrolled bill, former will prevail. State v. Burlington & Missouri River R. R. Co., 60 Neb. 741, 84 N.W. 254 (1901).
If it appears from journals of Legislature that bill had not actually passed, certificate of presiding officer is overthrown and bill is invalid. Webster v. City of Hastings, 56 Neb. 669, 77 N.W. 127 (1898).
25-1291.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-1292.
Abstracts of title and title insurance policy; when used as evidence; certification.(1) Any party to a civil action who may desire to use in evidence at the trial any abstract of title to real estate shall, not less than seven days prior to the date of trial, notify the adverse party by written notice addressed to such party's counsel of record and deposit such abstract in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county in which such action is pending for examination by such adverse party. Such abstract of title, if certified to and issued by a registered abstracter, shall be received in evidence as prima facie evidence of the existence of the record of deeds, mortgages, and other instruments, conveyances, or liens affecting the real estate mentioned in such abstract and that such record is as described in such abstract. If such abstract is successively certified to by abstracters who were bonded under section 76-506 prior to November 18, 1965, registered under sections 76-509 to 76-528 on or after November 18, 1965, but prior to March 26, 1985, or registered under the Abstracters Act, the same shall be received in evidence without further foundation.
(2) A title insurance policy issued by a title insurer licensed to issue such policy by the State of Nebraska shall also be received in court as prima facie evidence of the ownership, liens, mortgages, easements, and all other corporeal as well as incorporeal hereditaments to such real estate, the existence of which are indicated in such title insurance policy.
Source:Laws 1887, c. 64, § 3, p. 566; R.S.1913, § 7985; C.S.1922, § 8926; C.S.1929, § 20-1292; R.S.1943, § 25-1292; Laws 1965, c. 453, § 21, p. 1446;
Laws 1985, LB 47, § 1; Laws 1991, LB 235, § 1.
Cross References
Abstracters Act, see section 76-535.
Annotations
Abstracts of title, when proper foundation has been laid, are admissible in evidence. Worm v. Crowell, 165 Neb. 713, 87 N.W.2d 384 (1958).
25-1293.
Public seal affixed to copy of written law or public writing; effect; unwritten law; how proved.The public seal of the state or county affixed to a copy of a written law or other public writing, is also admissible as evidence of such law or writing respectively; the unwritten law of any other state or government may be proved as fact by parol evidence, and also by the books of reports of cases adjudged in their courts.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 420, p. 463; R.S.1913, § 7986; C.S.1922, § 8927; C.S.1929, § 20-1293; R.S.1943, § 25-1293.
Annotations
Where no evidence was given as to marriage laws of sister state where common law marriage was alleged to have occurred, law of this state at time marriage was alleged to have taken place was applicable. Forshay v. Johnston, 144 Neb. 525, 13 N.W.2d 873 (1944).
This section provides a method for proof of unwritten law of foreign states by parol evidence or reports of adjudicated cases. Banks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 823, 8 N.W.2d 185 (1943).
Common law of sister state may be proved by books of reports of decisions of her courts. Steinke v. Dobson, 90 Neb. 616, 134 N.W. 169 (1912).
Public seal of another state, affixed to copy of written law, is admissible as evidence of such law. Rieck v. Griffin, 74 Neb. 102, 103 N.W. 1061 (1905).
Except as to statute, law of another state is proper subject of expert testimony. Barber v. Hildebrand, 42 Neb. 400, 60 N.W. 594 (1894).
25-1294.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1295.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1296.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1297.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1298.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-1299.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-12,100.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 68, § 43.
25-12,101.
Judicial notice.Every court of this state shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 93, § 1, p. 272.
Annotations
Where statutes of sister state have not been interpreted, the courts of this state will give a practical interpretation thereto. Exstrum v. Union Cas. & Life Ins. Co., 165 Neb. 554, 86 N.W.2d 568 (1957).
Act is applicable to any action seeking to enforce rights based upon the common law or statute law of another state. Abramson v. Abramson, 161 Neb. 782, 74 N.W.2d 919 (1956).
Provisions of this act must be properly invoked. Smith v. Brooks, 154 Neb. 93, 47 N.W.2d 389 (1951).
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act does not remove the necessity of pleading and presenting the common law or statutes of sister state. Scott v. Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627 (1951).
District court was authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of Colorado. Snyder v. Lincoln, 153 Neb. 611, 45 N.W.2d 749 (1951).
The federal court sitting in Nebraska without violating doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, takes judicial notice of law of another state although it was not pleaded and proved and although under Nebraska law, if law of foreign state is not pleaded and proved, it is presumed to be the same as the law of the forum. Fullington v. Iowa Sheet Metal Contractors, Inc., 319 F.Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1970).
25-12,102.
Information of the court.The court may inform itself of such laws in such manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 93, § 2, p. 273.
Annotations
Court may require party invoking law of sister state to plead and present it. Scott v. Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627 (1951).
25-12,103.
Ruling reviewable.The determination of such laws shall be made by the court and not by the jury, and shall be reviewable.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 93, § 3, p. 273.
Annotations
Issue of validity of marriage in another state was properly pleaded and presented. Abramson v. Abramson, 161 Neb. 782, 74 N.W.2d 919 (1956).
25-12,104.
Evidence as to laws of other jurisdictions.Any party may also present to the trial court any admissible evidence of such laws, but, to enable a party to offer evidence of the law in another jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 93, § 4, p. 273.
Annotations
In order for litigant to invoke Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, he must give reasonable notice in pleadings or otherwise of intention so to do. Smith v. Brooks, 154 Neb. 93, 47 N.W.2d 389 (1951).
To require trial court to take judicial notice of law of another state, it must be pleaded. Scott v. Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627 (1951).
25-12,105.
Foreign country.The law of a jurisdiction other than those referred to in section 25-12,101 shall be an issue for the court, but shall not be subject to the foregoing provisions concerning judicial notice.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 93, § 5, p. 273.
Annotations
Laws of a jurisdiction other than state or territory of the United States must be both pleaded and proved. Scott v. Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627 (1951).
25-12,106.
Interpretation.Sections 25-12,101 to 25-12,107 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact them.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 93, § 6, p. 273.
Annotations
Operation of act is not dependent upon reciprocal law in another state. Abramson v. Abramson, 161 Neb. 782, 74 N.W.2d 919 (1956).
25-12,107.
Short title.Sections 25-12,101 to 25-12,107 may be cited as the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 93, § 7, p. 273.
25-12,108.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-12,109.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-12,110.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-12,111.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-12,112.
Admissibility of reproduced records in evidence; destruction of records; approval.If any business, institution, member of a profession or calling, or department or agency of government in the regular course of business or activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation, or combination thereof of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of the same to be recorded, copied, or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, optical imagery, microfilm, microcard, miniature photographic, optical disk, or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless held in a custodial or fiduciary capacity or unless its preservation is required by law and, with respect to agencies or departments of government, if the State Records Administrator approves such destruction. Such reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding whether the original is in existence or not and an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of the court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement, or facsimile does not preclude admission of the original.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 56, § 1, p. 188; Laws 1969, c. 105, § 6, p. 481;
Laws 1991, LB 25, § 1; Laws 1994, LB 980, § 1.
Cross References
Credit union records, see section 21-1737.
Annotations
Copy of memorandum from Postmaster General regarding early retirement opportunities was admissible hereunder. Corn v. Corn, 190 Neb. 383, 208 N.W.2d 678 (1973).
25-12,113.
Sections, how construed.Sections 25-12,112 to 25-12,114 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate their general purpose of making uniform the law of those states which enact them.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 56, § 2, p. 189.
25-12,114.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-12,112 to 25-12,114 may be cited as the Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evidence Act.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 56, § 3, p. 189.
25-12,115.
Report or finding admissible.A written report or finding of facts prepared by an expert not being a party to the cause, nor an employee of a party, except for the purpose of making such report or finding, nor financially interested in the result of the controversy, and containing the conclusions resulting wholly or partly from written information furnished by the cooperation of several persons acting for a common purpose, shall, insofar as the same may be relevant, be admissible when testified to by the person, or one of the persons, making such report or finding without calling as witnesses the persons furnishing the information, and without producing the books or other writings on which the report or finding is based, if, in the opinion of the court, no substantial injustice will be done the opposite party.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 57, § 1, p. 190.
Annotations
An offer of a composite record under this act is prima facie sufficient if a proper foundation is laid. Gateway Bank v. Department of Banking, 192 Neb. 109, 219 N.W.2d 211 (1974).
Report of results of blood test was admissible in evidence when supported by testimony of doctor who supervised the test. Houghton v. Houghton, 179 Neb. 275, 137 N.W.2d 861 (1965).
Application of statute doubted, but sufficient compliance shown. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. City of Norfolk, 157 Neb. 594, 60 N.W.2d 662 (1953).
25-12,116.
Cross-examination by adverse party.Any person who has furnished information on which such report or finding is based may be cross-examined by the adverse party, but the fact that his testimony is not obtainable shall not render the report or finding inadmissible, unless the trial court finds that substantial injustice would be done to the adverse party by its admission.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 57, § 2, p. 190.
25-12,117.
Notice; copy of report or finding.Such report or finding shall not be admissible unless the party offering it shall have given notice to the adverse party a reasonable time before trial of his intention to offer it, together with a copy of the report or finding, or so much thereof as may relate to the controversy, and shall also have afforded him a reasonable opportunity to inspect and copy any records or other documents in the offering party's possession or control, on which the report or finding was based, and also the names of all persons furnishing facts upon which the report or finding was based, except that it may be admitted if the trial court finds that no substantial injustice would result from the failure to give such notice.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 57, § 3, p. 190.
Annotations
Trial court is given discretion to admit report in evidence although no copy was served. Trute v. Skeede, 162 Neb. 266, 75 N.W.2d 672 (1956).
25-12,118.
Sections, how construed.Sections 25-12,115 to 25-12,119 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact them.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 57, § 4, p. 190.
25-12,119.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-12,115 to 25-12,119 may be cited as the Uniform Composite Reports as Evidence Act.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 57, § 5, p. 191.
25-12,120.
Hospital records; examination and inspection; presumption of consent; hospital medical staff committee; hospitalization utilization committee.From and after October 23, 1967, in the interest of public health and the improvement of patient medical and hospital care and in the interest of effective utilization of hospital facilities it shall be conclusively presumed that all persons hospitalized in any hospital in the State of Nebraska or confined in any extended care facility in the State of Nebraska have consented to the examination and inspection of all medical records of such hospital or extended care facility relating to such patient's care, treatment and the need for hospitalization or extended care by any hospital medical staff committee or by any utilization review committee for the purpose of studying and evaluating the necessity and the quality of the hospital and medical care and treatment or extended care provided to such patient and the necessity for continuation of such hospitalization or extended care of such patient. Hospital medical staff committee or hospital utilization committee as used in sections 25-12,120 and 25-12,121 shall mean a committee required by federal law or regulation for the purpose of administering in whole or in part a federal program for health care.
Source:Laws 1967, c. 142, § 1, p. 437.
25-12,121.
Hospital medical staff committee; hospital utilization committee; extended care facility utilization committee; recommendations or orders; liability for damages.No hospital medical staff committee or hospital utilization committee or extended care facility utilization committee or any member or agent of any such committee shall be held legally liable for damages or other relief to any patient or to any person or organization in behalf of any patient because of any recommendation or order made by such committee with reference to the hospitalization or continued hospitalization or confinement in an extended care facility of any individual or patient.
Source:Laws 1967, c. 142, § 2, p. 438.
25-12,122.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 279, § 75.
25-12,123.
Peer review committee; proceedings and records; testimony; use in civil actions; limitation.The proceedings and records of a peer review committee of a state or local association or society composed of health practitioners licensed pursuant to the Uniform Credentialing Act shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a person licensed pursuant to the act arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee. No person who was in attendance at a meeting of such committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any such civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of such committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions of such committee or any members thereof, except that information, documents, or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be construed as immune from discovery or use in any such civil action merely because they were presented during proceedings of such committee. Any documents or records which have been presented to the review committee by any witness shall be returned to the witness, if requested by him or her or if ordered to be produced by a court in any action, with copies thereof to be retained by the committee at its discretion. Any person who testifies before such committee or who is a member of such committee shall not be prevented from testifying as to matters within his or her knowledge, but such witness cannot be asked about his or her testimony before such a committee or opinions formed as a result of such committee hearings. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a court of record, after a hearing and for good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being shown, from ordering the disclosure of such proceedings, minutes, records, reports, or communications.
Cross References
Uniform Credentialing Act, see section 38-101.
25-12,124.
Statement, defined.As used in sections 25-12,124 to 25-12,126, unless the context otherwise requires, statement shall mean a recorded or written account of the facts out of which an injury arose given by the injured person to a person having an adverse interest. Statement shall not include (1) insurance claims forms, (2) medical authorizations, or (3) personal injury or accident report forms which are completed when an adverse person is not present.
25-12,125.
Rebuttable presumption; when.(1) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that any statement secured from an injured person by an adverse person at any time within thirty days after such injuries were sustained shall have been taken under duress for purposes of a trial of any action for damages for injuries sustained by such person or for the death of such person as the result of such injuries.
(2) The presumption described in subsection (1) of this section may be rebutted by evidence. The presumption shall be deemed rebutted as a matter of law if the adverse person taking the statement discloses to the injured person prior to taking the statement:
(a) Whom he or she represents;
(b) That the injured person may make the statement in the presence of counsel or any other representative; and
(c) That a copy of the statement is available at no cost to the injured person.
Annotations
Under this section, the presumption that a statement was taken under duress may be rebutted by evidence that the
statement was not made under duress. Schuemann v. Menard, Inc., 27 Neb. App. 977, 938 N.W.2d 378 (2020).
25-12,126.
Sections, how construed.Nothing in sections 25-12,124 to 25-12,126 shall be construed to supersede, abrogate, or limit any common-law remedies available to any injured person who has given a statement.
25-1301.
Judgment, rendition of judgment, entry of judgment, decree, or final order, defined; records; clerk; duties.(1) A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action.
(2) Rendition of a judgment is the act of the court, or a judge thereof, in signing a single written document stating all of the relief granted or denied in an action.
(3) The entry of a judgment, decree, or final order occurs when the clerk of the court places the file stamp and date upon the judgment, decree, or final order. For purposes of determining the time for appeal, the date stamped on the judgment, decree, or final order shall be the date of entry.
(4) The clerk shall prepare and maintain the records of judgments, decrees, and final orders that are required by statute and rule of the Supreme Court. Whenever any judgment is paid and discharged or when a satisfaction of judgment is filed, the clerk shall enter such fact upon the judgment index.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 428, p. 465; R.S.1913, § 7994; C.S.1922, § 8935; C.S.1929, § 20-1301; R.S.1943, § 25-1301; Laws 1961, c. 111, § 1, p. 350;
Laws 1999, LB 43, § 3; Laws 2018, LB193, § 17; Laws 2020, LB1028, § 3.
Cross References
For rate of interest on judgment, see section 45-103.
Annotations
1. Judgment
2. Miscellaneous
1. Judgment
A criminal judgment is not final for purposes of appeal until a file-stamped sentencing order is entered by the clerk. State v. Melton, 308 Neb. 159, 953 N.W.2d 246 (2021).
A final judgment is one that disposes of the case either by dismissing it before hearing is had upon the merits, or after trial by rendition of judgment for the plaintiff or defendant. Conversely, every direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing and not included in a judgment, is an order. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018).
A docket entry that is neither signed nor file stamped is not a final order. State v. Meints, 291 Neb. 869, 869 N.W.2d 343 (2015).
A conditional order is not a judgment, because it is not the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action. Nichols v. Nichols, 288 Neb. 339, 847 N.W.2d 307 (2014).
No appeal can be taken from an order that grants a motion to dismiss a complaint but allows time in which to file an amended complaint; such a conditional order is not a judgment. Nichols v. Nichols, 288 Neb. 339, 847 N.W.2d 307 (2014).
For a final judgment to exist, there must be an order that is both signed by the court and file stamped and dated by the clerk of the court. Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456, 763 N.W.2d 77 (2009).
This section sets forth two ministerial requirements for a final judgment: the rendition of the judgment and the entry thereof. Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456, 763 N.W.2d 77 (2009).
The void conditional judgment rule does not extend to actions in equity or to equitable relief granted within an action at law. Rather, where it is necessary and equitable to do so, a court of equitable jurisdiction may enter a conditional judgment and such judgment will not be deemed void simply by virtue of its conditional nature. Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 270 Neb. 917, 708 N.W.2d 821 (2006).
Orders which specify that a trial court will exercise its jurisdiction based upon future action or inaction by a party are conditional and therefore not appealable. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 258 Neb. 199, 602 N.W.2d 465 (1999).
Under this section, there are two occurrences, either of which constitutes a final order, which may begin the 30-day period in which a notice of appeal must be filed: (1) The rendition of a judgment, which occurs when an oral pronouncement of the judgment is made in open court and a notation of the judgment is made on the trial docket, or (2) the entry of a judgment, which is the act of the clerk of the court spreading on the court's journal both the proceedings had and the relief granted or denied. Dvorak v. Bunge Corp., 256 Neb. 341, 590 N.W.2d 682 (1999).
A rendition of judgment occurs when the court makes an oral pronouncement with a notation on the trial docket or, in the alternative, when some written notation of the judgment is filed in the records of the court. Reutzel v. Reutzel, 252 Neb. 354, 562 N.W.2d 351 (1997).
Rendition of a judgment includes the announcement by the court of the judgment. When written record of judgment and the verbatim record of the proceedings in open court are in conflict, the latter prevails. State v. Temple, 230 Neb. 624, 432 N.W.2d 818 (1988).
Although the clerk of the district court is authorized to spread upon the court journal the proceedings had and relief granted by the court, and to that extent is responsible for entry of the judgment, such clerk has no authority to perform the judicial function of rendering a judgment. Building Systems, Inc. v. Medical Center, Ltd., 228 Neb. 168, 421 N.W.2d 773 (1988).
District court order which was conditional in nature was not final and therefore not appealable. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Johnson, 226 Neb. 877, 415 N.W.2d 478 (1987).
A trial court's order which provided that if a case had not been "tried or otherwise disposed of" by a certain date and which required a showing of good cause if such deadline was not met, was a conditional order, and as such, not a judgment as defined in this provision. Lemburg v. Adams County, 225 Neb. 289, 404 N.W.2d 429 (1987).
The rendition of a judgment and the entry of a judgment are actions taken with respect to the judgment itself. State v. Carney, 220 Neb. 906, 374 N.W.2d 59 (1985).
An "order" entered on the trial docket does not constitute a rendition of judgment. State ex rel. Kaipus v. Board of Trustees of S. & I. Dist. No. 113, 200 Neb. 525, 264 N.W.2d 422 (1978).
Order of dismissal of party not final where motion for new trial filed and not ruled on. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. First Cadco Corp., 189 Neb. 553, 203 N.W.2d 770 (1973).
Amendments made to Installment Loan Act reducing penalty did not apply to actions in which a final judgment had been obtained. Kometscher v. Wade, 177 Neb. 299, 128 N.W.2d 781 (1964).
A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action. Rumbel v. Ress, 166 Neb. 839, 91 N.W.2d 36 (1958).
Decree to wife of divorce and monthly sum during minority of children is final judgment and lien upon husband's real estate. Wharton v. Jackson, 107 Neb. 288, 185 N.W. 428 (1921).
Order of justice on garnishee is a judgment. Johnson v. Samuelson, 82 Neb. 201, 117 N.W. 470 (1908).
Entry, that defendant is required to pay plaintiff determined amount, is a judgment. McNamara & Duncan v. Cabon, 21 Neb. 589, 33 N.W. 259 (1887).
Duly certified copy is transcript of judgment. Hastings School Dist. v. Caldwell, Hamilton & Co., 16 Neb. 68, 19 N.W. 634 (1884).
Judgment against city is binding on taxpayers. Shanahan v. City of So. Omaha, 2 Neb. Unof. 466, 89 N.W. 285 (1902).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the content of a document, rather than the intention of the judge or any interpretation of a party, dictates whether the document constitutes the final determination of the rights of the parties, for purposes of appeal. Ferer v. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co., 16 Neb. App. 866, 755 N.W.2d 415 (2008).
This section sets forth two ministerial requirements for a final judgment: rendition of a judgment by the court making and signing a written notation of relief and entry of a judgment by the clerk of court placing a file stamp and date upon the judgment. Rosen Auto Leasing v. Jordan, 15 Neb. App. 1, 720 N.W.2d 911 (2006).
The two ministerial requirements for a final judgment are (1) a rendition of the judgment, defined as the act of the court or a judge thereof in making and signing a written notation of the relief granted or denied in an action, and (2) an "entry" of a final order, occurring when the clerk of the court places the file stamp and date upon the judgment. State v. Brown, 12 Neb. App. 940, 687 N.W.2d 203 (2004).
Pursuant to this section, a judgment is entered by the clerk of the court by placing the file stamp and date upon a rendered judgment. State v. Wahrman, 11 Neb. App. 101, 644 N.W.2d 572 (2002).
A trial docket note entered by the court was not a judgment. Lee Sapp Leasing v. Ciao Caffe & Espresso, Inc., 10 Neb. App. 948, 640 N.W.2d 677 (2002).
Any action purporting to be a judgment, decree, or final order must be rendered and entered to be valid, as provided by this section. Murray Constr. Servs. v. Meco-Henne Contracting, 10 Neb. App. 316, 633 N.W.2d 915 (2001).
Pursuant to this section and section 25-2729, a judgment is entered when the clerk of the court places a file stamp and date upon it. State v. Wilcox, 9 Neb. App. 933, 623 N.W.2d 329 (2001).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, a final, appealable judgment was never rendered when there was a final sentencing order, but the only indication the defendant had been found guilty was a letter, signed by the court stenographer for the judge, stating, "Defendant is found guilty on Counts 1, 2 and 3," and the letter, although included in the transcript, did not contain a county court file stamp. State v. Engleman, 5 Neb. App. 485, 560 N.W.2d 851 (1997).
Entry in trial docket indicating "motion for postconviction relief overruled" was rendering of judgment, and subsequent file-stamped memorandum order was merely confirmation of docket entry. State v. McPherson, 1 Neb. App. 1022, 510 N.W.2d 487 (1993).
2. Miscellaneous
A journal entry that contemplates the preparation of a decree for opposing counsel's review and for signature by the court is not a final determination of the rights of the parties under this section. Hosack v. Hosack, 267 Neb. 934, 678 N.W.2d 746 (2004).
A motion for a new trial filed prior to the rendition of a judgment is premature and constitutes a nullity. Spanheimer Roofing & Supply Co. v. Thompson, 198 Neb. 710, 255 N.W.2d 265 (1977).
Application for new trial may be made within ten days after judgment is pronounced and noted on trial docket. Valentine Production Credit Assn. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 196 Neb. 119, 241 N.W.2d 541 (1976).
No judgment is rendered until pronouncement thereof is noted on the trial docket. Fritch v. Fritch, 191 Neb. 29, 213 N.W.2d 445 (1973).
Unless the context is shown to intend otherwise, action includes any proceeding in a court and only final orders therein are bases for appeals. Grantham v. General Telephone Co., 187 Neb. 647, 193 N.W.2d 449 (1972).
This section does not apply to eminent domain proceedings until they reach the district court. Weiner v. State, 179 Neb. 297, 137 N.W.2d 852 (1965).
Notice of rendition of judgment was not required as to judgments rendered before amendment of statute. Bebee v. Kriewald, 173 Neb. 179, 112 N.W.2d 764 (1962).
A judgment for alimony in gross survived the death of the judgment debtor. Spencer v. Spencer, 165 Neb. 675, 87 N.W.2d 212 (1957).
A docket entry/journal entry contained in the "Judges Notes" constituted an interlocutory order disposing of the party's motion to alter or amend; it did not need to be a separate file-stamped document. Pearce v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 28 Neb. App. 410, 945 N.W.2d 516 (2020).
An unsigned journal entry without a file stamp can constitute an interlocutory order; but it cannot constitute a final, appealable order, particularly when it does not dispose of all issues. Pearce v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 28 Neb. App. 410, 945 N.W.2d 516 (2020).
Finding of fact in replevin is not a judgment. Brounty v. Daniels, 23 Neb. 162, 36 N.W. 463 (1888).
Determination of rights of parties not before court is not judgment. State ex rel. Chandler v. Dodge County, 10 Neb. 20, 4 N.W. 370 (1880).
When a trial court order intended to finally dispose of a matter is announced but not rendered or entered pursuant to this section, but a party nonetheless files an otherwise timely notice of appeal, the appellate court has "potential jurisdiction" which "springs" into full jurisdiction when this section is complied with. Rosen Auto Leasing v. Jordan, 15 Neb. App. 1, 720 N.W.2d 911 (2006).
25-1301.01.
Civil judgment or final order; duty of clerk; exception.Within three working days after the entry of any civil judgment or final order, except judgments by default when service has been obtained by publication or interlocutory orders styled as judgments, the clerk of the court shall send the judgment or final order by United States mail or by service through the court's electronic case management system to each party whose address appears in the records of the action or to the party's attorney or attorneys of record.
Source:Laws 1961, c. 111, § 2, p. 350; Laws 1969, c. 186, § 1, p. 778;
Laws 1977, LB 124, § 1; Laws 1999, LB 43, § 4; Laws 2018, LB193, § 18; Laws 2020, LB1028, § 4.
Annotations
Where notice of judgment was mailed late, to an attorney no longer representing defendant and to an address where defendant could not be reached, the notification of judgment statute was not complied with, and is additional evidence to permit vacation of a default judgment. Tietsort v. Ranne, 200 Neb. 651, 264 N.W.2d 860 (1978).
Where judgment of dismissal was entered and no notice was given by the clerk to the parties, the proper proceeding to correct omissions of the clerk is by motion and notice. Pofahl v. Pofahl, 196 Neb. 347, 243 N.W.2d 55 (1976).
This section has no application to the filing of the report of appraisers with the county judge in eminent domain proceedings. Weiner v. State, 179 Neb. 297, 137 N.W.2d 852 (1965).
Sending of notice by post card is required as to ruling on motion for new trial where such ruling is a prerequisite to an appeal. Simmons v. Lincoln, 176 Neb. 71, 125 N.W.2d 63 (1963).
25-1302.
Repealed. Laws 2000, LB 921, § 38.
25-1303.
Transcript of judgment to other county; effect.The transcript of a judgment of any district court in this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court in any county. Such transcript, when so filed and entered on the judgment index, shall be a lien on the property of the debtor in any county in which such transcript is so filed, in the same manner and under the same conditions only as in the county where such judgment was rendered, and execution may be issued on such transcript in the same manner as on the original judgment. Such transcript shall at no time have any greater validity or effect than the original judgment.
Source:Laws 1869, § 1, p. 158; R.S.1913, § 7796; C.S.1922, § 8937; Laws 1929, c. 83, § 1, p. 332; C.S.1929, § 20-1303; R.S.1943, § 25-1303;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 19.
Cross References
County court judgment, transcript to district court for lien, see section 25-2721.
Annotations
Federal court judgments are liens on real estate only in county where rendered unless transcript is filed in other counties. Rathbone Co. v. Kimball, 117 Neb. 229, 220 N.W. 244 (1928).
Transcript filed in other county can only be vacated in suit to set aside original judgment; applies in suits to remove cloud on title. State ex rel. Long v. Westover, 107 Neb. 593, 186 N.W. 998 (1922).
Motion to revive judgment of district court must be made in court where rendered. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Edmisten, 85 Neb. 272, 122 N.W. 891 (1909).
Judgment in county court, regardless of amount, may be transcripted to any county in state. Cabon v. Gruenig, 18 Neb. 562, 26 N.W. 253 (1886).
Transcript of justice judgment must be filed in district court of county where judgment was rendered. Pemberton v. Pollard, 18 Neb. 435, 25 N.W. 582 (1885).
25-1304.
Decree for conveyance, release, or acquittance; effect.When any judgment or decree shall be rendered for a conveyance, release or acquittance, in any court of this state, and the party or parties against whom the judgment or decree shall be rendered do not comply therewith within the time mentioned in said judgment or decree, such judgment or decree shall have the same operation and effect, and be as available as if the conveyance, release or acquittance had been executed conformable to such judgment or decree.
Source:Laws 1869, § 1, p. 70; R.S.1913, § 7997; C.S.1922, § 8938; C.S.1929, § 20-1304; R.S.1943, § 25-1304.
25-1305.
Federal court judgment; transcript to other county; effect.A transcript of any judgment or decree rendered in a circuit or district court of the United States within the State of Nebraska, may be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court in any county in this state. Such transcript, when so filed and entered on the judgment index, shall be a lien on the property of the debtor in any county in which such transcript is so filed, in the same manner and under the same conditions only as if such judgment or decree had been rendered by the district court of such county. Such transcript shall at no time have a greater validity or effect than the original judgment. The lands and tenements of the debtor within the county where the judgment is entered shall be bound for the satisfaction thereof from the day on which such judgment is rendered without the filing of a transcript. Orders reviving dormant judgments shall become liens upon the lands and tenements of the judgment debtor only when such order is entered on the judgment index in the same manner as an original judgment.
Source:Laws 1889, c. 30, § 1, p. 377; R.S.1913, § 7998; C.S.1922, § 8939; Laws 1929, c. 83, § 1, p. 332; C.S.1929, § 20-1305; R.S.1943, § 25-1305;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 20.
Annotations
On appeal under this section, parties retain the same status in district court as they had in tribunal below. School Dist. of Wilber v. Pracheil, 180 Neb. 121, 141 N.W.2d 768 (1966).
Federal court judgment is lien on real estate only in county where rendered, unless transcript is filed in other counties. Rathbone Co. v. Kimball, 117 Neb. 229, 220 N.W. 244 (1928).
25-1306.
Dissolution of lien; deposit; bond; appellate proceedings.In all cases wherein the judgment of any court, for payment of money only, which may be a general lien on property of the judgment debtor, and the debtor proposes to take proceedings in error or by appeal for review of such judgment, he may deposit in the court in which such judgment is rendered the full sum of such judgment, interest and costs, there to abide until termination of such appellate proceedings, and may file bond in such sum as the court or judge thereof may determine, with sureties to the approval of the clerk of such court, conditioned to pay interest on the judgment debt and costs to accrue in event the judgment be affirmed. On such payment being made, and such bond filed and approved, the general lien of the judgment shall be dissolved.
Source:Laws 1893, c. 42, § 1, p. 383; R.S.1913, § 7999; C.S.1922, § 8940; C.S.1929, § 20-1306; R.S.1943, § 25-1306.
Annotations
This section provides for filing of petition and answer in an appeal under this section. School Dist. of Wilber v. Pracheil, 180 Neb. 121, 141 N.W.2d 768 (1966).
Under Nebraska law, which applies to a foreign judgment after the judgment is filed in Nebraska, once a party appeals a monetary judgment for money only and files a supersedeas bond which is approved by the court in which judgment was rendered, the general lien resulting from the judgment is dissolved. Anderson v. Werner Enters., Inc., 7 Neb. App. 294, 581 N.W.2d 104 (1998).
25-1307.
Dissolution of lien; disposition of deposit.If such judgment be affirmed, the money so deposited shall be paid to the judgment creditor, but if such judgment be reversed, the debtor may withdraw such deposit.
Source:Laws 1893, c. 42, § 2, p. 384; R.S.1913, § 8000; C.S.1922, § 8941; C.S.1929, § 20-1307; R.S.1943, § 25-1307.
25-1308.
Judgment upon failure to answer; procedure.If the taking of an account, or the proof of a fact, or the assessment of damages, be necessary to enable the court to pronounce judgment upon a failure to answer, or after a decision of an issue of law, the court may, with the assent of the party not in default, take the account, hear the proof, or assess the damages; or may, with the like assent, refer the same to a referee, master, or commissioner, or may direct the same to be ascertained or assessed by a jury. If a jury be ordered, it shall be on or after the day on which the action is set for trial. This section shall not be construed to impair the right of a party to a jury if he appear at the trial by himself or attorney, and demand the same.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 432, p. 466; R.S.1913, § 8001; C.S.1922, § 8942; C.S.1929, § 20-1308; R.S.1943, § 25-1308.
Annotations
Modification of child custody and support in a dissolution action is a special proceeding, and thus, the statute governing the procedure for a default judgment in a civil action is not controlling. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 286 Neb. 96, 835 N.W.2d 44 (2013).
This section applies where it is necessary to make proof of allegations of value and amount of damage, and did not apply to creditor's bill. Danbom v. Danbom, 132 Neb. 858, 273 N.W. 502 (1937).
Where only issue presented by answer was one of law, court properly proceeded under this section. Bankers' Reserve Life Assn. v. Finn, 64 Neb. 105, 89 N.W. 672 (1902).
25-1309.
Right to confess judgment; creditor's assent necessary.Any person indebted, or against whom a cause of action exists, may personally appear, in a court of competent jurisdiction, and, with the assent of the creditor or person having such cause of action, confess judgment therefor, whereupon judgment shall be entered accordingly.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 433, p. 466; R.S.1913, § 8002; C.S.1922, § 8943; C.S.1929, § 20-1309; R.S.1943, § 25-1309.
Annotations
General appearance is sufficient; actual physical presence of defendant is unnecessary. Thornhill v. Hargreaves, 76 Neb. 582, 107 N.W. 847 (1906).
Where corporation is already in default of answer, judgment may be entered upon stipulation without warrant to attorney. Alter v. State ex rel. Kountze Bros., 62 Neb. 239, 86 N.W. 1080 (1901).
Confession of judgment by corporation must be made by warrant of attorney. Fogg v. Ellis, 61 Neb. 829, 86 N.W. 494 (1901).
Corporation for pecuniary profit may confess judgment. Solomon Co. v. Schneider & Co., 56 Neb. 680, 77 N.W. 65 (1898).
Manager of corporation has no power to confess judgment. Howell v. Gilt Edge Mfg. Co., 32 Neb. 627, 49 N.W. 704 (1891).
Creditor's assent is necessary; but is presumed where defendant confesses sum demanded in petition. Flanigan v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Neb. 235, 34 N.W. 367 (1887).
25-1310.
Judgment by confession; contents.The debt or cause of action shall be briefly stated in the judgment, or in a writing to be filed as pleadings in other actions.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 434, p. 466; R.S.1913, § 8003; C.S.1922, § 8944; C.S.1929, § 20-1310; R.S.1943, § 25-1310.
Annotations
The provisions of this section are applicable to only civil proceedings. Dunham v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 649, 290 N.W. 723 (1940).
25-1311.
Enforcement of judgment.Such judgment shall authorize the same proceedings for its enforcement as judgments rendered in actions regularly brought and prosecuted; and the confession shall operate as a release of errors.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 435, p. 466; R.S.1913, § 8004; C.S.1922, § 8945; C.S.1929, § 20-1311; R.S.1943, § 25-1311.
25-1312.
Confession of judgment by attorney; warrant; requirements.Every attorney who shall confess judgment in any case, shall, at the time of making such confession, produce the warrant of attorney for making the same to the court before which he makes the confession; and the original or a copy of the warrant shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the judgment shall be entered.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 436, p. 466; R.S.1913, § 8005; C.S.1922, § 8946; C.S.1929, § 20-1312; R.S.1943, § 25-1312.
Annotations
Judgment on appeal, entered by consent, is not "judgment by confession." Wabaska Electric Co. v. City of Blue Springs, 84 Neb. 577, 122 N.W. 21 (1909).
County attorney must show warrant, or judgment against county is void. Custer County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 62 Neb. 657, 87 N.W. 341 (1901).
Judgment by confession against corporation, unless warrant of attorney is produced, is void. Fogg v. Ellis, 61 Neb. 829, 86 N.W. 494 (1901).
Authority of attorney to confess judgment under warrant in promissory note, without issuance of summons, raised but not decided. Wiley v. Neal, 24 Neb. 141, 37 N.W. 926 (1888).
25-1313.
Jury trial; judgment by court; entry of order.When a trial by jury has been had, judgment must be ordered by the court and entered upon the record in conformity to the verdict, unless it is special, or the court orders the case to be reserved for future argument or consideration.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 438, p. 467; R.S.1913, § 8006; C.S.1922, § 8947; C.S.1929, § 20-1313; R.S.1943, § 25-1313; Laws 1961, c. 111, § 3, p. 350;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 39.
Annotations
There was no compliance with this section or its alternatives. Northwestern Public Service Co. v. Juhl, 177 Neb. 625, 129 N.W.2d 570 (1964).
It is the duty of the clerk to render judgment on verdict. Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 155 Neb. 48, 50 N.W.2d 533 (1951).
Judgment was properly entered the same day verdict was received. Hamaker v. Patrick, 123 Neb. 809, 244 N.W. 420 (1932); Wiegand v. Lincoln Traction Co., 123 Neb. 766, 244 N.W. 298 (1932).
When verdict is general, it is clerk's duty to render judgment in conformity therewith, unless otherwise ordered. Crete Mills v. Stevens, 120 Neb. 794, 235 N.W. 453 (1931).
Where jury verdict finds for plaintiff but awards incorrect amount, court cannot recompute and enter judgment for proper amount; only remedy is motion for new trial. Kenesaw Mill & Elevator Co. v. Aufdenkamp, 106 Neb. 246, 183 N.W. 294 (1921).
It is error to enter judgment for amount of verdict if in excess of amount claimed; party may remit. Davis v. Hall, 70 Neb. 678, 97 N.W. 1023 (1904).
Court may reserve case on specific law points which must be stated in record; not on sufficiency of evidence. Barge v. Haslam, 65 Neb. 656, 91 N.W. 528 (1902).
Failure to enter judgment at term; court may enter later. Toogood v. Russell, 3 Neb. Unof. 189, 91 N.W. 249 (1902).
25-1314.
Entry of judgment by court; when required.Where the verdict is special, or where there has been a special finding on particular questions of fact, or where the court has ordered the case to be reserved, it shall order what judgment shall be entered.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 439, p. 467; R.S.1913, § 8007; C.S.1922, § 8948; C.S.1929, § 20-1314; R.S.1943, § 25-1314.
Annotations
Special circumstances of case required trial court to order what judgment should be entered. Bell v. Crook, 168 Neb. 685, 97 N.W.2d 352 (1959).
25-1315.
Multiple claims or parties; effect.(1) When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(2) When a court has ordered a final judgment under the conditions stated in subsection (1) of this section, the court may stay enforcement of that judgment until the entry of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered.
Annotations
1. Multiple claims or parties
2. Final order or judgment
3. Procedure
4. Miscellaneous
1. Multiple claims or parties
This section is implicated when a case involves multiple parties or multiple claims, and can be implicated in civil actions, special proceedings, and civil actions joined with special proceedings. McPherson v. Walgreens Boot Alliance, 314 Neb. 875, 993 N.W.2d 679 (2023).
The term "action" in this section broadly references civil cases that present multiple claims for relief or involve multiple parties. Mann v. Mann, 312 Neb. 275, 978 N.W.2d 606 (2022).
This section is inapplicable to a final order regarding a postjudgment garnishment in aid of execution directed to specific property where all rights of all parties claiming an interest in the specific property garnished have been adjudicated. Florence Lake Investments v. Berg, 312 Neb. 183, 978 N.W.2d 308 (2022).
This section is implicated where a habeas corpus petition is asserted in the same action as a petition in error, and therefore a party must wait to appeal until the court enters a "final order" within the meaning of section 25-1902 that addresses both petitions, or the court expressly directs the entry of a final order regarding the habeas corpus petition and determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Tyrrell v. Frakes, 309 Neb. 85, 958 N.W.2d 673 (2021).
Absent a specific statute allowing an immediate appeal, when the proceedings below involve multiple claims for relief or multiple parties, and the court has adjudicated fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, this section controls. TDP Phase One v. The Club at the Yard, 307 Neb. 795, 950 N.W.2d 640 (2020).
In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the plain language of section 25-21,233 does not allow an immediate appeal of an order of restitution when the order implicates this section, meaning the order adjudicates fewer than all claims for relief or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, without being certified pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. TDP Phase One v. The Club at the Yard, 307 Neb. 795, 950 N.W.2d 640 (2020).
This section was implicated in a paternity action initiated for two children where (1) the presumptive father filed a cross-claim against the mother for custody and visitation as to one child and a counterclaim against the State for disestablishment of paternity as to the other child and (2) the district court granted disestablishment of paternity but did not determine the custody issues as to the other child. State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. v. Ricky K., 300 Neb. 179, 912 N.W.2d 747 (2018).
This section provides that when a case involves multiple claims or multiple parties, a party may generally only appeal when all claims and the rights of all parties have been resolved. If a court issues an order that is final as to some, but not all, of the claims or parties, such an order is appealable only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such an entry of judgment, orders adjudicating fewer than all claims or the rights of fewer than all the parties are not final and are subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Thus, absent an entry of judgment under this section, no appeal will lie unless all claims have been disposed as to all parties in the case. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018).
A “claim for relief” under subsection (1) of this section is equivalent to a separate cause of action. Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion, 286 Neb. 322, 836 N.W.2d 588 (2013).
By its terms, subsection (1) of this section is implicated only where multiple causes of action are presented or multiple parties are involved, and a final judgment is entered as to one of the parties or causes of action. Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009).
Subsection (1) of this section requires, in cases with multiple claims or parties, an explicit adjudication with respect to all claims or parties or, failing such explicit adjudication of all claims or parties, an express determination that there is no just reason for delay of an appeal of an order disposing of less than all claims or parties and an express direction for the entry of judgment as to those adjudicated claims or parties. Malolepszy v. State, 270 Neb. 100, 699 N.W.2d 387 (2005).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, only when more than one claim for relief or multiple parties are involved may the court direct entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all the claims or parties. Tri-Par Investments v. Sousa, 263 Neb. 209, 640 N.W.2d 371 (2002).
Subsection (1) of this section is implicated only where multiple causes of action are presented or multiple parties are involved, and a final judgment is entered as to one of the parties or causes of action. Keef v. State, Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 262 Neb. 622, 634 N.W.2d 751 (2001).
One may bring an appeal pursuant to subsection (1) of this section governing entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a "final order" as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Southwest Omaha Hospitality v. Werner-Robertson, 20 Neb. App. 930, 834 N.W.2d 617 (2013).
Subsection (1) of this section is implicated only where multiple causes of action are presented or multiple parties are involved and a final judgment is entered as to one of the parties or causes of action. Parker v. Parker, 10 Neb. App. 658, 636 N.W.2d 385 (2001).
2. Final order or judgment
When a court enters an order dismissing all but one claim and does not expressly direct entry of judgment under this section, the order is interlocutory and an appeal cannot be taken until the court disposes of all claims. Bohling v. Tecumseh Poultry, 314 Neb. 129, 988 N.W.2d 529 (2023).
A "final order" is a prerequisite to an appellate court's obtaining jurisdiction of an appeal initiated pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009).
This section permits a judgment to become final only under the limited circumstances set forth in the statute. Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009).
The trial court's mere oral announcement of its judgment, without a written entry that is signed by the court, file stamped, and dated, is insufficient to render final judgment. Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456, 763 N.W.2d 77 (2009).
Certification of a final judgment must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007).
In deciding whether to grant certification under subsection (1) of this section, a trial court must address two distinct issues. A trial court must first determine that it is dealing with a "final judgment." It must be a "judgment" in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be "final" in the sense that it is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action. Once having found finality, the trial court must go on to determine whether there is any just reason for delay. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007).
In a case involving two appellees, a lower court order sustaining one appellee's motion for summary judgment and entering judgment against the appellant was a final order, because it determined the action as related to those two parties, and no further action was necessary as between those two parties. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Dailey, 268 Neb. 733, 687 N.W.2d 689 (2004).
An order granting an evidentiary hearing on some issues and denying a hearing on others is a final order because a postconviction proceeding is a special proceeding. The enactment of this section does not change that conclusion. State v. Harris, 267 Neb. 771, 677 N.W.2d 147 (2004).
To be appealable in a case with multiple parties or causes of action, an order must satisfy the final order requirements of section 25-1902, as well as the requirements of subsection (1) of this section. Halac v. Girton, 17 Neb. App. 505, 766 N.W.2d 418 (2009).
3. Procedure
To be appealable, an order must meet the final order requirements of both this section and section 25-1902. Mann v. Mann, 312 Neb. 275, 978 N.W.2d 606 (2022).
With the enactment of subsection (1) of this section, one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a "final order" within the meaning of section 25-1902 as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Therefore, to be appealable, an order must satisfy the final order requirements of section 25-1902 and, additionally, where implicated, subsection (1) of this section. Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009).
One may bring an appeal pursuant to this section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a "final order" within the meaning of section 25-1902 as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007).
With the enactment of subsection (1) of this section, one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a final order within the meaning of section 25-1902 as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Bailey v. Lund-Ross Constructors Co., 265 Neb. 539, 657 N.W.2d 916 (2003).
Without an express determination that there is no reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of final judgment from the trial court, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order that does not dispose of all of the claims against all of the parties. Abante, LLC v. Premier Fighter, 19 Neb. App. 730, 814 N.W.2d 109 (2012).
When certifying a judgment as final under subsection (1) of this section, a court must make specific findings and explain the reasoning for its determination. Murphy v. Brown, 15 Neb. App. 914, 738 N.W.2d 466 (2007).
In the absence of any express determination and express direction under subsection (1) of this section, an unresolved complaint in intervention caused the order sought to be appealed to be interlocutory. TierOne Bank v. Cup-O-Coa, Inc., 15 Neb. App. 648, 734 N.W.2d 763 (2007).
Where multiple causes of action or multiple parties are involved, the trial court must both enter a final order pursuant to section 25-1902 and make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and expressly direct the entry of judgment to make appealable an order adjudicating fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties. Pioneer Chem. Co. v. City of North Platte, 12 Neb. App. 720, 685 N.W.2d 505 (2004).
4. Miscellaneous
This section can be implicated in civil actions, special proceedings, and civil actions joined with special proceedings. Mann v. Mann, 312 Neb. 275, 978 N.W.2d 606 (2022).
The trial court should not have certified as final its order resolving a claim against the trustee where the trustee's third-party claim for contribution was unresolved and nothing in the record suggested that a delay of a few months before the third-party complaint would be ready for trial would cause an unusual hardship for the parties. Rafert v. Meyer, 298 Neb. 461, 905 N.W.2d 30 (2017).
This section does not modify final order jurisprudence as it regards orders denying intervention. Streck, Inc. v. Ryan Family, 297 Neb. 773, 901 N.W.2d 284 (2017).
In enacting this section, the Legislature did not amend the partition statutes or attempt to change the effect of prior jurisprudence. Both before and after the adoption of this section, section 25-2179 characterized the settlement of all ownership rights as a "judgment" and Nebraska case law characterizes the order as a final order. Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest. Co., 295 Neb. 639, 889 N.W.2d 825 (2017).
An order granting a lender's motions for summary judgment to enforce a guaranty, but failing to adjudicate a cross-claim and not directing the entry of final judgment under this section, is not a judgment sufficient to support execution or garnishment in aid of execution. Cattle Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Watson, 293 Neb. 943, 880 N.W.2d 906 (2016).
Where section 25-1315.03 and subsection (1) of this section are in conflict, section 25-1315.03 controls. R & D Properties v. Altech Constr. Co., 279 Neb. 74, 776 N.W.2d 493 (2009).
A postconviction motion presents a single cause of action, and the various facts alleged as evidence that the defendant is entitled to postconviction relief are but multiple theories of recovery. State v. Poindexter, 277 Neb. 936, 766 N.W.2d 391 (2009).
A trial court considering certification of a final judgment under this section should weigh factors such as (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the trial court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in setoff against the judgment sought to be made final; and (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007).
The power this section confers upon the trial judge should only be used in the infrequent harsh case as an instrument for the improved administration of justice, based on the likelihood of injustice or hardship to the parties of a delay in entering a final judgment as to part of the case. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007); Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, 17 Neb. App. 28, 756 N.W.2d 299 (2008).
When a trial court concludes that entry of judgment under this section is appropriate, it should ordinarily make specific findings setting forth the reasons for its order. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007); Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, 17 Neb. App. 28, 756 N.W.2d 299 (2008).
The policy behind subsection (1) of this section was the avoidance of piecemeal appellate review in routine cases, not the facilitation thereof. Halac v. Girton, 17 Neb. App. 505, 766 N.W.2d 418 (2009).
A trial court's decision to certify a final judgment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, 17 Neb. App. 28, 756 N.W.2d 299 (2008).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the certification under subsection (1) of this section, given that the length of time the litigation had been pending and the fact that a full jury trial had been brought to conclusion regarding the issues between certain parties, the case was the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket were outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties. Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, 17 Neb. App. 28, 756 N.W.2d 299 (2008).
25-1315.01.
Motion for directed verdict; joinder; effect; requisites.A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 88, § 1, p. 267.
Annotations
Although a motion for directed verdict should state the specific grounds therefor, where proof relating to a specific issue is so clear and convincing that reasonable minds cannot reach different conclusions, it is the duty of the trial court to enter judgment in accordance with the evidence. Hill v. City of Lincoln, 249 Neb. 88, 541 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
In the absence of a showing of prejudice, error may not be predicated on failure to state reasons in motion for directed verdict. Swink v. Smith, 173 Neb. 423, 113 N.W.2d 515 (1962).
Motion for directed verdict should set forth specific grounds. Allied Building Credits, Inc. v. Damicus, 167 Neb. 390, 93 N.W.2d 210 (1958); Segebart v. Gregory, 156 Neb. 261, 55 N.W.2d 678 (1952).
Motion sufficiently stated the specific grounds therefor. Sullivan v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 160 Neb. 342, 70 N.W.2d 98 (1955).
Although joined in by all parties, motion for directed verdict raises only questions of law and does not constitute waiver of a jury trial. In re Estate of Coons, 154 Neb. 690, 48 N.W.2d 778 (1951).
Act applies only in a case in which a motion for a directed verdict is made at the close of the evidence. In re Estate of Kinsey, 152 Neb. 95, 40 N.W.2d 526 (1949).
25-1315.02.
Motion for directed verdict at close of evidence; effect; filing before entry of judgment; treatment; motion to set aside verdict or judgment; power of court.Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. No later than ten days after the entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with the moving party's motion for a directed verdict. If the motion is filed after the announcement of a verdict but before the entry of judgment, it shall be treated as filed after the entry of judgment and on the day thereof. If a verdict is not returned, within ten days after the jury is discharged a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move for judgment in accordance with the moving party's motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If judgment was entered, the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned, the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.
Annotations
1. Duty of court
2. Allowance of motion
3. Denial of motion
4. Miscellaneous
1. Duty of court
Trial court had authority to vacate judgment it had entered for plaintiff after trial to the court, and to then enter judgment for defendants on motion couched in terms of this section. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 196 Neb. 158, 241 N.W.2d 674 (1976).
In passing on motion, court is required to re-examine the entire material evidence. Wagoun v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 155 Neb. 132, 50 N.W.2d 810 (1952); In re Estate of Bingaman, 155 Neb. 24, 50 N.W.2d 523 (1951).
Whether a judgment will be directed or new trial granted is matter of judicial discretion. In re Estate of Coons, 154 Neb. 690, 48 N.W.2d 778 (1951).
Where motion to dismiss was made on ground that evidence did not sustain a cause of action, this section applied. Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Assn., 154 Neb. 42, 46 N.W.2d 769 (1951).
This section deals with the powers of the trial court. Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 153 Neb. 98, 43 N.W.2d 609 (1950).
2. Allowance of motion
This section authorizes entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the appropriate motion is made within ten days after reception of the verdict to be set aside; a trial court should direct a verdict only when the facts are conceded, undisputed, or such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom. Getzschman v. Miller Chemical Co., 232 Neb. 885, 443 N.W.2d 260 (1989).
Where evidence showed that plaintiff was damaged but not the extent or amount thereof, grant of alternative motion for new trial rather than entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict was proper. Wylie v. Czapla, 168 Neb. 646, 97 N.W.2d 255 (1959).
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted where motion for directed verdict at close of all of the evidence should have been sustained. Weston v. Gold & Co., 167 Neb. 692, 94 N.W.2d 380 (1959).
A proper motion for a directed verdict is a necessary condition precedent to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Allied Building Credits, Inc. v. Damicus, 167 Neb. 390, 93 N.W.2d 210 (1958).
When a party has filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new trial, the granting of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict operates as a denial of the motion for new trial. Armer v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 153 Neb. 352, 44 N.W.2d 640 (1950).
If a motion for directed verdict made at the close of all of the evidence should have been sustained, it is the duty of the court on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to set same aside and render judgment pursuant to the motion. Hamilton v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 152 Neb. 328, 41 N.W.2d 139 (1950).
When proper motion is made and overruled, court is empowered to set aside verdict and enter judgment in accordance with motion. Sohler v. Christensen, 151 Neb. 843, 39 N.W.2d 837 (1949); Patrick v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 150 Neb. 201, 33 N.W.2d 537 (1948); In re Estate of Farr, 150 Neb. 67, 33 N.W.2d 454 (1948).
3. Denial of motion
The prerequisite motion for directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence was not made where plaintiff failed to renew her motion for directed verdict after defendant presented evidence on surrebuttal. Spulak v. Tower Ins. Co., 251 Neb. 784, 559 N.W.2d 197 (1997).
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may not properly be sustained in the absence of a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence, which motion should have been sustained because of a want of evidence. Palmtag v. Gartner Constr. Co., 245 Neb. 405, 513 N.W.2d 495 (1994).
Motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding inability of jury to agree on a verdict, were properly denied in view of the evidence on the record. Danielsen v. Richards Mfg. Co., Inc., 206 Neb. 676, 294 N.W.2d 858 (1980).
In the absence of a motion for directed verdict, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may not properly be sustained. Harris v. Pullen, 169 Neb. 298, 99 N.W.2d 238 (1959).
Where trial court denies motion for new trial and makes no ruling on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the denial operates for both. Lund v. Holbrook, 153 Neb. 706, 46 N.W.2d 130 (1951).
4. Miscellaneous
Pursuant to this section, when a jury is unable to return a verdict and is discharged, a party properly preserves for appeal only those issues stated in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict that it also asserted in its motion for directed verdict. Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, 268 Neb. 499, 684 N.W.2d 543 (2004).
This section authorizes an appeal from the denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the jury has been discharged as the result of an inability to reach a verdict. Snyder v. Contemporary Obstetrics & Gyn., 258 Neb. 643, 605 N.W.2d 782 (2000).
This section authorizes an appeal from the denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the jury has been discharged as the result of an inability to reach a verdict. Critchfield v. McNamara, 248 Neb. 39, 532 N.W.2d 287 (1995).
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not available in criminal proceedings in Nebraska state courts. State v. Miller, 240 Neb. 297, 481 N.W.2d 580 (1992).
This section authorizes the renewal of a party's previous directed verdict motion in cases where a jury is unable to reach a verdict and is discharged for that reason. Ditloff v. Otto, 239 Neb. 377, 476 N.W.2d 675 (1991).
A motion for a directed verdict is an absolute prerequisite to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Lockhart v. Continental Cheese, Inc., 203 Neb. 331, 278 N.W.2d 604 (1979); Pearson v. Schuler, 172 Neb. 353, 109 N.W.2d 537 (1961); Springer v. Henthorn, 169 Neb. 578, 100 N.W.2d 521 (1960); Kohl v. Unkel, 163 Neb. 257, 79 N.W.2d 405 (1956); In re Estate of Kinsey, 152 Neb. 95, 40 N.W.2d 526 (1949).
The procedure hereunder is limited to civil proceedings. State v. Torrence, 192 Neb. 720, 224 N.W.2d 177 (1974).
Section 25-1315.03, provides that certain orders are appealable, but it is not exclusive. Edquist v. Commercial Sav. & Loan Assn., 191 Neb. 618, 217 N.W.2d 82 (1974).
Motions for directed verdict following all evidence and, after mistrial, for judgment for defendant or dismissal of petition were proper. Giangrasso v. Schimmel, 190 Neb. 228, 207 N.W.2d 517 (1973).
Party may seek a new trial without asking for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Guynan v. Olson, 178 Neb. 335, 133 N.W.2d 571 (1965).
This section constitutes a special statutory procedure. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Atlantic Nat. Ins. Co., 178 Neb. 226, 132 N.W.2d 758 (1965).
Under specified conditions, order granting a new trial is an appealable order. Otteman v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., Inc., 171 Neb. 148, 105 N.W.2d 583 (1960).
Motion for new trial is not always essential to review on appeal. Hungerford v. Knudsen, 171 Neb. 125, 105 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
Where requisite motions have been made, order denying a new trial is an appealable order. Bell v. Crook, 168 Neb. 685, 97 N.W.2d 352 (1959).
Act applies where proper motions are made even though jury does not agree on verdict and is discharged. In re Estate of Fehrenkamp, 154 Neb. 488, 48 N.W.2d 421 (1951).
Party is required not only to timely make motion for directed verdict but thereafter to timely file motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Pahl v. Sprague, 152 Neb. 681, 42 N.W.2d 367 (1950).
The purpose of the act, of which this section is a part, was to simplify and expedite the final disposition of litigation. Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 151 Neb. 663, 38 N.W.2d 533 (1949).
25-1315.03.
Order for directed verdict or for new trial; appeal.An order entering judgment as provided in section 25-1315.02 or granting or denying a new trial is an appealable order. The time for and manner of taking such appeal shall be as in an appeal from a judgment, decree, or final order of the district court in a civil action. On appeal from an order granting a new trial, upon a review of an order denying a new trial in the action in which such motion was made, or on appeal from the judgment, the appellate court may order and direct judgment to be entered in favor of the party who was entitled to such judgment.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 85, § 1(2), p. 263; Laws 1955, c. 89, § 1, p. 263; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 49;
Laws 1992, LB 360, § 5.
Annotations
1. Appealable order
2. Procedure
3. Action of Supreme Court
4. Miscellaneous
1. Appealable order
The filing of a motion for new trial and its subsequent overruling do not convert an otherwise unappealable order into an appealable order. Similarly, the failure to file a motion for new trial does not preclude a party from appealing a final order. Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993).
The denial of a judgment authorized by section 25-1315.02 is an appealable order under this section. Ditloff v. Otto, 239 Neb. 377, 476 N.W.2d 675 (1991).
On appeal from the county court sitting as a juvenile court, an order of the district court remanding the case to the county court for a further dispositional hearing is a final order appealable to this court. In re Interest of Roman, 212 Neb. 919, 327 N.W.2d 36 (1982).
Order overruling motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for directed verdict may be reviewed on appeal although no verdict was returned by the jury. Bailey v. Williams, 189 Neb. 484, 203 N.W.2d 454 (1973).
An order granting a new trial in a civil action is appealable. Morford v. Lipsey Meat Co., Inc., 179 Neb. 420, 138 N.W.2d 653 (1965).
Where appropriate motions have been made, the granting or denying of a new trial is an appealable order. Hungerford v. Knudsen, 171 Neb. 125, 105 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
Appeal from order granting a new trial is authorized. Sleezer v. Lang, 170 Neb. 239, 102 N.W.2d 435 (1960); Dunlap v. Welch, 152 Neb. 459, 41 N.W.2d 384 (1950); Greenberg v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 150 Neb. 695, 35 N.W.2d 772 (1949).
Order granting or denying a new trial is an appealable order. Mueller v. Keeley, 163 Neb. 613, 80 N.W.2d 707 (1957).
Order denying a new trial is an appealable order. Lund v. Holbrook, 153 Neb. 706, 46 N.W.2d 130 (1951).
Order for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict is an appealable order. Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 151 Neb. 663, 38 N.W.2d 533 (1949).
2. Procedure
The filing of a notice of appeal and a deposit of a docket fee within 30 days after an order overruling a motion for new trial timely filed in a county court perfects an appeal to the district court from the final order of the county court. 132nd Street Ltd. v. Fellman, 245 Neb. 59, 511 N.W.2d 88 (1994).
On an appeal from the entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, all parties must preserve all errors on which they rely, alternative or otherwise, by adequate assignments in their respective briefs. Armer v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 153 Neb. 352, 44 N.W.2d 640 (1950).
Where trial court has granted new trial, correctness of ruling may properly be raised by direct appeal. Wagner v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 150 Neb. 7, 33 N.W.2d 300 (1948).
3. Action of Supreme Court
Order of trial court overruling motions of defendant for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict reversed and cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for defendant. Welsh v. Zuck, 192 Neb. 1, 218 N.W.2d 236 (1974).
Supreme Court can direct entry of judgment for defendant notwithstanding verdict. Laurinat v. Giery, 157 Neb. 681, 61 N.W.2d 251 (1953).
Supreme Court may review action on motion for directed verdict even though jury failed to agree. In re Estate of Fehrenkamp, 154 Neb. 488, 48 N.W.2d 421 (1951).
Judgment directed to be entered for defendant in automobile damage case under this section. Yanney v. Nemer, 154 Neb. 188, 47 N.W.2d 368 (1951).
Where trial court should have dismissed action, Supreme Court can direct such action to be taken. Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Assn., 154 Neb. 42, 46 N.W.2d 769 (1951).
Supreme Court may, on appeal from order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, dispose of motion for new trial. Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 153 Neb. 98, 43 N.W.2d 609 (1950).
On appeal from an order refusing to enter judgment notwithstanding verdict, Supreme Court may direct judgment to be entered in favor of party entitled thereto. Patrick v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 150 Neb. 201, 33 N.W.2d 537 (1948).
On appeal, Supreme Court may order judgment to be entered in favor of party entitled thereto without ordering new trial in district court. In re Estate of Farr, 150 Neb. 67, 33 N.W.2d 454 (1948).
4. Miscellaneous
Where this section and section 25-1315(1) are in conflict, this section controls. R & D Properties v. Altech Constr. Co., 279 Neb. 74, 776 N.W.2d 493 (2009).
Unless the proceedings leading up to a motion for new trial constitute a trial, the order granting a new trial does not afford a right to appeal. Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993).
While this section authorizes appeals in certain described situations, its definitions are not exclusive. Edquist v. Commercial Sav. & Loan Assn., 191 Neb. 618, 217 N.W.2d 82 (1974).
This section was not applicable to issues presented. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Atlantic Nat. Ins. Co., 178 Neb. 226, 132 N.W.2d 758 (1965).
Under specified conditions, right of appeal from interlocutory order was granted. Otteman v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., Inc., 171 Neb. 148, 105 N.W.2d 583 (1960).
Purpose and intention of the 1947 act, of which this section is a part, was not only to facilitate procedure but also to create additional rights. In re Estate of Kinsey, 152 Neb. 95, 40 N.W.2d 526 (1949).
25-1316.
Judgment upon counterclaim or setoff.If a counterclaim or setoff established at the trial exceeds the plaintiff's claim so established, judgment for the defendant must be given for the excess; or, if it appears that the defendant is entitled to any affirmative relief, judgment should be given therefor.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 441, p. 467; R.S.1913, § 8009; C.S.1922, § 8950; C.S.1929, § 20-1316; R.S.1943, § 25-1316.
Annotations
Where offsetting claims and counterclaims were tried separately, the final judgment did not occur until all claims were adjudicated and both jury verdicts were accepted by the district court. VKGS v. Planet Bingo, 309 Neb. 950, 962 N.W.2d 909 (2021).
It is approved practice for the judgment entry to show findings of the verdict for each party for computations of the judgment for excess. Crete Mills v. Stevens, 120 Neb. 794, 235 N.W. 453 (1931).
Plaintiff's claim and counterclaim should be disposed of in one trial. Miller v. McGannon, 79 Neb. 609, 113 N.W. 170 (1907).
25-1317.
Judgment or order; infant's right reserved.It shall not be necessary to reserve, in a judgment or order, the right of an infant to show cause against it after his attaining twenty years of age; but in any case in which, but for this section, such reservation would have been proper, the infant, within one year after arriving at the age of twenty years, may show cause against such order or judgment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 442, p. 467; R.S.1913, § 8010; C.S.1922, § 8951; C.S.1929, § 20-1317; R.S.1943, § 25-1317;
Laws 1972, LB 1049, § 5.
Annotations
Where infant, by guardian ad litem, unsuccessfully appealed from judgment against him, he cannot, after attaining his majority, open up judgment on ground of error in former proceedings. Foerster v. Helming, 105 Neb. 531, 181 N.W. 521 (1921).
After period stated, minor is as conclusively bound as an adult. McCreary v. Creighton, 76 Neb. 179, 107 N.W. 240 (1906).
Decree of strict foreclosure will not bar infant from showing cause against same. Stull v. Masilonka, 74 Neb. 322, 108 N.W. 166 (1906).
Modifies chancery rules only as to form of decree; decree of sale of infant's lands is binding. Manfull v. Graham, 55 Neb. 645, 76 N.W. 19 (1898).
25-1318.
Judgments and orders; record.All judgments and orders must be entered on the record of the court and specify clearly the relief granted or order made in the action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 443, p. 467; R.S.1913, § 8011; C.S.1922, § 8952; C.S.1929, § 20-1318; R.S.1943, § 25-1318;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 21.
Annotations
1. Necessity
2. Effect
3. Miscellaneous
1. Necessity
Orders which are not announced in open court are not formalized until they have been entered on the journal. The journal of the trial court is the official record of the judgments and orders of that court. In re Interest of J.A., 244 Neb. 919, 510 N.W.2d 68 (1994).
Order overruling motion for new trial must be entered on journal. Mueller v. Keeley, 163 Neb. 613, 80 N.W.2d 707 (1957).
Order overruling motion for new trial in criminal case must be entered on journal to start time running in which error proceedings may be taken. Fisher v. State, 153 Neb. 226, 43 N.W.2d 600 (1950).
Dismissal after final submission, to be effective, must be entered on journal. Tuttle v. Wyman, 149 Neb. 769, 32 N.W.2d 742 (1948).
Memorandum on trial docket is not judgment until extended upon journal, within meaning of section requiring appeals to Supreme Court to be filed within three months from rendition of judgment. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Saathoff, 115 Neb. 385, 213 N.W. 342 (1927).
Order of dismissal must be entered on journal. Knaak v. Brown, 115 Neb. 260, 212 N.W. 431 (1927).
Memorandum by judge in trial docket does not take place of entry in journal. Hornick v. Maguire, 47 Neb. 826, 66 N.W. 867 (1896).
Memorandum for a decree will not authorize a review in Supreme Court until extended upon the court journal. Ward v. Urmson, 40 Neb. 695, 59 N.W. 97 (1894).
May enter judgment nunc pro tunc. Morrill v. McNeill, 1 Neb. Unof. 651, 91 N.W. 601 (1901).
2. Effect
Entry in journal is controlling over notes in trial docket. Midwest Laundry Equipment Corp. v. Berg, 174 Neb. 747, 119 N.W.2d 509 (1963).
Failure of court, in decree of confirmation, to direct clerk to make an entry on the journal that the court is satisfied of the legality of such sale, was not prejudicial where clerk had, in fact, entered such decree on journal. Erwin v. Brunke, 133 Neb. 745, 277 N.W. 48 (1938).
District court has power to correct journal entry, at any time after decree pronounced and before complied with, on motion and satisfactory evidence. Occidental Building & Loan Assn. v. Adams, 96 Neb. 454, 148 N.W. 88 (1914).
Entry of judgment is not essential to validity. Horn v. Miller, 20 Neb. 98, 29 N.W. 260 (1886).
Entries in journal are not any part of complete record of case. McDonald v. Penniston, 1 Neb. 324 (1871).
3. Miscellaneous
Under facts in this case, there was no error in denying motion to correct decree nunc pro tunc. Karrer v. Karrer, 190 Neb. 610, 211 N.W.2d 116 (1973).
A judgment dismissing plaintiff's petition upon proper motion for judgment after mistrial and discharge of jury, but containing phrase notwithstanding verdict, is harmless error. Giangrasso v. Schimmel, 190 Neb. 228, 207 N.W.2d 517 (1973).
25-1319.
Repealed. Laws 2018, LB193, § 97.
25-1320.
Repealed. Laws 2018, LB193, § 97.
25-1321.
Repealed. Laws 2018, LB193, § 97.
25-1322.
Repealed. Laws 2018, LB193, § 97.
25-1323.
Repealed. Laws 2011, LB 17, § 8.
25-1324.
Repealed. Laws 2011, LB 17, § 8.
25-1325.
Repealed. Laws 2011, LB 17, § 8.
25-1326.
Judicial sale;
conveyance of land by master
commissioner; when
allowed; postponement of sale;
notice.(1) Real property may be conveyed by a master commissioner when (a) by
an order or judgment in an action or a proceeding a party is ordered to convey such property
to another and he or she neglects or refuses to
comply with such order or judgment or (b) specific
real property is required to be sold under an order or judgment of the court.
(2) A master
commissioner may, for any cause he or she deems expedient, postpone the sale
of all or any portion of the real property from time to time until it is completed,
and in every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration
thereof by such master commissioner at the time and place last appointed for
the sale. The public declaration of the notice of postponement shall include
the new date, time, and place of sale. No other notice of the postponed sale
need be given unless the sale is postponed for longer than forty-five days
beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, in which event the notice
thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale is
required to be given.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 451, p. 468; R.S.1913, § 8019; C.S.1922, § 8960; C.S.1929, § 20-1326; R.S.1943, § 25-1326;
Laws 2010, LB732, § 1.
Annotations
Commissioner need not take oath; may administer oath to appraisers. George v. Keniston, 57 Neb. 313, 77 N.W. 772 (1899).
Person designated by court to execute decree of foreclosure is a master commissioner. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mulvihill, 53 Neb. 538, 74 N.W. 78 (1898).
Appointment of commissioner instead of sheriff to make sale of real estate rests in discretion of trial court. American Investment Co. v. Nye, 40 Neb. 720, 59 N.W. 355 (1894).
Court may appoint sheriff or other person to conduct sale under mortgage foreclosure. State ex rel. Elliott v. Holliday, 35 Neb. 327, 53 N.W. 142 (1892).
This section applies to all sales of real estate under process of court. McKeighan v. Hopkins, 14 Neb. 361, 15 N.W. 711 (1883).
25-1327.
Judicial sale;
sheriff as master commissioner.A sheriff may act as a master commissioner under subdivision
(1)(b) of section 25-1326. Sales made under such
subdivision shall conform in all respects to the laws regulating
sales of land upon execution.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 452, p. 468; R.S.1913, § 8020; C.S.1922, § 8961; C.S.1929, § 20-1327; R.S.1943, § 25-1327;
Laws 2010, LB732, § 2.
Annotations
Officer cannot be compelled to advertise sale in any particular newspaper. State ex rel. Elliott v. Holliday, 35 Neb. 327, 53 N.W. 142 (1892).
25-1328.
Judicial sale; deed of commissioner; form and execution.The deed of a master commissioner shall contain the like recital and shall be executed, acknowledged and recorded in the same manner as the deed of a sheriff of real property sold under execution.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 453, p. 468; R.S.1913, § 8021; C.S.1922, § 8962; C.S.1929, § 20-1328; R.S.1943, § 25-1328.
25-1329.
Motion; when filed; filing before entry of judgment; treatment.A motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than ten days after the entry of the judgment. A motion to alter or amend a judgment filed after the announcement of a verdict or decision but before the entry of judgment shall be treated as filed after the entry of judgment and on the day thereof.
Annotations
1. What constitutes motion
2. Judgment
3. Miscellaneous
1. What constitutes motion
A motion for reconsideration is the functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend a judgment. Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 296 Neb. 632, 895 N.W.2d 284 (2017).
In determining what qualifies as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, the key is not the motion's title. If the motion seeks substantive alteration of the judgment—as opposed to the correction of clerical errors or relief wholly collateral to the judgment—a court may treat the motion as one to alter or amend the judgment. Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, 270 Neb. 1, 701 N.W.2d 320 (2005).
A motion which seeks a new hearing based on newly discovered evidence may be treated as a motion to alter or amend a judgment. Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, 268 Neb. 722, 687 N.W.2d 672 (2004).
A motion which seeks a substantive alteration of an order may be treated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under this section. A timely motion under this section tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. Central Neb. Pub. Power v. Jeffrey Lake Dev., 267 Neb. 997, 679 N.W.2d 235 (2004).
A determination as to whether a motion, however titled, should be deemed a motion to alter or amend a judgment depends upon the contents of the motion, not its title. In order to qualify for treatment as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, a motion must be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of judgment and must seek substantive alteration of the judgment. A motion which merely seeks to correct clerical errors or one seeking relief that is wholly collateral to the judgment is not a motion to alter or amend a judgment, and the time for filing a notice of appeal runs from the date of the judgment. State v. Bellamy, 264 Neb. 784, 652 N.W.2d 86 (2002).
In order to qualify for treatment as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, a motion must be filed no later than ten days after the entry of judgment and must seek substantive alteration of the judgment. Kotas v. Barnett, 31 Neb. App. 799, 990 N.W.2d 37 (2023).
In order to qualify for treatment as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, the motion must be filed no later than
10 days after the entry of judgment, as required under this section, and must seek substantive alteration of the
judgment. Bayliss v. Clason, 26 Neb. App. 195, 918 N.W.2d 612 (2018).
Under this section, a motion for reconsideration is the functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend a
judgment. Bayliss v. Clason, 26 Neb. App. 195, 918 N.W.2d 612 (2018).
Under this section, if a postjudgment motion seeks a substantive alteration of the judgment—as opposed to the
correction of clerical errors or relief wholly collateral to the judgment—a court may treat the motion as one to alter
or amend the judgment. Bayliss v. Clason, 26 Neb. App. 195, 918 N.W.2d 612 (2018).
In order to qualify for treatment as a motion to alter or amend the
judgment, the motion must be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of
judgment, as required under this section, and must seek substantive
alteration of the judgment. Beckman v. McAndrew, 16 Neb. App. 217, 742
N.W.2d 778 (2007).
2. Judgment
A judgment entered by the district court at the conclusion of an error proceeding pursuant to sections 25-1901 to
25-1908 is a judgment within the meaning of this section. McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., 303 Neb. 552,
931 N.W.2d 120 (2019).
A "judgment," for purposes of a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to this section, is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action, or a court's final consideration and determination of the respective rights and obligations of the parties to an action as those rights and obligations presently exist. Timmerman v. Neth, 276 Neb. 585, 755 N.W.2d 798 (2008).
A "judgment," for purposes of this section, does not include an appellate decision of a district court. Timmerman v. Neth, 276 Neb. 585, 755 N.W.2d 798 (2008).
3. Miscellaneous
A second motion to reconsider a final order entered 11 days earlier did not terminate the time for filing a notice
of appeal, and because appellant did not appeal within 30 days of the overruling of his first motion to reconsider—which was properly construed as a motion to alter or amend—the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.
Bryson L. v. Izabella L., 302 Neb. 145, 921 N.W.2d 829 (2019).
A motion to alter or amend filed more than 10 days after the court's denial of a postconviction claim does not
terminate or extend the time to appeal that denial. State v. Lotter, 301 Neb. 125, 917 N.W.2d 850 (2018).
A letter that had been in the defendant's possession at all relevant times did not constitute newly discovered evidence for purposes of a motion to alter or amend the judgment. State v. Timmens, 282 Neb. 787, 805 N.W.2d 704 (2011).
If, and only if, an amendment to a final judgment or decree affects the rights or obligations of the parties or creates a right of appeal that did not exist, a motion to alter or amend the amended judgment or decree terminates the running of the time for appeal from the original judgment or decree. Law Offices of Ronald J. Palagi v. Howard, 275 Neb. 334, 747 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
A motion to alter or amend is not an appropriate motion to file after the decision of a district court where the district court is functioning as an intermediate court of appeals and the motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Goodman v. City of Omaha, 274 Neb. 539, 742 N.W.2d 26 (2007).
It was not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to grant a motion to alter or amend judgment where there was no new evidence adduced at a hearing on the motion and the effect of the action was to correctly reflect the original evidence. Russell v. Clarke, 15 Neb. App. 221, 724 N.W.2d 840 (2006).
25-1330.
Claimant; right to move for summary judgment.A party seeking to recover in district court upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of thirty days from the service of process on the opposing party or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his or her favor upon all or any part thereof.
Annotations
1. Proper
2. Not proper
3. Miscellaneous
1. Proper
Summary judgment is to be granted only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from these facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carpender v. Bendorf, 246 Neb. 77, 516 N.W.2d 619 (1994).
A summary judgment shall be granted where there is no genuine issue either as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences to be drawn therefrom, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Glen Park Terr. #1 Homeowners Assn. v. M. Timm, Inc., 230 Neb. 48, 430 N.W.2d 40 (1988).
The right of a party to sue as representative of a class may be raised by a motion for summary judgment. Blankenship v. Omaha P. P. Dist., 195 Neb. 170, 237 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
Where only question of law was presented, summary judgment was proper. State v. Kidder, 173 Neb. 130, 112 N.W.2d 759 (1962).
Where controlling facts are not in dispute, and both parties have moved for summary judgment, entry of summary judgment is proper. County of Douglas v. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., 172 Neb. 696, 111 N.W.2d 719 (1961).
Summary judgment was proper under record presented. Dougherty v. Commonwealth Co., 172 Neb. 330, 109 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
Where there is no real controversy as to the facts, and no genuine issue remains for trial, summary judgment is proper. First Nat. Bank of Wayne v. Gross Real Estate Co., 162 Neb. 343, 75 N.W.2d 704 (1956).
Summary judgment was authorized where coverage of policy of group insurance was not in force. Palmer v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 157 Neb. 760, 61 N.W.2d 396 (1953).
Summary judgment is proper if pleadings and admissions show there is no genuine issue of fact. Mueller v. Shacklett, 156 Neb. 881, 58 N.W.2d 344 (1953).
Summary judgment was proper on issue of liability where publication was libel per se. Rimmer v. Chadron Printing Co., 156 Neb. 533, 56 N.W.2d 806 (1953).
Summary judgment for recovery of attorney's fees was properly granted. Mecham v. Colby, 156 Neb. 386, 56 N.W.2d 299 (1953).
Summary judgment is authorized only where moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Illian v. McManaman, 156 Neb. 12, 54 N.W.2d 244 (1952).
2. Not proper
Where there is a genuine issue as to material facts, it is error to render summary judgment. Hall v. Hadley, 173 Neb. 675, 114 N.W.2d 590 (1962).
Denial of summary judgment was not prejudicial error. Greer v. Chelewski, 162 Neb. 450, 76 N.W.2d 438 (1956).
Where question of fact is in dispute, summary judgment is not proper. City of Omaha v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., Inc., 156 Neb. 650, 57 N.W.2d 269 (1953).
3. Miscellaneous
It would be prejudicial to permit plaintiff to proceed in summary judgment where the defendant has been denied the right to file amended answers and a setoff. Building Systems, Inc. v. Medical Center, Ltd., 213 Neb. 49, 327 N.W.2d 95 (1982).
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and this burden may be discharged by a showing that if the case proceeded to trial his opponent could produce no competent evidence to support a contrary position. In re Estate of Nicholson, 211 Neb. 805, 320 N.W.2d 739 (1982).
Issue on motion for summary judgment is whether or not there is a genuine issue of fact, not how that issue should be determined. Valentine Production Credit Assn. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 196 Neb. 119, 241 N.W.2d 541 (1976).
The issue to be tried on a motion for summary judgment is whether or not there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. Youngs v. Wagner, 172 Neb. 735, 111 N.W.2d 629 (1961).
Summary judgment may be obtained in a declaratory judgment proceeding. Anderson v. Carlson, 171 Neb. 741, 107 N.W.2d 535 (1961).
Rules for application of Summary Judgment Act stated. Ingersoll v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 171 Neb. 297, 106 N.W.2d 197 (1960).
Summary Judgment Act is constitutional. Eden v. Klaas, 165 Neb. 323, 85 N.W.2d 643 (1957).
Object of motion for summary judgment is to separate the formal from the substantial issues. Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 59 N.W.2d 614 (1953).
25-1331.
Defending party; right to move for summary judgment.A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 65, § 2, p. 199.
Annotations
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the defendant shows that an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action is nonexistent. Tuttle & Assoc. v. Gendler, 237 Neb. 825, 467 N.W.2d 881 (1991).
The defense of res judicata need not be raised by answer, but can be raised and passed upon for the first time on a motion for summary judgment. DeCosta Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Kirkland, 210 Neb. 815, 316 N.W.2d 772 (1982)
Party in declaratory judgments proceeding may move for summary judgment. Arla Cattle Co. v. Knight, 174 Neb. 360, 118 N.W.2d 1 (1962).
To receive consideration on appeal, affidavits used on motion for summary judgment must be made a part of the bill of exceptions. Peterson v. George, 168 Neb. 571, 96 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
When a cause of action is commenced against an estate that has already been closed, the proper method of attacking the petition on the grounds that the estate has previously been closed and the personal representative discharged is through a motion for summary judgment, not a demurrer, because evidence beyond what appears on the face of the petition is usually necessary to establish that the estate has been closed and the personal representative discharged. Mach v. Schmer, 4 Neb. App. 819, 550 N.W.2d 385 (1996).
25-1332.
Motion for summary judgment; proceedings.(1) The motion shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings and the evidence admitted at the hearing show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The evidence that may be received on a motion for summary judgment includes depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine dispute as to the amount of damages.
(2) A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(a) Citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations, affidavits, or other materials; or
(b) Showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
(3) If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by subsection (2) of this section, the court may:
(a) Give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
(b) Consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(c) Grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials, including the facts considered undisputed, show that the movant is entitled to summary judgment; or
(d) Issue any other appropriate order.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Motion granted
3. Motion denied
4. Procedure
5. Court review
1. Scope
There is a difference between an issue of fact and a genuine issue as to any material fact within the meaning of this section. Recio v. Evers, 278 Neb. 405, 771 N.W.2d 121 (2009).
The plain, direct, and unambiguous meaning of the language of this section is that parties adverse to a motion for summary judgment may serve opposing affidavits prior to the day of the summary judgment hearing. Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, 268 Neb. 722, 687 N.W.2d 672 (2004).
The "clear beyond all doubt" standard for a summary judgment is inconsistent with the standard expressed in this section. Anderson v. Service Merchandise Co., 240 Neb. 873, 485 N.W.2d 170 (1992).
To entitle defendant to summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence, defendant has the burden of proving, under the facts viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, that (1) plaintiff's contributory negligence was more than slight as a matter of law or (2) defendant's negligence was not gross in comparison to plaintiff's negligence as a matter of law. John v. OO (Infinity) S Development Co., 234 Neb. 190, 450 N.W.2d 199 (1990).
This section has been construed to mean that if the moving party submits an affidavit as to a material fact, and that fact is not contradicted by the adverse party, the court will determine that there is no issue as to that fact. Raskey v. Michelin Tire Corp., 223 Neb. 520, 391 N.W.2d 123 (1986).
A summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, that the ultimate inferences to be drawn from those facts are clear, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Yankton Prod. Credit Assn. v. Larsen, 219 Neb. 610, 365 N.W.2d 430 (1985).
Summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should be awarded only when the issue is clear beyond all doubt. Yankton Prod. Credit Assn. v. Larsen, 219 Neb. 610, 365 N.W.2d 430 (1985).
The absence of a genuine issue as to a material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law are prerequisites to a summary judgment. Stolte v. Blackstone, 213 Neb. 113, 328 N.W.2d 462 (1982).
Summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should be awarded only when the issue is clear beyond all doubt. Bank of Valley v. Shunk, 208 Neb. 200, 302 N.W.2d 711 (1981).
For entry of a summary judgment, the record must show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reed v. Nice-Pak Products, Inc., 193 Neb. 505, 227 N.W.2d 854 (1975); Larson v. Board of Regents, 189 Neb. 688, 204 N.W.2d 568 (1973); Storz Brewing Co. v. Kuester, 178 Neb. 135, 132 N.W.2d 341 (1965).
Summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should be granted only when issue is clear beyond all doubt. It cannot be granted on cross-motion where only reason for same is that other party had also moved for summary judgment to which he was not entitled. Hiram Scott College v. Insurance Co. of North America, 187 Neb. 290, 188 N.W.2d 688 (1971).
Summary judgment is not a substitute for other remedies. Healy v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 158 Neb. 151, 62 N.W.2d 543 (1954).
Function of court on motion is to determine whether genuine issue of fact exists. Palmer v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 157 Neb. 760, 61 N.W.2d 396 (1953).
Summary judgment is only proper where no genuine issue of fact remains for trial. Illian v. McManaman, 156 Neb. 12, 54 N.W.2d 244 (1952).
On a motion for summary judgment, the question is not how a factual issue is to be decided, but whether any real issue of material fact exists. Where it is not clear from the record whether the trial court relied upon improper evidence, the better course is to reverse a grant of summary judgment. Summary judgment is an extreme remedy because it may dispose of a crucial question in litigation, or the litigation itself, and may thereby deny a trial to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is directed. Kulhanek v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 8 Neb. App. 564, 598 N.W.2d 67 (1999).
2. Motion granted
Where plaintiff was experienced businessman and attorney, who voluntarily and knowingly signed strict pledge agreement to bank, and bank presented enough evidence to demonstrate that agreement language should not be modified, summary judgment in favor of bank was proper. McCormack v. First Westroads Bank, 238 Neb. 881, 473 N.W.2d 102 (1991).
Summary judgment is proper where, as here, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in the case. Marshall v. Radiology Assoc., 225 Neb. 75, 402 N.W.2d 855 (1987).
The court should sustain a motion for summary judgment if, upon hearing, the pleadings, depositions, admission on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Borg-Warner v. Watton, 215 Neb. 318, 338 N.W.2d 612 (1983); Reifschneider v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 212 Neb. 91, 321 N.W.2d 445 (1982); First Mid America Inc. v. MCI Communications Corp., 212 Neb. 57, 321 N.W.2d 424 (1982); Manzer v. Pentico, 209 Neb. 364, 307 N.W.2d 812 (1981).
Summary judgment is proper where adjudication of any right or fact in issue is precluded by res judicata, and an order granting a motion for summary judgment by the municipal court is final and appealable and is not converted to an interlocutory order when reversed and remanded by the district court so as to prohibit an appeal to this court. DeCosta Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Kirkland, 210 Neb. 815, 316 N.W.2d 772 (1982).
Where bond was in effect at time actual demand was made against the principal, but not on earlier date when right to make demand accrued, summary judgment was properly granted to the surety. Stock v. Meissner, 209 Neb. 636, 309 N.W.2d 86 (1981).
Summary judgment was proper in granting the employee's commission where there was no dispute that the employment contract existed, that the employee performed under the contract when he obtained two real estate listings, and that a commission was paid to the employer when the two listings were sold. Oehlrich v. Gateway Realty of Columbus, Inc., 209 Neb. 417, 308 N.W.2d 327 (1981).
Summary judgment for employer was proper when at time of employee's tort he was not acting in kind of work he was employed to perform, within the authorized time and space limits, and his actions were not actuated in any part by a purpose to serve the employer. Johnson v. Evers, 195 Neb. 426, 238 N.W.2d 474 (1976).
The evidence as to whether plaintiff was a passenger or a guest was undisputed and the issue having been decided by the court as a matter of law, summary judgment was proper. Hale v. Taylor, 192 Neb. 298, 220 N.W.2d 378 (1974).
Motion for summary judgment may be granted only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Grantham v. General Tel. Co., 191 Neb. 21, 213 N.W.2d 439 (1973).
Motion for summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and admissions show there is no genuine issue of fact. Anderson v. Carlson, 171 Neb. 741, 107 N.W.2d 535 (1961).
Where controlling facts are not in substantial dispute and each party moves for summary judgment, entry of such judgment is proper. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bodenstedt, 170 Neb. 799, 104 N.W.2d 292 (1960).
Where undisputed showing disclosed that plaintiff's negligence was more than slight when compared with negligence of defendant, summary judgment for defendant was authorized. Miller v. Aitken, 160 Neb. 97, 69 N.W.2d 290 (1955).
Motion for summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of fact exists or court is without jurisdiction of subject matter. Mueller v. Shacklett, 156 Neb. 881, 58 N.W.2d 344 (1953).
Summary judgment was proper on issue of liability alone in libel action. Rimmer v. Chadron Printing Co., 156 Neb. 533, 56 N.W.2d 806 (1953).
Where issue of fact does not exist, summary judgment is proper. Mecham v. Colby, 156 Neb. 386, 56 N.W.2d 299 (1953).
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and the evidence admitted at the hearing disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stackhouse v. Gaver, 19 Neb. App. 117, 801 N.W.2d 260 (2011).
3. Motion denied
In this instance, the question of whether sufficient part performance has been established to render an alleged oral agreement enforceable and, if so, on what date this sufficient part performance was completed could not be answered as a matter of law, and therefor a genuine issue of material fact exists rendering the granting of a summary judgment improper. In re Estate of Nicholson, 211 Neb. 805, 320 N.W.2d 739 (1982).
Whether there is a compelling governmental interest for a municipal personnel rule is a question of fact which must be established before a summary judgment may be granted. Voichahoske v. City of Grand Island, 194 Neb. 175, 231 N.W.2d 124 (1975).
Where question of fraudulent intent is involved, motion for summary judgment should be denied. Nine v. Lurz, 191 Neb. 605, 216 N.W.2d 744 (1974).
The burden is upon the party moving for the summary judgment to show that no issue of fact exists, and unless he can conclusively do so, the motion must be overruled. Green v. Village of Terrytown, 189 Neb. 615, 204 N.W.2d 152 (1973).
Entry of summary judgment not proper where there were genuine issues of fact as to existence of warning signs, lighting arrangements, change in floor level, and plaintiff's familiarity with the premises. Snyder v. Fort Kearney Hotel Co., Inc., 182 Neb. 859, 157 N.W.2d 782 (1968).
Where genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment should be denied. Fay Smith & Associates, Inc. v. Consumers P. P. Dist., 172 Neb. 681, 111 N.W.2d 451 (1961); Dennis v. Berens, 156 Neb. 41, 54 N.W.2d 259 (1952).
Entry of summary judgment against guardian was not proper where there was a genuine issue of fact as to the correctness of account as a whole. Finn v. Whitten, 172 Neb. 282, 109 N.W.2d 376 (1961).
Where there was a genuine issue of fact, motion for summary judgment in disbarment suit was properly overruled. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Jensen, 171 Neb. 1, 105 N.W.2d 459 (1960).
Where moving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, motion for summary judgment should be overruled. Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 59 N.W.2d 614 (1953).
4. Procedure
Based on the plain text of this section, if the burden of proof at trial would be on the nonmoving party, then the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy its prima facie burden either by citing to materials in the record that affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or by citing to materials in the record demonstrating that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Clark v. Scheels All Sports, 314 Neb. 49, 989 N.W.2d 39 (2023).
A party adverse to a motion for summary judgment may not serve opposing affidavits on the day of the summary judgment hearing. Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, 268 Neb. 722, 687 N.W.2d 672 (2004).
This section expressly provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. Malicky v. Heyen, 251 Neb. 891, 560 N.W.2d 773 (1997).
An unsigned affidavit which was not offered until the day of the hearing on the summary judgment motion was properly excluded by the trial court. Medley v. Davis, 247 Neb. 611, 529 N.W.2d 58 (1995).
When it is asserted in a summary judgment motion that an opposing party has failed to state a cause of action, as far as that issue is concerned, the motion may be treated as one in fact for a judgment on the pleadings. Ruwe v. Farmers Mut. United Ins. Co., 238 Neb. 67, 469 N.W.2d 129 (1991).
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; that party must therefore produce enough evidence to demonstrate his entitlement to a judgment if the evidence remains uncontroverted, after which the burden of producing contrary evidence shifts to the party opposing the motion. Deutsche Credit Corp. v. Hi-Bo Farms, Inc., 224 Neb. 463, 398 N.W.2d 693 (1987).
Evidence adduced by cross-examination of an affiant in an earlier summary judgment proceeding cannot be considered an affidavit within the meaning of this section. First Nat. Bank of Ord v. Greene Bldg. & Supply, Inc., 220 Neb. 205, 369 N.W.2d 59 (1985).
District court erred in hearing motion for summary judgment where notice provisions of the statute were not complied with. Curley v. Curley, 214 Neb. 780, 336 N.W.2d 103 (1983).
Without a prima facie showing by the movant for a summary judgment, i.e., the production of enough evidence to demonstrate such party's entitlement to a judgment if evidence were uncontroverted at trial, which prima facie showing shifts the burden to the opposing party, the opposing party need not present expert witnesses to prove the existence of a doctor's negligence in a medical malpractice action to rebut the doctor's motion for summary judgment. Hanzlik v. Paustian, 211 Neb. 322, 318 N.W.2d 712 (1982).
Where one party moves for a partial summary judgment on certain issues only, the other party should not be expected at the hearing on the motion to present evidence on issues to which the motion does not apply. Schilke v. Walkenhorst, 210 Neb. 583, 316 N.W.2d 294 (1982).
Dialogue and actions by counsel held to constitute a waiver of his objection to a motion for summary judgment not timely heard. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 200 Neb. 635, 264 N.W.2d 854 (1978).
At hearing on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, defendant must proceed on the merits immediately when continuance denied. Yunghans v. O'Toole, 199 Neb. 317, 258 N.W.2d 810 (1977).
The right of a party to sue as representative of a class may be raised by a motion for summary judgment. Blankenship v. Omaha P. P. Dist., 195 Neb. 170, 237 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
Affidavits not submitted prior to day of hearing and not offered and received in evidence will not be considered on appeal. Center Bank v. Mid-Continent Meats, Inc., 194 Neb. 665, 234 N.W.2d 902 (1975).
Where no continuance was requested when affidavits were filed late, and they dealt with facts plaintiff did not dispute, error, if any, was harmless. Hi-Point Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Schlaphoff, 193 Neb. 276, 226 N.W.2d 926 (1975).
Depositions offered in evidence on motion for summary judgment must be included in bill of exceptions to be reviewed by Supreme Court on appeal. Brown v. Shamberg, 190 Neb. 171, 206 N.W.2d 846 (1973).
Denial of motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order. Otteman v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., Inc., 171 Neb. 148, 105 N.W.2d 583 (1960).
In absence of bill of exceptions, affidavits offered in evidence in support of motion for summary judgment cannot be considered. Brierly v. Federated Finance Co., 168 Neb. 725, 97 N.W.2d 253 (1959).
Summary judgment was properly denied even though reply to request for admissions was not made under oath. Greer v. Chelewski, 162 Neb. 450, 76 N.W.2d 438 (1956).
A summary judgment cannot be awarded for an amount in excess of the damages pled and prayed for in the operative petition. One Pacific Place, Ltd. v. H.T.I. Corp., 6 Neb. App. 62, 569 N.W.2d 251 (1997).
5. Court review
In appellate review of an order granting a summary judgment, the Supreme Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted. Tuttle & Assoc. v. Gendler, 237 Neb. 825, 467 N.W.2d 881 (1991).
A trial court may use appropriate judicial notice in resolving a motion for summary judgment. Gottsch v. Bank of Stapleton, 235 Neb. 816, 458 N.W.2d 443 (1990).
In appellate review of a summary judgment, the court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. John v. OO (Infinity) S Development Co., 234 Neb. 190, 450 N.W.2d 199 (1990).
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom it is directed and any reasonable doubt touching the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Mayer v. Howard, 220 Neb. 328, 370 N.W.2d 93 (1985).
In reviewing a summary judgment the court must take the view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Yankton Prod. Credit Assn. v. Larsen, 219 Neb. 610, 365 N.W.2d 430 (1985).
Issue to be tried on motion for summary judgment is whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, not how issue should be decided; court should view evidence in light most favorable to party against whom it is directed. Piper v. Hill, 185 Neb. 568, 177 N.W.2d 509 (1970).
District court possesses authority to render summary judgment, interlocutory in character, on issue of liability alone. Hart v. Ronspies, 181 Neb. 38, 146 N.W.2d 795 (1966).
In the absence of a bill of exceptions, it is presumed that ruling of district court on motion for summary judgment was correct. Lange v. Kansas Hide & Wool Co., 168 Neb. 601, 97 N.W.2d 246 (1959); Peterson v. George, 168 Neb. 571, 96 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
25-1333.
Case not fully adjudicated on motion.If on motion under sections 25-1330 to 25-1336 judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 65, § 4, p. 199.
Annotations
The right of a party to sue as representative of a class may be raised by a motion for summary judgment. Blankenship v. Omaha P. P. Dist., 195 Neb. 170, 237 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
Where each party files a motion for summary judgment in the district court, the Supreme Court can consider both motions and determine the controversy. Randall v. Erdman, 194 Neb. 390, 231 N.W.2d 689 (1975).
The Summary Judgment Act grants the district court power to enter interlocutory orders eliminating issues upon which no genuine issue of fact is presented and requires a trial and final order or judgment upon the facts that are in good faith controverted. Burroughs Corp. v. James E. Simon Constr. Co., 192 Neb. 272, 220 N.W.2d 225 (1974).
Court may specify the facts that appear without substantial controversy, and which facts are established for the trial. Hart v. Ronspies, 181 Neb. 38, 146 N.W.2d 795 (1966).
Legislature distinguished summary judgment process from a trial. Otteman v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., Inc., 171 Neb. 148, 105 N.W.2d 583 (1960).
Summary judgment on issue of liability, and submission of issue of damages to jury, was proper procedure. Rimmer v. Chadron Printing Co., 156 Neb. 533, 56 N.W.2d 806 (1953).
25-1334.
Form of affidavits; further testimony.Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions or by further affidavits.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 65, § 5, p. 200.
Annotations
The key inquiry under this section, insofar as an expert's opinion and foundational evidence is concerned, is whether such evidence would be admissible at trial, and thus, an expert's opinion may meet the requirements of this section. Boyle v. Welsh, 256 Neb. 118, 589 N.W.2d 118 (1999).
It was error for court to base decision on affidavits when there was no showing that affidavits were made based on affiant's personal knowledge of the facts set forth therein. First Nat. Bank in Morrill v. Union Ins. Co., 246 Neb. 636, 522 N.W.2d 168 (1994).
Affidavits in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 Neb. 11, 430 N.W.2d 27 (1988).
Statements in affidavits as to opinion, belief, or conclusions of law are of no effect. In re Estate of Villwok, 226 Neb. 693, 413 N.W.2d 921 (1987).
Administrative manager held competent to testify by affidavit to matters concerning records over which he was in charge. Kosowski v. City Betterment Corp., 197 Neb. 402, 249 N.W.2d 481 (1977).
Affidavit opposing summary judgment must set forth facts. Eden v. Klaas, 165 Neb. 323, 85 N.W.2d 643 (1957).
The trial court's consideration of a nursing home director's affidavit, when deciding a motion for summary judgment, was not plain error in a negligence action arising from a nursing home resident's death after an alleged fall from bed, where the director had sufficient personal knowledge, the affidavit set forth facts that would be admissible, and the director was competent to testify to the matters stated. Apkan v. Life Care Centers of America, 26 Neb. App. 154, 918 N.W.2d 601 (2018).
The affidavit of a county's planning director, which attached the zoning regulations at issue, was material and relevant, even if the portion of the affidavit containing the affiant's interpretation of the regulation and its applicability was inadmissible. Dowd Grain Co. v. County of Sarpy, 19 Neb. App. 550, 810 N.W.2d 182 (2012).
Under the terms of this section, affidavits offered for the truth of a particular fact (1) shall be made on personal knowledge, (2) shall set forth such facts as would be admissible into evidence, and (3) shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Richards v. Meeske, 12 Neb. App. 406, 675 N.W.2d 707 (2004).
Unsworn summaries of facts or arguments and of statements which would be inadmissible in evidence are of no effect in a motion for summary judgment. Kulhanek v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 8 Neb. App. 564, 598 N.W.2d 67 (1999).
To be effective, evidence opposing the rendition of a summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Statements in affidavits as to opinion, belief, or conclusions of law are of no effect. Holt Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 0025 v. Dixon, 8 Neb. App. 390, 594 N.W.2d 659 (1999).
25-1335.
Party unable to justify opposition by affidavit; refusal of order; continuance.Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 65, § 6, p. 200.
Annotations
This section provides a safeguard against an improvident or premature grant of summary judgment. George Clift Enters. v. Oshkosh Feedyard Corp., 306 Neb. 775, 947 N.W.2d 510 (2020).
A continuance authorized by this section is within the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Eastroads, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 237 Neb. 837, 467 N.W.2d 888 (1991); DeCamp v. Lewis, 231 Neb. 191, 435 N.W.2d 883 (1989).
An affidavit under this section need not contain evidence going to the merits of the case; rather, the affidavit need only contain reasonable excuse or good cause explaining why a party is presently unable to offer evidence essential to justify opposition to a motion for summary judgment. DeCamp v. Lewis, 231 Neb. 191, 435 N.W.2d 883 (1989).
This section does not provide relief to a party who has been dilatory. DeCamp v. Lewis, 231 Neb. 191, 435 N.W.2d 883 (1989).
This section prescribes a prerequisite for continuance, or additional time or other relief under the statute, namely, an affidavit stating a reasonable excuse or good cause for a party's inability to oppose a summary judgment motion. DeCamp v. Lewis, 231 Neb. 191, 435 N.W.2d 883 (1989).
The purpose of this section is to provide an additional safeguard against an improvident or premature grant of summary judgment. An affidavit need not contain evidence going to the merits of the case; rather, an affidavit must contain a reasonable excuse or good cause, explaining why a party is presently unable to offer evidence essential to justify opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Wachtel v. Beer, 229 Neb. 392, 427 N.W.2d 56 (1988).
Denial of motion for partial summary judgment was not error where basis for such action was not clearly shown. American Province Real Estate Corp. v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 178 Neb. 348, 133 N.W.2d 466 (1965).
Where motion for summary judgment had been argued and submitted without objection, motion to amend pleadings thereafter made was properly denied. Lange v. Kansas Hide & Wool Co., 168 Neb. 601, 97 N.W.2d 246 (1959).
A continuance authorized by this section is within the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. King v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 Neb. App. 544, 746 N.W.2d 383 (2008).
As a prerequisite for a continuance or additional time or other relief under this section, a party is required to submit an affidavit stating a reasonable excuse or good cause for the party's inability to oppose a summary judgment motion. Holt Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 0025 v. Dixon, 8 Neb. App. 390, 594 N.W.2d 659 (1999).
25-1336.
Affidavit made in bad faith.Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to sections 25-1330 to 25-1336 are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 65, § 7, p. 200.
25-1337.
Short title.Sections 25-1337 to 25-1348 shall be known and may be cited as the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.
25-1338.
Definitions.In the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act:
(1) Foreign country means a government other than:
(A) the United States;
(B) a state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession of the United States; or
(C) any other government with regard to which the decision in this state as to whether to recognize a judgment of that government's courts is initially subject to determination under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
(2) Foreign-country judgment means a judgment of a court of a foreign country.
25-1339.
Applicability.(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act applies to a foreign-country judgment to the extent that the judgment:
(1) grants or denies recovery of a sum of money; and
(2) under the law of the foreign country where rendered, is final, conclusive, and enforceable.
(b) The Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act does not apply to a foreign-country judgment, even if the judgment grants or denies recovery of a sum of money, to the extent that the judgment is:
(1) a judgment for taxes;
(2) a fine or other penalty; or
(3) a judgment for divorce, support, or maintenance, or other judgment rendered in connection with domestic relations.
(c) A party seeking recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the burden of establishing that the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act applies to the foreign-country judgment.
25-1340.
Standards for recognition of foreign-country judgment.(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a court of this state shall recognize a foreign-country judgment to which the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act applies.
(b) A court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment if:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(c) A court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if:
(1) the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunity to present its case;
(3) the judgment or the cause of action or claim for relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United States;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be determined otherwise than by proceedings in that foreign court;
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action;
(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment; or
(8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of law.
(d) A party resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the burden of establishing that a ground for nonrecognition stated in subsection (b) or (c) of this section exists.
25-1341.
Personal jurisdiction.(a) A foreign-country judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if:
(1) the defendant was served with process personally in the foreign country;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceeding, other than for the purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceeding or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant;
(3) the defendant, before the commencement of the proceeding, had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign country when the proceeding was instituted or was a corporation or other form of business organization that had its principal place of business in, or was organized under the laws of, the foreign country;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign country and the proceeding in the foreign court involved a cause of action or claim for relief arising out of business done by the defendant through that office in the foreign country; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign country and the proceeding involved a cause of action or claim for relief arising out of that operation.
(b) The list of bases for personal jurisdiction in subsection (a) of this section is not exclusive. The courts of this state may recognize bases of personal jurisdiction other than those listed in subsection (a) of this section as sufficient to support a foreign-country judgment.
25-1342.
Procedure for recognition of foreign-country judgment.(a) If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition shall be raised by filing an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country judgment.
(b) If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought in a pending action, the issue of recognition may be raised by counterclaim, cross-claim, or affirmative defense.
25-1343.
Effect of recognition of foreign-country judgment.If the court in a proceeding under section 25-1342 finds that the foreign-country judgment is entitled to recognition under the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act then, to the extent that the foreign-country judgment grants or denies recovery of a sum of money, the foreign-country judgment is:
(1) conclusive between the parties to the same extent as the judgment of a sister state entitled to full faith and credit in this state would be conclusive; and
(2) enforceable in the same manner and to the same extent as a judgment rendered in this state.
25-1344.
Stay of proceedings pending appeal of foreign-country judgment.If a party establishes that an appeal from a foreign-country judgment is pending or will be taken, the court may stay any proceedings with regard to the foreign-country judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the appellant has had sufficient time to prosecute the appeal and has failed to do so.
25-1345.
Statute of limitations.An action to recognize a foreign-country judgment must be commenced within the earlier of the time during which the foreign-country judgment is effective in the foreign country or fifteen years from the date that the foreign-country judgment became effective in the foreign country.
25-1346.
Uniformity of interpretation.In applying and construing the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
25-1347.
Saving clause.The Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act does not prevent the recognition under principles of comity or otherwise of a foreign-country judgment not within the scope of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.
25-1348.
Act; applicability.The Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act applies to all actions commenced on or after August 28, 2021, in which the issue of recognition of a foreign-country judgment is raised.
25-1349.
Short title.Sections 25-1349 to 25-1359 shall be known and may be cited as the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act.
25-1350.
Definitions.In the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act:
(1) Canada means the sovereign nation of Canada and its provinces and territories. Canadian has a corresponding meaning.
(2) Canadian judgment means a judgment of a court of Canada, other than a judgment that recognizes the judgment of another foreign country.
25-1351.
Applicability.(a) The Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act applies to a Canadian judgment to the extent the judgment is within the scope of section 25-1339, if recognition of the judgment is sought to enforce the judgment.
(b) A Canadian judgment that grants both recovery of a sum of money and other relief may be registered under the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act, but only to the extent of the grant of recovery of a sum of money.
(c) A Canadian judgment regarding subject matter both within and not within the scope of the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act may be registered under the act, but only to the extent the judgment is with regard to subject matter within the scope of the act.
25-1352.
Registration of Canadian judgment.(a) A person seeking recognition of a Canadian judgment described in section 25-1351 to enforce the judgment may register the judgment in the office of the clerk of a court in which an action for recognition of the judgment could be filed under section 25-1342.
(b) A registration under subsection (a) of this section must be executed by the person registering the judgment or the person's attorney and include:
(1) a copy of the Canadian judgment authenticated in the same manner as a copy of a foreign judgment is authenticated in an action under section 25-1342 as an accurate copy by the court that entered the judgment;
(2) the name and address of the person registering the judgment;
(3) if the person registering the judgment is not the person in whose favor the judgment was rendered, a statement describing the interest the person registering the judgment has in the judgment which entitles the person to seek its recognition and enforcement;
(4) the name and last-known address of the person against whom the judgment is being registered;
(5) if the judgment is of the type described in subsection (b) or (c) of section 25-1351, a description of the part of the judgment being registered;
(6) the amount of the judgment or part of the judgment being registered, identifying:
(A) the amount of interest accrued as of the date of registration on the judgment or part of the judgment being registered, the rate of interest, the part of the judgment to which interest applies, and the date when interest began to accrue;
(B) costs and expenses included in the judgment or part of the judgment being registered, other than an amount awarded for attorney's fees; and
(C) the amount of an award of attorney's fees included in the judgment or part of the judgment being registered;
(7) the amount, as of the date of registration, of postjudgment costs, expenses, and attorney's fees claimed by the person registering the judgment or part of the judgment;
(8) the amount of the judgment or part of the judgment being registered which has been satisfied as of the date of registration;
(9) a statement that:
(A) the judgment is final, conclusive, and enforceable under the law of the Canadian jurisdiction in which it was rendered;
(B) the judgment or part of the judgment being registered is within the scope of the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act; and
(C) if a part of the judgment is being registered, the amounts stated in the registration under subdivisions (6), (7), and (8) of this subsection relate to the part;
(10) if the judgment is not in English, a certified translation of the judgment into English; and
(11) a registration fee determined by the Supreme Court.
(c) On receipt of a registration that includes the documents, information, and registration fee required by subsection (b) of this section, the clerk shall file the registration, assign a docket number, and enter the Canadian judgment in the court's docket.
(d) A registration substantially in the following form complies with the registration requirements under subsection (b) of this section if the registration includes the attachments specified in the form:
REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT
Complete and file this form, together with the documents required by Part V of this form, with the Clerk of Court. When stating an amount of money, identify the currency in which the amount is stated.
PART I. IDENTIFICATION OF CANADIAN JUDGMENT
Canadian Court Rendering the Judgment: ............................
Case/Docket Number in Canadian Court: .............................
Name of Plaintiff(s): .................................
Name of Defendant(s): .................................
The Canadian Court entered the judgment on ...... [Date] in ...... [City] in ....................... [Province or Territory]. The judgment includes an award for the payment of money in favor of ................. in the amount of .................. .
If only part of the Canadian judgment is subject to registration (see subsections (b) and (c) of section 25-1351), describe the part of the judgment being registered: .................................
PART II. IDENTIFICATION OF PERSON REGISTERING JUDGMENT AND PERSON AGAINST WHOM JUDGMENT IS BEING REGISTERED
Provide the following information for all persons seeking to register the judgment under this registration and all persons against whom the judgment is being registered under this registration.
Name of Person(s) Registering Judgment: ...........................
If a person registering the judgment is not the person in whose favor the judgment was rendered, describe the interest the person registering the judgment has in the judgment which entitles the person to seek its recognition and enforcement: .................................
Address of Person(s) Registering Judgment: .......................
Additional Contact Information for Person(s) Registering Judgment (Optional): .................................
Telephone Number: ..................
FAX Number: ..................
Email Address: ...........................
Name of Attorney for Person(s) Registering Judgment, if any: .................................
Address: .................................
Telephone Number: ..................
FAX Number: ..................
Email Address: ...........................
Name of Person(s) Against Whom Judgment is Being Registered: ...........................
Address of Person(s) Against Whom Judgment is Being Registered: ........................... (provide the most recent address known)
Additional Contact Information for Person(s) Against Whom Judgment is Being Registered (Optional) (provide most recent information known):
Telephone Number: ..................
FAX Number: ..................
Email Address: ...........................
PART III. CALCULATION OF AMOUNT FOR WHICH ENFORCEMENT IS SOUGHT
Identify the currency or currencies in which each amount is stated.
The amount of the Canadian judgment or part of the judgment being registered is ........................... .
The amount of interest accrued as of the date of registration on the part of the judgment being registered is .................
The applicable rate of interest is ................
The date when interest began to accrue is ...........................
The part of the judgment to which the interest applies is ...........................
The Canadian Court awarded costs and expenses relating to the part of the judgment being registered in the amount of ............... (exclude any amount included in the award of costs and expenses which represents an award of attorney's fees).
The person registering the Canadian judgment claims postjudgment costs and expenses in the amount of ............... and postjudgment attorney's fees in the amount of .................. relating to the part of the judgment being registered (include only costs, expenses, and attorney's fees incurred before registration).
The Canadian Court awarded attorney's fees relating to the part of the judgment being registered in the amount of ..............
The amount of the part of the judgment being registered which has been satisfied as of the date of registration is .................
The total amount for which enforcement of the part of the judgment being registered is sought is ................
PART IV. STATEMENT OF PERSON REGISTERING JUDGMENT
I, ............................... [Person Registering Judgment or Attorney for Person Registering Judgment] state:
1. The Canadian judgment is final, conclusive, and enforceable under the law of the Canadian jurisdiction in which it was rendered.
2. The Canadian judgment or part of the judgment being registered is within the scope of the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act.
3. If only a part of the Canadian judgment is being registered, the amounts stated in Part III of this form relate to that part.
PART V. ITEMS REQUIRED TO BE INCLUDED WITH REGISTRATION
Attached are (check to signify required items are included):
........ A copy of the Canadian judgment authenticated in the same manner a copy of a foreign judgment is authenticated in an action under section 25-1342 as an accurate copy by the Canadian court that entered the judgment.
........ If the Canadian judgment is not in English, a certified translation of the judgment into English.
........ A registration fee determined by the Supreme Court.
I declare that the information provided on this form is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Submitted by: .................................
Signature of [Person Registering Judgment]
[Attorney for Person Registering Judgment]
[specify whether signer is the person registering the judgment or that person's attorney]
Date of submission: ...........................
25-1353.
Effect of registration.(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, a Canadian judgment registered under section 25-1352 has the same effect provided in section 25-1343 for a judgment a court determines to be entitled to recognition.
(b) A Canadian judgment registered under section 25-1352 may not be enforced by sale or other disposition of property, or by seizure of property or garnishment, until thirty-one days after notice under section 25-1354 of registration is served. The court for cause may provide for a shorter or longer time. This subsection does not preclude use of relief available under law of this state other than the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act to prevent dissipation, disposition, or removal of property.
25-1354.
Notice of registration.(a) A person that registers a Canadian judgment under section 25-1352 shall cause notice of registration to be served on the person against whom the judgment has been registered.
(b) Notice under this section must be served in the same manner that a summons and complaint must be served in an action seeking recognition under section 25-1342 of a foreign-country money judgment.
(c) Notice under this section must include:
(1) the date of registration and court in which the judgment was registered;
(2) the docket number assigned to the registration;
(3) the name and address of:
(A) the person registering the judgment; and
(B) the person's attorney, if any;
(4) a copy of the registration, including the documents required under subsection (b) of section 25-1352; and
(5) a statement that:
(A) the person against whom the judgment has been registered, not later than thirty days after the date of service of notice, may motion the court to vacate the registration; and
(B) the court for cause may provide for a shorter or longer time.
(d) Proof of service of notice under this section must be filed with the clerk of the court.
25-1355.
Motion to vacate registration.(a) Not later than thirty days after notice under section 25-1354 is served, the person against whom the judgment was registered may motion the court to vacate the registration. The court for cause may provide for a shorter or longer time for filing the motion.
(b) A motion under this section may assert only:
(1) a ground that could be asserted to deny recognition of the judgment under the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act; or
(2) a failure to comply with a requirement of the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act for registration of the judgment.
(c) A motion filed under this section does not itself stay enforcement of the registered judgment.
(d) If the court grants a motion under this section, the registration is vacated, and any act under the registration to enforce the registered judgment is void.
(e) If the court grants a motion under this section on a ground under subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the court also shall render a judgment denying recognition of the Canadian judgment. A judgment rendered under this subsection has the same effect as a judgment denying recognition to a judgment on the same ground under the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.
Cross References
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, see section 25-1337.
25-1356.
Stay of enforcement of judgment pending determination of motion.A person that files a motion under subsection (a) of section 25-1355 to vacate registration of a Canadian judgment may request the court to stay enforcement of the judgment pending determination of the motion. The court shall grant the stay if the person establishes a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to a ground listed in subsection (b) of section 25-1355 for vacating a registration. The court may require the person to provide security in an amount determined by the court as a condition of granting the stay.
25-1357.
Relationship to Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.(a) The Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act supplements the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act and that act, other than section 25-1342, applies to a registration under the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act.
(b) A person may seek recognition of a Canadian judgment described in section 25-1351 either:
(1) by registration under the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act; or
(2) under section 25-1342.
(c) Subject to subsection (d) of this section, a person may not seek recognition in this state of the same judgment or part of a judgment described in subsection (b) or (c) of section 25-1351 with regard to the same person under both the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act and section 25-1342.
(d) If the court grants a motion to vacate a registration solely on a ground under subdivision (b)(2) of section 25-1355, the person seeking registration may:
(1) if the defect in the registration can be cured, file a new registration under the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act; or
(2) seek recognition of the judgment under section 25-1342.
Cross References
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, see section 25-1337.
25-1358.
Uniformity of application and interpretation.In applying and construing the Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
25-1359.
Act; applicability.The Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act applies to the registration of a Canadian judgment entered in a proceeding that is commenced in Canada on or after August 28, 2021.
25-1401.
Causes of action which survive.In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or for an injury to real or personal estate, or for any deceit or fraud, shall also survive, and the action may be brought, notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 454, p. 469; R.S.1913, § 8022; C.S.1922, § 8963; C.S.1929, § 20-1401; R.S.1943, § 25-1401.
Annotations
1. Cause of action which survives
2. Applicability of section
3. Miscellaneous
1. Cause of action which survives
The language of this section and section 25-1402 should not be read to suggest that all pending actions other than those specifically listed survive the death of a party; Nebraska case law has long limited the list of those actions that survive death to exclude those which involve purely personal rights. Muller v. Weeder, 313 Neb. 639, 986 N.W.2d 38 (2023).
Despite the language of this section and section 25-1402 which suggests that all pending actions other than those specifically listed in the statutes survive the death of a party, Nebraska case law has limited the list of those actions which survive to exclude those which involve purely personal rights. Sherman v. Neth, 283 Neb. 895, 813 N.W.2d 501 (2012).
Under the provisions of this section, conscious prefatal-injury fear and apprehension of impending death survives a decedent's death as an element of decedent's personal injury action and inures to the benefit of decedent's estate. Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 434 N.W.2d 25 (1989).
In an action seeking damages for injuries sustained in an automobile collision, the plaintiff's cause of action survives and does not abate on his death. Spradlin v. Myers, 200 Neb. 559, 264 N.W.2d 658 (1978).
Cause of action to establish trust survived death of party to trust agreement. Workman v. Workman, 167 Neb. 857, 95 N.W.2d 186 (1959).
Action for injuries may be brought against estate of decedent whose negligence caused injury. In re Grainger's Estate, 121 Neb. 338, 237 N.W. 153 (1931), 78 A.L.R. 597 (1931).
Where, from nature of case, cause of action can continue, as in actions based on negligence, it will not abate, though not mentioned in this section. Levin v. Muser, 107 Neb. 230, 185 N.W. 431 (1921).
Husband's action for loss of services and expenses on account of tort to wife survives, and is assignable. Forbes v. Omaha, 79 Neb. 6, 112 N.W. 326 (1907).
A pending action for personal injuries occasioned by negligence does not abate by the death of the plaintiff. Webster v. City of Hastings, 59 Neb. 563, 81 N.W. 510 (1900).
As an element of a decedent's personal injury action, conscious prefatal-injury fear and apprehension of impending death survives a decedent's death, under the provisions of this section, and inures to the benefit of such decedent's estate. Scott v. Khan, 18 Neb. App. 600, 790 N.W.2d 9 (2010).
A claim for attorney's fees is saved by Nebraska's survival statute. Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
2. Applicability of section
Survivorship statutes merely preserve and continue the right of action which the decedent had prior to his death and do not create a new cause of action. Thus, where wrongful act results in instantaneous death, no cause of action in the deceased ever comes into being and none can survive. A cause of action which survives under this section may be joined with a wrongful death action; however, no recovery for loss of earnings may be had except those which may be recovered under the wrongful death action. Rhein v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 210 Neb. 321, 314 N.W.2d 19 (1982).
3. Miscellaneous
A survival claim is governed by the 4-year residual statute of limitations for tortious conduct, rather than the 2-year statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death claims. Corona de Camargo v. Schon, 278 Neb. 1045, 776 N.W.2d 1 (2009).
As a general rule, a cause of action may be assigned if the action would, on the death of the assignor, survive to the decedent's legal representative under this section. Kimco Addition v. Lower Platte South N.R.D., 232 Neb. 289, 440 N.W.2d 456 (1989).
Where action did not abate, administrator may recover all damages that deceased could have recovered if he had survived, including loss of earning power. Murray v. Omaha Transfer Co., 98 Neb. 482, 153 N.W. 488 (1915), affirming 95 Neb. 175, 145 N.W. 360 (1914).
A survival action is personal to the decedent for damages suffered by the decedent between the wrongful act and
his or her death, and recovery for such damage belongs to the decedent's estate and is administered as an estate
asset. In re Estate of McConnell, 28 Neb. App. 303, 943 N.W.2d 722 (2020).
A wrongful death action and a survival action are two distinct causes of action which may be brought by a
decedent's personal representative. Although they are frequently joined in a single action, they are conceptually
separate. In re Estate of McConnell, 28 Neb. App. 303, 943 N.W.2d 722 (2020).
Although damages for pain and suffering may be difficult to compute, that cannot preclude the entry of damages
where they are appropriate as discernible by sufficient evidence. The amount of damages is a matter solely for the
fact finder. In re Estate of McConnell, 28 Neb. App. 303, 943 N.W.2d 722 (2020).
An action under Nebraska's survival statute is the continuance of the decedent's own right of action, which he or
she possessed prior to his or her death. The survival action is brought on behalf of the decedent's estate and
encompasses the decedent's claim for predeath pain and suffering, medical expenses, funeral and burial expenses,
and any loss of earnings sustained by the decedent, from the time of the injury up until his or her death. In re Estate
of McConnell, 28 Neb. App. 303, 943 N.W.2d 722 (2020).
The same individuals may stand to recover in both a wrongful death and a survival action, as the decedent's next
of kin may also be beneficiaries of a survival claim under the decedent's will or the laws of intestate succession. In
re Estate of McConnell, 28 Neb. App. 303, 943 N.W.2d 722 (2020).
25-1402.
Actions which abate by death of defendant.No action pending in any court shall abate by the death of either or both the parties thereto, except an action for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, assault, or assault and battery, or for a nuisance, which shall abate by the death of the defendant.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 455, p. 469; R.S.1913, § 8023; C.S.1922, § 8964; C.S.1929, § 20-1402; R.S.1943, § 25-1402;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 130.
Annotations
1. Abatement
2. No abatement
3. Miscellaneous
1. Abatement
On death of either party before decree of divorce becomes final, suit abates and is not subject to revivor. Williams v. Williams, 146 Neb. 383, 19 N.W.2d 630 (1945).
Most liberal construction of this section could not prevent divorce action from abating where death occurs before decree becomes operative. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Billings, 107 Neb. 218, 185 N.W. 426 (1921).
An inmate's cause of action against the State for alleged violation of his constitutional rights while in prison did not survive his death. Fitzgerald v. Clarke, 9 Neb. App. 898, 621 N.W.2d 844 (2001).
2. No abatement
An action for an accounting is not one of those specifically excepted by the provisions of this section, and therefore such an action does not abate by reason of the death of one of the parties. Willis v. Rose, 223 Neb. 49, 388 N.W.2d 101 (1986).
Cause of action to establish trust did not abate. Workman v. Workman, 167 Neb. 857, 95 N.W.2d 186 (1959).
Right of action does not abate on wrongdoer's death before commencement of action. In re Grainger's Estate, 121 Neb. 338, 237 N.W. 153 (1931), 78 A.L.R. 597 (1931).
Action for personal injuries wrongfully inflicted does not abate by death, but may be revived and continued by personal representative. Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806 (1922).
Action does not abate where cause of action is such as by nature can continue, though not specifically mentioned in preceding section among those which survive. Levine v. Muser, 107 Neb. 230, 185 N.W. 431 (1921).
Action did not abate, but administrator may recover all damages deceased could have recovered, including loss of earning power. Murray v. Omaha Transfer Co., 98 Neb. 482, 153 N.W. 488 (1915), affirming 95 Neb. 175, 145 N.W. 360 (1914).
A pending action for libel does not abate by death of the plaintiff. Sheibley v. Nelson, 83 Neb. 501, 119 N.W. 1124 (1909).
Action for malicious conspiracy to injure trade does not abate. Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.W. 306 (1902), rehearing denied 66 Neb. 273, 96 N.W. 212 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 66 Neb. 276, 98 N.W. 1075 (1902).
Action for personal injuries was not abated by plaintiff's death. Webster v. City of Hastings, 59 Neb. 563, 81 N.W. 510 (1900).
A claim for attorney's fees is saved by Nebraska's survival statute. Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
3. Miscellaneous
The language of this section and section 25-1401 should not be read to suggest that all pending actions other than those specifically listed survive the death of a party; Nebraska case law has long limited the list of those actions that survive death to exclude those which involve purely personal rights. Muller v. Weeder, 313 Neb. 639, 986 N.W.2d 38 (2023).
Despite the language of section 25-1401 and this section which suggests that all pending actions other than those specifically listed in the statutes survive the death of a party, Nebraska case law has limited the list of those actions which survive to exclude those which involve purely personal rights. Sherman v. Neth, 283 Neb. 895, 813 N.W.2d 501 (2012).
Survivorship statutes merely preserve and continue the right of action which the decedent had prior to his death and do not create a new cause of action. Thus, where wrongful act results in instantaneous death, no cause of action in the deceased ever comes into being and none can survive. A cause of action which survives under this section may be joined with a wrongful death action; however, no recovery for loss of earnings may be had except those which may be recovered under the wrongful death action. Rhein v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 210 Neb. 321, 314 N.W.2d 19 (1982).
Section is not applicable as to widow's allowance. In re Samson's Estate, 142 Neb. 556, 7 N.W.2d 60 (1942).
25-1403.
Death of one of several parties; cessation of powers of personal representative; right of action surviving to or against remaining parties; procedure.Where there are several plaintiffs or defendants in an action and one of them dies, or his powers as a personal representative cease, if the right of action survive to or against the remaining parties, the action may proceed, the death of the party or the cessation of his powers, being stated on the record.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 456, p. 469; R.S.1913, § 8024; C.S.1922, § 8965; C.S.1929, § 20-1403; R.S.1943, § 25-1403.
Annotations
Statutory provisions regarding revivor of actions apply to cases in which a party dies pending an appeal, and any order of revivor or substitution must be had in the court having jurisdiction at the time of the party's death. Muller v. Weeder, 313 Neb. 639, 986 N.W.2d 38 (2023).
An order reviving an action, whether the order was entered in proceedings under section 25-322 or under this section to section 25-1420, is not a final order from which an appeal may immediately be taken. The order may be reviewed after final judgment in the case. Platte Valley Nat. Bank v. Lasen, 273 Neb. 602, 732 N.W.2d 347 (2007).
In an action seeking damages for injuries sustained in an automobile collision, the plaintiff's cause of action survives and does not abate on his death. Spradlin v. Myers, 200 Neb. 559, 264 N.W.2d 658 (1978).
Summary method of revivor is not exclusive. Keith v. Bruder, 77 Neb. 215, 109 N.W. 172 (1906).
Section applied to action in Supreme Court on error. Jameson v. Bartlett, 63 Neb. 638, 88 N.W. 860 (1902).
Summary mode of revivor is not exclusive. Hayden v. Huff, 62 Neb. 375, 87 N.W. 184 (1901).
This section applies to actions before justice of peace. Miller v. Curry, 17 Neb. 321, 22 N.W. 559 (1885).
25-1404.
Death of one of several parties; cessation of powers of personal representative; right of action not surviving to or against remaining parties; procedure.Where one of the several plaintiffs or defendants dies, or his powers as a personal representative cease, if the cause of action does not admit of survivorship, and the court is of opinion that the merits of the controversy can be properly determined, and the principles applicable to the case fully settled, it may proceed to try the same as between the remaining parties; but the judgment shall not prejudice any who are not parties at the time of the trial.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 457, p. 469; R.S.1913, § 8025; C.S.1922, § 8966; C.S.1929, § 20-1404; R.S.1943, § 25-1404.
25-1405.
Death of party; cessation of powers of personal representative; right of action surviving to or against successor; revivor.Where one of the parties to an action dies, or his powers as a personal representative cease, before the judgment, if the right of action survives in favor of or against his representatives or successor, the action may be revived, and proceed in their names.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 458, p. 470; R.S.1913, § 8026; C.S.1922, § 8967; C.S.1929, § 20-1405; R.S.1943, § 25-1405.
Annotations
Where there is no probate and no personal representative of the original plaintiff, the action may be revived in the names of the heirs-at-law of the original plaintiff. Spradlin v. Myers, 200 Neb. 559, 264 N.W.2d 658 (1978).
Section is not applicable as to revivor sought by executor of widow's estate in claim for widow's allowance. In re Samson's Estate, 142 Neb. 556, 7 N.W.2d 60 (1942).
Where party plaintiff dies before judgment, action can no longer proceed in his name but must be revived. Vogt v. Daily, 70 Neb. 812, 98 N.W. 31 (1904).
Action to recover support for child born out of wedlock may be revived in name of county. Dodge County v. Kemnitz, 28 Neb. 224, 44 N.W. 184 (1889).
Upon the cessation of a personal representative's powers as a result of his or her death, the personal injury action in which he or she is the plaintiff, while not abating but still surviving, becomes suspended or dormant until such time as it is revived or stricken from the docket in accordance with the procedure set forth by statute. Linch v. Northport Irr. Dist., 14 Neb. App. 842, 717 N.W.2d 522 (2006).
Because inmate's cause of action against the State for allegedly violating his constitutional rights did not survive his death, it could not be revived. Fitzgerald v. Clarke, 9 Neb. App. 898, 621 N.W.2d 844 (2001).
25-1406.
Revivor; procedure; conditional order.The revivor shall be, by a conditional order of the court if made in term, or by a judge thereof if made in vacation, that the action be revived in the names of the representatives or successor of the party who died, or whose powers ceased; and proceed in favor of or against them.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 459, p. 470; R.S.1913, § 8027; C.S.1922, § 8968; C.S.1929, § 20-1406; R.S.1943, § 25-1406.
Annotations
Where there is no probate and no personal representative of the original plaintiff, the action may be revived in the names of the heirs-at-law of the original plaintiff. Spradlin v. Myers, 200 Neb. 559, 264 N.W.2d 658 (1978).
Procedure for revivor is provided for actions that do not abate. Workman v. Workman, 167 Neb. 857, 95 N.W.2d 186 (1959).
Provisions of the civil code relative to abatement and revivor of actions are applicable to revivor of actions in Supreme Court. Keefe v. Grace, 142 Neb. 330, 6 N.W.2d 59 (1942).
If order is made absolute, right of administrator cannot be contested in main action. Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Fox, 56 Neb. 746, 77 N.W. 130 (1898).
25-1407.
Revivor; procedure; motion.The order may be made on the motion of the adverse party, or of the representatives or successor of the party who died, or whose powers ceased, suggesting his death or the cessation of his powers, which, with the names and capacities of his representatives or successor, shall be stated in the order.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 460, p. 470; R.S.1913, § 8028; C.S.1922, § 8969; C.S.1929, § 20-1407; R.S.1943, § 25-1407.
Annotations
Procedure for revivor is provided for actions that do not abate. Workman v. Workman, 167 Neb. 857, 95 N.W.2d 186 (1959).
Provisions of the civil code relative to abatement and revivor of actions are applicable to revivor of actions in Supreme Court. Keefe v. Grace, 142 Neb. 330, 6 N.W.2d 59 (1942).
Action for personal injuries does not abate by death, and administrator may revive. Murray v. Omaha Transfer Co., 95 Neb. 175, 145 N.W. 360 (1914), on rehearing, 98 Neb. 482, 153 N.W. 488 (1915).
Party having no interest in litigation adverse to deceased party cannot make motion. Jameson v. Bartlett, 63 Neb. 638, 88 N.W. 860 (1902).
25-1408.
Revivor; procedure; service of order; order by consent.If the order is made by consent of the parties, the action shall forthwith stand revived; and if not made by consent, the order shall be served in the same manner, and returned within the same time, as a summons, upon the party adverse to the one making the motion, and if sufficient cause be not shown against the revivor, the action shall stand revived.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 461, p. 470; R.S.1913, § 8029; C.S.1922, § 8970; C.S.1929, § 20-1408; R.S.1943, § 25-1408.
Annotations
An order reviving an action, whether the order was entered in proceedings under section 25-322 or under sections 25-1403 to 25-1420, is not a final order from which an appeal may immediately be taken. The order may be reviewed after final judgment in the case. Platte Valley Nat. Bank v. Lasen, 273 Neb. 602, 732 N.W.2d 347 (2007).
Where the defendant did not object to the conditional order of revivor and allowed it to become final, defendant's subsequent efforts to challenge the revivor action are of no avail. Spradlin v. Myers, 200 Neb. 559, 264 N.W.2d 658 (1978).
Motion for revivor fails when no conditional order is issued and served upon adverse party, and notice of pendency of motion is served only on attorneys. Keefe v. Grace, 142 Neb. 330, 6 N.W.2d 59 (1942).
Statutes regulating revival of actions are permissive, and do not operate to modify the appeal statute, once the latter has commenced to run, but must be subordinated thereto. Independent Lubricating Co. v. Good, 135 Neb. 171, 280 N.W. 460 (1938).
Service on attorney of record is insufficient; general appearance waives. Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Fox, 56 Neb. 746, 77 N.W. 130 (1898).
25-1409.
Revivor; procedure; service of order by publication.When the plaintiff shall make an affidavit, that the representatives of the defendant, or any of them, in whose name the action may be ordered to be revived, are nonresidents of the state, or have left the same to avoid the service of the order, or so concealed themselves that the order cannot be served upon them, or that the names and residence of the heirs or devisees of the person against whom the action may be ordered to be revived, or some of them, are unknown to the affiant, a notice may be published once in each week for four successive weeks, in the same manner as provided by section 25-519, notifying them to appear on a day therein named, not less than ten days after the publication is complete, and show cause why the action should not be revived against them; and if sufficient cause be not shown to the contrary, the action shall stand revived.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 462, p. 470; R.S.1913, § 8030; C.S.1922, § 8971; C.S.1929, § 20-1409; R.S.1943, § 25-1409;
Laws 1971, LB 47, § 2; Laws 1996, LB 299, § 20.
Annotations
Time for taking an appeal is not suspended until a representative is appointed and revivor had. Independent Lubricating Co. v. Good, 135 Neb. 171, 280 N.W. 460 (1938).
Service by publication in revival of dormant judgment is authorized. White v. Ress, 80 Neb. 749, 115 N.W. 301 (1908).
25-1410.
Death of plaintiff; in whose name action revived.Upon the death of the plaintiff in an action, it may be revived in the names of his representatives, to whom his right has passed. Where his right has passed to his personal representative, the revivor shall be in his name; where it has passed to his heirs or devisees, who could support the action if brought anew, the revivor may be in their names.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 463, p. 470; R.S.1913, § 8031; C.S.1922, § 8972; C.S.1929, § 20-1410; R.S.1943, § 25-1410.
Annotations
Where there is no probate and no personal representative of the original plaintiff, the action may be revived in the names of the heirs-at-law of the original plaintiff. Spradlin v. Myers, 200 Neb. 559, 264 N.W.2d 658 (1978).
Action to quiet title to real estate cannot be revived in name of administrator. Egan v. Niemann, 154 Neb. 161, 47 N.W.2d 404 (1951).
Where sole plaintiff in foreclosure proceedings died, leaving a will, revivor should be had in name of devisees. Vybiral v. Schildhauer, 144 Neb. 114, 12 N.W.2d 660 (1944).
Action for personal injuries does not abate by death, and administrator may revive. Murray v. Omaha Transfer Co., 95 Neb. 175, 145 N.W. 360 (1914), on rehearing, 98 Neb. 482, 153 N.W. 488 (1915).
Section is applicable to cases pending in Supreme Court. Sheibley v. Nelson, 83 Neb. 501, 119 N.W. 1124 (1909); Schmitt & Bros. Co. v. Mahoney, 60 Neb. 20, 82 N.W. 99 (1900).
Judgment should not be revived in name of administrator where he has not succeeded to rights of deceased. Vogt v. Binder, 76 Neb. 361, 107 N.W. 383 (1906).
Where sole plaintiff dies, proceedings are suspended until revived. Street v. Smith, 75 Neb. 434, 106 N.W. 472 (1906).
Where rights pass to heirs, heirs become necessary parties. Urlau v. Ruhe, 63 Neb. 883, 89 N.W. 427 (1902).
25-1411.
Death of defendant; against whom action revived.Upon the death of a defendant in an action, wherein the right, or any part thereof, survives against his personal representative, the revivor shall be against him; and it may also be against the heirs or devisees of the defendant, or both, when the right of action, or any part thereof, survives against them.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 464, p. 471; R.S.1913, § 8032; C.S.1922, § 8973; C.S.1929, § 20-1411; R.S.1943, § 25-1411.
Annotations
Where a cause of action or several causes of action may properly lie against a personal representative of a deceased defendant as well as against the heir of the deceased an order of revivor against only one of the parties, if proper, for some of the relief sought is not defective, and the cause of action may proceed against that party. Willis v. Rose, 223 Neb. 49, 388 N.W.2d 101 (1986).
Action to enforce trust was properly revived. Workman v. Workman, 167 Neb. 857, 95 N.W.2d 186 (1959).
To be a lien upon land descending to heirs of deceased judgment debtor, judgment must be revived against heirs, not against administrator. Dougherty v. White, 112 Neb. 675, 200 N.W. 884 (1924).
Dormant federal court judgment can be revived only in court where rendered. Holmes v. Webster, 98 Neb. 105, 152 N.W. 312 (1915).
In real estate mortgage foreclosure action, where party dies while proceedings are pending in Supreme Court, revivor should be had against heirs. Urlau v. Ruhe, 63 Neb. 883, 89 N.W. 427 (1902).
On motion to revive, merits of action cannot be heard; revivor is matter of right. Gillette v. Morrison, 7 Neb. 263 (1878).
25-1412.
Death of defendant in actions to recover real property; against whom action revived.Upon the death of a defendant in an action for the recovery of real property only, or which concerns only his rights or claims to such property, the action may be revived against his heirs or devisees, or both, and an order therefor may be forthwith made in the manner directed in the preceding sections of this chapter.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 465, p. 471; R.S.1913, § 8033; C.S.1922, § 8974; C.S.1929, § 20-1412; R.S.1943, § 25-1412.
Annotations
If a decree of foreclosure is obtained during the lifetime of the mortgagor, sale and confirmation after his death without revivor is voidable only and not subject to collateral attack. Wendt v. Jones, 145 Neb. 667, 17 N.W.2d 887 (1945).
25-1413.
Revivor as to defendant; time; limitation.An order to revive an action against the representatives or successor of a defendant shall not be made without the consent of such representatives or successor, unless in one year from the time it could have been first made.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 466, p. 471; R.S.1913, § 8034; C.S.1922, § 8975; C.S.1929, § 20-1413; R.S.1943, § 25-1413.
Annotations
Requirement of revivor within one year is not exclusive and has no application to dormant judgment. Rich v. Cooper, 136 Neb. 463, 286 N.W. 383 (1939).
Statutes regulating revival of action are permissive in quality and do not operate to suspend or interrupt time in which an appeal can be taken. Independent Lubricating Co. v. Good, 135 Neb. 171, 280 N.W. 460 (1938).
Successor of deceased judgment creditor may revive by original bill. Keith v. Bruder, 77 Neb. 215, 109 N.W. 172 (1906).
This section does not provide exclusive method. Plaintiff may revive by supplemental petition after one year, in discretion of court. Hayden v. Huff, 62 Neb. 375, 87 N.W. 184 (1901).
Limitation of one year is not applicable to revival of dormant judgments. School Dist. No. 34, Adams County v. Kountze Bros., 3 Neb. Unof. 690, 92 N.W. 597 (1902).
25-1414.
Revivor as to plaintiff; time; limitation; revivor as to both parties.An order to revive an action in the names of the representatives or successor of a plaintiff may be made forthwith, but shall not be made without the consent of the defendant, after the expiration of one year from the time the order might have been first made; but where the defendant shall also have died, or his powers have ceased in the meantime, the order of revivor on both sides may be made in the period limited in section 25-1413.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 467, p. 471; R.S.1913, § 8035; C.S.1922, § 8976; C.S.1929, § 20-1414; R.S.1943, § 25-1414.
Annotations
Where the defendant did not object to the conditional order of revivor and allowed it to become final, defendant's subsequent efforts to challenge the revivor action are of no avail. Spradlin v. Myers, 200 Neb. 559, 264 N.W.2d 658 (1978).
In case of the death of a party after final judgment and before an appeal is taken, revivor statutes do not suspend the running of time in which an appeal can be taken. Independent Lubricating Co. v. Good, 135 Neb. 171, 280 N.W. 460 (1938).
Where the sole defendant dies after filing notice of appeal and supersedeas bond, his attorney does not confer jurisdiction on Supreme Court by filing transcript after defendant's death, and court cannot substitute administrator of his estate. Independent Lubricating Co. v. Good, 133 Neb. 431, 275 N.W. 668 (1937).
25-1415.
Abatement of actions by death or cessation of powers of representative; duty of court.When it appears to the court by affidavit that either party to an action has been dead, or where a party sues or is sued as a personal representative, that his or her powers have ceased for a period so long that the action cannot be revived in the names of his or her representatives or successor, without the consent of both parties, it shall order the action to be stricken from the trial docket.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 468, p. 471; R.S.1913, § 8036; C.S.1922, § 8977; C.S.1929, § 20-1415; R.S.1943, § 25-1415;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 22.
Annotations
When no effort has been made to revive, and cause is stricken from docket, the action is terminated. Humfeldt v. Moles, 63 Neb. 448, 88 N.W. 655 (1902).
Striking cause from docket is a suspension but not a dismissal of action. Hayden v. Huff, 62 Neb. 375, 87 N.W. 184 (1901).
Where the record did not show that the plaintiff died more than 1 year prior to the trial court's order dismissing the cause for lack of prosecution, that order could not be construed as an order striking the action from the docket. Linch v. Northport Irr. Dist., 14 Neb. App. 842, 717 N.W.2d 522 (2006).
Where cause of action cannot be revived, it must be stricken from the docket. Fitzgerald v. Clarke, 9 Neb. App. 898, 621 N.W.2d 844 (2001).
25-1416.
Death of plaintiff; right of defendant to compel revivor.At any term of the court succeeding the death of the plaintiff, while the action remains on the trial docket, the defendant, having given to the plaintiff's proper representatives in whose names the action might be revived ten days' notice of the application therefor, may have an order to strike the action from the trial docket and for costs against the estate of the plaintiff, unless the action is forthwith revived.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 469, p. 471; R.S.1913, § 8037; C.S.1922, § 8978; C.S.1929, § 20-1416; R.S.1943, § 25-1416;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 23.
25-1417.
Revived action; when tried.When, by the provisions of sections 25-1405 to 25-1416, an action stands revived, the trial thereof shall not be postponed by reason of the revivor, if the action would have stood for trial at the term the revivor is complete, had no death or cessation of powers taken place.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 470, p. 471; R.S.1913, § 8038; C.S.1922, § 8979; C.S.1929, § 20-1417; R.S.1943, § 25-1417.
25-1418.
Joint debtors not originally summoned made judgment debtors.When a judgment is recovered against one or more persons jointly indebted upon contract, those who were not originally summoned may be made parties to the judgment by action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 471, p. 472; R.S.1913, § 8039; C.S.1922, § 8980; C.S.1929, § 20-1418; R.S.1943, § 25-1418.
Annotations
Where revivor of dormant judgment was had, want of jurisdiction in obtaining original judgment on joint promissory note could not be raised by injunction. Haynes v. Aultman, Miller & Co., 36 Neb. 257, 54 N.W. 511 (1893).
25-1419.
Death of parties after judgment; revivor in name of representatives of deceased.If either or both the parties die after judgment, and before satisfaction thereof, their representatives, real or personal, or both, as the case may require, may be made parties to the same, in the same manner as is prescribed for reviving actions before judgment; and such judgment may be rendered and execution awarded as might or ought to be given or awarded against the representatives real or personal, or both, of such deceased party.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 472, p. 472; R.S.1913, § 8040; C.S.1922, § 8981; C.S.1929, § 20-1419; R.S.1943, § 25-1419.
Annotations
To be a lien upon land descending to heirs of deceased judgment debtor, judgment must be revived against heirs, not against administrator. Dougherty v. White, 112 Neb. 675, 200 N.W. 884 (1924).
Proceedings should not be in name of administrator unless he has succeeded to right of deceased. Vogt v. Binder, 76 Neb. 361, 107 N.W. 383 (1906).
Execution is void unless judgment is revived after plaintiff's death. Vogt v. Daily, 70 Neb. 812, 98 N.W. 31 (1904).
Fact that one or more parties cannot be found will not abate action as against those found and properly served. Clark v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Columbus, 68 Neb. 764, 94 N.W. 958 (1903).
The word "manner" does not include the element of time. Bankers' Life Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 59 Neb. 170, 80 N.W. 484 (1899).
Administrator may prosecute error proceedings without order of revivor. Webster v. City of Hastings, 56 Neb. 245, 76 N.W. 565 (1898).
If judgment is joint, liability must be revived in that form. Fox v. Abbott, 12 Neb. 328, 11 N.W. 303 (1882).
25-1420.
Dormant judgment; revivor; time limitation.If a judgment becomes dormant, it may be revived in the same manner as is prescribed for reviving actions before judgment; Provided, no judgment shall be revived unless action to revive the same be commenced within ten years after such judgment became dormant.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 473, p. 472; Laws 1909, c. 154, § 1, p. 557; R.S.1913, § 8041; C.S.1922, § 8982; C.S.1929, § 20-1420; R.S.1943, § 25-1420.
Annotations
1. Limitation
2. Jurisdiction
3. Proceeding
4. Lien
5. Miscellaneous
1. Limitation
Alimony decree does not become dormant by lapse of time. Nowka v. Nowka, 157 Neb. 57, 58 N.W.2d 600 (1953).
A decree for child support rendered in a divorce action does not become dormant because of a failure to issue execution thereon for more than five years. In re Application of Miller, 139 Neb. 242, 297 N.W. 91 (1941).
A proceeding to revive a dormant judgment may be instituted at any time within ten years after it becomes dormant. Baker Steel & Machinery Co. v. Ferguson, 137 Neb. 578, 290 N.W. 449 (1940).
Judgment not revived within ten years after becoming dormant is forever barred. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Merryman, 126 Neb. 684, 254 N.W. 428 (1934).
Notwithstanding this section limiting revivor to ten years, domestic judgment is specialty, and action thereon is barred after five years. Armstrong v. Patterson, 97 Neb. 871, 152 N.W. 311 (1915).
Decree of foreclosure does not become dormant by failure to issue order of sale within five years. St. Paul Harvester Works v. Huckfeldt, 96 Neb. 552, 148 N.W. 153 (1914).
General statute of limitations does not apply. Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co. v. Van Boskirk, 78 Neb. 728, 111 N.W. 605 (1907).
Limitation of one year for revivor of action does not apply to revivor of judgments. School Dist. No. 34, Adams County v. Kountze Bros., 3 Neb. Unof. 690, 92 N.W. 597 (1902).
2. Jurisdiction
A defendant in revival proceedings does not have the right to have a jury decide whether the original judgment was entered without personal jurisdiction. Cave v. Reiser, 268 Neb. 539, 684 N.W.2d 580 (2004).
While a defendant in revival proceedings may not use extrinsic evidence to relitigate the merits of the case, the defendant can introduce extrinsic evidence to show that the original judgment was void because the court entered it without jurisdiction. Cave v. Reiser, 268 Neb. 539, 684 N.W.2d 580 (2004).
Order of revival of alimony decree was proper. Miller v. Miller, 160 Neb. 766, 71 N.W.2d 478 (1955).
Decree for child support is not a judgment within the meaning of this section. Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890, 46 N.W.2d 618 (1951).
A decree for alimony is not a judgment within the meaning of this section. Lippincott v. Lippincott, 152 Neb. 374, 41 N.W.2d 232 (1950).
Revivor must be in court where judgment rendered, not in court to which transcripted. Bank of Miller v. Moore, 98 Neb. 843, 154 N.W. 731 (1915).
A judgment of the federal court, when dormant, can only be revived in the court where it was rendered. Holmes v. Webster, 98 Neb. 105, 152 N.W. 312 (1915).
District court may revive transcripted judgment from inferior court though judgment became dormant before transcripted. Bussing v. Taggert, 73 Neb. 787, 103 N.W. 430 (1905).
District court may revive judgment transcripted from county court. Creighton & Morgan v. Gorum, 23 Neb. 502, 37 N.W. 76 (1888).
Revivor by county court is not error. Garrison v. Aultman & Co., 20 Neb. 311, 30 N.W. 61 (1886).
County court may revive judgment rendered by it; if transcripted to district court, latter should revive. Dennis v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 19 Neb. 675, 28 N.W. 512 (1886).
Section is applicable to judgments rendered by justice of peace. Miller v. Curry, 17 Neb. 321, 22 N.W. 559 (1885).
3. Proceeding
Defendant primarily liable, with other defendants, for aliquot part of judgment and surety for the others as to the remainder, may pay judgment and take assignment thereof, and, as assignee, is entitled to revive same in its entirety. Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. Sexson, 119 Neb. 370, 229 N.W. 17 (1930).
This section applies to judgment rendered before as well as those rendered after its adoption. Atkinson v. Uttley, 98 Neb. 722, 154 N.W. 247 (1915).
Proceedings to revive and action upon judgment are cumulative remedies; judgment if valid and unpaid will be revived. Young v. City of Broken Bow, 94 Neb. 470, 143 N.W. 742 (1913).
No objections which go behind original judgment will be heard. American Freehold Land Mortgage Co. v. Smith, 84 Neb. 237, 120 N.W. 1113 (1909).
Assignee of judgment may have same revived. Brunke v. Gruben, 84 Neb. 14, 120 N.W. 435 (1909).
Judgment debtor cannot plead as a defense a setoff or counterclaim. Lashmett v. Prall, 83 Neb. 732, 120 N.W. 206 (1909).
Revivor of judgment void on its face is nullity. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. L'Heureux, 82 Neb. 692, 118 N.W. 565 (1908).
While a revivor proceeding is not in one sense the commencement of a new action, it is the commencement of new and different proceeding. St. Paul Harvester Co. v. Mahs, 82 Neb. 336, 117 N.W. 702 (1908).
Judgment creditor must rebut presumption of payment. Platte County Bank v. Clark, 81 Neb. 255, 115 N.W. 787 (1908).
Judgment of revivor can be rendered against a nonresident upon service by publication. White v. Ress, 80 Neb. 749, 115 N.W. 301 (1908).
May impeach officer's return of service in original action. Johnson v. Carpenter, 77 Neb. 49, 108 N.W. 161 (1906).
Order of revivor is sufficient though without awarding execution. Thornhill v. Hargreaves, 76 Neb. 582, 107 N.W. 847 (1906).
Affidavit alleging judgment, nonpayment, that it is dormant, and prayer for order is sufficient. Furer v. Holmes, 73 Neb. 393, 102 N.W. 764 (1905).
All jointly liable should be made defendants. Clark v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Columbus, 68 Neb. 764, 94 N.W. 958 (1903).
Attorney having lien may intervene and revive in own name to extent of lien proper. Greek v. McDaniel, 68 Neb. 569, 94 N.W. 518 (1903).
Plea of payment admits validity of judgment. McCormick v. Carey, 62 Neb. 494, 87 N.W. 172 (1901).
Proceeding is continuation of original action. Bankers' Life Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 59 Neb. 170, 80 N.W. 484 (1899).
This section is substitute for writ of scire facias. Broadwater v. Foxworthy, 57 Neb. 406, 77 N.W. 1103 (1899).
4. Lien
Judgment when revived is lien only on realty then owned by debtor. Halmes v. Dovey, 64 Neb. 122, 89 N.W. 631 (1902).
Lien is renewed from date of revivor. Horbach v. Smiley, 54 Neb. 217, 74 N.W. 623 (1898).
5. Miscellaneous
A judgment is not a contract for purposes of the tolling provision of section 25-216. Nelssen v. Ritchie, 304 Neb.
346, 934 N.W.2d 377 (2019).
The only defenses available against an application to revive are (1) there is no judgment to revive, (2) the purported judgment is void, and (3) the judgment was paid or otherwise discharged. Cave v. Reiser, 268 Neb. 539, 684 N.W.2d 580 (2004).
If a defendant is personally served, even if the name is incorrect, the defendant must appear and call attention to the defect. Failing to do so waives the objection to the misnomer and allows a judgment to be rendered against the defendant by default. Capital One Bank v. Tafoya, 31 Neb. App. 875, 991 N.W.2d 306 (2023).
The intent of the plaintiff is a pivotal inquiry in the determination of whether a particular case involves a misnomer or mistaken identity; the objective manifestations of a plaintiff's intent which existed at the time of the lawsuit are the most reliable indicators of whom counsel intended to sue. Capital One Bank v. Tafoya, 31 Neb. App. 875, 991 N.W.2d 306 (2023).
The only defenses available against an action to revive are (1) there is no judgment to revive, (2) the purported judgment is void, and (3) the judgment was paid or otherwise discharged. When the revivor of a dormant judgment is sought, a defendant must show cause why the dormant judgment should not be revived. Capital One Bank v. Tafoya, 31 Neb. App. 875, 991 N.W.2d 306 (2023).
While a defendant in revival proceedings may not use extrinsic evidence to relitigate the merits of the case, the defendant can introduce extrinsic evidence to show that the original judgment was void because the court entered it without jurisdiction. Capital One Bank v. Tafoya, 31 Neb. App. 875, 991 N.W.2d 306 (2023).
25-1501.
Executions; by whom issued; how directed.Executions shall be deemed process of the court, and shall be issued by the clerk and directed to the sheriff of the county. They may be directed to different counties at the same time.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 474, p. 472; R.S.1913, § 8042; C.S.1922, § 8983; C.S.1929, § 20-1501; R.S.1943, § 25-1501.
Cross References
Execution against partnership or unincorporated associations, see section 25-316.
Annotations
Divorce decree which provides for child's support is subject to the power of the district court over all its decrees and processes. Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440, 286 N.W. 340 (1939).
No second order of sale shall issue against property sold under previous order, where first sale is confirmed. Storey v. Miles, 86 Neb. 827, 126 N.W. 517 (1910).
Execution issued without seal is void. Taylor v. Courtnay, 15 Neb. 190, 16 N.W. 842 (1883).
Execution cannot issue after supersedeas bond is filed. State Bank of Nebraska v. Green, 8 Neb. 297, 1 N.W. 210 (1879).
25-1501.01.
District court judgment; execution
issued to any county in state; procedure; lien on real estate;
procedure.Any
person having a judgment rendered by a district court may request the clerk
of such court to issue execution on the judgment in the same manner as execution
is issued upon other judgments rendered in the district court and direct the
execution on the judgment to any county in the state. Such person may request
that garnishment, attachment, or any other aid to execution for personal property
or wages be directed to any county without the necessity of filing a transcript
of the judgment in the receiving county, and any hearing or proceeding with
regard to such execution or aid in execution shall be heard in the court in
which the judgment was originally rendered. Such execution shall not serve
as a lien on real estate in a county other than the county where the judgment
was rendered unless a transcript of the judgment is filed with the clerk of
the district court in the county in which the real estate is located.
25-1502.
Kinds of executions.Executions are of two kinds: (1) Against the property of the judgment debtor, and (2) for delivery of the possession of real property with damages for withholding the same and costs.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 475, p. 472; R.S.1913, § 8043; C.S.1922, § 8984; C.S.1929, § 20-1502; R.S.1943, § 25-1502.
25-1503.
Property subject to levy and sale.Lands, tenements, goods and chattels, not exempt by law, shall be subject to the payment of debts, and shall be liable to be taken on execution and sold as hereinafter provided.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 476, p. 472; R.S.1913, § 8044; C.S.1922, § 8985; C.S.1929, § 20-1503; R.S.1943, § 25-1503.
Annotations
Automobile of nonresident defendant could be seized to pay modified judgment for alimony. Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890, 46 N.W.2d 618 (1951).
Attachment affects actual interest of defendant only. Westervelt v. Hagge, 61 Neb. 647, 85 N.W. 852 (1901).
Chattels levied on and replevied cannot be levied on again for claim against said debtor. Beagle v. Smith, 50 Neb. 446, 69 N.W. 956 (1897).
25-1504.
Lien of judgment; when attaches; lands within county where entered; other lands; chattels.The lands and tenements of the debtor within the county where the judgment is entered shall be bound for the satisfaction thereof only from the day on which such judgments are rendered. All other lands, as well as goods and chattels of the debtor, shall be bound from the time they shall be seized in execution. A judgment shall be considered as rendered when such judgment has been entered on the judgment index.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 477, p. 473; R.S.1913, § 8045; C.S.1922, § 8986; Laws 1927, c. 59, § 1, p. 221; Laws 1929, c. 83, § 3, p. 333; C.S.1929, § 20-1504; R.S.1943, § 25-1504;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 24.
Annotations
1. Priority
2. When attaches
3. Other lands
1. Priority
Lien of a prior judgment attaches the instant the judgment debtor acquires property. Glissmann v. McDonald, 128 Neb. 693, 260 N.W. 182 (1935).
Against subsequent purchaser, judgment is not a lien until properly indexed. German Nat. Bank of Beatrice v. Atherton, 64 Neb. 610, 90 N.W. 550 (1902).
Judgment is a lien on interest of vendor who has not yet given deed. Doe v. Startzer, 62 Neb. 718, 87 N.W. 535 (1901).
Lien on subsequently purchased land attaches as soon as title vests in debtor. Lessert v. Sieberling, 59 Neb. 309, 80 N.W. 900 (1899).
Lien is inferior to inchoate right of dower. Butler v. Fitzgerald, 43 Neb. 192, 61 N.W. 640 (1895).
Judgment lien is inferior to prior unrecorded deed. Pearson v. Davis, 41 Neb. 608, 59 N.W. 885 (1894).
Prior unrecorded deed made in good faith is superior, if recorded before deed based on judgment. Harral & Ure v. Gray, 10 Neb. 186, 4 N.W. 1040 (1880).
Judgment is not a specific lien, but is a general lien subject to all prior liens legal or equitable. Metz v. State Bank of Brownville, 7 Neb. 165 (1878).
Creditor of national bank, suing after insolvency but before appointment of receiver, is not entitled to judgment lien on bank's real estate. Steel v. Randall, 19 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1927).
2. When attaches
A lien on personal property is acquired at the time the property is seized in execution. Credit Bureau of Broken Bow, Inc. v. Moninger, 204 Neb. 679, 284 N.W.2d 855 (1979).
A manual interference with chattels is not essential to a valid levy thereon. It is sufficient if the property is present and subject for the time being to the control of the officer holding the writ, if the officer in express terms asserts his dominion over the property by virtue of such writ. Credit Bureau of Broken Bow, Inc. v. Moninger, 204 Neb. 679, 284 N.W.2d 855 (1979).
A judgment of the district court becomes a lien against real estate in that county from the time of its entry on the judgment record, and the judgment first entered is superior. Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Leisy, 144 Neb. 705, 14 N.W.2d 384 (1944).
A judgment becomes dormant and ceases to be a lien on real estate in five years from date thereof unless execution is sued out within such period, and a judgment revived is a lien on the real estate of judgment debtor from date of the order of revivor. Glissmann v. Happy Hollow Club, 132 Neb. 223, 271 N.W. 431 (1937).
To constitute sufficient levy, officer should have property under his control and openly and expressly assert dominion over it by virtue of writ, and where debtor promised to surrender automobile for purpose of levy, seizure of it at later date was not a sufficient levy as of time of promise. Miller v. Crosson, 131 Neb. 88, 267 N.W. 145 (1936).
Judgment in equity case affirmed on appeal is lien on debtor's land in county where rendered from date of rendition. Guaranty Fund Commission v. Teichmeier, 119 Neb. 387, 229 N.W. 121 (1930).
Federal court judgments are liens on real estate only in county where rendered; in other counties are liens where transcript filed and entered on judgment record. Rathbone Co. v. Kimball, 117 Neb. 229, 220 N.W. 244 (1928).
Lien of judgment is not perpetual and is subject to the limitations contained in the code. Glenn v. Glenn, 79 Neb. 68, 112 N.W. 321 (1907).
Lien on amount due vendor, who retains legal title, commences at date of filing judgment. First Nat. Bank of Falls City v. Edgar, 65 Neb. 340, 91 N.W. 404 (1902).
Lien is operative on homestead when abandoned. Horbach v. Smiley, 54 Neb. 217, 74 N.W. 623 (1898).
Judgment lien attached only to actual interest of debtor, though legal title in his name. Roberts v. Robinson, 49 Neb. 717, 68 N.W. 1035 (1896).
Lien is dependent upon rendition of judgment, and court cannot continue lien upon setting aside of judgment. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Killinger, 46 Neb. 677, 65 N.W. 790 (1896).
3. Other lands
Judgment rendered against bank while in hands of state banking authorities or receiver creates no lien upon its real estate as against those in possession. Brownell v. Svoboda, 118 Neb. 76, 223 N.W. 641 (1929).
Judgment transcribed from justice court is lien on after acquired property. Jones v. Knosp, 91 Neb. 224, 135 N.W. 1049 (1912).
Judgment is not a lien on equitable interest in land. Flint v. Chaloupka, 72 Neb. 34, 99 N.W. 825 (1904).
Vendee in possession is bound from time of actual notice. Wehn v. Fall, 55 Neb. 547, 76 N.W. 13 (1898).
Bona fide mortgagee of lands, not in name of judgment debtor, is protected. Reed v. Rice, 48 Neb. 586, 67 N.W. 459 (1896).
Mortgagor's bankruptcy trustee seeking to set aside mortgage and subsequent deed conveying mortgaged land to mortgagee occupied position of lienholder rather than unsecured creditor. Troyer v. Mundy, 60 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1932).
25-1505.
Stay of execution; maximum period.No stay of execution or order of sale upon any judgment or decree shall be granted for a longer time than nine months after the entry of such judgment or decree.
Source:Laws 1875, § 1, p. 49; R.S.1913, § 8046; C.S.1922, § 8987; C.S.1929, § 20-1505; R.S.1943, § 25-1505;
Laws 1999, LB 43, § 5.
Annotations
Legislature had in mind the matter of stays of execution on judgments and decrees where the ultimate purpose was the recovery of money only, and not payments for child support in divorce decree. Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440, 286 N.W. 340 (1939).
Where defendants avail themselves of the statutory stay of execution, they are estopped from attacking such judgment in any way. Bowman v. Caldwell, 135 Neb. 554, 283 N.W. 194 (1939).
Divorced wife may continue to claim homestead interest. Federal Credit Co. v. Reynolds, 132 Neb. 495, 272 N.W. 397 (1937).
Taking stay is an appearance, and waives all prior defects or error. Party is estopped to attack judgment. Franse v. Armbuster, 28 Neb. 467, 44 N.W. 481 (1890); Miller v. Hyers, 11 Neb. 474, 9 N.W. 645 (1881).
Mortgage debtor has right to nine months stay. Rafert v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, 152 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1945).
25-1506.
Order of sale of mortgaged premises; how stayed; length of stay.The order of sale on all decrees for the sale of mortgaged premises shall be stayed for the period of nine months after the entry of such decree, whenever the defendant shall, within twenty days after the entry of such decree, file with the clerk of the court a written request for the same. If the defendant makes no such request within twenty days, the order of sale may issue immediately after the expiration thereof. As to any mortgage executed after September 28, 1959, if the original maturity of indebtedness secured by the mortgage is more than twenty years after the date of the filing of the complaint to foreclose the mortgage and the mortgage covered a lot or lots, or any part thereof, in a regularly platted subdivision, or parcel of residential property not exceeding three acres in area, the stay period shall be three months, and, as to such a mortgage executed after October 9, 1961, if such original maturity is more than ten years but not more than twenty years from and after the date of the filing of the foreclosure complaint, the stay period shall be six months.
Source:Laws 1875, § 2, p. 49; R.S.1913, § 8047; C.S.1922, § 8988; C.S.1929, § 20-1506; R.S.1943, § 25-1506; Laws 1959, c. 105, § 1, p. 432; Laws 1961, c. 112, § 1, p. 351;
Laws 1999, LB 43, § 6; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 26.
Annotations
1. Time for filing
2. Who may file
3. Effect on appeal
4. Miscellaneous
1. Time for filing
When the party sought a stay more than 20 days after the initial foreclosure decree, but less than 20 days after the supplemental decree, the party was not entitled to a stay. Mutual of Omaha Bank v. Watson, 301 Neb. 833, 920 N.W.2d 284 (2018).
Request for stay must be filed within twenty days after rendition of decree. Alexander v. Oman, 137 Neb. 495, 289 N.W. 847 (1940).
District court is without power to extend time for filing request for stay of order of sale beyond 20 days as provided herein. Columbus Land, Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. Phillips, 124 Neb. 672, 247 N.W. 600 (1933).
Request for stay, filed before entry of decree, is continuing. May be filed by owner of equity of redemption after sale of his interest in mortgaged premises. Jenkins Land & Live Stock Co. v. Attwood, 80 Neb. 806, 115 N.W. 305 (1908).
Court cannot extend time; filing supersedeas bond does not suspend order. State ex rel. Harris v. Laflin, 40 Neb. 441, 58 N.W. 936 (1894).
2. Who may file
Word "defendant" in statute means the mortgagor or one in privity with him. Welty v. Schmutte, 128 Neb. 415, 258 N.W. 873 (1935).
Defendants in foreclosure are not entitled to a second stay because of filing of supplemental decree touching personal liability and not affecting foreclosure. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nethaway, 127 Neb. 330, 255 N.W. 26 (1934).
When vendor fails to convey, and purchaser sues in equity on the contract and accepts decree granting him a lien for the money paid as if it were a mortgage, vendor is entitled to a stay upon filing request therefor. Hawkins v. Mullen, 119 Neb. 567, 230 N.W. 252 (1930).
Word "defendant" applies to mortgagor, not cross-petitioners. Clark v. Pahl, 75 Neb. 161, 106 N.W. 420 (1905).
Stay cannot be taken in strict foreclosure. Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 56 N.W. 961 (1893).
Mortgagee's right to determine time of foreclosure sale is absolute, except for nine month's stay which must be granted on mortgagor's request. United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Pamp, 83 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1936).
Where, after decree of foreclosure of real estate mortgage, the mortgagor files petition in bankruptcy and to effect a composition with creditors, bankruptcy court has power to restrain mortgagee from further proceedings in foreclosure case. United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Pamp, 77 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1935).
3. Effect on appeal
When a defendant requests a stay of sale pursuant to this section, the defendant is precluded from appealing from the foreclosure decree. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Siegel, 279 Neb. 174, 777 N.W.2d 259 (2010).
When a defendant requests a stay of sale pursuant to this section, that request precludes that defendant from appealing from the foreclosure decree. Production Credit Assn. of the Midlands v. Schmer, 233 Neb. 785, 448 N.W.2d 141 (1989).
Filing request for stay precludes taking an appeal. Carley v. Morgan, 123 Neb. 498, 243 N.W. 631 (1932).
Request for stay inadvertently filed before decree is entered of record in foreclosure action will not defeat appeal. Theisen v. Peterson, 114 Neb. 154, 211 N.W. 19 (1926).
4. Miscellaneous
The original maturity of indebtedness, referred to herein, is the date on which the final payment is due without acceleration. Central Savings Bank of New York v. First Cadco Corp., 186 Neb. 112, 181 N.W.2d 261 (1970).
25-1507.
Execution; how stayed.On all judgments for the recovery of money only, except those rendered in any court on an appeal or writ of error thereto or against any officer or person or corporation, or the sureties of any of them, for money received in a fiduciary capacity, or for the breach of any official duty, there may be a stay of execution if the defendant therein shall, within twenty days after the entry of judgment, procure two or more sufficient freehold sureties to enter into a bond, acknowledging themselves security for the defendant for the payment of the judgment, interest, and costs, from the time of entering judgment until paid as follows: (1) If the sum for which judgment was rendered, exclusive of costs, does not exceed fifty dollars, three months; (2) if the sum for which judgment was rendered, exclusive of costs, exceeds fifty dollars and does not exceed one hundred dollars, six months; and (3) if the sum for which judgment was rendered, exclusive of costs, exceeds one hundred dollars, nine months.
Source:Laws 1875, § 3, p. 49; R.S.1913, § 8048; C.S.1922, § 8989; C.S.1929, § 20-1507; R.S.1943, § 25-1507;
Laws 1999, LB 43, § 7.
Annotations
Where a stay bond becomes dormant, it may be revived the same as a judgment. Baker Steel & Machinery Co. v. Ferguson, 137 Neb. 578, 290 N.W. 449 (1940).
Sureties when sued on bond cannot plead lack of legal qualifications. Heater v. Pearce, 59 Neb. 583, 81 N.W. 615 (1900).
Stay bond is a proceeding and may be amended. State ex rel. Cleary v. Russell, 17 Neb. 201, 22 N.W. 455 (1885).
25-1508.
Stay bonds; approval; justification of sureties.Officers approving stay bonds shall require the affidavits of the signers of such bonds that they own real estate not exempt from execution, and aside from encumbrance, to the value of twice the amount of the judgment.
Source:Laws 1875, § 4, p. 50; R.S.1913, § 8049; C.S.1922, § 8990; C.S.1929, § 20-1508; R.S.1943, § 25-1508.
Annotations
In action on constable's bond, it is sufficient to assign the breach in the language of the statute. Adams v. Weisberger, 62 Neb. 325, 87 N.W. 16 (1901).
Officer who approves stay bond without requiring affidavits of signers, is liable for damage. Heater v. Pearce, 59 Neb. 583, 81 N.W. 615 (1900).
25-1509.
Stay of execution; surety on stay bond excepted; no appeal after stay.No proceedings in errors or appeal shall be allowed after such stay has been taken, nor shall a stay be taken on a judgment entered as herein contemplated, against one who is surety in the stay of execution.
Source:Laws 1875, § 5, p. 50; R.S.1913, § 8050; C.S.1922, § 8991; C.S.1929, § 20-1509; R.S.1943, § 25-1509.
Annotations
Taking of stay is a general appearance and a waiver of all prior errors in the proceedings. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Baxter, 139 Neb. 648, 298 N.W. 530 (1941).
Party taking stay of order of sale in foreclosure proceedings cannot appeal hereunder. Carley v. Morgan, 123 Neb. 498, 243 N.W. 631 (1932).
Request for stay inadvertently filed before decree entered of record in foreclosure action will not defeat appeal. Theisen v. Peterson, 114 Neb. 150, 211 N.W. 19 (1925).
Taking stay of sale under decree of foreclosure is waiver of prior error. Ecklund v. Willis, 42 Neb. 737, 60 N.W. 1026 (1894).
25-1510.
Stay of execution; sureties; approval; bond tantamount to judgment confessed.The sureties for the stay of execution may be taken and approved by the clerk, the bond shall be recorded on the register of actions and have the force and effect of a judgment confessed from the date thereof against the property of the sureties, and the clerk shall enter such sureties on the judgment index, as in the case of other judgments.
Source:Laws 1875, § 6, p. 50; R.S.1913, § 8051; C.S.1922, § 8992; C.S.1929, § 20-1510; R.S.1943, § 25-1510;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 25.
Annotations
Stay bond, when recorded, is a judgment within purview of statute providing for revivor of dormant judgments. Baker Steel & Machinery Co. v. Ferguson, 137 Neb. 578, 290 N.W. 449 (1940).
25-1511.
Stay of execution; recall of writ; duties of clerk and sheriff.When the surety is entered after execution issued, the clerk shall immediately notify the sheriff of the stay, and he shall forthwith return the execution, with his doings thereon.
Source:Laws 1875, § 7, p. 50; R.S.1913, § 8052; C.S.1922, § 8993; C.S.1929, § 20-1511; R.S.1943, § 25-1511.
25-1512.
Stay of execution; property and undertakings relinquished.All property levied on before stay of execution, and all written undertakings for the delivery of personal property to the sheriff, shall be relinquished by the officer upon stay of execution being entered.
Source:Laws 1875, § 8, p. 50; R.S.1913, § 8053; C.S.1922, § 8994; C.S.1929, § 20-1512; R.S.1943, § 25-1512.
25-1513.
Stay of execution; expiration; writ to issue; duty of clerk.At the expiration of the stay the clerk shall issue a joint execution against the property of all the judgment debtors and sureties, describing them as debtors or sureties therein.
Source:Laws 1875, § 9, p. 51; R.S.1913, § 8054; C.S.1922, § 8995; C.S.1929, § 20-1513; R.S.1943, § 25-1513.
Annotations
Mandamus will lie to compel issuance of execution against both principal and sureties. State ex rel. Thorn v. Fleming, 21 Neb. 321, 32 N.W. 73 (1887).
25-1514.
Stay of execution; judgment liens not released.Where a stay of execution has been taken, such confessed judgment shall not release any judgment lien by virtue of the original judgment for the amount then due. The officer holding the execution shall return thereon what amount was made from the principal debtor, and how much from the sureties.
Source:Laws 1875, § 10, p. 51; R.S.1913, § 8055; C.S.1922, § 8996; C.S.1929, § 20-1514; R.S.1943, § 25-1514.
Annotations
Remedy in aid of execution does not exclude relief in equity. Parsons v. Cathers, 92 Neb. 525, 138 N.W. 747 (1912).
25-1515.
Judgment; when dormant.If execution is not sued out within five years after the date of entry of any judgment that now is or may hereafter be rendered in any court of record in this state, or if five years have intervened between the date of the last execution issued on such judgment and the time of suing out another writ of execution thereon, such judgment, and all taxable costs in the action in which such judgment was obtained, shall become dormant and shall cease to operate as a lien on the estate of the judgment debtor.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 482, p. 473; R.S.1913, § 8056; C.S.1922, § 8997; Laws 1927, c. 67, § 1, p. 230; C.S.1929, § 20-1515; R.S.1943; § 25-1515;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 11.
Annotations
1. When applicable
2. When dormant
3. Effect
1. When applicable
This section is a statute of limitations. Buffalo County v. Kizzier, 250 Neb. 180, 548 N.W.2d 757 (1996).
Section applied to judgment for alimony. Miller v. Miller, 160 Neb. 766, 71 N.W.2d 478 (1955).
Statute of limitations is not a bar to enforcement of alimony decree. Nowka v. Nowka, 157 Neb. 57, 58 N.W.2d 600 (1953).
Decree for child support is not a judgment within the meaning of this section. Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890, 46 N.W.2d 618 (1951).
A decree for alimony is not a judgment within the meaning of this section. Lippincott v. Lippincott, 152 Neb. 374, 41 N.W.2d 232 (1950).
This section does not apply to a decree for the sale of specific real estate. Stanton v. Stanton, 146 Neb. 71, 18 N.W.2d 654 (1945); Medland v. Van Etten, 75 Neb. 794, 106 N.W. 1022 (1906); Herbage v. Ferree, 65 Neb. 451, 91 N.W. 408 (1902).
A decree for child support, rendered in a divorce action, does not become dormant because of the failure to issue execution thereon for more than five years. In re Application of Miller, 139 Neb. 242, 297 N.W. 91 (1941).
This section is not applicable to decree of foreclosure. Jenkins Land & Live Stock Co. v. Kimsey, 99 Neb. 308, 156 N.W. 499 (1916); St. Paul Harvester Works v. Huckfeldt, 96 Neb. 552, 148 N.W. 153 (1914).
Claim against insolvent estate is not a judgment. Sharp v. Citizens Bank of Stanton, 70 Neb. 758, 98 N.W. 50 (1904).
This section applies to judgments against a municipal corporation. Alter v. State ex rel. Kountze Bros., 62 Neb. 239, 86 N.W. 1080 (1901).
2. When dormant
The date on which a workers' compensation court award is filed in a district court pursuant to section 48-188 is the date of the judgment for purposes of computing when the judgment becomes dormant. Weber v. Gas `N Shop, 278 Neb. 49, 767 N.W.2d 746 (2009).
The dormancy provisions of this section apply to an award of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court which is filed in the district court pursuant to section 48-188, and the date on which a workers' compensation award is filed in the district court is the date of judgment for purposes of computing when the judgment becomes dormant. Allen v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 278 Neb. 41, 767 N.W.2d 502 (2009).
Issuance and return of execution without a levy is sufficient to prevent judgment from becoming dormant. Hein v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 167 Neb. 176, 92 N.W.2d 185 (1958).
Where executions were issued within five years, judgment did not become dormant. Filley v. Mancuso, 146 Neb. 493, 20 N.W.2d 318 (1945).
Commencement of suit to foreclose a judgment lien before judgment becomes dormant does not operate to continue the judgment in force beyond the period of five years from date of last execution. Rich v. Cooper, 136 Neb. 463, 286 N.W. 383 (1939).
Repeal of statute permitting recovery of a deficiency judgment does not prevent action to revive a dormant deficiency judgment. McCormack v. Murray, 133 Neb. 125, 274 N.W. 383 (1937).
A judgment becomes dormant and ceases to be a lien on real estate in five years from date thereof unless execution is sued out within such period, and a judgment revived is a lien on the real estate of judgment debtor from date of the order of revivor. Glissmann v. Happy Hollow Club, 132 Neb. 223, 271 N.W. 431 (1937).
Issuance and return of execution without actual levy are sufficient as against judgment debtor to preserve priority of lien. Glenn v. Glenn, 79 Neb. 68, 112 N.W. 321 (1907).
Sale of real estate under an execution issued on a dormant judgment is void as to purchaser from judgment debtor. Harvey v. Godding, 77 Neb. 289, 109 N.W. 220 (1906).
Filing transcript of judgment of justice in district court does not extend life of such judgment. Farmer's State Bank v. Bales, 64 Neb. 870, 90 N.W. 945 (1902).
Judgment becomes dormant when no execution is issued before expiration of five years. Dillon v. Chicago, K. & N. R. R. Co., 58 Neb. 472, 78 N.W. 927 (1899).
When a judgment becomes dormant, its lien is lost as against a mortgage made by the debtor during the life of the judgment. Flagg v. Flagg, 39 Neb. 229, 58 N.W. 109 (1894).
The count for dormancy begins on the date that the foreign judgment is brought to a state and registered. St. Joseph Dev. Corp. v. Sequenzia, 7 Neb. App. 759, 585 N.W.2d 511 (1998).
3. Effect
When a judgment becomes dormant, the lien is lost as to judgment debtor's grantee and is not revived by a new execution. Lammers Land & Cattle Co. v. Hans, 213 Neb. 243, 328 N.W.2d 759 (1983).
Where party fails to revive judgment within ten years after it becomes dormant, right of revivor is lost. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Merryman, 126 Neb. 684, 254 N.W. 428 (1934).
Where face of petition shows cause of action barred by statute of limitations, and there are no allegations tolling the statute, general demurrer will lie. Reed v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Assn., 122 Neb. 817, 241 N.W. 769 (1932).
Sale of real estate under execution on dormant judgment will be enjoined at suit of one who acquired title to property during life of judgment lien. Lincoln Upholstering Co. v. Baker, 82 Neb. 592, 118 N.W. 321 (1908).
Judgment ceases to be a lien upon real estate where more than five years have elapsed after rendition of judgment without any execution having been issued thereon. Allen v. Holt County, 81 Neb. 198, 115 N.W. 775 (1908).
Time in which injunction stood against the judgment would be excluded. Cotton v. First Nat. Bank of Superior, 51 Neb. 751, 71 N.W. 711 (1897).
Sale of real estate to satisfy dormant judgment is voidable only, and cannot be assailed in collateral proceeding. Link v. Connell, 48 Neb. 574, 67 N.W. 475 (1896)
Tax cannot be levied for payment of dormant judgment against municipality. State ex rel. Craig v. School Dist. No. 2 of Phelps County, 25 Neb. 301, 41 N.W. 155 (1888); Reynolds v. Cobb, 15 Neb. 378, 19 N.W. 502 (1884).
25-1516.
Writ of execution; levy on real property; when; service upon debtor; procedure; State Court Administrator; duties; claim of exemption; hearing; valuation of motor vehicle.(1) The writ of execution against the property of the debtor issuing from any court of record in this state shall command the officer to whom it is directed that of the goods and chattels of the debtor he or she cause to be made the money specified in the writ, and for want of goods and chattels he or she cause the same to be made of the lands and tenements of the debtor. The exact amount of the debt, damages, and costs for which the judgment is entered shall be endorsed on the execution.
(2) The writ of execution and a notice of exemptions form shall be issued by the clerk and served upon the debtor by the officer to whom the writ of execution is directed in the manner provided for service of process in civil cases, except that service by certified mail shall not be permitted unless the debtor is a nonresident of the State of Nebraska, in which event service shall be made by any method provided by law for service of process in civil cases.
(3) The State Court Administrator shall adopt and promulgate rules and regulations which specify uniform writs of execution and notice of exemptions forms for use in all courts in this state. The forms shall include the writ of execution and a notice of exemptions form.
(4) The notice of exemptions form shall include the following information:
(a) The caption of the lawsuit and the mailing address of the clerk of the court issuing the writ of execution; and
(b) The following notice to the debtor, in substantially the form below, which shall be printed in all capital letters immediately below the caption of the lawsuit and the address of the clerk of the court issuing the writ of execution:
NOTICE TO THE DEBTOR
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT THIS COURT ISSUED A WRIT OF EXECUTION IN THIS CASE DIRECTING THAT SOME OF YOUR PROPERTY BE SOLD ACCORDING TO LAW AND THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE BE DELIVERED TO THE CLERK OF THIS COURT TO BE USED TO SATISFY PART OR ALL OF YOUR DEBT TO THE CREDITOR. THE LAW OF NEBRASKA AND THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES THAT CERTAIN PROPERTY CANNOT BE TAKEN FROM YOU AND SOLD TO PAY A DEBT. THE KINDS OF PROPERTY THAT CANNOT BE TAKEN FROM YOU AND THE PROCEDURE FOR CLAIMING THE EXEMPTION ARE SET FORTH BELOW.
THE LAW EXEMPTS FROM EXECUTION YOUR INTEREST IN OR RIGHT TO PROPERTY SET OUT IN LAW AS FOLLOWS: (THE NOTICE SHALL INCLUDE A SCHEDULE OF EXEMPTIONS AND MUST INCLUDE THOSE EXEMPTIONS LISTED IN SECTIONS 25-1552, 25-1556, 25-1559, 25-1563.01, 25-1563.02, 40-101, 44-371, AND 44-1089).
IF YOU BELIEVE THAT SOME OF YOUR PROPERTY IS EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION YOU MAY REQUEST A HEARING BY CHECKING THE BOX ON THIS FORM AND MAILING OR DELIVERING THIS FORM TO THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THIS COURT SET FORTH ABOVE. YOU MAY ALSO HAVE TO PROVIDE A LIST OF YOUR PROPERTY AND THE VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY AT THE TIME YOU MAIL OR DELIVER YOUR REQUEST FOR HEARING. FAILURE TO CLAIM THE EXEMPTION WITHIN TWENTY DAYS OF THE DATE YOU RECEIVE THIS NOTICE MAY MEAN THAT THE PROPERTY SEIZED WILL BE SOLD AND THE PROCEEDS APPLIED TO YOUR DEBT.
IF YOU REQUEST A HEARING THE HEARING WILL BE CONDUCTED NO LATER THAN TEN DAYS AFTER THE COURT RECEIVES YOUR REQUEST, UNLESS YOU REQUEST AN EARLIER HEARING DATE DUE TO AN EMERGENCY, IN WHICH CASE THE COURT SHALL SCHEDULE THE HEARING AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
IF YOU WANT LEGAL REPRESENTATION YOU SHOULD CONTACT YOUR LAWYER IMMEDIATELY. IF YOU NEED THE NAME OF A LAWYER, CONTACT THE LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATION OR YOUR LOCAL LEGAL AID OR LEGAL SERVICES OFFICE.
................................................
REQUEST FOR HEARING
I believe that some of my seized property may be exempt from execution in this matter and request that a hearing be held no later than ten days after the delivery of this request to the court.
Debtor.........................
Address.........................
Telephone Number.........................
Signature.........................
(5) The debtor desiring to claim an exemption from execution shall file a request for hearing.
(6) The clerk of the court which issued the writ of execution shall provide notice of the filing of the request for hearing and the date and time of any hearing to the person holding the writ and to all parties. There shall be a hearing held within ten days of the filing of the request for hearing unless the need for hearing is an emergency, in which case the court shall schedule the hearing as soon as practicable after the request is made. The hearing may be by conference telephone call if permitted by the court.
(7) At the hearing, the court shall determine the debtor's entitlement to the claimed exemption, whether the amount is owed on the judgment, and the value of the property claimed to be exempt and shall issue an exemption order after the hearing ordering the officer to sell the nonexempt property according to law and return the exempt property to the debtor immediately.
(8) If any of the personal property claimed to be exempt from execution by the debtor is a motor vehicle as defined in section 60-638, the cash value of such motor vehicle for purposes of the exemption may be determined by reference to a source of relevant fact commonly used in the motor vehicle industry to determine such value.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 483, p. 474; R.S.1913, § 8057; C.S.1922, § 8998; C.S.1929, § 20-1516; R.S.1943, § 25-1516;
Laws 1993, LB 458, § 10.
Annotations
Under this section, a judgment creditor can obtain a writ of execution only to levy on the judgment debtor’s personal or real property interests. Fox v. Whitbeck, 286 Neb. 134, 835 N.W.2d 638 (2013).
Unless a judgment creditor shows that a judgment debtor has fraudulently transferred real property to avoid creditors, the relevant question for the remedy of execution is whether the debtor has any interest in the property. Fox v. Whitbeck, 286 Neb. 134, 835 N.W.2d 638 (2013).
One holding judgment as trustee of an express trust is entitled to enforce same for beneficial owners. German Nat. Bank of Hastings v. First Nat. Bank of Hastings, 59 Neb. 7, 80 N.W. 48 (1899).
If personal property is insufficient to pay debt, sheriff may at same time levy on real property, personal property being sold first. Runge v. Brown, 29 Neb. 116, 45 N.W. 271 (1890).
A civil writ of execution by itself does not justify the search of a home which would otherwise be an illegal search. State v. Griess, 11 Neb. App. 389, 651 N.W.2d 859 (2002).
25-1517.
Several writs of execution; preference.When two or more writs of execution against the same debtor are delivered to the officer on the same day, no preference shall be given to either of such writs; but if a sufficient sum of money is not made to satisfy all executions, the amount made shall be distributed to the several creditors in proportion to the amount of their respective demands. In all other cases the writ of execution first delivered to the officer shall be first satisfied; and it shall be the duty of the officer to endorse on every writ of execution the time when he or she received the writ. This section shall not be construed as to affect any preferable lien which one or more of the judgments on which execution issued may have on the lands of the judgment debtor.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 484, p. 474; R.S.1913, § 8058; C.S.1922, § 8999; C.S.1929, § 20-1517; R.S.1943, § 25-1517;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 12.
Annotations
Judgments transcripted from justice court do not prorate with judgments rendered during term. Moores v. Peycke, 44 Neb. 405, 62 N.W. 1072 (1895).
Hour of receipt is not required on execution from justice or county court. Johnson v. Walker, 23 Neb. 736, 37 N.W. 639 (1888).
Executions delivered to officer on same day prorate and apply to proceedings before justice of peace. State ex rel. Philpott v. Hunger, 17 Neb. 216, 22 N.W. 457 (1885).
25-1518.
Levy of execution.The officer to whom a writ of execution is delivered shall proceed immediately to levy the same upon the goods and chattels of the debtor; but if no goods and chattels can be found, the officer shall endorse on the writ of execution no goods, and forthwith levy the writ of execution upon the lands and tenements of the debtor, which may be liable to satisfy the judgment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 485, p. 474; R.S.1913, § 8059; C.S.1922, § 9000; C.S.1929, § 20-1518; R.S.1943, § 25-1518.
Cross References
Execution against partnership or unincorporated associations, see section 25-316.
Annotations
Unless a judgment creditor shows that a judgment debtor has fraudulently transferred real property to avoid creditors, the relevant question for the remedy of execution is whether the debtor has any interest in the property. Fox v. Whitbeck, 286 Neb. 134, 835 N.W.2d 638 (2013).
Absent exigent circumstances, the rule which applies before an officer may enter a home to seize property or arrest a person also applies to entering to secure property in satisfaction of a judgment. Such execution warrant should be obtained in a manner similar to that provided in sections 29-830 to 29-835 relating to inspection warrants. State v. Hinchey, 220 Neb. 825, 374 N.W.2d 14 (1985).
Where execution is levied on real estate fraudulently transferred, execution creditor may proceed in equity to set aside sale; return not necessary. Howard v. Raymers, 64 Neb. 213, 89 N.W. 1004 (1902).
Levy is effective though officer trespasses. Battle Creek Valley Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Madison, 62 Neb. 825, 88 N.W. 145 (1901).
Growing crops are personal property. Sims v. Jones, 54 Neb. 769, 75 N.W. 150 (1898).
Where personalty is sold before realty, latter may be levied on before advertisement and sale of former. Runge v. Brown, 29 Neb. 116, 45 N.W. 271 (1890).
Levy upon growing crops does not require any act on the part of the officer which, but for the protection of the writ, would make him a trespasser. Johnson v. Walker, 23 Neb. 736, 37 N.W. 639 (1888).
Return of execution after levy without sale does not prevent plaintiff from issuing another execution on same property. Reynolds v. Cobb, 15 Neb. 378, 19 N.W. 502 (1884).
A manual interference with chattels is not essential to a valid levy thereon. State v. Griess, 11 Neb. App. 389, 651 N.W.2d 859 (2002).
25-1519.
Repealed. Laws 1967, c. 147, § 1, p. 444.
25-1520.
Repealed. Laws 1967, c. 147, § 1, p. 444.
25-1521.
Intervening claimants; proceedings to ascertain title.If the officer, by virtue of any writ of execution issued from any court of record in this state, shall levy the same on any goods and chattels claimed by any person other than the defendant, such officer shall give notice in writing to the court, in which shall be set forth the names of the plaintiff and defendant, together with the name of the claimant. At the same time such officer shall furnish the court with a schedule of the property claimed. Immediately upon the filing of such notice and schedule, the court shall determine the right of the claimant to the property in controversy.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 486, p. 474; R.S.1913, § 8062; C.S.1922, § 9003; C.S.1929, § 20-1521; R.S.1943, § 25-1521;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 131; Laws 1973, LB 226, § 13; Laws 2018, LB193, § 26.
Annotations
Sheriff does not receive additional compensation for services under this section. Muinch v. Hull, 181 Neb. 571, 149 N.W.2d 527 (1967).
Failure of sheriff to comply with this section, when property is claimed by third person, does not fix liability on sheriff. Miller v. Crosson, 131 Neb. 88, 267 N.W. 145 (1936).
Sheriff may bring suit hereunder to try claim to personal property attached by him. Leadabrand v. State, 121 Neb. 836, 238 N.W. 656 (1931).
An intervening claimant does not have a statutory right to a jury trial pursuant to the provisions of this section through section 25-1523. Eli's, Inc. v. Commercial Lithographing, Inc., 8 Neb. App. 752, 601 N.W.2d 795 (1999).
25-1522.
Intervening claimants; proceedings to ascertain title; procedure; judgment; effect.If the court shall find the right to said goods and chattels, or any part thereof, to be in the claimant, the court shall also find the value thereof, and shall render judgment for the claimant, that he recover his costs against the plaintiff in execution, or other party to the same for whose benefit the execution issued, and also that he have restitution of said goods and chattels, or any part thereof. But if the right of the goods and chattels, and every part thereof, shall not be in the claimant, then the court shall render judgment on such finding, in favor of the plaintiff in execution, or other party for whose benefit the same was issued and levied, against the claimant for costs, and award execution thereon. Such judgment for the claimant, unless an undertaking shall be executed as provided in section 25-1523, shall be a justification of the officer in returning no goods to the writ of execution by virtue of which the levy has been made, as to such part of the goods and chattels as were found to belong to such claimant.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 487, p. 475; R.S.1913, § 8063; C.S.1922, § 9004; C.S.1929, § 20-1522; R.S.1943, § 25-1522;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 132; Laws 1973, LB 226, § 14.
Annotations
Order by justice for restitution of the property is not judicial order but is only to apprise officer of result of inquisition. Fidler v. Adair, 109 Neb. 404, 191 N.W. 683 (1922).
Procedure after verdict stated. Bray v. Saaman, 13 Neb. 518, 14 N.W. 474 (1882); Storms v. Eaton, 5 Neb. 453 (1877).
25-1523.
Intervening claimants; proceedings before jury to ascertain title; levy notwithstanding verdict; bond.If the jury shall find the property, or any part thereof, to be in the claimant, and the plaintiff in execution shall, at any time within three days after said trial, tender to the sheriff or other officer having such property in his custody on execution, an undertaking, with good and sufficient sureties, payable to such claimant, in double the amount of the value of such property as assessed by the jury, to the effect that they will pay all damages sustained by reason of the detention or sale of such property, then the sheriff or other officer shall deliver said undertaking to claimant, and proceed to sell such property as if no such trial of the right of property had taken place, and shall not be liable to the claimant therefor.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 488, p. 475; R.S.1913, § 8064; C.S.1922, § 9005; C.S.1929, § 20-1523; R.S.1943, § 25-1523.
Annotations
Proceedings are not final adjudication of claimant's rights. Fidler v. Adair, 109 Neb. 404, 191 N.W. 683 (1922).
25-1524.
Goods unsold; delivery bond.In all cases where a sheriff, coroner, or other officer, shall by virtue of an execution, levy upon any goods and chattels which shall remain upon his hands unsold, for want of bidders, for the want of time to advertise and sell, or any other reasonable cause, the officer may, for his own security, take of the defendant an undertaking, with security in such sum as he may deem sufficient, to the effect that the said property shall be delivered to the officer holding an execution for the sale of the same, at the time and place appointed by said officer, either by notice given in writing to said defendant in execution, or by advertisement, published in a newspaper printed in the county, naming therein the day and place of sale. If the defendant shall fail to deliver the goods and chattels at the time and place mentioned in the notice to him given, or to pay to the officer holding the execution, the full value of said goods and chattels, or the amount of said debts and costs, the undertaking, given as aforesaid, shall be considered as broken, and may be proceeded on as in other cases.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 489, p. 476; R.S.1913, § 8065; C.S.1922, § 9006; C.S.1929, § 20-1524; R.S.1943, § 25-1524.
25-1525.
Goods unsold; additional writ; notice of sale.The officer who levies upon goods and chattels by virtue of an execution issued by a court of record, before he proceeds to sell the same, shall cause public notice to be given of the time and place of sale. The notice shall be given by publication once in each week for four successive weeks in some newspaper printed in the county, or in case no newspaper be printed therein, by posting notice in five public places in the county, two in the precinct where the sale is to be held. Where goods and chattels levied upon cannot be sold for want of bidders, the officer making such return shall annex to the execution a true and perfect inventory of such goods and chattels, and the plaintiff in such execution may thereupon sue out another writ of execution, directing the sale of the property levied upon as aforesaid; but such goods and chattels shall not be sold unless public notice of the time and place of sale has been given as hereinbefore provided.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 490, p. 476; R.S.1913, § 8066; C.S.1922, § 9007; C.S.1929, § 20-1525; R.S.1943, § 25-1525;
Laws 1971, LB 47, § 3.
Annotations
This section adopts the writ of venditioni exponas under which an officer is commanded to sell property already levied upon. Burkett v. Clark, 46 Neb. 466, 64 N.W. 1113 (1895).
25-1526.
Additional writ; goods unsold insufficient; further levy and sale.When any writ shall issue, directing the sale of property previously taken in execution, the officer issuing said writ shall, at the request of the person entitled to the benefit thereof, his agent or attorney, add thereto a command to the officer to whom such writ shall be directed, that if the property remaining in his hands not sold shall, in his opinion, be insufficient to satisfy the judgment, he shall levy the same upon the lands and tenements, goods and chattels, or either, as the law shall permit, being the property of the judgment debtor, sufficient to satisfy the debt.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 491, p. 476; R.S.1913, § 8067; C.S.1922, § 9008; C.S.1929, § 20-1526; R.S.1943, § 25-1526.
25-1527.
Sale of land; prior sale set aside; readvertisement.The officer holding such writ shall immediately advertise and sell said real estate, lands and tenements agreeable to the provisions of this chapter, and shall readvertise and sell the same in case a prior sale has been set aside by the district court or a judge thereof. In case the real estate offered for sale shall not be sold for want of bidders, the sheriff shall, at the request of the plaintiff, readvertise and again offer said property for sale under the said writ.
Source:Laws 1875, § 4, p. 61; R.S.1913, § 8071; Laws 1915, c. 149, § 1, p. 319; C.S.1922, § 9009; C.S.1929, § 20-1527; R.S.1943, § 25-1527.
Annotations
Amendatory act of 1915 was not unconstitutional; appraisal is no longer prerequisite to sale of land under execution of foreclosure decree. Conservative Savings & Loan Assn. of Omaha v. Anderson, 116 Neb. 627, 218 N.W. 423 (1928); Norris v. Tower, 102 Neb. 434, 167 N.W. 728 (1918).
Until bid is accepted it is a mere proposal and may be withdrawn by bidder. Strode v. Hoagland, 76 Neb. 542, 107 N.W. 754 (1906).
Notice of sale, published every issue of weekly newspaper for thirty days before sale, is sufficient. Cuyler v. Tate, 67 Neb. 317, 93 N.W. 675 (1903).
There is no statutory authority for adjournment of sale. Fraaman v. Fraaman, 64 Neb. 472, 90 N.W. 245 (1902).
Sale must be made in accordance with terms of decree, and terms cannot be changed by agreement of parties. Nebraska Loan & Trust Co. v. Hamer, 40 Neb. 281, 58 N.W. 695 (1894).
Rule requiring bidder to put up fifty dollars as guarantee of good faith before acceptance of bid was not unreasonable. Michigan Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Klatt, 5 Neb. Unof. 305, 98 N.W. 436 (1904).
Tract of two hundred acres, mortgaged as a whole, may be sold in one tract. Pierce v. Reed, 3 Neb. Unof. 874, 93 N.W. 154 (1903).
If plaintiff is purchaser, cash payment is not essential. Campbell v. Gawlewicz, 3 Neb. Unof. 321, 91 N.W. 569 (1902).
Sheriff may be justified in refusing to sell on account of complicated condition of title. Porter v. Trompen, 2 Neb. Unof. 76, 96 N.W. 226 (1901).
25-1528.
Successive executions or orders of sale; when authorized.Successive executions or orders of sale may issue at any time after the return of the officer not sold for want of bidders at the request of the plaintiff or his attorney.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 495, p. 477; R.S.1913, § 8073; Laws 1915, c. 149, § 2, p. 319; C.S.1922, § 9010; C.S.1929, § 20-1528; R.S.1943, § 25-1528.
Annotations
Amendatory act of 1915 was not unconstitutional; appraisement is no longer prerequisite to sale of land under execution of foreclosure decree. Conservative Savings & Loan Assn. of Omaha v. Anderson, 116 Neb. 627, 218 N.W. 423 (1928).
25-1529.
Sale of land; notice; publication; effect of failure to publish.Lands and tenements taken in execution shall not be sold until the officer causes public notice of the time and place of sale to be given. The notice shall be given by publication once each week for four successive weeks in some newspaper printed in the county, or, in case no newspaper be printed in the county, in some newspaper in general circulation therein, and by posting a notice on the courthouse door, and in five other public places in the county, two of which shall be in the precinct where such lands and tenements lie. All sales made without such notice shall be set aside on motion, by the court to which the execution is returnable.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 497, p. 478; R.S.1913, § 8075; C.S.1922, § 9011; C.S.1929, § 20-1529; R.S.1943, § 25-1529;
Laws 1971, LB 47, § 4.
Annotations
1. Publication
2. Sufficiency
3. Confirmation
4. Effect
1. Publication
The requirements of section 25-520.01 apply to a publication of notice given under this section governing sales on execution. KLH Retirement Planning v. Okwumuo, 263 Neb. 760, 642 N.W.2d 801 (2002).
Notice is required to be published during the thirty days. State ex rel. Harris v. Hanson, 80 Neb. 724, 115 N.W. 294 (1908), affirmed on rehearing 80 Neb. 738, 117 N.W. 412 (1908); Young v. Figg, 76 Neb. 526, 107 N.W. 788 (1906).
"Newspaper" defined. Merrill v. Conroy, 77 Neb. 228, 109 N.W. 175 (1906); Turney v. Blomstrom, 62 Neb. 616, 87 N.W. 339 (1901); Hanscom v. Meyer, 60 Neb. 68, 82 N.W. 114 (1900).
Notice must be published in all regular issues. Stevens v. Naylor, 75 Neb. 325, 106 N.W. 446 (1905).
Publication in every issue of weekly newspaper for thirty days before sale is sufficient. Cuyler v. Tate, 67 Neb. 317, 93 N.W. 675 (1903).
If sale is postponed it must be readvertised. Fraaman v. Fraaman, 64 Neb. 472, 90 N.W. 245 (1902).
"Printed" is equivalent to "published"; no objection that paper is partly printed out of county. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wortaszewski, 63 Neb. 636, 88 N.W. 855 (1902).
In weekly newspaper, notice should be published in every issue for five consecutive weeks; affidavit should be after last publication. Nebraska Land, Stock-Growing & Investment Co. v. McKinley-Lanning Loan & Trust Co., 52 Neb. 410, 72 N.W. 357 (1897).
Paper need not have general circulation in any particular city or portion of county. Smith v. Foxworthy, 39 Neb. 214, 57 N.W. 994 (1894).
Sale on thirtieth day after first publication is improper. Wyant v. Tuthill, 17 Neb. 495, 23 N.W. 342 (1885).
Posting notices is unnecessary if notice was published. Parrat v. Neligh, 7 Neb. 456 (1878).
Return of sheriff is prima facie proof of due publication. Advertising more for sale than authorized does not invalidate notice. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 1 Neb. Unof. 36, 95 N.W. 357 (1901).
2. Sufficiency
The phrase "on the courthouse door", as found in this section, is to be given a practical and reasonable interpretation, rather than a literal and technical construction, and a notice of public sale posted on a bulletin board near the courthouse door satisfies the statute's requirements. Kleeb v. Kleeb, 210 Neb. 637, 316 N.W.2d 583 (1982).
Notice first published thirty days before sale and continued in every issue until sale, without publication on day of sale, is sufficient. Publisher's affidavit, presumption. Mallory v. Patterson, 63 Neb. 429, 88 N.W. 686 (1902).
Notice correctly designating land by county, town, range and part of section is sufficient. Cross v. Leidich, 63 Neb. 420, 88 N.W. 667 (1902).
Notice is sufficient if description of property is reasonably certain. Stull v. Seymour, 63 Neb. 87, 88 N.W. 174 (1901).
Notice stating sale was under decree in case, giving title, is sufficient. Pearson v. Badger Lumber Co., 60 Neb. 167, 82 N.W. 374 (1900).
Description following decree is generally sufficient. Miller v. Lanham, 35 Neb. 886, 53 N.W. 1010 (1892).
One notice thirty days prior is insufficient. Lawson v. Gibson, 18 Neb. 137, 24 N.W. 447 (1885).
Proper but unnecessary to state amount of foreclosure decree. Gallentine v. Cummings, 4 Neb. Unof. 690, 96 N.W. 178 (1903).
3. Confirmation
Sale of lands upon execution must be conducted substantially in manner prescribed in notice and in accordance with the decree, and court should refuse to confirm sale not so conducted. Farmers Security Bank of Maywood v. Wood, 132 Neb. 175, 271 N.W. 349 (1937).
Where sale is confirmed without objection, confirmation settles and adjudicates sufficiency of publication in absence of fraud. Fisher v. Kellogg, 128 Neb. 248, 258 N.W. 404 (1935).
Objections to confirmation of sale not urged in trial court are not available on appeal. Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Mockett, 55 Neb. 323, 75 N.W. 845 (1898).
4. Effect
Notice required by this section is to inform the public of the nature of the property, place, date, and terms of sale. Hollstein v. Adams, 187 Neb. 781, 194 N.W.2d 216 (1972).
25-1530.
Foreclosure; redemption of land from levy and sale; rights of mortgagor; terminated, when.(1) The owners of any real estate against which a decree of foreclosure has been rendered in any court of record, or any real estate levied upon to satisfy any judgment or decree of any kind, may redeem the same from the lien of such decree or levy at any time before the sale of the same shall be confirmed by a court of competent jurisdiction by paying into court the amount of such decree or judgment together with all interests and costs. If such real estate has been sold to any person not a party plaintiff to the suit, the person so redeeming the same shall pay to such purchaser twelve percent interest on the amount of the purchase price from the date of the sale to the date of redemption or deposit the same with the clerk of the court where the decree or judgment was rendered.
(2) Subject to the right of redemption under subsection (1) of this section and the confirmation of the sale under section 25-1531, all right, title, interest, and claim of the mortgagor and his or her successors in interest, and of all persons claiming by, through, and under the mortgagor and his or her successors in interest, in and to the property sold, including all such right, title, interest, and claim in and to such property acquired by the mortgagor or his or her successors in interest subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, shall be deemed terminated as of the time the sheriff or master commissioner accepts the highest bid at the sale.
Source:Laws 1875, § 1, p. 57; R.S.1913, § 8076; C.S.1922, § 9012; C.S.1929, § 20-1530; R.S.1943, § 25-1530;
Laws 2004, LB 999, § 22.
Annotations
1. Rights of purchaser
2. Rights to redeem
3. Time to redeem
1. Rights of purchaser
Owner may redeem at any time before confirmation by payment of decree, interest and costs, and where land is sold to a person not a party plaintiff, interest to the purchaser at twelve per cent per annum on the purchase price. County of Madison v. Crippen, 143 Neb. 474, 10 N.W.2d 260 (1943).
Owner of foreclosed real estate has right to redeem before sale by paying amount of decree, but after sale must, in addition, pay to bidder twelve percent interest on amount of bid. Knox County v. Perry, 142 Neb. 678, 7 N.W.2d 475 (1943).
2. Rights to redeem
Equity of redemption of defendant is an interest in the land which judgment creditor has right to sell on execution to satisfy its lien. Farmers Security Bank of Maywood v. Wood, 132 Neb. 175, 271 N.W. 349 (1937).
After decree of foreclosure of a prior mortgage, in action to which junior encumbrancer was a party, the latter cannot then redeem from the prior mortgage and claim a decree of subrogation; his rights are sufficiently protected by the opportunity to purchase at the sale, or pay off prior encumbrance before sale. Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763, 266 N.W. 577 (1936).
Redemption is allowable by Supreme Court pending appeal; amount party seeking must pay and what he must do to redeem stated; right is not affected by discharge in bankruptcy. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn. v. Anderson, 115 Neb. 199, 212 N.W. 210 (1927).
Mortgagor owing duty to pay taxes, cannot purchase property at tax foreclosure sale. Pitman v. Boner, 81 Neb. 736, 116 N.W. 778 (1908).
Supreme Court on appeal may entertain application to redeem, and determine amount due. Thesing v. Westergren, 75 Neb. 387, 106 N.W. 438 (1905).
Plaintiff in action for redemption may redeem his interest by paying his equitable proportion of debt. Dougherty v. Kubat, 67 Neb. 269, 93 N.W. 317 (1903).
Upon redemption from lien, cotenant is subrogated to rights of lien creditor. Epp v. Bicknell, 138 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1943).
3. Time to redeem
Owners of real estate may redeem from tax sale at any time prior to confirmation, and provision for redemption is not violative of the Constitution. Lincoln County v. Shuman, 138 Neb. 84, 292 N.W. 30 (1940).
Owner may redeem from sale under tax lien before final order on appeal in Supreme Court; amount payable is the same as for redemption from mortgage foreclosure. Mummert v. Grant, 118 Neb. 651, 225 N.W. 773 (1929).
Action to redeem may be brought any time before the statutory bar of ten years is complete. Dickson v. Stewart, 71 Neb. 424, 98 N.W. 1085 (1904).
When appeal from order of confirmation is taken and bond given, mortgagor may redeem any time prior to decision by Supreme Court. Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Gustus, 55 Neb. 435, 75 N.W. 1107 (1898).
An action to redeem from foreclosure by an owner, not a party and not served, may be brought any time within ten years after cause of action accrued. Dorsey v. Conrad, 49 Neb. 443, 68 N.W. 645 (1896).
Title to foreclosed land remains in mortgagor or his grantee until actual execution of sheriff's deed in foreclosure. In re Worley, 50 F.Supp. 611 (D. Neb. 1943).
25-1531.
Mortgage foreclosure; confirmation of sale; grounds for refusing to confirm; time; motion; notice.If the court, upon the return of any writ of execution or order of sale for the satisfaction of which any lands and tenements have been sold, after having carefully examined the proceedings of the officer, is satisfied that the sale has in all respects been made in conformity to the provisions of this chapter and that the property was sold for fair value, under the circumstances and conditions of the sale, or that a subsequent sale would not realize a greater amount, the court shall enter upon the record an order that the court is satisfied of the legality of such sale, and an order that the officer make the purchaser a deed of such lands and tenements. Prior to the confirmation of sale pursuant to this section, the party seeking confirmation of sale shall, except in the circumstances described in section 40-103, provide notice to the debtor informing him or her of the homestead exemption procedure available pursuant to Chapter 40, article 1. The notice shall be given by certified mailing at least ten days prior to any hearing on confirmation of sale. The officer on making such sale may retain the purchase money in his or her hands until the court has examined his or her proceedings as aforesaid, when he or she shall pay the same to the person entitled thereto, agreeable to the order of the court. If such sale pertains to mortgaged premises being sold under foreclosure proceedings and the amount of such sale is less than the amount of the decree rendered in such proceedings, the court may refuse to confirm such sale, if, in its opinion, such mortgaged premises have a fair and reasonable value equal to or greater than the amount of the decree. The court shall in any case condition the confirmation of such sale upon such terms or under such conditions as may be just and equitable. The judge of any district court may confirm any sale at any time after such officer has made his or her return, on motion and ten days' notice to the adverse party or his or her attorney of record, if made in vacation, and such notice shall include information on the homestead exemption procedure available pursuant to Chapter 40, article 1. When any sale is confirmed in vacation the judge confirming the same shall cause his or her order to be entered on the record by the clerk. Upon application to the court by the judgment debtor within sixty days after the confirmation of any sale confirmed pursuant to this section, such sale shall be set aside if the court finds that the party seeking confirmation of sale failed to provide notice to the judgment debtor regarding homestead exemption procedures at least ten days prior to the confirmation of sale as required by this section.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 498, p. 478; Laws 1875, § 1, p. 38; R.S.1913, § 8077; Laws 1915, c. 149, § 3, p. 319; C.S.1922, § 9013; C.S.1929, § 20-1531; Laws 1933, c. 45, § 1, p. 254; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1531; R.S.1943, § 25-1531;
Laws 1983, LB 107, § 1; Laws 1983, LB 447, § 42; Laws 2018, LB193, § 27.
Annotations
1. Adequacy of price
2. Notice
3. Confirmation
4. Grounds for refusing to confirm
5. Miscellaneous
1. Adequacy of price
Confirmation of a mortgage foreclosure sale will not be reversed for inadequacy of price, in the absence of a showing of fraud, or shocking discrepancy between the value and sale price, or prospects of a higher bid on resale. Nebraska Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Patterson, 212 Neb. 29, 321 N.W.2d 71 (1982); Forsythe v. Bermel, 138 Neb. 802, 295 N.W. 693 (1941); Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Curry, 138 Neb. 741, 295 N.W. 282 (1940).
Confirmation of tax sale should be vacated during same term where sale price was inadequate. County of Scotts Bluff v. Bristol, 159 Neb. 634, 68 N.W.2d 197 (1955).
Where sale price is inadequate, it is duty of court to deny confirmation of execution sale. Ehlers v. Campbell, 147 Neb. 572, 23 N.W.2d 727 (1946).
Confirmation of sale should be reversed where plaintiff offers no positive evidence as to value and defendant's evidence shows sale price was far below the land's value. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Popham, 137 Neb. 529, 290 N.W. 423 (1940).
Inadequacy of price will not prevent confirmation of a sheriff's sale of land under a decree foreclosing a mortgage thereon, unless the price is so low as to shock the conscience of the court or to evidence fraud. Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Smith, 135 Neb. 618, 283 N.W. 371 (1939); Conservative Savings & Loan Assn. v. Mancuso, 134 Neb. 779, 279 N.W. 725 (1938).
Mere inadequacy of price will not preclude a confirmation of a judicial sale, unless it is so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court or amount to evidence of fraud. Department of Banking v. Modrow, 134 Neb. 336, 278 N.W. 559 (1938); Buchanan v. Rahmeyer, 134 Neb. 331, 278 N.W. 558 (1938); United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Pamp, 83 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1936).
On motion to confirm sale, a finding that a subsequent sale would not realize a greater amount is sufficient to sustain decree of confirmation without a further finding that said property sold for fair value. Erwin v. Brunke, 133 Neb. 745, 277 N.W. 48 (1938).
There are no restrictions upon the means by which the trial court may satisfy itself that a fair price was obtained. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Beal, 122 Neb. 40, 239 N.W. 202 (1931).
2. Notice
Court should refuse to confirm sale upon proper objections, where it is evident sale was not conducted in substantial conformance with the notice and with decree. Farmers Security Bank of Maywood v. Wood, 132 Neb. 175, 271 N.W. 349 (1937).
Notice is not necessary to confirmation at chambers of administrator's sale to pay debts. Brusha v. Phipps, 86 Neb. 822, 126 N.W. 856 (1910).
Ten days' notice is jurisdictional to confirmation in vacation. Armstrong v. Middlestadt, 22 Neb. 711, 36 N.W. 151 (1888).
3. Confirmation
Confirmation of judicial sales rests largely within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reviewed except for manifest abuse of such discretion. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Siegel, 279 Neb. 174, 777 N.W.2d 259 (2010).
Only matters which can be inquired into upon confirmation of sale are the steps which the law requires shall be had for satisfaction of the decree. Scotts Bluff County v. Frank, 144 Neb. 512, 13 N.W.2d 900 (1944).
A bid at an execution sale, made to be effective upon confirmation of sale and possession, is an unconditional bid, and is properly confirmed. Holferty v. Wortman, 135 Neb. 732, 283 N.W. 855 (1939).
Confirmation of a mortgage foreclosure sale of realty will not be disturbed unless there is such inadequacy of price as to show fraud or mistake. Lorenzen v. Stobbe, 134 Neb. 796, 279 N.W. 774 (1938).
Allowing bidder to increase bid on hearing for confirmation of mortgage foreclosure sale was not error, if owner is not injured. Gordon State Bank v. Hinchley, 117 Neb. 211, 220 N.W. 243 (1928).
Sale should be confirmed though order of sale was not returned within sixty days of issuance. Siwooganock Guaranty Sav. Bank v. Feltz, 84 Neb. 706, 121 N.W. 967 (1909).
Ordinarily duty is to confirm sale. Omaha Loan & Building Assn. v. Hendee, 77 Neb. 12, 108 N.W. 190 (1906); Strode v. Hoagland, 76 Neb. 542, 107 N.W. 754 (1906).
Interest runs until confirmation. Trompen v. Hammond, 61 Neb. 446, 85 N.W. 436 (1901).
Confirmation should be made by court only after careful examination of proceedings, and being satisfied that law has been complied with. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Creighton Theatre Bldg. Co., 54 Neb. 228, 74 N.W. 583 (1898).
Adjudicates only regularity of proceedings by sheriff in levy, appraisement, advertising, making and returning sale. Best v. Zutavern, 53 Neb. 619, 74 N.W. 81 (1898).
Confirmation may be had at chambers. Beatrice Paper Co. v. Beloit Iron Works, 46 Neb. 900, 65 N.W. 1059 (1896).
Confirmation may be made at adjourned term. Nebraska Loan & Trust Co. v. Hamer, 40 Neb. 281, 58 N.W. 695 (1894).
Confirmation cures all irregularities in proceedings. O'Brien v. Gaslin, 20 Neb. 347, 30 N.W. 274 (1886).
Conditional confirmation is unauthorized. Fitch & Co. v. Minshall, 15 Neb. 328, 18 N.W. 80 (1883).
Purchaser is bound by confirmation; entitled to order to compel sheriff to make deed and may be compelled to take same. Phillips v. Dawley, 1 Neb. 320 (1871).
At chambers, authority is limited to confirmation of sale; cannot grant writ of assistance. Hartsuff v. Huss, 2 Neb. Unof. 145, 95 N.W. 1070 (1901).
4. Grounds for refusing to confirm
Defect of parties defendant was not ground for refusing confirmation of mortgage foreclosure sale. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Diefenbaugh, 129 Neb. 59, 260 N.W. 689 (1935).
Confirmation by judge who as attorney commenced foreclosure is void. Harrington v. Hayes County, 81 Neb. 231, 115 N.W. 773 (1908).
Confirmation does not validate void sale. Jenkins Land & Live Stock Co. v. Attwood, 80 Neb. 806, 115 N.W. 305 (1908).
5. Miscellaneous
An appellate court reviews a court’s order confirming an execution sale or a judicial sale for abuse of discretion. Fox v. Whitbeck, 286 Neb. 134, 835 N.W.2d 638 (2013).
Unless a judgment creditor shows that a judgment debtor has fraudulently transferred real property to avoid creditors, the relevant question for the remedy of execution is whether the debtor has any interest in the property. Fox v. Whitbeck, 286 Neb. 134, 835 N.W.2d 638 (2013).
A court retains jurisdiction after confirmation of a judicial sale when there are special situations which have worked an injustice unknown to the complaining party, such as fraud, accident, or mistake. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Heim, 223 Neb. 75, 388 N.W.2d 106 (1986).
Decree complied with requirements of the statute. Curyea v. Fry, 133 Neb. 894, 277 N.W. 598 (1938).
Amendatory act of 1915 was not unconstitutional; appraisal is no longer prerequisite to sale of land under execution of foreclosure decree. Conservative Savings & Loan Assn. v. Anderson, 116 Neb. 627, 218 N.W. 423 (1928); Norris v. Tower, 102 Neb. 434, 167 N.W. 728 (1918).
Court is vendor and may reject any bid or vacate any erroneous or improvident order. Prudential Real Estate Co. v. Hall, 79 Neb. 808, 116 N.W. 40 (1908).
Plaintiff is not entitled to proceeds until sale is confirmed. Craw v. Abrams, 68 Neb. 546, 94 N.W. 639 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 68 Neb. 553, 97 N.W. 296 (1903).
Finding that sale was conducted legally was substantial compliance with this section. Nebraska Land, Stock-Growing and Investment Co. v. Cutting, 51 Neb. 647, 71 N.W. 312 (1897).
Statute contemplates that officer making sale shall distribute proceeds. Fire Association of Philadelphia v. Ruby, 49 Neb. 584, 68 N.W. 939 (1896).
Must affirmatively appear that all statutory provisions have been complied with or sale is invalid. Gundry v. Brown, 1 Neb. Unof. 877, 96 N.W. 610 (1901).
Farm debtor was entitled to injunction restraining sheriff from executing writ of assistance, where debtor, after sale, filed petition for composition or extension. In re Kalina, 9 F.Supp. 170 (D. Neb. 1934).
25-1532.
Sale upon execution; deed to purchaser.The sheriff or other officer who, upon such writ or writs of execution, shall sell lands and tenements, or any part thereof, shall make to the purchaser or purchasers thereof as good and sufficient a deed of conveyance of lands and tenements sold as the person or persons against whom such writ or writs of execution were issued could have made of the same at the time they became liable to the judgment, or at any time thereafter.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 499, p. 478; R.S.1913, § 8078; C.S.1922, § 9014; C.S.1929, § 20-1532; R.S.1943, § 25-1532.
Annotations
Sheriff's deed of homestead on judgment against husband alone will not divest debtor of title. Van Doren v. Wiedeman, 68 Neb. 243, 94 N.W. 124 (1903).
Unless decreed otherwise foreclosure transfers to purchaser every right and interest in the property of all parties to action. Hart v. Beardsley, 67 Neb. 145, 93 N.W. 423 (1903).
Where judgment is prematurely entered, error must be brought to attention of court entering it before action can be reviewed on appeal. Ley v. Pilger, 59 Neb. 561, 81 N.W. 507 (1900).
Purchaser at execution sale becomes vested with such title and right as were in the judgment debtor at the time the lien of the judgment attached. Orr v. Broad, 52 Neb. 490, 72 N.W. 850 (1897).
Where no supersedeas bond is filed, sale of property vests title in purchaser which is not affected by reversal of judgment. Green v. Hall, 43 Neb. 275, 61 N.W. 605 (1895).
On execution sale, owner retains title and is entitled to possession, rents and profits until final confirmation. Yeazel v. White, 40 Neb. 432, 58 N.W. 1020 (1894).
Successor to sheriff may make deed. Phillips v. Dawley, 1 Neb. 320 (1871).
25-1533.
Sale upon execution; deed to purchaser; form; estate conveyed.The deed shall be sufficient evidence of the legality of such sale and the proceedings therein until the contrary be proved, and shall vest in the purchaser as good and as perfect an estate in the premises therein mentioned as was vested in the party at or after the time when such lands and tenements became liable to the satisfaction of the judgment. Such deed of conveyance to be made by the sheriff or other officer, shall recite the execution or executions, or the substance thereof, and the names of the parties, the amount, and the date of term of rendition of each judgment, by virtue whereof the said lands and tenements were sold as aforesaid; and shall be executed, acknowledged and recorded as is or may be provided by law, to perfect the conveyance of real estate in other cases.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 500, p. 478; R.S.1913, § 8079; C.S.1922, § 9015; C.S.1929, § 20-1533; R.S.1943, § 25-1533.
Annotations
1. Deed to purchaser
2. Estate conveyed
3. Miscellaneous
1. Deed to purchaser
Sheriff's deed is prima facie evidence of validity of judgment. Everson v. State, 66 Neb. 154, 92 N.W. 137 (1902).
The office of description in sheriff's deed is not to identify lands but to provide means of identification. Abbott v. Coates, 62 Neb. 247, 86 N.W. 1058 (1901).
Imperfect recitals in sheriff's deed of the facts required in this section do not render deed void. Lamb v. Sherman, 19 Neb. 681, 28 N.W. 319 (1886).
2. Estate conveyed
Purchaser of real property at judicial sale buys at his peril. Hitchcock County v. Cole, 80 Neb. 375, 114 N.W. 276 (1907).
Grantee of a purchaser at a judicial sale may in proper case have a writ of assistance to place him in possession. Clark & Leonard Inv. Co. v. Lindgren, 76 Neb. 59, 107 N.W. 116 (1906).
If record discloses that court had no jurisdiction party cannot claim to be bona fide purchaser. Albers v. Kozeluh, 68 Neb. 522, 94 N.W. 521 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 68 Neb. 529, 97 N.W. 646 (1903).
Every right and interest of parties to action is transferred by sale. Hart v. Beardsley, 67 Neb. 145, 93 N.W. 423 (1903).
Purchaser is entitled to rents, from date of deed. Clark v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Trust Co., 59 Neb. 53, 80 N.W. 257 (1899).
Water power, race, etc., pass with sheriff's deed. Hoover v. Hale, 56 Neb. 67, 76 N.W. 457 (1898).
Deed conveys only the estate which a quitclaim deed from the execution debtor to purchaser would have conveyed. Peterborough Savings Bank v. Pierce, 54 Neb. 712, 75 N.W. 20 (1898).
Deed based on sale for husband's debt does not bar wife of dower. Butler v. Fitzgerald, 43 Neb. 192, 61 N.W. 640 (1895).
Tenant, who pending action of foreclosure takes a lease of premises, is charged with notice of suit. McLean v. McCormick, 4 Neb. Unof. 187, 93 N.W. 697 (1903).
Purchaser at execution sale is entitled to all crops planted after confirmation. Jaques v. Dawes, 3 Neb. Unof. 752, 92 N.W. 570 (1902).
3. Miscellaneous
Upon confirmation of judicial sale and delivery of the deed to the purchaser, legal title to the land passes from the previous landowner to the purchaser. Nuttelman v. Julch, 228 Neb. 750, 424 N.W.2d 333 (1988).
Wild hay cut after sale and before confirmation did not pass to purchaser. Yeazel v. White, 40 Neb. 432, 58 N.W. 1020 (1894).
25-1534.
Sale of lands and chattels; printer's fees to be advanced; effect of noncompliance.The officer who levies upon goods and chattels, or lands and tenements, or who is charged with the duty of selling the same by virtue of any writ or execution, may refuse to publish a notice of the sale thereof by advertisement in a newspaper until the party for whose benefit such execution issued, his agent or attorney, shall advance to such officer so much money as will be sufficient to discharge the fees of the printer for publishing such notice.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 501, p. 479; R.S.1913, § 8080; C.S.1922, § 9016; C.S.1929, § 20-1534; R.S.1943, § 25-1534.
25-1535.
Sale of lands and chattels; printer's fees; officer must demand.Before any officer shall be excused from giving the notification mentioned in section 25-1534 he shall demand of the party for whose benefit the execution was issued, his agent or attorney, provided either of them resides in the county, the fees in said section specified.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 502, p. 479; R.S.1913, § 8081; C.S.1922, § 9017; C.S.1929, § 20-1535; R.S.1943, § 25-1535.
25-1536.
Sales of lands or tenements; where held; officer disqualified to purchase.All sales of lands or tenements under execution shall be held at the courthouse, if there be one in the county in which such lands and tenements are situated, and if there be no courthouse, then at the door of the house in which the district court was last held. No sheriff or other officer making the sale of property, either personal or real, or any appraiser of such property, shall, either directly or indirectly, purchase the same; and every purchase so made shall be considered fraudulent and void.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 503, p. 479; R.S.1913, § 8082; C.S.1922, § 9018; C.S.1929, § 20-1536; R.S.1943, § 25-1536.
Annotations
A judicial sale advertised for the front door of the courthouse may be held at the front of the steps on the first floor inside the courthouse. Hollstein v. Adams, 187 Neb. 781, 194 N.W.2d 216 (1972).
Sale advertised to be held at the south door of a courthouse is sufficient. Peck v. Starks, 64 Neb. 341, 89 N.W. 1040 (1902).
Sale of lands under mortgage foreclosure decree must take place at courthouse. Smith Bros. Loan & Trust Co. v. Weiss, 56 Neb. 210, 76 N.W. 564 (1898).
Sale made to one of appraisers was void. Best v. Zutavern, 53 Neb. 604, 74 N.W. 64 (1898).
25-1537.
Lands unsold; additional writs.If lands and tenements levied on as aforesaid are not sold upon one execution, other executions may be issued to sell the lands so levied upon.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 504, p. 479; R.S.1913, § 8083; C.S.1922, § 9019; C.S.1929, § 20-1537; R.S.1943, § 25-1537.
Annotations
Legislature has made writ of venditioni exponas applicable to sales of real estate. Burkett v. Clark, 46 Neb. 466, 64 N.W. 1113 (1895).
25-1538.
Several writs of execution; levy on real property; how made; preference.In all cases when two or more executions shall be put into the hands of any sheriff or other officer, and it shall be necessary to levy on real estate to satisfy the same, and either of the judgment creditors in whose favor one or more of said executions is issued shall require the sheriff, or other officer, to make a separate levy to satisfy his execution or executions, it shall be the duty of the sheriff, or other officer, to levy said execution, or so many thereof as may be required, on separate parcels of real property of the judgment debtor or debtors, giving to the officer making the levy on behalf of the creditor whose execution may, by the provisions of this chapter, be entitled to a preference, the choice of such part of the real property of the judgment debtor or debtors, as will be sufficient to satisfy the same. In all cases where two or more executions, which are entitled to no preference over each other, are put into the hands of the same officer, it shall be the duty of the officer, when required, to levy the same on separate parcels of real property of the judgment debtor or debtors, when the same may be divided without material injury; and if the real property of said debtors will not be sufficient to satisfy all the executions chargeable thereon, such part of the same shall be levied on to satisfy each execution as will bear the same proportion in value to the whole as the amount due on the execution bears to the amount of all the executions chargeable thereon.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 505, p. 479; R.S.1913, § 8084; C.S.1922, § 9020; C.S.1929, § 20-1538; R.S.1943, § 25-1538.
25-1539.
Sale of lands and tenements; deed by sheriff's successor.If the term of service of the sheriff, or other officer, who has made or shall hereafter make sale of any lands and tenements, shall expire, or if the sheriff or officer shall be absent, or be rendered unable, by death or otherwise, to make a deed of conveyance of the same, any succeeding sheriff or other officer, on receiving a certificate from the court from which the execution issued for the sale of said lands and tenements, signed by the clerk, by order of said court, setting forth that sufficient proof has been made to the court that such sale was fairly and legally made, and on tender of the purchase money, or if the same or any part thereof be paid, then, on proof of such payment and tender of the balance, if any, may execute to the said purchaser or purchasers, or his or their legal representative, a deed of conveyance of said lands and tenements so sold. Such deed shall be as good and valid in law and have the same effect as if the sheriff or other officer who made the sale had executed the same.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 506, p. 480; R.S.1913, § 8085; C.S.1922, § 9021; C.S.1929, § 20-1539; R.S.1943, § 25-1539.
25-1540.
Sale on execution; disposition of proceeds.If on any sale made as aforesaid, there shall be in the hands of the sheriff or other officer more money than is sufficient to satisfy the writ or writs of execution, with interest and costs, the sheriff or other officer shall, on demand, pay the balance to the defendant in execution, or his legal representatives.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 507, p. 480; R.S.1913, § 8086; C.S.1922, § 9022; C.S.1929, § 20-1540; R.S.1943, § 25-1540.
Annotations
Sheriff is custodian of funds from date of sale until confirmation. Craw v. Abrams, 68 Neb. 546, 94 N.W. 639 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 68 Neb. 553, 97 N.W. 296 (1903).
It is duty of sheriff to pay proceeds directly to party entitled thereto unless court orders same paid into court. Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Ruby, 49 Neb. 584, 68 N.W. 939 (1896); Luce v. Foster, 42 Neb. 818, 60 N.W. 1027 (1894).
25-1541.
Sale of lands or tenements; reversal of judgment; title of purchaser; restitution.If any judgment or judgments, in satisfaction of which any lands or tenements are sold, shall at any time thereafter be reversed, such reversal shall not defeat or affect the title of the purchaser or purchasers; but, in such case, restitution shall be made by the judgment creditor, of the money for which such lands or tenements were sold, with lawful interest from the day of sale.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 508, p. 480; R.S.1913, § 8087; C.S.1922, § 9023; C.S.1929, § 20-1541; R.S.1943, § 25-1541.
Annotations
1. Reversal of judgment
2. Bona fide purchaser
1. Reversal of judgment
There is no sale as contemplated by the statute until order of confirmation is entered and time for superseding the order has elapsed and, where defendant appeals from order confirming sale, said order being superseded, and judgment is reversed, an order may be entered quashing the levy and vacating the sale. Baxter v. National Mortgage Loan Co., 130 Neb. 256, 264 N.W. 675 (1936).
Payment of judgment made by defendant to avoid sale of his property on execution does not waive his right to appeal. Burke v. Dendinger, 120 Neb. 594, 234 N.W. 405 (1931).
Upon reversal of judgment which has been executed, it is duty of court to compel restitution. Hier v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn., 60 Neb. 320, 83 N.W. 77 (1900).
Title of stranger through sale under judgment is not defeated by subsequent reversal of judgment. Manfull v. Graham, 55 Neb. 645, 76 N.W. 19 (1898).
Where judgment creditor purchases at execution sale on judgment which is subsequently reversed, it is his duty to make restitution. Nelson v. City of Beatrice, 2 Neb. Unof. 47, 96 N.W. 288 (1901).
2. Bona fide purchaser
Bona fide purchaser under decree of partition, no fraud being shown, is protected hereunder although judgment is thereafter reversed. Schleuning v. Tatro, 122 Neb. 3, 238 N.W. 741 (1931).
Only good faith purchaser is protected. Pauley v. Knouse, 109 Neb. 716, 192 N.W. 195 (1923).
Purchaser defined; one who made bona fide contract to purchase land sold under erroneous judgment is protected to extent of money paid, with interest. Coon v. O'Brien, 107 Neb. 427, 186 N.W. 340 (1922).
One who purchases knowing that proceedings are fraudulent, and that he is assisting in the fraud, does not get good title. Coates v. O'Connor, 102 Neb. 602, 168 N.W. 102 (1918), rehearing denied 102 Neb. 606, 169 N.W. 239 (1918).
Bona fide purchaser under judicial decree is protected by this section, though judgment is thereafter reversed. Kazebeer v. Nunemaker, 82 Neb. 732, 118 N.W. 646 (1908).
Purchaser should recover from redemptioner purchase money paid. Hitchcock County v. Cole, 80 Neb. 375, 114 N.W. 276 (1907).
25-1542.
Judgment lien; when lost.No judgment on which execution has not been taken out and levied before the expiration of five years after its entry shall operate as a lien upon the estate of any debtor to the preference of any other bona fide judgment creditor or purchaser, but when judgment has been or may be rendered in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court and any special mandate awarded to the district court to carry the same into execution, the lien of the judgment creditor shall continue for five years after the first day of the next term of the district court to which such mandate may be directed. Nothing in this section shall be construed to defeat the lien of any judgment creditor who fails to take out execution and cause a levy to be made as provided in this section when such failure is occasioned by appeal, proceedings in error, or injunction or by a vacancy in the office of sheriff and coroner or the inability of such officers until one year after such disability is removed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 509, p. 480; Laws 1901, c. 81, § 1, p. 474; R.S.1913, § 8088; C.S.1922, § 9024; C.S.1929, § 20-1542; R.S.1943, § 25-1542; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 50;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 13.
Annotations
To preserve priority of judgment lien against bona fide creditor or purchaser, actual levy of execution must be made. Hein v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 167 Neb. 176, 92 N.W.2d 185 (1958).
Lien of foreclosure decree is not lost by failure to have order of sale issued within five years. Jenkins Land & Live Stock Co. v. Kimsey, 99 Neb. 308, 156 N.W. 499 (1916).
Priority of a judgment lien may be continued as against other bona fide judgment creditors and purchasers only by the issuance of an execution and an actual levy within the time limited by statute. Glenn v. Glenn, 79 Neb. 68, 112 N.W. 321 (1907).
An appeal by judgment defendant does not in absence of a supersedeas, operate to prolong lien of judgment. Harvey v. Godding, 77 Neb. 289, 109 N.W. 220 (1906).
Lien of judgment created by mandate of Supreme Court continues for five years. Medland v. Van Etten, 75 Neb. 794, 106 N.W. 1022 (1906).
Right of judgment creditor to execution is a substantial one and can only be taken away by some act done in compliance with law. Halmes v. Dovey, 64 Neb. 122, 89 N.W. 631 (1902).
Execution levied but returned unsatisfied before sale by order of plaintiff prevents judgment from becoming dormant. Godman v. Boggs, 12 Neb. 13, 10 N.W. 403 (1881).
25-1543.
Writ of execution; when returnable.The sheriff or other officer to whom any writ of execution is directed shall return such writ to the court to which the writ is returnable as soon as practicable after the writ has been served.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 510, p. 480; R.S.1913, § 8089; C.S.1922, § 9025; C.S.1929, § 20-1543; R.S.1943, § 25-1543;
Laws 1993, LB 458, § 11.
Annotations
Failure to return order of sale within sixty days will not defeat confirmation. Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Buckstaff Bros. Mfg. Co., 61 Neb. 54, 84 N.W. 416 (1900).
Section is not applicable to orders of sale. Jarrett v. Hoover, 54 Neb. 65, 74 N.W. 429 (1898).
This provision is mandatory. Buckley v. Mason, 52 Neb. 639, 72 N.W. 1043 (1897).
Officer must return execution stating what he has done under it. Burkett v. Clark, 46 Neb. 466, 64 N.W. 1113 (1895).
25-1544.
Judgment against principal and surety; how entered; how executed.In all cases where judgment is rendered in any court of record within this state upon any instrument in writing in which two or more persons are jointly and severally bound, and it shall be made to appear to the court by parol or other testimony that one or more of said persons so bound signed the same as surety or bail for his or their codefendant, it shall be the duty of the clerk of said court in recording the judgment thereon, to certify which of the defendants is principal debtor, and which are sureties or bail. The clerk of the court aforesaid shall issue execution on such judgment, commanding the sheriff or other officer to cause the money to be made of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements, of the principal debtor, but for want of sufficient property of the principal debtor to make the same, that he cause the same to be made of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of the surety or bail. In all cases the property, both personal and real, of the principal debtor, within the jurisdiction of the court, shall be exhausted before any of the property of the surety or bail shall be taken in execution.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 511, p. 481; R.S.1913, § 8090; C.S.1922, § 9026; C.S.1929, § 20-1544; R.S.1943, § 25-1544.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Liability of surety
1. Scope
Purpose of statute was to enlarge the legal rights of the surety by requiring the property of the principal to be first exhausted before levy on the property of the surety. Exchange Elevator Co. v. Marshall, 147 Neb. 48, 22 N.W.2d 403 (1946).
Above section does not control procedure on entering judgment on bond guaranteeing fidelity of employee. Luther College v. Benson, 126 Neb. 410, 253 N.W. 421 (1934).
Statute applies generally to judgments on supersedeas bonds which stay proceedings pending appeals from district court to Supreme Court. Sonneman v. Dolan, 124 Neb. 830, 248 N.W. 402 (1933).
In action on injunction bond, judgment against principal and surety should be entered under this section. Trester v. Pike, 60 Neb. 510, 83 N.W. 676 (1900).
Judgment otherwise joint is not rendered several by finding entered under this section. Farney v. Hamilton County, 54 Neb. 797, 75 N.W. 44 (1898).
2. Liability of surety
It is not the duty of the jury to find which of the defendants is principal and which is surety. Smith v. Roehrig, 90 Neb. 262, 133 N.W. 230 (1911).
Vacation of judgment as to principal vacates as to surety. Sturgis, Cornish & Burn Co. v. Miller, 79 Neb. 404, 112 N.W. 595 (1907).
Surety paying judgment and taking assignment, may have execution against principal. Nelson v. Webster, 72 Neb. 332, 100 N.W. 411 (1904).
Failure of clerk to certify that some were principals and others were sureties, was reversible error, although matter was not brought to attention of trial court. Blaco v. State, 58 Neb. 557, 78 N.W. 1056 (1899).
Failure of judgment to distinguish between principal and surety does not extinguish relation. Drexel v. Pusey, 57 Neb. 30, 77 N.W. 351 (1898).
This section cannot be invoked in determining liability of surety to obligee. It applies only after judgment. Kroncke v. Madsen, 56 Neb. 609, 77 N.W. 202 (1898).
Liabilities of sureties will not be extended beyond terms of their agreements. Godfrey v. City of Beatrice, 51 Neb. 272, 70 N.W. 914 (1897).
In action on supersedeas bond judgment should show which defendant is principal debtor. Van Etten v. Kosters, 48 Neb. 152, 66 N.W. 1106 (1896).
Where agreement is made to exhaust one debtor's property first, its violation may be enjoined. Gibson v. McClay, 47 Neb. 900, 66 N.W. 851 (1896).
Surety discharging debt is entitled to contribution from co-surety. Smith v. Mason, 44 Neb. 610, 63 N.W. 41 (1895).
25-1545.
Execution; sheriff; amercement; causes; procedure.If any sheriff or other officer shall refuse or neglect to execute any writ of execution to him directed which has come to his hands; or shall neglect or refuse to sell any goods and chattels, lands and tenements; or shall neglect to call an inquest and return a copy thereof forthwith to the clerk's office; or shall neglect to return any writ of execution to the proper court, on or before the return day thereof; or shall neglect to return a just and perfect inventory of all and singular the goods and chattels by him taken in execution, unless the said sheriff or other officer shall return that he has levied and made the amount of the debt, damages and costs; or shall refuse or neglect on demand to pay over to the plaintiff, his agent or attorney of record, all money by him collected or received, for the use of said party, at any time after collecting or receiving the same, except as provided in section 25-1531; or shall neglect or refuse on demand made by the defendant, his agent or attorney of record, to pay over all money by him received for any sale made, beyond what is sufficient to satisfy the writ or writs of execution, with interest and legal costs, such sheriff or officer shall, on motion in court and two days' notice thereof in writing, be amerced in the amount of said debt, damages and costs, with ten percent thereon, to and for the use of said plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 513, p. 482; R.S.1913, § 8092; C.S.1922, § 9028; C.S.1929, § 20-1546; R.S.1943, § 25-1545.
Annotations
Inquiry is permitted whether the debt could have been collected, and whether its collection has been prejudiced by the acts of the officer. Ehlers v. Gallagher, 147 Neb. 97, 22 N.W.2d 396 (1946).
Judgment of amercement against sheriff, without notice, is void. Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Ruby, 58 Neb. 730, 79 N.W. 723 (1899).
Court may permit sheriff to amend return to conform to facts upon proper showing. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. King, 52 Neb. 562, 72 N.W. 855 (1897); Shufeldt & Co. v. Barlass, 33 Neb. 785, 51 N.W. 134 (1892).
Sheriff disburses money received on execution, and is not required to pay it into court. Luce v. Foster, 42 Neb. 818, 60 N.W. 1027 (1894).
Sureties on sheriffs' bond are liable in an action upon judgment of amercement. McNee v. Sewell, 14 Neb. 532, 16 N.W. 827 (1883).
25-1546.
Clerk of court; amercement; causes; procedure.If any clerk of the court shall neglect or refuse, on demand made by the persons entitled thereto, his agent, or attorney of record, to pay over all money by him received, in his official capacity, for the use of such person, every such clerk may be amerced; and the proceedings against him and his sureties shall be the same as provided for in section 25-1545 against sheriffs and their sureties.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 514, p. 482; R.S.1913, § 8093; C.S.1922, § 9029; C.S.1929, § 20-1547; R.S.1943, § 25-1546.
Annotations
Receipt of money by clerk is an official act. Moore v. Boyer, 52 Neb. 446, 72 N.W. 586 (1897); McDonald v. Atkins, 13 Neb. 568, 14 N.W. 532 (1882).
25-1547.
Amercement; amount; limit.When the cause of amercement is for refusing to pay over money collected as aforesaid, the said sheriff or other officer shall not be amerced in a greater sum than the amount so withheld, with ten percent thereon.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 515, p. 482; R.S.1913, § 8094; C.S.1922, § 9030; C.S.1929, § 20-1548; R.S.1943, § 25-1547.
25-1548.
Execution to another county; return by mail; effect upon liability of officer.When execution shall be issued in any county in this state, and directed to the sheriff or coroner of another county, it shall be lawful for such sheriff or coroner having the execution, after having discharged all the duties required of him by law, to enclose such execution by mail to the clerk of the court who issued the same. On proof being made by such sheriff or coroner that the execution was mailed soon enough to have reached the office where it was issued within the time prescribed by law, the sheriff or coroner shall not be liable for any amercement or penalty if it does not reach the office in due time.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 516, p. 483; R.S.1913, § 8095; C.S.1922, § 9031; C.S.1929, § 20-1549; R.S.1943, § 25-1548.
25-1549.
Amercement; motion; notice; effect of entry; transmission of money.No sheriff shall forward by mail any money made on any such execution, unless he shall be specially instructed to do it by the plaintiff, his agent or attorney of record. In all cases of a motion to amerce a sheriff or other officer of any county other than the one from which the execution issued, notice in writing shall be given to such officer, as hereinbefore required, by leaving it with him, or at his office, at least fifteen days before the first day of the term at which such motion shall be made, or by transmitting the notice by mail at least sixty days prior to the first day of the term at which such motion shall be made. All amercements, so procured, shall be entered on the record of the court, and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 517, p. 483; R.S.1913, § 8096; C.S.1922, § 9032; C.S.1929, § 20-1550; R.S.1943, § 25-1549.
25-1550.
Amercement; judgment; liability of sureties; execution.Every surety of any sheriff or other officer may be made a party to the judgment rendered as aforesaid, against the sheriff or other officer, by action, to be commenced and prosecuted as in other cases. But the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of any such surety shall not be liable to be taken on execution, when sufficient goods and chattels, lands and tenements of the sheriff or other officer, against whom execution may be issued, can be found to satisfy the same. Nothing herein contained shall prevent either party from proceeding against such sheriff or other officer by attachment, at his election.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 518, p. 483; R.S.1913, § 8097; C.S.1922, § 9033; C.S.1929, § 20-1551; R.S.1943, § 25-1550.
25-1551.
Amercement; execution on original judgment; rights of officer.In cases where a sheriff or other officer may be amerced, and shall not have collected the amount of the original judgment, he shall be permitted to sue out an execution, and collect the amount of said judgment in the name of the original plaintiff, for his own use.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 519, p. 483; R.S.1913, § 8098; C.S.1922, § 9034; C.S.1929, § 20-1552; R.S.1943, § 25-1551.
25-1552.
Personal property except wages; debtors; claim of exemption; procedure; adjustment by Department of Revenue.(1) Each natural person residing in this state shall have exempt from forced sale on execution the sum of five thousand dollars in personal property, except wages. The provisions of this section do not apply to the exemption of wages, that subject being fully provided for by section 25-1558. In proceedings involving a writ of execution, the exemption from execution under this section shall be claimed in the manner provided by section 25-1516. The debtor desiring to claim an exemption from execution under this section shall, at the time the request for hearing is filed, file a list of the whole of the property owned by the debtor and an indication of the items of property which he or she claims to be exempt from execution pursuant to this section and section 25-1556, along with a value for each item listed. The debtor or his or her authorized agent may select from the list an amount of property not exceeding the value exempt from execution under this section according to the debtor's valuation or the court's valuation if the debtor's valuation is challenged by a creditor.
(2) The dollar limitations in this section shall be adjusted by the Department of Revenue every fifth year beginning with the year 2023 to reflect the cumulative percentage change over the preceding five years in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, as prepared by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 521, p. 484; Laws 1913, c. 52, § 1, p. 158; R.S.1913, § 8099; C.S.1922, § 9035; C.S.1929, § 20-1553; R.S.1943, § 25-1552;
Laws 1973, LB 16, § 1; Laws 1977, LB 60, § 1; Laws 1980, LB 940, § 2;
Laws 1993, LB 458, § 12; Laws 1997, LB 372, § 1; Laws 2018, LB105, § 1.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Head of family
3. Homestead
4. Exemptions
1. Scope
Section should receive liberal construction. Wife contributing to support of dependent husband ordinarily qualifies as head of the family within meaning of this section. Grassman v. Jensen, 183 Neb. 147, 158 N.W.2d 673 (1968).
Exemption of wages from execution or attachment is not controlled by this section. Live Stock Nat. Bank v. Jackson, 137 Neb. 161, 288 N.W. 515 (1939).
This section is as inclusive as a statutory provision for stay is exclusive. Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440, 286 N.W. 340 (1939).
This section must be taken into consideration in determining the rights of an heir. Goodwin v. Freadrich, 135 Neb. 203, 280 N.W. 917 (1938).
Statute is to be liberally construed; and exemption claimed hereunder is paramount to cross-claim of judgment creditor. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Bank of Crab Orchard, 122 Neb. 210, 239 N.W. 836 (1932).
Exemption allowed by this section is additional to property specially exempted by law. Johnson v. Bartek, 56 Neb. 422, 76 N.W. 878 (1898).
"Subject to exemption" applies to lands, and lots as well as houses. Widemair v. Woolsey, 53 Neb. 468, 73 N.W. 947 (1898).
Right to homestead defeats exemption under this section, even though title is merely contract of sale, or mortgaged to full value. State ex rel. Hilton v. Townsend, 17 Neb. 530, 23 N.W. 509 (1885).
Exemptions of debtor's property are determinable upon basis of facts as they exist at time of filing of petition in bankruptcy. In re Burden, 83 F.Supp. 416 (D. Neb. 1949).
2. Head of family
Divorced husband, although remarried, cannot claim exemptions hereunder as against former wife's judgment for alimony. Winter v. Winter, 95 Neb. 335, 145 N.W. 709 (1914).
Personal property not exceeding five hundred dollars in value is exempt to head of family who does not have homestead. McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Dunn, 63 Neb. 81, 88 N.W. 159 (1901).
Every head of family not owning exempt real estate may claim benefit of section. Widemair v. Woolsey, 53 Neb. 468, 73 N.W. 947 (1898).
Wife with disabled husband, supporting family, is "head." State ex rel. Lucas v. Houck, 32 Neb. 525, 49 N.W. 462 (1891); Schaller v. Kurtz, 25 Neb. 655, 41 N.W. 642 (1889).
Wife, where husband has absconded from state, and who supports family, is "head." State ex rel. Scoville v. Wilson, 31 Neb. 462, 48 N.W. 147 (1891).
Divorced husband continuing to support children is entitled to exemption. Roberts v. Moudy, 30 Neb. 683, 46 N.W. 1013 (1890).
Head of family may claim property as exempt even though ordered sold under attachment. State ex rel. Stevens v. Carson, 27 Neb. 501, 43 N.W. 361 (1889).
Resident alien is entitled to exemptions though family have not yet moved here. People ex rel. Dobson v. McClay, 2 Neb. 7 (1873).
3. Homestead
Husband cannot claim exemption as long as he has homestead exemption. Creason v. Wells, 158 Neb. 78, 62 N.W.2d 327 (1954).
Consent of a wife to selection of a homestead from her property will be presumed from actual use of the premises as homestead, and she cannot claim allowance of five hundred dollars under this section in lieu of homestead. In re Estate of Nielsen, 135 Neb. 110, 280 N.W. 246 (1938).
Husband cannot claim exemption under this section though homestead in wife's name. Stout v. Rapp, 17 Neb. 462, 23 N.W. 364 (1885).
If family has homestead, cannot claim under this section. Axtell v. Warden, 7 Neb. 182 (1878).
4. Exemptions
A debtor engaged in the business of agriculture is not within the terms of the statute exempting tools and instruments of a mechanic, miner, or other person. Miller v. Dixon, 176 Neb. 659, 127 N.W.2d 203 (1964).
Five hundred dollar exemption in lieu of homestead may include wages due, or to become due, to the extent of ninety percent. Lyons v. Austin, 126 Neb. 248, 252 N.W. 908 (1934).
Nonresident of the state is not entitled to any part of the five hundred dollar exemption. Woolfson v. Mead, 96 Neb. 528, 148 N.W. 153 (1914).
There is no exemption until partnership's debts are paid. Miller v. Waite, 59 Neb. 319, 80 N.W. 907 (1899).
When debtor files inventory under oath, officer must call appraisers and setoff exemptions. Daley v. Peters, 47 Neb. 848, 66 N.W. 862 (1896).
Exemption may consist of judgment. Mace v. Heath, 34 Neb. 54, 51 N.W. 317 (1892).
Member of partnership cannot claim firm property as exempt against creditors of firm. Lynch v. Englehardt Winning Davison Merchantile Co., 1 Neb. Unof. 528, 96 N.W. 524 (1901).
A judgment debtor may assert the in-lieu-of-homestead exemption, provided by this section, in response to a garnishment summons against the judgment debtor's bank account. ARL Credit Servs. v. Piper, 15 Neb. App. 811, 736 N.W.2d 771 (2007).
United States is not entitled to object to exemption allowed bankrupt on ground that state taxes were not paid. United States v. Bernstein, 16 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1926).
25-1553.
Federal or state earned income tax credit refund; when exempt.In bankruptcy and in the collection of a money judgment, the full amount of any federal or state earned income tax credit refund shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or other legal or equitable process and from all claims of creditors.
25-1554.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1555.
Exemptions; not applicable to tax sales.Nothing in this chapter shall be considered as exempting any real or personal property from levy and sale for taxes.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 524, p. 484; R.S.1913, § 8102; C.S.1922, § 9038; C.S.1929, § 20-1556; R.S.1943, § 25-1555.
Annotations
This section applies only to property of private persons or corporations, and not to that of the state or its governmental subdivisions. Madison County v. School Dist. No. 2 of Madison County, 148 Neb. 218, 27 N.W.2d 172 (1947).
There is no exemption of any class or kind of personalty from distress or seizure for taxes except as specifically provided for by statute. Ryder v. Livingston, 145 Neb. 862, 18 N.W.2d 507 (1945).
United States is not entitled to object to exemption allowed bankrupt on ground that state taxes were not paid. United States v. Bernstein, 16 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1926).
25-1556.
Specific exemptions; personal property; selection by debtor; adjustment by Department of Revenue.(1) No property hereinafter mentioned shall be liable to attachment, execution, or sale on any final process issued from any court in this state, against any person being a resident of this state: (a) The immediate personal possessions of the debtor and his or her family; (b) all necessary wearing apparel of the debtor and his or her family; (c) the debtor's interest, not to exceed an aggregate fair market value of three thousand dollars, in household furnishings, household goods, household computers, household appliances, books, or musical instruments which are held primarily for personal, family, or household use of such debtor or the dependents of such debtor; (d) the debtor's interest, not to exceed an aggregate fair market value of five thousand dollars, in implements, tools, or professional books or supplies, other than a motor vehicle, held for use in the principal trade or business of such debtor or his or her family; (e) the debtor's interest, not to exceed five thousand dollars, in a motor vehicle; and (f) the debtor's interest in any professionally prescribed health aids for such debtor or the dependents of such debtor. The specific exemptions in this section shall be selected by the debtor or his or her agent, clerk, or legal representative in the manner provided in section 25-1552.
(2) The dollar limitations in this section shall be adjusted by the Department of Revenue every fifth year beginning with the year 2023 to reflect the cumulative percentage change over the preceding five years in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, as prepared by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 530, p. 485; R.S.1913, § 8103; C.S.1922, § 9039; C.S.1929, § 20-1557; R.S.1943, § 25-1556; Laws 1969, c. 187, § 1, p. 778;
Laws 1973, LB 16, § 2; Laws 1977, LB 60, § 2; Laws 1997, LB 372, § 2; Laws 2018, LB105, § 2.
Cross References
For other provisions for exempting burial lots and mausoleums, see sections 12-517, 12-520, and 12-605.
Annotations
1. Who may claim exemptions
2. Property exempt
1. Who may claim exemptions
A widow is not entitled to claim all farm machinery as exempt. Thomas v. Sternhagen, 178 Neb. 578, 134 N.W.2d 237 (1965).
Only residents and heads of families are entitled; physicians, attorneys, and other professional men, not heads of families, are not entitled to exemption. Howells State Bank v. Arps, 117 Neb. 110, 219 N.W. 844 (1928).
Debtor may also claim benefits of other statutes allowing specific exemptions. Johnson v. Bartek, 56 Neb. 422, 76 N.W. 878 (1898).
Debtor may make selection. Conway v. Roberts, 38 Neb. 456, 56 N.W. 980 (1893).
Where husband absconds, wife may claim benefit of statute. Frazier v. Syas, 10 Neb. 115, 4 N.W. 934 (1880).
2. Property exempt
A combine exceeding the value of fifty dollars is not exempt to one engaged in agriculture. Miller v. Dixon, 176 Neb. 659, 127 N.W.2d 203 (1964).
Property is specifically exempted under this section, irrespective of homestead exemption, and need not be appraised. Johnson v. Bartek, 56 Neb. 422, 76 N.W. 878 (1898).
Growing crops are personal property. Sims v. Jones, 54 Neb. 769, 75 N.W. 150 (1898).
Library of lawyer is not exempt where judgment is for money collected for client. Shreck v. Gilbert, 52 Neb. 813, 73 N.W. 276 (1897).
Exempt property is not subject to fraudulent alienation. Bloedorn v. Jewell, 34 Neb. 649, 52 N.W. 367 (1892).
Homestead exemption does not bar claim under this section. Axtell v. Warden, 7 Neb. 182 (1878).
Team of mules instead of horses may be claimed. State ex rel. Metz v. Cunningham, 6 Neb. 90 (1877).
Term "plow" includes any plow, even though too large for operation by two horses. Clay Center Bank v. McKelvie, 19 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1927).
Dealer in eggs and poultry, which he buys at farmers' houses and takes to his place of business, is entitled to hold as exempt a horse, harness, wagon and office furniture, scales, coops, etc., necessary to be used in conducting his business. In re Conley, 162 F. 806 (D. Neb. 1907).
Truck used by painter in carrying on business was exempt in bankruptcy court. In re Bailey, 172 F.Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1959).
Exemption of truck as tool for carrying on business allowed in bankruptcy court. In re Burden, 83 F.Supp. 416 (D. Neb. 1949).
25-1557.
Actions in which exemptions limited or not allowed.Nothing in this chapter shall be so construed as to exempt any property in this state from execution or attachment for unpaid wages; for money due and owing by an attorney at law for money or other valuable consideration received by such attorney for any person or persons; or for enforcement of an award of or judgment for child support, alimony, or maintenance or a judgment for property division awarded to a former spouse.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 531, p. 486; Laws 1869, § 1, p. 66; Laws 1887, c. 95, § 1, p. 649; R.S.1913, § 8104; C.S.1922, § 9040; C.S.1929, § 20-1558; R.S.1943, § 25-1557;
Laws 1977, LB 60, § 3; Laws 1997, LB 372, § 3.
Annotations
Judgment need not disclose nature of claim. Shreck v. Gilbert, 52 Neb. 813, 73 N.W. 276 (1897).
This section is not applicable to property exempt by homestead laws. Money due independent contractor is not "wages." Fox v. McClay, 48 Neb. 820, 67 N.W. 888 (1896).
Money due contractor furnishing his own and other labor is not exempt as wages. Henderson v. Nott, 36 Neb. 154, 54 N.W. 87 (1893).
"Necessaries of life" do not include goods furnished boarding house. Lehnoff v. Fisher, 32 Neb. 107, 48 N.W. 821 (1891).
Laborers' wages were exempt. Snyder v. Brune, 22 Neb. 189, 34 N.W. 364 (1887).
Proviso in this section does not limit value of specific property exemption under preceding section. Clay Center Bank v. McKelvie, 19 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1927).
25-1558.
Wages; subject to garnishment; amount; exceptions.(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subject to garnishment shall not exceed the lesser of the following amounts:
(a) Twenty-five percent of his or her disposable earnings for that week;
(b) The amount by which his or her disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by 29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1) in effect at the time earnings are payable; or
(c) Fifteen percent of his or her disposable earnings for that week, if the individual is a head of a family.
(2) The restrictions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply in the case of:
(a) Any order of any court for the support of any persons;
(b) Any order of any court of bankruptcy under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act; or
(c) Any debt due for any state or federal tax.
(3) No court shall make, execute, or enforce any order or process in violation of this section. The exemptions allowed in this section shall be granted to any person so entitled without any further proceedings.
(4) For the purposes of this section:
(a) Earnings shall mean compensation paid or payable by an employer to an employee for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program;
(b) Disposable earnings shall mean that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld;
(c) Garnishment shall mean any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt; and
(d) Head of a family shall mean an individual who actually supports and maintains one or more individuals who are closely connected with him or her by blood relationship, relationship by marriage, by adoption, or by guardianship, and whose right to exercise family control and provide for the dependent individuals is based upon some moral or legal obligation.
(5) Every assignment, sale, transfer, pledge, or mortgage of the wages or salary of an individual which is exempted by this section, to the extent of the exemption provided by this section, shall be void and unenforceable by any process of law.
(6) No employer shall discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his or her earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.
(7) In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the Commissioner of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in this section.
Source:Laws 1869, § 1, p. 170; G.S.1873, c. 57, § 1021, p. 715; Laws 1907, c. 160, § 1, p. 494; R.S.1913, § 8105; C.S.1922, § 9041; C.S.1929, § 20-1559; R.S.1943, § 25-1558; Laws 1969, c. 188, § 1, p. 779;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 133; Laws 2001, LB 489, § 4.
Annotations
1. Exemption of wages
2. Miscellaneous
1. Exemption of wages
The wage exemption this section provides to debtor wage earners is personal to the debtor and cannot be utilized for the garnishee's benefit. Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, 264 Neb. 365, 647 N.W.2d 615 (2002).
This section is constitutional, and controls exemption of wages from execution or attachment. Live Stock Nat. Bank v. Jackson, 137 Neb. 161, 288 N.W. 515 (1939).
Statute controls exemption from execution or attachment of wages of judgment debtor. Lyons v. Austin, 126 Neb. 248, 252 N.W. 908 (1934).
Surviving wife is entitled to exempt wages. Dobney v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 120 Neb. 824, 235 N.W. 585 (1931).
Traveling salesman's salary is exempt as wages. William Deering Co. v. Ruffner, 32 Neb. 845, 49 N.W. 771 (1891).
Exempt wages are not subject to fraudulent assignment. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Smersh, 22 Neb. 751, 36 N.W. 139 (1888).
This section, passed as independent act, controls subject of exemption of wages. Snyder v. Brune, 22 Neb. 189, 34 N.W. 364 (1887).
Garnishee must set up facts showing wages are exempt. Turner v. Sioux City & Pacific R. R. Co., 19 Neb. 241, 27 N.W. 103 (1886).
Debtor may recover of creditor exempt wages applied on judgment by garnishment. Albrecht v. Treitschke, 17 Neb. 205, 22 N.W. 418 (1885).
2. Miscellaneous
This section applies though employee is nonresident. Wright v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 19 Neb. 175, 27 N.W. 90 (1886).
The basic subsistence limitation under the child support guidelines was not applicable to reduce the amount being withheld from the father's monthly Social Security benefits to pay his child support arrearages. Ybarra v. Ybarra, 28 Neb. App. 216, 943 N.W.2d 447 (2020).
25-1559.
Pensions of disabled soldiers and sailors; property purchased therewith; limit.In addition to the exemptions otherwise provided for, there shall also be exempt from levy and sale upon execution or attachment, to every resident of the State of Nebraska, who became disabled in the service of the United States as a soldier, sailor or marine, all pension money hereafter received and all property hereafter purchased and improved exclusively therewith, not exceeding two thousand dollars in value, of and belonging to such soldier, sailor or marine.
Source:Laws 1887, c. 101, § 1, p. 656; R.S.1913, § 8106; C.S.1922, § 9042; C.S.1929, § 20-1560; R.S.1943, § 25-1559.
Annotations
Pension money is exempt, and exemption covers property bought therewith, exchanged, and increase up to two thousand dollars. Dargan v. Williams, 66 Neb. 1, 91 N.W. 862 (1902).
25-1560.
Exempt wages; interstate business; attachment or garnishment by method to avoid exemption laws; unlawful.It is hereby declared unlawful for any creditor of, or other holder of any evidence of debt, book account, or claim of any name or nature against any laborer, servant, clerk, or other employee, of any corporation, firm or individual in this state engaged in interstate business, for the purpose below stated, to sell, assign, transfer, or by any means dispose of any such claim, book account, bill, or debt of any name or nature whatever, to any person or persons, firm, corporation or institution, or to institute, in this state or elsewhere, or prosecute any suit or action for any such claim or debt against any such laborer, servant, clerk or employee by any process seeking to seize, attach, or garnish the wages of such person or persons earned within sixty days prior to the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of avoiding the effect of the laws of the State of Nebraska concerning exemptions.
Source:Laws 1889, c. 25, § 1, p. 369; R.S.1913, § 8107; C.S.1922, § 9043; C.S.1929, § 20-1561; R.S.1943, § 25-1560.
Annotations
Nonresident cannot claim benefits of this and following sections. McCormack v. Tincher, 77 Neb. 857, 110 N.W. 547 (1906).
Act, of which this section was part, is constitutional. Gordon Bros. v. Wageman, 77 Neb. 185, 108 N.W. 1067 (1906).
Foreign corporations are subject to operation of act; exemption laws where wages earned apply. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Fleming, 39 Neb. 679, 58 N.W. 226 (1894).
25-1561.
Exempt wages; interstate business; law violation; aiders; abettors.It is hereby declared unlawful for any person or persons to aid, assist, abet or counsel a violation of section 25-1560, for any purpose whatever.
Source:Laws 1889, c. 25, § 2, p. 370; R.S.1913, § 8108; C.S.1922, § 9044; C.S.1929, § 20-1562; R.S.1943, § 25-1561.
25-1562.
Exempt wages; interstate business; violation of sections; evidence.In any proceeding, civil or criminal, growing out of a breach of sections 25-1560 and 25-1561 or either of them, proof of the institution of a suit or service of garnishment summons by any person, firm or individual, in any court of any state, or territory, other than this state, or in this state to seize by process of garnishment or otherwise, any of the wages of such persons as defined in section 25-1560 shall be deemed prima facie evidence of an evasion of the laws of the State of Nebraska and a breach of the provisions of such sections on the part of the creditor or resident in Nebraska causing the same to be done.
Source:Laws 1889, c. 25, § 3, p. 370; R.S.1913, § 8109; C.S.1922, § 9045; C.S.1929, § 20-1563; R.S.1943, § 25-1562.
Annotations
Principal is not liable for unauthorized suit by agent. Satterlee v. First Nat. Bank of Columbus, 78 Neb. 691, 111 N.W. 591 (1907).
Suit by assignee is prima facie evidence in action against assignor; rebuttal. Gordon Bros. v. Wageman, 77 Neb. 185, 108 N.W. 1067 (1906).
Good faith of assignor is question for jury. Karnes v. Dovey, 53 Neb. 725, 74 N.W. 311 (1898).
25-1563.
Exempt wages; interstate business; violation; penalty.Any persons, firm, company, corporation or business institution guilty of a violation of section 25-1560 or 25-1561, shall be liable to the party injured through such violation thereof for the amount of the debt sold, assigned, transferred, garnished or sued upon with all costs and expenses and reasonable attorney's fee, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state, and shall further be guilty of a Class IV misdemeanor.
Source:Laws 1889, c. 25, § 4, p. 370; R.S.1913, § 8110; C.S.1922, § 9046; C.S.1929, § 20-1564; R.S.1943, § 25-1563;
Laws 1977, LB 40, § 100.
Annotations
Debtor, to claim benefit of act, must have residence in this state. Corliss v. Plano Mfg. Co., 80 Neb. 366, 114 N.W. 413 (1907).
Petition was sufficient to state cause of action under this section. Gordon Bros. v. Wageman, 77 Neb. 185, 108 N.W. 1067 (1906).
Section is constitutional; must allege plaintiff is head of family and wages are exempt. State ex rel. Green v. Power, 63 Neb. 496, 88 N.W. 769 (1902).
25-1563.01.
Stock, pension, or similar plan or contract; exempt from certain process; when.In bankruptcy and in the collection of a money judgment, the following benefits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or other legal or equitable process and from all claims of creditors: To the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor, an interest held under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or similar plan or contract payable on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service unless:
(1) Within two years prior to bankruptcy or to entry against the individual of a money judgment which thereafter becomes final, such plan or contract was established or was amended to increase contributions by or under the auspices of the individual or of an insider that employed the individual at the time the individual's rights under such plan or contract arose; or
(2) Such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 408A of the Internal Revenue Code.
For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires, insider shall have the meaning provided in 11 U.S.C. 101.
Annotations
Individual Retirement Accounts are generally protected from attachment and garnishment to the extent the funds contained therein are reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or any dependent of the debtor. Novak v. Novak, 245 Neb. 366, 513 N.W.2d 303 (1994).
25-1563.02.
Lump-sum settlement; structured settlement; exempt from certain process; when.(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all proceeds and benefits, including interest earned thereon, which are paid either in a lump sum or are accruing under any structured settlement providing periodic payments, which lump-sum settlement or periodic payments are made as compensation for personal injuries or death, shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or other legal or equitable process and from all claims of creditors of the beneficiary or the beneficiary's surviving dependents unless a written assignment to the contrary has been obtained by the claimant.
(2) All proceeds and benefits, including interest earned thereon, which are paid for personal injuries may be garnished by a county attorney or authorized attorney pursuant to section 43-512.03 or garnished for child support as defined in section 43-1705 by an obligee as defined in section 43-1713.
25-1564.
Property of debtor other than lands and chattels subject to payment of judgment.Where a judgment debtor has not personal or real property subject to levy on execution, sufficient to satisfy the judgment, any interest which he may have in any banking, turnpike, bridge, or other joint-stock company, or any interest he may have in any money, contracts, claims or choses in action, due or to become due to him, or in any judgment or decree, or any money, goods or effects which he may have in possession of any person, body politic or corporate, shall be subject to the payment of such judgment by proceedings in equity, or as in this chapter prescribed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 532, p. 486; R.S.1913, § 8111; C.S.1922, § 9047; C.S.1929, § 20-1565; R.S.1943, § 25-1564.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Proceeding
1. Scope
This section authorizes a creditor's bill in Nebraska. Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Neb., N.A., 260 Neb. 100, 615 N.W.2d 104 (2000).
This and succeeding sections provide remedy where discovery of property of judgment debtor is sought through evidence from others than a garnishee. Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. North, 125 Neb. 723, 251 N.W. 895 (1933).
Where creditor has exhausted legal remedies he may proceed in equity to reach interest of debtor in corporation. Fuchs v. Chambers, 89 Neb. 538, 131 N.W. 975 (1911).
This section does not supersede remedy in equity. First Nat. Bank of Plattsmouth v. Gibson, 69 Neb. 21, 94 N.W. 965 (1903).
This section takes place of bill of discovery. Clarke v. Nebraska Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 800, 69 N.W. 104 (1896).
2. Proceeding
Any interest a judgment debtor may have in any money or choses in action due, or to become due, is subject to the payment of the judgment against him. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Hallgren, 146 Neb. 530, 20 N.W.2d 501 (1945).
In proceedings in aid of execution, the judgment creditor proceeds directly against the debtor, citing him into court for an examination of his assets. Live Stock Nat. Bank v. Jackson, 137 Neb. 161, 288 N.W. 515 (1939).
Creditors suit is proper to impress a lien upon distributive share of judgment debtor in decedent's estate in process of administration. Fremont Farmers Union Coop. Assn. v. Markussen, 136 Neb. 567, 286 N.W. 784 (1939).
Proceedings in aid of execution afford ample remedy to judgment creditor where debtor makes false affidavit and procures release, as exempt, of property taken in execution; replevin is not proper remedy. France v. Larkin, 96 Neb. 365, 148 N.W. 86 (1914).
Creditor must have had actionable demand against his debtor when suit commenced. German Nat. Bank of Hastings v. First Nat. Bank of Hastings, 59 Neb. 7, 80 N.W. 48 (1899).
Equity court has power to subject to judgment property not reached by legal execution. Arlington State Bank v. Paulsen, 57 Neb. 717, 78 N.W. 303 (1899).
Creditor's bill is still available; not entitled to jury trial therein. Monroe v. Reid, Murdock & Co., 46 Neb. 316, 64 N.W. 983 (1895).
25-1565.
Discovery of property of debtor; order to appear and answer.At any time after the entry of judgment against the judgment debtor, or one of several debtors in the same action, the judgment creditor is entitled to an order from the county court or the district court of the county (1) in which the debtor resides, (2) if the debtor does not reside in the state, where judgment was rendered, or (3) in which a transcript of judgment has been filed, requiring the debtor to appear and answer concerning his or her property before the judge of such court or a referee appointed by the judge of such court at a time and place specified in the order within the county to which the order was issued.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 533, p. 487; R.S.1913, § 8112; C.S.1922, § 9048; C.S.1929, § 20-1566; R.S.1943, § 25-1565;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 134; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 11;
Laws 2004, LB 1207, § 7.
Annotations
Provisions of the code pertaining to compulsory discovery do not relate to the subject of pleading. Marshall v. Rowe, 126 Neb. 817, 254 N.W. 480 (1934).
Making of order is authorized only after return of execution unsatisfied. Clarke v. Nebraska Nat. Bank, 57 Neb. 314, 77 N.W. 805 (1899).
Proceedings in aid of execution were designed to take the place of bill of discovery. Clarke v. Nebraska Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 800, 69 N.W. 104 (1896).
Execution must issue to lay foundation for contempt proceedings. Hawthorne v. State, 45 Neb. 871, 64 N.W. 359 (1895).
Affidavit is unnecessary to obtain order; it is sufficient if execution is returned unsatisfied. English v. Smith, 1 Neb. Unof. 670, 96 N.W. 60 (1901).
25-1566.
Discovery of property of debtor; warrant for arrest; examination; undertaking; punishment for contempt.Instead of the order requiring the attendance of the judgment debtor, as provided in section 25-1565, the judge may, upon proof to his satisfaction by affidavit of the party or otherwise, that there is danger of the debtor leaving the state or concealing himself to avoid the examination herein mentioned, issue a warrant, requiring the sheriff to arrest him and bring him before such judge within the county in which the debtor may be arrested. Such warrant can be issued only by a county judge or a judge of the district court of the county in which such debtor resides or may be arrested. Upon being brought before the judge, he shall be examined on oath, and other witnesses may be examined on either side, and if on such examination it appears that there is danger of the debtor leaving the state, and that he has property which he unjustly refuses to apply to such judgment, he may be ordered to enter into an undertaking, in such sum as the judge may prescribe, with one or more sureties, that he will from time to time attend for examination before the judge or referee as shall be directed. In default of entering into such undertaking, he may be committed to the jail of the county by warrant of the judge, as for a contempt.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 535, p. 487; R.S.1913, § 8114; C.S.1922, § 9050; C.S.1929, § 20-1568; R.S.1943, § 25-1566.
Annotations
Intention to leave state alone is insufficient; but danger that citation will not be obeyed, is ground. Bank of Miller v. Richmon, 68 Neb. 731, 94 N.W. 998 (1903).
Affidavit upon information and belief is insufficient. Clarke v. Nebraska Nat. Bank, 57 Neb. 314, 77 N.W. 805 (1899).
25-1567.
Discovery of property of debtor; examination; debtor's incriminating answers; not privileged; immunity.No person shall, on examination pursuant to sections 25-1564 to 25-1580, be excused from answering any question on the ground that his examination will tend to convict him of a fraud, but his answer shall not be used as evidence against him in a prosecution for such fraud.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 536, p. 488; R.S.1913, § 8115; C.S.1922, § 9051; C.S.1929, § 20-1569; R.S.1943, § 25-1567.
25-1568.
Execution; satisfaction; payment by debtors of judgment debtor.After the issuing of execution against property, any person indebted to the judgment debtor may pay to the sheriff the amount of his debt, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the sheriff's receipt shall be a sufficient discharge for the amount so paid or directed to be credited by the judgment creditor on the execution.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 537, p. 488; R.S.1913, § 8116; C.S.1922, § 9052; C.S.1929, § 20-1570; R.S.1943, § 25-1568.
Annotations
This section relates to examination of the judgment debtor's debtor. Clarke v. Nebraska Nat. Bank, 57 Neb. 314, 77 N.W. 805 (1899).
25-1569.
Debtors of judgment debtor; examination; notice.After the issuing or return of an execution against property of the judgment debtor, or of any one of several debtors in the same judgment, and upon proof by affidavit or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the judge, that any person or corporation has property of such judgment debtor, or is indebted to him, the judge may, by an order, require such person or corporation, or any officer or member thereof, to appear at a specified time and place, within the county in which such person or corporation may be served with the order to answer, and answer concerning the same. The judge may also, in his discretion, require notice of such proceeding to be given to any party in the action, in such manner as may seem to him proper.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 538, p. 488; R.S.1913, § 8117; C.S.1922, § 9053; C.S.1929, § 20-1571; R.S.1943, § 25-1569.
Annotations
Notice is to be given in the manner which the court deems proper. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Hallgren, 146 Neb. 530, 20 N.W.2d 501 (1945).
This section applies to garnishment proceedings after judgment and return of execution nulla bona. Mercer v. Armstrong, 98 Neb. 645, 154 N.W. 219 (1915).
25-1570.
Discovery of property of debtor; examination; witnesses.Witnesses may be required, upon the order of the judge or by a subpoena issued by the clerk of the court, to appear and testify upon any proceedings under sections 25-1564 to 25-1580 in the same manner as upon the trial of an issue.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 539, p. 488; R.S.1913, § 8118; C.S.1922, § 9054; C.S.1929, § 20-1572; R.S.1943, § 25-1570; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 12.
Annotations
Witnesses may be required to appear and testify in the same manner as upon the trial of an issue. Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. North, 125 Neb. 723, 251 N.W. 895 (1933).
25-1571.
Discovery of property of debtor; examination; oath; referee.The party or witness may be required to attend before the judge or before a referee appointed by the court or judge. If before a referee, the examination must be taken by the referee and certified by the judge. All examinations and answers before a judge or referee under sections 25-1564 to 25-1580 must be on oath, but when a corporation answers, the answer must be on the oath of an officer thereof.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 540, p. 488; R.S.1913, § 8119; C.S.1922, § 9055; C.S.1929, § 20-1573; R.S.1943, § 25-1571.
Annotations
It is the duty of the district court, in a proceeding in aid of execution, when it is disclosed by the administrator of an estate that a judgment debtor has an interest in a distributive share of such estate, to impress a lien upon such share. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Hallgren, 146 Neb. 530, 20 N.W.2d 501 (1945).
Judgment debtor may be a witness. Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. North, 125 Neb. 723, 251 N.W. 895 (1933).
25-1572.
Discovery of property of debtor; disposition by judge.The judge may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, in the hands of either himself or any other person or corporation, or due to the judgment debtor, to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 541, p. 489; R.S.1913, § 8120; C.S.1922, § 9056; C.S.1929, § 20-1574; R.S.1943, § 25-1572.
Annotations
This section was not amended by act exempting ninety per cent of wages, and applies to proceedings against debtor in aid of execution. Live Stock Nat. Bank v. Jackson, 137 Neb. 161, 288 N.W. 515 (1939).
Order may be enforced by the ordinary legal methods of procedure. In re Havlik, 45 Neb. 747, 64 N.W. 234 (1895).
25-1573.
Discovery of property of debtor; appointment of receiver; transfer of nonexempt property; power of court to prevent.The judge may also, by order, appoint the sheriff of the proper county, or other suitable person, a receiver of the property of the judgment debtor, in the same manner and with the like authority as if the appointment were made by the court. The judge may also, by order, forbid a transfer or other disposition of the property of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and any interference therewith.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 542, p. 489; R.S.1913, § 8121; C.S.1922, § 9057; C.S.1929, § 20-1575; R.S.1943, § 25-1573.
25-1574.
Discovery of property of debtor; receiver; liability of officer and sureties; undertaking; oath.If the sheriff shall be appointed receiver, he and his sureties shall be liable on his official bond for the faithful discharge of his duties as such receiver; if any other person shall be appointed receiver, he shall give a written undertaking, in such sum as shall be prescribed by the judge, with one or more sureties, to the effect that he will faithfully discharge his duties of receiver, and he shall also take an oath to the same effect before acting as such receiver. The undertaking mentioned in this section shall be to the State of Nebraska, and actions may be prosecuted for a breach thereof, by any person interested, in the same manner as upon a sheriff's official bond.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 543, p. 489; R.S.1913, § 8122; C.S.1922, § 9058; C.S.1929, § 20-1576; R.S.1943, § 25-1574.
25-1575.
Discovery of property of debtor; proceedings; continuance.The judge or referee, acting under the provisions of sections 25-1564 to 25-1580, shall have power to continue his proceedings from time to time until they are completed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 544, p. 489; R.S.1913, § 8123; C.S.1922, § 9059; C.S.1929, § 20-1577; R.S.1943, § 25-1575.
25-1576.
Discovery of property of debtor; reference.The judge may in his discretion order a reference to a referee agreed upon or appointed by him, to report the evidence of the facts.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 545, p. 489; R.S.1913, § 8124; C.S.1922, § 9060; C.S.1929, § 20-1578; R.S.1943, § 25-1576.
25-1577.
Discovery of property of debtor; disobedience of order of court; penalty.(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, if any person, party, or witness disobeys an order of the judge or referee, duly served, such person, party, or witness may be punished by the judge as for contempt, and if a party, he or she shall be committed to the jail of the county wherein the proceedings are pending until he or she complies with such order; or, in case he or she has, since the service of such order upon him or her, rendered it impossible for him or her to comply therewith, until he or she has restored to the opposite party what such party has lost by such disobedience, or until discharged by due course of law.
(2) No imprisonment related to the debt collection process shall be allowed unless, after a hearing, a judgment debtor is found to be in willful contempt of court. A judgment debtor shall not be committed to jail for failing to appear pursuant to section 25-1565 unless, after service of an order to appear and show cause as to why the judgment debtor should not be found in contempt for failing to appear, the judgment debtor is found to be in willful contempt.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 546, p. 489; Laws 1875, § 1, p. 39; R.S.1913, § 8125; C.S.1922, § 9061; C.S.1929, § 20-1579; R.S.1943, § 25-1577;
Laws 2017, LB259, § 1.
Annotations
Failure to pay money is not punishable, unless party is able to pay or willfully unable. Hawthorne v. State, 45 Neb. 871, 64 N.W. 359 (1895).
Third person refusing to turn over property in his possession is not punishable. In re Havlik, 45 Neb. 747, 64 N.W. 234 (1895).
25-1578.
Discovery of property of debtor; orders to judgment debtors and witnesses; service; filing; record.The orders to judgment debtors and witnesses provided for in sections 25-1564 to 25-1580 shall be signed and filed by the judge making the same and shall be served in the same manner as a summons in other cases. The judge shall sign all such orders. Such orders shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the judgment is rendered or the transcript of the judgment filed, and the clerk shall enter on the record the date and time of filing the same.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 547, p. 489; R.S.1913, § 8126; C.S.1922, § 9062; C.S.1929, § 20-1580; R.S.1943, § 25-1578;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 28.
25-1579.
Discovery of property of debtor; proceedings; fees; taxation as costs.The judge shall allow to sheriffs, referees, receivers, and witnesses such compensation as is allowed for like service in other cases, to be taxed as costs in the case, and shall enforce by order the collection thereof from such party or parties as ought to pay the same.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 548, p. 489; R.S.1913, § 8127; C.S.1922, § 9063; C.S.1929, § 20-1581; R.S.1943, § 25-1579; Laws 1959, c. 140, § 2, p. 546.
25-1580.
Discovery of property of debtor; proceedings; county judge; fees.The county judge shall be allowed for his or her services, under sections 25-1564 to 25-1580, the sum of five dollars in each case, and such fees as are allowed by law to clerks of the district court for similar services.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 549, p. 490; R.S.1913, § 8128; C.S.1922, § 9064; C.S.1929, § 20-1582; R.S.1943, § 25-1580; Laws 1982, LB 928, § 19.
25-1581.
Execution; contents; satisfaction of damages and costs.If the execution be for the delivery of the possession of real property, it shall require the officer to deliver the same, particularly describing the property, to the party entitled thereto, and may at the same time require the officer to satisfy any costs or damages recovered in the same judgment, out of the goods and chattels of the party against whom it was rendered, and for want of such goods and chattels, then out of the lands and tenements, and in this respect it shall be deemed an execution against the property.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 559, p. 491; R.S.1913, § 8129; C.S.1922, § 9065; C.S.1929, § 20-1583; R.S.1943, § 25-1581.
25-1582.
Judgment other than for the recovery of money or real property; enforcement by attachment or rule of court; notice.When the judgment is not for the recovery of money or real property, the same may be enforced by attachment by the court rendering the judgment, upon motion made, or by a rule of the court upon the defendant; but in either case, notice of the motion, or service of a copy of the rule, shall be made on the defendant a reasonable time before the order of attachment is made.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 560, p. 491; R.S.1913, § 8130; C.S.1922, § 9066; C.S.1929, § 20-1584; R.S.1943, § 25-1582.
Annotations
Judgment becomes lien on after-acquired property. Jones v. Knosp, 91 Neb. 224, 135 N.W. 1049 (1912).
25-1583.
Repealed. Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 287.
25-1584.
Repealed. Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 287.
25-1585.
Repealed. Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 287.
25-1586.
Repealed. Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 287.
25-1587.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1587.01.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-1587.01 to 25-1587.09 shall be known and may be cited as the Nebraska Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.
Annotations
While Nebraska courts are prohibited from reviewing the merits of a foreign judgment, Nebraska courts may examine whether the foreign judgment was rendered with proper jurisdiction and may refuse to register and enforce a foreign judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter. Walksalong v. Mackey, 250 Neb. 202, 549 N.W.2d 384 (1996).
25-1587.02.
Foreign judgment, defined.For purposes of the Nebraska Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, foreign judgment means any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.
25-1587.03.
Filing and status of foreign judgments.A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress or the statutes of this state may be filed on or after January 1, 1994, in the office of the clerk of any court of this state having jurisdiction of such action. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of a court of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.
Annotations
The filing of a foreign judgment in a Nebraska court pursuant to this section is not an action upon a foreign judgment within the meaning of section 25-205. A foreign judgment filed in a Nebraska court pursuant to this section may be collaterally attacked on the ground that the court which entered the judgment lacked jurisdiction to do so, and the resolution of the issue must be made by the Nebraska court. Deuth v. Ratigan, 256 Neb. 419, 590 N.W.2d 366 (1999).
25-1587.04.
Notice of filing.(a) At the time of the filing of the foreign judgment, the judgment creditor or his or her lawyer shall make and file with the clerk of the court an affidavit setting forth the name and last-known post office address of the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor.
(b) Promptly upon the filing of the foreign judgment and the affidavit, the clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall file notice of the mailing on the record. The notice shall include the name and address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor's lawyer, if any, in this state. In addition, the judgment creditor may mail a notice of the filing of the judgment to the judgment debtor and may file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of mailing notice of filing by the clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by the judgment creditor has been filed.
25-1587.05.
Stay.(a) If the judgment debtor shows the court that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated, upon proof that the judgment debtor has furnished the security for the satisfaction of the judgment required by the state in which it was rendered.
(b) If the judgment debtor shows the court any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of any court of this state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment for an appropriate period upon requiring the same security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this state.
25-1587.06.
Fees.Any person filing a foreign judgment or a judgment from another court in this state shall pay to the clerk of the district or county court a fee as provided in section 33-106 or 33-123 for filing a transcript of judgment. Fees for filing, transcription, or other enforcement proceedings shall be as provided for judgments of the courts of this state.
25-1587.07.
Optional procedure.The right of a judgment creditor to bring an action to enforce his or her judgment instead of proceeding under the Nebraska Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act remains unimpaired.
25-1587.08.
Uniformity of interpretation.The Nebraska Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
25-1587.09.
Foreign judgments registered under prior law.Sections 25-1587.01 to 25-1587.08 do not apply to foreign judgments registered prior to January 1, 1994, pursuant to sections 25-1587 to 25-15,104 as such sections existed immediately prior to such date. Sections 25-1587 to 25-15,104 shall remain effective on and after January 1, 1994, only for the purpose of enforcement of foreign judgments registered prior to such date pursuant to sections 25-1587 to 25-15,104 as such sections existed immediately prior to such date.
25-1588.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1589.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1590.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1591.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1592.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1593.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1594.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1595.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1596.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1597.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1598.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-1599.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-15,100.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-15,101.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-15,102.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-15,103.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-15,104.
Repealed. Laws 1993, LB 458, § 15.
25-15,105.
Federal exemptions; rejected.The federal exemptions provided in 11 U.S.C. 522, subsection (d), are hereby rejected by the State of Nebraska. The State of Nebraska elects to retain the personal exemptions provided under Nebraska statutes and the Nebraska Constitution and to have such exemptions apply to any bankruptcy petition filed in Nebraska after April 17, 1980.
Source:Laws 1980, LB 940, § 1.
Cross References
Exemptions, see section 25-1552 et seq.
Homestead exemption, see section 40-101.
Insurance exemption, see section 44-371.
25-1601.
Transferred to section 25-1650.
25-1601.01.
Repealed. Laws 1977, LB 283, § 4.
25-1601.02.
Repealed. Laws 1967, c. 149, § 1, p. 446.
25-1601.03.
Transferred to section 25-1645.
25-1602.
Transferred to section 25-1651.
25-1603.
Transferred to section 25-1649.
25-1604.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1605.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1606.
Transferred to section 25-1660.
25-1607.
Transferred to section 25-1661.
25-1608.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1609.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB387, § 49.
25-1610.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1611.
Transferred to section 25-1675.
25-1612.
Transferred to section 25-1677.
25-1613.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1614.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1615.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1616.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1617.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1618.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1619.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1620.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1621.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1622.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1623.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1624.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 72, § 16, p. 237.
25-1625.
Transferred to section 25-1647.
25-1626.
Transferred to section 25-1648.
25-1626.01.
Repealed. Laws 1959, c. 266, § 1, p. 953.
25-1626.02.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB387, § 49.
25-1627.
Transferred to section 25-1653.
25-1627.01.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB387, § 49.
25-1628.
Transferred to section 25-1654.
25-1629.
Transferred to section 25-1659.
25-1629.01.
Transferred to section 25-1657.
25-1629.02.
Transferred to section 25-1658.
25-1629.03.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB387, § 49.
25-1629.04.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB387, § 49.
25-1630.
Transferred to section 25-1676.
25-1631.
Transferred to section 25-1671.
25-1631.01.
Repealed. Laws 1979, LB 234, § 18.
25-1631.02.
Repealed. Laws 1979, LB 234, § 18.
25-1631.03.
Transferred to section 25-1663.
25-1632.
Transferred to section 25-1662.
25-1632.01.
Transferred to section 25-1664.
25-1633.
Transferred to section 25-1669.
25-1633.01.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB387, § 49.
25-1633.02.
Repealed. Laws 1979, LB 234, § 18.
25-1633.03.
Repealed. Laws 1979, LB 234, § 18.
25-1634.
Transferred to section 25-1665.
25-1634.01.
Transferred to section 25-1667.
25-1634.02.
Transferred to section 25-1666.
25-1634.03.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB387, § 49.
25-1635.
Transferred to section 25-1673.
25-1636.
Transferred to section 25-1652.
25-1637.
Transferred to section 25-1678.
25-1638.
Repealed. Laws 1979, LB 234, § 18.
25-1639.
Transferred to section 25-1670.
25-1640.
Transferred to section 25-1674.
25-1641.
Transferred to section 25-1656.
25-1642.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB387, § 49.
25-1643.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB387, § 49.
25-1644.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-1644 to 25-1678 shall be known and may be cited as the Jury Selection Act.
25-1645.
Act; intent and purpose.The Legislature hereby declares that it is the intent and purpose of the Jury Selection Act to create a jury system which will ensure that:
(1) All persons selected for jury service are selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court;
(2) All qualified citizens have the opportunity to be considered for jury service;
(3) All qualified citizens fulfill their obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose; and
(4) No citizen is excluded from jury service in this state as a result of discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.
25-1646.
Terms, defined.For purposes of the Jury Selection Act:
(1) Combined list means the list created pursuant to section 25-1654 by merging the lists of names from the Department of Motor Vehicles and from election records into one list;
(2) Grand jury means a body of people who are chosen to sit permanently for at least a month and up to a year and who, in ex parte proceedings, decide whether to issue indictments in criminal cases;
(3) Jury commissioner means the person designated in section 25-1647;
(4) Jury list means a list or lists of names of potential jurors drawn from the master key list for possible service on grand and petit juries;
(5) Jury management system means an electronic process in which individuals are randomly selected to serve as grand or petit jurors and for which the presence of a district court judge or other designated official is not required. A jury management system may also provide an electronic process for a potential juror to complete and submit a juror qualification form and to receive summonses and notifications regarding jury service;
(6) Jury panel means the persons summoned to serve as grand or petit jurors for such period of a jury term as determined by the judge or judges;
(7) Jury term means a month, calendar quarter, year, or other period of time as determined by the judge or judges during which grand or petit jurors are selected for service from a master key list. A jury term shall not extend beyond the time by which a new combined list is required to be prepared pursuant to section 25-1654, except by order of the court;
(8) Manual jury selection process means a process in which individuals are randomly selected to serve on a grand or petit jury by drawing names from a wheel or box while in the presence of a district court judge or other official designated by the judge;
(9) Master key list means the list of names selected using the key number pursuant to section 25-1654;
(10) One-step qualifying and summoning system means a process for selecting and summoning grand or petit jurors in which a juror qualification form and summons, or instructions to complete a jury qualification form through a jury management system and a summons, are sent to a potential juror at the same time;
(11) Petit jury means a group of jurors who may be summoned and empaneled in the trial of a specific case;
(12) Tales juror means a person selected from among the bystanders in court or the people of the county to serve as a juror when the original jury panel has become deficient in number; and
(13) Two-step qualifying and summoning system means a process for selecting and summoning grand or petit jurors in which a juror qualification form, or instructions to complete a jury qualification form through a jury management system, is sent to a potential juror and, if the juror is qualified and drawn for jury service, a summons is sent.
25-1647.
Jury commissioner; designation; salary; expenses; duties; salary increase, when effective.(1) In each county of the State of Nebraska, the clerk of the district court shall serve as the jury commissioner.
(2) In counties having a population in excess of one hundred seventy-five thousand inhabitants, the judges of the district court within such counties shall determine whether the clerk of the district court will receive additional compensation to perform the duties of jury commissioner. The amount of any such additional compensation shall be fixed by the judges of the district court in an amount not to exceed three thousand dollars per annum.
(3) In all counties the necessary expenses incurred in the performance of the duties of jury commissioner shall be paid by the county board of the county out of the general fund, upon proper claims approved by one of the district judges in the judicial district and duly filed with the county board.
(4) In all counties the jury commissioner shall prepare and file the annual inventory statement with the county board of the county of all county personal property in his or her custody or possession, as provided in sections 23-346 to 23-350.
(5) This section shall be so interpreted as to effectuate its general purpose, to provide, in the public interest, adequate compensation for the jury commissioner and to permit a change in such salary as soon as the change may become operative under the Constitution of Nebraska.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 1, p. 568; C.S.1922, § 9095; C.S.1929, § 20-1625; Laws 1931, c. 65, § 5, p. 178; Laws 1939, c. 28, § 20, p. 159; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1625; R.S.1943, § 25-1625; Laws 1947, c. 62, § 9, p. 202; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 6, p. 227; Laws 1961, c. 113, § 1, p. 352;
Laws 1971, LB 547, § 1; Laws 1975, LB 527, § 1; Laws 1979, LB 234, § 6; Laws 2003, LB 19, § 4; Laws 2010, LB712, § 2; Laws 2013, LB169, § 1; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1625;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 4; Laws 2022, LB922, § 2.
Annotations
Statutory procedure for selection and impaneling of juries in a county the size of Douglas is provided. Maher v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 13 N.W.2d 641 (1944).
Jury commissioner act indicates modern trend against advance disclosure of names of jurors. Fetty v. State, 118 Neb. 169, 223 N.W. 955 (1929).
25-1648.
Jury commissioner; deputy; appointment; powers.(1) The jury commissioner shall appoint a deputy jury commissioner from the regular employees of his or her office who shall serve ex officio and who shall hold office during the pleasure of the jury commissioner. The deputy jury commissioner shall be approved by the judge or judges of the district court before taking office. The deputy jury commissioner, during the absence of the jury commissioner from the county or during the sickness or disability of the jury commissioner, with the consent of such judge or judges, may perform any or all of the duties of the jury commissioner.
(2) If there are no regular employees of the office of jury commissioner, he or she may appoint some other county officer or employee thereof as deputy jury commissioner.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 1, p. 568; C.S.1922, § 9096; C.S.1929, § 20-1626; R.S.1943, § 25-1626; Laws 1951, c. 69, § 1, p. 224; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 7, p. 227; Laws 1955, c. 90, § 2, p. 265; Laws 1955, c. 91, § 1, p. 268; Laws 1965, c. 123, § 1, p. 460; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1626;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 5; Laws 2022, LB922, § 3.
25-1649.
Jurors; selection.In each of the county and district courts of this state, the lists of grand and petit jurors shall be made up and jurors selected for jury duty in the manner prescribed in the Jury Selection Act.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 658, p. 510; R.S.1913, § 8137; C.S.1922, § 9073; C.S.1929, § 20-1603; Laws 1931, c. 36, § 1, p. 129; Laws 1939, c. 18, § 23, p. 113; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1603; R.S.1943, § 25-1603; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 2, p. 225;
Laws 1979, LB 234, § 3; Laws 1980, LB 733, § 2; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1603;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 6.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Challenge
1. Scope
Number of votes cast at election does not furnish basis for definite inference as to number of persons possessing qualifications of jurors. Nelson v. State, 118 Neb. 812, 226 N.W. 438 (1929).
Failure of county board to select jurors fifteen days before opening of term did not require quashing of panel without resulting prejudice. Fetty v. State, 118 Neb. 169, 223 N.W. 955 (1929).
Section is not applicable to calling of juries after commencement of term. Pinn v. State, 107 Neb. 417, 186 N.W. 544 (1922).
One who has served within two years should not be selected, but it is not sufficient to quash panel. Kerr v. State, 63 Neb. 115, 88 N.W. 240 (1901).
In calling special term, failure of judge to direct summons of jurors under this section does not invalidate. Welsh v. State, 60 Neb. 101, 82 N.W. 368 (1900).
Section is mandatory, and must be strictly followed. Davis v. State, 31 Neb. 247, 47 N.W. 854 (1891).
When right of suffrage was restricted to male voters, apportionment might be based on vote at last general election. Bohanan v. State, 15 Neb. 209, 18 N.W. 129 (1883).
Jury for called term must be selected in this manner. Brown alias McElvoy v. State, 9 Neb. 157, 2 N.W. 378 (1879).
2. Challenge
Failure to challenge a juror for cause and to examine him or other witnesses as to his competency is a waiver, even though fact of incompetency is not known until after verdict. Young v. State, 133 Neb. 644, 276 N.W. 387 (1937).
It was error to refuse to quash panel where officers who selected jurors are members of secret society seeking to convict defendant. Nelson v. State, 115 Neb. 26, 211 N.W. 175 (1926).
It was error to overrule challenge to the array in criminal case, where jurors were drawn by precinct, separately, instead of by lot from sixty names from county at large. Kronberg v. State, 114 Neb. 393, 207 N.W. 668 (1926).
Commissioner having case pending should not assist in selection of list, but panel will not be quashed. Northeastern Neb. R. R. Co. v. Frazier, 25 Neb. 42, 40 N.W. 604 (1888).
It is ground for plea in abatement, where grand jury is not proportionately selected. Barton v. State, 12 Neb. 260, 11 N.W. 323 (1882).
Plea in abatement that jurors were not properly selected must specifically point out objections. Baldwin v. State, 12 Neb. 61, 10 N.W. 463 (1881).
If not selected proportionately, it is ground for challenge to array. Clark v. Saline County, 9 Neb. 516, 4 N.W. 246 (1880).
25-1650.
Jurors; qualifications; disqualifications; excused or exempt, when.(1) All citizens of the United States residing in any of the counties of this state who are over the age of nineteen years, able to read, speak, and understand the English language, and free from all disqualifications set forth under this section and from all other legal exceptions are qualified to serve on all grand and petit juries in their respective counties. Persons disqualified to serve as either grand or petit jurors are: (a) Judges of any court, (b) clerks of the Supreme or district courts, (c) sheriffs, (d) jailers, (e) persons, or the spouse of any such persons, who are parties to suits pending in the county of his, her, or their residence for trial to that jury panel, (f) persons who have been convicted of a felony when such conviction has not been set aside or a pardon issued, and (g) persons who are subject to liability for the commission of any offense which by special provision of law disqualifies them. Spouses shall not serve as jurors on the same panel. Persons who are incapable, by reason of physical or mental disability, of rendering satisfactory jury service shall not be qualified to serve on a jury, but a person claiming this disqualification shall be required to submit a physician's certificate as to the disability and the certifying physician is subject to inquiry by the court at its discretion. A nursing mother who requests to be excused shall be excused from jury service until she is no longer nursing her child, but the mother shall be required to submit a physician's certificate in support of her request. A person who is serving on active duty as a member of the United States Armed Forces who requests to be exempt shall be exempt from jury service, but such person shall be required to submit documentation of his or her active-duty status in support of his or her request.
(2) The district court or any judge thereof may exercise the power of excusing any grand or petit juror or any person summoned for grand or petit jury service upon a showing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public necessity for such period as the court deems necessary. At the conclusion of such period the person shall reappear for jury service in accordance with the court's direction. All excuses and the grounds for such excuses shall be entered upon the record of the court. In districts having more than one judge of the district court, the court may by rule or order assign or delegate to the presiding judge or any one or more judges the sole authority to grant such excuses.
(3) No qualified potential juror is exempt from jury service, except that any person seventy years of age or older who makes a request to be exempt to the court at the time the juror qualification form is filed with the jury commissioner or who makes such a request in writing after being qualified and summoned shall be exempt from serving on grand and petit juries.
(4) A physician's certificate or other documentation or information submitted by a person in support of a claim of disqualification by reason of physical or mental disability or due to such person's status as a nursing mother is not a public record as defined in section 84-712.01 and is not subject to disclosure under sections 84-712 to 84-712.09.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 657, p. 509; Laws 1911, c. 171, § 1, p. 548; R.S.1913, § 8135; Laws 1917, c. 139, § 1, p. 325; C.S.1922, § 9071; C.S.1929, § 20-1601; Laws 1939, c. 18, § 1, p. 98; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1601; Laws 1943, c. 45, § 1, p. 191; R.S.1943, § 25-1601; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 1, p. 224; Laws 1955, c. 90, § 1, p. 264; Laws 1959, c. 106, § 1, p. 433; Laws 1959, c. 143, § 1, p. 551; Laws 1969, c. 189, § 1, p. 780;
Laws 1979, LB 234, § 2; Laws 1980, LB 733, § 1;
Laws 1985, LB 113, § 1; Laws 1993, LB 31, § 2; Laws 2003, LB 19, § 3; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1601;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 7.
Cross References
For exemption of National Guard, see section 55-173.
Annotations
1. Competency
2. Selection
1. Competency
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, not every person who works in a jail is necessarily a "jailer". State v. Jacob, 253 Neb. 950, 574 N.W.2d 117 (1998).
Holders of assessable policies issued by a mutual insurance company named as a party in an action may serve as jurors if the policyholder can decide the case fairly solely upon the evidence presented at trial. Howard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Neb. 624, 496 N.W.2d 862 (1993).
Although several husbands and wives were on the same jury panel, there was no evidence that any statutorily disqualified person actually served as a juror at the trial. Schroll v. Fulton, 213 Neb. 310, 328 N.W.2d 780 (1983).
Defendant not denied fair trial by statute limiting eligibility for jury duty according to age. State v. Schwartz, 199 Neb. 17, 255 N.W.2d 859 (1977).
Excluding nineteen and twenty year olds from petit and grand jury service does not violate constitutional due process guarantees. State v. Foster, 196 Neb. 332, 242 N.W.2d 876 (1976).
District court may excuse for cause any grand juror who has been summoned. State v. Abboud, 181 Neb. 84, 147 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
Nothing in this section disqualified a negro from jury service. Bell v. State, 159 Neb. 474, 67 N.W.2d 762 (1954).
Failure of counsel to again inquire of juror, incompetent and ineligible because of his age, was not waived, where trial court has asked the qualifying questions and juror failed to disclose his ineligibility, when fact is unknown to counsel and parties. Berg v. Griffiths, 126 Neb. 235, 252 N.W. 918 (1934).
Juror is presumed to be qualified at time of serving in absence of showing to contrary. Seaton v. State, 109 Neb. 828, 192 N.W. 501 (1923).
Mere impairment of eyesight does not render juror incompetent. Reed v. State, 75 Neb. 509, 106 N.W. 649 (1906).
Juror must be qualified voter. Russell v. State, 62 Neb. 512, 87 N.W. 344 (1901).
Juror must be elector of the county wherein he is called to serve. Hart v. State, 14 Neb. 572, 16 N.W. 905 (1883).
Negroes are not incompetent. Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198 (1873).
2. Selection
Statute exempting certain occupations from jury duty upheld against motion to quash jury panel. State v. Wounded Arrow, 207 Neb. 544, 300 N.W.2d 19 (1980).
It is not error to overrule challenge to the array that does not plead facts showing in what way statute was violated. Uerling v. State, 125 Neb. 374, 250 N.W. 243 (1933).
Failure to interrogate juror on voir dire as to his competency and to challenge for that cause constitutes waiver of juror's incompetency. Flannigan v. State, 124 Neb. 748, 248 N.W. 92 (1933).
Evidence was insufficient to support challenge to the array on ground jury panel was improperly selected. Nelson v. State, 118 Neb. 812, 226 N.W. 438 (1929).
25-1651.
Jurors; actions to which county or other municipal corporation a party; inhabitants and taxpayers; serve, when.On the trial of any suit in which a county or any other municipal corporation is a party, the inhabitants and taxpayers of such county or municipal corporation shall be qualified to serve as jurors if otherwise qualified according to law.
Source:Laws 1877, § 1, p. 16; R.S.1913, § 8136; C.S.1922, § 9072; C.S.1929, § 20-1602; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1602;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 8.
Annotations
Interest as taxpayer may disqualify where he testifies such interest would influence verdict. Omaha v. Cane, 15 Neb. 657, 20 N.W. 101 (1884).
Ordinarily interest as taxpayer does not disqualify. Omaha v. Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446 (1877).
25-1652.
Jurors; challenge for cause; grounds.(1) It shall be ground for challenge for cause that any potential juror: (a) Does not possess the qualifications of a juror as set forth in section 25-1650 or is excluded by the terms of section 25-1650; (b) has requested or solicited any officer of the court or officer charged in any manner with the duty of selecting the jury to place such juror upon the jury panel; or (c) otherwise lacks any of the qualifications provided by law.
(2) It shall not be a ground for challenge for cause that a potential juror has read, heard, or watched in news media an account of the commission of a crime with which a defendant is charged, if such juror states under oath that he or she can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence and the court is satisfied as to the truth of such statement. In the trial of any criminal cause, the fact that a person called as a juror has formed an opinion based upon rumor or statements or reports in news media, and as to the truth of which the person has formed no opinion, shall not disqualify the person to serve as a juror on such cause, if the person states under oath that he or she can fully and impartially render a verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence and the court is satisfied as to the truth of such statement.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 12, p. 573; Laws 1921, c. 113, § 2, p. 394; C.S.1922, § 9106; C.S.1929, § 20-1636; Laws 1939, c. 18, § 18, p. 110; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1636; Laws 1943, c. 45, § 3, p. 193; R.S.1943, § 25-1636; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 15, p. 236; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1636;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 9.
Annotations
The fact that many, most, or even all the jurors knew something about the case in advance does not entitle a defendant to a change of venue, for a criminal defendant is not guaranteed a jury totally ignorant of the facts and circumstances of his or her case. State v. Phelps, 241 Neb. 707, 490 N.W.2d 676 (1992).
It is not a cause challenge that a juror has read in the newspapers an account of the commission of a crime with which a prisoner is charged if such juror shall state on oath that it is the belief of that person that he or she can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence, and the court shall be satisfied as to the truth of that statement. State v. Jacobs, 226 Neb. 184, 410 N.W.2d 468 (1987).
To safeguard constitutional right of trial by jury in criminal case, legislature has provided for challenges for cause. Oden v. State, 166 Neb. 729, 90 N.W.2d 356 (1958).
Failure to interrogate jurors as to his residence waives disqualification of juror who is nonresident of county. Marino v. State, 111 Neb. 623, 197 N.W. 396 (1924).
An employee of a party, including a corporate party, is ineligible to serve on a jury involving its employer, and the challenge to such potential jurors may be made by either party to the litigation. When a challenge to a potential juror or venire is made on the basis of employment of a potential juror by a party to the litigation, it is not necessary that the challenging party show that the potential juror is biased or cannot be impartial. Kusek v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 4 Neb. App. 924, 552 N.W.2d 778 (1996).
25-1653.
Jury list; key number; determination; record.(1) The jury commissioner, at such times as may be necessary or as he or she may be ordered to do so by the district judge, shall draw a number to be known as a key number. The drawing of a key number shall be done in a manner which will ensure that the number drawn is the result of chance. The key number shall be drawn from among the numbers one to ten. Except as otherwise provided in this section, only one key number need be drawn.
(2) In a county with a population of less than three thousand inhabitants, the jury commissioner shall draw two key numbers or such larger number of key numbers as the district judge or judges may order instead of only one.
(3) In a county with a population of three thousand inhabitants or more, where experience demonstrates that the use of only one key number does not produce a list of names of sufficient number to make the system of practical use, the district judge or judges may, in their discretion, order the selecting of two key numbers.
(4) The jury commissioner shall make a record of the manner in which the key number or numbers were drawn and the date and the hour of the drawing, the same to be certified by the jury commissioner, and such records shall be entered upon the record of the court.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 3, p. 569; C.S.1922, § 9097; C.S.1929, § 20-1627; R.S.1943, § 25-1627; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 8(1), p. 228;
Laws 1977, LB 283, § 1; Laws 1979, LB 234, § 7; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1627;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 10.
Annotations
A defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to a proportionate number of his race on the jury. State v. Gutierrez, 187 Neb. 383, 191 N.W.2d 164 (1971).
Written order of court directing key number to be drawn is not necessary. Maher v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 13 N.W.2d 641 (1944).
25-1654.
Combined list; master key list; how produced.(1) Each December, the Department of Motor Vehicles shall make available to each jury commissioner a list in magnetic, optical, digital, or other electronic format mutually agreed to by the jury commissioner and the department containing the names, dates of birth, addresses, and motor vehicle operator license numbers or state identification card numbers of all licensed motor vehicle operators and state identification card holders nineteen years of age or older in the county. If a jury commissioner requests similar lists at other times from the department, the cost of processing such lists shall be paid by the county which the requesting jury commissioner serves. Upon request of the jury commissioner, the election commissioner or county clerk having charge of the election records shall furnish to the jury commissioner a complete list of the names, dates of birth, addresses, and motor vehicle operator license numbers or state identification card numbers of all registered voters nineteen years of age or older in the county.
(2) When required pursuant to subsection (3) of this section or when otherwise necessary or as directed by the judge or judges, the jury commissioner shall create a combined list by merging the separate lists described in subsection (1) of this section and reducing any duplication to the best of his or her ability.
(3) In counties having a population of seven thousand inhabitants or more, the jury commissioner shall produce a combined list at least once each calendar year. In counties having a population of three thousand inhabitants but less than seven thousand inhabitants, the jury commissioner shall produce a combined list at least once every two calendar years. In counties having a population of less than three thousand inhabitants, the jury commissioner shall produce a combined list at least once every five calendar years.
(4) The jury commissioner shall then create a master key list by selecting from the combined list the name of the person whose numerical order on such list corresponds with the key number and each successive tenth name thereafter. The jury commissioner shall certify that the master key list has been made in accordance with the Jury Selection Act.
(5) Any unintentional duplication of names on a combined list or master key list shall not be grounds for quashing any panel or jury list pursuant to section 25-1678 or for the disqualification of any juror.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 4, p. 569; C.S.1922, § 9098; C.S.1929, § 20-1628; R.S.1943, § 25-1628; Laws 1957, c. 88, § 1, p. 337;
Laws 1971, LB 11, § 1; Laws 1985, LB 113, § 2; Laws 1988, LB 111, § 1; Laws 1989, LB 82, § 1; Laws 2003, LB 19, § 5; Laws 2005, LB 402, § 1; Laws 2009, LB35, § 10; Laws 2010, LB712, § 3; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1628;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 11.
Annotations
A defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to a proportionate number of his race on the jury. State v. Gutierrez, 187 Neb. 383, 191 N.W.2d 164 (1971).
25-1655.
Potential jurors; how selected.(1) Prior to the jury term or at any time during the jury term, the jury commissioner may draw potential jurors from the master key list for service on petit jury panels that will be needed throughout the jury term. The jury commissioner shall draw such number of potential jurors from the master key list as the judge or judges direct.
(2) In drawing the names of potential jurors, the jury commissioner may use a manual jury selection process or a jury management system. The jury commissioner shall investigate the potential jurors so drawn pursuant to the two-step qualifying and summoning system or the one-step qualifying and summoning system.
(3)(a) If the jury commissioner uses the two-step qualifying and summoning system, he or she shall deliver to each potential juror a juror qualification form pursuant to section 25-1657.
(b) If the jury commissioner uses the one-step qualifying and summoning system, he or she shall deliver to each potential juror a juror qualification form pursuant to section 25-1657 and shall serve the potential juror with a summons pursuant to section 25-1660.
25-1656.
Petit jurors; how selected; summons or notice to report.(1) Unless the judge or judges order that no jury be drawn, the jury commissioner shall draw petit jurors for a regular jury panel pursuant to this section.
(2) If the jury commissioner has previously drawn and investigated potential jurors for service during the jury term as provided in section 25-1655, the jury commissioner shall draw by chance the names of thirty such qualified jurors, or such other number as the judge or judges may otherwise direct, for each judge sitting with a jury, as petit jurors for such regular jury panel.
(3) If the jury commissioner has not previously drawn and investigated potential jurors for service during the jury term as provided in section 25-1655, the jury commissioner shall draw and investigate potential jurors from the master key list in the same manner as provided in section 25-1655. The jury commissioner shall draw and investigate such number of potential jurors as the jury commissioner deems necessary to arrive at a list of thirty qualified jurors or such other number of qualified jurors as the judge or judges shall direct for each judge sitting with a jury.
(4) After drawing the names pursuant to subsection (2) or (3) of this section, the jury commissioner shall:
(a) Serve a summons pursuant to section 25-1660 on each person whose name was drawn if the jury commissioner uses the two-step qualifying and summoning system; or
(b) If the jury commissioner has not already done so in the summons or by another method of notification, notify each person whose name was drawn of the date and time to report for jury service if the jury commissioner uses the one-step qualifying and summoning system.
Source:Laws 1980, LB 733, § 5;
Laws 1983, LB 329, § 1; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 39; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1641;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 13.
25-1657.
Juror qualification form; potential juror; complete; return; when.(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the jury commissioner shall deliver a juror qualification form to each potential juror drawn for jury service. The delivery may be by first-class mail or personal service or through a jury management system. The jury commissioner shall include instructions to complete and return the form to the jury commissioner within ten days after its receipt. The form may be returned to the jury commissioner by mail or through a jury management system.
(2)(a) In lieu of the juror qualification form delivery process described in subsection (1) of this section, a jury commissioner may send to a potential juror a notice or summons which includes instructions to complete a juror qualification form through a jury management system. The notice or summons may be sent by first-class mail or personal service or through a jury management system. The jury commissioner shall include instructions to complete and submit the juror qualification form within ten days after receipt of the notice or summons.
(b) If a potential juror fails to complete the qualification form as instructed within such ten days, the jury commissioner shall deliver to such potential juror, by first-class mail or personal service, a revised notice or summons and juror qualification form with instructions to complete and return the form to the jury commissioner within ten days after its receipt.
(3) The juror qualification form shall be in the form prescribed by the Supreme Court. Notarization of the juror qualification form shall not be required. If the potential juror is unable to complete the form, another person may do it for the potential juror and shall indicate that such other person has done so and the reason therefor.
(4) If it appears that there is an omission, ambiguity, or error in a returned form, the jury commissioner shall again send the form with instructions to the potential juror to make the necessary addition, clarification, or correction and to return the form to the jury commissioner within ten days after its second receipt.
25-1658.
Juror qualification form; failure to return; effect; contempt of court.(1) Any potential juror who fails to return a completed juror qualification form as instructed shall be directed by the jury commissioner to appear before him or her to fill out the juror qualification form. At the time of the potential juror's appearance for jury service or at the time of any interview before the court or jury commissioner, any potential juror may be required to fill out another juror qualification form, at which time the potential juror may be questioned with regard to his or her responses to questions contained on the form and grounds for his or her excuse or disqualification. Any information thus acquired by the court or jury commissioner shall be noted on the juror qualification form.
(2) Any person who knowingly fails to complete and return or who willfully misrepresents a material fact on a juror qualification form for the purpose of avoiding or securing service as a juror shall be guilty of contempt of court.
25-1659.
Master key list; juror qualification form; review; names stricken.(1) If the jury commissioner finds, after reviewing a completed juror qualification form, that a potential juror does not possess the qualifications of a juror as set forth in section 25-1650 or is excluded by the terms of section 25-1650, the jury commissioner shall strike such potential juror's name from the master key list and make a record of each name stricken, which record shall be kept in the jury commissioner's office subject to inspection by the court and attorneys of record in cases triable to a jury pending before the court, under such rules as the court may prescribe.
(2) Any person entitled to access to the list of names stricken may make a request to the judge of the district court, in accordance with section 25-1673, for an explanation of the reasons a name has been stricken. If the judge is satisfied that such request is made in good faith and in accordance with section 25-1673, the judge shall direct the jury commissioner to appear before the judge at chambers and, in the presence of the requesting person, state his or her reasons for striking such name.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 5, p. 570; C.S.1922, § 9099; C.S.1929, § 20-1629; Laws 1939, c. 18, § 14, p. 106; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1629; R.S.1943, § 25-1629; Laws 1953, c. 7, § 1, p. 221; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 9, p. 229; Laws 1955, c. 9, § 4, p. 266;
Laws 1977, LB 283, § 2; Laws 1979, LB 234, § 9; Laws 1985, LB 113, § 3; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1629;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 16.
Annotations
The key-number system for the selection of jurors from voter registration lists is constitutionally valid. State v. Addison, 198 Neb. 442, 253 N.W.2d 165 (1977).
In selection of grand jury, names can be drawn from more than one panel. State v. Abboud, 181 Neb. 84, 147 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
Until jury list created by drawing of key number is exhausted, no new jury list can be made. Maher v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 13 N.W.2d 641 (1944).
25-1660.
Jurors; how summoned; notice; deadlines, applicability.(1) The summons of grand and petit jurors for the courts of this state shall be served by the jury commissioner, the clerk of such court, or any other person authorized by the court by delivering such summons by first-class mail or personal service or through a jury management system to the person whose name has been drawn.
(2)(a) If the jury commissioner uses the two-step qualifying and summoning system, the summons shall be delivered not less than ten days before the day such juror is to appear as a juror in such court.
(b) If the jury commissioner uses the one-step qualifying and summoning system, the summons shall be delivered:
(i) Not less than ten days before the first day of the jury term, if the jury commissioner is summoning jurors for service throughout the jury term; or
(ii) Not less than ten days before the day such juror is to appear as a juror in such court, if the jury commissioner is summoning a juror for service on a specific jury panel.
(c) The deadlines in this subsection shall not apply to summons delivered to extra jurors pursuant to section 25-1665 or tales jurors pursuant to section 25-1666. Summons to such jurors shall be delivered at the earliest possible time under the circumstances and as directed by the judge or judges.
(3)(a) If the jury commissioner uses the two-step qualifying and summoning system, a summons sent under this section shall include the day, time, place, and name of the court where the juror is to report for jury service.
(b) If the jury commissioner uses the one-step qualifying and summoning system, a summons sent under this section shall include such details as to the day, time, place, and name of the court where the juror is to report for jury service as are known at the time the summons is sent along with additional instructions regarding the manner in which the juror shall contact the court or will be notified by the court of any additional details.
Source:R.S.1867, Code §§ 661, 662, p. 510; Laws 1885, c. 97, § 1, p. 381; R.S.1913, § 8141; Laws 1915, c. 148, § 1, p. 318; C.S.1922, § 9076; C.S.1929, § 20-1606; R.S.1943, § 25-1606; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 3, p. 225; Laws 1957, c. 242, § 18, p. 831;
Laws 1982, LB 677, § 1; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1606;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 17.
Annotations
This section was cited as illustrative of service of process by registered mail. Blauvelt v. Beck, 162 Neb. 576, 76 N.W.2d 738 (1956).
25-1661.
Jurors; appearance; failure to appear or serve without good cause; contempt of court.(1) Each grand juror and petit juror summoned shall appear before the court on the day and at the hour specified in the summons or as further directed by the court.
(2) Any person summoned for jury service who fails to appear or to complete jury service as directed may be ordered by the court to appear forthwith and show cause for such failure to comply with the summons. If such person fails to show good cause for noncompliance with the summons, he or she shall be guilty of contempt of court.
(3) No person shall be guilty of contempt of court under this section for failing to respond to a summons sent:
(a) By first-class mail, if sent pursuant to a one-step qualifying and summoning system, and if the person has (i) returned a juror qualification form and the jury commissioner has determined that such person is not qualified; (ii) been excused from jury service; or (iii) had his or her jury service postponed; or
(b) Through a jury management system.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 663, p. 511; R.S.1913, § 8142; C.S.1922, § 9077; C.S.1929, § 20-1607; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1607;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 18.
25-1662.
Petit jury for subsequent periods; how drawn; how notified.Subsequent panels of petit jurors shall be called as the judge or judges may determine during the jury term. If it is determined that a subsequent panel or panels are necessary, the judge or judges, as the case may be, shall order the jury commissioner to draw by chance such number of potential jurors as such judge or judges shall direct as petit jurors for such subsequent jury panel. The persons so drawn shall be notified or summoned the same as those drawn for the regular jury panel under section 25-1656.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 8, p. 571; C.S.1922, § 9102; C.S.1929, § 20-1632; R.S.1943, § 25-1632; Laws 1953, c. 71, § 1, p. 222; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 11(1), p. 231; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1632;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 19.
Annotations
Trial courts are ordered to discontinue the practice of conducting jury selection on one day for all of the trials scheduled during a monthly term. State v. Cisneros, 248 Neb. 372, 535 N.W.2d 703 (1995).
25-1663.
Petit jury; examination by judge; excess jurors.The judge shall examine all jurors who appear for jury service. If, after all excuses have been allowed, there remain more than twenty-four petit jurors for each judge sitting with a jury who are qualified and not excluded by the terms of section 25-1650, the court may excuse by lot such number in excess of twenty-four as the court may see fit. Those jurors who have been discharged in excess of twenty-four for each judge, but are qualified, shall not be discharged permanently, but shall remain subject to be resummoned for jury service upon the same jury panel.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 7, p. 570; C.S.1922, § 9101; C.S.1929, § 20-1631; Laws 1939, c. 18, § 16, p. 107; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1631; R.S.1943, § 25-1631; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 10(4), p. 231;
Laws 1979, LB 234, § 10; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1631.03;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 20.
Annotations
Objection to jury panel on ground there were not 24 jurors for each judge was not sustained. Bell v. State, 159 Neb. 474, 67 N.W.2d 762 (1954).
25-1664.
Petit jury; special jury panel in criminal cases.Whenever there is pending in the criminal court any case in which the defendant is charged with a felony and the judge holding the court is convinced from the circumstances of the case that a jury cannot be obtained from the regular jury panel to try the case, the judge may, in his or her discretion, prior to the day fixed for the trial of the case, direct the jury commissioner to draw, in the same manner as described in section 25-1656, such number of names as the judge or judges may direct as a special jury panel from which a jury may be selected to try such case, which jury panel shall be summoned for such day in the same manner as the regular jury panel.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 8, p. 571; C.S.1922, § 9102; C.S.1929, § 20-1632; R.S.1943, § 25-1632; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 11(2), p. 232; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1632.01;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 21.
25-1665.
Petit jury; extra jurors to complete jury panel; tales jurors.(1) If for any reason it appears to the judge that the jury panel of petit jurors will not be adequate at any time during the jury term, the jury commissioner shall, when ordered by the judge, draw, in the same manner as the drawing of a regular jury panel under section 25-1656, such number of potential jurors as the judge directs to fill such jury panel or as extra jurors, and those drawn shall be notified and summoned in the same manner as described in section 25-1656 or as the court may direct. This shall also apply to the selection of tales jurors for particular causes after the regular jury panel is exhausted.
(2) Each person summoned under subsection (1) of this section shall forthwith appear before the court and if qualified shall serve on the jury panel unless such person is excused from service or lawfully challenged. If necessary, jurors shall continue to be so drawn from time to time until the jury panel is filled.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 10, p. 572; C.S.1922, § 9104; C.S.1929, § 20-1634; R.S.1943, § 25-1634; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 13(1), p. 234; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1634;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 22.
25-1666.
Petit jury; tales jurors; how chosen.(1) When it is deemed necessary, the judge shall direct the jury commissioner or the sheriff of the county or such other person as may be designated by the judge to summon from the bystanders or the body of the county a sufficient number of persons having the qualifications of jurors, as provided in section 25-1650, to serve as tales jurors to fill the jury panel, in order that a jury may be obtained.
(2) The persons summoned under subsection (1) of this section who are not chosen to serve on the jury shall be discharged from the jury panel as soon as the judge so determines. Such persons shall not thereafter be disqualified from service as jurors when regularly drawn from the jury list pursuant to the Jury Selection Act unless excused by the judge.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 10, p. 572; C.S.1922, § 9104; C.S.1929, § 20-1634; R.S.1943, § 25-1634; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 13(3), p. 235; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1634.02;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 23.
Annotations
Right to summon talesmen is made to depend upon necessity, which is determinable by trial judge. Pribyl v. State, 165 Neb. 691, 87 N.W.2d 201 (1957).
In great emergency, jury can be selected from bystanders. Losieau v. State, 157 Neb. 115, 58 N.W.2d 824 (1953).
25-1667.
Petit jury; postponement of service.The court may postpone service of a petit juror from one jury panel to a specific future jury panel. A written form may be completed for each such juror, giving the juror's name and address and the reason for the postponement and bearing the signature of the district judge. Such form shall be entered upon the record of the court. The names of jurors transferred from one jury panel to another shall be added to the names drawn for a particular jury panel as drawn under section 25-1662.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 10, p. 572; C.S.1922, § 9104; C.S.1929, § 20-1634; R.S.1943, § 25-1634; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 13(2), p. 235; Laws 1965, c. 124, § 1, p. 461; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1634.01;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 24.
25-1668.
Grand jury; potential jurors; how and when drawn; juror qualification form.(1) Unless the judge or judges order that no grand jury be drawn, after creating the master key list under section 25-1654, the jury commissioner shall draw potential jurors from the master key list for service on grand juries for the jury term in the manner and number provided in this section or as the judge or judges otherwise direct. In drawing names, the jury commissioner may use a manual jury selection process or a jury management system.
(2) If the judge or judges initially order that no grand jury be drawn, such judge or judges may at any time thereafter order the drawing of a grand jury.
(3) The jury commissioner shall draw such number of potential jurors for grand jury service:
(a) As the jury commissioner deems necessary to arrive at a list of eighty persons who possess the qualifications of jurors set forth in section 25-1650; or
(b) As the judge or judges may otherwise direct.
(4)(a) If the jury commissioner uses the two-step qualifying and summoning system, he or she shall deliver to each potential juror a juror qualification form pursuant to section 25-1657.
(b) If the jury commissioner uses the one-step qualifying and summoning system, he or she shall deliver to each potential juror a juror qualification form pursuant to section 25-1657 and shall serve the potential juror with a summons pursuant to section 25-1660.
25-1669.
Grand jury; how drawn; alternate jurors.(1) When the law requires that a grand jury be empaneled or when ordered by the judge or judges, the jury commissioner shall draw grand jurors pursuant to this section.
(2) The jury commissioner shall draw by chance forty names, or such other number as directed by the judge or judges, of persons the jury commissioner has investigated and determined to be qualified pursuant to section 25-1668. The jury commissioner shall then prepare a list of such names. Such list shall also contain the place of residence and occupation of each person on the list.
(3) The jury commissioner shall notify or summon persons selected under subsection (2) of this section as directed by the judge or judges.
(4) The list of names drawn pursuant to subsection (2) of this section shall then be turned over by the jury commissioner to a board to consist of the jury commissioner, the presiding judge of the district court, and one other person whom the presiding judge shall designate. The presiding judge shall be the chairperson. Such board shall select from such list the names of sixteen persons to serve as grand jurors and the names of three additional persons to serve as alternate jurors.
(5) The alternate jurors shall sit with the grand jury and participate in all investigative proceedings to the same extent as the regular grand jurors. Alternate grand jurors shall be permitted to question witnesses, review evidence, and participate in all discussions of the grand jury which occur prior to the conclusion of presentation of evidence. When the grand jury has determined that no additional evidence is necessary for its investigation, the alternate grand jurors shall be separated from the regular grand jurors and shall not participate in any further discussions, deliberations, or voting of the grand jury unless one or more of the regular grand jurors is or are excused because of illness or other sufficient reason. Such alternate jurors shall fill vacancies in the order of their selection.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 9, p. 572; Laws 1921, c. 113, § 1, p. 393; C.S.1922, § 9103; C.S.1929, § 20-1633; Laws 1939, c. 18, § 17, p. 108; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1633; R.S.1943, § 25-1633; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 12(1), p. 232;
Laws 1999, LB 72, § 1; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1633;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 26.
Annotations
In selection of grand jury, names can be drawn from more than one panel. State v. Abboud, 181 Neb. 84, 147 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
25-1670.
Juror; serve; limitations.In any five-year period no person shall be required to:
(1) Serve as a petit juror for more than four calendar weeks, except if necessary to complete service in a particular case;
(2) Serve on more than one grand jury; or
(3) Serve as both a grand and petit juror.
25-1671.
County court; advance jury selection; when authorized.All parties to an action which is filed with a county court of this state may agree that the jury may be selected up to thirty-one days prior to the date of trial. The stipulation must be unanimous among all parties and evidenced by a joint stipulation to the court.
25-1672.
Jury trial; notice to jury commissioner; waiver.The clerk magistrate shall provide written notice of a jury trial to the jury commissioner not less than thirty days prior to trial. The notice shall set forth the number of petit jurors to be summoned and the day and hour the petit jurors are to appear before the court. The requirements of this section may be waived upon an agreement between the jury commissioner and the clerk magistrate or judicial administrator.
25-1673.
Jurors; disclosing names; when permissible; penalty; access to juror qualification forms.(1) It shall be unlawful for a jury commissioner, any clerk or deputy thereof, or any person who may obtain access to any record showing the names of persons drawn to serve as grand or petit jurors to disclose to any person, except to other officers in carrying out official duties or as provided in the Jury Selection Act, the name of any person so drawn or to permit any person to examine such record or to make a list of such names, except under order of the court. The application for such an order shall be filed in the form of a motion in the office of the clerk of the district court, containing the signature and residence of the applicant or his or her attorney and stating all the grounds on which the request for such order is based. Such order shall not be made except for good cause shown in open court and it shall be spread upon the record of the court. Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a Class IV felony. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the judge or judges in any district may, in his, her, or their discretion, provide by express order for the disclosure of the names of persons drawn for actual service as grand or petit jurors.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the Supreme Court or an agent of the Supreme Court acting under the direction and supervision of the Chief Justice shall have access to juror qualification forms for research purposes. The Supreme Court and its agent shall treat such information as confidential, and nothing identifying any individual shall be released.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 11, p. 573; C.S.1922, § 9105; C.S.1929, § 20-1635; R.S.1943, § 25-1635; Laws 1949, c. 56, § 1, p. 167; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 14, p. 235;
Laws 1977, LB 40, § 102; Laws 2005, LB 105, § 2; Laws 2018, LB193, § 31; R.S.Supp.,2018, § 25-1635;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 30.
Annotations
Absent a reasonable ground for investigating jury misconduct or corruption, a party cannot use posttrial interviews with jurors as a "fishing expedition" to find some reason to attack a verdict. Golnick v. Callender, 290 Neb. 395, 860 N.W.2d 180 (2015).
Because there is no constitutional right to obtain information about a jury's deliberations, a court's discretion under this section to disclose juror information for good cause shown after a verdict should be tempered by the restrictions imposed under section 27-606(2). Golnick v. Callender, 290 Neb. 395, 860 N.W.2d 180 (2015).
25-1674.
Employee; penalized due to jury service; prohibited; penalty.Any person who is summoned to serve on jury duty shall not be subject to discharge from employment, loss of pay, loss of sick leave, loss of vacation time, or any other form of penalty as a result of his or her absence from employment due to such jury duty upon giving reasonable notice to his or her employer of such summons. Any person who is summoned to serve on jury duty shall be excused upon request from any shift work for those days required to serve as a juror without loss of pay. No employer shall subject an employee to discharge, loss of pay, loss of sick leave, loss of vacation time, or any other form of penalty on account of his or her absence from employment by reason of jury duty, except that an employer may reduce the pay of an employee by an amount equal to any compensation, other than expenses, paid by the court for jury duty. Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a Class IV misdemeanor.
25-1675.
Act; neglect or failure by officers; contempt of court.If any jury commissioner or deputy jury commissioner, sheriff or deputy sheriff, or person having charge of election records neglects or fails to perform the duties imposed by the Jury Selection Act, the person so offending shall be guilty of contempt of court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 667, p. 511; R.S.1913, § 8146; C.S.1922, § 9081; C.S.1929, § 20-1611; R.S.1943, § 25-1611; Laws 1953, c. 72, § 5, p. 226;
Laws 1979, LB 234, § 5; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1611;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 32.
25-1676.
Jury list; tampering; solicitation; penalty.If any person places a name or asks to have a name placed on any list of potential jurors for service on any grand or petit jury in a manner not authorized by the Jury Selection Act, such person shall be guilty of a Class IV felony.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 6, p. 570; C.S.1922, § 1900; C.S.1929, § 20-1630; Laws 1939, c. 18, § 15, p. 107; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1630; R.S.1943, § 25-1630;
Laws 1977, LB 40, § 101; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1630;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 33.
25-1677.
Packing juries; solicitation of jury service; penalties.(1) If a sheriff or other officer corruptly or through favor or ill will summons a juror with the intent that such juror shall find a verdict for or against either party, or summons a grand juror from like motives with the intent that such grand juror shall or shall not find an indictment or presentment against any particular individual, the sheriff or other officer shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, shall forfeit his or her office, and shall be forever disqualified from holding any office in this state.
(2) Any person who seeks the position of juror or who asks any attorney or other officer of the court or any other person or officer in any manner charged with the duty of selecting the jury to secure or procure his or her selection as a juror shall be guilty of contempt of court, shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars, and shall thereby be disqualified from serving as a juror for that jury term.
(3) Any attorney or party to a suit pending for trial at that jury term who requests or solicits the placing of any person upon a jury, or upon any list of potential jurors for service on any grand or petit jury, shall be guilty of contempt of court and be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars, and the person so sought to be put upon the jury or list shall be disqualified to serve as a juror for that jury term.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 668, p. 512; Laws 1901, c. 83, § 2, p. 477; R.S.1913, § 8147; C.S.1922, § 9082; C.S.1929, § 20-1612; R.S.1943, § 25-1612; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1612;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 34.
25-1678.
Juries; proceedings stayed; jury panel or list quashed; grounds; procedures; new list, order for.(1) A party may move to stay the proceedings, to quash the entire jury panel or jury list, or for other appropriate relief on the ground of substantial failure to comply with the Jury Selection Act in selecting the grand or petit jury. Such motion shall be made within seven days after the moving party discovered or by the exercise of diligence could have discovered the grounds for such motion, and in any event before the petit jury is sworn to try the case.
(2) Upon a motion filed under subsection (1) of this section containing a sworn statement of facts which, if true, would constitute a substantial failure to comply with the Jury Selection Act, the moving party is entitled to present, in support of the motion, the testimony of the jury commissioner, any relevant records and papers not public or otherwise available which were used by the jury commissioner, and any other relevant evidence. If the court determines that in selecting either a grand jury or a petit jury there has been a substantial failure to comply with the Jury Selection Act, the court shall stay the proceedings pending the selection of the jury in conformity with the act, quash an entire jury panel or jury list, or grant other appropriate relief.
(3) The procedures prescribed by this section are the exclusive means by which the state, a person accused of a crime, or a party in a civil case may challenge a jury on the ground that the jury was not selected in conformity with the Jury Selection Act.
(4) The contents of any records or papers used by the jury commissioner in connection with the selection process and not made public under the Jury Selection Act shall not be disclosed, except in connection with the preparation or presentation of a motion under subsection (1) of this section, until after all persons on the jury list have been discharged. The parties in a case may inspect, reproduce, and copy the records or papers at all reasonable times during the preparation and pendency of a motion under subsection (1) of this section.
(5) Whenever the entire jury list is quashed, the court shall make an order directing the jury commissioner to draw a new key number in the manner provided in section 25-1653 and prepare a new master key list in the manner provided in section 25-1654. The jury commissioner shall qualify and summon jurors from the new master key list as provided in the Jury Selection Act.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 248, § 13, p. 577; C.S.1922, § 9108; C.S.1929, § 20-1637; R.S.1943, § 25-1637; Laws 1959, c. 102, § 3, p. 425;
Laws 1979, LB 234, § 11; Laws 1985, LB 113, § 4; R.S.1943, (2016), § 25-1637;
Laws 2020, LB387, § 35; Laws 2022, LB922, § 4.
Annotations
Under subsection (1) of this section, an objection pertaining to a failure to comply with Batson requirements must be made before the jury is sworn to try the case. An objection challenging prosecution's strike of juror because of race must be made prior to swearing of jury. State v. Covarrubias, 244 Neb. 366, 507 N.W.2d 248 (1993).
25-1701.
Repealed. Laws 2003, LB 19, § 7.
25-1702.
Repealed. Laws 2003, LB 19, § 7.
25-1703.
Repealed. Laws 2001, LB 489, § 15.
25-1704.
Repealed. Laws 2001, LB 489, § 15.
25-1705.
Security for costs; judgment against surety upon motion; satisfaction.After final judgment has been rendered in an action in which security for costs has been given, as required by this chapter, the court, on motion of any person having a right to such costs, or any part thereof, after ten days' notice of such motion, may enter judgment against the surety for the amount of the costs or so much thereof as may be unpaid. Executions may be issued on such judgment, as in other cases, for the use and benefit of the persons entitled to such costs. In the event that a cash bond has been given, the court shall, on motion of any person having a right to such costs, or any part thereof, after ten days' notice of such motion, enter judgment for the amount of costs or so much thereof as may be unpaid, and shall proceed to pay the same from the cash bond; and any surplus remaining after such costs have been paid and satisfied shall be returned to the party who posted the cash bond.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 616, p. 503; R.S.1913, § 8164; C.S.1922, c. 150, § 1, p. 321; C.S.1922, § 9115; C.S.1929, § 20-1705; R.S.1943, § 25-1705;
Laws 2001, LB 489, § 8.
Annotations
Section is not applicable to cost bond of appellant required by rule of Supreme Court. Dunn v. Bozarth, 64 Neb. 862, 90 N.W. 954 (1902).
25-1706.
Costs upon disclaimer.Where defendants disclaim having any title or interest in land or other property, the subject matter of the action, they shall recover their costs unless for special reasons the court decides otherwise.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 618, p. 504; R.S.1913, § 8165; C.S.1922, § 9116; C.S.1929, § 20-1706; R.S.1943, § 25-1706.
Annotations
This section is declaratory of equity rule; court has discretion. Fowler v. Brown, 51 Neb. 414, 71 N.W. 54 (1897).
In action on official bond of state officers, state law governs in federal court; surety is liable where sheriff made arrest in conformity with duty under state law but used excessive force. Bassinger v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 58 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1932).
25-1707.
Costs on motions, continuances, and amendments.Unless otherwise provided by statute, the costs of motions, continuances, amendments, and the like, shall be taxed and paid as the court in its discretion may direct.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 619, p. 504; R.S.1913, § 8166; C.S.1922, § 9117; C.S.1929, § 20-1707; R.S.1943, § 25-1707.
25-1708.
Plaintiff's costs;
when allowed.Where it is not otherwise provided
by this and other statutes, costs shall be allowed of course to the plaintiff, except as waived or released in writing
by the plaintiff, upon a voluntary payment to the plaintiff after the action
is filed but before judgment, or upon a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, in actions for the recovery
of money only or
for the recovery of specific real or personal property.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 620, p. 504; R.S.1913, § 8167; C.S.1922, § 9118; C.S.1929, § 20-1708; R.S.1943, § 25-1708;
Laws 2009, LB35, § 11.
Cross References
Agreement to pay costs as part of settlement, authorized, see section 25-2240.
Annotations
1. Allowance
2. Disallowance
3. Miscellaneous
1. Allowance
Plaintiff, in action for recovery of money only, is ordinarily entitled to costs where he recovers judgment. Rehn v. Bingaman, 152 Neb. 171, 40 N.W.2d 673 (1950).
In a suit to quiet title in persons claiming adverse possession of specific real property, costs follow the judgment. Hallowell v. Borchers, 150 Neb. 322, 34 N.W.2d 404 (1948).
Ordinary rule is that the successful party is entitled to judgment for costs. Tobas v. Mutual Building & Loan Assn., 147 Neb. 676, 24 N.W.2d 870 (1946).
Where a judgment is obtained for the recovery of specific real property the costs follow the judgment. Tuttle v. Wyman, 146 Neb. 146, 18 N.W.2d 744 (1945).
Where plaintiff's action is for a recovery of money only, costs shall be allowed of course to the plaintiff upon a judgment in his favor. Shellenbarger v. Shellenbarger, 137 Neb. 762, 291 N.W. 95 (1940).
Where judgment is properly rendered against surety company on official bond a reasonable attorney's fee may be taxed as part of costs. Ericsson v. Streitz, 132 Neb. 692, 273 N.W. 17 (1937).
On appeal from justice court by defendant, where no setoff is pleaded, plaintiff is entitled to costs regardless of amount of judgment. Miller v. Henderson, 76 Neb. 383, 107 N.W. 586 (1906).
In an equity action seeking declaratory judgment and injunction, the taxation of costs by the trial court to the plaintiff in whose favor judgment was entered was not an abuse of discretion. R & S Investments v. Auto Auctions, 15 Neb. App. 267, 725 N.W.2d 871 (2006).
2. Disallowance
Award of costs to plaintiff was not required in equity action to determine lien. Ehlers v. Campbell, 159 Neb. 328, 66 N.W.2d 585 (1954).
Judgment on counterclaim for nominal damages would not carry costs when plaintiff was entitled to judgment in substantial amount. Stewart v. Spade Township, 157 Neb. 93, 58 N.W.2d 841 (1953).
This section provides no basis for taxing to a defendant in a civil action the costs of transporting a plaintiff who is an incarcerated person and who must be transported pursuant to section 25-1233. Jacob v. Schlichtman, 16 Neb. App. 783, 753 N.W.2d 361 (2008).
3. Miscellaneous
This section does not apply to a discretionary award of reasonable litigation expenses under either 18 U.S.C. 2520 or section 86-297. Brumbaugh v. Bendorf, 306 Neb. 250, 945 N.W.2d 116 (2020).
The scope of the exception to this section is limited to a plaintiff's waiver or release of costs in writing. Credit Mgmt. Servs. v. Jefferson, 290 Neb. 664, 861 N.W.2d 432 (2015).
This section does not provide for an exception where the defendant voluntarily paid the plaintiff's claim after the action was filed but before a judgment was entered. Credit Mgmt. Servs. v. Jefferson, 290 Neb. 664, 861 N.W.2d 432 (2015).
This section does not apply strictly where defendant prevails on a counterclaim; the fact that a defendant may procedurally bring a cause as a counterclaim does not preclude him from recovery of costs when he prevails on such. Langel Chevrolet-Cadillac v. Midwest Bridge, 213 Neb. 283, 329 N.W.2d 97 (1983).
In a suit for both money damages and equitable relief, the trial court was correct in denoting the action one in equity and finding that this section does not apply. Hein v. M&N Feed Yards, Inc., 205 Neb. 691, 289 N.W.2d 756 (1980).
Section recognizes common law precept. Keller v. State, 184 Neb. 853, 172 N.W.2d 782 (1969).
Costs which have accrued in district court prior to judgment of reversal abide the final determination of the cause. National Masonic Accident Assn. v. Burr, 57 Neb. 437, 77 N.W. 1098 (1899).
25-1709.
New or additional security.The court may order new or additional security at any time upon notice and on reasonable and proper terms.
25-1710.
Defendant's costs; when allowed.Costs shall be allowed of course to any defendant upon a judgment in his favor in the actions mentioned in section 25-1708.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 622, p. 504; R.S.1913, § 8169; C.S.1922, § 9120; C.S.1929, § 20-1710; R.S.1943, § 25-1710.
Annotations
Section recognizes common law precept. Keller v. State, 184 Neb. 853, 172 N.W.2d 782 (1969).
Defendant is ordinarily entitled to recover costs upon a judgment in his favor. Rehn v. Bingaman, 152 Neb. 171, 40 N.W.2d 673 (1950).
Successful party should be allowed costs as of course, where no reason appears why general rule should not be followed. Tobas v. Mutual Building & Loan Assn., 147 Neb. 676, 24 N.W.2d 870 (1946).
Defendant is not entitled to costs paid by him in order to obtain a change of venue. Moss v. Lindsey, 62 Neb. 829, 88 N.W. 119 (1901).
25-1711.
Award and taxation of costs; power of court to exercise discretion; frivolous appeals in jury cases; actual fees and expenses.In other actions the court may award and tax costs, and apportion the same between the parties on the same or adverse sides, as in its discretion it may think right and equitable. In all cases of appeals from an inferior court or when an original filing made in the district court is within the jurisdictional limits of an inferior court, and a jury is demanded, the court may in its discretion tax as costs the actual fees and expenses necessitated by such jury if the court finds that the appeal was taken or the original filing was made for a frivolous or capricious reason, and such costs may be apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 623, p. 504; R.S.1913, § 8170; C.S.1922, § 9121; C.S.1929, § 20-1711; R.S.1943, § 25-1711; Laws 1965, c. 125, § 1, p. 462.
Annotations
1. Discretion of court
2. Miscellaneous
1. Discretion of court
The district court did not abuse its discretion in allocating costs between several parties. City of Falls City v. Nebraska Mun. Power Pool, 281 Neb. 230, 795 N.W.2d 256 (2011).
It is within the discretion of a trial court to tax costs in certain proceedings as it may think right and equitable. States v. Anderson, 219 Neb. 545, 364 N.W.2d 38 (1985).
In a suit for both money damages and equitable relief, the trial court was correct in denoting the action one in equity and finding that this section applied. Hein v. M&N Feed Yards, Inc., 205 Neb. 691, 289 N.W.2d 756 (1980).
Upon reversal of a judgment, Supreme Court may apportion costs on appeal between the parties. Richardson v. Waterite Co., 169 Neb. 263, 99 N.W.2d 265 (1959).
In equity action, taxation of costs rests in discretion of trial court. Ehlers v. Campbell, 159 Neb. 328, 66 N.W.2d 585 (1954).
Where each party prevails in part, trial court has discretion in taxation of costs. Ricenbaw v. Kraus, 157 Neb. 723, 61 N.W.2d 350 (1953).
Discretion conferred on court in taxing costs is not arbitrary but a legal one. Stocker v. Wells, 155 Neb. 472, 52 N.W.2d 284 (1952).
Action of trial court in taxing costs is not reviewable unless abuse of discretion is shown. In re Estate of Nielsen, 135 Neb. 110, 280 N.W. 246 (1938).
In equity cases, the court has a sound discretion in taxing costs, but attorney's fees cannot be taxed as costs against the successful litigant. Hering v. Simon, 77 Neb. 60, 108 N.W. 154 (1906).
Discretion conferred is not arbitrary. Fee of guardian ad litem in will contest was properly chargeable to proponents. In re Clapham's Estate, 73 Neb. 492, 103 N.W. 61 (1905).
Costs in Supreme Court are entirely under the control and in the discretion of the court. German Nat. Bank of Beatrice v. Beatrice Rapid Transit & Power Co., 69 Neb. 115, 95 N.W. 49 (1903).
Where there are no provisions as to taxing costs, it is discretionary with court, and ruling will not be disturbed unless abused. Woodard v. Baird, 43 Neb. 310, 61 N.W. 612 (1895).
Court may apportion costs in child support case. Jones v. State ex rel. Gibson, 14 Neb. 210, 14 N.W. 901 (1883).
Discretion conferred is legal, within limits of legal and equitable principles. Albers v. Dillavou, 4 Neb. Unof. 340, 93 N.W. 937 (1903).
Taxation of costs will not be interfered with unless abuse is shown. Porter v. Trompen, 2 Neb. Unof. 76, 96 N.W. 226 (1901).
In an equity action seeking declaratory judgment and injunction, the
taxation of costs by the trial court to the plaintiff in whose favor
judgment was entered was not an abuse of discretion. R & S Investments
v. Auto Auctions, 15 Neb. App. 267, 725 N.W.2d 871 (2006).
2. Miscellaneous
This section governs the taxation of costs in equitable actions and does not require the court to tax costs to the unsuccessful party. Mock v. Neumeister, 296 Neb. 376, 892 N.W.2d 569 (2017).
Costs may not be taxed against persons who are not parties to the litigation. State v. Canizales, 240 Neb. 811, 484 N.W.2d 446 (1992); Ludwig v. Board of County Commissioners, 170 Neb. 600, 103 N.W.2d 838 (1960).
This section does not apply to actions for the recovery of money only, but rather only to "other" actions. Langel Chevrolet-Cadillac v. Midwest Bridge, 213 Neb. 283, 329 N.W.2d 97 (1983).
In contest over construction of a trust created by will, costs were chargeable to trustee and paid as an expense of administration. Hauschild v. Hauschild, 176 Neb. 319, 126 N.W.2d 192 (1964).
Costs can only be taxed against parties to the litigation. Ludwig v. Board of County Commissioners, 170 Neb. 600, 103 N.W.2d 838 (1960).
This section does not apply to actions for recovery of money only. Shellenbarger v. Shellenbarger, 137 Neb. 762, 291 N.W. 95 (1940).
Taxation of costs is ministerial, and clerk may tax costs after term, within reasonable time. Barkley v. Pool, 105 Neb. 203, 180 N.W. 77 (1920).
Costs in will contest may be paid out of trust estate. Smullin v. Wharton, 83 Neb. 328, 119 N.W. 773 (1909), opinion modified and rehearing denied 83 Neb. 346, 121 N.W. 441 (1909).
Court cannot allow costs to unsuccessful contestant of will. Wallace v. Sheldon, 56 Neb. 55, 76 N.W. 418 (1898).
25-1712.
Successive actions against joinable parties; limit to recovery by plaintiff.Where several actions are brought on one bill of exchange, promissory note, or other obligation or instrument in writing, against several parties, who might have been joined as defendants in the same action, no costs shall be recovered by the plaintiff in more than one of such actions, if the parties proceeded against in the other actions were, at the commencement of the previous action, openly within the state.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 624, p. 504; R.S.1913, § 8171; C.S.1922, § 9122; C.S.1929, § 20-1712; R.S.1943, § 25-1712.
25-1713.
Sheriff's fees; summons issued out of county; return.When a summons is issued to another county than that in which the action or proceeding is pending, it may be returned by mail, and the sheriff shall be entitled to the same fees as if the summons had issued in the county of which he is sheriff.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 625, p. 505; R.S.1913, § 8172; C.S.1922, § 9123; C.S.1929, § 20-1713; R.S.1943, § 25-1713.
25-1714.
Application for postponement of trial; condition.When an application shall be made to a court of record to postpone a trial, the payment to the adverse party of a sum not exceeding ten dollars, besides the costs of the term, may in the discretion of the judges be imposed as a condition of granting the postponement.
Source:Laws 1875, § 1, p. 63; R.S.1913, § 8173; C.S.1922, § 9124; C.S.1929, § 20-1714; R.S.1943, § 25-1714.
Annotations
Awarding costs is discretionary with court. Coombs v. Brenklander, 29 Neb. 586, 45 N.W. 929 (1890).
25-1715.
Costs on motion; limit; how taxed.Costs may be allowed on a motion, in the discretion of the court or judge, not exceeding ten dollars, which shall be absolute against the losing party on such motion, except that this provision shall not apply to verbal motions during the course of the trial.
Source:Laws 1875, § 2, p. 63; R.S.1913, § 8174; C.S.1922, § 9125; C.S.1929, § 20-1715; R.S.1943, § 25-1715;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 27.
25-1716.
Unpaid costs; lien; terminates.The judgment for unpaid court costs in any court of this state shall cease to be a lien on real estate unless action has been brought thereon within (1) five years after the latest partial payment has been made thereon, or (2) five years after such case becomes inactive or is closed by final judgment. The lien of any unpaid costs as of February 20, 1974, which would otherwise be terminated by this section shall continue for one year from such date at which time it shall terminate unless an action has been brought thereon within such year.
25-1717.
Bond for cost, appeal, supersedeas, injunction, or attachment; county and employees; exemption.No bond for cost, appeal, supersedeas, injunction, or attachment shall be required of any county or of any officer, board, head of any board, department, head of any department, commission, head of any commission, agent, or employee of any county in any proceeding or court action in which the county or any officer, board, head of any board, department, head of any department, commission, head of any commission, agent, or employee of the county is a party litigant in its, his, or her official capacity.
25-1801.
Lawsuit of four thousand dollars or less; recovery; costs; interest; attorney's fees.(1) On any lawsuit of four thousand dollars or less, regardless of whether the claims are liquidated or assigned, the plaintiff may recover costs, interest, and attorney's fees in connection with each claim as provided in this section. If, at the expiration of ninety days after each claim accrued, the claim or claims have not been paid or satisfied, the plaintiff may file a lawsuit for payment of the claim or claims. If full payment of each claim is made to the plaintiff by or on behalf of the defendant after the filing of the lawsuit, but before judgment is taken, except as otherwise agreed in writing by the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall be entitled to receive the costs of the lawsuit whether by voluntary payment or judgment. If the plaintiff secures a judgment thereon, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover:
(a) The full amount of such judgment and all costs of the lawsuit thereon;
(b) Interest at the rate of six percent per annum. Such interest shall apply to the amount of the total claim beginning thirty days after the date each claim accrued, regardless of assignment, until paid in full; and
(c) If the plaintiff has an attorney retained, employed, or otherwise working in connection with the case, an amount for attorney's fees as provided in this section.
(2) If the cause is taken to an appellate court and the plaintiff recovers a judgment thereon, the appellate court shall tax as costs in the action, to be paid to the plaintiff, an additional amount for attorney's fees in such appellate court as provided in this section, except that if the plaintiff fails to recover a judgment in excess of the amount that may have been tendered by the defendant, then the plaintiff shall not recover the attorney's fees provided by this section.
(3) Attorney's fees shall be assessed by the court in a reasonable amount, but shall in no event be less than ten dollars when the judgment is fifty dollars or less, and when the judgment is over fifty dollars up to four thousand dollars, the attorney's fee shall be ten dollars plus ten percent of the judgment in excess of fifty dollars.
(4) For purposes of this section, the date that each claim accrued means the date the services, goods, materials, labor, or money were provided, or the date the charges were incurred by the debtor, unless some different time period is expressly set forth in a written agreement between the parties.
(5) This section shall apply to original creditors as well as their assignees and successors.
(6) This section does not apply to a cause of action alleging personal injury, regardless of the legal theory asserted.
Source:Laws 1919, c. 191, § 1, p. 865; C.S.1922, § 9126; C.S.1929, § 20-1801; R.S.1943, § 25-1801; Laws 1951, c. 70, § 1, p. 225; Laws 1955, c. 92, § 1, p. 269; Laws 1967, c. 150, § 1, p. 446;
Laws 1993, LB 121, § 171; Laws 2009, LB35, § 13; Laws 2018, LB710, § 1.
Cross References
For interest on unsettled accounts, see section 45-104.
Annotations
1. Allowance
2. Denial
3. Procedure
4. Miscellaneous
1. Allowance
Plaintiff allowed fee hereunder for services of his counsel. Bauer v. Board of Regents of University of Nebraska, 192 Neb. 87, 219 N.W.2d 236 (1974).
Under this section when the judgment is over fifty dollars, the attorney's fee allowable is fixed at the sum of ten dollars plus ten percent of the judgment in excess of fifty dollars. Potts v. Mahood, 187 Neb. 142, 187 N.W.2d 655 (1971).
Attorney's fee correctly computed under facts of case. Sinnett v. Hie Food Products, Inc., 185 Neb. 221, 174 N.W.2d 720 (1970).
Allowance of attorney's fee for services in Supreme Court was proper in suit on open running account. Lewis v. Hiskey, 166 Neb. 402, 89 N.W.2d 132 (1958).
Allowance of attorneys' fees for services in Supreme Court sustained. Benson v. General Implement Corporation, 151 Neb. 234, 37 N.W.2d 223 (1949).
Party must plead and prove conditions precedent to be entitled to allowance of an attorney's fee. Haley v. Fleming, 148 Neb. 407, 27 N.W.2d 626 (1947).
It is the practice to allow attorney's fees and expenses only where provided by statute or where uniform course of procedure has been to allow such recovery. Blacker v. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co., 133 Neb. 66, 273 N.W. 836 (1937).
Reasonable attorney's fee may be taxed against employer on claim for wages. Dobney v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 120 Neb. 824, 235 N.W. 585 (1931).
Section is not unconstitutional as providing penalty in favor of individual. Daily v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 110 Neb. 481, 194 N.W. 676 (1923).
2. Denial
Attorney's fee for collecting an attorney's fee not allowed where first fee was expense claimed against trust fund. Krause v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 169 N.W.2d 601 (1969).
Voluntary reduction in amount of claim to one thousand dollars did not authorize allowance of attorney's fee. Hancock v. Parks, 172 Neb. 442, 110 N.W.2d 69 (1961).
Denial of attorney's fee based upon claim against a fund paid into court was proper. United Services Automobile Assn. v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, 109 N.W.2d 174 (1961).
Prayer for a total amount in excess of one thousand dollars due on one cause of action did not authorize allowance of attorney's fees. Schaffer v. Strauss Brothers, 164 Neb. 773, 83 N.W.2d 543 (1957).
Attorney's fees were not recoverable in action to enforce judgment. Ehlers v. Campbell, 159 Neb. 328, 66 N.W.2d 585 (1954).
3. Procedure
In order to receive an attorney fee under this section, it is necessary to plead and prove all the conditions precedent enumerated in the statute. Guaranteed Foods v. Rison, 207 Neb. 400, 299 N.W.2d 507 (1980).
Where request for attorney's fees failed to show compliance with this section or Rule 8 b 3 of Rules of the Supreme Court, 1974, it was disallowed. Edward Frank Rozman Co. v. Keillor, 195 Neb. 587, 239 N.W.2d 779 (1976).
Prejudgment interest and an attorney's fee cannot be recovered hereunder unless it is proved the claim was presented ninety days before suit commenced. Andrews Electric Co. v. Farm Automation, Inc., 188 Neb. 669, 198 N.W.2d 463 (1972).
To collect attorney's fee hereunder, plaintiff must plead and prove conditions precedent. Nichol v. Clema, 188 Neb. 74, 195 N.W.2d 233 (1972); Andrews v. Wilkie, 181 Neb. 398, 148 N.W.2d 924 (1967).
4. Miscellaneous
Cited and held not in point on facts in action involving fidelity policy or bond. Beshaler v. Helberg, 187 Neb. 584, 193 N.W.2d 261 (1971).
Allowance of attorney's fee within the limitations provided are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co. v. Malerbi, 180 Neb. 256, 142 N.W.2d 314 (1966).
25-1802.
Award of fees and expenses against state; terms, defined.For purposes of sections 25-1802 to 25-1807, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) Fees and other expenses shall mean reasonable attorney's fees and the reasonable expense of expert witnesses plus court costs, but shall not include any portion of an attorney's fee or salary paid by a unit of local, state, or federal government in the case;
(2) State shall mean the State of Nebraska, a state agency, or any official of the state acting in his or her official capacity; and
(3) State agency shall mean any state constitutional office, any state administrative department, or any state board or commission established by an act of the Legislature.
25-1803.
Award of fees and expenses against state; when authorized.(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, the court having jurisdiction over a civil action brought by the state or an action for judicial review brought against the state pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act shall award fees and other expenses to the prevailing party unless the prevailing party is the state, except that the court shall not award fees and expenses if it finds that the position of the state was substantially justified.
(2) The court, in its discretion, may reduce the amount to be awarded pursuant to this section, or deny an award, to the extent that the prevailing party, during the course of the proceedings engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy or when an overriding public interest exists which would make an award unjust.
Cross References
Administrative Procedure Act, see section 84-920.
Annotations
The mere fact that the State has not been successful in an appellate court does not mean its position was not substantially justified. In re Interest of A.A. et al., 308 Neb. 749, 957 N.W.2d 138 (2021).
This section does not waive sovereign immunity regarding attorney fees and expenses incurred to defend against positions taken against particular parties on particular motions within an action that was, as a whole, substantially justified. In re Interest of A.A. et al., 308 Neb. 749, 957 N.W.2d 138 (2021).
A judgment does not become final and appealable until the trial court has ruled upon a pending request for attorney fees made pursuant to state statute. Webb v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 301 Neb. 810, 920 N.W.2d 268 (2018).
A party seeking fees authorized by state law must make a request for such fees prior to a judgment in the cause. Webb v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 301 Neb. 810, 920 N.W.2d 268 (2018).
Attorney fees awarded pursuant to this section are generally treated as an element of court costs, and an award of costs in a judgment is considered a part of the judgment. Webb v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 301 Neb. 810, 920 N.W.2d 268 (2018).
Subsection (1) of this section acts as a limited waiver of the state's sovereign immunity in civil actions brought by the state to the extent that fees and expenses shall be awarded except when the court finds that the position of the State was substantially justified. Action for contempt brought by intervening prospective adoptive parents when Department of Social Services did not comply with unsupervised visitation order issued in an action brought by the department was a suit brought by the State for the purposes of this section. In re Interest of Krystal P. et al., 251 Neb. 320, 557 N.W.2d 26 (1996).
The establishment of "substantial justification" for a position under the provisions of this section is dependent upon the circumstances of each case. For the purposes of this section, a position has substantial justification if it has a reasonable basis both in law and in fact. The unsuccessful pursuit of a position by the State does not, in and of itself, establish that the position was not "substantially justified" so as to entitle the prevailing party to the award of fees and other expenses under the provisions of this section. Meier v. State, 227 Neb. 376, 417 N.W.2d 771 (1988).
Attorney fees may be awarded under this section only in legal and administrative proceedings initiated after July 17, 1982. Drinkwine v. Flebbe, 219 Neb. 291, 363 N.W.2d 152 (1985).
25-1804.
Award of fees and expenses against state; conditions; application.(1) A party seeking an award for fees and other expenses pursuant to sections 25-1802 to 25-1807 shall, not later than thirty days after the entry of the final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application which provides evidence of eligibility for an award pursuant to such sections and which specifies the amount sought. If the amount sought includes an attorney's fee or the fee for an expert witness, the application shall include an itemized statement for each such fee indicating the actual time expended in service to the applicant and the rate at which the fees were computed.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of such sections, fees and other expenses shall be awarded as provided in such sections only to those prevailing parties who are:
(a) Natural persons; or
(b) A sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or public or private organization:
(i) That had an average daily employment of fifty persons or less for the twelve months preceding the filing of such action; and
(ii) Whose gross receipts for the twelve-month period preceding the filing of the action was two million dollars or less or whose average gross receipts for the three twelve-month periods preceding the filing of such appeal pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act was two million dollars or less, whichever amount is greater.
Cross References
Administrative Procedure Act, see section 84-920.
Annotations
Attorney fees may be awarded under this section only in legal and administrative proceedings initiated after July 17, 1982. Drinkwine v. Flebbe, 219 Neb. 291, 363 N.W.2d 152 (1985).
25-1805.
Award of fees and expenses against state; additional to compensation.Fees and expenses awarded pursuant to sections 25-1802 to 25-1807 may be ordered in addition to any compensation awarded in a judgment.
25-1806.
Award of fees and expenses against state; how paid.Fees and expenses awarded by a federal court or pursuant to sections 25-1802 to 25-1805 shall be paid in the manner provided in the State Miscellaneous Claims Act. Claims for such fees and expenses shall be filed with the State Claims Board in the manner provided in such act.
Cross References
State Miscellaneous Claims Act, see section 81-8,294.
25-1807.
Award of fees and expenses against state; proceedings to which applicable.Sections 25-1802 to 25-1807 shall apply only to legal and administrative proceedings initiated after July 17, 1982.
25-1808.
Actions between state agencies, boards, commissions, constitutional officers, and members of the Legislature; costs awarded; when.Notwithstanding sections 25-1803, 25-21,210, 81-8,228, and 84-216, whenever a state agency, board, commission, or constitutional officer, any person acting in behalf of the agency, board, commission, or constitutional officer, or the Legislature brings a legal action or proceeding against another agency, board, commission, or constitutional officer or the Legislature, and fails to substantially prevail in the action or proceeding, as determined by the court, the party against whom the action is brought shall be awarded fees and other expenses incident to the action or proceeding by the court. Fees and expenses that shall be awarded include reasonable attorney's fees, reasonable expert witness fees, and court costs. If the Attorney General represented the agency, board, commission, constitutional officer, or Legislature, he or she shall prepare a billing of the services provided by his or her office, and the amount billed less any reduction made by the court shall be paid to the Legal Services Fund. The agency, board, commission, constitutional officer, or Legislature responsible for the payment of fees and expenses pursuant to this section shall make payment from funds appropriated to the agency, board, commission, constitutional officer, or Legislature unless a special fund or appropriation has been made for such purpose by the Legislature.
25-1809.
Legal Services Fund; created; use;
transfers.There is hereby created the Legal Services Fund
to be administered by the Director of Administrative Services. All money received
by the Attorney General or directed to be deposited in the fund by any state
agency, board, commission, or constitutional officer or the Legislature pursuant
to section 25-1808 shall be deposited into the fund. At the end of each fiscal
year, the director shall transfer from the fund into the budget of the appropriate
state agency, board, commission, or constitutional office or the Legislature
those fees and expenses that have been awarded by the court. In those instances
when the Attorney General has billed a state agency, board, commission, or
constitutional officer or the Legislature, the money awarded shall be appropriated
to the budget of the Attorney General. The director shall electronically
submit a summary of such transfers to the Legislature at the end
of each fiscal year.
25-1810.
Civil action or proceeding; appeal; award of attorney's fees by appellate court, when.A statute that authorizes the award of attorney's fees to a party in a civil action or proceeding also authorizes an appellate court to award attorney's fees if the party prevails on an appeal from a judgment or order in the action or proceeding. This section does not apply if another section of law specifically authorizes or prohibits the award of attorney's fees on an appeal from such a judgment or order.
25-1901.
District court; appellate jurisdiction; scope.A judgment rendered or final order made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified by the district court, except that the district court shall not have jurisdiction over (1) appeals from a juvenile court as defined in section 43-245, (2) appeals from a county court in matters arising under the Nebraska Probate Code or the Nebraska Uniform Trust Code, in matters involving adoption or inheritance tax, or in domestic relations matters, or (3) appeals within the jurisdiction of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 580, p. 496; R.S.1913, § 8175; C.S.1922, § 9127; C.S.1929, § 20-1901; R.S.1943, § 25-1901;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 136; Laws 1974, LB 733, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 22; Laws 1994, LB 1106, § 1; Laws 1995, LB 538, § 1; Laws 1996, LB 1296, § 4; Laws 2003, LB 130, § 115; Laws 2007, LB167, § 1.
Cross References
Nebraska Probate Code, see section 30-2201.
Nebraska Uniform Trust Code, see section 30-3801.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. When review allowed
3. When review denied
4. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
Petition-in-error jurisdiction is limited by statute to a review of a judgment rendered or final order made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court. Main St Properties v. City of Bellevue, 310 Neb. 669, 968 N.W.2d 625 (2022).
When an entity such as a city council is exercising its judicial functions, the petition in error statute is the proper method for challenging such actions. Main St Properties v. City of Bellevue, 310 Neb. 669, 968 N.W.2d 625 (2022).
Regardless of whether collective bargaining is generally legislatively authorized, the adjudicatory procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement for a committee that was never expressly contemplated by the Legislature do not establish any tribunal, board, or officer inferior in jurisdiction to the district court, which is capable of rendering judgments and final orders in the exercise of judicial functions for purposes of review by a petition in error. Champion v. Hall County, 309 Neb. 55, 958 N.W.2d 396 (2021).
Sheriffs' merit commissions are considered "tribunals" under this section. Schaffer v. Cass County, 290 Neb. 892, 863 N.W.2d 143 (2015).
When an entity such as a city council is exercising its judicial functions, the petition in error statute is the proper method for challenging such actions. Johnson v. City of Kearney, 277 Neb. 481, 763 N.W.2d 103 (2009).
Pursuant to this section, a district court has jurisdiction over a petition-in-error proceeding only when it is reviewing a judgment rendered or final order made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court. Clayton v. Lacey, 256 Neb. 282, 589 N.W.2d 529 (1999).
This section does not apply to judgments of the county court, and the exclusive method of obtaining district court review of a county court decision is by appeal. Miller v. Brunswick, 253 Neb. 141, 571 N.W.2d 245 (1997).
In reviewing the decision of a tribunal in a petition in error proceeding, a court is to determine whether the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction and whether the decision rendered is supported by sufficient relevant evidence and is restricted to the record created before the lower tribunal. Crown Products Co. v. City of Ralston, 253 Neb. 1, 567 N.W.2d 294 (1997).
A city council is a tribunal whose decision can be reversed, vacated, or modified by a court of proper jurisdiction. Abboud v. Lakeview, Inc., 237 Neb. 326, 466 N.W.2d 442 (1991).
Where no other method of appeal is provided, one may obtain judicial review by proceedings in error under this statute. Moore v. Black, 220 Neb. 122, 368 N.W.2d 488 (1985).
A petition in error is designed to review the decision of the inferior tribunal. It is not to act as a super legislative or administrative agency to come to an independent conclusion. Andrews v. City of Fremont, 213 Neb. 148, 328 N.W.2d 194 (1982).
The State Board of Education hearing appeals under section 79-1103.05 acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and therefor either party may appeal its decision under this section or under section 84-917. Richardson v. Board of Education, 206 Neb. 18, 290 N.W.2d 803 (1980).
Orders of the Department of Public Welfare made pursuant to section 68-1016, may be reviewed by petition in error as well as by appeal. Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594, 223 N.W.2d 148 (1974).
An appeal in a post conviction proceeding from a court inferior to the district court may be taken to the district court only. State v. Williams, 188 Neb. 802, 199 N.W.2d 611 (1972).
Granting of disability pension under city ordinance in question was quasi-judicial function; upon refusal to grant pension, proper remedy is by way of petition in error or appeal. Watts v. City of Omaha, 184 Neb. 41, 165 N.W.2d 104 (1969).
It is mandatory and jurisdictional under this section that a petition in error be filed in the appellate court and a properly authenticated transcript be filed within one calendar month after the rendition of the judgment or final order. Friedman v. State, 183 Neb. 9, 157 N.W.2d 855 (1968).
In a proceeding under this section, it is mandatory that the transcript be properly authenticated and timely filed to vest the appellate court with jurisdiction of the subject matter. Lemburg v. Nielsen, 182 Neb. 747, 157 N.W.2d 381 (1968).
Denial of petition for incorporation of a village may be reviewed by petition in error. Little v. Board of County Commissioners, 179 Neb. 655, 140 N.W.2d 1 (1966).
In a proceeding under this section it is mandatory that a petition in error and transcript be timely filed to vest appellate court with jurisdiction. Frankforter v. Turner, 175 Neb. 252, 121 N.W.2d 377 (1963); Harms v. County Board of Supervisors, 173 Neb. 687, 114 N.W.2d 713 (1962).
This and succeeding nine sections provide an effective procedure to secure a review by the district court of a final order made by the county court. Consolidated Credit Corporation v. Berger, 141 Neb. 598, 4 N.W.2d 571 (1942).
This section is in pari materia with section providing for appeal in probate cases. In re Estate of Mathews, 125 Neb. 737, 252 N.W. 210 (1933).
Order approving executor's account, requiring further report, and continuing proceedings, was not "final order." In re Hansen's Estate, 117 Neb. 551, 221 N.W. 694 (1928).
Error proceedings lie to review proceedings in justice court to try right of property. McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Scott, 66 Neb. 479, 92 N.W. 599 (1902).
Section is broad enough to include decree of adoption of probate court. Ferguson v. Herr, 64 Neb. 649, 90 N.W. 625 (1902), reversed on rehearing 64 Neb. 659, 94 N.W. 542 (1903).
To take error proceedings, there must be a final order or judgment. Reynolds v. City of Tecumseh, 48 Neb. 785, 67 N.W. 792 (1896).
An action brought by a county employee alleging that administrative discipline imposed upon him by his employer was a breach of contract was, at its core, an appeal of the decision of an administrative body denying a grievance and must comply with the petition in error statutes. Turnbull v. County of Pawnee, 19 Neb. App. 43, 810 N.W.2d 172 (2011).
2. When review allowed
Where a city building board of review received evidence and considered statements by the applicant and city officials before making its determination of whether the facts supported the notice of violation, the board exercised "judicial functions." McNally v. City of Omaha, 273 Neb. 558, 731 N.W.2d 573 (2007).
A petition in error is the proper proceeding to obtain review of an action of a city council, which is a tribunal inferior to the district court. In reviewing a decision based on a petition in error, an appellate court determines whether the inferior tribunal acted within its jurisdiction and whether the inferior tribunal's decision is supported by sufficient relevant evidence. Luet, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 247 Neb. 831, 530 N.W.2d 633 (1995).
A decision by the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services Appeals Board will not be reviewed by the district court unless a petition for review is filed within the 30-day limit prescribed by section 25-1931. Lewis v. Camp, 236 Neb. 94, 459 N.W.2d 211 (1990).
A petitioner in error must, within one calendar month after judgment is announced under the law and facts by an inferior tribunal, file his petition with a transcript containing the final judgment sought to be reversed. Marcotte v. City of Omaha, 196 Neb. 217, 241 N.W.2d 838 (1976).
Orders made in the exercise of judicial functions by a board inferior to the district court are reviewable by error proceedings. Emry v. Lake, 181 Neb. 568, 149 N.W.2d 520 (1967).
Changes made by county superintendent of schools in proceedings to change school district boundaries may be reviewed in district court either by appeal or by error proceedings. Moser v. Turner, 180 Neb. 635, 144 N.W.2d 192 (1966).
It is only where a tribunal acts judicially that a review by error proceedings is allowed. Longe v. County of Wayne, 175 Neb. 245, 121 N.W.2d 196 (1963).
Review may be had by petition in error of proceedings by city council in the levy of special assessments for paving. Elliott v. City of Auburn, 172 Neb. 1, 108 N.W.2d 328 (1961).
Final order of city council could be reviewed by error proceedings. Simpson v. City of Grand Island, 166 Neb. 393, 89 N.W.2d 117 (1958).
Order of county superintendent of schools may be reviewed by error proceedings. School Dist. No. 49 of Merrick County v. Kreidler, 165 Neb. 761, 87 N.W.2d 429 (1958).
Order of Superintendent of Public Instruction was reviewable by petition in error. Schutte v. Schmitt, 162 Neb. 162, 75 N.W.2d 656 (1956).
Action taken in reorganization of school district could be reviewed in district court. School District No. 49 of Lincoln County v. School District No. 65-R of Lincoln County, 159 Neb. 262, 66 N.W.2d 561 (1954).
Review in district court of appraisement of improvements on school lands was authorized. Jessen v. Blackard, 159 Neb. 103, 65 N.W.2d 345 (1954).
Error proceedings to district court were available to review action of county committee under Reorganization of School Districts Act. Nickel v. School Board of Axtell, 157 Neb. 813, 61 N.W.2d 566 (1953).
Error proceedings were available to review action appraising improvements on school land leases. From v. Sutton, 156 Neb. 411, 56 N.W.2d 441 (1953).
District court may review county court's exercise of probate jurisdiction by proceedings in error. In re Berg's Estate, 139 Neb. 99, 296 N.W. 460 (1941).
Error may be prosecuted from denial by Department of Trade and Commerce of permit to installment investment company to do business in state. Investor's Syndicate v. Bryan, 113 Neb. 816, 205 N.W. 294 (1925).
Order of State Banking Board on application for charger is reviewable by district court in error proceedings. Shumway v. Warrick, 108 Neb. 652, 189 N.W. 301 (1922).
Order by board of equalization of metropolitan water district is reviewable by district court on error. McCague Inv. Co. v. Metropolitan Water Dist., 101 Neb. 820, 165 N.W. 158 (1917).
The action of the State Banking Board in granting or refusing a bank charter is reviewable by petition in error in the district court. State ex rel. White v. Morehead, 101 Neb. 37, 161 N.W. 1040 (1917).
Conviction of civil contempt before justice of peace can be reviewed only by error proceedings. Hanika v. State, 87 Neb. 845, 128 N.W. 526 (1910).
Review on error of judgments of justices of the peace still exists. Engles v. Morgenstern, 85 Neb. 51, 122 N.W. 688 (1909).
Order of State Board of Health revoking physician's license is reviewable. Mathews v. Hedlund, 82 Neb. 825, 119 N.W. 17 (1908).
Action of State Board of Equalization may be reviewed in district court by petition in error. State ex rel. U.P.R.R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 81 Neb. 139, 115 N.W. 789 (1908).
District court has jurisdiction to review by proceedings in error an order revoking physician's license. Munk v. Frink, 75 Neb. 172, 106 N.W. 425 (1905).
Order of county court allowing claim against estate may be reviewed in district court on error. Herman v. Beck, 68 Neb. 566, 94 N.W. 512 (1903).
Order of county superintendent changing boundaries or creating new districts is reviewable by error proceedings. Pollack v. School Dist. No. 42 of Antelope County, 54 Neb. 171, 74 N.W. 393 (1898).
Judgment of county or city board of equalization may be reviewed by an error proceeding. Webster v. City of Lincoln, 50 Neb. 1, 69 N.W. 394 (1896).
Proceedings in hearing on habeas corpus may be reviewed on error. In re Van Sciever, 42 Neb. 772, 60 N.W. 1037 (1894).
Review of order of county board of equalization can be had by error proceedings. Waltham v. Town of Mullally, 27 Neb. 483, 43 N.W. 252 (1889).
Judgments or final orders of county court may be reviewed in error proceedings. Rudolf v. Winters, 7 Neb. 125 (1878).
An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitan-class city taken as specified in section 14-813 means that proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from a county board, and under this section, that means appeal is taken by petition in error and the review is solely of the record made before the tribunal whose action is being reviewed. Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 N.W.2d 680 (2001).
District court may review by error proceedings action of State Board of Equalization and Assessment in taxing air-flight equipment. Mid-Continent Airlines v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 105 F.Supp. 188 (D. Neb. 1952).
3. When review denied
A board or tribunal exercises a judicial function if it decides a dispute of adjudicative fact or if a statute requires it to act in a judicial manner. But where a board or tribunal decides no question of adjudicative fact and no statute requires it to act in a judicial manner, the orders are not "judicial" and are not reviewable by error proceedings. Main St Properties v. City of Bellevue, 310 Neb. 669, 968 N.W.2d 625 (2022).
A zoning ordinance constitutes the exercise of a governmental and legislative function, and a city council adopting a rezoning ordinance, which amends a general zoning ordinance, acts in a legislative capacity. Main St Properties v. City of Bellevue, 310 Neb. 669, 968 N.W.2d 625 (2022).
An appeal or error proceeding does not lie from a purely legislative act by a public body to which legislative power has been delegated, and the only remedy in such cases is by collateral attack, that is, by injunction or other suitable action. Main St Properties v. City of Bellevue, 310 Neb. 669, 968 N.W.2d 625 (2022).
When viewed under the motion to dismiss standards for review, the allegations showed the city council adopted a rezoning ordinance based upon the recommendation of the planning commission. The allegations did not show the city council decided a dispute of adjudicative fact. Main St Properties v. City of Bellevue, 310 Neb. 669, 968 N.W.2d 625 (2022).
The mere act of deciding a question of adjudicative fact after an evidentiary hearing, when the law has not contemplated the entity and any power to exercise judicial functions, does not render any tribunal's, board's, or officer's decision reviewable in district court by a petition in error. Champion v. Hall County, 309 Neb. 55, 958 N.W.2d 396 (2021).
The specific statutory procedure for appealing local administrative decisions to a board of adjustment foreclosed a landowner's ability to appeal by a petition in error the county board of supervisors' denial of a conditional use permit. Mogensen v. Board of Supervisors, 268 Neb. 26, 679 N.W.2d 413 (2004).
A decision by the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services Appeals Board will not be reviewed by the district court unless a petition for review is filed within the 30-day limit prescribed by section 25-1931. Lewis v. Camp, 236 Neb. 94, 459 N.W.2d 211 (1990).
Probate judgments of the county court may not be brought to the district court for review by the error proceedings contemplated in this section. In re Guardianship of Potter, 235 Neb. 149, 453 N.W.2d 755 (1990).
A 1974 amendment to this statute was intended to eliminate proceedings in error as a method of obtaining district court review of a county court decision; thus, the action was properly dismissed. SapaNajin v. Wolford, 222 Neb. 387, 383 N.W.2d 796 (1986).
Where errors assigned require review of evidence they cannot be considered on either appeal or error proceedings in absence of a bill of exceptions. Lanc v. Douglas County Welfare Administration, 189 Neb. 651, 204 N.W.2d 387 (1973).
Cited in holding that order of county superintendent was not reviewable by error proceedings. Kosmicki v. Kowalski, 184 Neb. 639, 171 N.W.2d 172 (1969).
Appeal or error proceedings do not lie from purely legislative acts by public bodies having legislative power; passage of a zoning ordinance is a legislative act. Scottsbluff Improvement Assn. v. City of Scottsbluff, 183 Neb. 722, 164 N.W.2d 215 (1969).
An order of an administrative officer is not reviewable by error proceedings under this section unless the officer exercised judicial functions. School Dist. No. 23 of Dakota County v. School Dist. No. 11 of Dakota County, 181 Neb. 305, 148 N.W.2d 301 (1967).
Findings of administrative board acting in a judicial capacity cannot be collaterally attacked. Cacek v. Munson, 160 Neb. 187, 69 N.W.2d 692 (1955).
Review in district court of action of county board, making assessments for benefit of drainage district, is by error proceedings and not by appeal. Loup River Public Power Dist. v. Platte County, 135 Neb. 21, 280 N.W. 430 (1938).
Legislature has provided no appeal to district court from act of city council of city of second class sitting as board of equalization to levy special assessments for paving, and jurisdiction cannot be conferred on district court by consent of parties. Roberts v. City of Mitchell, 131 Neb. 672, 269 N.W. 515 (1936).
The discretion exercised by a county board of commissioners under sections 39-1722 and 39-1725 is not judicial in nature, and as such, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear a petition in error under this section. Camp Clarke Ranch v. Morrill Cty. Bd. of Comrs., 17 Neb. App. 76, 758 N.W.2d 653 (2008).
4. Miscellaneous
A board exercises a judicial function if it decides a dispute of adjudicative fact or if a statute requires it to act in a judicial manner. Because teacher's pay scale grievance did not present a dispute of adjudicative fact and school board was not required by statute to act in a judicial manner when administering pay scale grievances, district court lacked jurisdiction to hear teacher's petition in error. Kropp v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 246 Neb. 138, 517 N.W.2d 113 (1994).
All parties interested must be made parties to review by error proceedings. Clausen v. School Dist. No. 33 of Lincoln County, 164 Neb. 78, 81 N.W.2d 822 (1957).
Proceedings in error afford remedy to correct errors of quasi-judicial tribunal. Jungman v. Coolidge, 157 Neb. 122, 58 N.W.2d 828 (1953).
An agreement between parties to an appeal from county court pending in district court, made without knowledge or consent of surety on appeal bond, to effect that defendant dismiss his appeal with costs taxed to defendant and that plaintiff withhold issuing execution for three months and four days after dismissal of appeal, operated as release of surety on appeal bond. New Idea Spreader Co. v. Brown, 129 Neb. 551, 262 N.W. 51 (1935).
Council's determination of sufficiency of abutting owner's objections to paving is judicial function; becomes final in absence of proceedings to review. Hiddleson v. City of Grand Island, 115 Neb. 287, 212 N.W. 619 (1927).
On review by error proceedings of order of probate court, petition in error must be filed. Baacke v. Dredla, 57 Neb. 92, 77 N.W. 341 (1898).
25-1902.
Final order, defined; appeal.(1) The following are final orders which may be vacated, modified, or reversed:
(a) An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;
(b) An order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding;
(c) An order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is entered; and
(d) An order denying a motion for summary judgment when such motion is based on the assertion of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a government official.
(2) An order under subdivision (1)(d) of this section may be appealed pursuant to section 25-1912 within thirty days after the entry of such order or within thirty days after the entry of judgment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 581, p. 496; R.S.1913, § 8176; C.S.1922, § 9128; C.S.1929, § 20-1902; R.S.1943, § 25-1902;
Laws 2019, LB179, § 1.
Annotations
1. Final order
2. Not final order
3. Special proceeding
4. Substantial right
5. Multiple claims or parties
6. Miscellaneous
1. Final order
The judicial supervision of the winding up of a limited liability company is a multifaceted special proceeding, and an order that ends a discrete phase of the proceeding affects a substantial right because it finally resolves the issues raised in that phase. Schreiber Bros. Hog Co. v. Schreiber, 312 Neb. 707, 980 N.W.2d 890 (2022).
An order overruling an application to determine garnishee liability in a postjudgment garnishment in aid of an execution proceeding is a "final order" under this section, because it affects a substantial right made on a summary application in an action after a judgment is entered. Florence Lake Investments v. Berg, 312 Neb. 183, 978 N.W.2d 308 (2022).
An order denying a petition for a special administrator under section 30-2457 and concurrent request under section 30-2457 for an order restraining, during the pendency of a will contest, the personal representative of the decedent's estate is a final, appealable order. In re Estate of Anderson, 311 Neb. 758, 974 N.W.2d 847 (2022).
The probate court's order appointing a personal representative was a final order; it ended a discrete phase of the probate proceeding and the appointment order, coupled with the issuance of letters of personal representative, imposed fiduciary duties on the appointee. In re Estate of Severson, 310 Neb. 982, 970 N.W.2d 94 (2022).
A court order dismissing a petition for the removal of the personal representatives of an estate and the appointment of a special administrator operates as a final, appealable order where the dismissal cannot be vindicated on appeal from any other potential final judgment or resolution of the case, and the order affected an essential legal right of the appellant. In re Estate of Lakin, 310 Neb. 271, 965 N.W.2d 365 (2021).
An order ending a discrete phase of probate proceedings is a final, appealable order, but one that is merely preliminary to such an order is not. In re Estate of Larson, 308 Neb. 240, 953 N.W.2d 535 (2021).
An order denying a biological father's motion for placement is not a mere continuation of a prior order of temporary physical custody when the court's order was its first adjudication of the father's parental right to temporary custody. In re Interest of A.A. et al., 307 Neb. 817, 951 N.W.2d 144 (2020).
A trial court's order denying a judgment debtor's motion to quash and vacate a foreign judgment affected a substantial right, and thus, the order was a final, appealable order; once the court ordered garnishment of the debtor's bank account, forcing him to postpone his appeal from such an order would have significantly undermined his right to the use and enjoyment of his property. Gem City Bone & Joint v. Meister, 306 Neb. 710, 947 N.W.2d 302 (2020).
An order denying a motion to modify or eliminate a probation condition is a final, appealable order. State v. Paulsen, 304 Neb. 21, 932 N.W.2d 849 (2019).
Under this section, the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is a final, appealable order, because it affects a substantial right and is made in a special proceeding. Cullinane v. Beverly Enters. - Neb., 300 Neb. 210, 912 N.W.2d 774 (2018).
Final orders and judgments issued by a county court may be appealed to district court. A district court order affirming, reversing, or remanding an order or judgment of the county court is itself a final order that an appellate court has jurisdiction to review. State v. Coble, 299 Neb. 434, 908 N.W.2d 646 (2018).
An order issuing a stay within an action is generally not appealable. But a stay that is tantamount to a dismissal of an action or has the effect of a permanent denial of the requested relief is a final order. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018).
Generally, an order of dismissal is a final, appealable order. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018).
The only three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018).
Under this section, an order is final for purposes of appeal if it affects a substantial right and (1) determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) is made during a special proceeding, or (3) is made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered. State v. McColery, 297 Neb. 53, 898 N.W.2d 349 (2017).
An order overruling a motion to terminate parental rights is a final, appealable order. In re Interest of Isabel P. et al., 293 Neb. 62, 875 N.W.2d 848 (2016).
A motion to compel arbitration invokes a special proceeding. An order that compels arbitration or stays court proceedings pending arbitration divests the court of jurisdiction to hear the parties' dispute and determines arbitrability. Accordingly, it is a final, appealable order. Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 290 Neb. 640, 861 N.W.2d 425 (2015).
The compensation court’s award which granted the worker vocational rehabilitation of formal training was a final order because it was made in a special proceeding and affected a substantial right by eliminating the employer’s claim that the worker was not entitled to vocational rehabilitation. Becerra v. United Parcel Service, 284 Neb. 414, 822 N.W.2d 327 (2012).
In a request for partition brought within a probate proceeding, a county court’s order directing a referee to sell the real estate was a final, appealable order. Probate proceedings are special proceedings, and the right to receive the real estate in kind is a substantial right that was affected by the order to sell the property. In re Estate of McKillip, 284 Neb. 367, 820 N.W.2d 868 (2012).
Where a child is adjudicated and placed in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services, and the department is the child's guardian, a juvenile court order permanently changing the child's placement is a final, appealable order. In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581, 811 N.W.2d 214 (2012).
An order resolving all the issues raised in an independent special proceeding is a final, appealable order. Big John's Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012).
If a plaintiff's other claims in an action are rendered moot by the court's ruling that a statute is unconstitutional, the trial court's order completely disposes of the subject matter of the litigation. Such an order both is final and affects a substantial right. Big John's Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012).
A probate court's denial of an application for the appointment of a special administrator, brought pursuant to section 30-2457(2), is a final, appealable order within the meaning of this section. In re Estate of Muncillo, 280 Neb. 669, 789 N.W.2d 37 (2010).
A stay in an independent special proceeding that is tantamount to a dismissal of an action or has the effect of a permanent denial of the requested relief is appealable as a final order. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010).
An order compelling arbitration or staying judicial proceedings pending arbitration is a final order under the second category of this section. It affects a substantial right in an independent special proceeding because it disposes of all the issues presented. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010).
An order of contempt in a postjudgment proceeding to enforce a previous final judgment is a final order for appeal purposes; the contempt order affects a substantial right, made upon a summary application in an action after judgment. Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010).
An order denying a motion to vacate or modify a final order affects a substantial right upon a summary application in an action after judgment, and is itself a final, appealable order. Capitol Construction v. Skinner, 279 Neb. 419, 778 N.W.2d 721 (2010).
An order granting an evidentiary hearing on some issues presented in a postconviction motion but denying a hearing on others is a final order. State v. Poindexter, 277 Neb. 936, 766 N.W.2d 391 (2009).
The three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right in an action and which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456, 763 N.W.2d 77 (2009); State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 604 N.W.2d 169 (2000); State v. Silvers, 255 Neb. 702, 587 N.W.2d 325 (1998); In re Interest of Anthony G., 255 Neb. 442, 586 N.W.2d 427 (1998); State v. Kula, 254 Neb. 962, 579 N.W.2d 541 (1998); Hull v. Aetna Ins. Co., 247 Neb. 713, 529 N.W.2d 783 (1995); Rohde v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Neb. 863, 509 N.W.2d 618 (1994); Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993); In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991); Moyers v. International Paper Co., 25 Neb. App. 282, 905 N.W.2d 87 (2017); Abante, LLC v. Premier Fighter, 19 Neb. App. 730, 814 N.W.2d 109 (2012); Michael B. v. Donna M., 11 Neb. App. 346, 652 N.W.2d 618 (2002); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 10 Neb. App. 622, 635 N.W.2d 272 (2001); O'Connor v. Kaufman, 6 Neb. App. 382, 574 N.W.2d 513 (1998).
A proceeding to determine the competency of an accused to stand trial is a special proceeding within the meaning of this section, and an order finding the accused incompetent to stand trial and ordering the accused confined until such time as he or she is competent is a final order from which an appeal may be taken under section 25-1911. State v. Lassek, 272 Neb. 523, 723 N.W.2d 320 (2006); State v. Jones, 258 Neb. 695, 605 N.W.2d 434 (2000); State v. Guatney, 207 Neb. 501, 299 N.W.2d 538 (1980).
A judgment is a court's final consideration and determination of the respective rights and obligations of the parties to an action as those rights and obligations presently exist. An order entered by a court may affect a substantial right and be subject to review as a final order although it could not or need not be properly denominated a judgment. State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (2005).
In a case involving two appellees, a lower court order sustaining one appellee's motion for summary judgment and entering judgment against the appellant was a final order because it determined the action as related to those two parties, and no further action was necessary as between those two parties. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Dailey, 268 Neb. 733, 687 N.W.2d 689 (2004).
A denial of a motion to compel based on the Federal Arbitration Act is a final, appealable order because it affects a substantial right and is made in a special proceeding. Webb v. American Employers Group, 268 Neb. 473, 684 N.W.2d 33 (2004).
A trial court's order which ordered the clerk of the court to issue an amended commitment for a defendant who had previously been convicted and sentenced is a final, appealable order. State v. Perry, 268 Neb. 179, 681 N.W.2d 729 (2004).
The denial of a motion to vacate and set aside the judgment under subsection (2) of section 29-4123 affects a substantial right in a special proceeding and is therefore an appealable order under this section. State v. Bronson, 267 Neb. 103, 672 N.W.2d 244 (2003).
An order denying a request for reimbursement pursuant to the in forma pauperis statutes entered after the judgment is an order affecting a substantial right made upon a summary application in an action after judgment and is therefore a final, appealable order under this section. Heathman v. Kenney, 263 Neb. 966, 644 N.W.2d 558 (2002).
A ruling on a plea in bar is a final order as defined in this section. State v. Marshall, 253 Neb. 676, 573 N.W.2d 406 (1998).
Per this section, a motion to discharge for lack of speedy trial, pursuant to section 29-1208, is an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding. State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 570 N.W.2d 331 (1997).
A ruling on a motion for absolute discharge based upon an accused criminal's nonfrivolous claim that his or her statutory speedy trial rights were violated is final and appealable. State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (1997).
The denial of a plea in bar is a final order as defined by this section. State v. Sinsel, 249 Neb. 369, 543 N.W.2d 457 (1996); State v. Lynch, 248 Neb. 234, 533 N.W.2d 905 (1995); State v. Milenkovich, 236 Neb. 42, 458 N.W.2d 747 (1990).
In order for a decree to qualify as "final", it must dispose of the whole merits of the case and leave nothing for further consideration of the court. In re Adoption of Krystal P. & Kile P., 248 Neb. 907, 540 N.W.2d 312 (1995).
The denial of a plea in bar raising a double jeopardy claim is a final order as defined in this section. State v. Woodfork, 239 Neb. 720, 478 N.W.2d 248 (1991).
An ex parte temporary detention order keeping a juvenile's custody from his or her parent for a short period of time pending a hearing as to whether the detention should be continued is not final; however, a detention order entered after a hearing continuing to keep a juvenile's custody from his or her parent pending an adjudication hearing to determine whether the juvenile is neglected, and thus within the purview of section 43-247(3)(a), is final and thus appealable. In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991).
An order which directs the Department of Social Services to pay for the costs of treatment is a final order for purposes of this section. In re Interest of J.M.N., 237 Neb. 116, 464 N.W.2d 811 (1991).
Order by separate juvenile court requiring parent to participate in psychological therapy and requiring Department of Social Services to pay for that therapy was a final order. In re Interest of B.M.H., 233 Neb. 524, 446 N.W.2d 222 (1989).
Order of county court dismissing motion to remove personal representative was appealable. In re Estate of Snover, 233 Neb. 198, 443 N.W.2d 894 (1989).
An order is final and appealable when the substantial rights of the parties to the action are determined even though the cause is retained for the determination of matters incidental thereto. In re 1983-84 County Tax Levy, 220 Neb. 897, 374 N.W.2d 235 (1985); Dorshorst v. Dorshorst, 174 Neb. 886, 120 N.W.2d 32 (1963).
On appeal from the county court sitting as a juvenile court, an order of the district court remanding the case to the county court for a further dispositional hearing is a final order appealable to this court. In re Interest of Roman, 212 Neb. 919, 327 N.W.2d 36 (1982).
Only final orders may be properly appealed to the Supreme Court. An order in a case is final if no further action by a court is necessary to dispose of the cause pending. Lake v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 212 Neb. 570, 324 N.W.2d 660 (1982).
An order fixing fees in a partition action is a final, appealable order. Evans v. Evans, 199 Neb. 480, 259 N.W.2d 925 (1977).
An order of the Court of Industrial Relations establishing bargaining units is a final order under this section, and becomes immediately appealable. American Assn. of University Professors v. Board of Regents, 198 Neb. 243, 253 N.W.2d 1 (1977).
An order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding is a final order which may be appealed. State v. Loomis, 195 Neb. 552, 239 N.W.2d 266 (1976).
Order of county superintendent denying petition for school district reorganization was a final order. Frankforter v. Turner, 175 Neb. 252, 121 N.W.2d 377 (1963).
Order vacating a default judgment is an appealable order. Jones v. Nebraska Blue Cross Hospital Service Assn., 175 Neb. 101, 120 N.W.2d 557 (1963).
A denial of a motion to file a petition on appeal from municipal court out of time is a final order. Pep Sinton, Inc. v. Thomas, 174 Neb. 508, 118 N.W.2d 621 (1962).
Public officer has an appealable interest where proper administration of the duties of a public office is involved. State ex rel. Coulter v. McFarland, 166 Neb. 242, 88 N.W.2d 892 (1958).
Order of dismissal without prejudice was a final order. Akins v. Chamberlain, 164 Neb. 428, 82 N.W.2d 632 (1957).
Order of Superintendent of Public Instruction dissolving school district was final order. Schutte v. Schmitt, 162 Neb. 162, 75 N.W.2d 656 (1956).
Order affecting substantial right in condemnation proceeding is appealable. Higgins v. Loup River P. P. & I. Dist., 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170 (1955).
Order granting interpleader is final order as between stakeholder and claimants. Strasser v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 157 Neb. 570, 60 N.W.2d 672 (1953).
Granting of continuance under federal Civil Relief Act was final order. Sullivan v. Storz, 156 Neb. 177, 55 N.W.2d 499 (1952).
Denial by district court of request to issue special execution by successful plaintiff in a replevin action is a final order from which an appeal can be taken. Barstow v. Wolff, 148 Neb. 14, 26 N.W.2d 390 (1947).
An order affecting a substantial right in an action upon a summary application after judgment is a final order from which an appeal may be taken. De Lair v. De Lair, 146 Neb. 771, 21 N.W.2d 498 (1946).
An order of the court confirming or refusing to confirm a sale constitutes a final and appealable order. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Ganser, 145 Neb. 589, 17 N.W.2d 613 (1945).
The denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus by the district court is a final order. Williams v. Olson, 145 Neb. 282, 16 N.W.2d 178 (1944).
Final orders in habeas corpus proceedings may be reviewed on appeal. The test of finality of order for purpose of appeal is whether particular proceeding or action is terminated by judgment. Tail v. Olson, 144 Neb. 820, 14 N.W.2d 840 (1944).
Judgment by district court awarding weekly sum "until further order" in compensation case was final order. Schlesselman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 Neb. 65, 195 N.W. 466 (1923).
Alimony decree was final order. Wharton v. Jackson, 107 Neb. 288, 185 N.W. 428 (1921).
Absolute order of revivor of action against defendant's executor was final order. Levin v. Muser, 107 Neb. 230, 185 N.W. 431 (1921).
Order vacating judgment on petition filed after the term was final order. Wunrath v. Peoples Furniture & Carpet Co., 98 Neb. 342, 152 N.W. 736 (1915).
An order granting or refusing license to sell realty to pay debts of deceased person was final order. In re Estate of Broehl, 93 Neb. 166, 139 N.W. 1020 (1913).
To appeal from order, it must be formally entered upon journal. Fauber v. Keim, 84 Neb. 167, 120 N.W. 1019 (1909).
Action of State Board of Equalization on railroad assessment was final order. State ex rel. U.P.R.R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 81 Neb. 139, 115 N.W. 789 (1908).
Quashing summons and dismissing action without prejudice was final order. Davis v. Jennings, 78 Neb. 462, 111 N.W. 128 (1907).
If no further action is necessary to dispose of case, order is final. Huffman v. Rhodes, 72 Neb. 57, 100 N.W. 159 (1904).
Order of county court denying right to file claim against estate was final order. Ribble v. Furmin, 71 Neb. 108, 98 N.W. 420 (1904).
Judgment of district court reversing judgment or order of inferior court, though case retained for trial, was final order. Ribble v. Furmin, 69 Neb. 38, 94 N.W. 967 (1903).
Order vacating judgment rendered at former term was final order. Bannard v. Duncan, 65 Neb. 179, 90 N.W. 947 (1902).
Appointment of receiver was final order. Seeds Dry-Plate Co. v. Heyn Photo-Supply Co., 57 Neb. 214, 77 N.W. 660 (1898).
Quashing writ of replevin and dismissing action was final order. Swain v. Savage, 55 Neb. 687, 77 N.W. 362 (1898).
Decree in foreclosure annulling mortgage though proceedings on note continued, was final order. France v. Bell, 52 Neb. 57, 71 N.W. 984 (1897).
Order setting aside sale was final order. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Creighton Theatre Bldg. Co., 51 Neb. 659, 71 N.W. 279 (1897).
Ex parte order, in aid of execution against defendant, was final order. Clarke v. Nebraska Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 800, 69 N.W. 104 (1896).
Decision refusing to order clerk to approve supersedeas was final order. State ex rel. Lions Ins. Co. v. Baker, 45 Neb. 39, 63 N.W. 139 (1895).
Order recalling order of sale in foreclosure was final order. State ex rel. Harris v. Laflin, 40 Neb. 441, 58 N.W. 936 (1894).
Discharge of attachment was final order. Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co. v. Curtis, 38 Neb. 520, 57 N.W. 161 (1893); Adams County Bank v. Morgan, 26 Neb. 148, 41 N.W. 993 (1889).
Denying petition to intervene was final order. Herman v. Barhydt, 20 Neb. 625, 31 N.W. 488 (1886).
Overruling application to set aside default and permit answer was final order. Steele v. Haynes, 20 Neb. 316, 30 N.W. 63 (1886).
Order on application to modify decree affecting substantial right though it does not determine action was final order. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 19 Neb. 584, 27 N.W. 640 (1886).
Order requiring attorney to pay money into court was final order. Baldwin v. Foss, 14 Neb. 455, 16 N.W. 480 (1883).
Decree enjoining sale of real estate was final order. Rickards v. Coon, 13 Neb. 419, 14 N.W. 162 (1882).
Judgment of dismissal and costs to defendant was final order. Rogers v. Russell, 11 Neb. 361, 9 N.W. 547 (1881).
Order confirming sale, made at chambers, was final order. State Bank of Nebraska v. Green, 8 Neb. 297, 1 N.W. 210 (1879).
Decision of county board of equalization in assessing and levying taxes was final order. Sioux City & P. R. R. v. Washington County, 3 Neb. 30 (1873).
A juvenile court order ceasing reasonable efforts and rejecting the permanency plan of reunification affected a substantial right of the parent, and thus was a final, appealable order that had to be appealed within 30 days; it did not matter that the court's order did not also simultaneously specify a new permanency plan, but instead returned the case to the Department of Health and Human Services for alternative permanency planning recommendations. In re Interest of LeAntonaé D. et al., 28 Neb. App. 144, 942 N.W.2d 784 (2020).
A final, appealable order must affect a substantial right. In re Guardianship of Aimee S., 24 Neb. App. 230, 885 N.W.2d 330 (2016).
The three types of final orders that an appellate court may review are (1) an order that affects a substantial right and that determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order that affects a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order that affects a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. In re Guardianship of Aimee S., 24 Neb. App. 230, 885 N.W.2d 330 (2016).
Under this section, the three types of final orders that an appellate court may review are (1) an order that affects a substantial right and that determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order that affects a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order that affects a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. Furstenfeld v. Pepin, 23 Neb. App. 673, 875 N.W.2d 468 (2016).
Under this section, the three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right in an action and which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. Belitz v. Belitz, 21 Neb. App. 716, 842 N.W.2d 613 (2014).
The granting of a summary judgment is a final order where it concludes all issues between the two parties on either side of the motion. Abante, LLC v. Premier Fighter, 19 Neb. App. 730, 814 N.W.2d 109 (2012).
Sentencing orders in which a defendant is sentenced to probation with one term of probation's being a jail term that may or may not ultimately be waived by the court are final, appealable orders. State v. Volcek, 15 Neb. App. 416, 729 N.W.2d 90 (2007).
An order denying a petition to invalidate pursuant to section 43-1507 and motion to dismiss is a final order for purposes of this section. In re Interest of Enrique P. et al., 14 Neb. App. 453, 709 N.W.2d 676 (2006).
An order adjudicating an individual as a mentally ill dangerous person pursuant to section 71‑908 and ordering that person retained for an indeterminate amount of time is an order affecting a substantial right in a special proceeding from which an appeal may be taken. In re Interest of Saville, 10 Neb. App. 194, 626 N.W.2d 644 (2001).
A denial of a plea in bar is a final, appealable order. State v. Noll, 3 Neb. App. 410, 527 N.W.2d 644 (1995).
A ruling on a motion to set aside the forfeiture of an appeal bond is an appealable order. State v. Hernandez, 1 Neb. App. 830, 511 N.W.2d 535 (1993).
2. Not final order
An order declaring a settlement agreement enforceable is not a final order, since further judicial action was required before all the terms of the settlement agreement could be effectuated and the cases dismissed. Paxton v. Paxton, 314 Neb. 197, 989 N.W.2d 420 (2023).
An order granting partial summary judgment on the issue of apportionment of inheritance tax obligations was not a final, appealable order where a discrete phase of probate proceedings regarding inheritance tax liability had not yet been completed in the county court. In re Hessler Living Trust, 313 Neb. 607, 985 N.W.2d 589 (2023).
An order denying temporary injunctive relief is not a "final order." Ramaekers v. Creighton University, 312 Neb. 248, 978 N.W.2d 298 (2022).
A defendant's appeal of a final order denying a pretrial motion for absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds did not result in appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal order that denied the motion on constitutional speedy trial grounds. State v. Abernathy, 310 Neb. 880, 969 N.W.2d 871 (2022).
An order which set aside a default order of modification of child support and allowed the obligor an opportunity to answer and defend was not a final order, because it did not affect a substantial right of the parties in the subject action. Porter v. Porter, 309 Neb. 167, 959 N.W.2d 235 (2021).
The order granting an application to proceed in forma pauperis is not a final, appealable order because it does not affect a substantial right. State v. Fredrickson, 306 Neb. 81, 943 N.W.2d 701 (2020).
An order overruling a plea in bar was not a final, appealable order, where the defendant's plea in bar did not
present a colorable double jeopardy claim. State v. Kelley, 305 Neb. 409, 940 N.W.2d 568 (2020).
Even if, in the face of a defendant's insistence, a court refuses to rule on the merits of a motion to quash an information on limitations grounds, the court's refusal to rule would be no more final, for purposes of an appeal, than a ruling on the motion would have been. State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852, 901 N.W.2d 679 (2017).
An order that merely holds bond funds in the court and does not state who is entitled to the funds is not a final, appealable order. State v. McColery, 297 Neb. 53, 898 N.W.2d 349 (2017).
An order disqualifying counsel in a civil case is not a final, appealable order, overruling Richardson v. Griffiths, 251 Neb. 825, 560 N.W.2d 430 (1997), and cases relying upon it. Heckman v. Marchio, 296 Neb. 458, 894 N.W.2d 296 (2017).
An order imposing a discovery sanction was not a final order; it did not dispose of the whole merits of the case, was not made during a special proceeding, and was not made after a judgment was rendered. Ginger Cove Common Area Co. v. Wiekhorst, 296 Neb. 416, 893 N.W.2d 467 (2017).
An order refusing to vacate a discovery sanction order was not a final order, because it did not affect a substantial right. Ginger Cove Common Area Co. v. Wiekhorst, 296 Neb. 416, 893 N.W.2d 467 (2017).
The denial of a motion to transfer a criminal case from district court to juvenile court is not final and appealable under this section. State v. Bluett, 295 Neb. 369, 889 N.W.2d 83 (2016).
A finding of abandonment under section 43-104(2)(b) in an ongoing adoption proceeding is not a final, appealable order; such a finding does not terminate parental rights or standing in the proceedings, but merely eliminates the need for the abandoning parent's consent and authorizes the execution of substitute consent, and such finding has no real and immediate effect on parental obligations, visitation, custody, or other matters pertaining to the parent's contact with the child during the pendency of the final judgment granting or denying the petition for adoption. In re Adoption of Madysen S. et al., 293 Neb. 646, 879 N.W.2d 34 (2016).
An order of the trial court issuing a warrant for a defendant's arrest and commitment upon finding that the Department of Correctional Services had erroneously released the defendant before his mandatory discharge date was an order on summary application relating to a final judgment (the defendant's sentence). But the order did not affect a substantial right necessary to qualify for immediate appeal. The trial court was not deciding any important right or issue affecting the subject matter of the underlying criminal action or of any rights allegedly derived from the mistaken release, and the trial court did not diminish any claim or defense that was available to the defendant prior to the order for an arrest and commitment warrant. State v. Jackson, 291 Neb. 908, 870 N.W.2d 133 (2015).
An order dismissing a case "subject to being reinstated" upon the filing of a motion for reinstatement within 14 days is conditional and, thus, not a final order. State v. Meints, 291 Neb. 869, 869 N.W.2d 343 (2015).
An order in a juvenile proceeding merely finding the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act applicable, without further adjudicative or dispositive action, is not a final order within the meaning of this section. In re Interest of Jassenia H., 291 Neb. 107, 864 N.W.2d 242 (2015).
A court's temporary injunction or stay that merely preserves the status quo pending a further order is not an order that amounts to a dismissal of the action or that permanently denies relief to a party. So it is not a final, appealable order. Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 290 Neb. 640, 861 N.W.2d 425 (2015).
A truly temporary order entered pursuant to section 43-2929.01(4)(a) is not a “final order” under this section. Huskey v. Huskey, 289 Neb. 439, 855 N.W.2d 377 (2014).
An order denying a motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity was not a final order for purposes of appeal. Carney v. Miller, 287 Neb. 400, 842 N.W.2d 782 (2014).
A Workers’ Compensation Court’s finding of a compensable injury or its rejection of an employer’s affirmative defense without a determination of benefits is not an order that affects an employer’s substantial right in a special proceeding, and thus, is not appealable. Jacobitz v. Aurora Co-op, 287 Neb. 97, 841 N.W.2d 377 (2013).
An order granting ancillary discovery of allegedly privileged information is not a final order under this section. Schropp Indus. v. Washington Cty. Atty.'s Ofc., 281 Neb. 152, 794 N.W.2d 685 (2011).
An order reviving an action is not a final order from which an appeal may immediately be taken; the order may be reviewed after final judgment in the case. Platte Valley Nat. Bank v. Lasen, 273 Neb. 602, 732 N.W.2d 347 (2007).
The overruling of a pretrial motion raising a statute of limitations defense neither affects a substantial right nor occurs in the context of a special proceeding. State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (2005).
An order denying or dissolving a temporary injunction or restraining order is not a final order as defined in this section. Dissolution of a temporary restraining order is not a final order within the meaning of this section. Waite v. City of Omaha, 263 Neb. 589, 641 N.W.2d 351 (2002).
An order sustaining a motion for partial summary judgment, which grants a permanent injunction but reserves the issue of monetary damages for later disposition, is not a final, appealable order. O'Connor v. Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 582 N.W.2d 350 (1998).
A motion to disqualify a criminal defendant's court-appointed attorney is not a final, appealable order. State v. Schlund, 249 Neb. 173, 542 N.W.2d 421 (1996).
A trial court order is not a final decision for the purposes of appeal or res judicata if a motion for new trial of the matter is pending before the court. Smith v. Smith, 246 Neb. 193, 517 N.W.2d 394 (1994).
Where the Nebraska Motor Vehicle Industry Licensing Board's order is clearly conditional, operating only in the event that the franchisor finds another franchisee and notifies the board of the fact that it has done so, it is not a final order and is therefore not appealable. Garber v. State, 241 Neb. 523, 489 N.W.2d 550 (1992).
Where all of plaintiff's theories are based on the same operative facts and involve the same parties, summary judgment with regard to only some of the theories does not constitute a final, appealable order which this court may consider. Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990).
An order dismissing one cause of action while a second cause of action arising out of the same factual circumstances and involving the same parties but asserting a different legal theory of recovery remains pending for trial does not constitute a final appealable order. P. R. Halligan Post 163 v. Schultz, 212 Neb. 329, 322 N.W.2d 657 (1982).
Decision of trial court temporarily suspending father's right of visitation and temporarily suspending his obligation to pay child support pending an appeal in a related guardianship case was not a final order, and was not appealable. Sain v. Sain, 211 Neb. 519, 319 N.W.2d 107 (1982).
Dissolution of a restraining order is not a final order within the meaning of this section. Abramson v. Bemis, 201 Neb. 97, 266 N.W.2d 226 (1978).
District court order remanding a cause to county court for new trial not an appealable, final order. Martin v. Zweygardt, 199 Neb. 770, 261 N.W.2d 379 (1978).
Order sustaining objections to personal jurisdiction not final within meaning of this section. Ranch & Farm Lines, Inc. v. Dressman, 185 Neb. 328, 175 N.W.2d 299 (1970).
An order sustaining a general demurrer to a petition, not followed by a judgment of dismissal or other final disposition of the case, is not a final order or judgment, and is not reviewable in the Supreme Court. Root v. School Dist. No. 25 of Custer County, 183 Neb. 22, 157 N.W.2d 877 (1968).
Summary judgment on issue of liability alone was not a final order. Hart v. Ronspies, 181 Neb. 38, 146 N.W.2d 795 (1966).
An order sustaining an objection to personal jurisdiction is not a final order. Busboom v. Gregory, 179 Neb. 254, 137 N.W.2d 825 (1965).
An order sustaining special appearance is not a final order. Erdman v. National Indemnity Co., 178 Neb. 312, 133 N.W.2d 472 (1965).
Order overruling a motion for summary judgment is not a final order. Pressey v. State, 173 Neb. 652, 114 N.W.2d 518 (1962); Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 59 N.W.2d 614 (1953).
Order of city council holding action on claim in abeyance is interlocutory and not final. Belitz v. City of Omaha, 172 Neb. 36, 108 N.W.2d 421 (1961).
Order denying motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order. Otteman v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 171 Neb. 148, 105 N.W.2d 583 (1960).
Order to bring in an additional party is not final or appealable. Lund v. Holbrook, 157 Neb. 854, 62 N.W.2d 112 (1954).
Sustaining motion to strike withdrawal from petition for probate of will was not a final order. Hill v. Humlicek, 156 Neb. 61, 54 N.W.2d 366 (1952).
Overruling of motion to dismiss appeal from county court to district court is not a final order. Egan v. Bunner, 155 Neb. 611, 52 N.W.2d 820 (1952).
An order sustaining a demurrer is not a final order. Shipley v. Shipley, 154 Neb. 872, 50 N.W.2d 103 (1951).
Pendency of motion for new trial prevents judgment from being final. Harkness v. Central Nebraska P. P. & I. Dist., 154 Neb. 463, 48 N.W.2d 385 (1951).
Order sustaining a demurrer, in absence of further proceedings, is not a final order reviewable on appeal. Koehn v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 151 Neb. 859, 39 N.W.2d 808 (1949).
An order is not final when the substantial rights of the parties remained undetermined and when the cause is retained for further action. Barry v. Wolf, 148 Neb. 27, 26 N.W.2d 303 (1947).
Order overruling a demurrer to a petition is not a final order reviewable on appeal. Anson v. Kruse, 147 Neb. 989, 25 N.W.2d 896 (1947).
An appeal from Department of Roads and Irrigation to Supreme Court will be dismissed where record does not disclose rendition of final order or judgment from which such appeal is prosecuted. Cozad Ditch Co. v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 132 Neb. 547, 272 N.W. 560 (1937).
Sustaining motion to strike certain parts of answer without further judicial action does not constitute a final, appealable order. State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bank of Omaha, 131 Neb. 223, 267 N.W. 532 (1936).
Order approving executor's account, requiring further report, and continuing proceedings was not a final order. In re Hansen's Estate, 117 Neb. 551, 221 N.W. 694 (1928).
Ruling on interlocutory matter was not a final order. Gainsforth v. Peterson, 113 Neb. 1, 201 N.W. 645 (1924).
County court's order appointing guardian ad litem was not a final order. In re Estate of Isaac, 108 Neb. 662, 189 N.W. 297 (1922).
Temporary injunction against Secretary of State from submitting referendum was not a final order. Barkley v. Pool, 102 Neb. 799, 169 N.W. 730 (1918).
Order to bring in additional defendant, another wrong-doer alleged to be indemnitor, in personal injury action, was not a final order. Kaplan v. City of Omaha, 100 Neb. 567, 160 N.W. 960 (1916).
In partition suit, where partition ordered, order is not appealable until effected and confirmed. Peterson v. Damoude, 95 Neb. 469, 145 N.W. 847 (1914).
Order dissolving temporary injunction, not disposing of case, was not final order. Young v. City of Albion, 77 Neb. 678, 110 N.W. 706 (1906).
Sustaining demurrer to petition without dismissal was not final order. Larson v. Sloan, 77 Neb. 438, 109 N.W. 752 (1906).
Refusal of peremptory writ of mandamus, in case not dismissed, was not a final order. State ex rel. Yeiser v. Higby, 60 Neb. 765, 84 N.W. 261 (1900).
Order fixing amount of supersedeas bond, delaying writ of assistance, was not a final order. Green v. Morse, 57 Neb. 798, 78 N.W. 395 (1899).
Overruling plea in abatement was not a final order. Bartels v. Sonnenschein, 54 Neb. 68, 74 N.W. 417 (1898).
Order opening judgment and permitting answer was not a final order. Merle & Heaney Mfg. Co. v. Wallace, 48 Neb. 886, 67 N.W. 883 (1896).
Judgment for costs is not reviewable before final adjudication disposing of case. Reynolds v. City of Tecumseh, 48 Neb. 785, 67 N.W. 792 (1896).
Judgment for costs in favor of defendant on verdict in his favor was not a final order. Little v. Gamble, 47 Neb. 827, 66 N.W. 849 (1896).
Dissolution of restraining order and denial of temporary injunction was not a final order. Manning v. Connell, 47 Neb. 83, 66 N.W. 17 (1896).
Order dissolving or modifying temporary injunction incident to cause was not a final order. Bartram v. Sherman, 46 Neb. 713, 65 N.W. 789 (1896).
Quashing summons without order of dismissal was not a final order. Lewis v. Barker, 46 Neb. 662, 65 N.W. 778 (1896).
Order setting aside verdict at term and granting new trial, before judgment, was not a final order. Johnson v. Parrotte, 46 Neb. 51, 64 N.W. 363 (1895).
Order determining that appeal to district court was taken in time was not a final order. Edgar v. Keller, 43 Neb. 263, 61 N.W. 587 (1895).
Overruling plaintiff's application for special master to conduct foreclosure sale was not final order. American Inv. Co. v. Nye, 40 Neb. 720, 59 N.W. 355 (1894).
Sustaining demurrer to counterclaim was not final order. Yager v. Lemp, 39 Neb. 93, 58 N.W. 285 (1894).
Sustaining of motion to quash service of summons is not a final order. Persinger v. Tinkle, 34 Neb. 5, 51 N.W. 299 (1892).
Overruling motion to discharge attachment was not a final order. Root v. State Bank of Nebraska, 30 Neb. 772, 47 N.W. 82 (1890).
Refusing to dismiss on motion of defendant was not a final order. Grimes v. Chamberlain, 27 Neb. 605, 43 N.W. 395 (1889).
Setting aside decree to permit defendant to answer cross-petition of which he had no notice was not a final order. Cockle Separator Mfg. Co. v. Clark, 23 Neb. 702, 37 N.W. 628 (1888).
Sustaining motion to strike amended pleading was not final order. Welch v. Calhoun, 22 Neb. 166, 34 N.W. 348 (1887).
Overruling motion for default judgment was not a final order. Shedenhelm v. Shedenhelm, 21 Neb. 387, 32 N.W. 170 (1887).
Order for temporary alimony was not a final order. Aspinwall v. Aspinwall, 18 Neb. 463, 25 N.W. 623 (1885).
Finding that petition was confessed where defendant was in default was not a final order. Daniels v. Tibbets, 16 Neb. 666, 21 N.W. 454 (1884).
Allowance or refusal of attachment on claim not due was not final order. Seidentopf v. Annabil, 6 Neb. 524 (1877).
Judgment that partition is impracticable, and directing sale, was not a final order. Mills v. Miller, 2 Neb. 299 (1873).
Quashing service by publication or summons was not final order. Goldie v. Stewart, 5 Neb. Unof. 523, 99 N.W. 255 (1904).
Dissolution of temporary injunction was not a final order. Stansbury v. Storer, 3 Neb. Unof. 100, 91 N.W. 197 (1902).
Judgment for costs on special findings was not a final order. Welch v. Tippery, 1 Neb. Unof. 163, 95 N.W. 491 (1901).
Where the issue of guardian ad litem fees has been raised and reserved for later determination, an order permanently modifying child custody but not resolving the issue of guardian ad litem fees is not a final, appealable order. McCaul v. McCaul, 17 Neb. App. 801, 771 N.W.2d 222 (2009).
A court's decision to deny waiver of a 45-day jail term as a condition of probation was not a final, appealable order. State v. Volcek, 15 Neb. App. 416, 729 N.W.2d 90 (2007).
An order overruling a pretrial motion to dismiss pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. section 6-1112(b)(1), (2), and (6) is not a final order. Qwest Bus. Resources v. Headliners—1299 Farnam, 15 Neb. App. 405, 727 N.W.2d 724 (2007).
An appeal based solely on an alleged violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial can be effectively vindicated in an appeal after judgment. State v. Wilson, 15 Neb. App. 212, 724 N.W.2d 99 (2006).
The denial of a motion for discharge, based upon a constitutional right to a speedy trial and in the absence of a nonfrivolous statutory claim, is interlocutory. State v. Wilson, 15 Neb. App. 212, 724 N.W.2d 99 (2006).
In cases where section 29-1819.02 does not apply, an order overruling a motion to withdraw a plea does not affect a substantial right in a special proceeding and therefore does not constitute a final, appealable order. State v. Cisneros, 14 Neb. App. 112, 704 N.W.2d 550 (2005).
3. Special proceeding
Derivative actions brought pursuant to the Nebraska Uniform Limited Liability Company Act are not special proceedings, and any proceedings under section 21-168 are merely a step in the underlying derivative action. Tegra Corp. v. Boeshart, 311 Neb. 783, 976 N.W.2d 165 (2022).
Juvenile court proceedings are "special proceedings" for purposes of this section. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).
A summary judgment motion does not invoke a special proceeding. It is a step in the overall action and cannot be a summary application made in an action after a judgment is rendered. Partial summary judgments are usually considered interlocutory. They are not appealable unless the order affects a substantial right and, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment. To be a final order under the first category of this section, the order must dispose of the whole merits of the case and leave nothing for the court's further consideration. Big John's Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012).
A proceeding's characterization does not hinge upon the remedy granted, because it cannot be both a special proceeding and a step within an action. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010).
Special proceedings include civil statutory remedies that are not encompassed in Chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes and sometimes statutory remedies within the civil procedure statutes. But regardless of a statutory remedy's location within Nebraska's statutes, actions and special proceedings are mutually exclusive. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010).
Proceedings regarding modification of a marital dissolution, which are controlled by section 42-364, are special proceedings as defined by this section. Steven S. v. Mary S., 277 Neb. 124, 760 N.W.2d 28 (2009).
Under this section, custody determinations are considered special proceedings. Steven S. v. Mary S., 277 Neb. 124, 760 N.W.2d 28 (2009).
A proceeding under section 30-2454 to remove a personal representative for cause is a special proceeding within the meaning of this section. In re Estate of Nemetz, 273 Neb. 918, 735 N.W.2d 363 (2007).
None of the many steps or proceedings necessary or permitted to be taken in an action to commence it, to join issues in it, and conduct it to a final hearing and judgment can be a special proceeding within the terms of this section. State v. Vela, 272 Neb. 287, 721 N.W.2d 631 (2006).
A proceeding initiated under sections 30-3814 and 30-3862 to remove a trustee is a special proceeding within the meaning of this section. In re Trust of Rosenberg, 269 Neb. 310, 693 N.W.2d 500 (2005).
Approval of class certification neither affects a substantial right nor is a special proceeding. A special proceeding within the meaning of this section must be one that is not an action and is not and cannot be legally a step in an action as part of it. None of the many steps or proceedings necessary or permitted to be taken in an action to commence it, to join issues in it, and conduct it to a final hearing and judgment can be a special proceeding within the terms of this section. Keef v. State, 262 Neb. 622, 634 N.W.2d 751 (2001).
An order denying an application for appointment of a receiver is not made in a special proceeding and therefore cannot be a final order. Nebraska Nutrients, Inc. v. Shepherd, 261 Neb. 723, 626 N.W.2d 472 (2001).
Postconviction proceedings are special proceedings under this section. State v. Silvers, 255 Neb. 702, 587 N.W.2d 325 (1998).
An order to vacate a dismissal constitutes a special proceeding within the meaning of this section. Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993).
An order vacating a dismissal after the limitations period has run constitutes an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and is therefore a final appealable order. Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993).
A proceeding under section 30-2454 to remove a personal representative for cause is a special proceeding within the meaning of this section and therefore is a final order and is appealable even though it may not terminate the action or constitute a final disposition of the case. In re Estate of Seidler, 241 Neb. 402, 490 N.W.2d 453 (1992).
Proceedings before the Department of Water Resources brought pursuant to section 46-209 also are special proceedings for the purposes of this section. In re Applications A-14137, A-14138A, A-14138B, and A-14139, 240 Neb. 117, 480 N.W.2d 709 (1992).
Order entered under Juvenile Court Act was made in special proceeding. Ripley v. Godden, 158 Neb. 246, 63 N.W.2d 151 (1954).
Condemnation is a special statutory proceeding under this section. Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 155 Neb. 48, 50 N.W.2d 533 (1951).
Suit under workmen's compensation law is a special proceeding hereunder and order of trial court is final and appealable within meaning of this section. G. A. Steinheimer Co. v. Podkovich, 122 Neb. 710, 241 N.W. 287 (1932).
Because a motion to modify a dissolution decree is brought pursuant to Chapter 42 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, it is not encompassed in Chapter 25 and is therefore a special proceeding as that term is used in this section. Templeton v. Templeton, 9 Neb. App. 937, 622 N.W.2d 424 (2001).
4. Substantial right
An order to mediate does not affect any substantial right of the parties. Tegra Corp. v. Boeshart, 311 Neb. 783, 976 N.W.2d 165 (2022).
Although requiring a probationer to live in a specific location might affect a substantial right in some cases, here the probationer was merely allowed to continue residing in Kansas instead of Nebraska. Thus, allowing her to continue living in Kansas did not affect the subject matter of the litigation by diminishing a claim or defense that was available to her. Therefore, because no substantial right was affected by the amended order of probation, the amended order was not a final, appealable order. State v. Reames, 308 Neb. 361, 953 N.W.2d 807 (2021).
An order which changed a parenting time schedule on a temporary basis and was set for a review hearing in 4 1/2 months did not affect a substantial right and, thus, was not a final order. Yori v. Helms, 307 Neb. 375, 949 N.W.2d 325 (2020).
An order finding a defendant to be indigent and appointing appellate counsel at the county's expense did not affect a substantial right of the parties and was not a final order for purposes of appeal, where the order did not obligate the county to pay any specific amount or set a deadline for payment, such determinations were to be the subject of future proceedings addressing the question of reasonable attorney fees, and the State had the ability to challenge the findings of indigency and recoup any subsequently expended funds from the defendant. State v. Fredrickson, 305 Neb. 165, 939 N.W.2d 385 (2020).
An order reinstating a case does not affect a substantial right merely because reinstatement would affect a defense in a future hypothetical action. Fidler v. Life Care Centers of America, 301 Neb. 724, 919 N.W.2d 903 (2018).
An order on a motion seeking to remove the record of a criminal citation from the public record under section 29-3523 affects a substantial right for purposes of this section. State v. Coble, 299 Neb. 434, 908 N.W.2d 646 (2018).
The illegality of an arrest gives rise only to "collateral" rights and remedies in the underlying criminal action, which are effectively vindicated on appeal from the judgment. Dugan v. State, 297 Neb. 444, 900 N.W.2d 528 (2017).
An order changing a permanency plan in a juvenile case adjudicated under section 43-247(3)(a) does not necessarily affect a substantial right of the parent for purposes of this section when the order continues prior orders directed at family preservation and reunification or remedying the reasons that led to the adjudication. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).
Subsequent review orders in a juvenile case adjudicated under section 43-247(3)(a) do not typically affect a substantial right for purposes of appeal under this section, because the parent has been given the full and fair opportunity to respond to the allegations at the adjudication stage. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).
Under this section, an order in a juvenile case adjudicated under section 43-247(3)(a), which order continues prior dispositional orders but changes the permanency objective from family reunification to another objective, is a final, appealable order only if the parent's ability to achieve rehabilitation and family reunification has been clearly eliminated, because such an order affects a substantial right. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).
Orders overruling a guarantor's and a coguarantor's objections to writs of execution and garnishment were orders made on summary application after judgment was rendered and affected the guarantor's and coguarantor's substantial rights and, thus, were final and appealable. Cattle Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Watson, 293 Neb. 943, 880 N.W.2d 906 (2016).
Juvenile court orders which changed the permanency objective from reunification to adoption, with concurrent plans that did not include reunification with the mother, were appealable even though they contained many of the same goals and strategies as previous orders, because an oral statement by the juvenile court from the bench had the effect of ending any services aimed at reunification with the mother and, thus, affected the mother's substantial rights. In re Interest of Octavio B. et al., 290 Neb. 589, 861 N.W.2d 415 (2015).
The order awarding a personal representative fee affected a substantial right where it was dispositive of the personal representative’s claim for reasonable compensation and awarded the entire amount of compensation to which the court found the personal representative was entitled. In re Estate of Gsantner, 288 Neb. 222, 846 N.W.2d 646 (2014).
A juvenile court order that adopts a case plan with a material change in the conditions for reunification with a parent’s child is a crucial step in child protection proceedings that could possibly lead to the termination of parental rights, and thus, such orders affect a parent’s substantial right in a special proceeding and are appealable. In re Interest of Mya C. & Sunday C., 286 Neb. 1008, 840 N.W.2d 493 (2013).
Substantial rights under this section include those legal rights that a party is entitled to enforce or defend. Therefore, an order that completely disposes of the subject matter of the litigation in an action or proceeding both is final and affects a substantial right because it conclusively determines a claim or defense. Big John's Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012).
A substantial right under this section is not affected when that right can be effectively vindicated in an appeal from the final judgment. In re Adoption of Amea R., 282 Neb. 751, 807 N.W.2d 736 (2011).
In determining whether a party can appeal from an order clarifying an injunction, the critical question is whether the order merely interprets the decree or modifies the decree in a way that affects a party's substantial right. A court's order clarifying a permanent injunction is a final order only if it changes the parties' legal relationship by expanding or relaxing the terms, dissolving the injunction, or granting additional injunctive relief. Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010).
The resolution of a motion to amend a postconviction motion to assert additional claims does not affect a substantial right and is not a final order under this section. State v. Hudson, 273 Neb. 42, 727 N.W.2d 219 (2007).
A substantial right can be affected by an order if the right is irrevocably lost by operation of the order, while a substantial right is not affected when that right can be effectively vindicated in an appeal from the final judgment. State v. Vela, 272 Neb. 287, 721 N.W.2d 631 (2006).
When an order affects the subject matter of the litigation, by diminishing a claim or defense available to a defendant, this affects a substantial right. Also, if an order significantly impinges on a constitutional right, for example, parents' liberty interest in raising their children or a criminal defendant's right not to be subjected to double jeopardy, this affects a substantial right. Hernandez v. Blankenship, 257 Neb. 235, 596 N.W.2d 292 (1999).
A substantial right is an essential legal right as distinguished from a mere technical one. Western Smelting & Refining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 150 Neb. 477, 35 N.W.2d 116 (1948).
Substantial rights under this section include those legal rights that a party is entitled to enforce or defend. Moyers v. International Paper Co., 25 Neb. App. 282, 905 N.W.2d 87 (2017); Furstenfeld v. Pepin, 23 Neb. App. 673, 875 N.W.2d 468 (2016).
A substantial right under this section is an essential legal right. Furstenfeld v. Pepin, 23 Neb. App. 673, 875 N.W.2d 468 (2016).
An order denying a motion for in-chambers testimony in an adjudication proceeding is not a final order that is reviewable on appeal because a child does not have a substantial right to testify outside the presence of the parent. In re Interest of Marcella B. & Juan S., 18 Neb. App. 153, 775 N.W.2d 470 (2009).
An order imposing a money judgment for attorney fees and expenses for discovery violations pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Disc. section 6-337(a)(4) does not affect a "substantial right" as required by this section. Frederick v. Seeba, 16 Neb. App. 373, 745 N.W.2d 342 (2008).
5. Multiple claims or parties
To be appealable, an order must meet the final order requirements of both section 25-1315 and this section. Mann v. Mann, 312 Neb. 275, 978 N.W.2d 606 (2022).
With the enactment of section 25-1315(1), one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a "final order" within the meaning of this section as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Therefore, to be appealable, an order must satisfy the final order requirements of this section and, additionally, where implicated, section 25-1315(1). Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009).
With the enactment of subsection (1) of section 25-1315, one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a final order within the meaning of this section as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Bailey v. Lund-Ross Constructors Co., 265 Neb. 539, 657 N.W.2d 916 (2003).
To be appealable in a case with multiple parties or causes of action, an order must satisfy the final order requirements of this section, as well as the requirements of section 25-1315(1). Halac v. Girton, 17 Neb. App. 505, 766 N.W.2d 418 (2009).
6. Miscellaneous
When a motion for summary judgment asserts that the plaintiff's claim falls within one or more of the statutory exemptions under the State Tort Claims Act or the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, the motion is based on the assertion of sovereign immunity within the meaning of subdivision (1)(d) of this section. Clark v. Sargent Irr. Dist., 311 Neb. 123, 971 N.W.2d 298 (2022).
When a motion for summary judgment asserts the plaintiff failed to comply with the presuit claim procedures of the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act or the State Tort Claims Act, the motion is not based on the assertion of sovereign immunity within the meaning of subdivision (1)(d) of this section. Clark v. Sargent Irr. Dist., 311 Neb. 123, 971 N.W.2d 298 (2022).
When there has been an amendment to the final order statute to make a previously interlocutory order a final order, it is a procedural change and not a substantive change and is therefore binding upon a tribunal upon the effective date of the amendment; this allows a party to file an appeal if the amendment took place within 30 days of the interlocutory order. Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Transit Auth. of Omaha, 305 Neb. 609, 941 N.W.2d 497 (2020).
Not every order vacating a dismissal and reinstating a case is final and appealable; rather, the statutory criteria of this section must be applied to determine whether the order appealed from is final. Fidler v. Life Care Centers of America, 301 Neb. 724, 919 N.W.2d 903 (2018).
An order affecting a substantial right that is issued upon a summary application in an action after judgment is an order ruling on a postjudgment motion in an action. State v. Coble, 299 Neb. 434, 908 N.W.2d 646 (2018).
A determination of the statute of limitations governing the prosecution of a criminal charge has no bearing on the correctness of a speedy trial determination. State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852, 901 N.W.2d 679 (2017).
The language in Peterson v. Damoude, 95 Neb. 469, 145 N.W. 847 (1914), concerning the appealability of orders in a partition action, harmonizes the final order language of this section with the partition procedure mandated by section 25-2179. Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest. Co., 295 Neb. 639, 889 N.W.2d 825 (2017).
When an appeal presents two jurisdictional issues—whether a party has appealed from a final order or judgment and whether the lower court had jurisdiction over the parties' dispute—the first step in determining appellate jurisdiction is to determine whether the lower court's order was final and appealable. Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 290 Neb. 640, 861 N.W.2d 425 (2015); Big John's Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012).
An appellate court considers the finality of an order entered in probate proceedings under the rubric of this section. In re Estate of Gsantner, 288 Neb. 222, 846 N.W.2d 646 (2014).
Under the collateral order doctrine, the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is appealable, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment, if the denial of immunity turns on a question of law. Carney v. Miller, 287 Neb. 400, 842 N.W.2d 782 (2014).
For appeal purposes, the distinction between criminal and civil contempt sanctions has no relevance to whether a party may appeal from a final order in a supplemental postjudgment contempt proceeding. Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010).
An order on "summary application in an action after judgment" under this section is an order ruling on a postjudgment motion in an action. Heathman v. Kenney, 263 Neb. 966, 644 N.W.2d 558 (2002); Furstenfeld v. Pepin, 23 Neb. App. 673, 875 N.W.2d 468 (2016).
Unless the context is shown to intend otherwise, action includes any proceeding in a court and only final orders therein are bases for appeals. Grantham v. General Telephone Co., 187 Neb. 647, 193 N.W.2d 449 (1972).
Under the collateral order doctrine, the denial of a claim for qualified immunity is appealable, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment, if the denial of immunity turns on a question of law. D.M. v. State, 25 Neb. App. 596, 911 N.W.2d 621 (2018).
An order denying a motion for in-chambers testimony in an adjudication proceeding is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. In re Interest of Marcella B. & Juan S., 18 Neb. App. 153, 775 N.W.2d 470 (2009).
Where multiple causes of action or multiple parties are involved, the trial court must both enter a final order pursuant to this section and make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and expressly direct the entry of judgment to make appealable an order adjudicating fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties. Pioneer Chem. Co. v. City of North Platte, 12 Neb. App. 720, 685 N.W.2d 505 (2004).
Orders which fall into the second category of this section must meet two requirements: A substantial right must be affected, and the court's order must be made in a special proceeding. Michael B. v. Donna M., 11 Neb. App. 346, 652 N.W.2d 618 (2002).
An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitan-class city taken as specified in section 14-813 means that proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from a county board, and under this section, that means appeal is taken by petition in error and the review is solely of the record made before the tribunal whose action is being reviewed. Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 N.W.2d 680 (2001).
An appellate court has jurisdiction over the appeal of an order by the workers' compensation court affecting a substantial right after a special proceeding, even where part of the order complained of involves a remand for clarification. Underwood v. Eilers Machine & Welding, Inc., 6 Neb. App. 631, 575 N.W.2d 878 (1998).
25-1903.
Petition in error; filing; summons; contents; service, when returnable; cause, when triable.The proceedings to obtain such reversal, vacation or modification shall be by petition entitled petition in error, filed in a court having power to make such reversal, vacation or modification, setting forth the errors complained of, and thereupon a summons shall issue and be served, or publication made, as in the commencement of an action. A service on the attorney of record in the original case shall be sufficient. The summons shall notify the adverse party that a petition in error has been filed in a certain case, naming it, and shall be returnable on or before the first day of the next term of court, if issued in vacation, and twenty days before the commencement of the term; if issued in term time, or within twenty days before the commencement of the term, it shall be returnable on a day named in said summons. In all cases in the Supreme Court, if a case be docketed twenty days or more before the next succeeding term, it shall stand for hearing at said term. If less than twenty days intervene, the cause shall not stand for trial, except by consent of all the parties thereto, until the second term after the docketing of said cause, except causes brought before the court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 584, p. 496; Laws 1885, c. 95, § 1, p. 375; R.S.1913, § 8177; C.S.1922, § 9129; C.S.1929, § 20-1903; R.S.1943, § 25-1903.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Procedure
3. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
Cited in holding that order of county superintendent was not reviewable by error proceedings. Kosmicki v. Kowalski, 184 Neb. 639, 171 N.W.2d 172 (1969).
Orders made in the exercise of judicial functions by a board inferior to the district court are reviewable by error proceedings. Emry v. Lake, 181 Neb. 568, 149 N.W.2d 520 (1967).
Error proceedings can still be brought to review changes in boundaries of school district made by county superintendent. Languis v. DeBoer, 181 Neb. 32, 146 N.W.2d 750 (1966).
Where two county superintendents hold a hearing on school district reorganization, error proceedings will lie from order of one superintendent denying petition. Frankforter v. Turner, 175 Neb. 252, 121 N.W.2d 377 (1963).
Determination by city council as to sufficiency of paving petition may be reviewed by petition in error. Elliott v. City of Auburn, 172 Neb. 1, 108 N.W.2d 328 (1961).
Where appeal is not provided, error proceedings from order of city council are available. Simpson v. City of Grand Island, 166 Neb. 393, 89 N.W.2d 117 (1958).
Award of appraisers in condemnation proceeding may be reviewed by district court on petition in error. Hoesly v. Department of Roads and Irrigation, 142 Neb. 383, 6 N.W.2d 365 (1942).
Review by district court of an assessment of benefits by a county board in creation of a drainage district is by petition in error. Loup River Public Power Dist. v. Platte County, 141 Neb. 29, 2 N.W.2d 609 (1942), 135 Neb. 21, 280 N.W. 430 (1938).
Appeal from assessment of benefits by county board in establishment of drainage district was not authorized under the statutes. Loup River Public Power District v. Platte County, 135 Neb. 21, 280 N.W. 430 (1938).
The Legislature has provided no appeal to district court from act of city council of city of second class, sitting as board of equalization to levy special assessments for paving, and only way district court gets jurisdiction is by proceedings in error. Roberts v. City of Mitchell, 131 Neb. 672, 269 N.W. 515 (1936).
Order granting or refusing bank charter is reviewable by district court on petition in error. State ex rel. White v. Morehead, 101 Neb. 37, 161 N.W. 1040 (1917).
A request for specific performance is outside the scope of a petition in error. Griess v. Clay Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 11 Neb. App. 910, 662 N.W.2d 638 (2003).
2. Procedure
A petitioner in error must, within one calendar month after judgment is announced under the law and facts by an inferior tribunal, file his petition with a transcript containing the final judgment sought to be reversed. Marcotte v. City of Omaha, 196 Neb. 217, 241 N.W.2d 838 (1976).
Petition is required to contain an assignment of errors. McDonald v. Rentfrow, 171 Neb. 479, 106 N.W.2d 682 (1960).
An error proceeding is in the nature of a new action. Dovel v. School Dist. No. 23 of Otoe County, 166 Neb. 548, 90 N.W.2d 58 (1958).
Upon review of order of school district boards, error proceedings should be taken to district court of county where hearing was held. School Dist. No. 49 of Merrick County v. Kreidler, 165 Neb. 761, 87 N.W.2d 429 (1959).
Summons is required to be issued. From v. Sutton, 156 Neb. 411, 56 N.W.2d 441 (1953).
Service of summons on attorney of record is sufficient. Parker v. Parker, 73 Neb. 4, 102 N.W. 85 (1905).
Summons cannot issue until petition in error and transcript are filed. Ritchey v. Seeley, 68 Neb. 120, 93 N.W. 977 (1903), motion to dismiss granted 68 Neb. 127, 94 N.W. 972 (1903), former decision affirmed on rehearing, 68 Neb. 129, 97 N.W. 818 (1903).
Serving of summons in error on attorney of record is properly made although defendant in error is dead. Link v. Reeves, 63 Neb. 424, 88 N.W. 670 (1902).
Each alleged error must be specially set forth in the petition in error. Ainsworth v. Taylor, 53 Neb. 484, 73 N.W. 927 (1898); Lean v. Andrews, 38 Neb. 656, 57 N.W. 401 (1894).
Notice of appeal given before filing of petition in error cannot be treated as summons in error. Benson v. Michael, 29 Neb. 131, 45 N.W. 276 (1890).
An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitan‑class city taken as specified in section 14‑813 means that proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from a county board, and under this section, that means appeal is taken by petition in error and the review is solely of the record made before the tribunal whose action is being reviewed. Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 N.W.2d 680 (2001).
The proceedings to obtain reversal, vacation, or modification of orders issued by tribunals inferior to the district court shall be by petition entitled "Petition in Error", setting forth the errors complained of. Cox v. Douglas Cty. Civ. Serv. Comm., 6 Neb. App. 748, 577 N.W.2d 758 (1998).
3. Miscellaneous
Jurisdiction of a proceeding in error was not defeated by omission of phrase "in error" from the reference in summons to the petition. Campbell v. City of Ogallala, 178 Neb. 663, 134 N.W.2d 597 (1965).
This section has been in force since 1913 revision, and provides effective procedure for review by the district court through proceedings in error of a final order made by the county court in the exercise of probate jurisdiction. In re Berg's Estate, 139 Neb. 99, 296 N.W. 460 (1941).
Right to review final orders of justices of the peace by error proceedings still exists. Engles v. Morgenstern, 85 Neb. 51, 122 N.W. 688 (1909).
Unless petition in error is filed, district court has no jurisdiction. Baacke v. Dredla, 57 Neb. 92, 77 N.W. 341 (1898).
25-1904.
Summons in error; praecipe; service; return; fees.The summons mentioned in section 25-1903 shall, upon the written praecipe of the plaintiff in error, or his attorney, be issued by the clerk of the court in which the petition is filed, to the sheriff of any county in which the defendant in error or his attorney of record may be; and if the writ issue to a foreign county, the sheriff thereof may return the same by mail to the clerk, and shall be entitled to the same fees as if the same had been returnable to the district court of the county in which said officer resides. The defendant in error, or his attorney, may waive in writing the issuing or service of the summons.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 585, p. 497; R.S.1913, § 8178; C.S.1922, § 9130; C.S.1929, § 20-1904; R.S.1943, § 25-1904.
Annotations
Omission of words "in error" from summons was a noncompliance with a directory provision. Campbell v. City of Ogallala, 178 Neb. 663, 134 N.W.2d 597 (1965).
Summons is required to be issued upon praecipe of petitioner. Dovel v. School Dist. No. 23 of Otoe County, 166 Neb. 548, 90 N.W.2d 58 (1958).
Summons may be served on attorney of record. Clausen v. School Dist. No. 33 of Lincoln County, 164 Neb. 78, 81 N.W.2d 822 (1957).
Waiver is of no effect until petition and transcript are filed, and void if proceedings are commenced after death of client. Ritchey v. Seeley, 68 Neb. 120, 93 N.W. 977 (1903), motion to dismiss granted, 60 Neb. 127, 94 N.W. 972 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 60 Neb. 129, 97 N.W. 818 (1903).
Attorney of record at time of trial may waive summons. Dakota County v. Bartlett, 67 Neb. 62, 93 N.W. 192 (1903).
If petition and transcript are filed before death, summons may be served upon attorney of record. Link v. Reeves, 63 Neb. 424, 88 N.W. 670 (1902).
An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitan‑class city taken as specified in section 14‑813 means that proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from a county board, and under this section, that means appeal is taken by petition in error and the review is solely of the record made before the tribunal whose action is being reviewed. Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 N.W.2d 680 (2001).
25-1905.
Proceedings in error; transcript; abstracts of record not required in Supreme Court.The plaintiff in error shall file with his or her petition a transcript of the proceedings or a praecipe directing the tribunal, board, or officer to prepare the transcript of the proceedings. The transcript shall contain the final judgment or order sought to be reversed, vacated, or modified. No written or printed abstract or any copy of an abstract of the records shall be required in any case in the Supreme Court of this state.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 586, p. 497; Laws 1885, c. 95, § 2, p. 376; Laws 1887, c. 96, § 1, p. 651; R.S.1913, § 8179; C.S.1922, § 9131; C.S.1929, § 20-1905; R.S.1943, § 25-1905; Laws 1991, LB 561, § 1.
Annotations
1. Necessity
2. Authentication
3. Contents
4. Miscellaneous
1. Necessity
The timely filing of the praecipe for transcript with the clerk of the district court satisfies the jurisdictional filing requirement, even if the tribunal does not timely prepare and furnish the transcript for filing with the clerk of the district court. McNally v. City of Omaha, 273 Neb. 558, 731 N.W.2d 573 (2007).
To confer jurisdiction on a district court for proceedings in error, a proper transcript must be filed with the district court within one calendar month after rendition of a final judgment or order to be reviewed. Clark v. Cornwell, 223 Neb. 282, 388 N.W.2d 848 (1986).
Where a proceeding in error pursuant to this section is utilized seek reversal, vacation, or modification of a final judgment or order, jurisdiction of a court does not attach until a petition and transcript, containing the final judgment or order, are filed in the court requested to review such judgment or order. Glup v. City of Omaha, 222 Neb. 355, 383 N.W.2d 773 (1986).
A transcript of the proceedings in the lower tribunal must be filed with the petition in error in order to confer jurisdiction upon the district court. School Dist. No. 39 of Sarpy County v. Farber, 215 Neb. 791, 341 N.W.2d 320 (1983).
A petitioner in error must, within one calendar month after judgment is announced under the law and facts by an inferior tribunal, file his petition with a transcript containing the final judgment sought to be reversed. Marcotte v. City of Omaha, 196 Neb. 217, 241 N.W.2d 838 (1976).
The provisions requiring plaintiff in error to file with his petition an authenticated transcript containing final order is jurisdictional and mandatory. Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594, 223 N.W.2d 148 (1974).
Responsibility for filing a proper transcript within time is placed directly on plaintiff in error. Lemburg v. Nielsen, 182 Neb. 747, 157 N.W.2d 381 (1968); Dovel v. School Dist. No. 23 of Otoe County, 166 Neb. 548, 90 N.W.2d 58 (1958).
Filing of transcript of proceedings of inferior tribunal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Anania v. City of Omaha, 170 Neb. 160, 102 N.W.2d 49 (1960).
Transcript is required. From v. Sutton, 156 Neb. 411, 56 N.W.2d 441 (1953).
Jurisdictional feature of transcript is the judgment, decree or final order sought to be vacated. Fike v. Ott, 76 Neb. 439, 107 N.W. 774 (1906).
Section applies to proceedings in error to Supreme Court; transcript is jurisdictional. Saussay v. Lemp Brewing Co., 64 Neb. 429, 89 N.W. 1048 (1902).
Transcript must be filed with petition and before issuance of summons to confer jurisdiction. Slobodisky v. Curtis, 58 Neb. 211, 78 N.W. 522 (1899).
In error proceedings, it is jurisdictional that transcript contain final order or judgment. Casler v. Nordgren, 55 Neb. 669, 76 N.W. 524 (1898).
Transcript of proceedings contemplates duly certified copies of original pleadings and papers. Royal Trust Co. of Chicago v. Exchange Bank of Cortland, 55 Neb. 663, 76 N.W. 425 (1898).
Requirement of filing of transcript of proceedings is jurisdictional. School District No. 49 of Adams County v. Cooper, 44 Neb. 714, 62 N.W. 1084 (1895).
Transcript of the record is necessary to review order discharging attachment. Goldsmith v. Wix, 43 Neb. 573, 61 N.W. 718 (1895).
Transcript must be filed with petition and cannot be waived. Record v. Butters, 42 Neb. 786, 60 N.W. 1019 (1894).
2. Authentication
The mere production of unauthenticated original papers does not constitute a transcript within the meaning of this section. Moell Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hosp., 221 Neb. 168, 375 N.W.2d 618 (1985).
Properly authenticated transcript must be filed within one calendar month after the rendition of the judgment or final order. Friedman v. State, 183 Neb. 9, 157 N.W.2d 855 (1968).
Filing of copy of final judgment, without reference to its source, does not constitute the filing of a transcript of proceedings. Adams v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 684, 139 N.W.2d 885 (1966).
Upon petition in error from administrative board of a city to the district court, authenticated copy of transcript is necessary. Ostler v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 515, 138 N.W.2d 826 (1965).
Original papers cannot be made a substitute for transcript. Smith v. Delane, 74 Neb. 594, 104 N.W. 1054 (1905); Brabham v. Custer County, 3 Neb. Unof. 801, 92 N.W. 989 (1902).
Duly authenticated transcript containing final judgment or order is jurisdictional. New Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Thornburg, 56 Neb. 636, 77 N.W. 86 (1898).
Transcript must be properly authenticated to confer jurisdiction on appellate court. Brockman Commission Co. v. Sang, 52 Neb. 506, 72 N.W. 856 (1897).
3. Contents
The plain language of this section requires that for jurisdiction to attach, the transcript of the proceedings or praecipe must be filed specifically with the petition in error in the court requested to review such judgment. River City Life Ctr. v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 265 Neb. 723, 658 N.W.2d 717 (2003).
It is mandatory and jurisdictional that a plaintiff in error file a transcript of the proceedings containing the final judgment or order to be reviewed at the time a petition in error is filed. Cole v. Kilgore, 241 Neb. 620, 489 N.W.2d 843 (1992); Brown v. Board of Education, 231 Neb. 108, 435 N.W.2d 184 (1989).
Record of proceedings before tribunal constitutes the transcript that must be filed in district court with the petition in error. Dlouhy v. City of Fremont, 175 Neb. 115, 120 N.W.2d 590 (1963).
Transcript is required to contain the final judgment or order sought to be reversed. McDonald v. Rentfrow, 171 Neb. 479, 106 N.W.2d 682 (1960).
Transcript from justice to district court was sufficient though bill of particulars was not copied therein. National Supply Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 108 Neb. 326, 187 N.W. 917 (1922).
Petition in error statute that mandates that appellant file with his or her petition for review a transcript of the proceedings or a praecipe directing the tribunal, board, or officer to prepare the transcript of the proceedings plainly indicates that the transcript or praecipe must be filed specifically with the petition in error and must contain the final judgment or order sought to be reversed, vacated, or modified. Meints v. City of Beatrice, 20 Neb. App. 129, 820 N.W.2d 90 (2012).
4. Miscellaneous
The action of the city council on claims for pension and disability is reviewable in the district court by way of petition in error or appeal. Schmitt v. City of Omaha, 191 Neb. 608, 217 N.W.2d 86 (1974).
This section is cited as illustration of the meaning of the term "final judgment." Kometscher v. Wade, 177 Neb. 299, 128 N.W.2d 781 (1964).
Only one transcript is required although proceeding affects school districts in more than one county. School Dist. No. 49 of Merrick County v. Kreidler, 165 Neb. 761, 87 N.W.2d 429 (1958).
An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitan‑class city taken as specified in section 14‑813 means that proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from a county board, and under this section, that means appeal is taken by petition in error and the review is solely of the record made before the tribunal whose action is being reviewed. Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 N.W.2d 680 (2001).
25-1906.
Proceedings in error; transcript; how obtained.Judges of judicial tribunals having no clerk, and clerks of every court of record, shall upon request and being paid the lawful fees therefor, furnish an authenticated transcript of the proceedings, containing the judgment or final order of such courts, to either of the parties to the same, or to any person interested in procuring such transcript.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 587, p. 497; R.S.1913, § 8180; C.S.1922, § 9132; C.S.1929, § 20-1906; R.S.1943, § 25-1906;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 137.
Annotations
The provision requiring plaintiff in error to file with his petition an authenticated transcript containing final order is jurisdictional and mandatory. Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594, 223 N.W.2d 148 (1974).
The filing by plaintiff in error of authenticated copy of proceedings containing final order to be reviewed is jurisdictional and mandatory. Lanc v. Douglas County Welfare Administration, 189 Neb. 651, 204 N.W.2d 387 (1973).
County superintendent not required to file a transcript anywhere; must only furnish upon request when paid lawful fees. Lemburg v. Nielsen, 182 Neb. 747, 157 N.W.2d 381 (1968).
Authenticated transcript was furnished. Ostler v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 515, 138 N.W.2d 826 (1965).
Authenticated transcript is required and filing of original papers is not sufficient. Anania v. City of Omaha, 170 Neb. 160, 102 N.W.2d 49 (1960).
County superintendent of schools who presides at hearing may authenticate transcript. School Dist. No. 49 of Merrick County v. Kreidler, 165 Neb. 761, 87 N.W.2d 429 (1958).
Attorney in fact for defeated party may demand transcript of justice judgment. State ex rel. Newby v. Ellsworth, 61 Neb. 444, 85 N.W. 439 (1901).
An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitan‑class city taken as specified in section 14‑813 means that proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from a county board, and under this section, that means appeal is taken by petition in error and the review is solely of the record made before the tribunal whose action is being reviewed. Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 N.W.2d 680 (2001).
25-1907.
Proceedings in error; effect; supersedeas bond.No proceedings to reverse, vacate, or modify any judgment rendered, or final order made, by any court inferior to the district court shall operate as a stay of execution unless the judge or clerk of the court in which the judgment was rendered or order made shall take and approve a written undertaking to the defendant in error, executed on the part of the plaintiff in error, by one or more sufficient sureties. The undertaking shall be conditioned that the plaintiff will pay all the costs which have accrued or may accrue on such proceedings in error, together with the amount of any judgment that may be rendered against such plaintiff in error, either on the further trial of the case, after the judgment of the court below shall have been set aside or reversed, or upon and after the affirmation thereof in the district court. No proceedings shall operate as a stay of execution on judgments of restitution rendered in actions for the forcible entry and detention, or the forcible detention only, of lands and tenements, unless the undertaking shall be further conditioned for the payment to the defendant in error of all money or sums of money that has or have accrued or may accrue to the defendant from the plaintiff in error for the use, occupation or rent of the lands and tenements in controversy, in case the judgment sought to be reversed shall be affirmed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 593, p. 499; Laws 1871, § 1, p. 110; R.S.1913, § 8181; C.S.1922, § 9133; C.S.1929, § 20-1907; R.S.1943, § 25-1907; Laws 1951, c. 71, § 1, p. 227;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 138.
Annotations
Supersedeas bond may be filed in district court in proceedings in error from county court to district court. In re Berg's Estate, 139 Neb. 99, 296 N.W. 460 (1941).
Bond is necessary to stay execution but not to obtain review. Welton v. Beltezore, 17 Neb. 399, 23 N.W. 1 (1885).
An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitan‑class city taken as specified in section 14‑813 means that proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from a county board, and under this section, that means appeal is taken by petition in error and the review is solely of the record made before the tribunal whose action is being reviewed. Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 N.W.2d 680 (2001).
25-1908.
Proceedings in error; stay of execution; supersedeas bond; approval; endorsement.Before the written undertaking mentioned in section 25-1907 shall operate to stay execution of the judgment or order, a petition in error must be filed in the district court, and the execution of the undertaking, and the sufficiency of the sureties must be approved by the judge or clerk of the court in which the judgment was rendered or order made. The judge or clerk of the court shall endorse approval upon the undertaking. The undertaking shall be filed in the court in which the judgment was rendered or order made.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 590, p. 498; G.S.1873, c. 57, § 590, p. 630; R.S.1913, § 8182; C.S.1922, § 9134; C.S.1929, § 20-1908; R.S.1943, § 25-1908; Laws 1951, c. 71, § 2, p. 227;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 139.
Annotations
Supersedeas bond may be filed in district court in proceedings in error from county court to district court. In re Berg's Estate, 139 Neb. 99, 296 N.W. 460 (1941).
Trial court has jurisdiction to vacate or set aside supersedeas bond where surety is insufficient. Bates & Co. v. Stanley, 51 Neb. 252, 70 N.W. 972 (1897).
Bond does not stay judgment until petition in error is filed. Von Dorn v. Mengedoht, 41 Neb. 525, 59 N.W. 800 (1894).
Filing of petition in error is a condition of supersedeas. McDonald v. Bowman, 40 Neb. 269, 58 N.W. 704 (1894).
An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitan‑class city taken as specified in section 14‑813 means that proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from a county board, and under this section, that means appeal is taken by petition in error and the review is solely of the record made before the tribunal whose action is being reviewed. Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 N.W.2d 680 (2001).
25-1909.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 733, § 5.
25-1910.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 733, § 5.
25-1911.
Appellate jurisdiction; scope.A judgment rendered or final order made by the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 582, p. 496; R.S.1913, § 8185; C.S.1922, § 9137; C.S.1929, § 20-1911; R.S.1943, § 25-1911; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 51.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Appeal proper
3. Appeal not proper
4. Court review
5. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
The word "court" means not only the tribunal over which a judge presides, but the judge himself or herself when exercising, at chambers, judicial power conferred by statute. Nebraska Republican Party v. Shively, 311 Neb. 160, 971 N.W.2d 128 (2022).
A proceeding to determine the competency of an accused to stand trial is a special proceeding within the meaning of section 25-1902. An order finding the accused competent to stand trial is not a final order from which an appeal may be taken under this section. If an accused is found guilty, he may raise the issue of his competency on appeal. State v. Lassek, 272 Neb. 523, 723 N.W.2d 320 (2006).
The Supreme Court reviews determinations made in the district courts only where there is a judgment rendered or final order made by the district court. Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990).
Matters involving appointments of personal representatives, on appeal to the district court and the Supreme Court, are reviewed for error appearing on the record. In re Estate of Casselman, 219 Neb. 653, 365 N.W.2d 805 (1985).
Only final orders regarding sufficiency of pleadings are appealable. State ex rel. Douglas v. Ledwith, 204 Neb. 6, 281 N.W.2d 729 (1979).
An order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding is a final order which may be appealed. State v. Loomis, 195 Neb. 552, 239 N.W.2d 266 (1976).
Section 25-1315.03 provides that certain orders are appealable, but it is not exclusive. Edquist v. Commercial Sav. & Loan Assn., 191 Neb. 618, 217 N.W.2d 82 (1974).
Unless the context is shown to intend otherwise, action includes any proceeding in a court and only final orders therein are bases for appeals. Grantham v. General Telephone Co., 187 Neb. 647, 193 N.W.2d 449 (1972).
There can be no appeal to the Supreme Court until there has been a judgment of final order in the district court. Essay v. Essay, 180 Neb. 291, 142 N.W.2d 337 (1966).
Supreme Court is authorized to review final orders for errors exhibited by the record. Akins v. Chamberlain, 164 Neb. 428, 82 N.W.2d 632 (1957).
Judgment may be reversed only "for errors appearing on record." Frey v. Drahos, 7 Neb. 194 (1878); Morrill v. Taylor, 6 Neb. 236 (1877).
2. Appeal proper
An appeal properly perfected under the provisions of this section and section 25-1912 prevents any final judgment or order from becoming final while the appeal is pending. State v. Beyer, 260 Neb. 670, 619 N.W.2d 213 (2000).
A proceeding before a juvenile court is a "special proceeding" for appellate purposes. A judicial determination made following an adjudication in a special proceeding which affects the substantial rights of parents to raise their children is a final, appealable order. In re Interest of Clifford M. et al., 258 Neb. 800, 606 N.W.2d 743 (2000).
The three types of final appealable orders are: (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which determines the action and prevents judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered. Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993).
A finding that the accused is incompetent to stand trial may be appealed to the Supreme Court as a final order. State v. Guatney, 207 Neb. 501, 299 N.W.2d 538 (1980).
A notice of appeal filed after the court has announced its decision, but before a judgment has been rendered or entered, is effective to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court if the notice of appeal shows on its face that it relates to a decision which has been announced by the trial court and the record shows that a judgment was subsequently rendered or entered in accordance with the decision which was announced and to which the notice of appeal relates. Dale Electronics, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 203 Neb. 133, 277 N.W.2d 572 (1979).
Action taken by county committee upon reorganization of school district was appealable. School District No. 49 of Lincoln County v. School District No. 65-R of Lincoln County, 159 Neb. 262, 66 N.W.2d 561 (1954).
Appeal from district court to Supreme Court was available to review action under Reorganization of School Districts Act. Nickel v. School Board of Axtell, 157 Neb. 813, 61 N.W.2d 566 (1953).
Order granting continuance under federal Civil Relief Act was appealable. Sullivan v. Storz, 156 Neb. 177, 55 N.W.2d 499 (1952).
A bidder at a judicial sale whose bid has been accepted may appeal from an order setting the sale aside. Enquist v. Enquist, 146 Neb. 708, 21 N.W.2d 404 (1946).
The refusal to allow a writ of habeas corpus is a final order. Williams v. Olson, 145 Neb. 282, 16 N.W.2d 178 (1944).
Final orders in habeas corpus proceedings may be reviewed on appeal. The test of finality of order for purpose of appeal is whether particular proceeding or action is terminated by judgment. Tail v. Olson, 144 Neb. 820, 14 N.W.2d 840 (1944).
Order vacating judgment on petition filed after the term is final and appealable. Wunrath v. Peoples Furniture & Carpet Co., 98 Neb. 342, 152 N.W. 736 (1915).
An order granting or refusing a license to sell real estate to pay debts of a deceased person is reviewable on appeal. In re Estate of Broehl, 93 Neb. 166, 139 N.W. 1020 (1913).
Judgment of district court reversing justice judgment on error is reviewable though case is retained for trial. Ribble v. Furmin, 69 Neb. 38, 94 N.W. 967 (1903).
Where court dismisses replevin action on ground that writ was unauthorized and the court without jurisdiction, there is a final judgment. Swain v. Savage, 55 Neb. 687, 77 N.W. 362 (1898).
3. Appeal not proper
A defendant's appeal of a final order denying a pretrial motion for absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds did not result in appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal order that denied the motion on constitutional speedy trial grounds. State v. Abernathy, 310 Neb. 880, 969 N.W.2d 871 (2022).
An order finding a defendant to be indigent and appointing appellate counsel at the county's expense did not affect
a substantial right of the parties and was not a final order for purposes of appeal, where the order did not obligate the county to pay any specific amount or set a deadline for payment, such determinations were to be the subject of future proceedings addressing the question of reasonable attorney fees, and the State had the ability to challenge the findings of indigency and recoup any subsequently expended funds from the defendant. State v. Fredrickson, 305 Neb. 165, 939 N.W.2d 385 (2020).
Because the district court's order denying the plaintiff's request for a stay did not finally determine the rights of the parties in an action, it was not a judgment and thus is only appealable if it qualifies as a final order. Mutual of Omaha Bank v. Watson, 301 Neb. 833, 920 N.W.2d 284 (2018).
An order dismissing one theory of recovery, while a second theory of recovery arising out of the same cause of action remains pending for trial, is not an appealable, final order. An action for damages arising from a contract of sale allegedly induced by several instances of fraud presents a single cause of action, and an order barring the action as it relates to one such instance only is not an appealable, final order. Henderson v. Forman, 240 Neb. 939, 486 N.W.2d 182 (1992).
A conditional judgment does not constitute a final and, therefore, appealable order. Schaad v. Simms, 240 Neb. 758, 484 N.W.2d 474 (1992).
Where all of plaintiff's theories are based on the same operative facts and involve the same parties, summary judgment with regard to only some of the theories does not constitute a final, appealable order which this court may consider. Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990).
If a contempt is criminal, the judgment is final and a proper subject for appeal. If the contempt is civil, the judgment is not final; the order is interlocutory and not subject to appeal. State ex rel Kandt v. North Platte Baptist Church, 219 Neb. 694, 365 N.W.2d 813 (1985).
An order overruling a motion for leave to amend is interlocutory and, in the absence of a final order, is not appealable. Knoell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hanson, 208 Neb. 373, 303 N.W.2d 314 (1981).
A conditional order is not final and therefore not subject to appeal. Fritch v. Fritch, 191 Neb. 29, 213 N.W.2d 445 (1973).
An order denying a plea of the statute of limitations after separate hearing on that issue is not appealable. Wulf v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 188 Neb. 258, 196 N.W.2d 164 (1972).
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review interlocutory ruling in habeas corpus proceeding. Rhodes v. Houston, 172 Neb. 177, 108 N.W.2d 807 (1961).
Where motion for new trial is timely filed, ruling on demurrer does not become final until motion is disposed of. Harkness v. Central Nebraska P. P. & I. Dist., 154 Neb. 463, 48 N.W.2d 385 (1951).
An order sustaining a demurrer to a petition, without a dismissal or other final disposition of the case, is not reviewable on appeal. Koehn v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 151 Neb. 859, 39 N.W.2d 808 (1949).
The sustaining of a motion to make more definite and certain or to strike certain parts of a pleading, without further judicial action, does not constitute a final, appealable order. Barry v. Wolf, 148 Neb. 27, 26 N.W.2d 303 (1947).
Order overruling demurrer is not a final order. Anson v. Kruse, 147 Neb. 989, 25 N.W.2d 896 (1947).
Order sustaining motion to strike certain parts of answer, without further judicial action, does not constitute a final, appealable order. State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bank of Omaha, 131 Neb. 223, 267 N.W. 532 (1936).
Where partition has been ordered in suit for that purpose, appeal will not lie until partition is effected and confirmed. Peterson v. Damoude, 95 Neb. 469, 145 N.W. 847 (1914).
Where appeal is taken before court acts upon report of referee awarding partition, it should be dismissed. Vrana v. Vrana, 85 Neb. 128, 122 N.W. 678 (1909).
When record does not disclose final order or judgment, proceedings should be dismissed. Skallberg v. Skallberg, 84 Neb. 717, 121 N.W. 979 (1909).
Final order granting or refusing a license to sell intoxicating liquors is not reviewable on appeal. Halverstadt v. Berger, 72 Neb. 462, 100 N.W. 934 (1904).
When cause is retained for further action, order is not final. Merle & Heaney Mfg. Co. v. Wallace, 48 Neb. 886, 67 N.W. 883 (1896).
4. Court review
An appellate court's jurisdiction to grant relief pursuant to this section is limited to reversal, vacation, or modification of the final order from which the appeal is taken. An appellate court cannot address issues that do not bear on the correctness of the final order upon which its appellate jurisdiction is based. State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (2005).
The failure to clearly include an instruction to guide the jury concerning defendant's affirmative defenses was plain error, prejudicial to defendant, requiring reversal for a new trial. Omaha Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Bellevue, 226 Neb. 743, 415 N.W.2d 111 (1987).
Supreme Court will take judicial notice of all rules of district, separate juvenile, county, municipal, and workmen's compensation courts on file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. State v. Barrett, 200 Neb. 553, 264 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
In absence of bill of exceptions, judgment should be affirmed where sufficiency of pleadings is not questioned. Eisele v. Meeker, 105 Neb. 687, 181 N.W. 609 (1921).
Judgment should be reversed where clearly wrong on sole issue of fact involved. In re Estate of O'Connor, 105 Neb. 88, 179 N.W. 401 (1920).
Where both parties tried case on theory that a certain essential fact was proved, Supreme Court will not reverse for lack of evidence of such fact. Underwood v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 100 Neb. 275, 159 N.W. 408 (1916).
Court is bound by law of case on first appeal. Home Savings Bank of Fremont v. Shallenberger, 100 Neb. 113, 158 N.W. 455 (1916).
Verdict not inconsistent with entire charge should not be set aside because in conflict with isolated instruction. Prediger v. Lincoln Traction Co., 97 Neb. 315, 149 N.W. 775 (1914).
Supreme Court has power to modify judgment without vacating or modifying it as a whole. Porter v. Sherman County Banking Co., 40 Neb. 274, 58 N.W. 721 (1894).
Original evidence by affidavits cannot be received to contradict record. McDonald v. Bowman, 40 Neb. 269, 58 N.W. 704 (1894).
5. Miscellaneous
Affirmative relief, for purposes of an appeal, is a reversal, vacation, or modification of a lower court's judgment, decree, or final order. An appellee's argument that a lower court's decision should be upheld on grounds specifically rejected below constitutes a request for affirmative relief, necessitating a cross-appeal in order for that argument to be considered. McDonald v. DeCamp Legal Servs., P.C., 260 Neb. 729, 619 N.W.2d 583 (2000).
An appeal properly perfected prevents any final judgment or order from becoming final while the appeal is pending. Dewey v. Dewey, 192 Neb. 676, 223 N.W.2d 826 (1974).
Jurisdiction to reverse judgment on appeal must be timely invoked. Campbell v. Campbell, 168 Neb. 533, 96 N.W.2d 417 (1959).
Final order need not properly be denominated a judgment. Western Smelting & Refining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 150 Neb. 477, 35 N.W.2d 116 (1948).
"Court" includes judge at chambers. Porter v. Flick, 60 Neb. 773, 84 N.W. 262 (1900).
Only parties to judgment, or their privies, may appeal or bring error. Burlington & M. R. R. R. Co. v. Martin, 47 Neb. 56, 66 N.W. 15 (1896).
Error proceedings in law and equity are identical. Swansen v. Swansen, 12 Neb. 210, 10 N.W. 713 (1881).
A statement of errors filed pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. of Cty. Cts. 52(I)(G) (rev. 1993) must be filed with the district court within 10 days of the filing of the bill of exceptions, rather than within 10 days of the filing of the notice of appeal. State v. Stuthman, 2 Neb. App. 317, 509 N.W.2d 410 (1993).
An appellant who has incorporated a properly drafted statement of errors directly into a notice of appeal from a judgment of the county court has satisfied the requirement in Neb. Ct. R. of Cty. Cts. 52(I)(G) (rev. 1992) concerning the timely filing of a statement of errors with the district court. State v. Nelson, 2 Neb. App. 289, 509 N.W.2d 232 (1993).
25-1912.
Appeal; civil and criminal actions; procedure; notice of appeal; docketing fee; filing of transcript.(1) The proceedings to obtain a reversal, vacation, or modification of judgments and decrees rendered or final orders made by the district court, including judgments and sentences upon convictions for felonies and misdemeanors, shall be by filing in the office of the clerk of the district court in which such judgment, decree, or final order was rendered, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, decree, or final order, a notice of intention to prosecute such appeal signed by the appellant or appellants or his, her, or their attorney of record and, except as otherwise provided in sections 25-2301 to 25-2310 and 29-2306 and subsection (4) of section 48-638, by depositing with the clerk of the district court the docket fee required by section 33-103.
(2) A notice of appeal or docket fee filed or deposited after the announcement of a decision or final order but before the entry of the judgment, decree, or final order shall be treated as filed or deposited after the entry of the judgment, decree, or final order and on the date of entry.
(3) The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal shall be terminated as to all parties (a) by a timely motion for a new trial under section 25-1144.01, (b) by a timely motion to alter or amend a judgment under section 25-1329, or (c) by a timely motion to set aside the verdict or judgment under section 25-1315.02, and the full time for appeal fixed in subsection (1) of this section commences to run from the entry of the order ruling upon the motion filed pursuant to subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection. When any motion terminating the time for filing a notice of appeal is timely filed by any party, a notice of appeal filed before the court announces its decision upon the terminating motion shall have no effect, whether filed before or after the timely filing of the terminating motion. A new notice of appeal shall be filed within the prescribed time after the entry of the order ruling on the motion. No additional fees are required for such filing. A notice of appeal filed after the court announces its decision or order on the terminating motion but before the entry of the order is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry of the order.
(4) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, sections 25-2301 to 25-2310 and 29-2306, and subsection (4) of section 48-638, an appeal shall be deemed perfected and the appellate court shall have jurisdiction of the cause when such notice of appeal has been filed and such docket fee deposited in the office of the clerk of the district court. After being perfected no appeal shall be dismissed without notice, and no step other than the filing of such notice of appeal and the depositing of such docket fee shall be deemed jurisdictional.
(5) The clerk of the district court shall forward such docket fee and a certified copy of such notice of appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall file such appeal.
(6) Within thirty days after the date of filing of notice of appeal, the clerk of the district court shall prepare and file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court a transcript certified as a true copy of the proceedings contained therein. The Supreme Court shall, by rule, specify the method of ordering the transcript and the form and content of the transcript. Neither the form nor substance of such transcript shall affect the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
(7) Nothing in this section shall prevent any person from giving supersedeas bond in the district court in the time and manner provided in section 25-1916 nor affect the right of a defendant in a criminal case to be admitted to bail pending the review of such case in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
Source:Laws 1907, c. 162, § 1, p. 495; R.S.1913, § 8186; Laws 1917, c. 140, § 1, p. 326; C.S.1922, § 9138; C.S.1929, § 20-1912; Laws 1941, c. 32, § 1, p. 141; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1912; R.S.1943, § 25-1912; Laws 1947, c. 87, § 1, p. 265; Laws 1961, c. 135, § 1, p. 388; Laws 1981, LB 411, § 5; Laws 1982, LB 720, § 2; Laws 1982, LB 722, § 2;
Laws 1986, LB 530, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 25; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 52;
Laws 1995, LB 127, § 1; Laws 1997, LB 398, § 1; Laws 1999, LB 43, § 8; Laws 1999, LB 689, § 1; Laws 2000, LB 921, § 15; Laws 2017, LB172, § 2; Laws 2018, LB193, § 32.
Cross References
For amount of docket fee, see section 33-103.
Annotations
1. Time for appeal
2. Jurisdiction
3. Motion for new trial
4. Petition in error
5. Miscellaneous
1. Time for appeal
An appeal challenging an order's appointment of a receiver must be filed within 30 days of its entry. Seid v. Seid, 310 Neb. 626, 967 N.W.2d 253 (2021).
An appellant must file his or her notice of appeal and deposit with the clerk of the district court the docket fee required by section 33-103 within 30 days of the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. Martin v. McGinn, 267 Neb. 931, 678 N.W.2d 737 (2004).
A determination as to whether a motion, however titled, should be deemed a motion to alter or amend a judgment depends upon the contents of the motion, not its title. In order to qualify for treatment as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, a motion must be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of judgment and must seek substantive alteration of the judgment. A motion which merely seeks to correct clerical errors or one seeking relief that is wholly collateral to the judgment is not a motion to alter or amend a judgment, and the time for filing a notice of appeal runs from the date of the judgment. State v. Bellamy, 264 Neb. 784, 652 N.W.2d 86 (2002).
Under this section, a party has 30 days in which to appeal from a final order. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 258 Neb. 199, 602 N.W.2d 465 (1999).
The notice of appeal and docket fee are mandatory and jurisdictional and must be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment of the trial court. Under subsection (2) of this section, the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal is terminated by only two events: the timely filing of a motion for new trial under section 25-1143 or a motion to set aside the verdict or judgment under section 25-1315.02. Under subsection (3) of this section, an appeal is deemed perfected and the appellate court has jurisdiction when the notice of appeal is filed and the docket fee is deposited; no other step shall be deemed jurisdictional. In re Interest of Noelle F. & Sarah F., 249 Neb. 628, 544 N.W.2d 509 (1996).
Under subsection (1) of this section, an appeal from the denial of a plea in bar must be filed within 30 days of the denial. State v. Sinsel, 249 Neb. 369, 543 N.W.2d 457 (1996).
Orders which are not announced in open court are not formalized until they have been entered on the journal. In such instances, pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the date the order was entered on the journal of the trial court. In re Interest of J.A., 244 Neb. 919, 510 N.W.2d 68 (1994).
The filing of a motion to reconsider a sentence made pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (1) of section 29-2308.01 does not affect the time within which a notice of appeal must be filed under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section. State v. Flying Hawk, 227 Neb. 878, 420 N.W.2d 323 (1988); State v. Spotted Elk, 227 Neb. 869, 420 N.W.2d 707 (1988).
The notice of appeal required by subsection (1) of this section is mandatory and jurisdictional and must be filed within the time required by statute; where such notice of appeal is not filed within thirty days from the entry of the judgment, decree, or final order appealed from, as required by subsection (1), the Supreme Court obtains no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal must be dismissed. State v. Flying Hawk, 227 Neb. 878, 420 N.W.2d 323 (1988).
In order to vest the Supreme Court with jurisdiction, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the entry of the final order or the overruling of a motion for new trial. In re Interest of C.M.H. and M.S.H., 227 Neb. 446, 418 N.W.2d 226 (1988); State v. Stickney, 222 Neb. 465, 384 N.W.2d 301 (1986); State v. Howell, 188 Neb. 687, 199 N.W.2d 21 (1972).
Where a notice of appeal is not filed within 1 month from entry of the final order, the Supreme Court obtains no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal must be dismissed. State v. Reed, 226 Neb. 575, 412 N.W.2d 848 (1987); Smith v. Smith, 225 Neb. 93, 402 N.W.2d 688 (1987).
The time within which an appeal must be taken is mandatory and must be met in order for an appellate tribunal to acquire jurisdiction of the subject matter. Federal Land Bank v. McElhose, 222 Neb. 448, 384 N.W.2d 295 (1986).
For this court to obtain jurisdiction, in the absence of a timely motion for new trial, a notice of appeal must be filed within one month after rendition of the judgment or decree or the making of the final order. Sederstrom v. Wrehe, 215 Neb. 429, 339 N.W.2d 74 (1983); Novak v. Nelsen, 209 Neb. 728, 311 N.W.2d 8 (1981).
Notice of intent to appeal filed more than thirty days after order denying relief sought in a petition for postconviction relief defeats the jurisdictional requirements of this section. State v. Harrington, 214 Neb. 696, 335 N.W.2d 316 (1983).
A notice of appeal is effective if it is filed within a month of the court's announcement of its judgment either in open court or by letter to the attorneys but before the judgment is entered. State v. Kolar, 206 Neb. 619, 294 N.W.2d 350 (1980).
There can be no appeal of a criminal conviction under this section until after sentence has been imposed. State v. Long, 205 Neb. 252, 286 N.W.2d 772 (1980).
Filing of notice of appeal and payment of docket fee are both mandatory within the one-month appeal period. American Legion Post No. 90 v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 199 Neb. 429, 259 N.W.2d 36 (1977).
An order of the Court of Industrial Relations establishing bargaining units is a final order under this section, and becomes immediately appealable. American Assn. of University Professors v. Board of Regents, 198 Neb. 243, 253 N.W.2d 1 (1977).
Order determining defendant a sexual sociopath and sentencing him to penal complex is a final order and appeal therefrom is barred after thirty days. State v. Wells, 197 Neb. 584, 249 N.W.2d 904 (1977).
Notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed with the clerk of the district court within one month after the overruling of a timely filed motion for new trial or sentencing, whichever is later. State v. Betts, 196 Neb. 572, 244 N.W.2d 195 (1976).
On appeal from a county or municipal court, notice of appeal and bond must be filed within ten days after rendition of judgment and this period cannot be prolonged by filing a motion for new trial. Edward Frank Rozman Co. v. Keillor, 195 Neb. 587, 239 N.W.2d 779 (1976).
An order placing a defendant on probation is a final order and appeal must be made within one month after it is entered. State v. Williams, 194 Neb. 483, 233 N.W.2d 772 (1975).
Appeal must be dismissed where notice of appeal is not filed within one month of judgment or final order. State v. Buss, 192 Neb. 407, 222 N.W.2d 113 (1974); Morimoto v. Nebraska Children's Home Society, 176 Neb. 403, 126 N.W.2d 184 (1964); Bebee v. Kriewald, 173 Neb. 179, 112 N.W.2d 764 (1962); Lockard v. Lockard, 169 Neb. 226, 99 N.W.2d 1 (1959); Campbell v. Campbell, 168 Neb. 533, 96 N.W.2d 417 (1959); Akins v. Chamberlain, 164 Neb. 428, 82 N.W.2d 632 (1957).
Unless notice of appeal is filed within one month from entry of judgment or final order, appeal therefrom must be dismissed. Diedrichs v. Empfield, 189 Neb. 120, 200 N.W.2d 254 (1972); Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation Dist. v. Ferguson, 154 Neb. 20, 46 N.W.2d 692 (1951).
Appeal was lodged by timely writing judge setting out intent to appeal, indigency, and request for counsel. State v. Moore, 187 Neb. 507, 192 N.W.2d 157 (1971).
Appeal must be taken within one month from rendition of judgment. Pallas v. Dailey, 169 Neb. 277, 99 N.W.2d 6 (1959).
Appeal from judgment in habeas corpus case was properly taken within one month from rendition of judgment. Neudeck v. Buettow, 166 Neb. 649, 90 N.W.2d 254 (1958).
Right of appeal may be lost if appeal is not timely taken. Mueller v. Keeley, 163 Neb. 613, 80 N.W.2d 707 (1957).
Time for appeal commences to run from rendition and not entry of judgment. Sloan v. Gibson, 156 Neb. 625, 57 N.W.2d 167 (1953).
Proceedings to obtain a reversal of judgment or final order, when motion for new trial is not filed, must be instituted within one month from rendition thereof. Ash v. City of Omaha, 152 Neb. 699, 42 N.W.2d 648 (1950).
Appeal from district court should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where transcript in workmen's compensation case was not filed within thirty days of the entry of the judgment. Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, 137 Neb. 1, 288 N.W. 32 (1939).
Supreme Court is without jurisdiction unless appeal is taken within statutory time; trial court cannot extend time for taking appeal by vacating decree after term and reentering same decree. Morrill County v. Bliss, 125 Neb. 97, 249 N.W. 98 (1933).
Time for perfecting appeal does not commence to run until district court's judgment is entered on journal. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Saathoff, 115 Neb. 385, 213 N.W. 342 (1927).
Amendment of this section shortening time for appeal was not applicable to judgments entered before statute took effect. Raddatz v. Christner, 103 Neb. 621, 173 N.W. 677 (1919).
Time for taking appeal begins to run when decree is entered of record. Anderson v. Griswold, 87 Neb. 578, 127 N.W. 883 (1910).
On appeal by party seeking to intervene after void judgment, time commences to run from dismissal of petition of intervention. Shold v. Van Treeck, 82 Neb. 99, 117 N.W. 113 (1908).
Transcript must be filed with petition and before issuance of summons to confer jurisdiction. Slobodisky v. Curtis, 58 Neb. 211, 78 N.W. 522 (1899).
To obtain a reversal, vacation, or modification of judgments and decrees rendered or final orders made by the district court, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of such judgment, decree, or final order. State v. Barber, 26 Neb. App. 339, 918 N.W.2d 359 (2018).
Pursuant to this section, a defendant has just 30 days to appeal from the denial of an evidentiary hearing; the failure to do so results in the defendant's losing the right to pursue those allegations further. State v. Huff, 25 Neb. App. 219, 904 N.W.2d 281 (2017).
Under subsection (1) of this section, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the final order in order to vest an appellate court with jurisdiction. In re Interest of Shane L. et al., 21 Neb. App. 591, 842 N.W.2d 140 (2013).
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, in order to be a tolling motion, a motion to alter or amend must seek substantive alteration of the judgment. Gebhardt v. Gebhardt, 16 Neb. App. 565, 746 N.W.2d 707 (2008).
This section does not contain a "good faith" exception to the requirement of timely payment of the docket fee. In re Interest of Jesse D., 15 Neb. App. 534, 732 N.W.2d 694 (2007).
In order to initiate an appeal, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment, decree, or final order. State v. Murphy, 15 Neb. App. 398, 727 N.W.2d 730 (2007).
Section 29-2315.01 must be read in pari material with this section and mandates that when an appellate court grants the State leave to docket an appeal, the State must file a notice of appeal within 30 days in order to perfect jurisdiction in the appellate court. State v. Kissell, 13 Neb. App. 209, 690 N.W.2d 194 (2004).
A notice of appeal filed before the trial court announces its "decision or final order" under subsection (2) of this section in final determination of an issue of costs cannot relate forward. J & H Swine v. Hartington Concrete, 12 Neb. App. 885, 687 N.W.2d 9 (2004).
Subsection (2) of this section was not intended to validate anticipatory notices of appeal filed prior to the announcement of a final judgment. J & H Swine v. Hartington Concrete, 12 Neb. App. 885, 687 N.W.2d 9 (2004).
Since a poverty affidavit which is substituted for the docket fee must be filed within the time and in the manner required for filing the docket fee in subsection (2) of this section, a poverty affidavit filed or deposited after the announcement of a decision or final order but before entry of the judgment, decree, or final order shall be treated as filed or deposited after the entry of the judgment, decree, or final order and on the date of entry of the judgment, decree, or final order. State v. Billups, 10 Neb. App. 424, 632 N.W.2d 375 (2001).
Where there is no trial, a pleading entitled "Motion for New Trial" is not properly considered as a motion for new trial and does not toll the running of the statutory time for filing an appeal from a trial court's order, but is only a motion to reconsider. Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 N.W.2d 680 (2001).
The filing of a motion to reconsider sentence does not toll the time within which a notice of appeal must be filed under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section. The only two situations in which the running of time for filing a notice of appeal shall be terminated are (1) if a motion for new trial is filed pursuant to section 25-1143 within 10 days after the verdict or (2) the filing of a motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to section 25-1315.02 within 10 days after receipt of the verdict. State v. Camomilli, 1 Neb. App. 735, 511 N.W.2d 155 (1993).
2. Jurisdiction
Although the record did not include an order granting or denying an inmate's in forma pauperis application, the appellate court had jurisdiction over the inmate's appeal where the record included the notice of appeal and an affidavit of poverty. Haynes v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 314 Neb. 771, 993 N.W.2d 97 (2023).
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, a notice of appeal filed before the district court completely disposed of a party's motion for new trial was of "no effect." When a notice of appeal is initially filed before the district court has completely disposed of a motion for new trial, and thus is of no effect, and neither party filed a new notice of appeal after the district court completely disposed of the motion, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. Haber v. V & R Joint Venture, 263 Neb. 529, 641 N.W.2d 31 (2002).
An appellate court has no power to exercise appellate jurisdiction in proceedings to review the judgment of the district court unless the appellant shall have filed a notice of appeal and deposited a docket fee in the office of the clerk of the district court within the time fixed and as provided in this section. State v. Parmar, 255 Neb. 356, 586 N.W.2d 279 (1998).
Timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional necessity. When the Legislature fixes the time for taking an appeal, the courts have no power to extend the time directly or indirectly; an appellate court may not consider a case as within its jurisdiction unless its authority to act is invoked in the manner prescribed by law. State v. Marshall, 253 Neb. 676, 573 N.W.2d 406 (1998).
Notice of appeal from juvenile court order, which was filed beyond 30-day limit for filing notice of appeal, did not satisfy requirements for appellate jurisdiction. In re Interest of B.M.H., 233 Neb. 524, 446 N.W.2d 222 (1989).
The filing of a notice of appeal under subsection (1) of this section, together with payment of fees unless fees are waived for cause, removes jurisdiction of the cause from the district court to the Supreme Court; once jurisdiction has been removed to the Supreme Court, the district court has no jurisdiction over the cause unless and until remand by the Supreme Court. State v. Spotted Elk, 227 Neb. 869, 420 N.W.2d 707 (1988).
The trial court is without jurisdiction to enter an order granting summary judgment after the defendant has perfected his appeal to the Supreme Court. Beavers v. Graham, 209 Neb. 556, 308 N.W.2d 826 (1981).
A notice of appeal filed after the court has announced its decision, but before a judgment has been rendered or entered, is effective to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court if the notice of appeal shows on its face that it relates to a decision which has been announced by the trial court and the record shows that a judgment was subsequently rendered or entered in accordance with the decision which was announced and to which the notice of appeal relates. Dale Electronics, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 203 Neb. 133, 277 N.W.2d 572 (1979).
Appeal dismissed in Supreme Court for lack of jurisdiction where notice of appeal was a nullity because filed prematurely. Spanheimer Roofing & Supply Co. v. Thompson, 198 Neb. 710, 255 N.W.2d 265 (1977).
An appeal shall be deemed perfected, giving the court jurisdiction, when notice of appeal has been timely filed and the docket fee timely deposited. State v. Price, 198 Neb. 229, 252 N.W.2d 165 (1977).
Order placing defendant on probation was a final and appealable order. State v. Osterman, 197 Neb. 727, 250 N.W.2d 654 (1977).
Any order made by the district court after jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court is void. State v. Allen, 195 Neb. 560, 239 N.W.2d 272 (1976).
Where a notice of appeal is not filed within one month from entry of the judgment or final order appealed from as required hereunder, the Supreme Court obtains no jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed. State v. Howell, 188 Neb. 687, 199 N.W.2d 21 (1972); State v. Williamsen, 183 Neb. 173, 159 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
Failure to appeal post conviction decision within one month prevented Supreme Court from obtaining jurisdiction. State v. Pauley, 185 Neb. 478, 176 N.W.2d 687 (1970).
Appeal must be dismissed where notice not filed within time prescribed by this section. Giangrasso v. Eagle Distributing Co., 185 Neb. 406, 176 N.W.2d 16 (1970).
In order to lodge jurisdiction in the Supreme Court where separate decrees are entered in an action brought on a single petition, it is necessary that a separate notice of appeal be filed and a separate docket fee paid on each decree which is appealed. County of Hall v. Engleman, 182 Neb. 676, 156 N.W.2d 801 (1968).
An appeal in a criminal case will not be dismissed because of the failure to state the nature of the offense and the sentence imposed. State v. Goff, 174 Neb. 217, 117 N.W.2d 319 (1962).
An intervener is a party to an action and may appeal or cross-appeal from an unfavorable judgment. Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (1959).
Jurisdiction of appeal in workmen's compensation case is obtained by filing of transcript and depositing docket fee. Miller v. Peterson, 165 Neb. 344, 85 N.W.2d 700 (1957).
Where appeal was taken out of time, it was subject to dismissal. Vasa v. Vasa, 163 Neb. 642, 80 N.W.2d 696 (1957).
Filing of notice of appeal and payment of docket fee are jurisdictional requirements. Ruan Transport Corp. v. Peake, Inc., 163 Neb. 319, 79 N.W.2d 575 (1956).
Filing of notice of appeal and depositing docket fee gives Supreme Court jurisdiction of the cause and all the parties. Fick v. Herman, 161 Neb. 110, 72 N.W.2d 598 (1955); County of Madison v. Crippen, 143 Neb. 474, 10 N.W.2d 260 (1943); Keefe v. Grace, 142 Neb. 330, 6 N.W.2d 59 (1942).
Proceeding under Juvenile Court Act is reviewable by appeal. Krell v. Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954).
Appeal within one month from date of rendition of decree in workmen's compensation case was required in order to confer jurisdiction on Supreme Court. Tucker v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 152 Neb. 622, 41 N.W.2d 911 (1950).
Deposit of docket fee with clerk of district court is one of jurisdictional steps on appeal. Barney v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 144 Neb. 230, 13 N.W.2d 120 (1944).
Where, through mistake in preparation, original transcript does not show facts sufficient to give court jurisdiction on appeal, the appellate court will on timely application, permit a correction of the record by filing supplemental transcript. Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, 137 Neb. 342, 289 N.W. 369 (1939).
Where notice of appeal is properly given in district court, Supreme Court acquires jurisdiction when transcript is filed, without further notice being required. Marvel v. Craft, 116 Neb. 802, 219 N.W. 242 (1928).
Necessary procedure to vest Supreme Court with jurisdiction is stated. Frazier v. Alexander, 111 Neb. 294, 196 N.W. 322 (1923).
No appeal can be taken from findings of fact or conclusions of law; there must be final judgment. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Cooper, 89 Neb. 632, 131 N.W. 958 (1911).
Stipulation was sufficient to give jurisdiction of cross-appeal. Lanham v. Bowlby, 86 Neb. 148, 125 N.W. 149 (1910).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, a trial court's dismissal of one defendant did not announce a judgment, decree, or final order, so as to allow the plaintiff's premature notice of appeal to relate forward, since the trial court's order did not dispose of all claims against all of the parties in each of their capacities. Ferer v. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co., 16 Neb. App. 866, 755 N.W.2d 415 (2008).
A motion to dismiss was a tolling motion under this section, and because a ruling on the motion was not announced prior to the filing of the notice of appeal, the notice of appeal was of no effect and the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Beckman v. McAndrew, 16 Neb. App. 217, 742 N.W.2d 778 (2007).
When a trial court's order intended to finally dispose of a matter is announced but not rendered or entered pursuant to section 25-1301, but a party nonetheless files an otherwise timely notice of appeal, the appellate court has "potential jurisdiction" which "springs" into full jurisdiction when section 25-1301 is complied with. Rosen Auto Leasing v. Jordan, 15 Neb. App. 1, 720 N.W.2d 911 (2006).
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, when a motion terminating the 30-day appeal period is filed by either party, a notice of appeal filed before the court announces its decision upon the terminating motion has no effect and an appellate court acquires no jurisdiction, whether the notice of appeal is filed before or after the timely filing of the terminating motion. State v. Blair, 14 Neb. App. 190, 707 N.W.2d 8 (2005).
The fact that a motion to reduce sentence was filed prior to filing a notice of appeal does not prevent the Court of Appeals from receiving jurisdiction of the case when the notice of appeal is filed. State v. Camomilli, 1 Neb. App. 735, 511 N.W.2d 155 (1993).
3. Motion for new trial
A motion to alter or amend a judgment is a "terminating motion" under subsection (3) of this section. State ex rel. BH Media Group v. Frakes, 305 Neb. 780, 943 N.W.2d 231 (2020).
A motion to alter or amend filed within 10 days of a judgment entered by the district court disposing of a petition in error will terminate the time for running of appeal under subsection (3) of this section. McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., 303 Neb. 552, 931 N.W.2d 120 (2019).
A motion for new trial, under section 25-1142, is not a proper motion to terminate the running of time to file a notice of appeal when the court grants a motion for summary judgement. Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 296 Neb. 632, 895 N.W.2d 284 (2017).
The running of the time for filing an appeal is terminated when a motion for new trial is filed by any party within 10 days after a verdict, report, or decision is rendered. Breeden v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 257 Neb. 371, 598 N.W.2d 441 (1999).
In a criminal case, the judgment occurs when the verdict and sentence are rendered by the court, and a motion for new trial does not toll the running of the 30-day jurisdictional requirement of this section. State v. Nash, 246 Neb. 1030, 524 N.W.2d 351 (1994).
A motion for new trial is authorized after a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, during pendency of such motion, suspends or tolls the time limit to comply with requirements for an appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court. Dunn v. Hemberger, 230 Neb. 171, 430 N.W.2d 516 (1988).
Where the notice of appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial was untimely filed, the time for appeal ran from the rendition of the judgment. Corell v. Corell, 201 Neb. 59, 266 N.W.2d 84 (1978).
An order in a criminal case overruling a motion for new trial and placing defendant on probation is a final appealable order. State v. Longmore, 178 Neb. 509, 134 N.W.2d 66 (1965).
Time for appeal did not commence to run until motion for new trial was overruled. Skag-Way Department Stores, Inc. v. City of Grand Island, 176 Neb. 169, 125 N.W.2d 529 (1964); Harkness v. Central Nebraska P. P. & I. Dist., 154 Neb. 463, 48 N.W.2d 385 (1951); Cozad v. McKeone, 149 Neb. 833, 32 N.W.2d 760 (1948).
Time for appeal begins to run from date of ruling on motion for new trial even though dismissal of action was based upon a ruling upon demurrer. Weiner v. Morgan, 175 Neb. 656, 122 N.W.2d 871 (1963).
Time for filing motion for new trial commences to run from rendition of judgment. Ricketts v. Continental Nat. Bank of Lincoln, 169 Neb. 809, 101 N.W.2d 153 (1960); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 168 Neb. 850, 97 N.W.2d 348 (1959).
Time for appeal begins to run from overruling of motion for new trial even though petition was dismissed on demurrer. Brasier v. Cribbett, 166 Neb. 145, 88 N.W.2d 235 (1958).
Jurisdictional steps must be taken within one month after rendition of judgment or of overruling of motion for new trial timely filed. Powell v. Van Donselaar, 160 Neb. 21, 68 N.W.2d 894 (1955).
Notice of appeal must be filed and docket fee paid within one month after rendition of decree or overruling of motion for new trial timely filed. Molczyk v. Molczyk, 154 Neb. 163, 47 N.W.2d 405 (1951).
Where motion for new trial was not filed within the time prescribed by law, time for appeal commenced to run from rendition of judgment rather than from overruling of motion for new trial. Ehlers v. Neal, 148 Neb. 697, 28 N.W.2d 558 (1947).
If a motion for new trial is filed in a case in which a judgment of dismissal was entered before any evidence was taken, the time for taking of appeal begins to run from the date of entry of order overruling such motion for new trial. McGerr v. Marsh, 148 Neb. 50, 26 N.W.2d 374 (1947).
Distinction pointed out between when time commences to run for filing of motion for new trial and for filing of transcript on appeal. Power v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 141 Neb. 139, 2 N.W.2d 924 (1942).
In equity case the sufficiency of the evidence contained in a bill of exceptions is properly before the Supreme Court for consideration notwithstanding the failure to file motion for a new trial in district court. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 131 Neb. 20, 266 N.W. 898 (1936).
To secure limited review of an equity case, motion for new trial is not required. Douglas County v. Barker Co., 125 Neb. 253, 249 N.W. 607 (1933).
Time for perfecting appeal in compensation proceeding begins to run from overruling of motion for new trial. Lincoln Packing Co. v. Coe, 120 Neb. 299, 232 N.W. 92 (1930).
Motion for new trial is necessary to review ruling of court on evidence in equity case. Brady v. McGinley, 94 Neb. 761, 144 N.W. 780 (1913).
Motion for new trial is still necessary in law actions. Carmack v. Erdenberger, 77 Neb. 592, 110 N.W. 315 (1906).
Although a motion for new trial generally tolls the running of the statutory time for filing an appeal from a final order of the district court, such is not the case if the proceedings leading up to the motion for new trial do not constitute a trial as contemplated by this section. State v. Plymate, 8 Neb. App. 513, 598 N.W.2d 65 (1999).
A motion for new trial is restricted to a trial court, and where the district court acts in the capacity of an appellate court, such a motion is not a proper pleading and it does not stop the running of time for perfecting an appeal. This is true whether that court is hearing appeals from the county court or from some other lower tribunal. State v. Deutsch, 2 Neb. App. 186, 507 N.W.2d 681 (1993).
A motion for new trial that is not timely filed will not extend the time within which a notice of appeal must be filed. Zoet v. Zoet, 2 Neb. App. 71, 507 N.W.2d 42 (1993).
When a district court is acting in an appellate capacity, a motion for new trial is not a proper pleading and it does not stop the running of time for perfecting an appeal. Woodward v. Yonker, 1 Neb. App. 1011, 510 N.W.2d 480 (1993).
When a motion for new trial terminating the time for filing a notice of appeal is timely filed by any party, a notice of appeal filed before the entry of the order ruling upon the motion shall have no effect. Horace Mann Cos. v. Pinaire, 1 Neb. App. 907, 511 N.W.2d 540 (1993).
4. Petition in error
Civil proceeding to recover a penalty for violation of city ordinance may not be reviewed by error proceedings. State v. Warren, 162 Neb. 623, 76 N.W.2d 728 (1956).
Only judgments and sentences of district court upon convictions for felonies and misdemeanors under criminal code may be brought to Supreme Court by petition in error. Hoover v. State, 126 Neb. 277, 253 N.W. 359 (1934).
Conviction in contempt proceedings is reviewable only by petition in error as in criminal cases. Gentle v. Pantel Realty Co., 120 Neb. 630, 234 N.W. 574 (1931).
Conviction in contempt proceedings is reviewable only on error. Hanika v. State, 87 Neb. 845, 128 N.W. 526 (1910).
Only judgment upon convictions under criminal code are reviewable on error; other cases, including convictions under city ordinances, are reviewable on appeal. Brandt v. State, 80 Neb. 843, 115 N.W. 327 (1908).
5. Miscellaneous
Misidentification of the appealing party in a notice of appeal is not a fatal flaw depriving the court of appellate jurisdiction, because this section does not require the notice to include the appellant's name. In re Estate of Lakin, 310 Neb. 271, 965 N.W.2d 365 (2021).
There is nothing in subsection (1) of this section that requires a notice of appeal to include the appellant's name. In re Estate of Lakin, 310 Neb. 271, 965 N.W.2d 365 (2021).
A defendant proceeding in forma pauperis does not perfect the appeal when the notary stamp on the affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis is expired. State v. Greer, 309 Neb. 667, 962 N.W.2d 217 (2021).
The dismissal of a prior unperfected appeal is not res judicata as to a properly perfected second attempt to appeal. State v. Greer, 309 Neb. 667, 962 N.W.2d 217 (2021).
Where a court does not reach the merits of a claim, its order does not announce a "decision or final order" which would trigger the saving clause for a premature notice of appeal. State v. Lotter, 301 Neb. 125, 917 N.W.2d 850 (2018).
To trigger the savings clause for premature notices of appeal, an announcement must pertain to a decision or order that, once entered, would be final and appealable. Lindsay Internat. Sales & Serv. v. Wegener, 297 Neb. 788, 901 N.W.2d 278 (2017).
"[A]nnounces" in subsection (3) of this section requires some type of public or official notification by the court and includes a judge's proclamation from the bench, trial docket notes, file-stamped but unsigned journal entries, and signed journal entries which are not file stamped. Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 296 Neb. 632, 895 N.W.2d 284 (2017).
To determine whether a postjudgment motion was effective to terminate the running of time to file a notice of appeal, an appellate court reviews the motion based on the relief it seeks, rather than its title. Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 296 Neb. 632, 895 N.W.2d 284 (2017).
To determine whether the savings clause in subsection (3) of this section applies to a notice of appeal filed before the entry of judgment on a postjudgment motion, the court must determine if the postjudgment motion was timely and effective and then determine if the notice was filed after the court announced its decision on the postjudgment motion. Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 296 Neb. 632, 895 N.W.2d 284 (2017).
The proper procedure to be followed when taking an appeal from a final order of the district court under section 71-1214 is the general appeal procedure set forth in this section. In re Interest of L.T., 295 Neb. 105, 886 N.W.2d 525 (2016).
Subsection (2) of this section applies only to a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision or final order, but before entry of judgment; it was not intended to validate anticipatory notices of appeal filed prior to the announcement of final judgment. Wright v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 280 Neb. 941, 791 N.W.2d 760 (2010).
This section does not expressly require a notice of appeal to display a trial court docket number, or be filed in a particular trial court docket; instead, it requires only a notice of intention to prosecute an appeal from a judgment, decree, or final order of the district court. A notice of appeal filed under the wrong docket number is not fatal to appellate jurisdiction. Hearst-Argyle Prop. v. Entrex Comm. Servs., 279 Neb. 468, 778 N.W.2d 465 (2010).
The tolling motions listed in subsection (3) of this section are ineffective when a district court is acting as an intermediate court of appeals. Timmerman v. Neth, 276 Neb. 585, 755 N.W.2d 798 (2008).
An appeal properly perfected under the provisions of this section and section 25-1911 prevents any final judgment or order from becoming final while the appeal is pending. State v. Beyer, 260 Neb. 670, 619 N.W.2d 213 (2000).
According to the plain language of this section, a poverty affidavit must be filed after the entry of the final order, and thus, a poverty affidavit is insufficient to perfect an appeal unless it is filed during the 30-day period following the rendition of judgment. A poverty affidavit must be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court, and its receipt in any other location is insufficient to perfect an appeal. State v. Parmar, 255 Neb. 356, 586 N.W.2d 279 (1998).
Per subsection (1) of this section, a motion to discharge for lack of speedy trial, pursuant to section 29-1208, is a final, appealable order. State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 570 N.W.2d 331 (1997).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, a notice of appeal filed before a judgment on a motion for new trial is entered has no effect. Reutzel v. Reutzel, 252 Neb. 354, 562 N.W.2d 351 (1997).
In a criminal case, judgment occurs when the verdict and sentence are rendered by the court. In a criminal action, the filing of a motion for new trial shall have no effect on the jurisdictional requirement that the appealing party must file a motion of appeal within 30 days after the sentencing date. State v. McCormick and Hall, 246 Neb. 271, 518 N.W.2d 133 (1994).
Under subsection (1) of this section, the appointment of a receiver may be treated as a final order. Robertson v. Southwood, 233 Neb. 685, 447 N.W.2d 616 (1989).
Generally, a criminal appeal may only be brought by the person who is aggrieved by the judgment and who has been given the right to appeal; however, a person who has been released and discharged from further prosecution on a specific complaint is not legally aggrieved, even though the person is open to prosecution for future violations of a similar nature. State v. Sports Couriers, Inc., 210 Neb. 168, 313 N.W.2d 447 (1981).
This section of the Nebraska Constitution does not bar either the Legislature or the Supreme Court from making reasonable rules and regulations governing review on appeal. Nebraska State Bank v. Dudley, 203 Neb. 226, 278 N.W.2d 334 (1979).
This section, specifying what steps are necessary in perfecting an appeal, is deemed jurisdictional and is not unconstitutionally vague so as to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Nebraska State Bank v. Dudley, 203 Neb. 226, 278 N.W.2d 334 (1979).
No third party has right to intervene in a criminal case and appeal of news media from restrictive order is dismissed. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
The right to appeal in criminal cases can be exercised only by the party to whom it is given; and generally only a person aggrieved or injured by a judgment may appeal. State v. Berry, 192 Neb. 826, 224 N.W.2d 767 (1975).
An appeal properly perfected prevents any final judgment or order from becoming final while the appeal is pending. Dewey v. Dewey, 192 Neb. 676, 223 N.W.2d 826 (1974).
Failure of public defender, on request of defendant, to file notice of appeal within prescribed time did not excuse defendant from requirements of this section. State v. Blunt, 182 Neb. 477, 155 N.W.2d 443 (1968).
Where a defendant invoked remedy by appeal, he could not at the same time carry on proceeding under the Post Conviction Act. State v. Carr, 181 Neb. 251, 147 N.W.2d 619 (1967).
A notice of appeal need not specifically describe the judgment appealed from. Morford v. Lipsey Meat Co., Inc., 179 Neb. 420, 138 N.W.2d 653 (1965).
The Legislature has made an interlocutory order appealable in civil cases. State v. Taylor, 179 Neb. 42, 136 N.W.2d 179 (1965).
Pendency of appeal from order of State Railway Commission did not operate to keep temporary rate in effect that expired by lapse of time. United Mineral Products Co. v. Nebraska Railroads, 177 Neb. 898, 131 N.W.2d 604 (1964).
Transcript on appeal to Supreme Court contains filings made in office of clerk of the district court. Everts v. School Dist. No. 16 of Fillmore County, 175 Neb. 310, 121 N.W.2d 487 (1963).
Appeal was proper from order adjudging defendant guilty of contempt. State ex rel. Beck v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 174 Neb. 172, 116 N.W.2d 281 (1962).
Adequate cause must be shown for filing of supplemental transcript after submission of case. Robinson v. Meyer, 166 Neb. 178, 88 N.W.2d 219 (1958).
Party to appeal has right to have any omitted pleadings included in supplemental transcript. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).
Award of temporary alimony by district court during pendency of appeal is not authorized. Schlueter v. Schlueter, 158 Neb. 233, 62 N.W.2d 871 (1954).
Appeal, and not error, is the proper procedure to review conviction of violation of municipal ordinance. Wells v. State, 152 Neb. 668, 42 N.W.2d 363 (1950).
General appeal statute does not control appeals from entry of order for judgment notwithstanding verdict. Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 151 Neb. 663, 38 N.W.2d 533 (1949).
This section is made applicable to appeals from the State Railway Commission. In re Application of Moritz, 147 Neb. 400, 23 N.W.2d 545 (1946).
This section does not apply to filing fees in workmen's compensation cases. Lee v. Lincoln Cleaning & Dye Works, 144 Neb. 659, 14 N.W.2d 227 (1944).
A cross-appeal may be raised in the appellee's brief. In re Estate of Dalbey, 143 Neb. 32, 8 N.W.2d 512 (1943).
Where on second appeal to Supreme Court from Department of Roads and Irrigation substantially every issue presented was considered and determined adversely to appellant on first appeal, the appeal will be dismissed. Cozad Ditch Co. v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 132 Neb. 547, 272 N.W. 560 (1937).
Right to appeal is not forfeited by payment of judgment by defendant to avoid sale of his property on execution. Burke v. Dendinger, 120 Neb. 594, 234 N.W. 405 (1931).
Time of filing transcript is determined by time of arrival at clerk's office, and failure to deliver mail is no excuse. Larson v. Wegner, 120 Neb. 449, 233 N.W. 253 (1930).
Supreme Court may allow representative of deceased party to revive action after transcript is filed. Long v. Krause, 104 Neb. 599, 178 N.W. 188 (1920).
Rule in equity cases is unchanged. Ogden v. Garrison, 82 Neb. 302, 117 N.W. 714 (1908).
Requisites of transcripts are stated. Fike v. Ott, 76 Neb. 439, 107 N.W. 774 (1906).
A court order that substantively alters a prior decree creates a "new judgment" subject to the right to seek timely alteration or amendment under this section. Kingston v. Kingston, 31 Neb. App. 201, 979 N.W.2d 277 (2022).
A determination as to whether a motion, however titled, should be deemed a motion to alter or amend a judgment depends upon the contents of the motion, not its title. In order to qualify for treatment as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, a motion must be filed no later than ten days after the entry of judgment and must seek substantive alteration of the judgment. Kingston v. Kingston, 31 Neb. App. 201, 979 N.W.2d 277 (2022).
The modification of a child custody action and a contempt action for failure to pay child support presented separate issues, even though both were heard at the same time; one sought new relief, and the other sought to enforce relief previously granted; each order needed to be timely appealed. State on behalf of Nathaniel R. v. Shane F., 30 Neb. App. 797, 973 N.W.2d 191 (2022).
A docket entry/journal entry contained in the "Judges Notes" constituted an interlocutory order disposing of the party's motion to alter or amend; it did not need to be a separate file-stamped document. Pearce v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 28 Neb. App. 410, 945 N.W.2d 516 (2020).
An unsigned journal entry without a file stamp can constitute an interlocutory order; but it cannot constitute a
final, appealable order, particularly when it does not dispose of all issues. Pearce v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 28 Neb. App. 410, 945 N.W.2d 516 (2020).
An appellant's designation in the notice of appeal of the wrong court was not necessarily fatal, where the notice was timely forwarded to the proper appellate court and no opposing party claimed to have suffered prejudice. In re Guardianship of Breeahana C., 14 Neb. App. 182, 706 N.W.2d 66 (2005).
25-1912.01.
Appellate review; motion for new trial; when required.(1) A motion for a new trial shall not be a prerequisite to obtaining appellate review of any issue upon which the ruling of the trial court appears in the record.
(2) When an action has been tried before a jury a motion for a new trial shall not be a prerequisite to obtaining appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence, but a motion for a new trial shall be a prerequisite to obtaining appellate review of the issue of inadequate or excessive damages.
Source:Laws 1982, LB 720, § 1.
Annotations
Where a party has not made a motion for new trial in the trial court, but argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the amount of damages awarded at trial, an appellate court will review only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict. First Nat. Bank North Platte v. Cardenas, 299 Neb. 497, 909 N.W.2d 79 (2018).
In order for any question as to the admissibility of evidence to be reviewed on appeal under subsection (1) of this section, the record must show that the objection was brought to the attention of the trial judge and ruled upon. State v. Blair, 227 Neb. 742, 419 N.W.2d 868 (1988).
A motion for a new trial is not a prerequisite to obtain review in most cases, but the timely filing of such a motion will extend the time within which a notice of appeal must be filed to a period of thirty days following the overruling of that motion. In re Interest of C.M.H. and M.S.H., 227 Neb. 446, 418 N.W.2d 226 (1988).
A motion for new trial is not required to obtain appellate review of any issue upon which the ruling of the trial court appears in the record. State v. Wright, 220 Neb. 847, 374 N.W.2d 26 (1985).
The Supreme Court acquires jurisdiction of an equitable appeal when the notice of appeal and docket fee are filed within one month of the judgment. Caro, Inc. v. Roby, 215 Neb. 897, 342 N.W.2d 182 (1983).
25-1913.
Appealed causes; parties; how designated.The cause shall be docketed in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court under the same title it had in the district court. The party or parties asking for the reversal, vacation, or modification of such judgment, decree, or final order shall be designated as appellant or appellants, and the adverse party or parties shall be designated as appellee or appellees.
Source:Laws 1907, c. 162, § 2, p. 496; R.S.1913, § 8187; C.S.1922, § 9139; C.S.1929, § 20-1913; R.S.1943, § 25-1913; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 53.
Annotations
An intervener against whom a judgment has been rendered may cross-appeal. Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (1959).
Party designated as appellee may take cross-appeal. Security Investment Co. v. Golz, 151 Neb. 172, 36 N.W.2d 862 (1949).
25-1914.
Appeal; cost bond; cash deposit; appellate proceedings; dismissal.On appeal in any case taken from the district court to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, other than an appeal pursuant to section 71-6904, the appellant or appellants shall, within thirty days after the entry of the judgment, decree, or final order sought to be reversed, vacated, or modified or within thirty days after the entry of the order overruling a motion for a new trial in such cause, (1) file in the district court a bond or undertaking in the sum of seventy-five dollars to be approved by the clerk of the district court, conditioned that the appellant shall pay all costs adjudged against him or her in the appellate court, or (2) make a cash deposit with the clerk of at least seventy-five dollars for the same purpose. If a supersedeas bond is executed, no bond for costs shall be required. The giving of either form of bond or the making of such deposit shall be certified to by the clerk of the district court in the transcript for the appellate court. The appeal may be dismissed on motion and notice in the appellate court if no bond has been given and certified in the transcript or within such additional time as may be fixed by the appellate court for good cause shown.
Source:Laws 1907, c. 162, § 3, p. 496; R.S.1913, § 8188; C.S.1922, § 9140; Laws 1929, c. 72, § 1, p. 252; C.S.1929, § 20-1914; Laws 1941, c. 32, § 2, p. 142; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1914; R.S.1943, § 25-1914; Laws 1947, c. 87, § 2, p. 266;
Laws 1987, LB 33, § 1; Laws 1991, LB 425, § 10; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 54;
Laws 1999, LB 43, § 9.
Annotations
1. Bond
2. Notice of appeal
1. Bond
Section contains no exceptions to the requirement of filing bond; case dismissed where county did not file bond or make application or showing for an extension of time to file the required bond. County of Hall v. Engleman, 182 Neb. 676, 156 N.W.2d 801 (1968).
Only one cost bond is required even though there are multiple appellants. Dorshorst v. Dorshorst, 174 Neb. 886, 120 N.W.2d 32 (1963).
Appellant in compensation case is not exempted from filing cost bond or making cash deposit in lieu thereof. Hoffman v. State, 142 Neb. 821, 8 N.W.2d 200 (1943).
Where an executor appeals from an order which does not affect him in his representative capacity and fails to give bond, the appeal will be dismissed. In re Vetter's Estate, 139 Neb. 307, 297 N.W. 554 (1941).
A party is not entitled to any of the rights of an appellant in Supreme Court, where he has failed to give a cost or supersedeas bond, and where he has not been designated as a party to the appeal in a praecipe by another party who has appealed. Heinisch v. Travelers Mutual Casualty Co., 135 Neb. 13, 280 N.W. 234 (1938).
Where appellant executes supersedeas bond, but it is filed too late to operate as a supersedeas, it will operate as a cost bond on appeal if filed within time for that purpose. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Carlson, 134 Neb. 574, 279 N.W. 162 (1938).
Statute means appellant must file such bond within time prescribed by statute from rendition of final order in district court; if no such bond is filed, the appeal will be dismissed. In re Estate of Raymond, 124 Neb. 125, 245 N.W. 442 (1932).
Provision for giving bond is mandatory and jurisdictional, and if bond is not filed within time prescribed by statute, appeal will be dismissed. Paper v. Galbreth, 123 Neb. 841, 244 N.W. 896 (1932); Greb v. Hansen, 123 Neb. 426, 243 N.W. 278 (1932).
Under section 43-2,106.01, an appeal taken in the same manner as an appeal from district court includes the appeal bond requirement set forth in this section. In re Interest of Kayla F. et al., 13 Neb. App. 679, 698 N.W.2d 468 (2005).
Where, after petitioner's appeal was dismissed by Nebraska Supreme Court for failure to deposit cash or bond and United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, sections 25-2301 to 25-2307 were enacted permitting appeal in forma pauperis, judgment was vacated, and cause remanded for reconsideration. Huffman v. Boersen, 406 U.S. 337 (1972).
2. Notice of appeal
Filing of transcript in workmen's compensation case was duty of clerk of district court. Miller v. Peterson, 165 Neb. 344, 85 N.W.2d 700 (1957).
Supplemental transcript disclosed that appellant had properly perfected appeal. Stark v. Turner, 154 Neb. 268, 47 N.W.2d 569 (1951).
Where party fails to give notice of appeal in district court, and praecipe on appeal omits party to cause who might be affected by reversal or modification of judgment, appeal will be dismissed. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Neverve, 135 Neb. 630, 283 N.W. 378 (1939).
Trial court cannot extend time for taking appeal by vacating decree after term and reentering same decree. Hoover v. State, 126 Neb. 277, 253 N.W. 359 (1934); Morrill County v. Bliss, 125 Neb. 97, 249 N.W. 98 (1933).
Where notice of appeal is properly given in district court, jurisdiction acquired by Supreme Court when transcript is filed, without further notice. Marvel v. Craft, 116 Neb. 802, 219 N.W. 242 (1928).
Notice of appeal is not jurisdictional. Anderson v. Griswold, 87 Neb. 578, 127 N.W. 883 (1910).
25-1915.
Appeal; unpaid costs itemized in order; payment.The order of the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall itemize the costs due and unpaid in each case, which costs shall be paid to the clerk of the district court and shall be paid by such clerk to the party adjudged entitled to the same.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 72, § 2, p. 253; C.S.1929, § 20-1915; R.S.1943, § 25-1915; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 55.
25-1916.
Appeal; supersedeas; cash or bond; effect; undertakings; amount, terms, and conditions; effect of having corporate surety.No appeal in any case shall operate as a supersedeas unless the appellant or appellants within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, decree, or final order execute to the adverse party a bond with one or more sureties, make a deposit of United States Government bonds with the clerk, or in lieu thereof make a cash deposit with the clerk for the benefit of the adverse party as follows:
(1) When the judgment, decree, or final order appealed from directs the payment of money, the bond, deposit of United States Government bonds, or cash deposit shall be the lesser of (a) the amount of the judgment, decree, or final order and the taxable court costs in the district court, plus the estimated amount of interest that will accrue on the judgment, decree, or final order between its date and the final determination of the cause in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court and the estimated amount of the costs of appeal, such estimated interest to accrue and estimated court costs to be determined by the trial court, (b) fifty percent of the appellant's net worth, or (c) fifty million dollars. If an appellee proves by a preponderance of the evidence that an appellant is dissipating or diverting assets outside the ordinary course of business to avoid the payment of a judgment, the court may enter any orders necessary to protect the appellee and require the appellant to provide a bond, deposit of United States Government bonds, or cash deposit up to and including the amount required under subdivision (1)(a) of this section.
Such bond, United States Government bond, or cash deposit shall be conditioned that the appellant or appellants will prosecute such appeal without delay and pay all condemnation money and costs which may be found against him, her, or them on the final determination of the cause in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. When a cash deposit is made, United States Government bonds are deposited, or a bond is provided which is written by a corporate surety company authorized to do business within the State of Nebraska and the cash deposit, United States Government bonds, or supersedeas bond is approved by the trial court in which the judgment was rendered and filed in the court, the general lien of the judgment shall be dissolved;
(2) When the judgment, decree, or final order directs the execution of a conveyance or other instrument, the bond, deposit of United States Government bonds, or cash deposit shall be in such sum, not exceeding the lesser of fifty percent of the appellant's net worth or fifty million dollars, as shall be prescribed by the district court, or judge thereof in vacation, conditioned that the appellant or appellants will prosecute such appeal without delay and will abide and perform the judgment or decree rendered or final order which shall be made by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court in the cause;
(3) When the judgment, decree, or order directs the sale or delivery of possession of real estate, the bond, deposit of United States Government bonds, or cash deposit shall be in such sum, not exceeding the lesser of fifty percent of the appellant's net worth or fifty million dollars, as the court, or judge thereof in vacation, shall prescribe, conditioned that the appellant or appellants will prosecute such appeal without delay, will not during the pendency of such appeal commit or suffer to be committed any waste upon such real estate, and will pay all costs and all rents or damages to such real estate which may accrue during the pendency of such appeal and until the appellee is legally restored thereto; and
(4) When the judgment, decree, or final order dissolves or modifies any order of injunction which has been or hereafter may be granted, the supersedeas bond, deposit of United States Government bonds, or cash deposit shall be in such reasonable sum, not exceeding the lesser of fifty percent of the appellant's net worth or fifty million dollars, as the court or judge thereof in vacation shall prescribe, conditioned that the appellant or appellants will prosecute such appeal without delay and will pay all costs which may be found against him, her, or them on the final determination of the cause in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. Such supersedeas bond, deposit of United States Government bonds, or cash deposit shall stay the doing of the act or acts sought to be restrained by the suit and continue such injunction in force until the case is heard and finally determined in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The undertaking given upon the allowance of the injunction shall be and remain in effect until it is finally decided whether or not the injunction ought to have been granted.
The changes made to this section by Laws 2004, LB 1207, shall apply to all cases pending on or filed on or after April 16, 2004.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 3, p. 716; Laws 1889, c. 26, § 1, p. 371; Laws 1903, c. 126, § 1, p. 632; R.S.1913, § 8189; C.S.1922, § 9141; Laws 1925, c. 68, § 1, p. 227; C.S.1929, § 20-1916; Laws 1939, c. 16, § 1, p. 94; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1916; R.S.1943, § 25-1916;
Laws 1971, LB 377, § 1; Laws 1981, LB 42, § 16; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 26; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 56;
Laws 1994, LB 899, § 1; Laws 1999, LB 43, § 10; Laws 2004, LB 1207, § 8.
Annotations
1. Amount
2. Terms and conditions
3. Discretion of court
4. Effect
5. Miscellaneous
1. Amount
Where decree orders sale of land, supersedeas bond should be conditioned as set out in subsection (3) hereof with amount fixed by court, but if decree directs payment of money also, supersedeas may be required in amount computed under subsection (1) and conditioned as provided in subsections (1) and (3). The Exchange Bank of Gibbon v. Mid-Nebraska Computer Services, Inc., 188 Neb. 673, 199 N.W.2d 5 (1972).
Bond to pay whatever judgment might be rendered covers only money judgment. German Nat. Bank of Beatrice v. Beatrice Rapid Transit & Power Co., 69 Neb. 115, 95 N.W. 49 (1903).
Bond not providing payment for value of the use and occupation is ineffective. Collins v. Brown, 64 Neb. 173, 89 N.W. 754 (1902).
Order fixing amount of supersedeas bond is not appealable. Green v. Morse, 57 Neb. 798, 78 N.W. 395 (1899).
Court may require additional bond to continue supersedeas if shown insufficient in amount. Tulleys v. Keller, 42 Neb. 788, 60 N.W. 1015 (1894).
2. Terms and conditions
Where a decree orders the sale of land, the law in Nebraska explicitly requires that a supersedeas be set out as stated in subsection (3) of this section. Production Credit Assn. of the Midlands v. Schmer, 233 Neb. 785, 448 N.W.2d 141 (1989).
Where decree of trial court requires execution of a conveyance, trial court may for purpose of appeal prescribe bond to be executed conditional for the performance of the decree, or the party so required may, in lieu thereof, execute the required conveyance and deposit it with the clerk of the court to abide judgment of appellate court. Walter v. Gillan, 129 Neb. 514, 262 N.W. 33 (1935).
Judgment of district court must state who is principal and who are sureties on supersedeas bond, and require plaintiffs to exhaust on execution the property of principal before levying on property of one of sureties. Sonneman v. Dolan, 124 Neb. 830, 248 N.W. 402 (1933); Palmer v. Caywood, 64 Neb. 372, 89 N.W. 1034 (1902), distinguished.
Appeal bond from decree of strict foreclosure should be conditioned to pay value of use and occupation. State ex rel. Pinkos v. Rice, 98 Neb. 36, 151 N.W. 925 (1915).
Where bond is provided for rent for use of property, it can be enforced although petition does not show rendition of money judgment. Locke v. Skow, 76 Neb. 39, 106 N.W. 1013 (1906).
Bond in words of statute superseding decree cancelling deed and quieting title did not cover rents and profits pendente lite. Griswold v. Hazels, 62 Neb. 888, 87 N.W. 1047 (1901).
Bond not properly conditioned will not continue injunction in force. O'Chander v. State, 46 Neb. 10, 64 N.W. 373 (1895).
On foreclosure of chattel mortgage, court may fix reasonable terms and amount of bond. State ex rel. Baker v. Baxter, 4 Neb. Unof. 869, 96 N.W. 647 (1903).
3. Discretion of court
Trial court may in its discretion grant supersedeas in cases not specified in this section, such as a divorce action. Hall v. Hall, 176 Neb. 555, 126 N.W.2d 839 (1964).
In other cases, court in its discretion may allow supersedeas; should fix terms as well as amount of bond. Carson v. Jansen, 65 Neb. 423, 91 N.W. 398 (1902).
Supersedeas may be allowed in other cases in discretion of court, and mandamus will not lie to compel approval. State ex rel. Dickinson Paper Co. v. Scott, 60 Neb. 98, 82 N.W. 320 (1900).
Court in its discretion may allow bond superseding writ of assistance in foreclosure case. Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Dutcher, 48 Neb. 755, 67 N.W. 766 (1886).
Court has no discretion with respect to prescribing amount of penalty for supersedeas of judgment for payment of money only. State ex rel. Walton v. Cornish, 48 Neb. 614, 67 N.W. 481 (1896).
The trial court may in its discretion grant supersedeas in cases not specified in this section. Clark v. Tyrrell, 16 Neb. App. 692, 750 N.W.2d 364 (2008).
4. Effect
An order determining child custody will not be superseded as a matter of right merely by the filing of a bond pursuant to this section. Friedenbach v. Friedenbach, 204 Neb. 587, 284 N.W.2d 285 (1979).
Where neither cost bond nor supersedeas has been filed, Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on appeal. Heinisch v. Travelers Mutual Casualty Co., 135 Neb. 13, 280 N.W. 234 (1938).
Where appellant executes supersedeas bond, but it is filed too late to operate as a supersedeas, it will operate as a cost bond on appeal if filed within time for that purpose. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Carlson, 134 Neb. 574, 279 N.W. 162 (1938).
Temporary restraining order cannot be continued in effect by giving supersedeas bond in case where trial court denies permanent injunction. Harbin v. Love, 119 Neb. 76, 227 N.W. 145 (1929).
Power of district court is suspended by filing of supersedeas bond. Carroll v. Polfus, 98 Neb. 657, 154 N.W. 213 (1915).
Unless bond is given, judgment is enforceable during pendency of appeal; court may grant supersedeas pending motion for new trial. Rice v. Parrott, 76 Neb. 501, 107 N.W. 840 (1906), affirmed on rehearing 76 Neb. 505, 111 N.W. 583 (1907).
Order granting writ of assistance in foreclosure is not supersedable by waste bond. Escritt v. Michaelson, 73 Neb. 634, 103 N.W. 300 (1905), affirmed on rehearing 73 Neb. 640, 106 N.W. 1016 (1906).
Bond to stay confirmation of order of sale also stays execution on deficiency judgment. Kountze v. Erck, 45 Neb. 288, 63 N.W. 804 (1895).
If not filed in twenty days, bond does not operate as supersedeas. Whitaker v. McBride, 5 Neb. Unof. 411, 98 N.W. 877 (1904).
Under Nebraska law, which applies to a foreign judgment after the judgment is filed in Nebraska, once a party appeals a monetary judgment for money only and files a supersedeas bond which is approved by the court in which judgment was rendered, the general lien resulting from the judgment is dissolved. Anderson v. Werner Enters., Inc., 7 Neb. App. 294, 581 N.W.2d 104 (1998).
5. Miscellaneous
If no motion for new trial is timely filed, a party who wishes to file a supersedeas bond must do so within 30 days of the entry of the judgment, decree, or other final order sought to be reversed, vacated, or modified. If a timely motion for new trial is filed, a party who wishes to file a supersedeas bond must do so within 30 days of the ruling on the motion for new trial rather than the judgment, decree, or other order to which the motion for new trial was directed. Buffalo County v. Kizzier, 250 Neb. 180, 548 N.W.2d 757 (1996).
Where the owners of property sold in a partition sale appeal confirmation of the sale and file a supersedeas bond, and the confirmation is affirmed on appeal, the stay merely prevented the referee from carrying out the order of the trial court, and the buyer is entitled to profits and liable for taxes during the stay, but is not liable for interest on the unpaid balance of the purchase price, which was not due under the sale terms until delivery of a deed. Kleeb v. Kleeb, 213 Neb. 537, 330 N.W.2d 484 (1983).
This section is cited as illustration of the meaning of the term "final judgment." Kometscher v. Wade, 177 Neb. 299, 128 N.W.2d 781 (1964).
Order approving consolidation of school districts was not a conveyance of property. School Dist. No. 65 of Perkins County v. McQuiston, 163 Neb. 246, 79 N.W.2d 413 (1956).
This section does not make supersedeas prerequisite to review of judgment on appeal. Burke v. Dendinger, 120 Neb. 594, 234 N.W. 405 (1931).
Time for filing of supersedeas bond in law action runs from overruling of motion for new trial, not from entry of judgment. First Nat. Bank of University Place v. Gates, 104 Neb. 230, 176 N.W. 726 (1920).
Dissolution of order appointing guardian for incompetent is supersedable in discretion of court. Prante v. Lompe, 74 Neb. 210, 104 N.W. 1150 (1905).
"Condemnation money" is "found" when judgment below is affirmed. Maloney v. Johnson-McLean Co., 72 Neb. 340, 100 N.W. 423 (1904).
Though bond has been given, court may pass on pending motion for new trial. Armstrong v. Mayer, 69 Neb. 187, 95 N.W. 51 (1903).
Supreme Court may allow supersedeas. Carson v. Jansen, 65 Neb. 423, 91 N.W. 398 (1902).
To maintain action on bond, party need not first exhaust property of appellant. Palmer v. Caywood, 64 Neb. 372, 89 N.W. 1034 (1902).
Appeal without bond does not stay proceedings. Dovey v. McCullough, 60 Neb. 376, 83 N.W. 171 (1900).
Where trial court denies permission to intervene, intervener has no standing to supersede judgment. State ex rel. Bugbee v. Holmes, 59 Neb. 503, 81 N.W. 512 (1900).
Order to receiver to sell real estate is supersedable of right. State ex rel. German Savings Bank v. Fawcett, 58 Neb. 371, 78 N.W. 636 (1899).
Superseding order appointing receiver rests in discretion of court. Lowe v. Riley, 57 Neb. 252, 77 N.W. 758 (1898).
Surety is not released by death of appellant pending appeal by failure to revive action. Bell v. Walker, 54 Neb. 222, 74 N.W. 617 (1898).
Decree for permanent alimony is for payment of money and is supersedable of right. State ex rel. Beard v. Cook, 51 Neb. 822, 71 N.W. 733 (1897).
Third subdivision provides for appeal by owner or party in possession, not by purchaser. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Creighton Theatre Bldg. Co., 51 Neb. 659, 71 N.W. 279 (1897).
Bond is not essential to review or appeal; is indispensable to stay proceedings. Creighton v. Keith, 50 Neb. 810, 70 N.W. 406 (1897).
Dissolution of temporary restraining order is not supersedable. State ex rel. Downing v. Greene, 48 Neb. 327, 67 N.W. 162 (1896).
If bond is not given, sale vests title in purchaser regardless of reversal of judgment. Green v. Hall, 43 Neb. 275, 61 N.W. 605 (1895).
Dismissal of appeal for want of prosecution affirms judgment. Dunterman v. Storey, 40 Neb. 447, 58 N.W. 949 (1894).
Unless exception is taken to confirmation of sale, mandamus will not lie to compel supersedeas. State v. Doane, 35 Neb. 707, 53 N.W. 611 (1892).
If decree quiets title in plaintiff and no bond is given, bona fide purchaser gets valid title though decree is later reversed. Parker v. Courtnay, 28 Neb. 605, 44 N.W. 863 (1890).
Fixing supersedeas is ministerial duty where allowed by this section, and mandamus will lie to compel approval. McBride v. Whitaker, 5 Neb. Unof. 399, 98 N.W. 847 (1904).
Administrator need not give bond on appeal. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Klatt, 5 Neb. Unof. 305, 98 N.W. 436 (1904).
Where decree is entered for foreclosure of mortgage and for deficiency judgment, party may supersede latter part of decree. State ex rel. Baker v. Baxter, 4 Neb. Unof. 869, 96 N.W. 647 (1903).
25-1917.
Appeal; substitute for undertaking.Instead of the undertaking prescribed in subdivision (2) of section 25-1916, the conveyance or other instrument may be executed and deposited with the clerk of the court in which the judgment was rendered or order made, to abide the judgment of the appellate court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 589, p. 498; R.S.1913, § 8190; C.S.1922, § 9142; C.S.1929, § 20-1917; R.S.1943, § 25-1917;
Laws 1994, LB 899, § 2.
Annotations
Deposit of order approving consolidation of school districts was not a substitute for supersedeas bond. School Dist. No. 65 of Perkins County v. McQuiston, 163 Neb. 246, 79 N.W.2d 413 (1956).
Where decree of trial court requires execution of a conveyance the appellant may, in lieu of bond, execute the required conveyance and deposit it with the clerk to abide the judgment of the appellate court. Walter v. Gillan, 129 Neb. 514, 262 N.W. 33 (1935).
25-1918.
Appeal; bond; approval; by whom made.Before any bond executed as aforesaid shall operate as a supersedeas, the execution of the same, and the sufficiency of the sureties therein, must be approved by the clerk of the court in which the judgment or decree was rendered or the final order was made.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 4, p. 717; R.S.1913, § 8191; C.S.1922, § 9143; C.S.1929, § 20-1918; R.S.1943, § 25-1918.
Annotations
If sureties are responsible, clerk must approve. State ex rel. Beard v. Cook, 51 Neb. 822, 71 N.W. 733 (1897).
25-1919.
Appeal; briefs; rules; plain error.The Supreme Court shall by rule provide for the filing of briefs in all causes appealed to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The brief of appellant shall set out particularly each error asserted and intended to be urged for the reversal, vacation, or modification of the judgment, decree, or final order alleged to be erroneous, but no petition in error or other assignment of errors shall be required beyond or in addition to such requirement. The Court of Appeals or Supreme Court may at its option consider a plain error not specified in appellant's brief.
Source:Laws 1907, c. 162, § 4, p. 496; R.S.1913, § 8192; C.S.1922, § 9144; C.S.1929, § 20-1919; R.S.1943, § 25-1919; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 57.
Annotations
1. Assignments of error
2. Failure to assign error
3. Discussion of error
4. Plain error
5. Miscellaneous
1. Assignments of error
The Supreme Court, in reviewing decisions of the district court which affirmed, reversed, or modified decisions of the county court, will consider only those errors specifically assigned in the appeal to the district court and again assigned as error in the appeal to the Supreme Court. State v. Erlewine, 234 Neb. 855, 452 N.W.2d 764 (1990).
This statute, in addition to Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 9D(1)d (rev. 1986), requires that each error assigned be separately stated in the appellant's brief. McCombs v. Prenosil, 226 Neb. 839, 415 N.W.2d 453 (1987).
Assignments of error must be set out in appellant's brief in order to be reviewed by the court. State v. Eckstein, 223 Neb. 943, 395 N.W.2d 515 (1986); United States Nat. Bank v. Feenan, 182 Neb. 524, 156 N.W.2d 29 (1968).
Assignments of error in brief are required to advise what questions are submitted for determination. Cook v. Lowe, 180 Neb. 39, 141 N.W.2d 430 (1966).
Brief of appellant is required to set out particularly each error relied upon for reversal. Northwestern Public Service Co. v. Juhl, 177 Neb. 625, 129 N.W.2d 570 (1964).
Assignments of error were sufficient. Ballantyne Co. v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 229, 113 N.W.2d 486 (1962); First Nat. Bank of Elgin v. Adams, 82 Neb. 801, 118 N.W. 1055 (1908).
Function of assignments of error is to set out the issues presented on appeal. Backer v. City of Sidney, 165 Neb. 816, 87 N.W.2d 610 (1958).
The function of assignments of error is to set out the issues presented on appeal. Smallcomb v. Smallcomb, 165 Neb. 191, 84 N.W.2d 217 (1957).
Assignment of errors in brief is required, except that court may note a plain error not assigned. Schaffer v. Strauss Brothers, 164 Neb. 773, 83 N.W.2d 543 (1957).
An assignment of error must point out the error of which complaint is made. Van Wye v. Wagner, 163 Neb. 205, 79 N.W.2d 281 (1956); Okuda v. Hampton, 154 Neb. 886, 50 N.W.2d 108 (1951).
Brief of appellant is required to set out particularly each error asserted and intended to be urged on appeal. Guyette v. Schmer, 150 Neb. 659, 35 N.W.2d 689 (1949).
Where sufficiency of evidence to support verdict was assigned as error in motion for new trial and discussed in the briefs, Supreme Court would consider question although not formally assigned as error in the brief. In re Inda's Estate, 146 Neb. 179, 19 N.W.2d 37 (1945).
Brief must contain specific statement of errors complained of. Mauder v. State, 97 Neb. 380, 149 N.W. 800 (1914).
Brief should be upon particular questions involved, not a mere general classification of subjects. Witt v. Caldwell, 95 Neb. 484, 145 N.W. 1006 (1914).
Only one brief is required specifying errors; technical assignments are unnecessary. Waxham v. Fink, 86 Neb. 180, 125 N.W. 145 (1910).
2. Failure to assign error
Generalized and vague assertions do not advise the Supreme Court of the issues submitted for decision. In such a circumstance, the decision appealed from will be affirmed unless the Supreme Court elects to note plain error. In re Interest of Rasmussen, 236 Neb. 572, 462 N.W.2d 621 (1990).
Where the appellant's brief does not contain specific assignments of error as required by this section and Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 9D(1)d, the judgment will be affirmed in the absence of any plain error this court may note. State v. Tracy, 228 Neb. 610, 423 N.W.2d 479 (1988); Nebraska Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmland Indus., 227 Neb. 93, 416 N.W.2d 221 (1987).
If a brief filed in the Supreme Court fails to make any specific assignments of error, and absent any plain error which the court may note, the judgment of the lower court will be affirmed. In re Interest of P.W., 224 Neb. 197, 397 N.W.2d 36 (1986).
In the absence of an assigned error, the judgment of the district court will be affirmed unless the record discloses plain error prejudicial to the appellant. Baggett v. City of Omaha, 220 Neb. 805, 373 N.W.2d 391 (1985).
Generally, repetition of statutory grounds for new trial is insufficient as assignments of error upon appeal. Wieck v. Blessin, 165 Neb. 282, 85 N.W.2d 628 (1957); Labs v. Farmers State Bank of Millard, 135 Neb. 130, 280 N.W. 452 (1938).
Contention that damages were excessive, not having been alleged as ground of error in brief, will not be considered on appeal. Kuhlman v. Schacht, 130 Neb. 511, 265 N.W. 549 (1936).
Failure to assign errors in brief, as provided hereby, was sufficient to justify affirmance. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Elsemann, 121 Neb. 397, 237 N.W. 288 (1931).
Where there is no assignment of errors, or same are not sufficiently specific, judgment should be affirmed. Gorton v. Goodman, 107 Neb. 671, 187 N.W. 45 (1922); Sellers v. Johnson, 107 Neb. 669, 186 N.W. 989 (1922); Wielinga v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 95 Neb. 406, 145 N.W. 987 (1914).
Assignments of error not definitely set out or discussed in brief are not ordinarily considered. Packard v. De Voe, 94 Neb. 740, 144 N.W. 813 (1913); First Nat. Bank v. Hedgecock, 87 Neb. 220, 127 N.W. 171 (1910).
Where appellant, in an appeal from a county court decision, fails to file in district court a statement of errors within the time required by Neb. Ct. R. of Cty. Cts. 52(I)(G), the district court is precluded from considering appellant's assigned errors, and instead must review the record only for plain error; the judgment of the district court will be affirmed absent plain error in the record. State v. Harlan, 1 Neb. App. 184, 488 N.W.2d 374 (1992).
3. Discussion of error
The general rule is that the consideration of appeals to this court is limited to errors assigned and discussed. Unless assigned and argued, claimed errors relied upon for reversal will not be considered. Wellman v. Birkel, 220 Neb. 1, 367 N.W.2d 716 (1985).
Errors assigned but not discussed will generally not be considered on appeal. Holt County Co-op Assn. v. Corkle's, Inc., 214 Neb. 762, 336 N.W.2d 312 (1983); State v. Hochstetler, 214 Neb. 482, 334 N.W.2d 455 (1983).
Consideration of assignments of error by this court is limited to those discussed in the briefs; any not accordingly discussed will not be addressed. Flakus v. Schug, 213 Neb. 491, 329 N.W.2d 859 (1983).
Consideration of a cause on appeal is limited to errors assigned and discussed. McClellen v. Dobberstein, 189 Neb. 669, 204 N.W.2d 559 (1973); Trute v. Skeede, 162 Neb. 266, 75 N.W.2d 672 (1956).
Errors assigned but not argued in brief may be disregarded. Garska v. Harris, 172 Neb. 339, 109 N.W.2d 529 (1961).
4. Plain error
The Nebraska Supreme Court and Court of Appeals reserve the right to review the record for plain error, regardless of whether the error was raised at trial or on appeal. Miller v. Brunswick, 253 Neb. 141, 571 N.W.2d 245 (1997).
While this section provides that consideration of the cause on appeal is limited to errors assigned and discussed by the parties, it also permits the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court to note any plain error not assigned. Law Offices of Ronald J. Palagi v. Dolan, 251 Neb. 457, 558 N.W.2d 303 (1997).
While this section and Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 9D(1)d provide that consideration of the cause on appeal is limited to errors assigned and discussed by the parties, they also permit the Supreme Court to note any plain error not assigned. Biddlecome v. Conrad, 249 Neb. 282, 543 N.W.2d 170 (1996).
Generally this court only considers errors assigned and discussed; however, by statute and court rule we may note plain error not assigned. Tautfest v. Tautfest, 215 Neb. 233, 338 N.W.2d 49 (1983); Hartman v. Hartmann, 150 Neb. 565, 35 N.W.2d 482 (1948).
The Supreme Court at its option may consider plain error not specified in appellant's brief. Schmidt v. Richman Gordman, Inc., 191 Neb. 345, 215 N.W.2d 105 (1974); Hamaker v. Patrick, 123 Neb. 809, 244 N.W. 420 (1932); American State Bank of Springfield v. Phelps, 120 Neb. 370, 232 N.W. 612 (1930).
The right of the Supreme Court to notice a plain error not assigned rests on this section and rule of court. Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (1959).
Supreme Court may note a plain error not assigned. State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Barkus, 168 Neb. 257, 95 N.W.2d 674 (1959); Dell v. City of Lincoln, 168 Neb. 174, 95 N.W.2d 336 (1959).
In divorce suit, court may at its option note a plain error not assigned. Zych v. Zych, 165 Neb. 586, 86 N.W.2d 611 (1957).
Court may consider error not specifically assigned to prevent improper disposal of public funds. State ex rel. J. L. Brandeis & Sons v. Melcher, 87 Neb. 359, 127 N.W. 241 (1910).
5. Miscellaneous
Where LSD tablet was used up in test and graph was not preserved, but it was stipulated results of laboratory test, investigation, and experiments were produced and copies given to defendant and no specific request for graph was made in discovery motion, refusal of court to suppress evidence was not error. State v. Batchelor, 191 Neb. 148, 214 N.W.2d 276 (1974).
Where appellee desires to have reviewed a portion of judgment against him, he must cross-appeal and assign error in relation thereto. Bastian v. Weber, 150 Neb. 709, 35 N.W.2d 791 (1949).
Sufficient exceptions were taken on behalf of accused. Scott v. State, 121 Neb. 232, 236 N.W. 608 (1931).
Affirmance for want of briefs is as conclusive as if case was briefed and argued. DeBolt v. McBrien, 96 Neb. 237, 147 N.W. 462 (1914).
25-1920.
Appeal; injunctions; cause advanced, when.In all actions in which a temporary injunction has been granted and entered in the district court, which order allowing the temporary injunction is or has been superseded for by law, and in which action the trial court, on the merits, determined that the temporary injunction ought not to have been granted and a permanent injunction was refused in such action, such cause shall be advanced by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court for hearing. In all such actions, if the relief demanded involves the delivery of irrigation water and the Director of Natural Resources, as defined in section 25-1062.01, is a party, any appeal from the judgment or decree of the district court shall be perfected within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, decree, or final order by the district court, and the cause shall be advanced for hearing before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 100, § 1, p. 255; R.S.1913, § 8193; C.S.1922, § 9145; C.S.1929, § 20-1920; Laws 1941, c. 29, § 8, p. 136; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1920; R.S.1943, § 25-1920; Laws 1959, c. 102, § 5, p. 426; Laws 1961, c. 113, § 2, p. 353;
Laws 1987, LB 33, § 2; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 58;
Laws 1999, LB 43, § 11; Laws 2000, LB 900, § 67.
25-1921.
Repealed. Laws 1965, c. 126, § 1.
25-1922.
Repealed. Laws 1965, c. 126, § 1.
25-1923.
Appeal; original bill of exceptions; return to district court; disposition.When any case or proceeding in which the record or transcript has been so made up has been finally determined in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the original bill or bills of exceptions shall be by the Clerk of the Supreme Court transmitted to the clerk of the district court from which such case or proceeding was removed. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the district court to preserve such bill or bills of exceptions in the files of the office for a period of ten years from the time of receipt from the Clerk of the Supreme Court. After the lapse of such time, if the record in the district court does not show any unfinished matter pending in the case and upon such notice as the district court may direct, such bill or bills of exceptions may be removed from the files and disposed of in any way that the judge of the district court directs when approval is given by the State Records Administrator pursuant to the Records Management Act.
Source:Laws 1881, c. 28, § 3, p. 205; R.S.1913, § 8196; C.S.1922, § 9148; C.S.1929, § 20-1923; Laws 1941, c. 34, § 1, p. 44; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1923; R.S.1943, § 25-1923; Laws 1969, c. 105, § 7, p. 482; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 59.
Cross References
Records Management Act, see section 84-1220.
25-1924.
Appeal; original bill of exceptions; return to appellate court if rehearing allowed.In the event a rehearing of any such cause or proceeding is allowed by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court or if for any other reason the appellate court needs or desires the use of such original bill or bills of exceptions or testimony in equity and law cases, it may order the return of the same to it, and it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court in whose custody the same may be to transmit the same to the Clerk of the Supreme Court upon being personally served with a copy of such order of the appellate court, duly certified under the seal of the appellate court. The expense of the transmittal of such bills and testimony and the costs made in recording, certifying, and serving such order shall be taxed to the unsuccessful party to such suit or proceeding unless the appellate court orders otherwise. The party at whose instance such expense of transmittal is to be made shall advance the same to the clerk if required by him or her. Service of the certified copy of the order may be made by any person. If done by the sheriff of any county, his or her official return shall be sufficient evidence of the fact of service. If by any other person, the service shall be sufficiently proved by his or her affidavit to the fact.
Source:Laws 1885, c. 96, § 4, p. 379; R.S.1913, § 8197; C.S.1922, § 9149; C.S.1929, § 20-1924; R.S.1943, § 25-1924; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 60.
25-1925.
Appeal; suits in equity; trial de novo.In all appeals from the district court in suits in equity in which review of some or all of the findings of fact of the district court is asked by the appellant, it shall be the duty of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to retry the issue or issues of fact involved in the finding or findings of fact complained of upon the evidence preserved in the bill of exceptions and, upon trial de novo of such question or questions of fact, reach an independent conclusion as to what finding or findings are required under the pleadings and all the evidence without reference to the conclusion reached in the district court or the fact that there may be some evidence in support thereof.
Source:Laws 1903, c. 125, § 1, p. 631; R.S.1913, § 8198; C.S.1922, § 9150; C.S.1929, § 20-1925; R.S.1943, § 25-1925; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 61.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Findings of trial court
3. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
In an appeal of an action in equity, this court tries the factual issues raised by the appellant's assignments of error de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independent of the findings of the trial court. Romshek v. Osantowski, 237 Neb. 426, 466 N.W.2d 482 (1991).
An action to rescind a written instrument is an equity action. In an appeal of an equity action, the Supreme Court tries factual questions de novo on the record. Kracl v. Loseke, 236 Neb. 290, 461 N.W.2d 67 (1990).
In an appeal in a dissolution of marriage action, the Supreme Court's review of the trial court's action is de novo on the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge, whose judgment will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Brandt v. Brandt, 227 Neb. 325, 417 N.W.2d 339 (1988).
In an equitable action, the Supreme Court reviews the facts de novo without reference to the findings of fact made by the trial court, and reaches an independent conclusion. Lanphier v. OPPD, 227 Neb. 241, 417 N.W.2d 17 (1987); Dupuy v. Western State Bank, 221 Neb. 230, 375 N.W.2d 909 (1985); Haller v. Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc., 195 Neb. 65, 236 N.W.2d 822 (1975); Hansen v. Commonwealth Co., 174 Neb. 70, 115 N.W.2d 895 (1962); Nitzel & Co. v. Nelson, 144 Neb. 662, 14 N.W.2d 197 (1944); Sherwood v. Salisbury, 139 Neb. 838, 299 N.W. 185 (1941); Thurston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 128 Neb. 141, 258 N.W. 66 (1934); Kline v. Department of Public Works, 126 Neb. 587, 253 N.W. 861 (1934); Chizek v. City of Omaha, 126 Neb. 333, 253 N.W. 441 (1934).
In an appeal of a declaratory judgment action concerning an equity case, the Supreme Court reviews the trial court's findings of fact de novo on the record. Millard Rur. Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Omaha, 226 Neb. 50, 409 N.W.2d 574 (1987).
The record of an equity action is reviewed de novo on appeal. Lincoln East Bancshares v. Rierden, 225 Neb. 440, 406 N.W.2d 337 (1987).
Action in equity for restitution of value of improvements to leasehold is reviewed by Nebraska Supreme Court by trial de novo. Schmeckpeper v. Koertje, 222 Neb. 800, 388 N.W.2d 51 (1986).
Findings of fact in declaratory judgment decrees are reviewed de novo on the record by the Supreme Court. OB-GYN v. Blue Cross, 219 Neb. 199, 361 N.W.2d 550 (1985).
The district court may simply affirm a decision of the county court after giving that decision a de novo review. The Supreme Court will review probate matters de novo. In re Testamentary Trust of Criss, 213 Neb. 379, 329 N.W.2d 842 (1983).
An action for specific performance is an equity action and will be tried de novo on the record in the Supreme Court. Rybin Investment Co., Inc. v. Wade, 210 Neb. 707, 316 N.W.2d 744 (1982); Dowd Grain Co., Inc. v. Pflug, 193 Neb. 483, 227 N.W.2d 610 (1975); Friehe Farms, Inc. v. Haberman, 191 Neb. 292, 214 N.W.2d 916 (1974); Smith v. Hornkohl, 166 Neb. 702, 90 N.W.2d 347 (1958); Mainelli v. Neuhaus, 157 Neb. 392, 59 N.W.2d 607 (1953).
Acquisition of a prescriptive easement is an equitable action and, as such, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to try the issues de novo on the record and reach independent conclusions without being influenced by the findings of the trial court, except, where the credible evidence is in conflict, to give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their demeanor. Sturm v. Mau, 209 Neb. 865, 312 N.W.2d 272 (1981).
A lien foreclosure is an action in equity, and it is therefor the duty of the Supreme Court to retry the issues of fact upon the evidence in the record and reach an independent conclusion. O'Neill Production Credit Assoc. v. Mitchell, 209 Neb. 206, 307 N.W.2d 115 (1981).
A real estate foreclosure action is an action in equity, and upon appeal to the Supreme Court is tried de novo in conformity with this section, subject however to the condition that when the evidence on material questions of fact is in irreconcilable conflict, the court will, in determining the weight of the evidence, consider the fact the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying and has accepted one version of the testimony rather than the opposite. Tilden v. Beckmann, 203 Neb. 293, 278 N.W.2d 581 (1979).
An action based on the claim of adverse possession is an action in equity and the Supreme Court will try the issue de novo on the record without reference to findings of the trial court; such independent conclusions of fact will be determined in accordance with ordinary rules governing burden of proof and competency and materiality of the evidence. Rentscheler v. Walnofer, 203 Neb. 84, 277 N.W.2d 548 (1979).
Equity appeals in Supreme Court are retried de novo on the record to reach an independent conclusion. Schupack v. McDonald's System, Inc., 200 Neb. 485, 264 N.W.2d 827 (1978); Rogers v. Petsch, 174 Neb. 313, 117 N.W.2d 771 (1962).
Appeal from district court finding involving dependent children, voluntarily relinquished, is heard de novo on the record. State v. Worrell, 198 Neb. 507, 253 N.W.2d 843 (1977).
Appeals in proceedings to transfer land from one school district to another are governed by this section. Klecan v. Schmal, 196 Neb. 100, 241 N.W.2d 529 (1976).
An action to quiet title is an action in equity and is considered de novo on appeal. Bartlett v. Kloepping, 195 Neb. 755, 240 N.W.2d 592 (1976); Neylon v. Parker, 177 Neb. 187, 128 N.W.2d 690 (1964); Fitch v. Slama, 177 Neb. 96, 128 N.W.2d 377 (1964); Walker v. Bell, 154 Neb. 221, 47 N.W.2d 504 (1951); Eirich v. Ostwald, 154 Neb. 8, 46 N.W.2d 686 (1951); Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962).
In appeals in equity, Supreme Court must try issues of fact de novo in accordance with rules governing burden of proof and competency and materiality of the evidence and reach independent conclusion. Campbell v. Buckler, 192 Neb. 336, 220 N.W.2d 248 (1974).
Issues of alimony and attorney's fees made de novo by Supreme Court on appeal. Barnes v. Barnes, 192 Neb. 295, 220 N.W.2d 22 (1974).
Trial de novo on appeal in Supreme Court not required by this section in proceeding under Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. Craig v. Gage County, 190 Neb. 320, 208 N.W.2d 82 (1973).
Where appeal was pending in divorce case when the no fault divorce law became effective, the cause was triable de novo by the Supreme Court on the record in compliance with the provisions of that act. Lienemann v. Lienemann, 189 Neb. 626, 204 N.W.2d 170 (1973).
Issue of whether, under terms of the joint venture involved herein, one of its members had duty to account to joint venture was triable de novo in the Supreme Court. Cedars Corp. v. H. Krasne & Son, Inc., 189 Neb. 220, 202 N.W.2d 205 (1972).
Final order of separate juvenile court is triable de novo on the record in the Supreme Court. Grant v. Doeschot, 189 Neb. 121, 200 N.W.2d 252 (1972).
Review in the Supreme Court of proceedings in Court of Industrial Relations is in the manner provided by law for disposition of equity cases including an independent conclusion as to disputed issues of fact. City of Grand Island v. American Federation of S. C. & M. Employees, 186 Neb. 711, 185 N.W.2d 860 (1971).
Action in equity to establish a highway by prescription was required to be tried de novo upon appeal. Satterfield v. Dunne, 180 Neb. 274, 142 N.W.2d 345 (1966).
Proceeding for disconnection of land from a village is triable de novo in Supreme Court. Shelton Grain & Supply Co. v. Village of Shelton, 178 Neb. 695, 134 N.W.2d 815 (1965).
On review in Supreme Court, examination of the conclusion of the district court is not prohibited. Weise v. Klassen, 177 Neb. 496, 129 N.W.2d 527 (1964).
Proceeding to determine statutory allowances in estate proceeding was triable de novo in Supreme Court. Parker v. Comstock, 177 Neb. 197, 128 N.W.2d 696 (1964).
Proceeding for formation of sanitary and improvement district was triable de novo in Supreme Court. Zwink v. Ahlman, 177 Neb. 15, 128 N.W.2d 121 (1964).
On appeal in divorce case, Supreme Court is required to try case de novo on the record. Upah v. Upah, 175 Neb. 606, 122 N.W.2d 507 (1963); Jones v. Jones, 173 Neb. 880, 115 N.W.2d 462 (1962); Jablonski v. Jablonski, 173 Neb. 544, 114 N.W.2d 1 (1962); Scholz v. Scholz, 172 Neb. 184, 109 N.W.2d 156 (1961); Spencer v. Spencer, 158 Neb. 629, 64 N.W.2d 348 (1954); Schwarting v. Schwarting, 158 Neb. 99, 62 N.W.2d 315 (1954); Hoffmeyer v. Hoffmeyer, 157 Neb. 842, 62 N.W.2d 138 (1954); Mason v. Mason, 157 Neb. 279, 59 N.W.2d 365 (1953); McNamee v. McNamee, 154 Neb. 212, 47 N.W.2d 383 (1951); Zoppelli v. Zoppelli, 153 Neb. 577, 45 N.W.2d 599 (1951); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 152 Neb. 799, 42 N.W.2d 861 (1950); Ristow v. Ristow, 152 Neb. 615, 41 N.W.2d 924 (1950); Peterson v. Peterson, 152 Neb. 571, 41 N.W.2d 847 (1950); Eicher v. Eicher, 148 Neb. 173, 26 N.W.2d 808 (1947).
Action to declare zoning ordinance void was triable de novo in Supreme Court. Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
Proceeding for remission of bail is equitable in nature. State v. Seaton, 170 Neb. 687, 103 N.W.2d 833 (1960).
Action to quiet title against tax deed alleged to be void was triable de novo in Supreme Court. Thomas v. Flynn, 169 Neb. 458, 100 N.W.2d 37 (1959).
Action to enjoin liquor nuisance was triable de novo on appeal to Supreme Court. State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Kubik, 167 Neb. 219, 92 N.W.2d 533 (1958).
Claims for benefits under Employment Security Law are tried de novo in Supreme Court. A. Borchman Sons v. Carpenter, 166 Neb. 322, 89 N.W.2d 123 (1958).
Where suit at inception was one in equity, review in Supreme Court was governed by this section. Dargue v. Chaput, 166 Neb. 69, 88 N.W.2d 148 (1958).
Action for rescission of a contract is triable de novo. Caruso v. Moy, 164 Neb. 68, 81 N.W.2d 826 (1957).
Action to detach lands from municipality is triable de novo in Supreme Court. Egan v. Village of Meadow Grove, 159 Neb. 207, 66 N.W.2d 425 (1954).
Action to set aside deed was triable de novo in Supreme Court. Eggert v. Schroeder, 158 Neb. 65, 62 N.W.2d 266 (1954); Cain v. Killian, 156 Neb. 132, 54 N.W.2d 368 (1952); Wiskocil v. Kliment, 155 Neb. 103, 50 N.W.2d 786 (1952).
Action to enjoin violation of restrictive covenant was triable de novo on appeal. Gallagher v. Vogel, 157 Neb. 670, 61 N.W.2d 245 (1953).
Action to enjoin construction of ditches to drain land was triable de novo. Bussell v. McClellan, 155 Neb. 875, 54 N.W.2d 81 (1952).
Appeals in guardianship matters are heard de novo in Supreme Court. Cass v. Pense, 155 Neb. 792, 54 N.W.2d 68 (1952).
Action to establish oral agreement of joint adventure was triable de novo. Rossbach v. Bilby, 155 Neb. 575, 52 N.W.2d 747 (1952).
Action for accounting of partnership assets was triable de novo in Supreme Court. Byram v. Thompson, 154 Neb. 756, 49 N.W.2d 628 (1951).
Contest over sufficiency of election by widow to take under statute was triable de novo in Supreme Court. In re Estate of Bergren, 154 Neb. 289, 47 N.W.2d 582 (1951).
Equity case is tried de novo on appeal. Molczyk v. Molczyk, 154 Neb. 163, 47 N.W.2d 405 (1951); Trowbridge v. Donner, 152 Neb. 206, 40 N.W.2d 655 (1950); Pitman v. Henkens, 125 Neb. 621, 251 N.W. 282 (1933).
Action of partition was triable de novo in Supreme Court. Frankenberger v. Holm, 154 Neb. 80, 46 N.W.2d 901 (1951).
Action to establish plaintiff's right to a road was triable de novo. Magnuson v. Coburn, 154 Neb. 24, 46 N.W.2d 775 (1951).
Action to have warranty deed declared void for lack of delivery was an equitable action reviewable de novo in Supreme Court. Cerveny v. Cerveny, 154 Neb. 1, 46 N.W.2d 632 (1951).
Action in equity to recover proceeds of insurance policy was triable de novo on appeal. Hall v. Modern Woodmen of America, 153 Neb. 600, 45 N.W.2d 630 (1951).
Actions in equity are triable de novo in Supreme Court, subject to observance of witnesses rule. Sopcich v. Tangeman, 153 Neb. 506, 45 N.W.2d 478 (1951).
Action to reform contract for purchase of lands is equitable in nature, and is triable de novo on appeal by the Supreme Court. Kear v. Hausmann, 152 Neb. 512, 41 N.W.2d 850 (1950).
Action for specific performance of a contract to convey real estate was triable de novo in the Supreme Court. Nelson v. Cross, 152 Neb. 197, 40 N.W.2d 663 (1950).
Action to establish rights of partners to assets of partnership was equitable in nature and required trial de novo in Supreme Court. Baum v. McBride, 152 Neb. 152, 40 N.W.2d 649 (1950).
In proceeding by State Fire Marshal to condemn building, review in Supreme Court is by trial de novo as in equity. In re Application of Iverson, 151 Neb. 802, 39 N.W.2d 797 (1949).
Proceedings to detach agricultural lands from municipality are triable de novo in the Supreme Court. Kuebler v. City of Kearney, 151 Neb. 698, 39 N.W.2d 415 (1949).
Actions in equity are tried de novo on appeal in Supreme Court subject to specified conditions. Maddox v. Maddox, 151 Neb. 626, 38 N.W.2d 547 (1949).
Appeal in equity case presents entire record in Supreme Court for trial de novo. Security Investment Co. v. Golz, 151 Neb. 172, 36 N.W.2d 862 (1949).
It is duty of Supreme Court to retry issues in equity case without reference to the conclusion reached in the district court. Garner v. City of Aurora, 149 Neb. 295, 30 N.W.2d 917 (1948); Gable v. Carpenter, 136 Neb. 669, 287 N.W. 70 (1939).
Where damages are sought in an action for mandatory injunction requiring defendant to increase the carrying capacity of a canal, the case is properly triable de novo in the Supreme Court. Faught v. Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist., 147 Neb. 1032, 25 N.W.2d 889 (1947).
An appeal from a judgment quieting title on cross-petition of a defendant in mortgage foreclosure suit is tried in Supreme Court de novo. Evers v. Evers, 146 Neb. 104, 18 N.W.2d 673 (1945).
In an equity case the Supreme Court must try the case de novo and reach an independent conclusion as to the findings of fact and of the law. Robinson v. Dawson County Irr. Co., 145 Neb. 32, 15 N.W.2d 231 (1944).
An appeal to the district court from a county board of equalization is heard as an equity matter, and on appeal to Supreme Court is for trial de novo. Weller v. County of Valley, 141 Neb. 69, 2 N.W.2d 606 (1942).
In suit by heirs against administrator of estate seeking to hold him liable as trustee, appeal to Supreme Court is tried de novo. Meade v. Van de Voorde, 139 Neb. 827, 299 N.W. 175 (1941).
Appeal in suit to enjoin defendant from engaging in business in violation of contract is tried de novo on appeal to Supreme Court. Conrad v. Kaup, 137 Neb. 900, 291 N.W. 687 (1940).
Appeal is for trial de novo hereunder. Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 124 Neb. 464, 247 N.W. 39 (1933).
In mechanic's lien foreclosure, Supreme Court is required to try case de novo. York Brick & Tile Co. v. Ude Motor Co., 123 Neb. 154, 242 N.W. 361 (1932).
Action in nature of creditor's bill was for trial de novo in Supreme Court. Cary v. Reiter, 122 Neb. 476, 240 N.W. 582 (1932).
Action for annulment of marriage was required to be tried de novo. O'Reilly v. O'Reilly, 120 Neb. 720, 234 N.W. 916 (1931).
Interpleader suit is one in equity, and is determined de novo on appeal. Citizens Nat. Bank of Wisner v. McNamara, 120 Neb. 252, 231 N.W. 781 (1930).
If allegations are sufficient to present executor's right to retain and apply legacy on debt, issue is determined on appeal de novo regardless of surplusage. First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Cornell, 114 Neb. 126, 206 N.W. 749 (1925).
Suit to rescind subscription to corporate stock is triable de novo on appeal. Edgar v. Skinner Packing Co., 112 Neb. 752, 200 N.W. 992 (1924); Brown v. Stroud & Co., 112 Neb. 210, 199 N.W. 33 (1924).
Suit to cancel mortgages and remove cloud is triable de novo. King v. DeTar, 112 Neb. 535, 199 N.W. 847 (1924).
Action originally commenced at law, but heard in equity below on motion of party, is triable de novo on appeal. Miller v. Baker, 112 Neb. 375, 199 N.W. 845 (1924).
In suit to redeem by party not served with process, validity of sheriff's return showing service is triable de novo. First Nat. Bank of Lexington v. Anderson, 106 Neb. 204, 182 N.W. 1021 (1921).
In ejectment, where only defense is equitable, case is triable de novo in Supreme Court. Tillson v. Holloway, 94 Neb. 635, 143 N.W. 939 (1913).
Section is not applicable to trials to court in law cases. First Nat. Bank of West Point v. Crawford, 78 Neb. 665, 111 N.W. 587 (1907).
Suit to enjoin payment of guaranty fund assessments was tried de novo in Supreme Court. Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 282 U.S. 765 (1931).
2. Findings of trial court
In an appeal of an equity action, the Supreme Court tries factual questions de novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the trial court, provided, where credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the Supreme Court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. Hughes v. Enterprise Irrigation Dist., 226 Neb. 230, 410 N.W.2d 494 (1987); Schmidt v. Chimney Rock Irrigation Dist., 209 Neb. 1, 305 N.W.2d 888 (1981); Kinkenon v. Hue, 207 Neb. 698, 301 N.W.2d 77 (1981).
An equitable matter is reviewed by this court de novo on the record, subject to the rules that where credible evidence on material issues is in conflict, this court will consider that the trial court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over another, and where the trial court has viewed the premises, this court is required to consider any competent and relevant facts revealed by the viewing and any finding made by the trial court, provided that the record contains competent evidence to support the findings. Burgess v. Omahawks Radio Control Org., 219 Neb. 100 362 N.W.2d 27 (1985).
This court reviews matters equitable in nature de novo on the record, subject to the rule that where credible evidence is in conflict on material issues of fact, this court will consider the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over another. Masid v. First State Bank, 213 Neb. 431, 329 N.W.2d 560 (1983); Seybold v. Seybold, 191 Neb. 480, 216 N.W.2d 179 (1974); Rettinger v. Pierpont, 145 Neb. 161, 15 N.W.2d 393 (1944); Otto v. L. L. Coryell & Son, 141 Neb. 498, 3 N.W.2d 915 (1942); Chitwood Packing Co. v. Warner, 138 Neb. 800, 295 N.W. 882 (1941); First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Airedale Ranch & Cattle Co., 136 Neb. 521, 286 N.W. 766 (1939); Kennedy v. Buffalo County, 134 Neb. 744, 279 N.W. 464 (1938); Graham Ice Cream Co. v. Petros, 127 Neb. 172, 254 N.W. 869 (1934); Gaunt v. Smith, 103 Neb. 506, 172 N.W. 365 (1919); Shafer v. Beatrice State Bank, 99 Neb. 317, 156 N.W. 632 (1916).
On trial de novo of equity case with irreconcilable evidence on material issue, fact that district court made personal observation of physical facts should be considered. Winkle v. Mitera, 195 Neb. 821, 241 N.W.2d 329 (1976).
Upon appeal in mechanics' lien actions, when the testimony of witnesses orally examined before the court upon the vital issues is conflicting, the Supreme Court, while trying the case de novo, will consider the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying and must have accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite. Modern Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Journey West Campground, Inc., 193 Neb. 781, 229 N.W.2d 192 (1975).
Appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations are to be heard and disposed of de novo, but the superior position of the original trier of fact is to be respected and accorded great weight. Crete Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Crete, 193 Neb. 245, 226 N.W.2d 752 (1975); Mid-Plains Education Assn. v. Mid-Plains Nebraska Tech. College, 189 Neb. 37, 199 N.W.2d 747 (1972).
In actions in equity, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to try the issues of fact de novo on the record and to reach an independent conclusion without reference to the findings of the district court. Shirk v. Schmunk, 192 Neb. 25, 218 N.W.2d 433 (1974); Stocker v. Wells, 150 Neb. 51, 33 N.W.2d 445 (1948).
On appeal in equity, Supreme Court is required to make independent conclusions of fact and review is not restricted by fact there may be some evidence to support district court's conclusion or judgment. Schuller v. Schuller, 191 Neb. 266, 214 N.W.2d 617 (1974).
This section does not disturb conclusiveness of decisions of fact by juries or by trial judges sitting in their stead in law cases. Larutan Corp. v. Magnolia Homes Manuf. Co., 190 Neb. 425, 209 N.W.2d 177 (1973).
Where district court had only cold record before it, the rule pertaining to Supreme Court's consideration of the opportunity of the trial court in equity to observe the witnesses is inapplicable. C & L Co. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 190 Neb. 91, 206 N.W.2d 49 (1973).
In equity, issues of fact are tried de novo in the Supreme Court and, in reviewing findings insofar as credibility of witnesses is concerned, the Supreme Court will take into consideration that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. First Cadco Corp., 189 Neb. 553, 203 N.W.2d 770 (1973); O'Brien v. Fricke, 148 Neb. 369, 27 N.W.2d 403 (1947); Beskas v. Calkins, 135 Neb. 323, 281 N.W. 29 (1938); Ohme v. Thomas, 134 Neb. 727, 279 N.W. 480 (1938); Burrows v. Keebaugh, 120 Neb. 136, 231 N.W. 751 (1930); Peterson v. Winkelmann, 114 Neb. 714, 209 N.W. 499 (1926); Magill v. Magill, 114 Neb. 636, 209 N.W. 241 (1926); Enterprise Planing Mill Co. v. Methodist Episcopal Church of Sterling, 100 Neb. 29, 158 N.W. 386 (1916); Nelson v. City of Florence, 94 Neb. 847, 144 N.W. 791 (1913); Tillson v. Holloway, 94 Neb. 635, 143 N.W. 939 (1913).
In equity case, Supreme Court is required to reach an independent conclusion without reference to findings of district court. Mid-America Appliance Corp. v. Federated Finance Co., 172 Neb. 270, 109 N.W.2d 381 (1961); Toelle v. Preuss, 172 Neb. 239, 109 N.W.2d 293 (1961).
Supreme Court may take into consideration view of premises by trial court. Hehnke v. Starr, 158 Neb. 575, 64 N.W.2d 68 (1954); Lackaff v. Bogue, 158 Neb. 174, 62 N.W.2d 889 (1954).
Actions in equity are triable de novo in the Supreme Court, subject to the condition arising from determination of credibility of witnesses by trial court. Parrott v. Hofmann, 151 Neb. 249, 37 N.W.2d 199 (1949).
In equity suit, trial de novo is necessary and Supreme Court is required to reach an independent conclusion, without reference to the fact that there may be some evidence in support of findings of trial court. Goodwin v. Freadrich, 135 Neb. 203, 280 N.W. 917 (1938).
In determination of appeals in equity, Supreme Court will reach independent conclusions as to findings under pleadings and evidence without reference to those of the district court. Ericson v. Nebraska-Iowa Farm Inv. Co., 134 Neb. 391, 278 N.W. 841 (1938).
Where testimony is in conflict and principal fact to be determined rests on evidence of interested witnesses, court will give considerable weight to judgment of trial court. Dvorak v. Kucera, 130 Neb. 341, 264 N.W. 737 (1936).
In trial de novo court will give weight to findings of trial court on questions of fact but if convinced that the facts are otherwise will so find. Coe v. Talcott, 130 Neb. 32, 263 N.W. 596 (1935).
Where trial court has made a personal examination of physical facts involved and where oral evidence as to material issues is conflicting, appellate court will consider trial court's decision thereon in reaching independent conclusion hereunder. City of Wilber v. Bednar, 123 Neb. 324, 242 N.W. 644 (1932).
Supreme Court is required to dispose of appeal without reference to conclusion of court below. State v. Lovell, 117 Neb. 710, 222 N.W. 625 (1929); Colby v. Foxworthy, 80 Neb. 239, 114 N.W. 174 (1907), rehearing denied 80 Neb. 244, 115 N.W. 1076 (1908).
Where evidence on material issues is in irreconcilable conflict, court will consider findings below. In re Estate of Waller, 116 Neb. 352, 217 N.W. 588 (1928); Jones v. Dooley, 107 Neb. 162, 185 N.W. 307 (1921); Greusel v. Payne, 107 Neb. 84, 185 N.W. 336 (1921); Wetherell v. Adams, 80 Neb. 584, 114 N.W. 778 (1908).
Where trial court has examined physical facts and oral evidence is conflicting, Supreme Court will consider trial court's examination and observation of witnesses. State v. Delaware-Hickman Ditch Co., 114 Neb. 806, 210 N.W. 279 (1926).
It is the duty of Supreme Court to retry case. Coad v. Coad, 87 Neb. 290, 127 N.W. 455 (1910).
Findings below are not conclusive but entitled to consideration if not to considerable weight. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Jansen, 70 Neb. 579, 97 N.W. 814 (1903).
3. Miscellaneous
Specific performance of contract on realty denied where circumstances revealed time was of the essence. Menke v. Foote, 199 Neb. 800, 261 N.W.2d 635 (1978).
Assignments of error are required even though trial is de novo. Smallcomb v. Smallcomb, 165 Neb. 191, 84 N.W.2d 217 (1957).
Upon trial de novo, finding of nonexistence of valid option was sustained. Budde v. Anderson, 156 Neb. 812, 58 N.W.2d 204 (1953).
In equity case, presumption obtains that trial court considered only such evidence as was competent and relevant. Rohn v. Kelley, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953).
In action in equity where trial is de novo, court may do that which in equity and good conscience should be done. Mangiameli v. Mangiameli, 153 Neb. 753, 45 N.W.2d 910 (1951).
Where, in a trial in equity, the district court receives evidence over objection, and a motion for new trial is not made, the Supreme Court upon trial de novo will consider such evidence preserved in the bill of exceptions and give it whatever probative value it may have. Nemetz v. Nemetz, 147 Neb. 187, 22 N.W.2d 619 (1946).
Since equity suit is tried de novo in Supreme Court, remarks of trial court indicating prejudice will not cause reversal. Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 448, 13 N.W.2d 634 (1944).
Rule that appeals in equity must be tried de novo in Supreme Court is subject to the qualification that where defendant moves to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's case, and motion is sustained, the court on appeal will treat the plaintiff's testimony as true, together with every conclusion which may fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom. Meyer v. Platt, 137 Neb. 714, 291 N.W. 86 (1940).
On trial de novo evidence was insufficient to prove alleged lost or stolen contract on which plaintiff relied. Cohen v. Swanson Petroleum Co., 133 Neb. 581, 276 N.W. 190 (1937).
In proceedings to establish heirship, where only questions of fact are involved, parties are entitled to jury; no trial de novo on appeal. In re O'Connor's Estate, 117 Neb. 636, 222 N.W. 57 (1928).
Appeal suspends divorce decree, and brings case up for trial de novo. Westphalen v. Westphalen, 115 Neb. 217, 212 N.W. 429 (1927).
Facts alleged must be supported by competent evidence to entitle plaintiff to decree in trial de novo on appeal. Miksch v. Tassler, 108 Neb. 208, 187 N.W. 796 (1922).
Judgment should be affirmed if, for sufficient reason appearing in record, it was correct. Dappen v. Weber, 106 Neb. 812, 184 N.W. 952 (1921).
Evidence must be preserved in bill of exceptions for trial of issue of fact de novo. Thies v. Thies, 103 Neb. 499, 172 N.W. 364 (1919), affirmed on rehearing 103 Neb. 501, 175 N.W. 646 (1919).
Supreme Court is not required to try whole case de novo, but to try and independently decide such issues only as are presented by appeal. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mallory, 93 Neb. 579, 141 N.W. 190 (1913).
Ordinary rules as to burden of proof, competency, and materiality of evidence, apply. Beckman v. Lincoln & N. W. R. R. Co., 79 Neb. 89, 112 N.W. 348 (1907).
Presumption in favor of findings exists where testimony was given orally but not by deposition. Roe v. Howard County, 75 Neb. 448, 106 N.W. 587 (1906).
Amended petition to conform to facts proved in record may be filed. Raley v. Raymond Bros. Clarke Co., 73 Neb. 496, 103 N.W. 57 (1905).
Findings based upon depositions are disregarded; if based on oral testimony are not regarded unless upon whole record appear correct. Naudain v. Fullenwider, 72 Neb. 221, 100 N.W. 296 (1904).
There is no presumption in favor of findings. Michigan Trust Co. v. City of Red Cloud, 69 Neb. 585, 96 N.W. 140 (1903), rehearing denied 69 Neb. 592, 98 N.W. 413 (1904).
Court may still remand for further proceedings. Hanson v. Hanson, 4 Neb. Unof. 880, 97 N.W. 23 (1903).
Plaintiff's death during de novo appeal has the same effect as if he or she had died before the trial court's judgment. Fitzgerald v. Clarke, 9 Neb. App. 898, 621 N.W.2d 844 (2001).
25-1926.
Appeal; reversal of judgment; mandate.When a judgment or final order is reversed either in whole or in part in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the appellate court shall proceed to render such judgment as the court below should have rendered or remand the cause to the court below for such judgment. The appellate court shall not issue execution in causes that are removed to it on error on which it pronounced judgment but shall send a special mandate to the court below, as the case may require, to award execution thereupon. The court to which such special mandate is sent shall proceed in such case in the same manner as if such judgment or final order had been rendered therein, and on motion and good cause shown, it may suspend any execution made returnable before it by order of the appellate court in the same manner as if such execution had been issued from its own court, but such power shall not extend further than to stay proceedings until the matter can be further heard by the appellate court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 594, p. 499; Laws 1875, § 1, p. 40; R.S.1913, § 8199; Laws 1915, c. 21, § 2, p. 82; C.S.1922, § 9151; C.S.1929, § 20-1926; R.S.1943, § 25-1926; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 62.
Annotations
1. Affirmance
2. Reversal
3. Remanded with directions
4. Miscellaneous
1. Affirmance
When evidence is substantially same as on first appeal questions held foreclosed by former decision. Hruby v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., 83 Neb. 800, 120 N.W. 427 (1909).
Judgment will not be reversed for mere technical error not prejudicial to appellant. Kimmerly v. McMichael, 83 Neb. 789, 120 N.W. 487 (1909).
On affirmance clerk may issue execution. Porter v. Sherman County Banking Co., 40 Neb. 274, 58 N.W. 721 (1894); State ex rel. Noble v. Sheldon, 26 Neb. 151, 42 N.W. 335 (1889).
2. Reversal
The rule, that a verdict will not be disturbed where there is some evidence tending to support it, does not apply where the verdict is opposed to the undisputed physical facts of the case. Parish v. County Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 134 Neb. 563, 279 N.W. 170 (1938).
In election contest where contestant failed to prove illegal acts alleged, judgment will be reversed and suit dismissed. Mehrens v. Election Canvassing Board of Douglas County, 134 Neb. 151, 278 N.W. 252 (1938).
In case where trial court sought to correct a supposed error in failing to sustain a motion for directed verdict by vacating the verdict returned and then dismissing the action, Supreme Court will, upon reversing the judgment of dismissal, if no other error is presented by the record, proceed to render such judgment as the court below should have rendered, or remand the cause to lower court for that purpose. LeBarron v. City of Harvard, 129 Neb. 460, 262 N.W. 26 (1935).
It is optional with Supreme Court to render such judgment as court below should have rendered or to remand cause to the district court for such judgment. Harvey v. Godding, 77 Neb. 289, 109 N.W. 220 (1906).
3. Remanded with directions
When the Supreme Court vacates or sets aside a general verdict it should either grant a new trial or remand the cause to the trial court for such judgment. In re George's Estate, 144 Neb. 915, 18 N.W.2d 68 (1945).
Where trial court erroneously vacated verdict and judgment and dismissed action, Supreme Court, on reversing judgment of dismissal, if no other error is presented, will remand cause with directions that verdict and judgment be reinstated. Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N.W. 335 (1931).
In reversing a law action, Supreme Court has jurisdiction to direct district court to render judgment in favor of successful party. Armsby Co. v. Raymond Bros.-Clarke Co., 90 Neb. 773, 134 N.W. 920 (1912).
New parties cannot be brought in after case is remanded with specific directions. Gund v. Ballard, 80 Neb. 385, 114 N.W. 420 (1907).
When case is remanded without directions, trial court should retrace steps to place where first material error occurred. Colby v. Foxworthy, 78 Neb. 288, 110 N.W. 857 (1907).
Where case is remanded generally, district court has discretion as to further proceedings. Gadsden v. Thrush, 72 Neb. 1, 99 N.W. 835 (1904).
4. Miscellaneous
Supreme Court can make any order that district court is authorized to make. Fick v. Herman, 161 Neb. 110, 72 N.W.2d 598 (1955).
Supreme Court may remove guardian appointed by trial court, and appoint another having no interest in ward's estate. Keiser v. Keiser, 113 Neb. 645, 204 N.W. 394 (1925).
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain plea in abatement based on matters happening after appeal perfected. Irwin v. Jetter Brewing Co., 101 Neb. 409, 163 N.W. 470 (1917).
Supreme Court may order remittitur, and reverse if not filed, where judgment below is clearly excessive. Nutter v. Standard Land Co., 100 Neb. 548, 160 N.W. 948 (1916).
Judgment in obedience to mandate is final and will not be superseded or reversed on appeal. Kerr v. McCreary, 86 Neb. 786, 126 N.W. 299 (1910).
Supreme Court cannot enlarge scope of trial court's findings. Sowerwine v. Central Irr. Dist., 85 Neb. 687, 124 N.W. 118 (1909).
A judgment is not considered an entirety unless the interests of the judgment debtors are inseparable. Sturgis, Cornish & Burn Co. v. Miller, 79 Neb. 404, 112 N.W. 595 (1907).
Applicability to appeal cases is questioned. Hoagland v. Stewart, 71 Neb. 102, 98 N.W. 428 (1904), rehearing denied 71 Neb. 106, 100 N.W. 133 (1904).
District court must obey mandate; cannot permit intervention. State ex rel. Bradbury v. Thompson, 69 Neb. 157, 95 N.W. 47 (1903).
Obedience to mandate may be enforced by mandamus. State ex rel. Horton v. Dickinson, 63 Neb. 869, 89 N.W. 431 (1902).
Court may recall mandate during term before it is acted upon. Horton v. State ex rel. Hayden, 63 Neb. 34, 88 N.W. 146 (1901).
Mistake in entry of judgment may be corrected without remanding cause for new trial. Youngson v. Pollock, 25 Neb. 431, 41 N.W. 279 (1889).
25-1927.
Original cause in Supreme Court; complete record upon final determination; waiver.A complete record of every original cause in the Supreme Court, as soon as it is finally determined, shall be made by the clerk of such court, unless both parties shall declare in open court, at the term at which the final order or judgment shall be made or hearing had, their agreement that no record shall be made.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 57, § 12, p. 713; Laws 1899, c. 86, § 1, p. 342; R.S.1913, § 8200; C.S.1922, § 9152; C.S.1929, § 20-1927; R.S.1943, § 25-1927.
25-1928.
Appeal; mistake of clerk; effect; procedure.A mistake, neglect or omission of the clerk shall not be a ground of error, until the same has been presented and acted upon in the court in which the mistake, neglect or omission occurred.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 597, p. 500; R.S.1913, § 8201; C.S.1922, § 9153; C.S.1929, § 20-1928; R.S.1943, § 25-1928.
Annotations
Clerk's mistake, neglect, or omission in entering judgment on verdict is not ground of error until presented and acted upon in court in which it occurred. Crete Mills v. Stevens, 120 Neb. 794, 235 N.W. 453 (1931).
Section applied to error in inserting erroneous answer day in summons in county court. Ley v. Pilger, 59 Neb. 561, 81 N.W. 507 (1900).
25-1929.
Appeal; remittitur; effect.Whenever the court shall direct a remittitur in any action, and the same is made, and the party for whose benefit it is made shall appeal said action, then the party remitting shall not be barred from maintaining that the remittitur should not have been required either in whole or in part.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 247, § 1, p. 567; C.S.1922, § 9154; C.S.1929, § 20-1929; R.S.1943, § 25-1929.
Annotations
Where interest before judgment is not prayed for as an element of damages, action of trial court in ordering remittitur will not be disturbed upon ground that party was entitled to interest upon claim before judgment. Welch v. Reeves, 142 Neb. 171, 5 N.W.2d 275 (1942).
Where recovery is had upon cause of action for wrongful death and also for cause of action for pain and suffering sustained by the deceased until his death and for medical and burial expenses, remittitur ordered by trial court of lump sum from verdict was treated as applying to latter cause of action. Vanderlippe v. Midwest Studios, 137 Neb. 289, 289 N.W. 341 (1939).
Request to restore amount remitted was denied in negligence case. Banta v. McChesney, 127 Neb. 764, 257 N.W. 68 (1934).
Where trial court ordered remittitur cutting verdict by half, Supreme Court will vacate that portion of remittitur which is excessive. Mangiameli v. Ariano, 126 Neb. 629, 253 N.W. 871 (1934).
Where issues of fact are controverted and findings of jury under the court's instructions warrant recovery, trial court may not require successful party to file remittitur of such recovery. Loy v. Storz Electric Refrigeration Co., 122 Neb. 357, 240 N.W. 423 (1932).
Supreme Court may reduce amount of remittitur ordered by the district court. Christoffersen v. Weir, 110 Neb. 390, 193 N.W. 922 (1923); Miller v. Central Taxi Co., 110 Neb. 306, 193 N.W. 919 (1923).
Order requiring remittitur resting on substantial basis in the evidence will not be reversed. Hellerich v. Central Granaries Co., 104 Neb. 818, 178 N.W. 919 (1920).
Where not convinced that trial court erred in requiring remittitur, order will not be disturbed. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Queenan, 102 Neb. 391, 167 N.W. 410 (1918); Wunrath v. Peoples Furniture & Carpet Co., 100 Neb. 539, 160 N.W. 971 (1916).
25-1930.
Civil cases; writs of error abolished.Writs of error to reverse, vacate, or modify judgments or final orders in civil cases are abolished, but courts shall have the same power to compel complete and perfect transcripts of the proceedings containing the judgment or final order sought to be reversed to be furnished as they formerly had under writs of error.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 599, p. 500; R.S.1913, § 8202; C.S.1922, § 9155; C.S.1929, § 20-1930; R.S.1943, § 25-1930; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 63.
Annotations
Writ of prohibition was not abolished by this section. State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676 (1937).
Effect of abolishment of writ of certiorari stated. Engles v. Morgenstern, 85 Neb. 51, 122 N.W. 688 (1909); Mathews v. Hedlund, 82 Neb. 825, 119 N.W. 17 (1908); Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co. v. Curtis, 38 Neb. 520, 57 N.W. 161 (1893).
Supreme Court may order court to send up perfect transcript but cannot order amendment of record. Thompson & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Nicholls, 52 Neb. 312, 72 N.W. 217 (1897).
Order entered in habeas corpus proceedings may be reviewed on error. In re Van Sciever, 42 Neb. 772, 60 N.W. 1037 (1894).
25-1931.
Time for commencement; persons under disability.Proceedings under section 25-1901 for reversing, vacating, or modifying judgments or final orders shall be commenced within thirty days after the rendition of the judgment or making of the final order complained of, except that when the person entitled to such proceedings is an infant, mentally incompetent, or imprisoned, he or she shall have one year, exclusive of the time of his or her disability, within which to commence such proceedings.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 592, p. 498; Laws 1875, § 1, p. 40; Laws 1877, § 1, p. 14; Laws 1899, c. 85, § 1, p. 341; Laws 1901, c. 82, § 1, p. 475; R.S.1913, § 8203; C.S.1922, § 9156; Laws 1925, c. 69, § 1, p. 229; C.S.1929, § 20-1931; R.S.1943, § 25-1931; Laws 1949, c. 57, § 1, p. 168;
Laws 1987, LB 33, § 3; Laws 1999, LB 43, § 12; Laws 2000, LB 921, § 16.
Annotations
1. Time for commencement
2. Persons under disability
1. Time for commencement
Under rule that in a postconviction proceeding, an order granting an evidentiary hearing on some issues and denying a hearing on others is a final order, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over claims dismissed in an order that also granted an evidentiary hearing, because no appeal was taken within 30 days from the date of the order. State v. Timmens, 282 Neb. 787, 805 N.W.2d 704 (2011).
Timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional necessity. When the Legislature fixes the time for taking an appeal, the courts have no power to extend the time directly or indirectly; an appellate court may not consider a case as within its jurisdiction unless its authority to act is invoked in the manner prescribed by law. State v. Marshall, 253 Neb. 676, 573 N.W.2d 406 (1998).
Timely filing of both the petition and the transcript is mandatory to confer jurisdiction of the reviewing court. Imprisonment is not a disability entitling a prisoner to a period of exclusion from the normal time limits set forth in this section. There must be a showing of a recognizable disability, separate from the imprisonment, that prevents a person from protecting his or her rights under the statute. Lewis v. Camp, 236 Neb. 94, 459 N.W.2d 211 (1990).
To confer jurisdiction on a district court for proceedings in error, a proper transcript must be filed with the district court within one calendar month after rendition of a final judgment or order to be reviewed. Clark v. Cornwell, 223 Neb. 282, 388 N.W.2d 848 (1986).
In a proceeding in error, the jurisdiction of the court does not attach until there is presented to it, within the one-month limitation contained in this section, a duly authenticated transcript containing the final order of which complaint is made. Moell v. Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hosp., 221 Neb. 168, 375 N.W.2d 618 (1985).
A petitioner in error must, within one calendar month after judgment is announced under the law and facts by an inferior tribunal, file his petition with a transcript containing the final judgment sought to be reversed. Marcotte v. City of Omaha, 196 Neb. 217, 241 N.W.2d 838 (1976).
No authenticated copy of proceedings including order appealed from having been filed within one calendar month, dismissal was proper. Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594, 223 N.W.2d 148 (1974).
Error proceedings must be commenced within one month from rendition of the judgment or final order. Friedman v. State, 183 Neb. 9, 157 N.W.2d 855 (1968); Adams v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 684, 139 N.W.2d 885 (1966); Brown v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 224, 137 N.W.2d 814 (1965); Frankforter v. Turner, 175 Neb. 252, 121 N.W.2d 377 (1963).
Where review is sought of decision of school district committee, proceeding must be brought within one month of the decision. Longe v. County of Wayne, 175 Neb. 245, 121 N.W.2d 196 (1963).
Petition in error and transcript must be filed in appellate court within one month of decision of lower tribunal. Harms v. County Board of Supervisors of Dodge County, 173 Neb. 687, 114 N.W.2d 713 (1962).
Error proceedings may be taken within one month from imposition of sentence or overruling of motion for new trial, whichever is the later. Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853 (1960).
Error proceedings from order in school district reorganization proceedings must be instituted within one month. Keedy v. Reid, 165 Neb. 519, 86 N.W.2d 370 (1957).
Limitation of one month in which to institute error proceedings is applicable where the proceeding is for review of judgment or final order in criminal action. Cunningham v. State, 153 Neb. 912, 46 N.W.2d 636 (1951).
Time to institute error proceedings begins to run when ruling on motion for new trial has been entered on journal. Fisher v. State, 153 Neb. 226, 43 N.W.2d 600 (1950).
Where defendant fails to file transcript and petition in error in Supreme Court within time provided by law from rendition of judgment or making of final order, error proceedings will be dismissed. Iron Bear v. State, 149 Neb. 634, 32 N.W.2d 130 (1948).
Trial court may not extend time in which an appeal can be taken by vacating and reentering the same judgment. Dimmel v. State, 128 Neb. 191, 258 N.W. 271 (1935).
Time commences to run from entry of judgment on court journal as shown by transcript; cannot be contradicted by detached certificate of clerk. In re Getchell's Estate, 98 Neb. 788, 154 N.W. 537 (1915).
By analogy to this section, time to file appeal bond from justice judgment dates from entry thereof on docket. Bishop v. Lincoln Baseball Club, 98 Neb. 558, 153 N.W. 586 (1915).
Where motion for new trial was filed, time commences to run from overruling of motion. Bowers v. Raitt, 96 Neb. 460, 148 N.W. 93 (1914); Clark v. McDowell, 58 Neb. 593, 79 N.W. 158 (1899).
Section applies to criminal cases. Dirksen v. State, 86 Neb. 334, 125 N.W. 618 (1910).
If transcript is not filed within time provided by law, appellate court has no jurisdiction. Amendment of 1901 was constitutional. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Sporer, 72 Neb. 372, 100 N.W. 813 (1904).
Where ruling on motion for new trial was not made until after rendition of judgment, time in which to institute error proceedings would not begin to run until ruling on motion. City of Lincoln v. First Nat. Bank of Lincoln, 64 Neb. 725, 90 N.W. 874 (1902).
If transcript is so incomplete as not to affirmatively disclose error, proper order is affirmance, not dismissal. Hesser v. Johnson, 57 Neb. 155, 77 N.W. 406 (1898).
Jurisdiction attaches though transcript is defective; by leave may amend. Moss v. Robertson, 56 Neb. 774, 77 N.W. 403 (1898).
Time for instituting proceedings cannot be extended by agreement of parties. Tootle, Hosea & Co. v. Shirey, 52 Neb. 674, 72 N.W. 1045 (1897).
Omission to file transcript is not excused by failure to obtain bill of exceptions in time. Stull v. Cass County, 51 Neb. 760, 71 N.W. 777 (1897).
Time cannot be extended by court. Omaha Loan & Trust Co. v. Ayer, 38 Neb. 891, 57 N.W. 567 (1894).
Time commences to run from rendition of judgment. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Swantkowski, 31 Neb. 245, 47 N.W. 917 (1891).
All parties to judgment must be brought before court within time prescribed. Curten v. Atkinson, 29 Neb. 612, 46 N.W. 91 (1890).
2. Persons under disability
A showing of a recognizable legal disability, separate from the mere fact of imprisonment, which prevents a person from protecting his or her rights is required in order for a prisoner to be entitled to a period of exclusion from the normal time limitation of this section. Cole v. Kilgore, 241 Neb. 620, 489 N.W.2d 843 (1992); Scott v. Hall, 241 Neb. 420, 488 N.W.2d 549 (1992); Lewis v. Camp, 236 Neb. 94, 459 N.W.2d 211 (1990).
Provision allowing infant one year exclusive of disability to institute error proceedings does not apply to criminal cases. Newquist v. State, 153 Neb. 917, 46 N.W.2d 639 (1951).
Imprisonment under sentence in criminal case is not a disability, excusing failure to timely bring proceedings. Kock v. State, 73 Neb. 354, 102 N.W. 768 (1905).
"Unsound mind" means "insane," total want of understanding. Witte v. Gilbert, 10 Neb. 539, 7 N.W. 288 (1880).
25-1932.
Judgment prematurely rendered as error.Rendering judgment before the action stood for trial, according to the provisions of this code, shall be deemed a clerical error.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 598, p. 500; R.S.1913, § 8204; C.S.1922, § 9157; C.S.1929, § 20-1932; R.S.1943, § 25-1932.
Annotations
Premature default and forfeiture of bail bond on morning of day defendant was required to appear is not jurisdictional defect and became final after term. State v. Ingoldsby, 111 Neb. 787, 197 N.W. 960 (1924).
25-1933.
Costs; how taxed.When a judgment, decree or final order is reversed, vacated or modified, the court may render judgment for all costs against the appellee or appellees or some of them, or may direct that each party pay his own costs or apportion the costs among parties or direct that judgment for costs abide the event of a new trial as, in its discretion, the equities of the cause may require.
Source:Laws 1907, c. 162, § 5, p. 496; R.S.1913, § 8205; C.S.1922, § 9158; C.S.1929, § 20-1933; R.S.1943, § 25-1933.
Annotations
Upon modification of judgment, Supreme Court is authorized to apportion costs. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 609, 107 N.W.2d 397 (1961).
Costs can only be taxed against parties to the litigation. Ludwig v. Board of County Commissioners of Sarpy County, 170 Neb. 600, 103 N.W.2d 838 (1960).
Where appellant obtained reversal in part, all costs in Supreme Court could be taxed to appellee. Ricenbaw v. Kraus, 157 Neb. 723, 61 N.W.2d 350 (1953).
On reversal, Supreme Court may tax costs as the equities of the cause require. Stocker v. Wells, 155 Neb. 472, 52 N.W.2d 284 (1952).
When a judgment is reversed on appeal to Supreme Court, the court in its discretion may render judgment for all costs in favor of one party, direct each party to pay his own costs, apportion the costs among the parties, or direct that costs abide the event of a new trial. Rehn v. Bingaman, 152 Neb. 171, 40 N.W.2d 673 (1950).
If appellant seeks reversal and appellee consents thereto, Supreme Court will ordinarily tax costs to appellee. In re Estate of Simon, 149 Neb. 382, 31 N.W.2d 231 (1948).
Interest on amount paid for bill of exceptions is not allowable as costs until entry of mandate on appeal. Nemaha Valley Drainage Dist. No. 2 v. Stocker, 95 Neb. 663, 146 N.W. 936 (1914).
25-1934.
Money judgment; enforcement notwithstanding supersedeas; undertaking required.In an action arising on contract for the payment of money only, notwithstanding the execution of an undertaking to stay proceedings, if the defendant in error or appellee give adequate security to make restitution in case the judgment is reversed or modified, he may upon leave obtained from the court below, or a judge thereof in vacation, proceed to enforce the judgment. Such security must be an undertaking executed to the plaintiff in error by at least two sufficient sureties, to the effect that if the judgment be reversed or modified, he will make full restitution to the plaintiff in error or appellee of the money by him received under the judgment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 591, p. 498; R.S.1913, § 8206; C.S.1922, § 9159; C.S.1929, § 20-1934; R.S.1943, § 25-1934.
Annotations
Defendant's payment of judgment to avoid sale of his property on execution will not deprive him of right to appeal. Burke v. Dendinger, 120 Neb. 594, 234 N.W. 405 (1931).
Unless appellee has given bond, he cannot plead judgment as set off to another action. Spencer v. Johnston, 58 Neb. 44, 78 N.W. 482 (1899).
If appellee gives bond and has leave to enforce, appellant cannot enjoin. Bodewig v. Standard Cattle Co., 56 Neb. 217, 76 N.W. 580 (1898).
25-1935.
Opinion of appellate court; certified to clerk of district court.It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the Supreme Court immediately upon the entering of a judgment by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court to certify without cost a copy of the opinion of the court to the clerk of the district court from which the appeal was prosecuted.
Source:Laws 1933, c. 39, § 1, p. 245; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1935; R.S.1943, § 25-1935; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 64.
Annotations
Opinion of Supreme Court, duly certified, must be filed in the case in the trial court. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Gillan, 70 F.Supp. 640 (D. Neb. 1945).
25-1936.
Order of remittitur deemed a final order.Whenever in any action at law in the district court a verdict of the jury has been returned for the recovery of money and the court orders a remittitur by the prevailing party of a part of the amount of such verdict, either as a condition to allowing the verdict so reduced to stand or otherwise, such order of remittitur shall be deemed a final order from which such party may prosecute an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The provisions of this section shall not in any manner affect the rights of parties on appeal as provided for in section 25-1929.
Source:Laws 1937, c. 45, § 1, p. 190; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-1936; R.S.1943, § 25-1936; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 65.
25-1937.
Appeals; general procedure.When the Legislature enacts a law providing for an appeal without providing the procedure therefor, the procedure for appeal to the district court shall be the same as for appeals from the county court to the district court in civil actions. Trial in the district court shall be de novo upon the issues made up by the pleadings in the district court. Appeals from the district court to the Court of Appeals shall be taken in the same manner provided by law for appeals from the district court in civil cases. This section shall not apply if the Administrative Procedure Act otherwise provides.
Cross References
Administrative Procedure Act, see section 84-920.
Annotations
Because section 23-114.01 creates a statutory right to appeal a decision related to a conditional use permit to the district court but does not specify the procedure for perfecting such appeal, the general procedure from this section applies. Preserve the Sandhills v. Cherry County, 313 Neb. 668, 986 N.W.2d 265 (2023).
When a decision regarding a conditional use or special exception permit is appealed under section 23-114.01(5) and a trial is held de novo under this section, the findings of the district court shall have the effect of a jury verdict and the court's judgment will not be set aside by an appellate court unless the court's factual findings are clearly erroneous or the court erred in its application of the law. Egan v. County of Lancaster, 308 Neb. 48, 952 N.W.2d 664 (2020).
Subsection (5) of section 23-114.01 provides for a right of appeal to the district court from a decision by the county planning commission or county board of commissioners or supervisors, without setting forth any procedure for prosecuting the appeal. Therefore, the appeal procedure in this section is also implicated. In re Application of Olmer, 275 Neb. 852, 752 N.W.2d 124 (2008).
This section provides for appeal when a statute confers the right to appeal but fails to prescribe the procedure. Hawkins v. City of Omaha, 261 Neb. 943, 627 N.W.2d 118 (2001).
This section provides the procedure for appeal when a statute confers a right to appeal, but fails to prescribe the procedure therefor. Prucha v. Kahlandt, 260 Neb. 366, 618 N.W.2d 399 (2000).
This section and others cited provide for appeals from action of county superintendent in school reorganization case. Schroeder v. Oeltjen, 184 Neb. 8, 165 N.W.2d 81 (1969).
Remedy by appeal under this section is not exclusive. Moser v. Turner, 180 Neb. 635, 144 N.W.2d 192 (1966).
This section provides the procedure for appeal when right of appeal is given but procedure is not provided. School Dist. of Wilbur v. Pracheil, 180 Neb. 121, 141 N.W.2d 768 (1966).
25-2001.
District court; power to vacate or modify judgments or orders.(1) The inherent power of a district court to vacate or modify its judgments or orders during term may also be exercised after the end of the term, upon the same grounds, upon a motion filed within six months after the entry of the judgment or order.
(2) The power of a district court under its equity jurisdiction to set aside a judgment or an order as an equitable remedy is not limited by this section.
(3) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court by an order nunc pro tunc at any time on the court's initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the case is submitted for decision in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(4) A district court may vacate or modify its own judgments or orders after the term at which such judgments or orders were made (a) for mistake, neglect, or omission of the clerk, or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order; (b) for fraud practiced by the successful party in obtaining the judgment or order; (c) for newly discovered material evidence which could neither have been discovered with reasonable diligence before trial nor have been discovered with reasonable diligence in time to move for a new trial; (d) for erroneous proceedings against an infant or person of unsound mind if the condition of such defendant does not appear in the record of the proceedings; (e) for the death of one of the parties before the judgment in the action; (f) for unavoidable casualty or misfortune, preventing the party from prosecuting or defending; and (g) for taking judgments upon warrants of attorney for more than was due to the plaintiff when the defendant was not summoned or otherwise legally notified of the time and place of taking such judgment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 602, p. 500; Laws 1899, c. 87, § 1, p. 342; R.S.1913, § 8207; C.S.1922, § 9160; C.S.1929, § 20-2001; R.S.1943, § 25-2001; Laws 1947, c. 84, § 2, p. 261;
Laws 1997, LB 1, § 2; Laws 2000, LB 921, § 17.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Fraud
3. Irregularity
4. Equitable relief
5. Unavoidable casualty
6. County court jurisdiction
7. Omissions and mistakes
8. Other grounds
9. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
Without statutory authorization, a district court's order purporting to vacate a previous order is without legal effect. State v. Bartel, 308 Neb. 169, 953 N.W.2d 224 (2021).
A district court sitting as an appellate court has the same power to reconsider its orders, both inherently and under this section, as it does when it is a court of original jurisdiction. Capitol Construction v. Skinner, 279 Neb. 419, 778 N.W.2d 721 (2010).
After the final adjournment of the term of court at which a judgment has been rendered, a court has no authority to modify a judgment except for the reasons stated and within the time limited in this section. Andersen v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 249 Neb. 169, 542 N.W.2d 703 (1996).
Under this section, a district court has the power to vacate or modify its own judgment after term for one of nine reasons enumerated in the statute. However, this section is not the exclusive remedy for vacating or modifying a judgment after term; this section is concurrent with the courts' independent equity jurisdiction. DeVaux v. DeVaux, 245 Neb. 611, 514 N.W.2d 640 (1994).
This statute provides the only vehicle for a direct action aimed at vacating an out-of-term district court decree. State ex rel. Ward v. Pape, 237 Neb. 283, 465 N.W.2d 760 (1991).
This section is not the exclusive remedy for vacating a judgment after the term has expired, but is concurrent with an independent equity jurisdiction. Joyce v. Joyce, 229 Neb. 831, 429 N.W.2d 355 (1988); Emry v. American Honda Motor Co., 214 Neb. 435, 334 N.W.2d 786 (1983).
This section authorizes the trial court to vacate its order for mistake, neglect, or omission of the clerk or for unavoidable casualty or misfortune, preventing the party from prosecuting or defending. In re Interest of C.M.H. and M.S.H., 227 Neb. 446, 418 N.W.2d 226 (1988).
The court has no authority to vacate or modify a judgment after the final adjournment of the term of court at which it was rendered except for the reasons stated and within the time limited in this section. State ex rel. Birdine v. Fuller, 216 Neb. 86, 341 N.W.2d 613 (1983); Emry v. American Honda Motor Co., 214 Neb. 435, 334 N.W.2d 786 (1983); In re Estate of Weinberger, 207 Neb. 711, 300 N.W.2d 818 (1981); Lienemann v. Lienemann, 197 Neb. 449, 249 N.W.2d 902 (1977); State v. Byrd, 186 Neb. 330, 183 N.W.2d 234 (1971); Kasparek v. May, 174 Neb. 732, 119 N.W.2d 512 (1963); Pep Sinton, Inc. v. Thomas, 174 Neb. 508, 118 N.W.2d 621 (1962); Stanton v. Stanton, 146 Neb. 71, 18 N.W.2d 654 (1945); Feldt v. Wanek, 134 Neb. 334, 278 N.W. 557 (1938).
Under section 24-310, R.R.S.1943, a trial court retains the authority to rule on a motion to vacate if the motion was made during the original term, even if none of the grounds listed in section 25-2001, R.R.S.1943, are met. Moackler v. Finley, 207 Neb. 353, 299 N.W.2d 166 (1980).
In absence of appeal, determination of trial court that class action was properly brought was final and, not being void, judgment could not be set aside. Gant v. City of Lincoln, 193 Neb. 108, 225 N.W.2d 549 (1975).
This section does not apply to subsequent proceedings authorized by statute that relate to the division, disposition, and enforcement of the judgment, including application for attorney's fees. Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251, 220 N.W.2d 8 (1974).
Power to vacate judgment after term is not in any way affected by the taking of an appeal from original judgment. Simmons v. Lincoln, 176 Neb. 71, 125 N.W.2d 63 (1963).
Divorce decree may be vacated at subsequent term. Attebery v. Attebery, 172 Neb. 671, 111 N.W.2d 553 (1961).
After adjournment of the term, a new trial may be granted on any of the grounds stated in this section. Harman v. Swanson, 169 Neb. 452, 100 N.W.2d 33 (1959).
Injunction decree could not be modified at subsequent term of court except as provided by this section. Rose v. Vonderfecht, 167 Neb. 276, 92 N.W.2d 691 (1958).
District court may set aside an order vacating a decree of divorce. Vasa v. Vasa, 165 Neb. 69, 84 N.W.2d 185 (1957).
After adjournment of term dismissal without prejudice can only be set aside upon compliance with this section. Brown v. Lincoln, 157 Neb. 840, 61 N.W.2d 836 (1954).
After final adjournment of term, court could not set aside confirmation of sale except in accord with this section. Gasper v. Mazur, 155 Neb. 856, 54 N.W.2d 66 (1952).
In appropriate and timely proceedings, district court has jurisdiction to set aside approval of property settlement in divorce decree. Pasko v. Trela, 153 Neb. 759, 46 N.W.2d 139 (1951).
To be entitled to maintain an action in equity to vacate a judgment and obtain a new trial, the litigant must show, without fault or laches on his part, he was prevented from proceeding under this section. Nemetz v. Nemetz, 152 Neb. 178, 40 N.W.2d 685 (1950).
District court has power to vacate or modify its judgment entered on appeal from workmen's compensation court. Miller v. Schlereth, 151 Neb. 33, 36 N.W.2d 497 (1949).
If application to vacate judgment is filed more than ten days after rendition in a subsequent term, it must set out one of grounds necessary to authorize vacation at subsequent term. Shipley v. McNeel, 149 Neb. 793, 32 N.W.2d 636 (1948).
District court has inherent power during term to vacate default judgment. Barney v. Platte Valley, P. P. & I. Dist., 147 Neb. 375, 23 N.W.2d 335 (1946).
Trial court may vacate a judgment rendered at a previous term only for reasons enumerated and within time limited by statute. Elvidge v. Brant, 131 Neb. 1, 267 N.W. 169 (1936); Cronkleton v. Lane, 130 Neb. 17, 263 N.W. 388 (1935).
District court has power to vacate or modify its judgments or orders after term at which made only for reasons stated and within time limited in this article. Hoeppner v. Bruckman, 129 Neb. 390, 261 N.W. 572 (1935); Lyman v. Dunn, 125 Neb. 770, 252 N.W. 197 (1934); State ex rel. Sorensen v. Security State Bank of Plainview, 125 Neb. 516, 251 N.W. 97 (1933).
Order granting new trial under this section is reviewable on direct appeal to Supreme Court. Ward v. Geary, 115 Neb. 58, 211 N.W. 208 (1926).
Probable, but not decided, that proceedings were sufficient to justify relief hereunder. Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N.W. 640 (1925).
Order setting aside divorce decree after term can be vacated only in manner prescribed herein. Carmony v. Carmony, 112 Neb. 651, 200 N.W. 830 (1924).
Where defendant's attorney failed, because of illness, to file transcript on appeal in time, party must proceed hereunder. Welsh v. Valla, 102 Neb. 84, 165 N.W. 895 (1917).
Order approving guardian's final account was vacated where based on signed statement fraudulently procured from ward. In re Hilton, 99 Neb. 387, 156 N.W. 659 (1916).
Provisions of this section are concurrent with independent equity jurisdiction. Abbott v. Johnston, 93 Neb. 726, 141 N.W. 821 (1913).
After term party cannot open decree except for grounds named or on petition in equity. Hitchcock County v. Cole, 87 Neb. 43, 126 N.W. 513 (1910).
In exercise of original jurisdiction of Supreme Court, this section applies. State ex rel. Caldwell v. Lincoln Street Ry. Co., 80 Neb. 352, 118 N.W. 326 (1908).
Discretion to vacate judgments ends with term. State v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 771, 111 N.W. 118 (1907).
There is no jurisdiction after term except for causes named. Meade Plumbing, Heating & Lighting Co. v. Irwin, 77 Neb. 385, 109 N.W. 391 (1906).
Failure to proceed by motion to obtain new trial does not preclude action in equity. Bankers Union of the World v. Landis, 75 Neb. 625, 106 N.W. 973 (1906).
Interlocutory order may be reversed and vacated at subsequent term without compliance with this section. Huffman v. Rhodes, 72 Neb. 57, 100 N.W. 159 (1904).
Section is applicable to divorce decrees. Schafer v. Schafer, 71 Neb. 708, 99 N.W. 482 (1904).
Decree setting aside fraudulent conveyance could not be vacated at subsequent term except by petition in equity or under the provisions of this section. Sherman County v. Nichols, 65 Neb. 250, 91 N.W. 198 (1902).
Error in rendering decision is not ground for new trial after term. Dillon v. Chicago, K. & N. R. R. Co., 58 Neb. 472, 78 N.W. 927 (1899).
This section applies only to judgments and orders possessing some degree of legal validity, and not to such as are absolutely void. Kaufmann v. Drexel, 56 Neb. 229, 76 N.W. 559 (1898).
2. Fraud
A district court lacks a lawful basis to vacate an order for fraud absent a showing of fraud by the moving party and a finding of fraud by the district court. State v. Bartel, 308 Neb. 169, 953 N.W.2d 224 (2021).
The standard for showing fraud under subsection (4) of this section is high. State v. Bartel, 308 Neb. 169, 953 N.W.2d 224 (2021).
A party seeking to set aside a judgment after term for fraud under subsection (4)(b) of this section must prove that he or she exercised due diligence at the former trial and was not at fault or negligent in the failure to secure a just decision. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 275 Neb. 810, 749 N.W.2d 485 (2008).
Pursuant to subsection (4) of this section, in order to set aside a judgment after term on the ground of fraud practiced by the successful party, the petitioning party must prove that due diligence was exercised by him or her at the former trial and that the failure to secure a just decision was not attributable to his or her fault or negligence. McCarson v. McCarson, 263 Neb. 534, 641 N.W.2d 62 (2002).
If a party's lawyer colludes in a material and factual misrepresentation which otherwise constitutes an intentional fraud or deceit and results in a judgment adverse to the interests of the party represented by such collusive lawyer, relief by vacating such fraudulently obtained judgment is available to the injured party under subsection (4) of this section. In re Estate of West, 226 Neb. 813, 415 N.W.2d 769 (1987).
In reviewing a trial court's action, under subsection (4) of this section, in vacating or refusing to vacate a judgment or order made in a prior term of court and allegedly obtained through fraud practiced by the successful party, the Supreme Court will uphold the trial court's decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of West, 226 Neb. 813, 415 N.W.2d 769 (1987).
Proceeding authorized by subsection (4) of this section to vacate a judgment is not an equitable cause of action based on fraud, but is a remedy at law conferred by statute. Whether relief is sought by a motion addressed to a court's equity jurisdiction or by a petition based on a statute which supplies a legal remedy, vacating a judgment or order is equitable in nature. In re Estate of West, 226 Neb. 813, 415 N.W.2d 769 (1987).
Under subsection (4) of this section, party seeking to vacate judgment in order allegedly obtained through fraud practiced by the successful party must prove: (1) judgment or order has been obtained or produced through fraud; (2) it is inequitable to enforce the judgment or order; (3) failure to secure a just decision is not the result of the vacating party's fault or neglect; and (4) the party seeking to vacate has exercised due diligence in discovering the fraud. In re Estate of West, 226 Neb. 813, 415 N.W.2d 769 (1987).
In order to set aside a judgment after term on the ground of fraud practiced by the successful party, as allowed by this section, the petitioning party must prove all diligence was exercised by him or her at the former trial and the failure to secure a just decision was not attributable to his or her fault or negligence. Caddy v. Caddy, 218 Neb. 582, 358 N.W.2d 184 (1984).
Demurrer was properly sustained, in an action to vacate a tax foreclosure judgment on ground of fraud, where statute authorized service by publication on a dissolved corporation. County of Madison v. City of Norfolk, 198 Neb. 718, 255 N.W.2d 54 (1977).
In order to vacate judgment for fraud or for death of party, action must be brought within required time. McNally v. McNally, 152 Neb. 845, 43 N.W.2d 170 (1950).
Where facts alleged to constitute fraud were discovered within two years, action brought more than two years after rendition of decree was barred. Watters v. Harris, 147 Neb. 1081, 26 N.W.2d 182 (1947).
Where petition alleges fraud in procuring service by publication and fails to set forth that the facts constituting the fraud were not discovered within two years, equity is powerless to relieve where action was instituted more than two years after order was entered for service by publication. Katz v. Swanson, 147 Neb. 791, 24 N.W.2d 923 (1946).
Under subdivision (4), it is only when a judgment is clearly shown to have been obtained by fraud or false testimony, and which it would be against good conscience to enforce, that judgment will be vacated upon application of unsuccessful party upon proper showing of due diligence. County of Lincoln v. Provident Loan & Investment Co., 147 Neb. 169, 22 N.W.2d 609 (1946); Pinches v. Village of Dickens, 131 Neb. 573, 268 N.W. 645 (1936); Kielian v. Kent & Burke Co., 131 Neb. 308, 268 N.W. 79 (1936).
Where fraud charged was violation of an oral agreement between attorneys, evidence was sufficient to sustain denying application to vacate judgment. Drake v. Ralston, 137 Neb. 72, 288 N.W. 377 (1939).
Where new trial is sought by means of petition filed after term, alleging fraud and perjury in procurement of judgment, party seeking new trial must introduce evidence adduced at the former trial. Weber v. Allen, 121 Neb. 833, 238 N.W. 740 (1931).
Attorney's fees are properly taxed on refusal to vacate for fraud judgment for plaintiff on fire policy. Messing v. Dwelling House Mut. Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 36, 226 N.W. 914 (1929).
Petition to vacate judgment for fraud after two years is properly stricken, where it shows on face fraud was discovered within two-year period. Brandeen v. Beale, 117 Neb. 291, 220 N.W. 298 (1928).
Petition must show fraud was not discovered within two years from rendition of judgment if action commenced later. State ex rel. Nelson v. Lincoln Med. College, 86 Neb. 269, 125 N.W. 517 (1910).
Action against receiver for fraud in purchasing claims against estate is not limited by section. State v. Merchants Bank, 81 Neb. 710, 120 N.W. 157 (1909).
Courts will relieve against a decree on the ground of fraud committed by the successful party. State v. Omaha Country Club, 78 Neb. 178, 110 N.W. 693 (1907).
Intentional production of false testimony is ground, if opponent shows diligence at trial. Secord v. Powers, 61 Neb. 615, 85 N.W. 846 (1901).
Fraud must have been practiced in connection with trial of case. Munro v. Callahan, 55 Neb. 75, 75 N.W. 151 (1898).
Negligence of counsel is not ground for granting new trial, unless amounting to fraud. Scott v. Wright, 50 Neb. 849, 70 N.W. 396 (1897).
Court has general power to set aside divorce decree obtained by fraud. Wisdom v. Wisdom, 24 Neb. 551, 39 N.W. 594 (1888).
Taking judgment contrary to oral agreement for continuance is fraud. Mordhorst v. Reynolds, 23 Neb. 485, 37 N.W. 80 (1888).
3. Irregularity
The purpose of an order nunc pro tunc is to correct clerical or formal errors in order to make the record correctly reflect the judgment actually rendered by the court. A nunc pro tunc order reflects now what was actually done before, but was not accurately recorded. The power to issue nunc pro tunc orders is not only conveyed by statute, but is inherent in the power of the courts. In re Interest of Luz P. et al., 295 Neb. 814, 891 N.W.2d 651 (2017).
This section is concurrent with an independent equity jurisdiction and with a court's inherent powers of equity. A district court has no authority to set aside a judgment after the term when any mistake, inadvertence, or neglect was the party's own. The purpose of subsection (3) of this section is to address mishaps beyond a party's control. A litigant seeking vacation or modification of a judgment after term may take one of two routes: The litigant may proceed either under this section or under the district court's independent equity jurisdiction. With regard to subsection (3) of this section, the operative definition of "irregularity" limits the term to the doing or not doing that, in the conduct of a suit at law, which, conformably with the practice of the court, ought or ought not to be done. A judgment marred by irregularity is one rendered contrary to the course of law and practice of the court. Roemer v. Maly, 248 Neb. 741, 539 N.W.2d 40 (1995).
The first part of subsection (3) of this section, providing that a judgment may be vacated "for mistake, neglect, or omission of the clerk," applies only to the actions of the district court clerk; the second part of subsection (3), dealing with "irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order," refers to judgments or orders rendered contrary to the course of law and the practice of the courts. Therefore, relief for errors of law or judicial acts may not be sought under subsection (3). State ex rel. Ward v. Pape, 237 Neb. 283, 465 N.W.2d 760 (1991).
Absence of required allegation in petition resulting in default judgment is not irregularity in obtaining decree. Gasper v. Mazur, 157 Neb. 857, 62 N.W.2d 117 (1954).
Where findings are made in judgment that are foreign to any pleading and not necessary to relief grantable to any litigant in case, it is an irregularity in obtaining judgment which court has power to modify after expiration of term. Petersen v. Dethlefs, 139 Neb. 572, 298 N.W. 155 (1941).
Where order on claim in probate proceedings is entered by judge, it cannot be set aside under subdivision (3). Estate of McKenna v. McCormick, 60 Neb. 595, 83 N.W. 844 (1900).
Court may set aside judgment rendered without jurisdiction as irregular. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 53 Neb. 44, 73 N.W. 269 (1897).
Defects in service by publication not rendering service void constitute irregularity. Scarborough v. Myrick, 47 Neb. 794, 66 N.W. 867 (1896).
Omission of clerk to journalize judgment when entered does not constitute irregularity in obtaining judgment. Slater v. Skirving, 45 Neb. 594, 63 N.W. 848 (1895).
Failure to give notice of appeal and to give notice of application for default judgment did not authorize vacation of judgment on ground of irregularity. McBrien v. Riley, 38 Neb. 561, 57 N.W. 385 (1894).
Taking of stay is not a waiver of right to apply for correction of mistake in entry of decree. Hoagland v. Way, 35 Neb. 387, 53 N.W. 207 (1892).
4. Equitable relief
To be entitled to vacate a judgment after term by an action in equity, the litigant must show that, without fault or laches on his part, he was prevented from proceeding under this section. Jeffrey B. v. Amy L., 283 Neb. 940, 814 N.W.2d 737 (2012).
In order to seek vacation or modification of judgment under the district court's equity jurisdiction, a litigant must show that this section cannot provide adequate relief. Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems, Inc., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2d 764 (2000).
With regard to the invocation of the equity powers of this section, the applicant, to be successful, must first allege and prove that he exercised due diligence and that his failure to secure a proper decision in the prior term was not due to his own fault or negligence. Thrift Mart v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 251 Neb. 448, 558 N.W.2d 531 (1997).
A litigant seeking the vacation of a prior decree or judgment after term may either proceed under this section or under the district court's independent equity jurisdiction. Welch v. Welch, 246 Neb. 435, 519 N.W.2d 262 (1994).
Equity power conferred by Constitution on district court is ample for granting relief against default judgment attributable to fraud of attorney, notwithstanding limited powers granted by this section. Seward v. Churn Ranch Co., 136 Neb. 804, 287 N.W. 610 (1939).
This section does not provide exclusive remedy for vacation of judgment for fraud, but is concurrent with independent equity jurisdiction, which may be exercised by county court. In re Estate of Jensen, 135 Neb. 602, 283 N.W. 196 (1939).
Statutory grounds for vacating judgment after term are not exclusive but concurrent with independent equity jurisdiction. Pavlik v. Burns, 134 Neb. 175, 278 N.W. 149 (1938).
In action in equity to set aside order dismissing law action, plaintiff must show that, without fault or laches on his part, he was prevented from proceeding under this section to obtain a new trial. Lindstrom v. Nilsson, 133 Neb. 184, 274 N.W. 485 (1937).
Provisions of statute are concurrent with equity jurisdiction, and where circumstances call for equitable relief, a decree may be set aside after expiration of term at which rendered. Howard Stove & Furnace Co. v. Rudolf, 128 Neb. 665, 260 N.W. 189 (1935).
Statute is not always the measure of equitable relief; general powers of equity court may be invoked to redress wrong resulting from abuse of confidential relation. Hall v. Hall, 123 Neb. 280, 242 N.W. 607 (1932).
Statute is not exclusive but declaratory of the equitable power of the court at time of its enactment. Hall v. Hall, 122 Neb. 228, 239 N.W. 825 (1932).
Party failing to show reasonable diligence in producing evidence of adverse party's perjury may not have judgment vacated by producing such evidence in equity suit. Gutru v. Johnson, 115 Neb. 309, 212 N.W. 622 (1927).
Equity will afford relief against fraudulent judgment where fraud was not discovered in time to proceed to vacate hereunder. Krause v. Long, 109 Neb. 846, 192 N.W. 729 (1923).
Where this section is inadequate to prevent sale upon judgment obtained by fraud in county court and transcribed to another county, injunction may be allowed. Spence v. Miner, 90 Neb. 108, 132 N.W. 942 (1911).
Remedy under this section for fraud in obtaining judgment is declaratory of equity practice, and concurrent with remedy in equity. Schneider v. Lobingier, 82 Neb. 174, 117 N.W. 473 (1908).
In equity, party must show good reason why special remedy of code is not available. Van Antwerp v. Lathrop, 70 Neb. 747, 98 N.W. 35 (1904).
Section is declaratory of equity power; substantial injury must be shown. Van Every v. Sanders, 69 Neb. 509, 95 N.W. 870 (1903).
Equity will not enjoin if relief is possible under this section. Woodward v. Pike, 43 Neb. 777, 62 N.W. 230 (1895).
Petition in equity for new trial must be founded upon some equitable ground, as fraud, accident or mistake. Douglas County v. Connell, 15 Neb. 617, 19 N.W. 591 (1884).
5. Unavoidable casualty
This section provides for circumstances which prevent parties from participating in an action by virtue of unavoidable casualty or misfortune; it is not an excuse to disregard court orders. The casualty must be such that it prevents the party from prosecuting or defending. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Dickinson, 216 Neb. 660, 345 N.W.2d 8 (1984).
Lack of diligence or negligence of counsel is not an unavoidable casualty or misfortune. Emry v. American Honda Motor Co., 214 Neb. 435, 334 N.W.2d 786 (1983); Johnston Grain Co. v. Tridle, 175 Neb. 859, 124 N.W.2d 463 (1963).
Unavoidable casualty alone does not provide a basis for vacating a judgment after term. That casualty must also be one preventing the party from prosecuting or defending. Emry v. American Honda Motor Co., 214 Neb. 435, 334 N.W.2d 786 (1983).
The lack of diligence of a party or his attorney is not an "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" under this section preventing the party from defending an action at a former term of court. Lyman v. Dunn, 125 Neb. 770, 252 N.W. 197 (1934).
Unavoidable casualty must be such as prevents from prosecuting or defending in trial court, and is not applicable to appeals. Loss of bill of exceptions by fire is not ground hereunder, but may be in equity. Norfolk Packing Co. v. American Ins. Co., 116 Neb. 118, 216 N.W. 309 (1927).
Unavoidable casualty was shown to exist. Poeggler v. Supreme Council of Catholic Mutual Benefit Assn., 102 Neb. 608, 168 N.W. 194 (1918); Hodder v. Olson, 102 Neb. 429, 167 N.W. 575 (1918).
Dishonesty of attorney, permitting default judgment, is unavoidable casualty. Anthony & Co. v. Karbach, 64 Neb. 509, 90 N.W. 243 (1902).
Lack of knowledge by client of holding of term of court and failure of counsel to attend did not authorize vacation of judgment on ground of unavoidable casualty. Ganzer v. Schiffbauer, 40 Neb. 633, 59 N.W. 98 (1894).
Where husband withheld summons from wife, properly left at residence, it was unavoidable casualty. Morse v. Engle, 28 Neb. 534, 44 N.W. 859 (1890).
Circumstances must have been entirely beyond control of party, without negligence on his part, to constitute unavoidable casualty. Pope v. Hooper, 6 Neb. 178 (1877).
The rule is well-established in Nebraska that the lack of diligence or negligence of counsel is not an unavoidable casualty or misfortune in the context of subdivision (4)(f) of this section, entitling the applicant to vacation of a judgment after adjournment of the term at which the judgment has been rendered. Woodcock v. Navarrete-James, 26 Neb. App. 809, 923 N.W.2d 769 (2019).
6. County court jurisdiction
This section applies to county courts as well as to district courts, and the fact that the county court rules on a demurrer at a subsequent term is immaterial. In re Estate of Reikofski, 144 Neb. 735, 14 N.W.2d 379 (1944).
County court has power to vacate order appointing administrator obtained by fraud. In re Estate of Sheerer, 137 Neb. 374, 289 N.W. 529 (1940).
County court cannot vacate judgment in case beyond justice jurisdiction after expiration of monthly term, except under this section; attempt to vacate without notice is void. Stone v. Jensen, 118 Neb. 254, 224 N.W. 284 (1929).
Order of county court vacating fraudulent judgment is reviewable by district court on appeal. Gainsforth v. Peterson, 114 Neb. 442, 207 N.W. 935 (1926).
Justices and county courts within justice jurisdiction have no power to vacate judgment after expiration of time for appeal. Carlson v. Ray, 104 Neb. 18, 175 N.W. 886 (1919).
County court may vacate probate of will procured by fraud and permit contest. In re Estate of Kelly, 103 Neb. 513, 175 N.W. 653 (1919).
County court may vacate erroneous judgment against incompetent defendant where condition of such defendant does not appear of record. Spence v. Miner, 90 Neb. 108, 132 N.W. 942 (1911); Spence v. Miner, 89 Neb. 610, 131 N.W. 1044 (1911).
Applicable to county court in term cases. Oakdale Heat & Light Co. v. Seymour, 78 Neb. 50, 114 N.W. 643 (1908).
County court cannot set aside award in condemnation proceedings procured by fraud. Mattheis v. Fremont, E. & M. V. R. R. Co., 53 Neb. 681, 74 N.W. 30 (1898).
7. Omissions and mistakes
A district court may freely correct clerical errors after notice of appeal has been filed up until the time the parties submit the case at the conclusion of arguments. After that time, the district court must obtain leave of the appellate court to fix a clerical error in a prior order. Eicher v. Mid America Fin. Invest. Corp., 275 Neb. 462, 748 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
The failure of the clerk of the court to send notice of a summary judgment is beyond the control of the parties and within the statutory grounds for vacating or modifying an order under subsection (4) of this section. Nye v. Fire Group Partnership, 263 Neb. 735, 642 N.W.2d 149 (2002).
The first part of subsection (3) of this section, providing that a judgment may be vacated "for mistake, neglect, or omission of the clerk," applies only to the actions of the district court clerk; the second part of subsection (3), dealing with "irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order," refers to judgments or orders rendered contrary to the course of law and the practice of the courts. Therefore, relief for errors of law or judicial acts may not be sought under subsection (3). State ex rel. Ward v. Pape, 237 Neb. 283, 465 N.W.2d 760 (1991).
This section governs the vacation or modification of judgments after the term, and for mistake or omissions by the clerk, proceedings may be commenced within three years. Pofahl v. Pofahl, 196 Neb. 347, 243 N.W.2d 55 (1976).
Where clerk omitted to enter proper judgment after first trial, court, on second trial of cause, may correct record to show judgment as it should have shown as result of first trial. Crete Mills v. Stevens, 120 Neb. 794, 235 N.W. 453 (1931).
Where, by mistake of clerk in placing case on trial docket after judgment, it was dismissed, latter order was a nullity. Jacoby v. Dvorak, 111 Neb. 683, 197 N.W. 428 (1924).
Court has power, where clerk fails to enter judgment, to order judgment entered nunc pro tunc, subject to rights of innocent third parties, who may oppose. Clark & Leonard Inv. Co. v. Rich, 81 Neb. 321, 115 N.W. 1084 (1908).
For mistakes of clerk, party must apply to court for correction of record. Tootle-Weakley Millinery Co. v. Billingsley, 74 Neb. 531, 105 N.W. 85 (1905).
Entry by probate judge, acting as his own clerk, on records of probate court, was not an act of mistake, neglect or omission of clerk under this section. Estate of McKenna v. McCormick, 60 Neb. 595, 83 N.W. 844 (1900).
Neglect and mistakes of clerk as such, not as agent of parties, constitute ground for new trial. Thompson v. Sharp, 17 Neb. 69, 22 N.W. 78 (1885).
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, an order nunc pro tunc is appropriate only to remedy an error arising from oversight or omission, but not to allow a court to sua sponte clarify prior order in absence of any clerical or scrivener's error. Willis v. Brammer, 20 Neb. App. 574, 826 N.W.2d 908 (2013).
Subsection (3) of this section, which allows for the correction of clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission by an order nunc pro tunc, does not authorize the district court to correct mistakes or errors made by a party or the party's attorney. Bevard v. Kelly, 15 Neb. App. 960, 739 N.W.2d 243 (2007).
The county court may correct clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission by issuing an order nunc pro tunc as provided in subsection (3) of this section. State v. Ziemann, 14 Neb. App. 117, 705 N.W.2d 59 (2005).
8. Other grounds
The district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to reopen the case where "new evidence" was not material to the proponent's case and could have been discovered through due diligence. Frederick v. City of Falls City, 295 Neb. 795, 890 N.W.2d 498 (2017).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, a district court has inherent authority to vacate or modify a decision within the same term that the decision is rendered. Such decision will be reversed only if it is shown that the district court abused its discretion. Hartman v. Hartman, 265 Neb. 515, 657 N.W.2d 646 (2003).
As a general rule, in order to make a sufficient showing for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the proof in support thereof must show that such evidence is now available which neither the litigant nor counsel could have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence and that the evidence is not merely cumulative but competent, relevant, and material, and of such character as to reasonably justify a belief that its admission would bring about a different result if a new trial were granted. DeVaux v. DeVaux, 245 Neb. 611, 514 N.W.2d 640 (1994).
Newly discovered evidence is not grounds for a motion for new trial where the exercise of reasonable diligence would have produced the evidence. A motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence must allege that the evidence could not have been discovered during term with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Reasonable diligence means appropriate action where there is some reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in a channel in which it will be successful. DeVaux v. DeVaux, 245 Neb. 611, 514 N.W.2d 640 (1994).
Judgment may be attacked after two years where relief is sought upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Thomas v. Flynn, 169 Neb. 458, 100 N.W.2d 37 (1959).
Court is not authorized to set aside judgment or order after term because of plaintiff's own mistake, inadvertence or neglect. State ex rel. Spillman v. Commercial State Bank of Omaha, 143 Neb. 490, 10 N.W.2d 268 (1943).
One seeking writ of error coram nobis to vacate judgment against him on ground that he was of unsound mind must begin proceedings within two years after disability is removed. Newcomb v. State, 129 Neb. 69, 261 N.W. 348 (1935).
In compensation case, decree may be modified any time after six months on ground of decrease or increase of disability. Metropolitan Dining Room v. Jensen, 126 Neb. 765, 254 N.W. 405 (1934).
Failure to appoint guardian ad litem in partition suit is erroneous, and appropriate remedy is by a proceeding in error, not by proceeding to vacate judgment hereunder. Schleuning v. Tatro, 122 Neb. 3, 238 N.W. 741 (1931).
Conditions for granting a new trial upon newly discovered evidence stated. Smith v. Goodman, 100 Neb. 284, 159 N.W. 418 (1916).
Court of equity will grant new trial where party is deprived of bill of exceptions by failure of reporter to furnish in time. Ferber v. Leise, 97 Neb. 795, 151 N.W. 307 (1915).
Minor must institute action to vacate decree within two years after becoming of age. Kiplinger v. Joslyn, 93 Neb. 40, 139 N.W. 1019 (1913).
New trial may be granted for perjury of successful party. Wirth v. Weigand, 85 Neb. 115, 122 N.W. 714 (1909).
Interlocutory order may be vacated at subsequent term without compliance with this section. Godfrey v. Cunningham, 77 Neb. 462, 109 N.W. 765 (1906).
Section is not applicable to matters arising subsequent to judgment depriving party of review. Ritchey v. Seeley, 73 Neb. 164, 102 N.W. 256 (1905).
Provisions of code in regard to vacation of judgments and granting of new trials is not exclusive. Meyers v. Smith, 59 Neb. 30, 80 N.W. 273 (1899).
If record shows defendant is infant, remedy is by error. Manfull v. Graham, 55 Neb. 645, 76 N.W. 19 (1898).
Petition to set aside judgment must allege one or more of the statutory grounds for granting new trial. Kirkham v. Gibson, 52 Neb. 23, 71 N.W. 960 (1897).
Court has power to correct record to conform to facts. Wachsmuth v. Orient Ins. Co., 49 Neb. 590, 68 N.W. 935 (1896).
Court has power to correct decree to conform to pleadings; stay of execution is not waiver of right to correction. Hoagland v. Way, 35 Neb. 387, 53 N.W. 207 (1892).
Court may correct record to conform to judgment actually rendered. Brownlee v. Davidson, 28 Neb. 785, 45 N.W. 51 (1890).
Section applies to voidable but not void judgments. Baldwin v. Burt, 2 Neb. Unof. 377, 2 Neb. Unof. 383, 96 N.W. 401 (1902).
9. Miscellaneous
A court treats a motion to reinstate a case after an order of dismissal as a motion to vacate the order, and a court generally has jurisdiction over a motion to vacate an order of dismissal and reinstate a case. Schaaf v. Schaaf, 312 Neb. 1, 978 N.W.2d 1 (2022).
The district court's authority to reinstate a case following its grant of partial summary judgment on one of several claims was unaffected by the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of the entire action, to which the plaintiffs were not statutorily entitled. Schaaf v. Schaaf, 312 Neb. 1, 978 N.W.2d 1 (2022).
Courts have the power to vacate or modify their own judgments and orders at any time during the term at which they were pronounced. But this power may not be used to circumvent the Legislature's power to fix the time limit to take an appeal. A court may not vacate an order or judgment and reinstate it at a later date just for the purpose of extending the time for appeal. One exception to this rule against using a court's power to vacate as a tool to extend the time for appeal is where a clerk fails to provide notice of a judgment to a party, thereby impairing the party's ability to appeal. In re Interest of Luz P. et al., 295 Neb. 814, 891 N.W.2d 651 (2017).
Juvenile courts have the power to vacate or modify their own judgments and orders during or after the term in which they were made in the same manner as provided for district courts under this section. In re Interest of Luz P. et al., 295 Neb. 814, 891 N.W.2d 651 (2017).
The time for exercise of the trial court’s inherent power to vacate its judgment as extended by subsection (1) had expired where the complaint to vacate was filed 20 months after dismissal of the action. Carlson v. Allianz Versicherungs-AG, 287 Neb. 628, 844 N.W.2d 264 (2014).
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its judgment under subsection (4) of this section, because the complaint to vacate was not properly served under the Hague Convention. Carlson v. Allianz Versicherungs-AG, 287 Neb. 628, 844 N.W.2d 264 (2014).
The question of whether a paternity decree should be set aside must be determined under section 43-1412.01, applicable to setting aside a judgment of paternity, and not under the provisions of this section, applicable to vacating judgments in general. Jeffrey B. v. Amy L., 283 Neb. 940, 814 N.W.2d 737 (2012).
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, "pendency" refers to the period of time after notice of appeal has been filed but before the parties have submitted the case at argument. Eicher v. Mid America Fin. Invest. Corp., 275 Neb. 462, 748 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
"Submitted for decision" refers to the period after the case was submitted at oral argument but before appellate court's opinion has issued. Eicher v. Mid America Fin. Invest. Corp., 275 Neb. 462, 748 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
An appellate court will reverse a decision on a motion to vacate or modify a judgment under the statutory grounds listed in this section only if the litigant shows that the district court abused its discretion. Nye v. Fire Group Partnership, 263 Neb. 735, 642 N.W.2d 149 (2002).
As a discretionary matter, the determination of whether a default judgment should be set aside after term will, on appeal, be presumed to have been made in proper exercise of that discretion where the contrary does not appear from the record. Diplomat Inn, Inc. v. Weindorf, 206 Neb. 565, 293 N.W.2d 861 (1980).
Where defendant not properly served, had no knowledge of his attorney's withdrawal, and had a meritorious defense, the district court may properly vacate its default judgment. Tietsort v. Ranne, 200 Neb. 651, 264 N.W.2d 860 (1978).
This section does not provide the district court power to vacate a judgment after term on claim of error of law. Paine v. United States Nat. Bank of Omaha, 199 Neb. 248, 257 N.W.2d 826 (1977).
One seeking to open up a judgment secured by constructive service must act within five years and must, by a preponderance of the evidence, show that he had no notice prior to judgment and he must file a meritorious answer. Wittwer v. Dorland, 198 Neb. 361, 253 N.W.2d 26 (1977).
Costs may be retaxed at subsequent term when court has failed to follow a mandatory statutory duty to tax costs, in event of clerical error, failure to perform a ministerial act, and in instances authorized by this section for vacation or modification of judgments at a subsequent term. Muff v. Mahloch Farms Co., Inc., 186 Neb. 151, 181 N.W.2d 258 (1970).
This section is cited as illustration of the meaning of the term "final judgment." Kometcher v. Wade, 177 Neb. 299, 128 N.W.2d 781 (1964).
Power to modify judgment ends with adjournment of term. Meier v. Nelsen, 156 Neb. 666, 57 N.W.2d 273 (1953).
Failure to institute proceedings to set aside tax foreclosure did not bar easement. Jurgensen v. Ainscow, 155 Neb. 701, 53 N.W.2d 196 (1952).
Remedy under this section is concurrent with exercise of independent equity jurisdiction. Shinn v. Shinn, 148 Neb. 832, 29 N.W.2d 629 (1947).
Order at subsequent term directing that all parties be placed in status quo was unauthorized where judicial sale had not been vacated, although confirmation had been set aside at same term. Enquist v. Enquist, 146 Neb. 708, 21 N.W.2d 404 (1946).
Where court found that petition to modify decree did not state facts sufficient to grant relief, it was error to re-enter decree with additional findings therein. Hallgren v. Williams, 146 Neb. 525, 20 N.W.2d 499 (1945).
Procedure for vacation of judgments does not apply to municipal courts. State Furniture Co. v. Abrams, 146 Neb. 342, 19 N.W.2d 627 (1945).
An order, fixing a time for the filing of petitions in intervention by a claimant whose claim has been classified as invalid by the receiver of an insolvent bank, is not a judgment within the meaning of this article. State ex rel. Sorensen v. South Omaha State Bank, 135 Neb. 478, 282 N.W. 382 (1938).
Court which rendered judgment alone can vacate regardless of residence of parties. Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 131 Neb. 724, 269 N.W. 818 (1936); Trimble & Blackman v. Corey & Son, 78 Neb. 639, 111 N.W. 376 (1907).
Statute authorizing new trial in civil actions at subsequent term on ground of newly discovered evidence is not available in criminal case. Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 261 N.W. 339 (1935).
In mortgage foreclosure, petition to set aside decree after term of court at which it was rendered cannot be maintained after sale under decree on ground of error in computation of interest where parties knew or should have known of error and, after knowledge of error, took a stay of order of sale. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Arthur, 124 Neb. 496, 247 N.W. 17 (1933).
Evidence was not sufficient to sustain grounds to vacate or modify judgment hereunder. Citizens Bank of Ogallala v. Lister, 123 Neb. 386, 242 N.W. 926 (1932).
Judge at chambers is without jurisdiction to modify or correct judgment except by consent. Nicholson v. Getchell, 113 Neb. 248, 202 N.W. 618 (1925); Kime v. Fenner, 54 Neb. 476, 74 N.W. 869 (1898).
Statutory time to bring proceedings hereunder is not applicable to orders nunc pro tunc. Calloway v. Doty, 108 Neb. 319, 188 N.W. 104 (1922).
Statements by third party that action had been settled did not constitute ground for vacating default. Kulhanek v. Kulhanek, 106 Neb. 595, 184 N.W. 139 (1921).
New trial was denied where issue was disputed on whether court promised extension of time in which to settle bill of exceptions. Ferber v. Leise, 101 Neb. 374, 163 N.W. 317 (1917).
Requires service of summons or voluntary appearance and due proof. Wunrath v. Peoples Furniture & Carpet Co., 98 Neb. 342, 152 N.W. 736 (1915).
Error in computation of interest in decree cannot be remedied hereunder. Girard Trust Co. v. Null, 97 Neb. 324, 149 N.W. 809 (1914).
General statement that petitioner has meritorious action or defense is sufficient in absence of attack by motion or demurrer. Wagener v. Whitmore, 79 Neb. 558, 113 N.W. 238 (1907).
Party must show due diligence at former trial. Citizens Ins. Co. v. Herpolsheimer Imp. Co., 78 Neb. 707, 111 N.W. 606 (1907).
Court cannot vacate judgment upon void service. McCormick Harv. Machine Co. v. Stires, 68 Neb. 432, 94 N.W. 629 (1903).
Motion to vacate until acted upon has no effect on decree. Omaha Loan & Trust Co. v. Walenz, 64 Neb. 89, 89 N.W. 623 (1902).
Where proceeding is brought under this section, ruling thereon is res judicata in subsequent suit to enjoin enforcement of judgment. Slater v. Skirving, 51 Neb. 108, 70 N.W. 493 (1897).
Court should not set aside judgment until it first ascertains that applicant has valid cause of action or defense. Western Assur. Co. of Toronto v. Klein, 48 Neb. 904, 67 N.W. 873 (1896).
Affidavit for attachment must be filed before notice is served. State ex rel. Austrian, Wise & Co. v. Duncan, 37 Neb. 631, 56 N.W. 214 (1893).
Remedy afforded by this section is not a new action, but proceeding in original action. Morse & Co. v. Engle, 26 Neb. 247, 41 N.W. 1098 (1889).
Trial court had no obligation, under statute permitting correction of clerical mistakes in judgments, to set supersedeas bond pending borrower's appeal from order entered in forcible entry and detainer action, so as to prevent issuance of writ of restitution pending borrower's appeal from judgment entered in forcible entry and detainer action brought by lender who purchased property at trustees' sale after borrower defaulted on deed of trust; rather, it was borrower who should have posted supersedeas bond to prevent writ of restitution from being issued pending appeal. Enterprise Bank v. Knight, 20 Neb. App. 662, 832 N.W.2d 25 (2013).
Under this section, a nunc pro tunc matter is not submitted for decision in the appellate court until after the hearing. State v. Ziemann, 14 Neb. App. 117, 705 N.W.2d 59 (2005).
The plain language of this section limits the operation of subsection (3) to nunc pro tunc orders as they existed under prior case law; that is, a nunc pro tunc order operates to correct a clerical error or a scrivener's error, not to change or revise a judgment or order, or set aside a judgment actually rendered, or to render an order different from the one actually rendered, even if such order was not the order intended. In re Interest of Antone C. et al., 12 Neb. App. 466, 677 N.W.2d 190 (2004).
A court may modify or vacate a judgment after the term has expired under any of the nine reasons set out in this statute or under the court's independent equity jurisdiction. Portland v. Portland, 5 Neb. App. 364, 558 N.W.2d 605 (1997).
25-2002.
District court judgment; proceedings to vacate or modify; summons; waiver of error.The proceedings to vacate or modify the judgment or order on the grounds mentioned in subsection (4) of section 25-2001 shall be by complaint, setting forth the judgment or order, the grounds to vacate or modify it, and the defense to the action, if the party applying was defendant. On such complaint a summons shall issue and be served as in the commencement of an action. Summons shall not issue in any case in which there is upon the minutes of the court, or among the files of the case, a waiver of error by the party or the party's attorney, unless the court or a judge thereof endorses upon the complaint permission to issue such summons.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 603, p. 501; R.S.1913, § 8208; C.S.1922, § 9161; C.S.1929, § 20-2002; R.S.1943, § 25-2002;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 18; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 28.
Annotations
1. Jurisdiction
2. Pleading
3. Evidence
4. Miscellaneous
1. Jurisdiction
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its judgment under section 25-2001(4), because the complaint to vacate was not properly served under the Hague Convention. Carlson v. Allianz Versicherungs-AG, 287 Neb. 628, 844 N.W.2d 264 (2014).
The provisions of this section apply only to a modification of a judgment entered at a subsequent term. Hyde v. Shapiro, 216 Neb. 785, 346 N.W.2d 241 (1984).
Fraud may only be taken advantage of by action. Gasper v. Mazur, 157 Neb. 857, 62 N.W.2d 117 (1954).
Final order of county court in proceeding to set aside fraudulent judgment after term is reviewable by district court on appeal. Gainsforth v. Peterson, 114 Neb. 442, 207 N.W. 935 (1926).
District judge is not vested with jurisdiction at chambers to modify judgment, except by consent. Nicholson v. Getchell, 113 Neb. 248, 202 N.W. 618 (1925).
2. Pleading
Proceedings to vacate or modify a judgment or order on the grounds mentioned in section 25-2001 shall be by petition verified by affidavit. Haen v. Haen, 210 Neb. 380, 314 N.W.2d 276 (1982).
To obtain relief for vacation of judgment at subsequent term, petition must be filed. Shipley v. McNeel, 149 Neb. 793, 32 N.W.2d 636 (1948).
Application for modification should set forth the defense the applicant has to the original action. Hoeppner v. Bruckman, 129 Neb. 390, 261 N.W. 572 (1935).
Petition to vacate judgment for fraud filed more than two years after the entry thereof, which showed discovery of fraud within two-year period but alleged no ground for extending period, was properly stricken. Brandeen v. Beale, 117 Neb. 291, 220 N.W. 298 (1928).
Suit in equity to cancel judgment should be dismissed where facts pleaded fail to disclose meritorious defense. Westman v. Carlson, 86 Neb. 847, 126 N.W. 515 (1910).
Petition need not be verified positively. Anthony & Co. v. Karbach, 64 Neb. 509, 90 N.W. 243 (1902).
Petition must show one of grounds in preceding section. Kirkham v. Gibson, 52 Neb. 23, 71 N.W. 960 (1897).
3. Evidence
Not error to deny defendant a separate trial where codefendant's inculpating testimony subject to full cross-examination and no prejudice shown to defendant. State v. Edwards, 197 Neb. 354, 248 N.W.2d 775 (1977).
It is error to vacate judgment assailed by petition without evidence to sustain allegation of petition. Trimble & Blackman v. Corey & Son, 78 Neb. 639, 111 N.W. 376 (1907).
4. Miscellaneous
To vacate for irregularity, it is unnecessary to tender answer with motion. Fisk v. Thorp, 60 Neb. 713, 84 N.W. 79 (1900).
Defense need not be complete to entire claim; it is sufficient if it be to a substantial part. Kime v. Fenner, 54 Neb. 476, 74 N.W. 869 (1898).
25-2003.
Repealed. Laws 2000, LB 921, § 38.
25-2004.
District court judgment; grounds for vacation or modification; determination.The court may first try and decide upon the grounds to vacate or modify a judgment or order, before trying or deciding upon the validity of the defense or cause of action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 605, p. 501; R.S.1913, § 8210; C.S.1922, § 9163; C.S.1929, § 20-2004; R.S.1943, § 25-2004.
Annotations
Court should not try out merits of controversy at same time it determines whether or not a valid cause of action or defense has been presented. Miller v. Schlereth, 151 Neb. 33, 36 N.W.2d 497 (1949).
Attempt of county court to vacate judgment in civil action after term, without notice, was void. Stone v. Jensen, 118 Neb. 254, 224 N.W. 284 (1929).
Court should hear evidence on petition to vacate before entry of order. Trimble & Blackman v. Corey & Son, 78 Neb. 639, 111 N.W. 376 (1907).
General finding is sufficient in absence of request for special findings. Anthony & Co. v. Karbach, 64 Neb. 509, 90 N.W. 243 (1902).
It is not necessary to tender an answer with a motion to vacate. Fisk v. Thorp, 60 Neb. 713, 84 N.W. 79 (1900).
25-2005.
District court judgment; vacation; existence of valid claim or defense a prerequisite; preservation of liens upon modification.A judgment shall not be vacated on motion or complaint, until it is adjudged that there is a valid defense to the action in which the judgment is rendered, or, if the plaintiff seeks its vacation, that there is a valid cause of action; and when a judgment is modified, all liens and securities obtained under it shall be preserved to the modified judgment.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 606, p. 501; R.S.1913, § 8211; C.S.1922, § 9164; C.S.1929, § 20-2005; R.S.1943, § 25-2005;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 29.
Annotations
Prerequisite to vacation of judgment is showing of valid defense. Gasper v. Mazur, 157 Neb. 857, 62 N.W.2d 117 (1954).
Plaintiff seeking vacation of judgment after term must allege and prove valid cause of action. Morrill County v. Bliss, 125 Neb. 97, 249 N.W. 98 (1933).
Court must adjudge that cause of action is prima facie valid before it is authorized to take action on motion. Gavin v. Reed, 73 Neb. 237, 102 N.W. 455 (1905).
Mere showing of want of service of summons is not sufficient. Baldwin v. Burt, 54 Neb. 287, 74 N.W. 594 (1898).
Party seeking to vacate judgment after term must plead and prove valid cause or defense. Gilbert v. Marrow, 54 Neb. 77, 74 N.W. 420 (1898).
"Adjudged" means judicially determined. Western Assur. Co. of Toronto v. Klein, 48 Neb. 904, 67 N.W. 873 (1896).
Applicant must allege and prove valid defense or cause of action. Bond v. Wycoff, 42 Neb. 214, 60 N.W. 564 (1894).
Motion to vacate must be accompanied by answer. McBrien v. Riley, 38 Neb. 561, 57 N.W. 385 (1894).
25-2006.
District court judgment; proceedings to vacate or modify; injunction.The party seeking to vacate or modify a judgment or order, may obtain an injunction suspending proceedings on the whole or part thereof, which injunction may be granted by the court, or any judge thereof, upon its being rendered probable, by affidavit or by exhibition of the record, that the party is entitled to have such judgment or order vacated or modified.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 607, p. 502; R.S.1913, § 8212; C.S.1922, § 9165; C.S.1929, § 20-2006; R.S.1943, § 25-2006.
25-2007.
District court judgment; rendition before action regularly stood for trial; rights of defendant; no showing of valid defense required.When the judgment was rendered before the action stood for trial, the suspension may be granted as provided in section 25-2006, although no valid defense to the action is shown; and the court shall make such orders concerning the executions to be issued on the judgment, as shall give to the defendant the same rights of delay he would have had if the judgment had been rendered at the proper time.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 608, p. 502; R.S.1913, § 8213; C.S.1922, § 9166; C.S.1929, § 20-2007; R.S.1943, § 25-2007.
Annotations
Notice required by this section only applies when a default is to be taken in chambers. Frazier, Inc. v. Alexander, 183 Neb. 451, 161 N.W.2d 505 (1968).
Where trial court vacated order of confirmation but did not set aside sale, return of purchase money was not warranted. Enquist v. Enquist, 146 Neb. 708, 21 N.W.2d 404 (1946).
25-2008.
District court judgment; proceedings to vacate or modify; statute of limitations.Proceedings to vacate or modify a judgment or order, for the causes mentioned in subsection (4) of section 25-2001 must be commenced no later than two years after the entry of the judgment or order unless the party entitled thereto is an infant or person of unsound mind, and then no later than two years after removal of such disability.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 609, p. 502; Laws 1899, c. 88, § 1, p. 344; R.S.1913, § 8214; C.S.1922, § 9167; C.S.1929, § 20-2008; R.S.1943, § 25-2008;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 19.
Annotations
1. Statute of limitations
2. Miscellaneous
1. Statute of limitations
Equity will afford relief against a judgment procured by fraud of the successful party, when it appears that the injured party did not, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, discover, within the time allowed for commencing the proceeding to vacate such judgment, sufficient evidence of the fraud to warrant a reasonable belief that such a proceeding would be successful if begun. In re Estate of West, 226 Neb. 813, 415 N.W.2d 769 (1987).
This section governs the vacation or modification of judgments after the term, and for mistake or omissions by the clerk, proceedings may be commenced within three years. Pofahl v. Pofahl, 196 Neb. 347, 243 N.W.2d 55 (1976).
If defendant's motion is viewed as an application for a writ of coram nobis, it was not effective because not filed within time limited by statute. State v. Rhodes, 192 Neb. 557, 222 N.W.2d 837 (1974).
Judgment may be attacked after two years where relief is sought upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Thomas v. Flynn, 169 Neb. 458, 100 N.W.2d 37 (1959).
District court may, after term at which order was entered, set aside order vacating decree of divorce, within time prescribed. Vasa v. Vasa, 165 Neb. 69, 84 N.W.2d 185 (1957).
Application to vacate approval of property settlement in divorce proceeding was filed in time. Pasko v. Trela, 153 Neb. 759, 46 N.W.2d 139 (1951).
To vacate judgment on ground of death of party, action must be brought within three years after defendant had notice of judgment. McNally v. McNally, 152 Neb. 845, 43 N.W.2d 170 (1950).
Proceedings to vacate judgment approving settlement in workmen's compensation case must be commenced within two years from rendition of judgment. Miller v. Schlereth, 151 Neb. 33, 36 N.W.2d 497 (1949).
Limitation of two years does not prevent setting aside of divorce decree where parties resumed marital relations within six months from entry of decree. Shinn v. Shinn, 148 Neb. 832, 29 N.W.2d 629 (1947).
Proceeding to set aside judgment for fraud must be brought within two years unless fraud was not discovered within that period. Katz v. Swanson, 147 Neb. 791, 24 N.W.2d 923 (1946).
Petition to set aside order rejecting claim in receivership proceeding upon ground of fraud was properly dismissed when filed more than two years after entry of order. State ex rel. Spillman v. Commercial State Bank of Omaha, 143 Neb. 490, 10 N.W.2d 268 (1943).
Proceeding to set aside judgment of district court disallowing will and denying probate thereof is barred after two years from rendition of the judgment. In re Estate of McLean, 138 Neb. 752, 295 N.W. 270 (1940).
A petition filed more than two years after judgment to set aside the judgment for fraud, which shows on its face the fraud was discovered within the two-year period, does not state a cause of action. In re Estate of Jensen, 135 Neb. 602, 283 N.W. 196 (1939).
Where no good cause was shown by plaintiff why proceedings were not instituted within two years to vacate order of dismissal as provided by statute, equity will refuse relief. Lindstrom v. Nilsson, 133 Neb. 184, 274 N.W. 485 (1937).
Proceedings to modify judgment or order must be commenced within two years. Hoeppner v. Bruckman, 129 Neb. 390, 261 N.W. 572 (1935).
Proceeding to vacate judgment for fraud practiced against one of unsound mind, must be commenced within two years of time disability is removed. Newcomb v. State, 129 Neb. 69, 261 N.W. 348 (1935); Scott v. Scott, 125 Neb. 32, 248 N.W. 923 (1933).
Petition to vacate judgment for fraud after two years is properly stricken where it shows on face fraud discovered within two-year period. Brandeen v. Beale, 117 Neb. 291, 220 N.W. 298 (1928).
A female under this section must commence her suit within two years after becoming of age. Kiplinger v. Joslyn, 93 Neb. 40, 139 N.W. 1019 (1913).
To open judgment for fraud petition must show facts were not discovered within two years. State ex rel. Nelson v. Lincoln Med. Col., 86 Neb. 269, 125 N.W. 517 (1910).
Proceeding to vacate judgment for mistake, neglect, or omission of clerk must be brought within three years. Brownlee v. Davidson, 28 Neb. 785, 45 N.W. 51 (1890).
Motion to retax costs must be made within three years. Cattle v. Haddox, 17 Neb. 307, 22 N.W. 565 (1885).
2. Miscellaneous
On refusal of application to vacate judgment for plaintiff on fire policy, court may award reasonable attorney's fee to plaintiff. Messing v. Dwelling House Mut. Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 36, 226 N.W. 914 (1929).
Equity will afford relief against fraudulent judgment where fraud was not discovered in time for statutory proceedings to vacate after term. Krause v. Long, 109 Neb. 846, 192 N.W. 729 (1923).
This section is not applicable to motion for entry of judgment or order nunc pro tunc. Calloway v. Doty, 108 Neb. 319, 188 N.W. 104 (1922).
Action may be brought by infant at any time before maturity. Martin v. Long, 53 Neb. 694, 74 N.W. 43 (1898).
This section is not applicable to a motion for an entry nunc pro tunc of a judgment or order. Hyde v. Michelson, 52 Neb. 680, 72 N.W. 1035 (1897).
25-2009.
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and county court judgments; laws applicable.The provisions of Chapter 25 shall apply to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and county court, so far as the same may be applicable to the judgments or final orders of such courts. The parties shall be limited to the same time in which to commence proceedings; and in estimating time, the county court shall, for such purpose, be considered as holding, in each year, a regular term of court commencing on January 1.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 610, p. 502; R.S.1913, § 8215; C.S.1922, § 9168; C.S.1929, § 20-2009; Laws 1941, c. 30, § 1, p. 139; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-2009; R.S.1943, § 25-2009;
Laws 2006, LB 1115, § 17.
Annotations
1. Power
2. Procedure
3. Miscellaneous
1. Power
A county court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction is not bound by the statute which fixes its terms within which its jurisdiction in civil cases must be exercised. In re Estate of Reikofski, 144 Neb. 735, 14 N.W.2d 379 (1944).
County court has power to vacate order in probate proceedings at subsequent term. In re Estate of Sheerer, 137 Neb. 374, 289 N.W. 529 (1940).
County court cannot vacate or modify judgment in civil cases beyond jurisdiction of justice after monthly term except as provided by statute. Stone v. Jensen, 118 Neb. 254, 224 N.W. 284 (1929).
Justices and county courts exercising justice jurisdiction are not empowered to vacate judgment after time to appeal has expired, nor to vacate fraudulent judgment after term. Carlson v. Ray, 104 Neb. 18, 175 N.W. 886 (1919).
County court may vacate probate procured by fraud and permit contest of will. In re Estate of Kelly, 103 Neb. 513, 172 N.W. 758 (1919), rehearing denied 103 Neb. 524, 175 N.W. 653 (1919).
The county court may correct clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission by issuing an order nunc pro tunc as provided in section 25-2001(3). State v. Ziemann, 14 Neb. App. 117, 705 N.W.2d 59 (2005).
2. Procedure
This section makes proceedings to vacate or modify judgment at subsequent term applicable to Supreme and county courts. In re Estate of Jensen, 135 Neb. 602, 283 N.W. 196 (1939).
Law authorizing district court to vacate judgment cannot be invoked after judgment is pronounced regular by Supreme Court. Brandeen v. Beale, 117 Neb. 291, 220 N.W. 298 (1928).
Final order of county court in proceeding to set aside fraudulent judgment is reviewable by district court on appeal. Gainsforth v. Peterson, 114 Neb. 442, 207 N.W. 935 (1926).
Procedure to vacate judgment applies to county court in exercise of probate jurisdiction. Oakdale Heat & Light Co. v. Seymour, 78 Neb. 50, 114 N.W. 643 (1908).
3. Miscellaneous
Statutory provision is exclusive. State v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 771, 111 N.W. 118 (1907).
25-2101.
Action on bonds or insurance; by whom and how brought.When an officer, executor, or administrator within this state, by misconduct or neglect of duty, forfeits his or her bond or commercial insurance policy or renders his or her sureties liable, any person injured thereby, or who is by law entitled to the benefit of the security, may bring an action thereon in his or her own name against the officer, executor, or administrator, and his or her sureties, to recover the amount to which he or she may be entitled by reason of the delinquency. The action may be instituted and proceeded in on a certified copy of the bond or commercial insurance policy, which copy shall be furnished by the person holding the original thereof.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 643, p. 507; R.S.1913, § 8216; C.S.1922, § 9169; C.S.1929, § 20-2101; R.S.1943, § 25-2101;
Laws 2004, LB 884, § 13.
Annotations
Section refers to bond given under statutory authority only. Cushing v. Lickert, 79 Neb. 384, 112 N.W. 616 (1907).
Any person entitled to benefit of bond may sue thereon in his own name. Barker v. Wheeler, 71 Neb. 740, 99 N.W. 548 (1904).
That bond is joint instead of joint and several is no defense. Wilcox v. Perkins County, 70 Neb. 139, 97 N.W. 236 (1903).
County is not a necessary party. Stewart v. Carter, 4 Neb. 564 (1876).
25-2102.
Further action; authorized.A judgment in favor of a party for one delinquency does not preclude the same or another party from an action on the same security for another delinquency.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 644, p. 507; R.S.1913, § 8217; C.S.1922, § 9170; C.S.1929, § 20-2102; R.S.1943, § 25-2102.
25-2103.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2104.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2105.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2106.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2107.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2108.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2109.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2110.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2111.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2112.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2113.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2114.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2115.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2116.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2117.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2118.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2119.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2120.
Repealed. Laws 1987, LB 71, § 25.
25-2121.
Conduct constituting contempt; powers of court of record to punish.Every court of record shall have power to punish by fine and imprisonment, or by either, as for criminal contempt, persons guilty of (1) disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior towards the court, or any of its officers in its presence; (2) any breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance tending to interrupt its proceedings; (3) willful disobedience of or resistance willfully offered to any lawful process or order of said court; (4) any willful attempt to obstruct the proceedings, or hinder the due administration of justice in any suit, proceedings, or process pending before the courts; or (5) contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn or affirmed as a witness, and when sworn or affirmed, refusal to answer any legal and proper interrogatory.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 669, p. 512; R.S.1913, § 8236; C.S.1922, § 9189; C.S.1929, § 20-2121; R.S.1943, § 25-2121.
Annotations
1. Grounds
2. Procedure
3. Punishment
1. Grounds
The willful refusal of a garnishee who serves as the plan administrator for a judgment debtor's employee benefits plan to comply with section 25-1026 may constitute contempt. Florence Lake Investments v. Berg, 312 Neb. 183, 978 N.W.2d 308 (2022).
Civil contempt proceedings are instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit when a party fails to comply with a court order made for the benefit of the opposing party. Vyhlidal v. Vyhlidal, 309 Neb. 376, 960 N.W.2d 309 (2021).
For purposes of subsection (3) of this section, "willful" means the violation was committed intentionally, with knowledge that the act was in violation of the lawful process or court order. In re Contempt of Sileven, 219 Neb. 34, 361 N.W.2d 189 (1985); State v. Thalken, 2 Neb. App. 867, 516 N.W.2d 635 (1994).
Disobedience of an injunction must be willful before a breach thereof is contempt. Paasch v. Brown, 199 Neb. 683, 260 N.W.2d 612 (1977).
Question asked must be pertinent to issue in the case to justify conviction of contempt for refusal to answer question. Tastee Inn, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., Inc., 167 Neb. 264, 92 N.W.2d 664 (1958).
Conduct of bondsman hindered administration of justice. Cornett v. State, 155 Neb. 766, 53 N.W.2d 747 (1952).
Willful disobedience of or resistance willfully offered to any lawful process or order of court constitutes criminal contempt. In re Application of Niklaus, 144 Neb. 503, 13 N.W.2d 655 (1944).
False statements made to court by attorney in respect to substitution of page in pleading constituted criminal contempt. Butterfield v. State, 144 Neb. 388, 13 N.W.2d 572 (1944).
Unless the disobedience of an order of court is willful, it is not contempt. Whipple v. Nelson, 138 Neb. 514, 293 N.W. 382 (1940).
Supreme Court can punish, as contempt, contumacious refusal of witness to answer a legal and proper interrogatory propounded to him in hearing before referee in disbarment proceeding. State v. Degele, 137 Neb. 810, 291 N.W. 554 (1940).
Where layman engages in the practice of "ambulance chasing," he is guilty of contempt of court. State ex rel. Wright v. Hinckle, 137 Neb. 735, 291 N.W. 68 (1940).
Notary may commit a witness for contempt when, during taking of deposition, witness refuses to answer proper questions. Ehlers v. State, 133 Neb. 241, 274 N.W. 570 (1937).
Former husband's failure to make payments for support of children as required by decree of divorce is not contumacious if due to lack of means and ability to procure means to pay such support money. Scott v. State, 132 Neb. 39, 270 N.W. 833 (1937).
Willful disobedience of injunction order constituted contempt. McFry v. City of Lincoln, 127 Neb. 404, 255 N.W. 239 (1934).
Obstructing sheriff in holding foreclosure sale was contempt of court. Lux v. State, 126 Neb. 133, 252 N.W. 897 (1934).
Editorial relating to case pending on appeal to Supreme Court was contemptuous per se. State v. Lovell, 117 Neb. 710, 222 N.W. 625 (1929).
Discussion of merits of case by juror with person outside of court was contempt. Rozean v. State, 109 Neb. 354, 191 N.W. 319 (1922).
Abuse of freedom of the press relating to undetermined cases in court will sustain conviction of contempt. Bee Pub. Co. v. State, 107 Neb. 74, 185 N.W. 339 (1921).
Reprehensible misconduct in open court is contempt. Aabel v. State, 86 Neb. 711, 126 N.W. 316 (1910).
Section is merely confirmatory of common law power. State v. Rosewater, 60 Neb. 438, 83 N.W. 353 (1900); State v. Bee Pub. Co., 60 Neb. 282, 83 N.W. 204 (1900).
Party may be guilty of contempt in disobeying erroneous order. Jenkins v. State, 59 Neb. 68, 80 N.W. 268 (1899).
Power to punish for contempt is inherent in courts of common law jurisdiction regardless of statute. Nebraska Children's Home Soc. v. State, 57 Neb. 765, 78 N.W. 267 (1899).
Failure to pay decree for alimony is not contempt per se. Leeder v. State, 55 Neb. 133, 75 N.W. 541 (1898); Segear v. Segear, 23 Neb. 306, 36 N.W. 536 (1888).
Statement of grounds of objection to trial before presiding judge, if on good points, is not contempt. Le Hane v. State, 48 Neb. 105, 66 N.W. 1017 (1896).
Attorney's refusal to practice before certain judge with statement of reasons, is not contempt. Hawes v. State, 46 Neb. 149, 64 N.W. 699 (1895).
Publication regarding a cause during its pendency in court of an article which tends to embarrass administration of justice is a contempt. Percival v. State, 45 Neb. 741, 64 N.W. 221 (1895).
Party ignoring alternative writ of mandamus may be guilty of contempt. McAleese v. State, 42 Neb. 886, 61 N.W. 88 (1894).
Exception to charge of judge to grand jury for purpose of securing ruling thereon is not contempt. Clair v. State, 40 Neb. 534, 59 N.W. 118 (1894).
The power to punish for contempt of court is inherent in every judicial tribunal. Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F.Supp. 624 (D. Neb. 1962).
2. Procedure
In order to prove civil contempt, unless the alleged contemptuous acts occurred within the presence of the judge, or the parties stipulate otherwise, an evidentiary hearing is necessary so that the moving party can offer evidence to demonstrate both that a violation of a court order occurred and that the violation was willful. Vyhlidal v. Vyhlidal, 309 Neb. 376, 960 N.W.2d 309 (2021).
Where an affidavit is used to prosecute a contempt charge, failure to use the word "willful" is not fatal where the reading of the affidavit clearly indicates intentional disobedience. Sempek v. Sempek, 198 Neb. 300, 252 N.W.2d 284 (1977).
The right of confrontation does not apply to criminal contempt proceedings and defendant's presence is not required if there have been suitable notice and adequate opportunity to appear and be heard. State v. Rhodes, 192 Neb. 557, 222 N.W.2d 837 (1974).
Deposition of defendant can be taken in contempt proceeding. State ex rel. Beck v. Lush, 168 Neb. 367, 95 N.W.2d 695 (1959).
Procedure to punish for violation of mandatory injunction is authorized. Meier v. Nelsen, 156 Neb. 666, 57 N.W.2d 273 (1953).
Criminal contempts must be prosecuted by information in separate action by state. Leeman v. Vocelka, 149 Neb. 702, 32 N.W.2d 274 (1948).
Conviction for contempt may be reviewed only on petition in error, as in criminal cases. Gentle v. Pantel Realty Co., 120 Neb. 630, 234 N.W. 574 (1931); State v. Dodd, 99 Neb. 800, 157 N.W. 1010 (1916).
Formal complaint must be filed and opportunity given to defend, where evidence must be adduced to determine whether contempt has been committed. Gonzalez v. State, 119 Neb. 13, 226 N.W. 801 (1929).
Without formal complaint, finding by court that party to civil action is guilty of contempt is insufficient to sustain conviction. Finegold v. State, 112 Neb. 64, 198 N.W. 572 (1924).
Where offense is committed in court's presence, notice to accused is not essential. In re Dunn, 85 Neb. 606, 124 N.W. 120 (1909).
Where act alleged is contempt per se, accused is not entitled to acquittal on mere denial. Emery v. State, 78 Neb. 547, 111 N.W. 374 (1907).
Presumptions and intendments will not be indulged in to sustain convictions for contempt. Crites v. State, 74 Neb. 687, 105 N.W. 469 (1905).
Disavowal of intent is receivable in extenuation. Mackay v. State, 60 Neb. 143, 82 N.W. 372 (1900).
Proceedings in contempt, in their nature, are criminal. Boyd v. State, 19 Neb. 128, 26 N.W. 925 (1886).
3. Punishment
A party to an action who fails to obey an order of the court, made for the benefit of the opposing party, is, ordinarily, guilty of a mere civil contempt. Vyhlidal v. Vyhlidal, 309 Neb. 376, 960 N.W.2d 309 (2021).
The juvenile court, as a court of record, has the statutory authority pursuant to this section to punish contemptuous conduct by fine or imprisonment. In re Interest of Thomas M., 282 Neb. 316, 803 N.W.2d 46 (2011).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court is a court of record. Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215, 803 N.W.2d 1 (2011).
This section permits a court of record to punish contempt by fine and imprisonment, but not by dismissal of a petition. Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215, 803 N.W.2d 1 (2011).
This section does not limit the court's inherent authority to impose sanctions in addition to those listed herein. Tyler v. Heywood, 258 Neb. 901, 607 N.W.2d 186 (2000).
This section is a codification of the common law of contempt and does not supplant a court's inherent contempt powers. The fact that this section does not list attorney fees as punishment that a court of record may impose in a contempt proceeding does not necessarily prohibit the court from awarding attorney fees under certain circumstances. Attorney fees may also be recovered when a recognized and accepted uniform course of procedure allows recovery of an attorney fee. In re Interest of Krystal P. et al., 251 Neb. 320, 557 N.W.2d 26 (1996).
Failure to support wife and child in violation of court order could be punished by contempt proceedings. State v. Pitzel, 181 Neb. 176, 147 N.W.2d 524 (1966).
Information was sufficient hereunder; sentence of four months in county jail and one hundred dollars fine for attempt to bribe juror was sustained. Kopp v. State, 124 Neb. 363, 246 N.W. 718 (1933).
Proceeding against party for contempt hereunder is in nature of criminal prosecution and governed by rules of construction applicable thereto; sentence of six months in county jail and two hundred fifty dollars fine for attempt to bribe juror was sustained. McCauley v. State, 124 Neb. 102, 245 N.W. 269 (1932).
District court could punish disobedience of its lawful orders by fine or imprisonment, or both. Back v. State, 75 Neb. 603, 106 N.W. 787 (1906).
Power to punish for contempt is conferred, not upon judges, but upon courts of record. Johnson v. Bouton, 35 Neb. 898, 53 N.W. 995 (1892).
25-2122.
Punishment; procedure.Contempts committed in the presence of the court may be punished summarily; in other cases the party upon being brought before the court, shall be notified of the accusation against him, and have a reasonable time to make his defense.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 670, p. 512; R.S.1913, § 8237; C.S.1922, § 9190; C.S.1929, § 20-2122; R.S.1943, § 25-2122.
Annotations
1. Procedure
2. Review
1. Procedure
Before a sanction for criminal contempt of court committed outside the presence of the court may be levied, defendant must be brought before the court, notified of the accusation against him, and given reasonable time to make his defense. State ex rel. Collins v. Beister, 227 Neb. 829, 420 N.W.2d 309 (1988).
Appellant, who was found in contempt for tardiness after receiving notice, adequate time to prepare for a hearing, and a hearing at which he could have offered an excuse or explanation for his tardiness, cannot complain that he was convicted of constructive contempt without a hearing, technically proper notice, and the production of evidence. In re Contempt of Potter, 207 Neb. 769, 301 N.W.2d 560 (1981).
Where an affidavit is used to prosecute a contempt charge, failure to use the word "willful" is not fatal where the reading of the affidavit clearly indicates intentional disobedience. Sempek v. Sempek, 198 Neb. 300, 252 N.W.2d 284 (1977).
The right of confrontation does not apply to criminal contempt proceedings and defendant's presence is not required if there have been suitable notice and adequate opportunity to appear and be heard. State v. Rhodes, 192 Neb. 557, 222 N.W.2d 837 (1974).
Only requirement as to information is that the accused shall be notified of the charge against him when brought before the court. In re Application of Niklaus, 144 Neb. 503, 13 N.W.2d 655 (1944).
Notary may commit a witness for contempt for refusal to answer proper questions during taking of deposition. Ehlers v. State, 133 Neb. 241, 274 N.W. 570 (1937).
Preliminary examination is not necessary in proceedings for contempt. Kopp v. State, 124 Neb. 363, 246 N.W. 718 (1933).
Contempt proceedings are in nature to be deemed criminal, and governed by same rules. Gentle v. Pantel Realty Co., 120 Neb. 630, 234 N.W. 574 (1931).
Summary proceedings for contempt lie only where contempt committed in court's presence and court has judicial cognizance of facts. Judgment not stating facts constituting alleged contempt will not sustain sentence. Gonzalez v. State, 119 Neb. 13, 226 N.W. 801 (1929).
Without formal complaint, finding by court that party to civil action is guilty of contempt will not sustain conviction. Finegold v. State, 112 Neb. 64, 198 N.W. 572 (1924).
Affidavit charging constructive contempt, made by county attorney, is sufficient, though on information and belief. Tasich v. State, 111 Neb. 465, 196 N.W. 688 (1923).
Summary conviction may be had only for contempt committed in presence of court. Gordon v. State, 73 Neb. 221, 102 N.W. 458 (1905).
Proceedings are strictly construed; accused is entitled to be heard in own defense. Beckett v. State, 49 Neb. 210, 68 N.W. 473 (1896); Hawes v. State, 46 Neb. 149, 64 N.W. 699 (1895).
When committed in presence of court, affidavit must state sufficient facts to show that the case is one over which the court has jurisdiction. Hawthorne v. State, 45 Neb. 871, 64 N.W. 359 (1895).
Material facts must be stated. Ludden v. State, 31 Neb. 429, 48 N.W. 61 (1891).
This section does allow summary punishments of contempts committed in the presence of the court. In re Interest of Simon H., 8 Neb. App. 225, 590 N.W.2d 421 (1999).
Charge of contempt committed outside presence of court must be made by information. Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F.Supp. 624 (D. Neb. 1962).
2. Review
Where punishment for contempt not committed in presence of court is imposed by void order without accusation, notice or opportunity to make defense, and without evidence or trial, such order may be reviewed without motion for new trial. Muffly v. State, 129 Neb. 334, 261 N.W. 560 (1935).
Proceeding must be reviewed on error, not by appeal. Hanika v. State, 87 Neb. 845, 128 N.W. 526 (1910).
Judgment may be reviewed on error. Gandy v. State, 13 Neb. 445, 14 N.W. 143 (1882).
25-2123.
Effect of punishment upon criminal liability.Persons punished for contempt under the preceding provisions shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, if such contempt shall amount to an indictable offense; but the court before which the conviction shall be had may, in determining the punishment, take into consideration the punishment before inflicted in mitigation of the sentence.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 671, p. 513; R.S.1913, § 8238; C.S.1922, § 9191; C.S.1929, § 20-2123; R.S.1943, § 25-2123.
Annotations
The right of confrontation does not apply to criminal contempt proceedings and defendant's presence is not required if there have been suitable notice and adequate opportunity to appear and be heard. State v. Rhodes, 192 Neb. 557, 222 N.W.2d 837 (1974).
Action for criminal contempt for practicing law without license was not barred by lapse of time or by statute making it a misdemeanor, there being no statute limiting time for prosecution of such action and no prejudice shown to defendant by delay. State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N.W. 282 (1937).
Failure of information for contempt to use word "willful" is not fatal. Kammer v. State, 105 Neb. 224, 180 N.W. 39 (1920).
25-2124.
Ejectment; complaint; allegations.In an action for the recovery of real property, it shall be sufficient if the complaint states that the plaintiff has a legal estate therein, and is entitled to the possession thereof, describing the same, and that the defendant unlawfully keeps the plaintiff out of the possession. It shall not be necessary to state how the plaintiff's estate or ownership is derived.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 626, p. 505; R.S.1913, § 8239; C.S.1922, § 9192; C.S.1929, § 20-2124; R.S.1943, § 25-2124;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 30.
Annotations
1. Elements
2. Pleadings
3. Title
4. Miscellaneous
1. Elements
Unless a provision in a land installment contract provides that a vendor has the right to declare the contract terminated and repossess the premises if a vendee defaults, the vendor cannot bring an action for ejectment. Beckner v. Urban, 309 Neb. 677, 962 N.W.2d 497 (2021).
The essential elements of ejectment are legal estate, a right of possession in the plaintiff, and unlawful detention by the defendant. K & K Farming v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 237 Neb. 846, 468 N.W.2d 99 (1991); Bridenbaugh v. Bryant, 79 Neb. 329, 112 N.W. 571 (1907).
Plaintiff must have both legal title and right of possession. Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church v. St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 75 Neb. 774, 106 N.W. 1010 (1906).
2. Pleadings
In a proceeding in equity to establish corners and boundaries to land and protection of right of possession thereof, it is not necessary to allege how plaintiff's estate or ownership is derived. McGowan v. Neimann, 139 Neb. 639, 298 N.W. 411 (1941).
Special pleading is not required in ejectment action. Fitch v. Walsh, 94 Neb. 32, 142 N.W. 293 (1913).
In suit by administrator or executor, it is not necessary to allege that plaintiff has a legal estate in the land. Tillson v. Holloway, 90 Neb. 481, 134 N.W. 232 (1912).
Petition must allege plaintiff is entitled to possession. Wells v. Steckelberg, 52 Neb. 597, 72 N.W. 865 (1897); George v. McCullough, 48 Neb. 680, 67 N.W. 758 (1896).
Description of land in petition must be such as would enable a competent surveyor to locate it. Lane v. Abbott, 23 Neb. 489, 37 N.W. 82 (1888).
Where petition contains a particular description, by courses and distances, such description will prevail over a general statement that the land is part of a certain lot. Cushing v. Conness, 4 Neb. Unof. 669, 95 N.W. 855 (1903).
3. Title
Ejectment may be maintained by a vendor of real property against his vendee under an executory contract of sale where vendee is in default and contract provides for forfeiture. Abbas v. Demont, 152 Neb. 77, 40 N.W.2d 265 (1949).
Tax deed constitutes color of title. White v. Musser, 87 Neb. 628, 127 N.W. 1058 (1910).
Plaintiff must recover on strength of own title; adverse possession is defense. Abbott v. Coates, 62 Neb. 247, 86 N.W. 1058 (1901); Comstock v. Kerwin, 57 Neb. 1, 77 N.W. 387 (1898); Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Schalkopf, 54 Neb. 448, 74 N.W. 826 (1898); Omaha Real Estate & Trust Co. v. Kragscow, 47 Neb. 592, 66 N.W. 658 (1896).
Tax sale certificate is not color of title. Webb v. Thiele, 56 Neb. 752, 77 N.W. 56 (1898); McKeighan v. Hopkins, 14 Neb. 361, 15 N.W. 711 (1883).
Plaintiff must show legal estate, but evidence thereof need not be a perfect legal paper title. Lantry v. Wolff, 49 Neb. 374, 68 N.W. 494 (1896).
In trial of title, ejectment is proper proceeding. Snowden v. Tyler, 21 Neb. 199, 31 N.W. 661 (1887).
4. Miscellaneous
In an action in ejectment, a trial court's findings will not be set aside unless clearly wrong. K & K Farming v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 237 Neb. 846, 468 N.W.2d 99 (1991).
Remedy for recovery of real estate by one claiming legal title against another in possession claiming an estate therein is an action of ejectment. Johnston v. Robertson, 171 Neb. 324, 106 N.W.2d 192 (1960).
Ejectment may be maintained by heir. Lewon v. Heath, 53 Neb. 707, 74 N.W. 274 (1898).
Verdict must respond to issues. Cannon v. Smith, 47 Neb. 917, 66 N.W. 999 (1896).
Record must affirmatively show plaintiff has interest in land. Wildman v. Shambaugh, 43 Neb. 371, 61 N.W. 578 (1895).
Action presents two questions, viz: title and right of possession. Malloy v. Malloy, 35 Neb. 224, 52 N.W. 1097 (1892).
Prior possession is sufficient to maintain. Robinson v. Gantt, 1 Neb. Unof. 51, 95 N.W. 506 (1901).
25-2125.
Ejectment; answer; contents.It shall be sufficient in such action if the answer denies generally the title alleged in the complaint, or that the defendant withholds possession, as the case may be; but if the defendant denies the title of the plaintiff, possession by the defendant shall be taken as admitted. If the defendant does not defend for the whole premises, the answer shall describe the particular part for which defense is made.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 627, p. 505; R.S.1913, § 8240; C.S.1922, § 9193; C.S.1929, § 20-2125; R.S.1943, § 25-2125;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 31.
Annotations
Defendant's general denials in an ejectment action are sufficient to raise the question of the defendant's equity in the property as a defense to the ejectment action. Miller v. Radtke, 230 Neb. 561, 432 N.W.2d 542 (1988).
Ejectment of a vendee may be granted as a remedy for violating the terms of a land contract only where the equities of the particular case justify such a disposition, where the property is of less value than the contract price, and where such a procedure would not offend against justice and equity. Miller v. Radtke, 230 Neb. 561, 432 N.W.2d 542 (1988).
In an ejectment action, where defendant presents an equitable defense, the case is tried, and reviewed, as an action in equity. Miller v. Radtke, 230 Neb. 561, 432 N.W.2d 542 (1988).
In enforcing a vendor's rights in a land contract, ejectment is a more severe disposition than is the remedy of strict foreclosure. Miller v. Radtke, 230 Neb. 561, 432 N.W.2d 542 (1988).
Under general denial, defendant may prove estoppel to defeat plaintiff's cause of action. Fitch v. Walsh, 94 Neb. 32, 142 N.W. 293 (1913).
Proof of adverse possession is admissible under general denial. Murray v. Romine, 60 Neb. 94, 82 N.W. 318 (1900).
Where answer denies title and right of possession, defendant may interpose defense of adverse possession. Fink v. Dawson, 52 Neb. 647, 72 N.W. 1037 (1897).
Defendant may interpose any number of defenses. Wanser v. Lucas, 44 Neb. 759, 62 N.W. 1108 (1895).
Defendant under general denial may prove any fact which will defeat plaintiff's cause of action. Staley v. Housel, 35 Neb. 160, 52 N.W. 888 (1892).
Statute of limitations is a defense. Gue v. Jones, 25 Neb. 634, 41 N.W. 555 (1889); Colvin v. Republican Valley Land Assn., 23 Neb. 75, 36 N.W. 361 (1888).
25-2126.
Ejectment; actions between tenants in common; complaint; allegations.In an action by a tenant in common of real property against a cotenant the plaintiff must state, in addition to what is required in section 25-2124, that the defendant either denies the plaintiff's right, or did some act amounting to such denial.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 628, p. 505; R.S.1913, § 8241; C.S.1922, § 9194; C.S.1929, § 20-2126; R.S.1943, § 25-2126.
Annotations
Lease by tenant in common of an entire estate is void as to interest of his cotenants. Jackson v. O'Rorke, 71 Neb. 418, 98 N.W. 1068 (1904).
Where tenant in common denies title of cotenants, and is in possession of and claiming property, such holding is adverse. Craven v. Craven, 68 Neb. 459, 94 N.W. 604 (1903).
Statute of limitations need not be pleaded. Oldig v. Fisk, 53 Neb. 156, 73 N.W. 661 (1897).
Tenant in common can recover only to extent of his title. Kirk v. Bowling, 20 Neb. 260, 29 N.W. 928 (1886).
25-2127.
Ejectment; plaintiff's right terminating while action pending; verdict; judgment.In an action for the recovery of real property, where the plaintiff shows a right to recover at the time the action was commenced, but it appears that his right has terminated during the pendency of the action, the verdict and judgment must be according to the fact, and the plaintiff may recover for withholding the property.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 629, p. 505; R.S.1913, § 8242; C.S.1922, § 9195; C.S.1929, § 20-2127; R.S.1943, § 25-2127.
Annotations
Right to maintain ejectment of pendente lite purchaser was terminated upon confirmation of mortgage foreclosure sale, but recovery could be made of rents and profits. Orr v. Broad, 52 Neb. 490, 72 N.W. 850 (1897).
25-2128.
Ejectment; occupying claimants; rights.The parties in an action for the recovery of property may avail themselves, if entitled thereto, of the relief provided for in sections 76-301 to 76-311 for occupying claimants.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 632, p. 506; R.S.1913, § 8234; C.S.1922, § 9196; C.S.1929, § 20-2128; R.S.1943, § 25-2128.
Annotations
To recover under occupying claimant's act, defendant must have made improvements or paid taxes while in good faith claiming title. Carter v. Brown, 35 Neb. 670, 53 N.W. 580 (1892).
Measure of recovery by occupying claimant is the amount the improvements add to value of property. Fletcher v. Brown, 35 Neb. 660, 53 N.W. 577 (1892).
25-2129.
Waste; negligence in preventing; liability.Any person whose duty it is to prevent waste, and who has not used reasonable care and diligence to prevent it, is deemed to have committed it.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 635, p. 506; R.S.1913, § 8246; C.S.1922, § 9199; C.S.1929, § 20-2131; R.S.1943, § 25-2129.
25-2130.
Trespass; liability; damages; when recoverable.For willful trespass, injuring any timber, tree, or shrub on the land of another, or in the street or highway in front of another's cultivated ground, yard, or town lot, or on the public grounds of any town, or any land held by this state, for any purpose whatever, the trespasser shall pay damages at the suit of any person entitled to protect or enjoy the property aforesaid.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 636, p. 506; R.S.1913, § 8247; C.S.1922, § 9200; C.S.1929, § 20-2132; R.S.1943, § 25-2130;
Laws 2000, LB 626, § 20.
Annotations
To recover multiple damages one must distinctly claim them in his petition. George Rose Sodding & Grading Co., Inc. v. City of Omaha, 190 Neb. 12, 205 N.W.2d 655 (1973).
To constitute willful trespass, act must be done knowingly or intentionally. Hallowell v. Borchers, 150 Neb. 322, 34 N.W.2d 404 (1948).
Waste defined; equity will restrain. Hayman v. Rownd, 82 Neb. 598, 118 N.W. 328 (1908).
Injunction to restrain threatened trespass is allowable. Peterson v. Hopewell, 55 Neb. 670, 76 N.W. 451 (1898).
Entry of homesteader is sufficient to support action. Culbertson Irrigating & Water Power Co. v. Olander, 51 Neb. 539, 71 N.W. 298 (1897).
25-2131.
Trespass; taking timber for repair of public highways or bridges; liability.Nothing herein contained authorizes the recovery of more than the just value of the timber taken from uncultivated woodland for the repair of a public highway or bridge in its immediate neighborhood.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 637, p. 506; R.S.1913, § 8248; C.S.1922, § 9201; C.S.1929, § 20-2133; R.S.1943, § 25-2131.
25-2132.
Waste or trespass; remainderman; reversioner; rights.The owner of an estate in remainder or reversion, may maintain an action for trespass or waste for injuries done to the inheritance, notwithstanding any intervening estate for life or years.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 638, p. 506; R.S.1913, § 8249; C.S.1922, § 9202; C.S.1929, § 20-2134; R.S.1943, § 25-2132.
Annotations
Lessee remaining in possession after death of life tenant becomes liable to the reversioner for reasonable value of the use and occupation of premises. Guthmann v. Vallery, 51 Neb. 824, 71 N.W. 734 (1897).
Conveyance of reversion carries rents. Eiseley v. Spooner, 23 Neb. 470, 36 N.W. 659 (1888).
25-2133.
Waste or trespass; heir; rights.An heir, whether a minor or of full age, may maintain an action for trespass or waste for injuries done in the time of his ancestors as well as in his own time, unless barred by the statute of limitations.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 639, p. 506; R.S.1913, § 8250; C.S.1922, § 9203; C.S.1929, § 20-2135; R.S.1943, § 25-2133.
Annotations
Action to quiet title by administrator is not a bar to like action by heir. Eayrs v. Nason, 54 Neb. 143, 74 N.W. 408 (1898).
25-2134.
Waste or trespass; purchaser on execution; rights.Where lands or tenements are sold by virtue of an execution, the purchaser at such sale may maintain his action against any person for trespass or waste occurring or existing after his purchase.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 640, p. 506; R.S.1913, § 8251; C.S.1922, § 9204; C.S.1929, § 20-2136; R.S.1943, § 25-2134.
25-2135.
Waste or trespass; occupant; right to use lands or timber for repairs.Section 25-2134 is not intended to prevent the person who occupies the lands in the meantime from using them in the ordinary course of husbandry, or from using timber for the purpose of making suitable repairs thereon.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 641, p. 507; R.S.1913, § 8252; C.S.1922, § 9205; C.S.1929, § 20-2137; R.S.1943, § 25-2135.
25-2136.
Waste; occupant; right to use timber for repairs; limit.If for the purpose stated in section 25-2135 the occupant employs timber vastly superior to that required for the occasion, he will be deemed to have committed waste, and will be liable accordingly.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 642, p. 507; R.S.1913, § 8253; C.S.1922, § 9206; C.S.1929, § 20-2138; R.S.1943, § 25-2136.
25-2137.
Complaint for foreclosure or satisfaction; where filed.All complaints for the foreclosure or satisfaction of mortgages shall be filed in the district court where the mortgaged premises are situated.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 845, p. 542; R.S.1913, § 8254; C.S.1922, § 9207; C.S.1929, § 20-2139; R.S.1943, § 25-2137;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 32.
Annotations
Action to foreclose real estate mortgage must be brought in county where real estate is situated. Boehmer v. Heinen, 138 Neb. 376, 293 N.W. 237 (1940).
Right to bring action at law on promissory note, secured by real estate mortgage, has not been abolished. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Thiele, 137 Neb. 626, 290 N.W. 471 (1940).
It is presumed that the law of Colorado regarding place of filing mortgage foreclosure actions is same as that of Nebraska in absence of proof to contrary. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 130 Neb. 130, 264 N.W. 155 (1936).
Foreclosure was properly brought in county where land was located. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 122 Neb. 561, 240 N.W. 766 (1932).
One holding interest in proceeds of sale because of rights possessed in the mortgage is necessary party in foreclosure suit. Webb v. Patterson, 114 Neb. 346, 207 N.W. 522 (1926).
A judicial foreclosure is not designed to remove the original mortgage lien and create a new and independent one; purpose of foreclosure decree was not to destroy lien of mortgages but to judicially recognize them. In re Black Ranches, Inc., 362 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1966).
Confirmation of sale under mortgage foreclosure after death of mortgagor is voidable but not void, and is not open to collateral attack. O'Connor v. Townsend, 87 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1937).
Mortgagor retains legal title and substantial interest in mortgaged real estate until confirmation of sale and execution of deed, and may redeem at any time before order of confirmation becomes final. United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Pamp, 83 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1936).
25-2138.
Sale of premises; decree; power of court.Whenever a complaint is filed for the foreclosure or satisfaction of a mortgage, the court has the power to decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, or such part thereof as may be sufficient to discharge the amount due on the mortgage, and the cost of suit.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 846, p. 542; R.S.1913, § 8255; C.S.1922, § 9208; C.S.1929, § 20-2140; R.S.1943, § 25-2138;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 33.
Cross References
For stay of order of sale, see section 25-1506.
Annotations
1. Decree
2. Sale
3. Miscellaneous
1. Decree
Decree is final judgment; is reviewable before sale and confirmation. Schuyler Building & Loan Assn. v. Fulmer, 61 Neb. 68, 84 N.W. 609 (1900).
Decree in foreclosure is not personal judgment. Alling v. Nelson, 55 Neb. 161, 75 N.W. 581 (1898).
2. Sale
Court may in the decree provide for the sale of the premises in parcels or en masse as the best interests of the parties may require. Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Richter, 58 Neb. 463, 78 N.W. 932 (1899); Kane v. Jonasen, 55 Neb. 757, 76 N.W. 441 (1898).
Order of sale, aside from decree, is unnecessary. Clark & Leonard Investment Co. v. Hamilton, 54 Neb. 95, 74 N.W. 430 (1898); Johnson v. Colby, 52 Neb. 327, 72 N.W. 313 (1897).
Personal notice of sale and confirmation is unnecessary. Link v. Connell, 48 Neb. 574, 67 N.W. 475 (1896).
A special execution may issue for sale of mortgaged premises on decree of foreclosure. Renard v. Brown, 7 Neb. 449 (1878).
3. Miscellaneous
Sale of real estate on mortgage foreclosure is not a bar to withdrawal of note after foreclosure is completed and the mortgagee may bring suit thereon to collect deficiency. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Thiele, 137 Neb. 626, 290 N.W. 471 (1940).
Defense of usury is not available to purchaser of equity of redemption. Building & Loan Assn. of Dakota v. Bilan, 59 Neb. 458, 81 N.W. 308 (1899).
Doctrine of subrogation discussed and applied. Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Bishop, 53 Neb. 545, 74 N.W. 55 (1898); Ocobock v. Baker, 52 Neb. 447, 72 N.W. 582 (1897).
Mortgagor retains legal title and substantial interest in mortgaged real estate until confirmation of sale and execution of deed, and may redeem at any time before order of confirmation becomes final. United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Pamp, 83 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1936).
25-2139.
Decree; power of court.When a complaint is filed for the satisfaction of a mortgage, the court has the power only to decree and compel the delivery of the possession of the premises to the purchaser thereof.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 847, p. 542; R.S.1913, § 8256; C.S.1922, § 9209; C.S.1929, § 20-2141; Laws 1933, c. 41, § 1, p. 248; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-2141; R.S.1943, § 25-2139;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 34.
Annotations
1. Deficiency judgment
2. Other remedies
1. Deficiency judgment
The use of the word "premises" does not refer to deficiencies wherein chattel mortgages are involved. Schreiner v. Witte, 143 Neb. 109, 8 N.W.2d 831 (1943).
Amendment of 1933 depriving court of jurisdiction in foreclosure action to render a deficiency judgment does not apply to mortgage obligations created prior thereto, and deficiency judgment may be entered on such an obligation at any time within five years from confirmation of sale. Bartels v. Meyer, 136 Neb. 274, 285 N.W. 698 (1939).
The general saving clause preserves the right to a deficiency judgment in the foreclosure of a mortgage obligation created prior to amendment of this section abolishing deficiency judgment. Vlazny v. Dittrich, 136 Neb. 266, 285 N.W. 697 (1939); Filley v. Mancuso, 135 Neb. 403, 281 N.W. 850 (1938); First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Eastridge Club of Lincoln, 134 Neb. 785, 279 N.W. 720 (1938); Stowers v. Stuck, 131 Neb. 409, 268 N.W. 310 (1936).
Repeal of the statute permitting recovery of a deficiency judgment did not prevent action to revive a dormant deficiency judgment. McCormack v. Murray, 133 Neb. 125, 274 N.W. 383 (1937).
Repeal of statute permitting recovery of deficiency judgment does not affect pending actions. Arnold v. Hawley, 128 Neb. 766, 260 N.W. 284 (1935).
Statute was not applicable to suit pending when it took effect. Helfrich v. Baxter, 128 Neb. 281, 258 N.W. 532 (1935).
Act of 1933 relating to deficiency judgments was not applicable to case where decree of foreclosure was obtained, property sold and sale confirmed, and application for deficiency judgment made and denied and appeal from denial taken before act took effect. First Trust Co. of Omaha v. Glendale Realty Co., 125 Neb. 283, 250 N.W. 68 (1933).
2. Other remedies
This section only operates to separate the deficiency action from the foreclosure action and requires a separate action be brought at law to collect a deficiency after foreclosure. Carman v. Gibbs, 220 Neb. 603, 371 N.W.2d 283 (1985).
Amendment abolishing deficiency judgment in foreclosure action does not apply to action at law on note, even if accompanied by ancillary remedy of attachment. Linder v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 139 Neb. 636, 298 N.W. 545 (1941).
Amendment abolishing deficiency judgment does not apply where the mortgage was executed before the restriction was passed and was not then due nor in litigation. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Plumer, 139 Neb. 301, 297 N.W. 541 (1941).
The effect of 1933 amendment is to deny a deficiency judgment to the mortgagee in a foreclosure action, and to leave unaffected other remedies for the collection of the debt. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Claussen, 138 Neb. 518, 293 N.W. 424 (1940).
Amendment of 1933 does not abolish action at law on debt secured by mortgage, and after completion of foreclosure, mortgagee may withdraw note with leave of court and bring suit thereon for deficiency. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Thiele, 137 Neb. 626, 290 N.W. 471 (1940).
Recovery on note after foreclosure of mortgage had been completed is allowed where leave of the court to withdraw note is obtained. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Cramb, 137 Neb. 553, 290 N.W. 440 (1940).
25-2140.
Decree; effect upon right to recover for debt.After a complaint for foreclosure or satisfaction of a mortgage is filed, while the same is pending, and after a decree is rendered thereon, no proceedings whatever shall be had at law for the recovery of the debt secured by the mortgage, or any part thereof, unless authorized by the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 848, p. 542; R.S.1913, § 8257; C.S.1922, § 9210; C.S.1929, § 20-2142; R.S.1943, § 25-2140;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 35.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Deficiency judgment
3. Action at law
4. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
Purpose of this section is to prevent the prosecution of proceedings at law to recover the debt concurrently with proceedings to foreclose mortgage, and to eliminate the possibility of two judgments being rendered against the debtor for the same debt. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Claussen, 138 Neb. 518, 293 N.W. 424 (1940).
Conditional allowance of mortgagee's claim against mortgagor's estate did not preclude foreclosure. Quesner v. Novotny, 116 Neb. 84, 215 N.W. 796 (1927).
"After a decree rendered thereon" refers to the decree of foreclosure on the mortgage. Armstrong v. Patterson, 97 Neb. 229, 149 N.W. 408 (1914).
Filing claim against mortgagor's estate pending foreclosure does not operate as a release or discharge of mortgage. National Life Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 61 Neb. 692, 85 N.W. 948 (1901).
Purpose is to avoid two actions being in progress at same time. Meehan v. First Nat. Bank of Fairfield, 44 Neb. 213, 62 N.W. 490 (1895).
2. Deficiency judgment
The general saving statute preserves right of action on claim for a deficiency judgment in suit to foreclose a mortgage not due nor in litigation at time the Legislature, without a special saving clause, passed the act of 1933 repealing the statutory provision permitting deficiency judgments. Stowers v. Stuck, 131 Neb. 409, 268 N.W. 310 (1936).
Mortgagee's petition for deficiency judgment, filed in same court where mortgage was foreclosed and sale had thereunder, is continuation of foreclosure suit, and court order authorizing prosecution thereof is not required. Scottsbluff Nat. Bank v. Pfeifer, 120 Neb. 445, 233 N.W. 255 (1930).
Application for deficiency judgment as continuation of original foreclosure suit does not require leave of court. Bennett v. Winegar, 103 Neb. 843, 174 N.W. 512 (1919).
Party is not entitled to deficiency judgment when foreclosure proceedings commenced prior thereto remain undisposed of. Wolff v. Phelps, 3 Neb. Unof. 511, 92 N.W. 143 (1902).
3. Action at law
In an action in equity for reinstatement of a mortgage where relief is denied because of laches, the court may nonetheless render judgment on the note where such alternative relief is included in the prayer. Rutt v. Frank, 186 Neb. 842, 186 N.W.2d 911 (1971).
Burden rests on mortgagee to establish that no proceedings at law have been had to recover on the mortgage indebtedness. Bankers Life Co. v. Peterson, 178 Neb. 205, 132 N.W.2d 377 (1965).
Failure to amend this section shows legislative intent to permit suit at law for deficiency after mortgage foreclosure proceeding is completed. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Thiele, 137 Neb. 626, 290 N.W. 471 (1940).
Recovery on note is allowed after foreclosure of mortgage has been completed, where plaintiff obtains leave of the court to withdraw the note. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Cramb, 137 Neb. 553, 290 N.W. 440 (1940).
It is not necessary to obtain leave of court to commence action at law on note secured by real estate mortgage where pleadings and proof show that no action has been filed in district court of county where mortgaged premises are situated to foreclose the mortgage. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 130 Neb. 130, 264 N.W. 155 (1936).
Granting motion to dismiss application for deficiency judgment is not authority to sue. Mann v. Burkland, 68 Neb. 269, 94 N.W. 116 (1903).
After dismissal, holder of note may sue for debt. Kendall v. Selby, 66 Neb. 60, 92 N.W. 178 (1902).
Action at law is not abated by action to enforce lien in equity. Garneau v. Kendall, 61 Neb. 396, 85 N.W. 291 (1901).
There is no inhibition against the prosecution of proceedings at law to recover a debt other than the one the mortgage was given to secure. Maxwell v. Home Fire Ins. Co., 57 Neb. 207, 77 N.W. 681 (1898).
Creditor may proceed at law without having exhausted his remedy by foreclosure. Grable v. Beatty, 56 Neb. 642, 77 N.W. 49 (1898).
Pendency of proceedings against garnishees, upon judgment for the debt, stays foreclosure. Hargreaves v. Menken, 45 Neb. 668, 63 N.W. 951 (1895).
Plaintiff must plead authority to sue at law. Brayton v. Oaks, 2 Neb. Unof. 593, 89 N.W. 646 (1902).
4. Miscellaneous
A construction lien is not a mortgage for purposes of applying this section. Tilt-Up Concrete, Inc. v. Star City/Federal, Inc., 261 Neb. 64, 621 N.W.2d 502 (2001).
25-2141.
Parties defendant; joinder.If the mortgage debt is secured by the obligation or other evidence of debt of any other person besides the mortgagor, the complainant may make such person a party to the action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 849, p. 543; R.S.1913, § 8258; C.S.1922, § 9211; C.S.1929, § 20-2143; Laws 1933, c. 41, § 2, p. 248; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-2143; R.S.1943, § 25-2141.
Annotations
After mortgage foreclosure is completed, mortgagee may sue at law for deficiency without authorization of equity court wherein foreclosure was had. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Claussen, 138 Neb. 518, 293 N.W. 424 (1940).
Amendment of 1933 did not affect right of creditor to bring suit at law on note for deficiency remaining after foreclosure of mortgage has been completed. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Thiele, 137 Neb. 626, 290 N.W. 471 (1940); Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Cramb, 137 Neb. 553, 290 N.W. 440 (1940).
Parties to indemnity agreement against loss on real estate mortgage are proper, though not necessary, parties to original foreclosure proceeding. First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Airedale Ranch & Cattle Co., 136 Neb. 521, 286 N.W. 766 (1939).
Holder of secured note transferring it without disclosing that he was agent is liable for deficiency. Thornton v. Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank of Fairbury, 117 Neb. 355, 220 N.W. 598 (1928).
Joining sureties on note secured by mortgage as defendants in foreclosure suit was proper. United States Trust Co. v. Miller, 116 Neb. 25, 215 N.W. 462 (1927).
Vendor becomes in effect surety if mortgagee elects to hold purchaser. Merriam v. Miles, 54 Neb. 566, 74 N.W. 861 (1898).
If conveyed subject to mortgage, purchaser is not liable for deficiency. Green v. Hall, 45 Neb. 89, 63 N.W. 119 (1895).
Purchaser agreeing to pay mortgage as part consideration may be sued at law or held liable on foreclosure. Reynolds v. Dietz, 39 Neb. 180, 58 N.W. 89 (1894).
Where purchaser assumes and agrees to pay mortgage, it is immaterial in foreclosure action whether vendor had mortgageable interest in premises. Bond v. Dolby, 17 Neb. 491, 23 N.W. 351 (1885).
25-2142.
Complaint for foreclosure or satisfaction; allegations; complainant; designate person to receive notices; when.(1) Upon filing a complaint for the foreclosure or satisfaction of a mortgage, the complainant shall state therein whether any proceedings have been had at law for the recovery of the debt secured thereby, or any part thereof, and whether such debt, or any part thereof, has been collected and paid.
(2) Subsequent to the filing of a complaint for the foreclosure or satisfaction of a mortgage under this section, the complainant, within five business days after receipt of a written request by a designated representative of the incorporated city or village having jurisdiction of the mortgaged property, shall provide the name and address of a person designated by the complainant to accept notices of violations of ordinances by the owner of the mortgaged property on behalf of the complainant. Failure to provide the name and address required under this subsection shall not void, invalidate, or affect in any way a complaint for the foreclosure or satisfaction of a mortgage filed under this section. This subsection does not impose upon the complainant a duty to maintain the mortgaged property. The designation of a representative to receive notices shall terminate upon transfer of fee title ownership to the mortgaged property.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 850, p. 543; R.S.1913, § 8259; C.S.1922, § 9212; C.S.1929, § 20-2144; R.S.1943, § 25-2142;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 36; Laws 2015, LB151, § 1.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Allegations
3. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
Requirement that petition state whether any proceedings at law have been brought is for protection of the debtor, and does not apply to purchaser of land who did not assume mortgage indebtedness. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Adams, 142 Neb. 202, 5 N.W.2d 384 (1942).
Failure to amend this section shows legislative intent to permit suit at law for deficiency after mortgage foreclosure proceeding is completed. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Thiele, 137 Neb. 626, 290 N.W. 471 (1940).
Section applies only to formal mortgages and not to mortgages or liens arising out of the equities between the parties. Luikart v. Bank of Benkelman, 132 Neb. 501, 272 N.W. 324 (1937); Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Ohrt, 131 Neb. 858, 270 N.W. 497 (1936).
Statute does not apply to action to foreclose a contract for sale of real estate. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Leahy, 125 Neb. 644, 251 N.W. 278 (1933).
Defense is available to attaching creditor contesting priority. Fryer v. Fryer, 74 Neb. 845, 105 N.W. 712 (1905).
Intent of this section is to prevent prosecution of proceedings at law to recover indebtedness concurrently with proceedings to foreclose mortgage. Carman v. Harris, 61 Neb. 635, 85 N.W. 848 (1901).
Section applies only to formal mortgages, and not to liens arising from equities between parties. Dimick v. Grand Island Banking Co., 37 Neb. 394, 55 N.W. 1066 (1893).
Section is for benefit of mortgagor, and between lienors is not required. Chaffee v. Schestedt, 4 Neb. Unof. 740, 96 N.W. 161 (1903).
2. Allegations
Allegation that no proceedings at law have been had must be proved to entitle plaintiff to a decree of foreclosure. United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Holman, 177 Neb. 682, 130 N.W.2d 593 (1964).
Absence of required allegation is not ground for vacation of judgment after expiration of term. Gasper v. Mazur, 157 Neb. 857, 62 N.W.2d 117 (1954).
If plaintiff's allegation that no proceedings at law have been instituted for the recovery of the debt is denied, plaintiff is not entitled to a decree of foreclosure unless his allegation is supported by competent evidence. Jones v. Vennerberg, 133 Neb. 143, 274 N.W. 494 (1937).
Failure to insert in petition to foreclose mortgage allegations that there has been no action at law to collect the debt and that debt has not been paid, is not ground for reversal on appeal, where such allegations were read into the record of the trial with permission of the court, and were put in issue by an answer and tried to the court. Hitchens v. Alderson, 129 Neb. 573, 262 N.W. 501 (1935).
Where plaintiff in alleging in his petition that there had been no action at law to recover the debt failed to include the statutory words "or any part thereof," Supreme Court would permit amendment in furtherance of justice and to conform to proof. Pitman v. Henkens, 125 Neb. 621, 251 N.W. 282 (1933).
Plaintiff must allege, and if denied, prove no proceedings at law started. McMonies v. Lindgren, 115 Neb. 207, 212 N.W. 45 (1927); Young v. Thompson, 114 Neb. 804, 210 N.W. 407 (1926); Reed v. Good, 114 Neb. 777, 209 N.W. 619 (1926).
Where plaintiff is assignee he must make prima facie proof that no action has been commenced by any holder. Lyons v. Allen, 88 Neb. 41, 128 N.W. 652 (1910).
Without such allegation in pleadings, decree will be reversed. Michigan Trust Co. v. City of Red Cloud, 69 Neb. 585, 96 N.W. 140 (1903), rehearing denied 69 Neb. 592, 98 N.W. 413 (1904).
Petition must state whether action at law has been commenced, and whether debt or any part has been paid. Bing v. Morse, 51 Neb. 842, 71 N.W. 712 (1897).
3. Miscellaneous
Conditional allowance of mortgagee's claim against mortgagor's estate did not preclude foreclosure. Quesner v. Novotny, 116 Neb. 84, 215 N.W. 796 (1927).
Ordinary rules of proving a negative apply. McLanahan v. Chamberlain, 85 Neb. 850, 124 N.W. 684 (1910).
The negative allegation plaintiff must prove if denied. Beebe v. Bahr, 84 Neb. 191, 120 N.W. 1021 (1909).
Where answer is general denial, plaintiff must prove whether or not any proceedings at law have been had for the recovery of the debt. Jones v. Burtis, 57 Neb. 604, 78 N.W. 261 (1899).
Objection that no proceedings at law have been had must be made prior to rendition of decree. Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. McCurdy, 36 Neb. 863, 55 N.W. 262 (1893).
25-2143.
Prior judgment at law; effect.If it appears that any judgment has been obtained in a suit at law for the money demanded by such complaint, or any part thereof, no proceedings shall be had in such case, unless to an execution against the property of the defendant in such judgment the sheriff or other proper officer has returned that the execution is unsatisfied in whole or in part and that the defendant has no property whereof to satisfy such execution except the mortgaged premises.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 851, p. 543; R.S.1913, § 8260; C.S.1922, § 9213; C.S.1929, § 20-2145; R.S.1943, § 25-2143;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 37.
Annotations
Whether creditor mortgagee will be required to first exhaust mortgaged property before subjecting fraudulently transferred property to satisfaction of its judgment is within discretion of court. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. First Cadco Corp., 189 Neb. 553, 203 N.W.2d 770 (1973).
Institution of suit at law upon note and obtaining judgment thereon is not a release of the mortgage security, and does not bar foreclosure after execution on judgment has been returned unsatisfied. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Adams, 142 Neb. 202, 5 N.W.2d 384 (1942).
Failure to amend this section disclosed legislative intent to permit suit at law for deficiency after mortgage foreclosure proceeding is completed. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Thiele, 137 Neb. 626, 290 N.W. 471 (1940).
Conditional allowance of mortgagee's claim against mortgagor's estate did not preclude foreclosure. Quesner v. Novotny, 116 Neb. 84, 215 N.W. 796 (1927).
Return of execution unsatisfied did not relieve plaintiff from alleging no action at law where there are guarantors of note. Michigan Trust Co. v. City of Red Cloud, 69 Neb. 585, 96 N.W. 140 (1903), rehearing denied 69 Neb. 592, 98 N.W. 413 (1904).
Return nulla bona, when judgment transcripted to another county is sufficient. Allegations required by preceding section are unnecessary. Montpelier Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Follett, 68 Neb. 416, 94 N.W. 635 (1903).
Proceedings against garnishees upon judgment for debt stays foreclosure. Hargreaves v. Menken, 45 Neb. 668, 63 N.W. 951 (1895).
Requirement is for benefit of mortgagor and between lienors is immaterial. Simmons Hardware Co. v. Brokaw, 7 Neb. 405 (1878); Chaffee v. Schestedt, 4 Neb. Unof. 740, 96 N.W. 161 (1903).
Return of sheriff nulla bona to execution in law action is sufficient to authorize court to proceed in equity. Zug v. Forgan, 3 Neb. Unof. 149, 90 N.W. 1129 (1902).
25-2144.
Sale of premises;
by whom made; liability and compensation of sheriff; postponement of sale; notice.(1) All
sales of mortgaged premises under a decree shall be made by a sheriff or some
other person authorized by the court in the county where the premises or some
part of them are situated.
In all
cases where the sheriff makes such
sale, he or she shall act in his or her official capacity, shall be liable on his or her official bond for all
his or her acts
therein, and shall
receive the same compensation as is provided by law for like services upon
sales under execution.
(2) The sheriff
or other person conducting the sale may, for any cause he or she deems expedient,
postpone the sale of all or any portion of the real property from time to
time until it is completed, and in every such case, notice of postponement
shall be given by public declaration thereof by the sheriff or such other
person at the time and place last appointed for the sale. The public declaration
of the notice of postponement shall include the new date, time, and place
of sale. No other notice of the postponed sale need be given unless the sale
is postponed for longer than forty-five days beyond the day designated in
the notice of sale, in which event notice thereof shall be given in the same
manner as the original notice of sale is required to be given.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 852, p. 543; Laws 1875, § 1, p. 42; Laws 1899, c. 90, § 1, p. 345; R.S.1913, § 8261; C.S.1922, § 9214; C.S.1929, § 20-2146; R.S.1943, § 25-2144;
Laws 2010, LB732, § 3.
Annotations
1. Person designated to hold sale
2. Miscellaneous
1. Person designated to hold sale
Objection that special master is incompetent must be made against decree directly and not by motion to vacate sale. Eddy v. Kimerer, 61 Neb. 498, 85 N.W. 540 (1901).
Deputy sheriff may conduct sale. Scottish-American Mtg. Co. v. Nye, 58 Neb. 661, 79 N.W. 553 (1899).
Master commissioner need not take or file oath; may administer oath to appraisers. George v. Keniston, 57 Neb. 313, 77 N.W. 772 (1899).
One designated to hold sale cannot delegate authority; court should not confirm sale. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Creighton Theatre Bldg. Co., 54 Neb. 228, 74 N.W. 583 (1898).
Decree of foreclosure is sufficient authority to officer to proceed; order of sale is unnecessary. Johnson v. Colby, 52 Neb. 327, 72 N.W. 313 (1897).
District court has power to appoint a person other than the sheriff to make sale. Omaha Loan & Trust Co. v. Bertrand, 51 Neb. 508, 70 N.W. 1120 (1897).
Foreclosure sale is regarded as a sale by the court itself. Conley v. State, 46 Neb. 187, 64 N.W. 708 (1895).
Appointment of some disinterested person to sell is in sound discretion of court. American Inv. Co. v. Nye, 40 Neb. 720, 59 N.W. 355 (1894).
Court may appoint special master commissioner. Jones v. Miller, 2 Neb. Unof. 582, 92 N.W. 201 (1902).
2. Miscellaneous
Sheriff does not receive additional compensation for services under this section. Muinch v. Hull, 181 Neb. 571, 149 N.W.2d 527 (1967).
Where notice of place of sale was given, as at east front door of county courthouse, and it was actually held inside the east front door at top of short flight of stairs, there is substantial compliance with the notice. Bowman v. Caldwell, 135 Neb. 554, 283 N.W. 194 (1939).
Sureties are liable for money received by sheriff on mortgage sale. Milligan v. Gallen, 64 Neb. 561, 90 N.W. 541 (1902).
Publication of notice of sale is under control of court and not parties. State ex rel. Elliott v. Holliday, 35 Neb. 327, 53 N.W. 142 (1892).
Section applies only to mortgage and tax foreclosures. Cochran v. Cochran, 1 Neb. Unof. 508, 95 N.W. 778 (1901).
Mortgagor retains legal title and substantial interest in mortgaged premises until confirmation of sale and execution of deed, and may redeem at any time before order of confirmation becomes final. United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Pamp, 83 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1936).
25-2145.
Deed of conveyance; effect; estate conveyed.Deed shall thereupon be executed by such sheriff, which shall vest in the purchaser the same estate that would have vested in the mortgagee if the equity of redemption had been foreclosed, and no other or greater; and such deeds shall be as valid as if executed by the mortgagor and mortgagee, and shall be an entire bar against each of them and all parties to the suit in which the decree for such sale was made, and against their heirs respectively, and all persons claiming under such heirs.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 853, p. 543; R.S.1913, § 8262; C.S.1922, § 9215; C.S.1929, § 20-2147; R.S.1943, § 25-2145.
Annotations
Confirmation of sale vests in purchaser estate that would have been vested in mortgagee if equity of redemption had been foreclosed. Mauzy v. Elliott, 146 Neb. 865, 22 N.W.2d 142 (1946).
The purchaser at a foreclosure sale buys all the interests of all parties to the suit. George v. Pracheil, 92 Neb. 81, 137 N.W. 880 (1912).
Deed transfers every right and interest in the property of all parties to action, unless otherwise provided. Arterburn v. Beard, 86 Neb. 733, 126 N.W. 379 (1910).
Deed is subject to rights of parties not served. Kerr v. McCreary, 84 Neb. 315, 120 N.W. 1117 (1909).
Deed conveys all interest of mortgagor, and grantee need not account to junior mortgagee, not party to action, where latter is not seeking to redeem. City of Lincoln v. Lincoln St. Ry. Co., 75 Neb. 523, 106 N.W. 317 (1906).
Foreclosure sale transfers to purchaser every right, title and interest of all the parties to the suit. Hart v. Beardsley, 67 Neb. 145, 93 N.W. 423 (1903).
Mortgagor retains legal title and substantial interest in mortgaged premises until confirmation of sale and execution of deed, and may redeem at any time before order of confirmation becomes final. United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Pamp, 83 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1936).
25-2146.
Sale; proceeds; how applied.The proceeds of every sale made under a decree in equity shall be applied to the discharge of the debt adjudged by such court to be due, and of the costs awarded, and if there be any surplus, it shall be brought into court for the use of the defendant, or of the persons entitled thereto, subject to the order of the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 854, p. 543; R.S.1913, § 8263; C.S.1922, § 9216; C.S.1929, § 20-2148; R.S.1943, § 25-2146.
Annotations
District court has jurisdiction over distribution of proceeds of mortgage foreclosure sale. Mauzy v. Elliott, 146 Neb. 865, 22 N.W.2d 142 (1946).
Where plaintiff bid in the property at foreclosure sale, he cannot apply interest coupons, not included in the decree, to reduce the surplus which he must pay into court above the amount due on his lien. DeMoulin Loan & Inv. Co. v. McLain, 107 Neb. 858, 187 N.W. 123 (1922).
Court may bring in all necessary parties to complete distribution of surplus. Montague v. Marunda, 71 Neb. 805, 99 N.W. 653 (1904).
Sheriff is custodian of proceeds until confirmation; then it is his duty to pay to parties entitled. Craw v. Abrams, 68 Neb. 546, 94 N.W. 639 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 68 Neb. 553, 97 N.W. 296 (1903).
Junior mortgagee, not party to foreclosure, may claim surplus. Milligan v. Gallen, 64 Neb. 561, 90 N.W. 541 (1902).
There should be ratable application to all notes secured by mortgage though some were outlawed, where security is insufficient. Patrick v. National Bank of Commerce, 63 Neb. 200, 88 N.W. 183 (1901).
Entire proceeds of sale are subject to order of court until paid out. Conley v. State, 46 Neb. 187, 64 N.W. 708 (1895).
Officer selling property has no authority to sell on credit unless authorized by express terms of decree or statute. Hooper v. Castetter, 45 Neb. 67, 63 N.W. 135 (1895).
25-2147.
Sale; proceeds; surplus; disposition.If such surplus, or any part thereof, shall remain in the court for the term of three months without being applied for, the court may direct the same to be put out at interest under the direction of the court for the benefit of the defendant, his representative or assigns, to be paid to them by the order of such court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 855, p. 543; R.S.1913, § 8264; C.S.1922, § 9217; C.S.1929, § 20-2149; R.S.1943, § 25-2147.
25-2148.
Payment by defendant of sums due; effect.Whenever a complaint is filed for the satisfaction or foreclosure of any mortgage, upon which there is due any interest on any portion or installment of the principal, and there are other portions or installments to become due subsequently, the complaint shall be dismissed upon the defendant's bringing into court, at any time before the decree of sale, the principal and interest due, with costs.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 856, p. 544; R.S.1913, § 8265; C.S.1922, § 9218; C.S.1929, § 20-2150; R.S.1943, § 25-2148;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 38.
Annotations
Stipulation in mortgage accelerating debt for failure to pay interest or taxes will be enforced. Crawford v. Houser, 115 Neb. 62, 211 N.W. 165 (1926).
Holder may foreclose when any installment has become due; statute begins to run on each when due. Nares v. Bell, 66 Neb. 606, 92 N.W. 571 (1903).
Deposit of money with clerk of court in vacation did not extinguish indebtedness. Commercial Investment Co. v. Peck, 53 Neb. 204, 73 N.W. 452 (1897).
25-2149.
Payment by defendant of sums due; stay; decree.If, after a decree for sale, entered against a defendant in such case, he shall bring into court the principal and interest due, with costs, the proceedings in the suit shall be stayed, but the court shall enter a decree of foreclosure and sale, to be enforced by a further order of the court, upon a subsequent default in the payment of any portion or installment of the principal, or any interest thereafter to grow due.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 857, p. 544; R.S.1913, § 8266; C.S.1922, § 9219; C.S.1929, § 20-2151; R.S.1943, § 25-2149.
Annotations
Section is applicable only to cases where foreclosure is for interest or part of principal. It was not intended to relieve party from forfeiture. Beisel v. Artman, 10 Neb. 181, 4 N.W. 1011 (1880).
25-2150.
Reference to sheriff; sale of premises in parcels; decree; effect.If the defendant shall not bring into court the amount due, with costs, or if for any other cause a decree shall pass for the complainant, the court may direct a reference to a sheriff to ascertain and report the situation of the mortgaged premises, or may determine the same on oral or other testimony, and if it shall appear that the same can be sold in parcels, without injury to the parties, the decree shall direct so much of the mortgaged premises to be sold as will be sufficient to pay the amount then due on such mortgage, with costs, and such decree shall remain a security for any subsequent default.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 858, p. 544; R.S.1913, § 8267; C.S.1922, § 9220; C.S.1929, § 20-2152; R.S.1943, § 25-2150.
25-2151.
Default in payment of installments subsequent to decree; order of sale.If, in the case mentioned in section 25-2150, there shall be any default subsequent to such decree in the payment of any portion or installment of the principal, or any interest due upon such mortgage, the court may, upon the complaint of the complainant, by a further order, founded upon such first decree, direct a sale of so much of the mortgaged premises to be made, under such decree, as will be sufficient to satisfy the amount so due, with the costs of such complaint and subsequent proceedings thereon, and the same proceedings may be had as often as a default shall happen.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 859, p. 544; R.S.1913, § 8268; C.S.1922, § 9221; C.S.1929, § 20-2153; R.S.1943, § 25-2151;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 39.
25-2152.
Sale of entire property; when ordered.If in any of the foregoing cases, it shall appear to the court that the mortgaged premises are so situated that a sale of the whole will be most beneficial to the parties, the decree shall, in the first instance, be entered for the sale of the whole premises accordingly.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 860, p. 544; R.S.1913, § 8269; C.S.1922, § 9222; C.S.1929, § 20-2154; R.S.1943, § 25-2152.
Annotations
Where no such finding and decree, tracts must be appraised and sold separately. Rohrer v. Fassler, 2 Neb. Unof. 262, 96 N.W. 523 (1902).
25-2153.
Sale of entire property; proceeds; disposition.In such case the proceeds of such sale shall be applied as well to the interest, portion, or installment of the principal due as towards the whole or residue of the sum secured by such mortgage, and not due and payable at the time of such sale; and if such residue does not bear interest, then the court may direct the same to be paid with a rebate of the legal interest, for the time during which such residue shall not be due and payable; or the court may direct the balance of the proceeds of such sale, after paying the sum due, with costs, to be put out at interest, for the benefit of the complainant, to be paid to him as the installments or portions of the principal or interest may become due, and the surplus for the benefit of the defendant, his representative, or assigns, to be paid to them on the order of the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 861, p. 544; R.S.1913, § 8270; C.S.1922, § 9223; C.S.1929, § 20-2155; R.S.1943, § 25-2153.
25-2154.
Satisfaction or payment; certificate; delivery to register of deeds; duties of clerk of district court; fee of register of deeds.In all cases of foreclosure of mortgages in the several counties in the state, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the district court, on the satisfaction or payment of the amount of the decree, to forward to the register of deeds a certificate setting forth the names of parties, plaintiff and defendant, descriptions of the premises mentioned in the decree, and the book and page where the mortgage foreclosed is recorded. For such certificate the clerk of the district court shall collect the fee required pursuant to section 33-109 for recording the certificate. Such amount shall be taxed as part of the costs in the case, and such sum shall be paid to the register of deeds as the fee for recording the certificate.
Source:Laws 1887, c. 63, § 1, p. 564; R.S.1913, § 5614; C.S.1922, § 4933; C.S.1929, § 26-1010; R.S.1943, § 25-2154; Laws 1951, c. 106, § 1, p. 512; Laws 1959, c. 140, § 3, p. 546;
Laws 1971, LB 495, § 1; Laws 2012, LB14, § 3; Laws 2017, LB152, § 1; Laws 2017, LB268, § 2.
Annotations
Certificate issued by clerk on own motion before satisfaction of mortgage does not cancel same in favor of one with notice of facts. Ryan v. West, 63 Neb. 894, 89 N.W. 416 (1902).
If a false certificate is recorded, it does not suspend execution of decree for foreclosure and sale. Clark & Leonard Inv. Co. v. Hamilton, 54 Neb. 95, 74 N.W. 430 (1898).
25-2155.
Satisfaction or payment; certificate; recording and indexing; duties of register of deeds.It shall be the duty of the register of deeds on receipt of the certificate mentioned in section 25-2154 to enter the same upon his numerical index, and record the same in the mortgage record of his office.
Source:Laws 1887, c. 63, § 2, p. 564; R.S.1913, § 5615; C.S.1922, § 4934; C.S.1929, § 26-1011; R.S.1943, § 25-2155.
25-2156.
Writ of mandamus; to whom issued.The writ of mandamus may be issued to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Though it may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment, or proceed to the discharge of any of its functions, it cannot control judicial discretion.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 645, p. 507; R.S.1913, § 8271; C.S.1922, § 9224; C.S.1929, § 20-2156; R.S.1943, § 25-2156.
Cross References
To compel public corporations to pay judgment, see section 77-1623.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. When issued
1. Scope
A duty which a private landowner would have in complying with ordinances placing restrictions on a specific use of property is not a duty that results from any "office, trust or station". State ex rel. City of Alma v. Furnas Cty. Farms, 257 Neb. 189, 595 N.W.2d 551 (1999).
Nothing in these sections governing mandamus indicates a legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity for mandamus actions against a state agency. Henderson v. Department of Corr. Servs., 256 Neb. 314, 589 N.W.2d 520 (1999).
Mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty, and not to control judicial discretion. State ex rel. Wright v. Pepperl, 221 Neb. 664, 380 N.W.2d 259 (1986).
A motion for a writ of mandamus to compel the enforcement of a plea bargain agreement is not properly granted where the relator has the alternative remedy of a motion requesting the district court to enforce the agreement or dismiss the charges brought and where the relator has not entered a guilty plea or taken other action in detrimental reliance upon the agreement. State ex rel. Fortner v. Urbom, 211 Neb. 309, 318 N.W.2d 286 (1982).
A writ of mandamus may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment but it may not control judicial discretion. State ex rel. Stansbery v. Schwasinger, 205 Neb. 457, 289 N.W.2d 506 (1980).
The exercise by county commissioners of their authority to acquire or accept rights-of-way or to establish and/or improve a new road is vested in the sound discretion of the commissioners and may not be compelled by mandamus. State ex rel. Stansbery v. Schwasinger, 205 Neb. 457, 289 N.W.2d 506 (1980).
Mandamus is generally not available for quasi-judicial or discretionary duties, but is available if the duty is ministerial. Singleton v. Kimball County Board of Commissioners, 203 Neb. 429, 279 N.W.2d 112 (1979).
Granting of disability pension under city ordinance in question was judicial in nature; mandamus not a proper remedy upon refusal to grant pension. Watts v. City of Omaha, 184 Neb. 41, 165 N.W.2d 104 (1969).
In absence of special provisions to the contrary, ordinary rules of pleading apply to mandamus. State ex rel. Krieger v. Board of Supervisors of Clay County, 171 Neb. 117, 105 N.W.2d 721 (1960).
Judicial discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus. State ex rel. Coulter v. McFarland, 166 Neb. 242, 88 N.W.2d 892 (1958); State ex rel. Cumming County Farm Bureau v. Tighe, 124 Neb. 578, 247 N.W. 419 (1933).
Mandamus is not a preventive remedy but is a coercive writ. State ex rel. Bates v. Morgan, 154 Neb. 234, 47 N.W.2d 512 (1951).
Mandamus is a proper remedy to enforce the performance of a ministerial act. State ex rel. Herman v. City of Grand Island, 145 Neb. 150, 15 N.W.2d 341 (1944).
To warrant issue of mandamus against officer to compel him to act, the duty must be imposed on him by law, it must exist at the time the writ is applied for, and it must be clear. State ex rel. Johnson v. Goble, 136 Neb. 242, 285 N.W. 569 (1939).
Writ of prohibition is abolished; mandamus lies where no adequate legal remedy. State ex rel. Parmenter v. Troup, 98 Neb. 333, 152 N.W. 748 (1915).
When duty is made plain by statute, and officer is given no discretion, performance may be compelled by mandamus. State ex rel. Pinkos v. Rice, 98 Neb. 36, 151 N.W. 925 (1915).
Mandamus cannot be used to control discretion of inferior tribunal or board. State ex rel. Davis v. Hoctor, 98 Neb. 15, 151 N.W. 923 (1915).
Writ should be issued in name of state upon relation of party seeking relief. City of Crawford v. Darrow, 87 Neb. 494, 127 N.W. 891 (1910).
Mandamus may lie to enforce but not to control judicial action. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Graves, 66 Neb. 17, 92 N.W. 144 (1902).
Mandamus cannot be used to try the title or right to possession of real or personal property. State ex rel. Jones v. Williams, 54 Neb. 154, 74 N.W. 396 (1898).
Court cannot by mandamus control action of county board in the adjustment of claims against a county. State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Merrell, 43 Neb. 575, 61 N.W. 754 (1895).
Mandamus may issue to officer of legislative branch of government. State v. Elder, 31 Neb. 169, 47 N.W. 710 (1891).
Statute of limitations applies. State ex rel. Chem. Nat. Bank v. School Dist. No. 9 of Sherman County, 30 Neb. 520, 46 N.W. 613 (1890).
Mandamus will not issue to a justice of the peace to require him to make an order after the cause has been removed to district court. State ex rel. Rudabeck v. Livsey, 27 Neb. 55, 42 N.W. 762 (1889).
2. When issued
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act or duty, imposed by law upon an inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, where (1) the relator has a clear legal right to the relief sought, (2) there is a corresponding clear duty existing on the part of the respondent to perform the act in question, and (3) there is no other plain and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. A grant or denial of mandamus is within the trial court's judicial discretion. An accepted affiliation petition pursuant to section 79-413 et seq. creates duties imposed by law owed to the public which, if ministerial, may be enforced by writ of mandamus. State ex rel. Fick v. Miller, 255 Neb. 387, 584 N.W.2d 809 (1998).
When the purpose of a request to inspect a corporation's books is to ascertain the value of the requesting shareholder's stock, the statutory penalty of 10 percent of the value of that stock for failure to comply is not an adequate remedy at law and a writ of mandamus compelling the corporation to open its books may lie. State ex rel. Lillie v. Cosgriff Co., 240 Neb. 387, 482 N.W.2d 555 (1992).
A writ of mandamus is proper to compel the transportation of nonprofit private school children on a public school district's buses pursuant to section 79-487. State ex rel. Bouc v. School Dist. of City of Lincoln, 211 Neb. 731, 320 N.W.2d 472 (1982).
Before a peremptory writ of mandamus may issue, it must appear to the court that (1) a duty is imposed by law; (2) the duty exists at the time the writ is applied for; and (3) the duty to act is clear. State ex rel. Neb. Nurses Assn. v. State Board of Nursing, 205 Neb. 792, 290 N.W.2d 453 (1980); State ex rel. Blome v. Bridgeport Irr. Dist., 205 Neb. 97, 286 N.W.2d 426 (1979).
A writ of mandamus may be issued to compel performance of act specifically provided by law. State ex rel. Agricultural Extension Service v. Miller, 182 Neb. 285, 154 N.W.2d 469 (1967).
Mandamus will not lie where city council acted in executive or administrative capacity to make operative the provisions of a state law already existing. State ex rel. Nelson v. Butler, 145 Neb. 638, 17 N.W.2d 683 (1945).
After the statutory period for appeal by a taxpayer has passed, one in whose favor a claim has been duly allowed by a county board may by mandamus compel the issuance of a warrant for the payment of such claim. State ex rel. Campbell v. Slavik, 144 Neb. 633, 14 N.W.2d 186 (1944).
In the enforcement of judgments against municipal corporations, mandamus is a substitute for execution, and may properly be used to enforce satisfaction of a judgment against a county. State ex rel. Warren v. Raabe, 140 Neb. 16, 299 N.W. 338 (1941).
Mandamus lies to compel issuance of certificate of registration for practice of engineering and architecture, where certificate is unreasonably and arbitrarily refused by board of examiners. Downs v. Nebraska State Board of Examiners, 139 Neb. 23, 296 N.W. 151 (1941).
Mandamus will lie to compel a public officer to perform a ministerial duty. State ex rel. Cashman v. Carmean, 138 Neb. 819, 295 N.W. 801 (1941).
Mandamus is proper remedy to enforce stockholder's right to inspect books and records of state bank, remedy by inspection and copying being inadequate. State ex rel. Charvat v. Sagl, 119 Neb. 374, 229 N.W. 118 (1930).
Mandamus will not lie to compel county court to vacate order denying jury trial to one charged with liquor offense, in view of adequate legal remedy. State ex rel. Garton v. Fulton, 118 Neb. 400, 225 N.W. 28 (1929).
Mandamus lies to compel railroad company to furnish cars to shipper. State ex rel. Luben v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 83 Neb. 524, 120 N.W. 163 (1909).
Mandamus is proper to compel one who diverts public water to maintain bridge over canal. Nuckolls County v. Guthrie & Co., 76 Neb. 464, 107 N.W. 779 (1906).
Mandamus lies to compel surrender of records by officer to his successor. State ex rel. Coney v. Hyland, 75 Neb. 767, 107 N.W. 113 (1906).
Mandamus lies to require treasurer to deposit funds in depository bank. State ex rel. First Nat. Bank of Atkinson v. Cronin, 72 Neb. 636, 101 N.W. 325 (1904).
Mandamus lies to compel county to join in repair of county line bridge or unequivocally refuse. Iske v. State ex rel. Pankonin, 72 Neb. 278, 100 N.W. 315 (1904).
Mandamus lies to compel police authorities to prevent open violation of law. Moores v. State ex rel. Dunn, 71 Neb. 522, 99 N.W. 249 (1904).
Mandamus will lie to enforce discharge of duty by executive state officer. State ex rel. Wright v. Savage, 64 Neb. 684, 90 N.W. 898, 91 N.W. 557 (1902).
Duty imposed upon officer and not upon his successor may be enforced by mandamus after expiration of term. Kas v. State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1, Sarpy County, 63 Neb. 581, 88 N.W. 776 (1902).
Mandamus lies to compel school board to execute district's command. Krull v. State ex rel. Furgason, 59 Neb. 97, 80 N.W. 272 (1899).
Mandamus lies to reinstate pupil in school. Jackson v. State ex rel. Majors, 57 Neb. 183, 77 N.W. 662 (1898).
Mandamus is proper remedy by county to compel county officer to report fees. State ex rel. Wayne County v. Russell, 51 Neb. 774, 71 N.W. 785 (1897).
Mandamus may be used to compel erection of viaduct in metropolitan city. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. State ex rel. City of Omaha, 47 Neb. 549, 66 N.W. 624 (1896).
Mandamus is proper remedy to compel canvassing board to reconvene and correct canvass of returns. State ex rel. Welty v. McFadden, 46 Neb. 668, 65 N.W. 800 (1896).
Mandamus lies to compel approval of official bonds. State ex rel. Horne v. Holcomb, 46 Neb. 88, 64 N.W. 437 (1895).
Relator must trace his right through a public duty of respondent and not his private obligation. State ex rel. Gillilan v. Home St. Ry. Co., 43 Neb. 830, 62 N.W. 225 (1895).
Mandamus lies to compel county to repair bridge. Dutton v. State ex rel. Pankonin, 42 Neb. 804, 60 N.W. 1042 (1894).
Mandamus will lie to enforce duty which law enjoins when respondent in default. Strunk v. State ex rel. Lippi, 33 Neb. 322, 50 N.W. 14 (1891).
Mandamus lies to compel payment of official salaries. Von Forel v. State, 4 Neb. Unof. 843, 96 N.W. 648 (1903).
25-2157.
Writ; when not issued.The writ of mandamus may not be issued in any case where there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. It may issue on the information of the party beneficially interested.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 646, p. 507; R.S.1913, § 8272; C.S.1922, § 9225; C.S.1929, § 20-2157; R.S.1943, § 25-2157.
Annotations
1. Adequate remedy at law
2. When not issued
1. Adequate remedy at law
For writ of mandamus to issue, there must be no other plain and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Fick v. Miller, 255 Neb. 387, 584 N.W.2d 809 (1998).
Mandamus is not available if there is an adequate remedy at law. Little v. Board of County Commissioners of Cherry County, 179 Neb. 655, 140 N.W.2d 1 (1966).
Where there is another adequate remedy, mandamus is not available. State ex rel. Krieger v. Board of Supervisors of Clay County, 171 Neb. 117, 105 N.W.2d 721 (1960).
The writ of mandamus may not be issued in any case where there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Campbell v. Slavik, 144 Neb. 633, 14 N.W.2d 186 (1944); State ex rel. Cuming Co. Farm Bureau v. Tighe, 124 Neb. 578, 247 N.W. 419 (1933).
Writ of mandamus may not be issued in case where police officer alleges he has been illegally suspended by city council, as he has adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Sutton v. Towl, 127 Neb. 848, 257 N.W. 263 (1934).
Writ will not issue to review action of inferior court, or to coerce judicial discretion, where there is adequate legal remedy. State ex rel. Garton v. Fulton, 118 Neb. 400, 225 N.W. 28 (1929).
Mandamus is not the proper remedy to correct errors in assessments for special benefits by equalization board. State ex rel. Funke v. Lancaster County, 110 Neb. 635, 194 N.W. 807 (1923).
Correct practice is to issue writ in the name of the state upon the relation of the party claiming the relief sought. City of Crawford v. Darrow, 87 Neb. 494, 127 N.W. 891 (1910).
Appeal from county board of equalization is adequate; test of adequacy stated. State ex rel. Mickey v. Drexel, 75 Neb. 751, 107 N.W. 110 (1906).
Remedy by appeal from action of county board on claim is adequate; mandamus will not be allowed. Mitchell v. County of Clay, 69 Neb. 779, 96 N.W. 673 (1903), reversed on rehearing 69 Neb. 795, 98 N.W. 662 (1904).
Mandamus to compel issuance of warrant would not issue where adequate remedy at law existed. Horton v. State ex rel. Hayden, 60 Neb. 701, 84 N.W. 87 (1900).
Where county board of equalization could grant relief, mandamus will not lie. State ex rel. Young v. Osborn, 60 Neb. 415, 83 N.W. 357 (1900).
Mandamus is not allowed where statute has provided special remedy. Nebraska Tel. Co. v. State ex rel. Yeiser, 55 Neb. 627, 76 N.W. 171 (1898).
Mandamus will not lie in first instance in Supreme Court to compel action by clerk of district court. State ex rel. Solman v. Moores, 29 Neb. 122, 45 N.W. 278 (1890).
Right of review or appeal prevents mandamus. State ex rel. Neeland v. Follmer, 4 Neb. Unof. 376, 94 N.W. 103 (1903).
Mandamus will not issue to compel vacation of order granting new trial, as appeal is adequate remedy. State ex rel. Chadron L. & B. Assn. v. Westover, 2 Neb. Unof. 768, 89 N.W. 1002 (1902).
2. When not issued
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and may not be issued in any case where there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 227 Neb. 676, 419 N.W.2d 539 (1988).
Mandamus will not lie to compel a city to revoke a development permit it has issued. Larson v. City of Omaha, 226 Neb. 751, 415 N.W.2d 115 (1987).
The mere fact that there is another remedy at law will not prevent the issuance of a writ of mandamus unless the other remedy is adequate to afford relief upon the very subject matter involved. State ex rel. Herman v. City of Grand Island, 145 Neb. 150, 15 N.W.2d 341 (1944).
Judgment for debt against county is a condition precedent to issuance of writ of mandamus to make levy for its payment. State ex rel. Warren v. Raabe, 140 Neb. 16, 299 N.W. 338 (1941).
Where remedy by inspection and copying books and papers is inadequate, mandamus will lie to enforce stockholder's right to inspect books and records of state bank. State ex rel. Charvat v. Sagl, 119 Neb. 374, 229 N.W. 118 (1930).
Discretion of state board in awarding contract to lowest responsible bidder will not be controlled by mandamus. State ex rel. Neb. Building & Inv. Co. v. Board of Comrs. of State Institutions, 105 Neb. 570, 181 N.W. 530 (1921).
Mandamus will not lie to compel president pro tem of city council to name standing committees when duty is not enjoined by law. State ex rel. Bishop v. Dunn, 76 Neb. 155, 107 N.W. 236 (1906).
Mandamus does not lie to determine title to office. State ex rel. Coney v. Hyland, 75 Neb. 767, 107 N.W. 113 (1906); State ex rel. Truesdell v. Plambeck, 36 Neb. 401, 54 N.W. 667 (1893).
Mandamus is not proper to correct error of including irrelevant matter in bill of exceptions. State ex rel. Cobb v. Fawcett, 64 Neb. 496, 90 N.W. 250 (1902).
Mandamus will not lie to compel county board to construct drainage ditch, where relator is not shown to be interested. Van Horn v. State ex rel. Allen, 51 Neb. 232, 70 N.W. 941 (1897).
Mandamus lies to compel action, not to correct errors committed by court or other judicial body. McGee v. State ex rel. North American Cattle Co., 32 Neb. 149, 49 N.W. 220 (1891).
Mandamus will not lie to compel payment of dormant judgment. State ex rel. Craig v. School Dist. No. 2 of Phelps County, 25 Neb. 301, 41 N.W. 155 (1888).
Mandamus will not lie to compel building of railroad station. State ex rel. Moore v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. R. Co., 19 Neb. 476, 27 N.W. 434 (1886).
25-2158.
Alternative and peremptory writs.The writ is either alternative or peremptory. The alternative writ must state concisely the facts showing the obligation of the defendant to perform the act, and his omission to perform it, and command him, that immediately upon the receipt of the writ, or at some other specified time, he do the act required to be performed, or show cause before the court whence the writ issued, at a specified time and place, why he has not done so; and that he then and there return the writ, with his certificate of having done as he is commanded. The peremptory writ must be in a similar form, except that the words requiring the defendant to show cause why he has not done as commanded must be omitted.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 647, p. 508; R.S.1913, § 8273; C.S.1922, § 9226; C.S.1929, § 20-2158; R.S.1943, § 25-2158.
Annotations
Alternative writ should contain an order to show cause. State ex rel. Krieger v. Board of Supervisors of Clay County, 171 Neb. 117, 105 N.W.2d 721 (1960).
Two types of writs of mandamus are recognized and defined. State ex rel. Beck v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 164 Neb. 60, 81 N.W.2d 584 (1957).
Nothing can be contained in the peremptory writ that is not embraced in the alternative writ. State ex rel. Shriver v. Karr, 64 Neb. 514, 90 N.W. 298 (1902).
Peremptory writ must conform strictly to command of alternative writ and clearly show duty to be performed. Laflin v. State ex rel. Gray, 49 Neb. 614, 68 N.W. 1022 (1896).
Alternative writ must state all facts necessary to justify order sought. State ex rel. Mitchell v. School Dist. No. 9 of York County, 8 Neb. 92 (1878).
25-2159.
Peremptory writ; when allowed in first instance.When the right to require the performance of the act is clear and it is apparent that no valid excuse can be given for not performing it, a peremptory mandamus may be allowed in the first instance. In all other cases, the alternative writ must be first issued, except that a peremptory mandamus in the first instance shall not be given in any case involving the delivery of irrigation water if the Director of Natural Resources as defined in section 25-1062.01 is a party.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 648, p. 508; R.S.1913, § 8274; C.S.1922, § 9227; C.S.1929, § 20-2159; Laws 1941, c. 29, § 9, p. 137; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-2159; R.S.1943, § 25-2159; Laws 1957, c. 365, § 5, p. 1234;
Laws 2000, LB 900, § 68.
Annotations
When right to writ is clear and no excuse can be given for failure to perform duty, peremptory writ may be issued. State ex rel. Krieger v. Board of Supervisors of Clay County, 171 Neb. 117, 105 N.W.2d 721 (1960).
Peremptory writ may be issued without notice only where court can take judicial notice that a valid excuse is impossible. State ex rel. Beck v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 164 Neb. 60, 81 N.W.2d 584 (1957).
Peremptory writ without notice should be issued only where legal right to it is clearly shown. Summit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Nimtz, 158 Neb. 762, 64 N.W.2d 803 (1954).
A peremptory writ of mandamus may issue without notice only where there is no room for controversy as to the right of the applicant thereto, and where judicial notice can be taken that a valid excuse for failure to act cannot be given. State ex rel. Platte Valley Irr. Dist. v. Cochran, 139 Neb. 324, 297 N.W. 587 (1941).
Peremptory writ cannot issue without notice unless court can take judicial notice that defense is impossible. State ex rel. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Harrington, 78 Neb. 395, 110 N.W. 1016 (1907).
Relator's right and respondent's duty must clearly appear. State ex rel. Niles v. Weston, 67 Neb. 175, 93 N.W. 182 (1903).
Peremptory writ may issue against public officer without notice but not against officer of private corporation. Horton v. State ex rel. Hayden, 60 Neb. 701, 84 N.W. 87 (1900).
Court may grant peremptory writ at chambers only when right is clear. Mayer v. State ex rel. Wilkinson, 52 Neb. 764, 73 N.W. 214 (1897).
When facts are disputed on hearing to show cause, alternative writ should issue. American Waterworks Co. v. State ex rel. O'Connor, 31 Neb. 445, 48 N.W. 64 (1891).
25-2160.
Peremptory writ; motion; affidavit required; notice; order to show cause; actions involving irrigation water.The motion for the writ must be made upon affidavit. The court may require a notice of the application to be given to the adverse party, may grant an order to show cause why it should not be allowed, or may grant the writ without notice. No peremptory writ of mandamus shall be allowed in any case involving the delivery of irrigation water if the Director of Natural Resources, as defined in section 25-1062.01, is a party unless notice by either registered or certified mail has been given, as provided therein, seventy-two hours prior to the time of hearing to the director and division supervisor in the water division created by section 61-212 in which the action is brought and to all appropriators whose rights to the delivery of water might in any manner be affected, of the time and place of the hearing. In such case, any person, natural or artificial, injured or likely to be injured by the granting of such writ, may intervene in such action at any stage of the proceedings and become a party to such litigation.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 649, p. 508; R.S.1913, § 8275; C.S.1922, § 9228; C.S.1929, § 20-2160; Laws 1941, c. 29, § 10, p. 137; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-2160; R.S.1943, § 25-2160; Laws 1957, c. 242, § 20, p. 831; Laws 1957, c. 365, § 6, p. 1235;
Laws 2000, LB 900, § 69.
Annotations
A verification which is a part of an affidavit upon which a writ of mandamus is sought must be positively verified, and a verification based upon mere belief is inadequate. State ex rel. Van Cleave v. City of No. Platte, 213 Neb. 426, 329 N.W.2d 358 (1983).
To sustain an application for mandamus, motion for the writ must be made upon affidavit. Little v. Board of County Commissioners of Cherry County, 179 Neb. 655, 140 N.W.2d 1 (1966).
If no alternative writ has been granted, case may be heard on petition and response thereto. State ex rel. Krieger v. Board of Supervisors of Clay County, 171 Neb. 117, 105 N.W.2d 721 (1960).
Petition must be filed, and writ allowed by judge. State ex rel. Hansen v. Carrico, 86 Neb. 448, 125 N.W. 1110 (1910).
Action is not begun until motion and affidavit, or petition verified positively, filed. State ex rel. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Harrington, 78 Neb. 395, 110 N.W. 1016 (1907).
Affidavit upon information and belief is insufficient but is amendable. Steidl v. State ex rel. School Dist. of the City of Crete, 63 Neb. 695, 88 N.W. 853 (1902).
Writ issues upon motion supported by affidavit. State ex rel. Otto v. Commissioners of Lancaster County, 49 Neb. 51, 68 N.W. 336 (1896).
Application must show prior demand and refusal, and facts showing legal duty of respondent. Kemerer v. State ex rel. Garber, 7 Neb. 130 (1878).
25-2161.
Writ; endorsement of allowance; service; neglect to return; penalty.The allowance of the writ must be endorsed thereon, signed by a judge of the court granting it, and the writ must be served personally upon the defendant. If the defendant duly served neglects to return the same, he shall be proceeded against, as for a contempt.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 650, p. 508; R.S.1913, § 8276; C.S.1922, § 9229; C.S.1929, § 20-2161; R.S.1943, § 25-2161.
Annotations
This section does not authorize judge to issue writ. Clerk of district court issues writ, authenticated by seal of the court. State ex rel. Hansen v. Carrico, 86 Neb. 448, 125 N.W. 1110 (1910).
25-2162.
Alternative writ; answer.On the return day of the alternative writ, or such further day as the court may allow, the party on whom the writ shall have been served may show cause, by answer made, in the same manner as an answer to a complaint in a civil action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 651, p. 508; R.S.1913, § 8277; C.S.1922, § 9230; C.S.1929, § 20-2162; R.S.1943, § 25-2162;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 40.
Annotations
The alternative writ and answer thereto constitute the pleadings. State ex rel. Krieger v. Board of Supervisors of Clay County, 171 Neb. 117, 105 N.W.2d 721 (1960).
25-2163.
Peremptory writ; when issued; failure to answer, effect; pleading new matter, effect.If no answer be made, a peremptory mandamus must be allowed against the defendant. If an answer be made containing new matter, the same shall not in any respect conclude the plaintiff, who may, on the trial or other proceeding, avail himself of any valid objection to its sufficiency, or may countervail it by proof, either in direct denial or by way of avoidance.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 652, p. 508; R.S.1913, § 8278; C.S.1922, § 9231; C.S.1929, § 20-2163; R.S.1943, § 25-2163.
Annotations
The issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus under this section because of a respondent's failure to answer the alternative writ is the equivalent of a default judgment. State ex rel. Unger v. State, 293 Neb. 549, 878 N.W.2d 540 (2016).
If no answer is filed to alternative writ, peremptory writ must be allowed. State ex rel. Krieger v. Board of Supervisors of Clay County, 171 Neb. 117, 105 N.W.2d 721 (1960).
Plaintiff may avail himself of any valid objection to new matter contained in the answer. State ex rel. Seth Thomas Clock Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Cass County, 60 Neb. 566, 83 N.W. 733 (1900).
25-2164.
Pleadings; trial.No other pleading or written allegation is allowed than the writ and answer. These are the pleadings in the case, and have the same effect and are to be construed and may be amended in the same manner as pleadings in a civil action; and the issues thereby joined must be tried, and the further proceedings thereon had in the same manner as in a civil action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 653, p. 508; R.S.1913, § 8279; C.S.1922, § 9232; C.S.1929, § 20-2164; R.S.1943, § 25-2164.
Annotations
1. Pleadings
2. Trial
1. Pleadings
The alternative writ and the answer constitute the pleadings. State ex rel. Krieger v. Board of Supervisors of Clay County, 171 Neb. 117, 105 N.W.2d 721 (1960).
Where no ruling was made on demurrer to return and trial was had, demurrer was held to have been waived. State ex rel. League of Municipalities v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 158 Neb. 160, 62 N.W.2d 682 (1954).
Difference between alternative and peremptory writ did not prejudice defendant. State ex rel. City of Grand Island v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 152 Neb. 772, 42 N.W.2d 867 (1950).
In mandamus proceedings no pleading is authorized other than writ and the answer; intervention should be denied. State ex rel. Randall v. Hall, 125 Neb. 236, 249 N.W. 756 (1933).
Demurrer to alternative writ is irregular, but is treated as admission of facts alleged in writ. State ex rel. Glatfelter v. Hart, 106 Neb. 61, 182 N.W. 567 (1921).
Demurrer is proper method to assail defective petition for mandamus. State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914).
Demurrer is proper to test sufficiency of petition. City of Crawford v. Darrow, 87 Neb. 494, 127 N.W. 891 (1910).
Issuance of new writ to amend old is not commencement of new action. Kas v. State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1 of Sarpy County, 63 Neb. 581, 88 N.W. 776 (1902).
No pleading other than writ and the answer is allowed. State ex rel. Wayne County v. Russell, 51 Neb. 774, 71 N.W. 785 (1897).
Upon defendant's demurrer, writ only is considered. King v. State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1 of Hall County, 50 Neb. 66, 69 N.W. 307 (1896).
Material averment in application, not denied in the answer, must be taken as true. State ex rel. Marquett, Deweese & Hall v. Baushausen, 49 Neb. 558, 68 N.W. 950 (1896).
2. Trial
Mandamus is law action, and motion for new trial is necessary. State ex rel. McKee v. Porter, 90 Neb. 233, 133 N.W. 189 (1911).
Liberal rules of amendment provided by code apply to mandamus proceeding. State ex rel. Shriver v. Karr, 64 Neb. 514, 90 N.W. 298 (1902).
Jury trial is not demandable as matter of right. Mayer v. State ex rel. Wilkinson, 52 Neb. 764, 73 N.W. 214 (1897).
Facts cannot be tried on affidavits over objection. American Waterworks Co. v. State ex rel. O'Connor, 31 Neb. 445, 48 N.W. 64 (1891).
A motion for summary judgment is a proper procedural device in an action for a writ of mandamus. Russell v. Clarke, 15 Neb. App. 221, 724 N.W.2d 840 (2006).
25-2165.
Judgment for plaintiff; damages; peremptory writ granted; costs and attorney's fees, authorized.If judgment be given for the plaintiff, he or she shall recover the damages which he or she shall have sustained, to be ascertained by the court or a jury, or by referees, in a civil action, and a peremptory mandamus shall also be granted to him or her without delay. In addition to damages the court may also award costs and reasonable attorney's fees. The costs and attorney's fees shall be paid by the governmental body represented by the public official or employee.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 654, p. 509; R.S.1913, § 8280; C.S.1922, § 9233; C.S.1929, § 20-2165; R.S.1943, § 25-2165;
Laws 1981, LB 120, § 1; Laws 1981, LB 273, § 30.
Annotations
The right of a plaintiff to an award of attorney fees is dependent upon the plaintiff's having recovered judgment. State ex rel. PROUD v. Conley, 236 Neb. 122, 459 N.W.2d 222 (1990).
Attorney's fee is not allowable as "damages" where judgment is given for plaintiff hereunder. State ex rel. Charvat v. Sagl, 119 Neb. 374, 229 N.W. 118 (1930).
25-2166.
Recovery of damages; effect upon right of action.A recovery of damages by virtue of this chapter, against a party, who shall have made a return to a writ of mandamus, is a bar to any other action against the same party for the making of such return.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 655, p. 509; R.S.1913, § 8281; C.S.1922, § 9234; C.S.1929, § 20-2166; R.S.1943, § 25-2166.
25-2167.
Peremptory writ directed to public officials; imposition of fine; payment; effect.Whenever a peremptory mandamus is directed to any public officer, body or board, commanding the performance of any public duty, specially enjoined by law, if it appear to the court that such officer, or any member of such body or board, has without just excuse refused or neglected to perform the duty so enjoined, the court may impose a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars upon every such officer, or member of such body or board. Such fine, when collected, shall be paid into the treasury of the county where the duty ought to have been performed; and the payment thereof is a bar to an action for any penalty incurred by such officer, or member of such body or board, by reason of his refusal or neglect to perform the duty so enjoined.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 656, p. 509; R.S.1913, § 8282; C.S.1922, § 9235; C.S.1929, § 20-2167; R.S.1943, § 25-2167.
25-2168.
Right of private persons to bring action.Any private person may on his own relation sue out writs of mandamus without application to the prosecuting attorney.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 2, p. 279; R.S.1913, § 8283; C.S.1922, § 9236; C.S.1929, § 20-2168; R.S.1943, § 25-2168.
Annotations
Private person may on his own relation bring mandamus action. McFarland v. State, 165 Neb. 487, 86 N.W.2d 182 (1957).
Writ is issued in name of state, upon relation of party seeking relief. City of Crawford v. Darrow, 87 Neb. 494, 127 N.W. 891 (1910).
Party may bring mandamus in name of state on his relation. State ex rel. Levy v. Spicer, 36 Neb. 469, 54 N.W. 849 (1893).
25-2169.
Action by private person; costs.Private persons suing out writs of mandamus, under the provisions of sections 25-2156 to 25-2168, shall be liable for costs as in civil cases.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 3, p. 279; R.S.1913, § 8284; C.S.1922, § 9237; C.S.1929, § 20-2169; R.S.1943, § 25-2169.
25-2170.
Complaint for partition; parties; allegations.The complaint shall describe the property, and the several interests and estates of the several joint owners, or lessees thereof, if known. All tenants in common, joint tenants, or lessees of any estate in land or interest therein, or of any mineral, coal, petroleum, or gas rights, may be compelled to make or suffer partition of such estate or estates in the manner hereinafter prescribed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 802, p. 538; Laws 1899, c. 89, § 1, p. 344; R.S.1913, § 8285; C.S.1922, § 9238; C.S.1929, § 20-2170; R.S.1943, § 25-2170; Laws 1951, c. 72, § 1(2), p. 228;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 41.
Annotations
1. Right to partition
2. Procedure
3. Attorney's fees
1. Right to partition
The removal of minerals whether held in solution upon the land or resting in the soil or subsurface, is the removal of a component part of the real estate itself. The severance changes the character of the property, but it remains real estate until detached. Wheelock & Manning OO Ranches, Inc. v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978).
Once joint title in real estate is established, partition may be had as a matter of law. Yunghans v. O'Toole, 199 Neb. 317, 258 N.W.2d 810 (1977).
A life tenant who owns no other interest in the property cannot compel partition over objection of remaindermen. Dixon v. Dixon, 189 Neb. 212, 202 N.W.2d 180 (1972).
Lessee for a term of years cannot prevent partition where life tenant fails to object to partition. Hartman v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958).
Joint tenants and tenants in common of a future interest, subject to an outstanding life estate in the whole of the premises, may bring or be compelled to suffer partition. Baskins v. Krepcik, 153 Neb. 36, 43 N.W.2d 624 (1950).
When there is outstanding estate for life vested in another to the whole of the premises for which partition is sought, a remainderman cannot maintain partition over the objection of the holder of the life estate. Bodeman v. Cary, 152 Neb. 506, 41 N.W.2d 797 (1950).
This state enacted partition statute to give parties the right to sale of property and division of proceeds where partition in kind could not be made without great prejudice to the owners. Trowbridge v. Donner, 152 Neb. 206, 40 N.W.2d 655 (1950).
Each joint tenant is entitled to partition of estate continuing during life of all tenants; on death of one of two joint tenants, survivor takes all. Arthur v. Arthur, 115 Neb. 781, 215 N.W. 117 (1927).
Life tenant and remaindermen cannot require other remaindermen to submit to partition against their will, contrary to will restricting right. Freeland v. Andersen, 114 Neb. 822, 211 N.W. 167 (1926).
Remaindermen cannot maintain partition over objection of life tenant. Weddingfeld v. Weddingfeld, 109 Neb. 729, 192 N.W. 227 (1923).
Partition is not maintainable in violation of plaintiff's agreement or of restriction imposed by grantor. Wicker v. Moore, 79 Neb. 755, 113 N.W. 148 (1907).
Only joint tenant or tenant in common may maintain action; administrator cannot. Phillips v. Dorris, 56 Neb. 293, 76 N.W. 555 (1898); Barr v. Lamaster, 48 Neb. 114, 66 N.W. 1110 (1896).
Compulsory partition is matter of right of any tenant; co-reversioners may partition. Oliver v. Lansing, 50 Neb. 828, 70 N.W. 369 (1897).
2. Procedure
Petition in action for partition was not defective because of failure to allege joint tenancy where facts were alleged in detail setting out the interests of the parties. Giles v. Sheridan, 179 Neb. 257, 137 N.W.2d 828 (1965).
One of several tenants in common has an absolute right to a partition of real estate, in the absence of an agreement or other impediment to the contrary, and such action may be brought by the guardian of an incompetent person who is a tenant in common. Windle v. Kelly, 135 Neb. 143, 280 N.W. 445 (1938).
Where there is an estate for life vested in a third person in the whole of the premises of which partition is sought a remainderman cannot maintain an action in partition over the objection of the holder of the life estate. Bartels v. Seefus, 132 Neb. 841, 273 N.W. 485 (1937).
It is error to order partition, over objection of some beneficiaries, of land conveyed in trust to pay rents and profits to beneficiaries and to sell land within trustee's discretion; if trustee dies, successor should be appointed. Heiser v. Brehm, 117 Neb. 472, 221 N.W. 97 (1928).
3. Attorney's fees
Where partition proceedings are amicable and for the benefit of all parties in interest, an attorney's fee should be allowed even though there is a contest between the parties over whether property sold for fair value at partition sale. Wilcox v. Halligan, 141 Neb. 643, 4 N.W.2d 750 (1942).
25-2170.01.
Who may compel partition.Any joint owner of any real estate or of any interest therein or of any mineral, coal, petroleum, or gas rights, whether held in fee or by lease or otherwise, may compel a partition thereof in the manner provided in sections 25-2170 to 25-21,111.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 72, § 1(1), p. 228.
Annotations
A tenant cannot seek partition of a landlord's property. Dreesen Enters. v. Dreesen, 308 Neb. 433, 954 N.W.2d 874 (2021).
Partition, if well founded, is an absolute right, and a conservator need not obtain a license to so act. Cofer v. Perkins, 199 Neb. 327, 258 N.W.2d 807 (1977).
A life tenant who owns no other interest in the property cannot compel partition over objection of remaindermen. Dixon v. Dixon, 189 Neb. 212, 202 N.W.2d 180 (1972).
Action to partition mineral interests in lands was authorized by this section. Phillips v. Phillips, 170 Neb. 733, 104 N.W.2d 52 (1960).
Lessee for term of years holding an entire interest in lease has no leasehold to partition. Hartman v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958).
25-2171.
Complaint; unknown owners or interests; allegations.If the number of shares or interests is known, but the owners thereof are unknown, or if there are, or are supposed to be, any interests which are unknown, contingent or doubtful, these facts shall be set forth in the complaint with reasonable certainty.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 803, p. 538; R.S.1913, § 8286; C.S.1922, § 9239; C.S.1929, § 20-2171; R.S.1943, § 25-2171;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 42.
25-2172.
Parties; lienholders.Creditors having a specific or general lien upon all or any portion of the property may or may not be made parties, at the option of the plaintiff.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 804, p. 538; R.S.1913, § 8287; C.S.1922, § 9240; C.S.1929, § 20-2172; R.S.1943, § 25-2172.
Annotations
Plaintiff in partition suit may at his option make holder of tax lien a party to the suit. Fairley v. Kemper, 174 Neb. 565, 118 N.W.2d 754 (1962).
Creditor having a specific or a general lien upon property being partitioned may or may not be made a party at the option of the plaintiff. Majerus v. Santo, 143 Neb. 774, 10 N.W.2d 608 (1943).
25-2173.
Liens upon undivided interests; lien for costs paramount.If the lien is upon one or more undivided interests of any of the parties, it shall, after partition or sale, remain a charge upon those particular interests or the proceeds thereof. But the due proportion of costs is a charge upon those interests paramount to all other liens.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 805, p. 538; R.S.1913, § 8288; C.S.1922, § 9241; C.S.1929, § 20-2173; R.S.1943, § 25-2173.
Annotations
Proceeds are not exempt as personalty against judgment lien. First Nat. Bank of Albion v. Snyder, 2 Neb. Unof. 136, 96 N.W. 285 (1901).
25-2174.
Answer; contents.The answers of the defendants must state, among other things, the amount and nature of their respective interests. They may deny the interest of any of the plaintiffs, and by supplemental pleading, if necessary, may deny the interests of any of the other defendants.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 806, p. 538; R.S.1913, § 8289; C.S.1922, § 9242; C.S.1929, § 20-2174; R.S.1943, § 25-2174.
Annotations
Where plaintiff bases action on legal title, defendant may set up in answer equitable defense thereto. Lynch v. Lynch, 18 Neb. 586, 26 N.W. 390 (1886).
25-2175.
Repealed. Laws 2002, LB 876, § 92.
25-2176.
Trial; costs.Issues may thereupon be joined and tried between any of the contesting parties, the question of costs on such issues being regulated between the contestants agreeably to the principles applicable to other cases.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 808, p. 538; R.S.1913, § 8291; C.S.1922, § 9244; C.S.1929, § 20-2176; R.S.1943, § 25-2176.
Annotations
Issues may be joined and trial had between any of contesting parties to the suit. Fairley v. Kemper, 174 Neb. 565, 118 N.W.2d 754 (1962).
25-2177.
Trial; proof.Each of the parties appearing, whether as plaintiff or defendant, must exhibit his documentary proof of title, if he has any, and must file the same, or copies thereof, with the clerk.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 809, p. 539; R.S.1913, § 8292; C.S.1922, § 9245; C.S.1929, § 20-2177; R.S.1943, § 25-2177.
Cross References
Abstracts of title, when used as evidence, see section 25-1292.
Annotations
Method of proving claims of both plaintiffs and defendants is provided. Fairley v. Kemper, 174 Neb. 565, 118 N.W.2d 754 (1962).
In partition suit, each party must exhibit his documentary proof of title. Frankenberger v. Holm, 154 Neb. 80, 46 N.W.2d 901 (1951).
Filing documentary evidence is not jurisdictional. Kazebeer v. Nunemaker, 82 Neb. 732, 118 N.W. 646 (1908).
25-2178.
Pleadings; when taken as true.If the statements in the complaint are not denied in the answer or contradicted by the documentary proof exhibited, they shall be taken as true.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 810, p. 539; R.S.1913, § 8293; C.S.1922, § 9246; C.S.1929, § 20-2178; R.S.1943, § 25-2178;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 43.
Annotations
Uncontroverted statements in petition and answer will be taken as true. Fairley v. Kemper, 174 Neb. 565, 118 N.W.2d 754 (1962).
Court should first enter judgment confirming shares before determining whether or not partition is practicable. Burke v. Cunningham, 42 Neb. 645, 60 N.W. 903 (1894).
25-2179.
Judgment.After all the shares and interests of the parties have been settled in any of the methods aforesaid, judgment shall be rendered confirming those shares and interests, and directing partition to be made accordingly.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 811, p. 539; R.S.1913, § 8294; C.S.1922, § 9247; C.S.1929, § 20-2179; R.S.1943, § 25-2179.
Annotations
In enacting section 25-1315, the Legislature did not amend the partition statutes or attempt to change the effect of our prior jurisprudence. Both before and after the adoption of section 25-1315, this section characterized the settlement of all ownership rights as a "judgment" and our case law characterizes the order as a final order. Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest. Co., 295 Neb. 639, 889 N.W.2d 825 (2017).
The language in Peterson v. Damoude, 95 Neb. 469, 145 N.W. 847 (1914), concerning the appealability of orders in a partition action, harmonizes the final order language of section 25-1902 with the partition procedure mandated by this section. Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest. Co., 295 Neb. 639, 889 N.W.2d 825 (2017).
An affirmative judgment in favor of a cross-petitioner on a tax sale certificate can be obtained in a partition suit. Fairley v. Kemper, 174 Neb. 565, 118 N.W.2d 754 (1962).
Where partition suit is amicable and for benefit of all parties, court may allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by parties in proportion to their interests. Mabry v. Mudd, 132 Neb. 610, 272 N.W. 574 (1937).
When partition has been ordered, no appeal lies until same has been effected and confirmed. Peterson v. Damoude, 98 Neb. 370, 152 N.W. 786 (1915); Peterson v. Damoude, 95 Neb. 469, 145 N.W. 847 (1914).
Judgment fixing shares is a final judgment and is res judicata of the interests of the parties. Staats v. Wilson, 76 Neb. 204, 107 N.W. 230 (1906).
25-2180.
Referee or referees; appointment; duty.Upon entering such judgment the court shall appoint a referee or referees, not exceeding three in number, to make partition into the requisite number of shares.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 812, p. 539; Laws 1905, c. 178, § 1, p. 671; R.S.1913, § 8295; C.S.1922, § 9248; C.S.1929, § 20-2180; R.S.1943, § 25-2180.
Annotations
Under this section, the court is required to appoint at least one referee. In re Estate of McKillip, 284 Neb. 367, 820 N.W.2d 868 (2012).
Referee in partition is an officer of the court. Knouse v. Knouse, 157 Neb. 748, 61 N.W.2d 388 (1953).
Referee in partition is an officer of the court subject to its lawful orders and directions. Siekert v. Soester, 144 Neb. 321, 13 N.W.2d 139 (1944).
Referees in first instance determine practicability of partition. Burke v. Cunningham, 42 Neb. 645, 60 N.W. 903 (1894).
Court may also appoint referee to make accounting. Mills v. Miller, 3 Neb. 87 (1873).
25-2181.
Report of referees.If it appears to the referee or referees that partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners, they shall so report to the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 814, p. 539; R.S.1913, § 8296; C.S.1922, § 9249; C.S.1929, § 20-2181; R.S.1943, § 25-2181.
Annotations
Under this section, the referee is required to report to the court if it appears to the referee that partition in kind cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners. In re Estate of McKillip, 284 Neb. 367, 820 N.W.2d 868 (2012).
When the evidence showed that only two of four tracts were contiguous, the tracts had different uses, the tracts would not typically be offered for sale together and would not bring a higher price if sold together, and another party proposed an in-kind distribution that came close to dividing the land into equal thirds based on appraised value, a plaintiff for partition failed to show partition in kind would result in great prejudice to the owners and did not rebut the presumption that real estate should be distributed in kind. In re Estate of McKillip, 284 Neb. 367, 820 N.W.2d 868 (2012).
Presumption is in favor of partition in kind; however, the character and location of the property, or the amount of interest sought to be assigned, or both, may be such that it will be presumed that partition in kind cannot be made. Nordhausen v. Christner, 215 Neb. 367, 338 N.W.2d 754 (1983).
As between partition in kind or sale of land, partition in kind is preferred. Phillips v. Phillips, 170 Neb. 733, 104 N.W.2d 52 (1960).
The effect of this section, in connection with section 25-2183, is to make uncertain whether property should be partitioned in kind or sold and the proceeds distributed, until a judicial determination of that issue is made by the court. Trowbridge v. Donner, 152 Neb. 206, 40 N.W.2d 655 (1950).
Effect of this section, together with section authorizing court to order sale if satisfied with report, is to make uncertain whether land will be physically divided or sold. Heiser v. Brehm, 117 Neb. 472, 221 N.W. 97 (1928).
Impracticability of partition does not render action adversary; attorney's fees should be allowed if amicable. Smith v. Palmer, 91 Neb. 796, 137 N.W. 843 (1912).
25-2182.
Referees; special allotments; when directed.For good and sufficient reasons appearing to the court, the referee or referees may be directed to allot particular portions of the land to particular individuals. In other cases the shares must be made as nearly as possible of equal value.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 813, p. 539; R.S.1913, § 8297; C.S.1922, § 9250; C.S.1929, § 20-2182; R.S.1943, § 25-2182.
Annotations
The trial court is given power to direct the referee to allot particular portions of land to particular individuals, and unless so allotted the shares may be drawn by lot. Trowbridge v. Donner, 152 Neb. 206, 40 N.W.2d 655 (1950).
Court may allot particular portions to particular individuals. McClave v. McClave, 60 Neb. 464, 83 N.W. 668 (1900).
Court may award compensation or charge land where incapable of fair division. Lynch v. Lynch, 18 Neb. 586, 26 N.W. 390 (1886).
25-2183.
Sale; order; place held.If satisfied with such report the court shall cause an order to be entered directing the referee or referees to sell the premises so situated, and shall also fix the place and terms of sale. The sale may be held at any place in the county in which the action is brought, or if there is land situated in two or more counties, sale may be had in any county in which any part of the real estate is situated.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 815, p. 539; R.S.1913, § 8298; Laws 1917, c. 142, § 1, p. 328; C.S.1922, § 9251; C.S.1929, § 20-2183; R.S.1943, § 25-2183; Laws 1949, c. 58, § 1, p. 169.
Annotations
The effect of this section, in connection with section 25-2181, is to make uncertain whether property should be partitioned in kind or sold and the proceeds distributed, until a judicial determination of that issue is made by the court. Trowbridge v. Donner, 152 Neb. 206, 40 N.W.2d 655 (1950).
25-2184.
Referees; bond; conditions; further security.Before proceeding to sell, the referee or referees shall each give security, to be fixed by the court and to be approved by the clerk of said court or the judge thereof, conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties. At any time thereafter the court may require further and better security.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 816, p. 539; R.S.1913, § 8299; Laws 1917, c. 141, § 1, p. 327; C.S.1922, § 9252; C.S.1929, § 20-2184; R.S.1943, § 25-2184.
25-2185.
Sale of property; notice; procedure.The same notice of sale shall be given as when lands are sold on execution by the sheriff, and the sale shall be conducted in like manner, except as to place of sale.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 817, p. 539; R.S.1913, § 8300; Laws 1917, c. 142, § 1, p. 328; C.S.1922, § 9253; C.S.1929, § 20-2185; R.S.1943, § 25-2185.
Cross References
Provisions for sale of property under execution, see sections 25-1527 to 25-1541.
Annotations
Appraisement is unnecessary. Schick v. Whitcomb, 68 Neb. 784, 94 N.W. 1023 (1903).
25-2186.
Sale of property; report of referee.After completing said sale, the referee or referees must report their proceedings to the court, with a description of the different parcels of land sold to each purchaser, and the price bid therefor, which report shall be filed with the clerk.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 818, p. 539; R.S.1913, § 8301; C.S.1922, § 9254; C.S.1929, § 20-2186; R.S.1943, § 25-2186.
Annotations
Sale may be made prior to report. Schick v. Whitcomb, 68 Neb. 784, 94 N.W. 1023 (1903).
25-2187.
Encumbrances; referee; appointment; report; appeal.If deemed advisable, the court may appoint a referee to inquire into the nature and amount of encumbrances, and report accordingly. From that report an appeal lies to the court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 820, p. 539; R.S.1913, § 8303; C.S.1922, § 9255; C.S.1929, § 20-2187; R.S.1943, § 25-2187.
Annotations
Referee may inquire into and report as to the nature and the amount of encumbrances. Hartman v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958).
25-2188.
Encumbrances; duty of referee; notice of hearing.The referee shall give the parties interested at least five days' notice of the time and place when he will receive proof of the amount of such encumbrances.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 821, p. 540; R.S.1913, § 8304; C.S.1922, § 9256; C.S.1929, § 20-2188; R.S.1943, § 25-2188.
25-2189.
Encumbrances; evidence before referee.In taking such proof he may receive, with other evidence, the affidavit of the parties interested.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 822, p. 540; R.S.1913, § 8305; C.S.1922, § 9257; C.S.1929, § 20-2189; R.S.1943, § 25-2189.
25-2190.
Encumbrances; payment with consent of owner.If any encumbrance is ascertained to exist, the proceeds of the sale of that portion, after the payment of costs, or so much thereof as is necessary, shall, if the owner consents, be paid over to the encumbrancer.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 823, p. 540; R.S.1913, § 8306; C.S.1922, § 9258; C.S.1929, § 20-2190; R.S.1943, § 25-2190.
Annotations
Where there is an encumbrance on a share, proceeds of sale if owner consents may be paid over to encumbrancer. Hartman v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958).
This section shows legislative intent to permit partition subject to outstanding encumbrance such as a life estate. Baskins v. Krepcik, 153 Neb. 36, 43 N.W.2d 624 (1950).
Where there is an estate for life vested in a third person in the whole of the premises of which partition is sought, a remainderman cannot maintain an action in partition over the objection of the holder of the life estate. Bartels v. Seefus, 132 Neb. 841, 273 N.W. 485 (1937).
Widow with life estate cannot compel partition, and demand the value thereof out of proceeds of partition sale, where some remaindermen object. Freeland v. Andersen, 114 Neb. 822, 211 N.W. 167 (1926).
Remaindermen cannot force partition and make life tenant take value of life estate as if it were an encumbrance. Weddingfeld v. Weddingfeld, 109 Neb. 729, 192 N.W. 227 (1923).
25-2191.
Encumbrances; objection of owner to payment; procedure; notice.If the owner objects to the payment of such encumbrance, the money shall be retained or invested by order of the court to await final action in relation to its disposition, and notice thereof shall be forthwith given to the encumbrancer, unless he has already been made a party.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 824, p. 540; R.S.1913, § 8307; C.S.1922, § 9259; C.S.1929, § 20-2191; R.S.1943, § 25-2191.
Annotations
Encumbrancer may be a proper but not a necessary party. Hartman v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958).
25-2192.
Issue between owner and encumbrancer; order; effect.The court may direct an issue to be made up between the encumbrancer and the owner, which shall be decisive of their respective rights.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 825, p. 540; R.S.1913, § 8308; C.S.1922, § 9260; C.S.1929, § 20-2192; R.S.1943, § 25-2192.
Annotations
Court may direct issues to be made up between encumbrancer and owner of share. Hartman v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958).
25-2193.
Encumbrances; life estate or estate for years; settlement in gross; investment of proceeds.If an estate for life or years be found to exist as an encumbrance upon any part of said property, and if the parties cannot agree upon the sum in gross which they will consider an equivalent for such estate, the court shall direct the avails of the encumbered property to be invested, and the proceeds to be paid to the encumbrancer during the existence of the encumbrance.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 826, p. 540; R.S.1913, § 8309; C.S.1922, § 9261; C.S.1929, § 20-2193; R.S.1943, § 25-2193.
Annotations
Holder of encumbrance on life estate is entitled to protection according to terms of his contract. Hartman v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958).
Remainderman may not maintain partition over objection of life tenant, but may do so where life tenant does not object. Baskins v. Krepcik, 153 Neb. 36, 43 N.W.2d 624 (1950).
Where there is an estate for life vested in a third person in the whole of the premises of which partition is sought, a remainderman cannot maintain an action in partition over the objection of the holder of the life estate. Bartels v. Seefus, 132 Neb. 841, 273 N.W. 485 (1937).
Life tenant and remaindermen cannot force partition against the will of other remaindermen. Freeland v. Andersen, 114 Neb. 822, 211 N.W. 167 (1926).
Remaindermen cannot maintain partition over objection of life tenant. Weddingfeld v. Weddingfeld, 109 Neb. 729, 192 N.W. 227 (1923).
25-2194.
Encumbrance proceedings; not to delay distribution of other shares.The proceedings in relation to the encumbrances shall not delay the distribution of the proceeds of other shares in respect to which no difficulties exist.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 827, p. 540; R.S.1913, § 8310; C.S.1922, § 9262; C.S.1929, § 20-2194; R.S.1943, § 25-2194.
Annotations
In default of owner, person holding an encumbrance may appear and act as his representative. Hartman v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958).
25-2195.
Security for refund.The court in its discretion may require all or any of the parties, before they receive the money arising from any sale authorized in sections 25-2170 to 25-21,111, to give satisfactory security to refund such money with interest, in case it afterward appears that such parties were not entitled thereto.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 828, p. 540; R.S.1913, § 8311; C.S.1922, § 9263; C.S.1929, § 20-2195; R.S.1943, § 25-2195.
25-2196.
Order of conveyance; when made; purchase money security.If the sales aforesaid are approved and confirmed, an order shall be entered directing the referee or referees, or a majority thereof, to execute conveyances pursuant to such sales. But no conveyance can be made until all the money is paid, without receiving from the purchaser a mortgage of the land so sold, or other equivalent security.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 829, p. 540; R.S.1913, § 8312; C.S.1922, § 9264; C.S.1929, § 20-2196; R.S.1943, § 25-2196.
Annotations
Where referee reported to court that he received money and court confirmed sale, failure to collect purchase price would not render sale void as against later purchaser in good faith. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Tuma, 116 Neb. 99, 216 N.W. 186 (1927).
Referees are not absolved from liability in not requiring payment of purchase money by confirmation of sale. Schick v. Whitcomb, 68 Neb. 784, 94 N.W. 1023 (1903).
25-2197.
Conveyances; valid against subsequent purchasers and parties to action.Such conveyances so executed, being recorded in the county where the premises are situated, shall be valid against all subsequent purchasers, and also against all persons interested at the time who were made parties to the proceedings in the mode pointed out by law.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 830, p. 540; R.S.1913, § 8313; C.S.1922, § 9265; C.S.1929, § 20-2197; R.S.1943, § 25-2197.
Annotations
Judgment fixing shares and confirming sale is final where all interested parties are before court; and parties thereto cannot question title of subsequent bona fide purchaser, in absence of fraud on face of proceedings. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Tuma, 116 Neb. 99, 216 N.W. 186 (1927).
25-2198.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 73, § 1, p. 229.
25-2199.
Disapproval of sale; refund.If the sales are disapproved the money paid and the securities given must be returned to the persons respectively entitled thereto.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 832, p. 541; R.S.1913, § 8315; C.S.1922, § 9267; C.S.1929, § 20-2199; R.S.1943, § 25-2199.
Annotations
Money belongs to bidder until sale is confirmed, and he has right to follow it wherever he can trace it and recover it from one who had knowledge of the facts. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank of McCook, 125 Neb. 437, 250 N.W. 553 (1933).
25-21,100.
Partition in kind; how made.When partition is deemed proper the referee or referees must make out the shares by visible monuments, and may employ a competent surveyor and the necessary assistants to aid them.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 833, p. 541; R.S.1913, § 8316; C.S.1922, § 9268; C.S.1929, § 20-21,100; R.S.1943, § 25-21,100.
25-21,101.
Partition; report of referees; form; contents.The report of the referee or referees must be in writing signed by at least two of them where more than one has been appointed. It must describe the respective shares with reasonable particularity, and be accompanied by a plat of the premises.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 834, p. 541; R.S.1913, § 8317; C.S.1922, § 9269; C.S.1929, § 20-21,101; R.S.1943, § 25-21,101.
25-21,102.
Shares drawn by lot, when.Unless the shares are allotted to their respective owners by the referee or referees as hereinbefore contemplated, the clerk shall number the shares and then draw the names of the future owners by lot.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 835, p. 541; R.S.1913, § 8318; C.S.1922, § 9270; C.S.1929, § 20-21,102; R.S.1943, § 25-21,102.
Annotations
Unless specifically directed by the trial court, the shares may be drawn by lot. Trowbridge v. Donner, 152 Neb. 206, 40 N.W.2d 655 (1950).
25-21,103.
Partition in part; remaining portion; sale.When partition can be conveniently made of part of the premises, but not of all, one portion may be partitioned and the other sold as hereinafter provided.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 836, p. 541; R.S.1913, § 8319; C.S.1922, § 9271; C.S.1929, § 20-21,103; R.S.1943, § 25-21,103.
25-21,104.
Partition; report of referees set aside, when; rereference.On good cause shown, the report may be set aside and the matter again referred to the same or other referee or referees.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 837, p. 541; R.S.1913, § 8320; C.S.1922, § 9272; C.S.1929, § 20-21,104; R.S.1943, § 25-21,104.
25-21,105.
Confirmation of report of referees; judgment.Upon report of the referee or referees being confirmed, judgment thereon shall be rendered that the partition be firm and effectual forever.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 838, p. 541; R.S.1913, § 8321; C.S.1922, § 9273; C.S.1929, § 20-21,105; R.S.1943, § 25-21,105.
Annotations
Where summons was properly served in partition suit upon defendants who were claimed to be insane, confirmation of sale was binding, and would not be set aside against bona fide purchaser. Schleuning v. Tatro, 122 Neb. 3, 238 N.W. 741 (1931).
25-21,106.
Service of process; parties bound by proceedings.The defendants may be served in the same manner as in ordinary civil action by summons, or by publication as provided in this code, and when all the parties in interest have been duly served, any of the proceedings herein prescribed shall be binding and conclusive upon them all. If only a portion of such parties be served, they only shall be bound by such proceedings.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 839, p. 541; Laws 1899, c. 89, § 2, p. 345; R.S.1913, § 8322; C.S.1922, § 9274; C.S.1929, § 20-21,106; R.S.1943, § 25-21,106.
Cross References
For service of process, see Chapter 25, article 5.
Annotations
A judgment in a partition action determining the title of land subject to partition is conclusive on parties to the action. Bender v. Fuchs, 179 Neb. 162, 137 N.W.2d 364 (1965).
Bona fide purchaser was protected by confirmation, even though one defendant was insane, another defendant weak-minded, and no guardian ad litem was appointed for either. Schleuning v. Tatro, 122 Neb. 3, 238 N.W. 741 (1931).
Minor heirs are bound by judgment in partition involving homestead of surviving parent, if properly served, and guardian ad litem appointed and answers. Weddle v. Specht, 97 Neb. 693, 151 N.W. 160 (1915).
Parties are bound by judgment fixing shares. Staats v. Wilson, 76 Neb. 204, 107 N.W. 230 (1906).
25-21,107.
Judgment of partition; effect.The judgment of partition shall be presumptive evidence of title in all cases, and as between the parties themselves it is conclusive evidence thereof, subject, however, to be defeated by proof of a title paramount to, or independent of, that under which the parties held as joint tenants or tenants in common.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 840, p. 541; R.S.1913, § 8323; C.S.1922, § 9275; C.S.1929, § 20-21,107; R.S.1943, § 25-21,107.
Annotations
Party claiming title by adverse possession was bound by judgment in partition action in which he was a party. Bender v. Fuchs, 179 Neb. 162, 137 N.W.2d 364 (1965).
Where title under trust deed was paramount to that under which parties held, as tenants, partition would not lie. Heiser v. Brehm, 117 Neb. 472, 221 N.W. 97 (1928).
Judgment is conclusive though proceedings were irregular and shares were found according to unconstitutional act. Staats v. Wilson, 76 Neb. 204, 107 N.W. 230 (1906), affirmed on rehearing 76 Neb. 210, 109 N.W. 379 (1906).
25-21,108.
Partition; proceedings; fees and costs; awarded, when; division.If, in the proceedings in partition, judgment shall be entered directing partition, as provided in section 25-2179, the court shall, after partition or after the confirmation of the sale and the conveyance by the referee, determine a reasonable amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, which amount shall be taxed as costs in the proceedings. If the shares confirmed by such judgment and the existence of all encumbrances of which the plaintiff had actual or constructive notice were accurately pleaded in the original complaint of the plaintiff, such attorney's fees shall be awarded entirely to the attorney for the plaintiff; otherwise, the court shall order such fees for the attorneys to be divided among such of the attorneys of record in the proceedings as have filed pleadings upon which any of the findings in the judgment of partition are based. The court shall also determine and tax as costs a reasonable fee for the referee.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 841, p. 541; R.S.1913, § 8324; C.S.1922, § 9276; C.S.1929, § 20-21,108; R.S.1943, § 25-21,108; Laws 1955, c. 93, § 1, p. 271;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 44.
Annotations
1. Award of attorney's fees
2. Division of fees
3. Miscellaneous
1. Award of attorney's fees
The shares confirmed by the judgment of the trial court were correctly pleaded by the plaintiff in the original and amended petitions; therefor, the fee of four thousand two hundred dollars awarded to plaintiff's attorney and taxed one-half to the plaintiff and one-half to the defendant was proper. Sweet v. Fairbairn, 208 Neb. 286, 303 N.W.2d 288 (1981).
Attorneys for the plaintiff in a partition action shall be entitled to all awarded fees where the shares conferred by the judgment and all encumbrances acted upon by plaintiff are accurately pleaded in the original petition. Lienemann v. Lienemann, 201 Neb. 458, 268 N.W.2d 108 (1978).
Where interests of parties in land are not in dispute, controversy over rents and claim of mortgagee to proceeds of sale does not bar allowance of attorney's fee. Lorenz v. Lorenz, 150 Neb. 20, 33 N.W.2d 162 (1948).
Where partition proceedings are for benefit of all parties in interest, an attorney's fee should be allowed even though there is a contest over whether property sold for fair value at partition sale. Wilcox v. Halligan, 141 Neb. 643, 4 N.W.2d 750 (1942).
Impracticability of partition does not of itself render proceedings adversary, so as to prevent allowance of fees. Smith v. Palmer, 91 Neb. 796, 137 N.W. 843 (1912).
Allowance of fees to defendant's counsel was erroneous. Branson v. Branson, 84 Neb. 288, 121 N.W. 109 (1909).
Attorney's fees for plaintiff should be allowed where proceedings are amicable. Johnson v. Emerick, 74 Neb. 303, 104 N.W. 169 (1905).
2. Division of fees
In a partition action fees shall be divided among the attorneys of record who shall have filed pleadings upon which any of the findings in a judgment of partition are based. Lienemann v. Lienemann, 201 Neb. 458, 268 N.W.2d 108 (1978).
Division of attorney's fees between attorneys rests in judicial discretion of trial court. Stoddard v. Montgomery, 169 Neb. 252, 98 N.W.2d 875 (1959).
3. Miscellaneous
An order fixing fees in a partition action is a final, appealable order. Evans v. Evans, 199 Neb. 480, 259 N.W.2d 925 (1977).
Attorney's fees and referee's fees are distinctly and separately treated in this section, the common denominator is that each shall be reasonable. Snook v. Snook, 184 Neb. 798, 172 N.W.2d 85 (1969).
Under former law, if proceedings were adversary, attorney's fees could not be allowed. Oliver v. Lansing, 57 Neb. 352, 77 N.W. 802 (1899).
25-21,109.
Default of owner; right of encumbrancers to appear.Any persons claiming to hold an encumbrance upon any portion of the property involved in the suit, may, in default of the owner, appear and act as his representative in any of the proceedings under sections 25-2170 to 25-21,111.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 842, p. 542; R.S.1913, § 8325; C.S.1922, § 9277; C.S.1929, § 20-21,109; R.S.1943, § 25-21,109.
Annotations
Owner by defaulting cannot defeat the rights of an encumbrancer. Hartman v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958).
25-21,110.
Holders of contingent interests; rights; joinder in action.Persons having contingent interests in such property may be made parties to the proceedings, and the proceeds of the property so situated (or the property itself, in case of partition) shall be subject to the order of the court until the right becomes fully vested.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 843, p. 542; R.S.1913, § 8326; C.S.1922, § 9278; C.S.1929, § 20-21,110; R.S.1943, § 25-21,110.
25-21,111.
Share of absent owner; how conserved.The ascertained share of any absent owner shall be retained, or the proceeds invested for his benefit.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 844, p. 542; R.S.1913, § 8327; C.S.1922, § 9279; C.S.1929, § 20-21,111; R.S.1943, § 25-21,111.
Annotations
Money paid to clerk of district court by referee in partition is received in official capacity and sureties are liable. Dirks v. Juel, 59 Neb. 353, 80 N.W. 1045 (1899).
25-21,112.
Scope of relief.An action may be brought and prosecuted to final decree, judgment or order, by any person or persons, whether in actual possession or not, claiming title to, or an estate in real estate against any person or persons who claim, or apparently have an adverse estate or interest therein, for the purpose of determining such estate, or interest, canceling unenforceable liens, or claims against, or which appear to be against said real estate, and quieting the title to real estate.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 130, § 1, p. 540; C.S.1922, § 5676; C.S.1929, § 76-401; R.S.1943, § 25-21,112.
Annotations
1. Scope of relief
2. Who may bring action
3. Equitable action
4. Limitations of actions
5. Adverse possession
6. Miscellaneous
1. Scope of relief
Quiet title statutes were designed to enlarge jurisdiction of courts. Action may be brought under this section which, by strict rules of equity, could not have been maintained. Allegation that legal remedy is adequate is not a defense to quiet title action brought under this section. Connealy v. Mueller, 211 Neb. 484, 319 N.W.2d 86 (1982).
A lessee of real estate may maintain an action to quiet title to his leasehold. Peterson v. Vak, 169 Neb. 441, 100 N.W.2d 44 (1959).
Special action to cancel oil and gas lease is in the nature of action to quiet title. Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 89 N.W.2d 245 (1958).
Allegations of cross-petition in suit to quiet title were sufficient to raise issue of mutual mistake. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).
Where vendee has failed to perform contract for sale of real estate, vendor is entitled to have title quieted. Sofio v. Glissmann, 156 Neb. 610, 57 N.W.2d 176 (1953).
In suit hereunder to quiet title against judgments claimed to be liens against real estate, it was not improper to enjoin threatened enforcement of judgment pending determination of issues. American Savings & Loan Assn. v. Barry, 123 Neb. 523, 243 N.W. 628 (1932).
Amount must be tendered to quiet title against unpaid mortgage. Barney v. Chamberlain, 85 Neb. 785, 124 N.W. 482 (1910).
Holder of mortgage, barred by statute of limitations, cannot ask affirmative relief. Herbage v. McKee, 82 Neb. 354, 117 N.W. 706 (1908).
Decree quieting title does not bar rights not in issue. Wetherell v. Adams, 80 Neb. 589, 116 N.W. 861 (1908).
Apparent lien of judgment on homestead may be removed. Smith v. Neufeld, 57 Neb. 660, 78 N.W. 278 (1899); Corey v. Schuster, 44 Neb. 269, 62 N.W. 470 (1895).
Purpose of act was to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Foree v. Stubbs, 41 Neb. 271, 59 N.W. 798 (1894).
Plaintiff may set up two titles, and establishment of either is sufficient. Gregory v. Langdon, 11 Neb. 166, 7 N.W. 871 (1881).
Although suit could be brought in federal court by party claiming title to quiet title to real estate, the other rules governing jurisdiction of federal equity courts to such cases will apply. Barnes v. Boyd, 8 F.Supp. 584 (S. D. West Vir. 1934).
2. Who may bring action
A lessee of real estate may maintain an action to quiet title to his leasehold. Peterson v. Vak, 160 Neb. 450, 70 N.W.2d 436 (1955).
Action to quiet title may be maintained by any person whether in actual possession or not, and is tried as an equitable action. Morse v. Cochran, 131 Neb. 424, 268 N.W. 307 (1936).
Remaindermen may maintain suit to quiet title before termination of life estate. Davis v. Davis, 107 Neb. 70, 185 N.W. 442 (1921); Naiman v. Bohlmeyer, 97 Neb. 551, 150 N.W. 829 (1915).
Remainderman may maintain action to quiet title. Criswell v. Criswell, 101 Neb. 349, 163 N.W. 302 (1917).
Party seeking to quiet title must do equity. Bank of Alma v. Hamilton, 85 Neb. 441, 123 N.W. 458 (1909); Humphrey v. Hays, 85 Neb. 239, 122 N.W. 987 (1909); Kerr v. McCreary, 84 Neb. 315, 120 N.W. 1117 (1909).
Party to set aside decree affecting real estate must have interest therein. Stull v. Masilonka, 74 Neb. 309, 104 N.W. 188 (1905), rehearing denied 74 Neb. 322, 108 N.W. 166 (1906).
Action may be maintained by one either in or out of possession. Andersen v. Andersen, 69 Neb. 565, 96 N.W. 276 (1903); Lyon v. Gombert, 63 Neb. 630, 88 N.W. 774 (1902); Ross v. McManigal, 61 Neb. 90, 84 N.W. 610 (1900); Foree v. Stubbs, 41 Neb. 271, 59 N.W. 798 (1894).
Administrator cannot maintain action. Youngson v. Bond, 64 Neb. 615, 90 N.W. 556 (1902); Eayrs v. Nason, 54 Neb. 143, 74 N.W. 408 (1898).
One holding under tax deed may maintain action. Merriam v. Dovey, 25 Neb. 618, 41 N.W. 550 (1889).
Owner of leasehold estate may maintain action. McDonald v. Early, 15 Neb. 63, 17 N.W. 257 (1883).
3. Equitable action
Action to quiet title is triable by the court as an equitable action without a jury. Frank v. Smith, 138 Neb. 382, 293 N.W. 329 (1940).
Suit to quiet title is essentially an action in equity and court properly denied trial by jury. Sittler v. Wittstruck, 122 Neb. 452, 240 N.W. 562 (1932).
4. Limitations of actions
Although a remainderman has the right to bring an action to quiet title, he is not required to do so to protect his estate in remainder from claim of adverse possession by grantee of life estate. Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292 N.W. 38 (1940).
Laches may preclude plaintiff from maintaining action. Butler v. Peterson, 79 Neb. 715, 116 N.W. 515 (1908).
Statute of limitations commenced to run against quieting title action from the time adverse claim attaches. Lyons v. Carr, 77 Neb. 883, 110 N.W. 705 (1906).
Action to remove cloud is not barred by lapse of time. Batty v. City of Hastings, 63 Neb. 26, 88 N.W. 139 (1901).
Running of statute against action for relief on account of fraud, runs from discovery of facts constituting fraud, or facts sufficient to put person on inquiry. Parker v. Kuhn, 21 Neb. 413, 32 N.W. 74 (1887).
Statute of limitations against suit to quiet title would not run against beneficiary of trust in possession until after trustee had disavowed trust. Clark v. Clark, 21 Neb. 402, 32 N.W. 157 (1887).
5. Adverse possession
One who claims title by adverse possession must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been in actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious adverse possession under claim of ownership for full period of ten years. Campbell v. Buckler, 192 Neb. 336, 220 N.W.2d 248 (1974).
Adverse occupant of real estate for more than ten years may maintain action to quiet title. Walker v. Bell, 154 Neb. 221, 47 N.W.2d 504 (1951).
Possession by widow as holder of life estate under will, will not be deemed hostile and adverse to that of remaindermen until such knowledge is clearly brought to them. Bretschneider v. Farmers Nat. Bank of Madison, 131 Neb. 495, 268 N.W. 278 (1936).
When possession of land is construed to be adverse or hostile to remainderman stated. Maurer v. Reifschneider, 89 Neb. 673, 132 N.W. 197 (1911); First Nat. Bank of Perry, Iowa v. Pilger, 78 Neb. 168, 110 N.W. 704 (1907).
Requirements to acquire ownership by adverse possession stated. Lanning v. Musser, 88 Neb. 418, 129 N.W. 1022 (1911); Andrews v. Hastings, 85 Neb. 548, 123 N.W. 1035 (1909).
Fencing and cultivating part of street was not sufficient to support claim of adverse possession. Field v. City of Lincoln, 85 Neb. 781, 124 N.W. 468 (1910).
Exclusive occupation under claim of right is ordinarily sufficient to establish adverse possession. Ryan v. City of Lincoln, 85 Neb. 539, 123 N.W. 1021 (1909).
One's adverse possession is not affected by his purchasing at tax sale. Griffith v. Smith, 27 Neb. 47, 42 N.W. 749 (1889).
6. Miscellaneous
In suit to quiet title in plaintiff, uncontradicted testimony by holder of legal title that he conveyed it to plaintiff may be sufficient to make a prima facie case in favor of plaintiff who is in possession of the land. Ellsworth Corporation v. Stratbucker, 134 Neb. 246, 278 N.W. 381 (1938).
Action must be laid in county in which land is. Johnson v. Samuelson, 82 Neb. 201, 117 N.W. 470 (1908).
25-21,113.
Parties as defendants; how designated; effect of decree.In all actions to establish or quiet title to an estate in real estate, all persons in whose favor any interest, right, title, estate in, or lien upon such real estate appears of record shall be made defendants by the names by which they are designated on the record. When it is alleged in the complaint that there are persons who claim or appear to have some interest in, right or title to, or lien upon such property, and that the ownership of, interest in, right or title to, or lien upon such property of such persons does not appear of record in or by their respective names in the county wherein such property is situated, and that the plaintiff, after diligent investigation and inquiry, is unable to ascertain and does not know the names or whereabouts, if in this state, or the residence of such persons, there shall also be designated as defendants in such action "all persons having or claiming any interest in" (here inserting an accurate and definite description of the property involved) followed by the words "real names unknown". Judgments and decrees rendered in such actions after the defendants so impleaded and designated have been served as provided by statute, shall be conclusive against all defendants impleaded and designated by name, and also against all persons who are not in actual possession of such property, whose ownership of, interest in, rights or title to, or lien upon such property does not appear of record in or by their respective names in the county wherein such property is situated.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 130, § 2, p. 541; C.S.1922, § 5677; C.S.1929, § 76-402; R.S.1943, § 25-21,113;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 45.
Annotations
Parties in actual possession of land were not precluded from right to redeem from tax sale where service was had by publication. Thomas v. Flynn, 169 Neb. 458, 100 N.W.2d 37 (1959).
A decree in an action to quiet title against all persons having or claiming any interest in designated lands is conclusive against all persons not in possession and not record holders. State ex rel. Conkey v. Ryan, 136 Neb. 334, 285 N.W. 923 (1939).
Where law providing quieting title by making land defendant was complied with, it was not necessary to comply with previous law covering service on unknown heirs. Miller v. Ruzicka, 109 Neb. 152, 190 N.W. 216 (1922).
25-21,114.
Persons, defined.The word persons as used in sections 25-21,112 to 25-21,120 includes natural and artificial persons.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 130, § 3, p. 541; C.S.1922, § 5678; C.S.1929, § 76-403; R.S.1943, § 25-21,114.
25-21,115.
Adverse claims; liens of record; how pleaded.It shall be sufficient to allege generally in the complaint that the defendants claim or appear to have some interest in, right or title to, or lien upon the real estate or a part thereof; and it is not necessary to allege the nature of any adverse claim or that the value of plaintiff's title or estate is lessened thereby. No lien of record or mortgage of record, however, shall be affected by such action unless it is particularly described, and payment or other legal reason for its cancellation, or that it is barred by limitation, is specifically alleged.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 130, § 4, p. 541; C.S.1922, § 5679; C.S.1929, § 76-404; R.S.1943, § 25-21,115;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 46.
Annotations
Allegation that judgment was dormant and barred by lapse of time was sufficient. Hein v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 167 Neb. 176, 92 N.W.2d 185 (1958).
Allegations of cross-petition in suit to quiet title were sufficient to raise issue of mutual mistake. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).
It is sufficient to allege title generally in plaintiff and that defendant claims some interest in the land. Wells v. Tietge, 143 Neb. 230, 9 N.W.2d 180 (1943).
Quieting title suit may be maintained even though only matter in dispute is proper location of division line between adjoining tracts. Morse v. Cochran, 131 Neb. 424, 268 N.W. 307 (1936).
25-21,116.
Unenforceable liens; title quieted without offer to redeem.When any lien or apparent lien on any real estate shall not be enforceable by reason of lapse of time, the owner of such real estate shall be entitled to have his title thereto quieted against such unenforceable lien or apparent lien without redeeming or offering to redeem therefrom; Provided, the owner or owners or their privies in estate of such real estate shall have been in possession of the same during the period of the statute of limitations.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 130, § 5, p. 542; C.S.1922, § 5680; C.S.1929, § 76-405; R.S.1943, § 25-21,116.
Annotations
Party must be owner and in possession of land to quiet title against lien barred by lapse of time. Hadley v. Platte Valley Cattle Co., 143 Neb. 482, 10 N.W.2d 249 (1943).
Decree quieting title to land encumbered by a mortgage may be obtained upon proper ground without alleging payment of mortgage. McLaughlin v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 308, 202 N.W. 871 (1925).
A court of equity in quieting title clouded by void judicial proceedings, should impose reasonable conditions on plaintiff. Westerfield v. Howell, 88 Neb. 463, 129 N.W. 986 (1911); McCabe v. Equitable Land Co., 88 Neb. 453, 129 N.W. 1018 (1911).
Court should require person asking equitable relief to do equity. Kerr v. McCreary, 84 Neb. 315, 120 N.W. 1117 (1909).
25-21,117.
Remaindermen; reversioners; rights and benefits.Any person or persons having an interest in remainder or reversion in real estate shall be entitled to all the rights and benefits of sections 25-21,112 to 25-21,120.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 130, § 6, p. 542; C.S.1922, § 5681; C.S.1929, § 76-406; R.S.1943, § 25-21,117.
Annotations
Although a remainderman has the right to bring an action to quiet title, he is not required to do so to protect his estate in remainder from claim of adverse possession by grantee of life estate. Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292 N.W. 38 (1940).
Remainderman may maintain action to quiet title before termination of life estate. Davis v. Davis, 107 Neb. 70, 185 N.W. 442 (1921); Naiman v. Bohlmeyer, 97 Neb. 551, 150 N.W. 829 (1915); First Nat. Bank of Perry, Iowa v. Pilger, 78 Neb. 168, 110 N.W. 704 (1907); Foree v. Stubbs, 41 Neb. 271, 59 N.W. 798 (1894).
Rule stated as to when statute commences to run against remainderman where adverse holder is a stranger holding by independent title not in privity with life tenant. Criswell v. Criswell, 101 Neb. 349, 163 N.W. 302 (1917); which overrules Bohrer v. Davis, 94 Neb. 367, 143 N.W. 209 (1913); McFarland v. Flack, 87 Neb. 452, 127 N.W. 375 (1910); Helming v. Forrester, 87 Neb. 438, 127 N.W. 373 (1910); Hobson v. Huxtable, 79 Neb. 334, 112 N.W. 658 (1907).
Statute of limitations will not run against remainderman in favor of life tenant until knowledge of adverse holding is brought home to the owner of the remainder. Maurer v. Reifschneider, 89 Neb. 673, 132 N.W. 197 (1911).
Minor has ten years after attaining majority in which to bring suit to quiet title against surviving widow claiming title. Draper v. Clayton, 87 Neb. 443, 127 N.W. 369 (1910).
25-21,118.
Service of process.Defendants may be served as in other civil actions.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 130, § 7, p. 542; C.S.1922, § 5682; C.S.1929, § 76-407; R.S.1943, § 25-21,118;
Laws 1983, LB 447, § 43.
Annotations
Where affidavit for constructive service contains no venue and does not show whether notary was commissioned for the county, affidavit was fatally defective. Northouse v. Torstenson, 146 Neb. 187, 19 N.W.2d 34 (1945).
25-21,119.
Costs.If the defendant, or any one of several defendants, shall appear and disclaim all title, lien, and interest adverse to the plaintiff, such defendant shall recover costs. In other cases the costs shall abide the final decree, judgment or order in the action.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 130, § 8, p. 542; C.S.1922, § 5683; C.S.1929, § 76-408; R.S.1943, § 25-21,119.
Annotations
Where defendant denies plaintiff's title, costs follow judgment. Hallowell v. Borchers, 150 Neb. 322, 34 N.W.2d 404 (1948).
25-21,120.
Trial; appeal.The court shall try such cause in like manner as other equitable actions and shall enter therein such orders and decrees as the parties may be entitled to. Appeals from final orders may be had as in other actions.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 130, § 9, p. 542; C.S.1922, § 5684; C.S.1929, § 76-409; R.S.1943, § 25-21,120.
Annotations
A quiet title action sounds in equity. Boundary disputes cannot be determined in a quiet title action. Rather, boundary disputes are properly brought as an action in ejectment or pursuant to section 34-301. Rush Creek Land & Live Stock Co. v. Chain, 255 Neb. 347, 586 N.W.2d 284 (1998).
Since amendment of 1921, action to quiet title may be maintained by any person whether in actual possession or not, and cause is tried as an equitable action. Morse v. Cochran, 131 Neb. 424, 268 N.W. 307 (1936).
Defendant defeats action by proving no title or interest in plaintiff. Van Patten v. O'Brien, 88 Neb. 382, 129 N.W. 540 (1911).
As between rival homestead claimants, no finding of ownership can be made before patent is issued. Rupke v. Moran, 87 Neb. 316, 127 N.W. 127 (1910).
Maintenance of action by remainderman during life estate is permitted. Hobson v. Huxtable, 79 Neb. 334, 112 N.W. 658 (1907), judgment vacated on rehearing 79 Neb. 340, 116 N.W. 278 (1908).
Purpose of action is to obtain complete determination of question of title between parties. Dolen v. Black, 48 Neb. 688, 67 N.W. 760 (1896).
Plaintiff must show his interest is superior to defendant's if put in issue. McCauley v. Ohenstein, 44 Neb. 89, 62 N.W. 232 (1895).
Plaintiff should allege the nature, extent, and invalidity of defendant's title. McDonald v. Early, 15 Neb. 63, 17 N.W. 257 (1883).
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiff has the burden of proof and must recover upon the strength of his title. Vogel v. Bartels, 1 Neb. App. 1113, 510 N.W.2d 529 (1993).
25-21,121.
Quo warranto; action; against whom brought.An information may be filed against any person unlawfully holding or exercising any public office or franchise within this state, or any office in any corporation created by the laws of this state, or when any public officer has done or suffered any act which works a forfeiture of his office, or when any persons act as a corporation within this state without being authorized by law, or if, being incorporated, they do or omit acts which amount to a surrender or forfeiture of their rights and privileges as a corporation, or when they exercise powers not conferred by law.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 704, p. 517; R.S.1913, § 8328; C.S.1922, § 9280; C.S.1929, § 20-21,112; R.S.1943, § 25-21,121.
Cross References
Domestic societies, against, violations of law, see section 44-10,101.
Governor, failure to call special session of the Legislature, see section 50-126.
Reclamation districts, when granted, see section 46-528.
Secretary of State, failure to call special session of the Legislature, see section 50-126.
Supreme Court, jurisdiction, see section 24-204.
Annotations
1. Scope of action
2. Against whom brought
1. Scope of action
A quo warranto action which contemplates the constitutional validity of the position and the ouster of one unconstitutionally holding the position and exercising the powers and duties thereof provides a complete remedy. Quo warranto is the proper means of testing whether a district judge's membership on the Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice was constitutionally proper. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Murphy, 247 Neb. 358, 527 N.W.2d 185 (1995).
Absent an illegal expenditure of public funds or an increase in the tax burden, the sole method of attacking the validity of a franchise is by quo warranto. Just as in a derivative action against a corporation, a stockholder is excused from making a demand upon a corporation if such would be unavailing, so, too, is one excused from making a futile demand upon a municipality. Bard v. Cox Cable of Omaha, Inc., 226 Neb. 880, 416 N.W.2d 4 (1987).
Remedy is provided to try title to public office. State ex rel. Johnson v. Hagemeister, 161 Neb. 475, 73 N.W.2d 625 (1955).
Quo warranto may be used to test legal entity of school district and status of the officers. State ex rel. Larson v. Morrison, 155 Neb. 309, 51 N.W.2d 626 (1952).
Quo warranto is employed only to test the actual right to an office or franchise, and it can afford no relief for official misconduct or be used to test the legality of the official action of public or corporate officers. State ex rel. Johnson v. Consumers Public Power Dist., 143 Neb. 753, 10 N.W.2d 784 (1943).
Issues of law or of fact in quo warranto are required to be joined by filing a demurrer or answer, and motion to dismiss will not lie. State ex rel. Johnson v. Consumers Public Power Dist., 142 Neb. 114, 5 N.W.2d 202 (1942).
Quo warranto is intended to prevent the exercise of powers that are not conferred by law, and is not ordinarily available to regulate the manner of exercising these powers. State ex rel. Wright v. Eastern Nebraska Public Power District, 130 Neb. 683, 266 N.W. 594 (1936); State ex rel. Wright v. Lancaster County Rural Public Power Dist., 130 Neb. 677, 266 N.W. 591 (1936); State ex rel. Gantz v. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Merrick County, 100 Neb. 625, 160 N.W. 997 (1916).
If there is adequate remedy at law or equity, quo warranto is improper. State v. Scott, 70 Neb. 681, 97 N.W. 1021 (1904).
Quo warranto may be maintained either by a prosecuting attorney or by a private individual. State ex rel. Broatch v. Moores, 58 Neb. 285, 78 N.W. 529 (1899); State ex rel. Broatch v. Moores, 58 Neb. 285, 73 N.W. 299 (1897).
Jury is not demandable as of right in quo warranto. State ex rel. Broatch v. Moores, 56 Neb. 1, 76 N.W. 530 (1898).
Quo warranto is proper remedy to oust persons who are exercising corporate powers when corporation has no legal existence. State ex rel. Summers v. Uridil, 37 Neb. 371, 55 N.W. 1072 (1893).
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to determine conflicting claims to a public office. State ex rel. Fair v. Frazier, 28 Neb. 438, 44 N.W. 471 (1890).
2. Against whom brought
The position of assistant professor at a state college is a public office for the purposes of quo warranto under the provisions of this section. State ex rel. Spire v. Conway, 238 Neb. 766, 472 N.W.2d 403 (1991).
An information may be filed against any person holding office who has committed an act that works a forfeiture of that office. Sorensen v. Swanson, 181 Neb. 205, 147 N.W.2d 620 (1967).
This section not only prescribes who the defendants in a quo warranto action may be, but also prescribes the acts which may be the basis for any information. State ex rel. Johnson v. Conservative Savings & Loan Assn., 143 Neb. 805, 11 N.W.2d 89 (1943).
Action in quo warranto may be filed against any person unlawfully holding or exercising any public office. State ex rel. Good v. Marsh, 125 Neb. 125, 249 N.W. 295 (1933).
Privilege of foreign corporation doing business in state is revocable in quo warranto by Attorney General, in name of state, for violation of law. State ex rel. Spillman v. Central Purchasing Co., 118 Neb. 383, 225 N.W. 46 (1929).
Persons assuming to act as officers of village having no legal existence may be ousted by quo warranto. State ex rel. Banta v. Greer, 86 Neb. 88, 124 N.W. 905 (1910).
Quo warranto is proper remedy to set aside franchise irregularly granted. Clark v. Interstate Ind. Tel. Co., 72 Neb. 883, 101 N.W. 977 (1904).
Quo warranto is proper remedy to oust foreign corporation violating antitrust act. State v. Standard Oil Co., 61 Neb. 28, 84 N.W. 413 (1900).
Quo warranto may be invoked to test validity of appointment, but court cannot enjoin appointment. Fort v. Thompson, 49 Neb. 772, 69 N.W. 110 (1896).
Quo warranto is remedy to test legal existence of city, not injunction. Osborn v. Village of Oakland, 49 Neb. 340, 68 N.W. 506 (1896).
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in quo warranto to determine rights of persons claiming the office of Governor. State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682, 48 N.W. 739 (1891), 51 N.W. 602 (1892).
Quo warranto is proper to oust corporation; company is only necessary defendant. State ex rel. Leese v. Atchison & Nebraska R. R. Co., 24 Neb. 143, 38 N.W. 43 (1888).
Quo warranto may be brought against county treasurer in Supreme Court. State ex rel. Glenn v. Stein, 13 Neb. 529, 14 N.W. 481 (1882).
State court judgment in quo warranto ousting corporation is binding as against collateral attack in federal court. Brictson Mfg. Co. v. Close, 25 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1928).
25-21,122.
Quo warranto; action; by whom brought; bond, when; conditions.Such information may be filed by the Attorney General or by the county attorney of the proper county whenever either of such officers deems it his duty so to do, except that the county attorney shall not have authority to file such information against any state officer or a judge of the district court; Provided, however, that any elector of the proper county may file such information against any person unlawfully holding or exercising the functions of any public office in the state, other than state officers or judges of the district court, whenever the county attorney of the proper county shall refuse so to do within ten days after he shall have been notified in writing by any elector that any such person is disqualified by the Constitution or the laws of the State of Nebraska to hold the office in question or to exercise the functions thereof. Any person other than the county attorney who shall institute such action shall file with such information in the office of the clerk of the district court a bond signed by a duly authorized surety company or by two resident freeholders of the county in which the action is filed, the amount of which bond shall be not less than five hundred dollars and be fixed by, and the sufficiency of the sureties thereon approved by the clerk. The bond shall be conditioned that the plaintiff shall prosecute the action without delay and that he shall pay the costs of such suit including a reasonable attorney fee to the person against whom such information is filed should the action be unsuccessful. The amount of such attorney fee shall be fixed by the court and taxed as costs in the action.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 705, p. 517; R.S.1913, § 8329; Laws 1921, c. 126, § 1, p. 535; C.S.1922, § 9281; C.S.1929, § 20-21,113; R.S.1943, § 25-21,122.
Annotations
Upon refusal of county attorney, any elector of county may file quo warranto information against county officer. Stasch v. Weber, 188 Neb. 710, 199 N.W.2d 391 (1972).
This section provides who may bring an action in quo warranto. Sorensen v. Swanson, 181 Neb. 205, 147 N.W.2d 620 (1967).
Where action is by relator in his own right against incumbent, relator is not required to give bond. State ex rel. Brogan v. Boehner, 174 Neb. 689, 119 N.W.2d 147 (1963).
Private person may file information when county attorney and Attorney General refuse to do so. State ex rel. Larson v. Morrison, 155 Neb. 309, 51 N.W.2d 626 (1952).
When the right of two or more persons to separate offices depends upon the same questions of law and fact, they may properly join as relators in an action in nature of quo warranto, to try the title to such offices. Thompson v. James, 125 Neb. 350, 250 N.W. 237 (1933).
Privilege of foreign corporation doing business in state is revocable in quo warranto by Attorney General. State ex rel. Spillman v. Central Purchasing Co., 118 Neb. 383, 225 N.W. 46 (1929).
Quo warranto may be brought by taxpayer with consent of county attorney against village trustees. State ex rel. Banta v. Greer, 86 Neb. 88, 124 N.W. 905 (1910).
Attorney General, not county attorney, should bring quo warranto, if filed in Supreme Court. State ex rel. Crosby v. Cones, 15 Neb. 444, 19 N.W. 682 (1884).
In contest of office, individual must show right to office. County attorney brings action in county; Attorney General, if state at large is interested. State ex rel. Glenn v. Stein, 13 Neb. 529, 14 N.W. 481 (1882).
Ouster of foreign corporation in quo warranto by Attorney General in state court upheld. Brictson Mfg. Co. v. Close, 25 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1928).
25-21,123.
Duty of Attorney General or county attorney to bring quo warranto action; when.The Attorney General or the county attorney of the proper county must file such information when directed to do so by the Governor, the Legislative Assembly, or the district court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 706, p. 517; R.S.1913, § 8330; Laws 1921, c. 126, § 2, p. 536; C.S.1922, § 9282; C.S.1929, § 20-21,114; R.S.1943, § 25-21,123.
25-21,124.
Information; contents.Such information shall consist of a plain statement of the facts which constitute the grounds of the proceeding, addressed to the court, which shall stand for an original complaint.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 707, p. 517; R.S.1913, § 8331; C.S.1922, § 9283; C.S.1929, § 20-21,115; R.S.1943, § 25-21,124;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 47.
Annotations
Quo warranto lies against one who is in possession or user of an office, or who has been admitted thereto. State ex rel. Good v. Marsh, 125 Neb. 125, 249 N.W. 295 (1933).
Petition sustained against claim of stating two separate and distinct causes of action. Duffy v. State ex rel. Edson, 60 Neb. 812, 84 N.W. 264 (1900).
25-21,125.
Summons.Such statement shall be filed in the clerk's office, and summons issued and served in the same manner as hereinbefore provided for the commencement of actions in the district court.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 708, p. 517; R.S.1913, § 8332; C.S.1922, § 9284; C.S.1929, § 20-21,116; R.S.1943, § 25-21,125.
Cross References
For issuance and service of summons, see Chapter 25, article 5.
Annotations
Defendant is required to answer in the usual way contemplated by code of civil procedure. State ex rel. Johnson v. Consumers Public Power Dist., 142 Neb. 114, 5 N.W.2d 202 (1942).
25-21,126.
Answer.The defendant shall appear and answer such information in the usual way, and issue being joined it shall be tried in the ordinary manner.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 709, p. 518; R.S.1913, § 8333; C.S.1922, § 9285; C.S.1929, § 20-21,117; R.S.1943, § 25-21,126.
Annotations
Defendant is required to answer the charges made against him in the information. State ex rel. Johnson v. Conservative Savings & Loan Assn., 143 Neb. 805, 11 N.W.2d 89 (1943).
Defendant must show precisely under what authority he holds office. State ex rel. Sabin v. Tillma, 32 Neb. 789, 49 N.W. 806 (1891).
25-21,127.
Action by claimant against incumbent of office; information; trial.When the defendant is holding an office to which another is claiming the right, the information should set forth the name of such claimant, and the trial must, if practicable, determine the rights of the contesting parties.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 710, p. 518; R.S.1913, § 8334; C.S.1922, § 9286; C.S.1929, § 20-21,118; R.S.1943, § 25-21,127.
Annotations
When the defendant is holding an office claimed by another, the trial court must determine the rights of the contesting parties. Sorensen v. Swanson, 181 Neb. 205, 147 N.W.2d 620 (1967).
If by Attorney General, respondent must prove right to office. State ex rel. Blessing v. Davis, 64 Neb. 499, 90 N.W. 232 (1902).
Where individual is relator, he must prove right to office. State ex rel. Birkhauser v. Moores, 52 Neb. 634, 72 N.W. 1056 (1897).
Quo warranto will lie where it is claimed that person is ineligible to hold office. State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682, 48 N.W. 739 (1891), 51 N.W. 602 (1892).
25-21,128.
Action by claimant against incumbent of office; judgment for plaintiff; effect.If judgment is rendered in favor of such claimant, he shall proceed to exercise the functions of the office, after he has qualified as required by law.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 711, p. 518; R.S.1913, § 8335; C.S.1922, § 9287; C.S.1929, § 20-21,119; R.S.1943, § 25-21,128.
Annotations
Officer may qualify after judgment where failure to do so earlier was not own fault. State ex rel. Barton v. Frantz, 55 Neb. 167, 75 N.W. 546 (1898).
If relator is found entitled to hold over, must then requalify. State ex rel Thayer v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682, 48 N.W. 739 (1891), 51 N.W. 602 (1892).
25-21,129.
Action by claimant against incumbent of office; judgment for plaintiff; delivery of books and papers.The court, after such judgment, shall order the defendant to deliver over all books and papers in his custody or under his control belonging to said office.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 712, p. 518; R.S.1913, § 8336; C.S.1922, § 9288; C.S.1929, § 20-21,120; R.S.1943, § 25-21,129.
25-21,130.
Action by claimant against incumbent of office; judgment for plaintiff; suit for damages by claimant.When judgment has been rendered in favor of the claimant, the claimant may at any time within one year after the entry of the judgment bring suit against the defendant and recover the damages the claimant has sustained by reason of the act of the defendant.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 713, p. 518; R.S.1913, § 8337; C.S.1922, § 9289; C.S.1929, § 20-21,121; R.S.1943, § 25-21,130;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 20.
25-21,131.
Action against several claimants of office or franchise.When several persons claim to be entitled to the same office or franchise, an information may be filed against all or any portion thereof, in order to try their respective rights thereto.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 714, p. 518; R.S.1913, § 8338; C.S.1922, § 9290; C.S.1929, § 20-21,122; R.S.1943, § 25-21,131.
25-21,132.
Ouster, judgment of; costs.If the defendant is found guilty of unlawfully holding or exercising any office, franchise or privilege, or if a corporation is found to have violated the law by which it holds its existence, or in any other manner to have done acts which amount to a surrender or forfeiture of its privileges, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted, and altogether excluded from such office, franchise or privilege, and also that he pay the costs of the proceedings.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 715, p. 518; R.S.1913, § 8339; C.S.1922, § 9291; C.S.1929, § 20-21,123; R.S.1943, § 25-21,132.
Annotations
Right to do business in state may be revoked in quo warranto by Attorney General against foreign corporations. State ex rel. Spillman v. Central Purchasing Co., 118 Neb. 383, 225 N.W. 46 (1929).
Corporation formed by licensed physician to make contracts for services of members is not subject to ouster. State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905).
Supersedeas is discretionary, and denial is not reviewable. Gandy v. State, 10 Neb. 243, 4 N.W. 1019 (1880).
Ouster of foreign corporation in quo warranto by Attorney General in state court upheld as against collateral attack by corporation in federal court. Brictson Mfg. Co. v. Close, 25 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1928).
25-21,133.
Partial ouster, judgment of.If the defendant is found to have exercised merely certain individual powers and privileges to which he was not entitled, the judgment shall be the same as above directed, but only in relation to those particulars in which he is thus exceeding the lawful exercise of his rights and privileges.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 716, p. 518; R.S.1913, § 8340; C.S.1922, § 9292; C.S.1929, § 20-21,124; R.S.1943, § 25-21,133.
25-21,134.
Quo warranto; in whose name brought; costs.When an information is upon the relation of a private individual, it shall be so stated in the complaint and proceedings, and such individual shall be responsible for costs in case they are not adjudged against the defendant. In other cases the title of the cause shall be the same as in a criminal prosecution, and the payment of costs shall be regulated by the same rule.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 717, p. 518; R.S.1913, § 8341; C.S.1922, § 9293; C.S.1929, § 20-21,125; R.S.1943, § 25-21,134;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 48.
25-21,135.
Judgment against pretended corporation; costs.In case judgment is rendered against a pretended, but not real, corporation, the costs may be collected from any person who has been acting as an officer or proprietor of such pretended corporation.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 718, p. 518; R.S.1913, § 8342; C.S.1922, § 9294; C.S.1929, § 20-21,126; R.S.1943, § 25-21,135.
25-21,136.
Dissolved corporation; trustees; appointment.If a corporation is ousted and dissolved by the proceedings herein authorized, the court shall appoint three disinterested persons as trustees of the creditors and stockholders.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 719, p. 519; R.S.1913, § 8343; C.S.1922, § 9295; C.S.1929, § 20-21,127; R.S.1943, § 25-21,136.
Annotations
Court ousting foreign corporation may appoint trustees for its creditors and stockholders. State ex rel. Spillman v. Brictson Mfg. Co., 114 Neb. 341, 207 N.W. 664 (1926), affirming 113 Neb. 781, 205 N.W. 246 (1925).
State court judgment ousting foreign corporation and appointing trustees for its property in Nebraska upheld as against collateral attack in federal court. Brictson Mfg. Co. v. Close, 25 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1928).
25-21,137.
Dissolved corporation; trustees; bond.Such trustees shall enter into bond, in such a penalty and with such security as the court may approve, conditioned for the faithful discharge of their trust.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 720, p. 519; R.S.1913, § 8344; C.S.1922, § 9296; C.S.1929, § 20-21,128; R.S.1943, § 25-21,137.
25-21,138.
Dissolved corporation; trustees; bond, action upon.Suit may be brought on such bond by any person injured by the negligence or wrongful act of the trustees in the discharge of their duties.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 721, p. 519; R.S.1913, § 8345; C.S.1922, § 9297; C.S.1929, § 20-21,129; R.S.1943, § 25-21,138.
25-21,139.
Dissolved corporation; trustees; duties.The trustees shall proceed immediately to collect the debts and pay the liabilities of the corporation, and to divide the surplus among those thereto entitled.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 722, p. 519; R.S.1913, § 8346; C.S.1922, § 9298; C.S.1929, § 20-21,130; R.S.1943, § 25-21,139.
Annotations
Surplus property of ousted foreign corporation should be returned to its proper officers or representatives, not to stockholders. State ex rel. Spillman v. Brictson Mfg. Co., 114 Neb. 341, 207 N.W. 664 (1926).
Bankruptcy court, in summary proceeding to recover bankrupt corporation's assets from trustees appointed in state court to liquidate corporation and distribute its assets, acquired no jurisdiction, where, at time of bankruptcy, receiver of corporation was holding its assets pursuant to court order. Marcell v. Engebretson, 74 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1934).
25-21,140.
Dissolved corporation; books, papers, effects; delivery to trustees; enforcement.The court shall, upon an application for that purpose, order any officer of such corporation, or any other person having possession of any of the effects, books, or papers of the corporation in any wise necessary for the settlement of its affairs, to deliver up the same to the trustees.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 723, p. 519; R.S.1913, § 8347; C.S.1922, § 9299; C.S.1929, § 20-21,131; R.S.1943, § 25-21,140.
25-21,141.
Dissolved corporation; trustees; inventory.As soon as practicable after their appointment, the trustees shall make and file in the office of the clerk of the court, an inventory of all the effects, rights and credits which come to their possession or knowledge, the truth of which inventory shall be sworn to.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 724, p. 519; R.S.1913, § 8348; C.S.1922, § 9300; C.S.1929, § 20-21,132; R.S.1943, § 25-21,141.
25-21,142.
Dissolved corporation; trustees; corporate claims and property; duty to sue; liability.They shall sue for and recover the debts and property of the corporation, and shall be responsible to the creditors and stockholders, respectively, to the extent of the effects which come to their hands, in the same manner as though they were the executors of a deceased person.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 725, p. 519; R.S.1913, § 8349; C.S.1922, § 9301; C.S.1929, § 20-21,133; R.S.1943, § 25-21,142.
25-21,143.
Ouster of corporation; liability of officers for misconduct.When judgment of ouster is rendered against a corporation on account of the misconduct of the directors or officers thereof, such officers shall be jointly and severally liable to an action by anyone injured thereby.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 726, p. 519; R.S.1913, § 8350; C.S.1922, § 9302; C.S.1929, § 20-21,134; R.S.1943, § 25-21,143.
25-21,144.
Quo warranto; disobedience of court order; liability; penalty.Any person who, without good reason, refuses to obey any order of the court as provided in sections 25-21,121 to 25-21,148 shall be deemed guilty of a contempt of court, and shall be fined in any sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, and imprisoned in the county jail until he comply with said order, and shall be further liable for the damages resulting to any person on account of his refusal to obey such order.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 727, p. 519; R.S.1913, § 8351; C.S.1922, § 9303; C.S.1929, § 20-21,135; R.S.1943, § 25-21,144.
25-21,145.
Quo warranto; letters patent; annulment; grounds.An action of quo warranto may be instituted in the manner contemplated in sections 25-21,121 to 25-21,148, for the purpose of annulling or vacating any letters patent granted by the proper authorities of this state, where there is reason to believe that the same were obtained by fraud, or through mistake or ignorance of a material fact, or when the patentee, or those claiming under him, have done or omitted an act in violation of the terms and conditions on which the letters were granted, or have by any other means forfeited the interest acquired under the same.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 728, p. 519; R.S.1913, § 8352; C.S.1922, § 9304; C.S.1929, § 20-21,136; R.S.1943, § 25-21,145.
25-21,146.
Action by claimant against incumbent of office; condition precedent.When any citizen of this state shall claim any office which is usurped, invaded or unlawfully held and exercised by another, the person so claiming such office shall have the right to file in the district court an information in the nature of a quo warranto, upon his own relation, and with or without the consent of the prosecuting attorney, and such person shall have the right to prosecute said information to final judgment; Provided, he shall have first applied to the prosecuting attorney to file the information, and the prosecuting attorney shall have refused or neglected to file the same.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 1, p. 279; R.S.1913, § 8353; C.S.1922, § 9305; C.S.1929, § 20-21,137; R.S.1943, § 25-21,146.
Annotations
1. Scope of action
2. Condition precedent
3. Miscellaneous
1. Scope of action
A person claiming an office that has been usurped or invaded by another may maintain an action in quo warranto. State ex rel. Brogan v. Boehner, 174 Neb. 689, 119 N.W.2d 147 (1963).
Quo warranto to try title to office will lie, even though validity of election and existence of office are drawn in question. Thompson v. James, 125 Neb. 350, 250 N.W. 237 (1933).
Teacher claiming to have been wrongfully dismissed may bring quo warranto to test right of successor to take his place, and force dismissal. Eason v. Majors, 111 Neb. 288, 196 N.W. 133 (1923).
Quo warranto applies only to claimants of office, and is not proper action to test constitutionality of law creating office. State v. Scott, 70 Neb. 681, 97 N.W. 1021 (1904).
Quo warranto should be brought in Supreme Court by Attorney General, in district court by county attorney, and by individual where officer refuses. State ex rel. Fair v. Frazier, 28 Neb. 438, 44 N.W. 471 (1890).
2. Condition precedent
In a suit under this section, consent of Attorney General or county attorney is not required. Sorensen v. Swanson, 181 Neb. 205, 147 N.W.2d 620 (1967).
Individual relator must allege refusal of county attorney in information. Harpham v. State ex rel. Cruse, 63 Neb. 396, 88 N.W. 489 (1901).
Consent is evidenced by county attorney prosecuting action filed in relator's name. Duffy v. State ex rel. Edson, 60 Neb. 812, 84 N.W. 264 (1900).
3. Miscellaneous
Private relator in statutory quo warranto contesting an election with knowledge of election irregularities may not be entitled to relief for that reason in certain circumstances. State ex rel. Genz v. Thomas, 185 Neb. 637, 177 N.W.2d 607 (1970).
Relator must show better title than respondent. State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, 34 Neb. 435, 51 N.W. 964 (1892).
Information that does not show relator's title is demurrable. State ex rel. Cooper v. Hamilton, 29 Neb. 198, 45 N.W. 279 (1890).
25-21,147.
Public officers; malfeasance; ouster.Any county attorney or prosecuting officer, sheriff, mayor, police officer, or police commissioner, or other officer, who shall willfully fail, neglect or refuse to enforce any law which it is made his duty to enforce shall thereby forfeit his office and may be removed therefrom.
Source:Laws 1907, c. 87, § 1, p. 306; R.S.1913, § 8354; C.S.1922, § 9306; C.S.1929, § 20-21,138; R.S.1943, § 25-21,147;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 143.
Annotations
To willfully fail, neglect, or refuse to enforce a law involves more than oversight or carelessness or voluntary neglect. State ex rel. Thompson v. Donahue, 91 Neb. 311, 135 N.W. 1030 (1912).
25-21,148.
Public officers; malfeasance; action in Supreme Court; suspension of defendant; temporary appointment.The Attorney General of the State of Nebraska or a special attorney designated by the Governor, when directed by the Governor, shall institute and prosecute quo warranto proceedings in the Supreme Court against any such county attorney or prosecuting officer, sheriff, police officer or police commissioner, mayor or other officer, who holds his office by a vote of the people. During the pendency of such proceedings such officer may by the Governor be suspended from performing the duties of his office, and temporary appointment may be made by the Governor for the performance of the duties of such office. If the court shall find that such suspended officer has willfully failed or refused to enforce any law which it is his duty as such officer to perform, then the court shall render judgment of ouster against such officer and the office shall thereby become vacant.
Source:Laws 1907, c. 87, § 2, p. 306; R.S.1913, § 8355; C.S.1922, § 9307; Laws 1923, c. 116, § 1, p. 277; C.S.1929, § 20-21,139; R.S.1943, § 25-21,148; Laws 1965, c. 118, § 2, p. 451;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 44.
25-21,149.
Declaratory judgments; courts of
record; jurisdiction.Courts of record within their respective
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal
relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory
judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative
or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree. Any action or proceeding seeking
a declaratory judgment that any tax, penalty, or part thereof is unconstitutional
shall be brought within
twelve months after such tax or penalty was levied or assessed.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 1, p. 257; C.S.1929, § 20-21,140; R.S.1943, § 25-21,149; Laws 1949, c. 59, § 1, p. 170; Laws 1991, LB 829, § 4;
Laws 2014, LB558, § 1.
Cross References
Rules and regulations, declaratory judgment, see section 84-911.
Submitting controversy, see sections 25-903 to 25-905.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Effect
3. Jurisdiction
1. Scope
A declaratory judgment will not lie where a writ of mandamus, another equally serviceable remedy, is available. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020).
This section encompasses the court's power to determine a party's rights under a contract, including a claim that the contract itself is invalid. Young v. Govier & Milone, 286 Neb. 224, 835 N.W.2d 684 (2013).
A declaratory judgment action under this section is the proper means of challenging the constitutionality of a tax statute. Trumble v. Sarpy County Board, 283 Neb. 486, 810 N.W.2d 732 (2012).
When the plaintiff's pleadings in a declaratory judgment action put the defendant on notice of the remedy sought, a trial court may order relief which is clearly within the scope of its declaratory judgment. Conversely, when a plaintiff's requested relief is not clearly within the scope of a court's declaratory judgment, the court should grant such relief only for a plaintiff's concurrent or subsequent cause of action or the plaintiff's application for supplemental relief under section 25-21,156. Wetovick v. County of Nance, 279 Neb. 773, 782 N.W.2d 298 (2010).
A justiciable issue requires a present substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests susceptible to immediate resolution and capable of present judicial enforcement. City of Fremont v. Kotas, 279 Neb. 720, 781 N.W.2d 456 (2010).
An action for declaratory judgment cannot be used to decide the legal effect of a state of facts which are future, contingent, or uncertain. City of Fremont v. Kotas, 279 Neb. 720, 781 N.W.2d 456 (2010).
The existence of a justiciable issue is a fundamental requirement to a court's exercise of its discretion to grant declaratory relief. City of Fremont v. Kotas, 279 Neb. 720, 781 N.W.2d 456 (2010).
A declaratory judgment action is to declare the rights, status, or other legal relations between the parties. Bentley v. School Dist. No. 025, of Custer County, 255 Neb. 404, 586 N.W.2d 306 (1998).
A liability insurer is not permitted to seek, in a direct action under this section, a declaration of noncoverage that is binding in a later action as to a potential claimant against the insured. Medical Protective Co. v. Schrein, 255 Neb. 24, 582 N.W.2d 286 (1998).
Where an exclusive statutory remedy is provided, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not provide an additional remedy. Boettcher v. Balka, 252 Neb. 547, 567 N.W.2d 95 (1997).
A declaratory judgment is available to test the constitutionality of a tax statute. Jones v. State, 248 Neb. 158, 532 N.W.2d 636 (1995).
The state has not waived its sovereign immunity in declaratory judgment actions, and such actions filed against officers of the state which seek to compel affirmative action on the part of the officials are within the scope of immunity. County of Lancaster v. State, 247 Neb. 723, 529 N.W.2d 791 (1995).
A declaratory judgment action should not be entertained when it is initiated by a prospective tort defendant. Ryder Truck Rental v. Rollins, 246 Neb. 250, 518 N.W.2d 124 (1994).
Nebraska's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not waive the State's sovereign immunity. Concerned Citizens v. Department of Environ. Contr., 244 Neb. 152, 505 N.W.2d 654 (1993).
A declaratory judgment action, pursuant to this section, is an appropriate method to obtain a judicial construction of a statute or determination of a statute's validity, including resolution of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. State ex rel. Spire v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 233 Neb. 262, 445 N.W.2d 284 (1989).
The use and determination of a demurrer in actions arising under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act are controlled by the same principles as apply in other cases. S.I.D. No. 272 of Douglas County v. Marquardt, 233 Neb. 39, 443 N.W.2d 877 (1989).
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is available when a present actual controversy exists and all interested persons are parties to the proceedings, and then only when a justiciable issue exists for resolution. Koenig v. Southeast Community College, 231 Neb. 923, 438 N.W.2d 791 (1989); Miller v. Stolinski, 149 Neb. 679, 32 N.W.2d 199 (1948).
For purposes of determining whether a litigant is entitled to declaratory relief, existence of a controversy depends not only on the circumstances existing at the commencement of the action but also the circumstances when the judgment is granted. Mullendore v. Nuernberger, 230 Neb. 921, 434 N.W.2d 511 (1989).
Unwed father allowed to use declaratory judgment to determine paternity. White v. Mertens, 225 Neb. 241, 404 N.W.2d 410 (1987).
A declaratory judgment is an appropriate method to challenge constitutionality of a tax statute. Mullendore v. School Dist. No. 1 of Lancaster County, 223 Neb. 28, 388 N.W.2d 93 (1986).
Declaratory action could not be used to contest school reorganization election once the election had been held. Eriksen v. Ray, 212 Neb. 8, 321 N.W.2d 59 (1982).
A declaratory judgment action may not be used by an insurance company to determine its obligation to pay when the insured is not yet obligated to pay, and until such time, no actual controversy exists. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Novak, 210 Neb. 184, 313 N.W.2d 636 (1981).
The use of a declaratory judgment remedy as provided by this section is proper in this state to determine the rights and obligations of the insured and the insurance company under an uninsured motorist clause following the rendition of a final judgment against the uninsured motorist. Herrera v. American Standard Ins. Co., 203 Neb. 477, 279 N.W.2d 140 (1979).
Where rights of all parties cannot be determined in a conversion action, action under sections 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 is proper when requisite precedent conditions are met. Berigan Bros. v. Growers Cattle Credit Corp., 182 Neb. 656, 156 N.W.2d 794 (1968).
Action to determine who was liable on automobile insurance policies was properly brought under this act. Truck Ins. Exchange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 330, 154 N.W.2d 524 (1967).
Validity of city ordinance could be determined in declaratory judgment proceedings. Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131 N.W.2d 609 (1964).
Declaratory judgment proceeding was proper to determine question as to constitutional validity of statutes. Meyerkorth v. State, 173 Neb. 889, 115 N.W.2d 585 (1962); Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 609, 107 N.W.2d 397 (1961); State ex rel. State Railway Commission v. Ramsey, 151 Neb. 333, 37 N.W.2d 502 (1949); Thorin v. Burke, 146 Neb. 94, 18 N.W.2d 664 (1945).
Declaratory judgment action brought by Attorney General was proper to determine constitutionality of legislative act. State ex rel. Meyer v. Story, 173 Neb. 741, 114 N.W.2d 769 (1962).
Act is available to a public power district to secure a declaration as to reasonableness of rates. York County Rural P. P. Dist. v. O'Connor, 172 Neb. 602, 111 N.W.2d 376 (1961).
An action for a declaratory judgment will not be entertained when an equally serviceable remedy has been provided. Scudder v. County of Buffalo, 170 Neb. 293, 102 N.W.2d 447 (1960).
Original action in Supreme Court for declaratory judgment as to constitutionality of tax on building and loan stock could be maintained. Anderson v. Herrington, 169 Neb. 391, 99 N.W.2d 621 (1959).
Party seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest or right in the controversy. Nebraska Seedsmen Assn. v. Department of Agriculture & Inspection, 162 Neb. 781, 77 N.W.2d 464 (1956).
Declaratory judgment is appropriate to determine the validity, construction, or interpretation of a statute when there is a justiciable controversy. Armstrong v. Board of Supervisors of Kearney County, 153 Neb. 858, 46 N.W.2d 602 (1951).
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act and Reclamation Act are not in conflict. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950).
A declaratory judgment action will not be entertained if there is pending other litigation in which the rights of the parties can be determined. Strawn v. County of Sarpy, 146 Neb. 783, 21 N.W.2d 597 (1946).
Court is without power to declare the law unless the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is complied with. Wightman v. City of Wayne, 144 Neb. 871, 15 N.W.2d 78 (1944).
Under the Declaratory Judgments Act, an equity court has the power to determine the parentage of a child. Carlson v. Bartels, 143 Neb. 680, 10 N.W.2d 671 (1943).
Action to determine validity of delinquent tax law was properly brought under Declaratory Judgments Act. Tukey v. Douglas County, 133 Neb. 732, 277 N.W. 57 (1938).
State of Nebraska and executive departments thereof may seek relief under Declaratory Judgments Act in an original action in Supreme Court. State ex rel. Smrha v. General American Life Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 520, 272 N.W. 555 (1937).
Action to determine rights of office holder whose office had been abolished by constitutional amendment was brought under Declaratory Judgments Act. Swanson v. State, 132 Neb. 82, 271 N.W. 264 (1937).
Declaratory judgment sought under this statute to determine how liquor license fees should be distributed. School District of Omaha v. Gass, 131 Neb. 312, 267 N.W. 528 (1936).
Court may refuse to render declaratory judgment where, if rendered or entered, it would not terminate the controversy giving rise to the proceeding. Arlington Oil Co. v. Hall, 130 Neb. 674, 266 N.W. 583 (1936).
Court should, under most circumstances, dismiss action for declaratory judgment where all parties whose rights are affected have not been impleaded in action. Updike Inv. Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, 128 Neb. 295, 258 N.W. 470 (1935).
Taxpayer having actual and justiciable controversy with taxing authorities as to his status as affected by tax statute is entitled to have questions determined under Declaratory Judgments Act. Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424, 255 N.W. 551 (1934).
Proceedings for a declaratory judgment will not be entertained where another equally serviceable remedy has been provided by law for the character of action in hand. Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N.W. 552 (1933).
Declaratory Judgments Act applies only to actions where there is an actual controversy and justiciable issues presented, and cannot be used to decide moot questions. Banning v. Marsh, 124 Neb. 207, 245 N.W. 775 (1932).
Declaratory Judgments Act applies only to actions involving actual controversy and justiciable issues, and therefore is not void as conferring non-judicial powers. Lynn v. Kearney County, 121 Neb. 122, 236 N.W. 192 (1931).
Nebraska's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not waive the state's sovereign immunity, and a plaintiff who seeks declaratory relief against the state must find authorization for such remedy outside the confines of that act. Pratt v. Clarke, 8 Neb. App. 199, 590 N.W.2d 426 (1999).
Declaratory Judgments Act is applicable to questions involving state taxation. Mid-Continent Airlines v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 105 F.Supp. 188 (D. Neb. 1952).
2. Effect
An action for declaratory judgment is sui generis; whether such action is to be treated as one at law or one in equity is to be determined by the nature of the dispute. The test is whether, in the absence of the prayer for declaratory judgment, the issues presented should properly be disposed of in an equitable as opposed to a legal action. Boyles v. Hausmann, 246 Neb. 181, 517 N.W.2d 610 (1994).
An action for declaratory judgment under this section is sui generis; whether such an action is to be treated as one at law or one in equity is to be determined by the nature of the dispute. Donaldson v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 232 Neb. 140, 440 N.W.2d 187 (1989); Boren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 225 Neb. 503, 406 N.W.2d 640 (1987).
An action for declaratory judgment determines the rights of the parties in a justiciable controversy and is binding on any further adjudication between the parties as the rights so declared. Russell v. First York Sav. Co., 218 Neb. 112, 352 N.W.2d 871 (1984).
If an action for declaratory judgment under this section involves a question of fact, the parties are entitled to a jury trial. MFA Ins. Companies v. Mendenhall, 205 Neb. 430, 288 N.W.2d 270 (1980).
Constitutionality of Installment Sales Act of 1963 was tested under Declaratory Judgments Act. Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.2d 844 (1963).
Where defendant prayed for entry of declaratory judgment, it was precluded on appeal from contending that such relief was improper. County of Douglas v. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., 172 Neb. 696, 111 N.W.2d 719 (1961).
Under Declaratory Judgments Act, it was proper to submit question of ownership of automobile to a jury. Hawkeye Casualty Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623 (1951).
Declarations made by court in declaratory judgment proceeding have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. Morrell v. Towle, 141 Neb. 370, 3 N.W.2d 655 (1942).
Declaratory judgment law is not a substitute for a new trial or appeal, nor does it operate to supersede former adjudications or proper proceedings already pending in court. Phelps County v. City of Holdrege, 133 Neb. 139, 274 N.W. 483 (1937).
Declaratory judgment confirming validity of a trust agreement and directing trustee to pay trust funds to parties entitled thereto is final and binding on the parties to the proceeding, their privies and successors in interest. In re Reynolds Estate, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480 (1936).
3. Jurisdiction
District courts have inherent equity jurisdiction to resolve custody disputes, and they have jurisdiction over habeas proceedings challenging adoption proceedings. Accordingly, district courts have jurisdiction over a related declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Nebraska adoption statutes. In re Adoption of Jaelyn B., 293 Neb. 917, 883 N.W.2d 22 (2016).
The district court did not have jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the constitutionality of a tax statute under this section when the plaintiff filed suit outside the same tax year in which the taxes were levied or assessed. Trumble v. Sarpy County Board, 283 Neb. 486, 810 N.W.2d 732 (2012).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court is a "court of record" and, as such, has the authority to enter a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Deyle, 234 Neb. 537, 451 N.W.2d 910 (1990).
The district court has power to retain jurisdiction and grant further relief where it has entered a declaratory judgment declaring the rights of the parties under a contract. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 191 Neb. 249, 214 N.W.2d 483 (1974).
Courts of record are empowered to render declaratory judgments. Haynes v. Anderson, 163 Neb. 50, 77 N.W.2d 674 (1956).
County court may render declaratory judgment. Rohn v. Kelley, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953).
Court does not lack jurisdiction to render declaratory judgment merely because construction or validity of a penal statute is necessary to a decision. Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 291 N.W. 62 (1940).
25-21,150.
Rights of claimants; determination.Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 2, p. 257; C.S.1929, § 20-21,141; R.S.1943, § 25-21,150.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
A declaratory judgment is appropriate to declare one party's then-existing rights under a contract or real covenant. Equestrian Ridge v. Equestrian Ridge Estates II, 308 Neb. 128, 953 N.W.2d 16 (2021).
The district court was correct in concluding that it did not have authority to enter a declaratory judgment for a taxpayer seeking an order declaring the meaning of the Nebraska Supreme Court's prior opinion and directing the county assessor to record the taxable value that the opinion and the mandate required, because a writ of mandamus issued to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission was a serviceable remedy. Cain v. Lymber, 306 Neb. 820, 947 N.W.2d 541 (2020).
District courts have inherent equity jurisdiction to resolve custody disputes, and they have jurisdiction over habeas proceedings challenging adoption proceedings. Accordingly, district courts have jurisdiction over a related declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Nebraska adoption statutes. In re Adoption of Jaelyn B., 293 Neb. 917, 883 N.W.2d 22 (2016).
A declaratory judgment action is the proper judicial proceeding to determine a party's rights and obligations under a particular statute. Ameritas Life Ins. Corp. v. Balka, 257 Neb. 878, 601 N.W.2d 508 (1999).
Preliminary correspondence and unsigned insurance policy form did not constitute a contract within the meaning of this section. Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd., 229 Neb. 740, 428 N.W.2d 895 (1988).
Declaratory judgment proceeding permissible to determine rights and benefits under Fireman's Pension Act. Hooper v. City of Lincoln, 183 Neb. 591, 163 N.W.2d 117 (1968).
This section authorizes courts of record to construe wills. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Graybill, 178 Neb. 79, 132 N.W.2d 304 (1964).
Action to construe a deed to city was properly brought under Declaratory Judgments Act. City of Gering v. Jones, 175 Neb. 626, 122 N.W.2d 503 (1963).
Separation agreement between husband and wife was within terms of Declaratory Judgments Act. Dorland v. Dorland, 175 Neb. 233, 121 N.W.2d 28 (1963).
Tax-exempt status of property was properly determined in declaratory judgment proceeding. County of Douglas v. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., 172 Neb. 696, 111 N.W.2d 719 (1961).
An insurance contract comes within the purview of the act. Gottula v. Standard Reliance Ins. Co., 165 Neb. 1, 84 N.W.2d 179 (1957).
Action seeking the construction of a will is authorized. Phillips v. Phillips, 163 Neb. 282, 79 N.W.2d 420 (1956).
Unincorporated trade association could not maintain action on behalf of members whose rights were affected. Nebraska Seedsmen Assn. v. Department of Agriculture & Inspection, 162 Neb. 781, 77 N.W.2d 464 (1956).
Individual plaintiff must have a legally protectible interest or right. Schroder v. City of Lincoln, 155 Neb. 599, 52 N.W.2d 808 (1952).
Question of coverage under policy of insurance was properly determinable. Hawkeye Casualty Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623 (1951).
Declaratory judgment action will lie to determine rights over the disposition of public funds of a city operating under a home rule charter. Noble v. City of Lincoln, 153 Neb. 79, 43 N.W.2d 572 (1950).
Proceedings for a declaratory judgment extend to the validity of a statute where there is a justiciable, determinable controversy between parties in respect to rights thereunder. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation Dist. v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950).
Declaratory judgment proceeding may properly be brought to test validity of city ordinance. Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 141 Neb. 363, 3 N.W.2d 635 (1942).
Validity of tax on air-flight equipment could be challenged in declaratory judgment proceeding. Mid-Continent Airlines v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 105 F.Supp. 188 (D. Neb. 1952).
2. Miscellaneous
A plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a statute must prove that the plaintiff is a person whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by the challenged statute. Mullendore v. Nuernberger, 230 Neb. 921, 434 N.W.2d 511 (1989).
To obtain declaratory relief, a plaintiff has the burden to prove the existence of a justiciable controversy and an interest in the subject matter of the action. Mullendore v. Nuernberger, 230 Neb. 921, 434 N.W.2d 511 (1989).
Plaintiffs are not required to violate a penal statute as a condition of having it construed or its validity determined, but may seek declaratory judgment. Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 291 N.W. 62 (1940).
Word "person" includes the State of Nebraska and its executive departments. State ex rel. Smrha v. General American Life Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 520, 272 N.W. 555 (1937).
Court may refuse to render declaratory judgment where it would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. In re Reynolds Estate, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480 (1936); Smithberger v. Banning, 130 Neb. 354, 265 N.W. 10 (1936).
25-21,151.
Construction of contract; before or after breach.A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 3, p. 257; C.S.1929, § 20-21,142; R.S.1943, § 25-21,151.
Annotations
A contract may be construed under Declaratory Judgments Act either before or after there has been a breach thereof. Dorland v. Dorland, 175 Neb. 233, 121 N.W.2d 28 (1963).
Action is authorized after breach of contract of insurance. Hawkeye Casualty Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623 (1951).
25-21,152.
Fiduciary or interested person; action to declare rights.Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust or the estate of a decedent, an infant, person with a mental disorder, or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal relation in respect thereto:
(a) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin, or others; or
(b) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
(c) To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other writings.
Annotations
This section authorizes courts of record to construe wills. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Graybill, 178 Neb. 79, 132 N.W.2d 304 (1964).
Administrator of estate could bring action to determine validity of devise and bequest under will. Hipsley v Hipsley, 162 Neb. 518, 76 N.W.2d 462 (1956).
A declaratory judgment may be had in probate proceedings. Rohn v. Kelley, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953).
Declaratory judgment proceeding was proper to determine interest of parties in cattle. Graham v. Beauchamp, 154 Neb. 889, 50 N.W.2d 104 (1951).
25-21,153.
Sections; not limiting or restrictive.The enumeration in sections 25-21,150, 25-21,151 and 25-21,152 does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in section 25-21,149, in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 5, p. 258; C.S.1929, § 20-21,144; R.S.1943, § 25-21,153.
Annotations
Coverage under public liability policy could be determined. Hawkeye Casualty Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623 (1951).
Affirmative relief against items of state taxation is authorized. Mid-Continent Airlines v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 105 F.Supp. 188 (D. Neb. 1952).
25-21,154.
Declaratory judgments; when refused.The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 6, p. 258; C.S.1929, § 20-21,145; R.S.1943, § 25-21,154.
Annotations
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd., 229 Neb. 740, 428 N.W.2d 895 (1988); Arlington Oil Co. v. Hall, 130 Neb. 674, 266 N.W. 583 (1936); Smithberger v. Banning, 130 Neb. 354, 265 N.W. 10 (1936).
Where eminent domain proceeding was pending in which question of abandonment and its effect could be determined, action for declaratory judgment on claimed abandonment should have been dismissed. Zarybnicky v. County of Gage, 196 Neb. 210, 241 N.W.2d 834 (1976).
Discretionary power is conferred. Haynes v. Anderson, 163 Neb. 50, 77 N.W.2d 674 (1956).
One of the purposes of the act is to terminate the controversy that gave rise to the proceedings. Custer Public Power Dist. v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 162 Neb. 300, 75 N.W.2d 619 (1956).
Court will not render declaratory judgment where necessary parties have not been joined. Redick v. Peony Park, 151 Neb. 442, 37 N.W.2d 801 (1949).
Statute authorizing declaratory judgment is applicable only when all interested persons are made parties to the proceeding. Ben B. Wood Realty Co. v. Wood, 132 Neb. 817, 273 N.W. 493 (1937); Southern Nebraska Power Co. v. Village of Deshler, 130 Neb. 133, 264 N.W. 462 (1936).
Declaratory Judgments Act is applicable only where there is a present actual controversy and where justiciable issues are presented. Dobson v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 124 Neb. 652, 247 N.W. 789 (1933).
25-21,155.
Declaratory judgments; review.All orders, judgments and decrees under sections 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 7, p. 258; C.S.1929, § 20-21,146; R.S.1943, § 25-21,155.
Annotations
Determinations of factual issues in a declaratory judgment action will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly wrong. Beatrice Nat. Bank v. Southeast Neb. Co-op, 230 Neb. 671, 432 N.W.2d 842 (1988).
Declaratory judgment decrees may be reviewed in the Supreme Court as are other decrees. OB-GYN v. Blue Cross, 219 Neb. 199, 361 N.W.2d 550 (1985).
Examination of reviewing court will be confined to questions determined by trial court. Lickert v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 75, 12 N.W.2d 644 (1944).
25-21,156.
Pleadings; complaint; orders to show cause.Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by complaint to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application is deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
Annotations
When the plaintiff's pleadings in a declaratory judgment action put the defendant on notice of the remedy sought, a trial court may order relief which is clearly within the scope of its declaratory judgment. Conversely, when a plaintiff's requested relief is not clearly within the scope of a court's declaratory judgment, the court should grant such relief only for a plaintiff's concurrent or subsequent cause of action or the plaintiff's application for supplemental relief under this section. Wetovick v. County of Nance, 279 Neb. 773, 782 N.W.2d 298 (2010).
The trial court has the power to retain jurisdiction in order to grant further relief for the amounts of percentage rent as they may be determined each year until the expiration of the lease which was the subject of the declaratory judgment action. S.N. Mart, Ltd. v. Maurices Inc., 234 Neb. 343, 451 N.W.2d 259 (1990).
Judgment for amount due under contract may be obtained in a declaratory judgment action. Richardson v. Waterite Co., 169 Neb. 263, 99 N.W.2d 265 (1959).
Injunction against enforcing of city ordinance was properly refused. McNeil v. City of Omaha, 160 Neb. 301, 70 N.W.2d 83 (1955).
Injunctive relief deemed unnecessary. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Heintze, 159 Neb. 520, 67 N.W.2d 753 (1954).
Further relief may be granted to carry into effect declaratory judgment. Noble v. City of Lincoln, 158 Neb. 457, 63 N.W.2d 475 (1954).
25-21,157.
Trial; issues of fact; how conducted.When a proceeding under sections 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 9, p. 258; C.S.1929, § 20-21,148; R.S.1943, § 25-21,157.
Annotations
A party may not simply move the court for a declaratory judgment; no such summary proceeding is recognized in Nebraska. Breci v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 288 Neb. 626, 849 N.W.2d 523 (2014).
In a declaratory judgment action involving the determination of issues of fact, such issues may be tried and determined as in other civil actions. Millard Rur. Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Omaha, 226 Neb. 50, 409 N.W.2d 574 (1987).
Fact questions in a declaratory judgment action may be tried and determined as in other civil actions. OB-GYN v. Blue Cross, 219 Neb. 199, 361 N.W.2d 550 (1985).
Where a decision appealed from involves, at the outset, questions of fact, the parties are entitled to a jury trial, notwithstanding the fact that the action may have involved both questions of fact and of law. Hemenway v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 211 Neb. 193, 318 N.W.2d 70 (1982).
In a declaratory judgment action, issues of fact may be tried and determined as in other civil actions, and if the action would otherwise be an action at law and is tried to the court without a jury the trial court's findings have the effect of a jury verdict. Larutan Corp. v. Magnolia Homes Manuf. Co., 190 Neb. 425, 209 N.W.2d 177 (1973).
Where jury waived, judgment of trial court will not be set aside unless clearly wrong. Belek v. Travelers Ind. Co., 187 Neb. 470, 191 N.W.2d 819 (1971).
Issues of fact may be tried and determined as in other civil actions. American Standard Ins. Co. v. Tournor, 186 Neb. 585, 185 N.W.2d 267 (1971); United Services Automobile Assn. v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, 109 N.W.2d 174 (1961); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kersey, 171 Neb. 212, 106 N.W.2d 31 (1960).
An issue of fact may be submitted for determination by a jury. Hawkeye Casualty Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623 (1951).
25-21,158.
Costs.In any proceeding under sections 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 the court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 10, p. 258; C.S.1929, § 20-21,149; R.S.1943, § 25-21,158.
Annotations
Under this section, attorney fees are not taxed as "costs." Without another source of statutory authority permitting attorney fees to be taxed as costs, the prevailing party cannot recover attorney fees in a declaratory judgment action. Wetovick v. County of Nance, 279 Neb. 773, 782 N.W.2d 298 (2010).
Where petition for declaratory judgment was denied for lack of necessary parties, all costs were taxed to plaintiff. Phillips v. Phillips, 163 Neb. 282, 79 N.W.2d 420 (1956).
25-21,159.
Parties; municipalities; Attorney General.When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard. If a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General of the state shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.
Annotations
1. Necessary parties
2. Miscellaneous
1. Necessary parties
Landowners in a sanitary improvement district are indispensable parties to a declaratory judgment action seeking construction of a statute governing landowner voting rights. SID No. 2 of Knox Cty. v. Fischer, 308 Neb. 791, 957 N.W.2d 154 (2021).
The participation of a statutorily mandated necessary party in a declaratory judgment action involving the validity of a city ordinance is a jurisdictional requirement, and the failure to include such party requires vacation of a district court's judgment in the action. Dunn v. Daub, 259 Neb. 559, 611 N.W.2d 97 (2000).
A party is not permitted to first obtain a judgment and then apply the requirements of this section in order to determine who is a necessary party to an action. Taylor Oil Co., Inc. v. Retikis, 254 Neb. 275, 575 N.W.2d 870 (1998).
Judgment creditors or persons injured in automobile accidents are interested parties in declaratory judgment action between insured and insurance company as to validity of policy; thus, declaratory judgment was not available, and subsequent granting of motion for summary judgment based on res judicata effect of original declaratory judgment order was error. Krohn v. Gardner, 238 Neb. 460, 471 N.W.2d 391 (1991).
In a taxpayer's action, potentially all of the taxpayers and citizens are parties; but the fact that all taxpayers may be potential parties does not mean that they are indispensable parties. There is no requirement that all taxpayers who might be affected in some manner by the result of the litigation be made parties to the action. Christensen v. City of Tekamah, 230 Neb. 576, 432 N.W.2d 798 (1988).
The statute authorizing a declaratory judgment action is applicable only where all interested persons are made parties to the proceeding. Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd., 229 Neb. 740, 428 N.W.2d 895 (1988).
"Indispensable party" to a suit is defined as one who must have such an interest in the controversy as to preclude a final decree without affecting such party's interests. Shepoka v. Knopik, 197 Neb. 651, 250 N.W.2d 619 (1977).
All necessary persons must be parties to action at time court enters declaratory judgment. Baker v. A. C. Nelson Co., 185 Neb. 128, 174 N.W.2d 197 (1970).
Action should be dismissed without prejudice when there is an absence of necessary parties. Marsh v. Marsh, 173 Neb. 282, 113 N.W.2d 323 (1962).
Joinder of all necessary parties defendant is required. Haynes v. Anderson, 163 Neb. 50, 77 N.W.2d 674 (1956).
State was not a necessary party to suit to enjoin tax. Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 160 Neb. 320, 70 N.W.2d 382 (1955).
In controversy between store operator and city over validity of ordinance, other store owners were not necessary parties. City of Omaha v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., Inc., 156 Neb. 650, 57 N.W.2d 269 (1953).
Whenever all necessary parties have not been impleaded, action should be dismissed. Stahl v. Allchin, 155 Neb. 412, 52 N.W.2d 251 (1952).
Duty is imposed upon plaintiff of joining all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the judgment. Redick v. Peony Park, 151 Neb. 442, 37 N.W.2d 801 (1949).
2. Miscellaneous
This section applies only to actions for declaratory relief. State v. Kelley, 249 Neb. 99, 541 N.W.2d 645 (1996).
The requirement that the Attorney General be served with a copy of the proceeding when the constitutionality of an ordinance is raised is a prerequisite to the exercise of the district court's jurisdiction. Absent compliance with this section, a district court may not exercise its jurisdiction. DeCoste v. City of Wahoo, 248 Neb. 463, 534 N.W.2d 760 (1995).
Petition seeking declaration that residency requirement for dissolution of marriage was unconstitutional dismissed upon demurrer of Attorney General. Ashley v. Ashley, 191 Neb. 824, 217 N.W.2d 926 (1974).
Where constitutionality of statute is involved, Attorney General should be served with copies of the proceedings. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 609, 107 N.W.2d 397 (1961).
Requisites for maintenance of declaratory judgment proceedings are stated. Graham v. Beauchamp, 154 Neb. 889, 50 N.W.2d 104 (1951).
25-21,160.
Sections, how construed.Sections 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 are declared to be remedial; their purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations; and are to be liberally construed and administered.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 12, p. 259; C.S.1929, § 20-21,151; R.S.1943, § 25-21,160.
Annotations
The Attorney General may bring an action for a declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of a statute which the Tax Commissioner proposes to implement and enforce. State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 199 N.W.2d 738 (1972).
Requirements for declaratory relief met. Slosburg v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 839, 165 N.W.2d 90 (1969).
Act is to be liberally construed and administered. Berigan Bros. v. Growers Cattle Credit Corp., 182 Neb. 656, 156 N.W.2d 794 (1968).
Act has application both substantively and adjectively. Hawkeye Casualty Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623 (1951).
25-21,161.
Person, defined.The word person wherever used in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act shall be construed to mean any person, partnership, limited liability company, joint-stock company, unincorporated association, society, or municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever.
Annotations
The term "person" as used in this section is broad enough to include the state or any subdivision thereof. Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d 223 (1994).
An unincorporated association is included within the statutory definition of a person. Nebraska Seedsmen Assn. v. Department of Agriculture & Inspection, 162 Neb. 781, 77 N.W.2d 464 (1956).
25-21,162.
Validity of sections.Sections 25-21,149 to 25-21,164, except sections 25-21,149 and 25-21,150, are hereby declared independent and severable, and the invalidity, if any, of any part or feature thereof shall not affect or render the remainder of sections 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 invalid or inoperative.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 14, p. 259; C.S.1929, § 20-21,153; R.S.1943, § 25-21,162.
25-21,163.
Interpretation and construction of sections to effectuate uniformity.Sections 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact them, and to harmonize, as far as possible, with federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 15, p. 259; C.S.1929, § 20-21,154; R.S.1943, § 25-21,163.
25-21,164.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 may be cited as the "Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act".
Source:Laws 1929, c. 75, § 16, p. 259; C.S.1929, § 20-21,155; R.S.1943, § 25-21,164.
25-21,165.
By whom brought; jurisdiction.Whenever a suit praying for an interlocutory injunction shall have been begun in the United States District Court in any Division in the State of Nebraska to restrain any official or officials of the State of Nebraska from enforcing or administering any statute of the State of Nebraska, or from enforcing or administering any administrative order of any department, bureau or commission of this state, or to set aside or enjoin such statute or administrative order, any defendant in such suit or the Attorney General of the State of Nebraska may bring an action to enforce said statute or order in the district court of the county of the State of Nebraska in which the State Capitol of said state is located at any time before the hearing or application for said interlocutory injunction in the suit in the United States District Court, District of Nebraska, in the proper Division thereof; and jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the district court of the county of the State of Nebraska in which its State Capitol is located to entertain such suit with the powers hereinafter granted.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 79, § 1, p. 268; C.S.1929, § 20-21,156; R.S.1943, § 25-21,165.
25-21,166.
Certification to federal court; stay of proceedings.The district court of the county in Nebraska in which said State Capitol is located shall, when such suit is brought, grant a stay of proceedings to any state officer or officers under such statute or order, pending the determination of such suit by the courts of the State of Nebraska. The district court of the county in Nebraska in which its State Capitol is located shall upon the institution of said suit, certify forthwith to the United States District Court, District of Nebraska, to its proper Division in which such action heretofore has been brought, the fact that such suit has been begun in the district court of the county in the state where the State Capitol is located.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 79, § 2, p. 269; C.S.1929, § 20-21,157; R.S.1943, § 25-21,166.
25-21,167.
Expedited trial and appeal; advancement.The district court of Lancaster County shall speedily determine the action, and an appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals within thirty days after the entry of the judgment. Trial in the appellate court shall in all ways be expedited, set for an early hearing, and advanced as other causes which involve the public welfare and convenience are advanced.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 79, § 3, p. 269; C.S.1929, § 20-21,158; R.S.1943, § 25-21,167; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 67;
Laws 1992, LB 360, § 6; Laws 2000, LB 921, § 21.
25-21,168.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,169.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,170.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,171.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,172.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,173.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,174.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,175.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,176.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,177.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,178.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,179.
Repealed. Laws 1974, LB 354, § 316.
25-21,180.
Terms, defined.As used in sections 25-224 and 25-21,180 to 25-21,182, unless the context otherwise requires: Product liability action shall mean any action brought against a manufacturer, seller, or lessor of a product, regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought, for or on account of personal injury, death, or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formulation, installation, preparation, assembly, testing, packaging, or labeling of any product, or the failure to warn or protect against a danger or hazard in the use, misuse, or intended use of any product, or the failure to provide proper instructions for the use of any product.
Annotations
In defining a product liability action as an action brought for or on account of personal injury, death, or property damage caused by a product, this section refers only to physical harm, not to economic loss. National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983).
25-21,181.
Action based on strict liability in tort; brought against seller or lessor; when.No product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort shall be commenced or maintained against any seller or lessor of a product which is alleged to contain or possess a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the buyer, user, or consumer unless the seller or lessor is also the manufacturer of the product or the part thereof claimed to be defective.
25-21,182.
Product liability action; based upon negligent or defective design, testing, or labeling; defense.In any product liability action based upon negligent or defective design, testing, or labeling, proof establishing that such design, testing, or labeling was in conformity with the generally recognized and prevailing state of the art in the industry at the time the specific product involved in the action was first sold to any person not engaged in the business of selling such product shall be a defense. State of the art as used in this section shall be defined as the best technology reasonably available at the time.
25-21,183.
Transferred to section 13-911.
25-21,184.
Railroad company; actions by employees against; negligence; assumption of risk.In any action brought against a railroad or street railroad company to recover damages for personal injury to any employee, whether such injury results in death or not, the employee shall not be held to have assumed any of the risks of his employment in any case where the railroad company or its agents, servants or employees have been guilty of negligence.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 98, § 1, p. 252; R.S.1913, § 7891; C.S.1922, § 8833; C.S.1929, § 20-1150; R.S.1943, § 25-1150; R.S.1943, (1979), § 25-1150.
Annotations
Section is not applicable in action under federal employer's liability act; in such case federal law as to assumption of risk is controlling. Preble v. Union Stock Yards Co., 110 Neb. 383, 193 N.W. 910 (1923).
25-21,185.
Actions accruing before February 8, 1992, for injuries to person or property; contributory negligence; comparative negligence.In all actions accruing before February 8, 1992, brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or to property caused by the negligence or act or omission giving rise to strict liability in tort of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence or act or omission giving rise to strict liability in tort of the defendant was gross in comparison, but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff, and all questions of negligence or act or omission giving rise to strict liability in tort and contributory negligence shall be for the jury.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 124, § 1, p. 311; R.S.1913, § 7892; C.S.1922, § 8834; C.S.1929, § 20-1151; R.S.1943, § 25-1151;
Laws 1978, LB 665, § 6; R.S.1943, (1979), § 25-1151;
Laws 1992, LB 262, § 9.
Annotations
1. Slight negligence of plaintiff
2. Gross negligence of defendant
3. Comparison
4. Miscellaneous
1. Slight negligence of plaintiff
Negligence of plaintiff must be compared with that of defendant to determine whether negligence is slight or gross. Brackman v. Brackman, 169 Neb. 650, 100 N.W.2d 774 (1960).
Where plaintiff's negligence was more than slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant, directed verdict was proper. Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (1959); Rogers v. Sheperd, 159 Neb. 292, 66 N.W.2d 815 (1954); Meyer v. Platte Valley Construction Co., 147 Neb. 860, 25 N.W.2d 412 (1946); Western Contracting Corp. v. Odle, 331 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1964).
Slight negligence does not defeat recovery if by comparison the negligence of defendant is gross. Fairchild v. Sorenson, 165 Neb. 667, 87 N.W.2d 235 (1957).
Failure to use due care after becoming aware of an obstacle is more than slight negligence. Allen v. Kavanaugh, 160 Neb. 645, 71 N.W.2d 119 (1955).
Instruction given under this statute was erroneous which directed jury that the amount that might be deducted on account of contributory negligence of plaintiff must necessarily not be any large percent of the total damages. Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 153 Neb. 98, 43 N.W.2d 609 (1950).
Where there is no basis in the evidence for a finding of contributory negligence, it is error to instruct on the subject. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. County of Red Willow, 149 Neb. 10, 30 N.W.2d 51 (1947).
Failure of jewelry salesman to inform hotel of contents of sample case containing jewelry or value thereof constituted contributory negligence of such degree as to bar recovery. Roger Wurmser, Inc. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 148 Neb. 660, 28 N.W.2d 405 (1947).
Failure to instruct on the comparative negligence rule when the evidence discloses the contributory negligence of the plaintiff exceeds slight negligence is not prejudicial error. Shiman Bros. & Co. v. Nebraska National Hotel Co., 146 Neb. 47, 18 N.W.2d 551 (1945).
When the plaintiff's negligence is more than slight as compared with that of the defendant, and is clearly the proximate cause of the accident, the court should direct a verdict for the defendant. Dickenson v. County of Cheyenne, 146 Neb. 36, 18 N.W.2d 559 (1945).
One who suddenly moves from place of safety into the path of a moving vehicle, after seeing it approach, is guilty of more than slight negligence. Hughes v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 143 Neb. 47, 8 N.W.2d 509 (1943).
Where pedestrian was struck by defendant's truck, evidence of intoxication of pedestrian was not of itself contributory negligence but was circumstance to be considered by jury in determining whether intoxication contributed to injury. Nichols v. Havlat, 142 Neb. 534, 7 N.W.2d 84 (1942).
One injured while momentarily standing in a highway is not, because of that fact, guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Grantham v. Watson Brothers Transportation Co., 142 Neb. 362, 6 N.W.2d 372 (1942).
Anyone who voluntarily walks about in total darkness in a strange place, where no special circumstances require him to proceed, does so at his own risk and is guilty of more than slight negligence as a matter of law. Wetink v. Traphagen, 138 Neb. 41, 291 N.W. 884 (1940).
Where evidence shows beyond reasonable dispute that plaintiff's negligence is more than slight as compared with defendant's negligence, it is proper for trial court to instruct jury to return verdict for defendant. Whittaker v. Hanifin, 138 Neb. 18, 291 N.W. 723 (1940); Doan v. Hoppe, 132 Neb. 641, 272 N.W. 763 (1937).
Where a pedestrian suddenly steps from a place of safety into the path of a street car, his contributory negligence is more than slight as a matter of law. Travinsky v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 137 Neb. 168, 288 N.W. 512 (1939).
Where an automobile driver parks his car parallel to the curb, gets out of his car on the left hand side, and is struck by another automobile while standing beside his car in a city street, he is not guilty of more than slight negligence as a matter of law. Brenning v. Remington, 136 Neb. 883, 287 N.W. 776 (1939).
Where view at railroad crossing is obstructed, motorist who attempts to cross and fails to look or listen is guilty of such contributory negligence as will defeat recovery. Mundt v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 136 Neb. 478, 286 N.W. 691 (1939).
Where the driver of an automobile disregards a stop sign and drives out upon an arterial highway without stopping and collides with another automobile, he is guilty of more than slight negligence as a matter of law. Ritter v. Hering, 135 Neb. 1, 280 N.W. 231 (1938).
One entering a darkened room on own premises where a trapdoor is liable to be open, without ascertaining whether the door is open or shut, is guilty of more than slight negligence as a matter of law. Gardner v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 134 Neb. 163, 278 N.W. 137 (1938).
If evidence clearly shows that plaintiff is guilty of more than slight negligence which will defeat a recovery, it is proper to sustain motion for instructed verdict for defendant. McDonald v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 128 Neb. 17, 257 N.W. 489 (1934).
Notwithstanding wording of statute, court may pass on sufficiency of evidence of contributory negligence as bar to recovery. Pinches v. Village of Dickens, 127 Neb. 239, 254 N.W. 877 (1934).
Instruction permitting recovery unless plaintiff's intestate was guilty of gross negligence was erroneous. McDonald v. Wright, 125 Neb. 871, 252 N.W. 411 (1934).
Comparative negligence rule precludes recovery by one who approaches railway crossing without precaution. Stanley v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 113 Neb. 280, 202 N.W. 864 (1925).
Where both parties are negligent in some degree, it is error to omit the word "slight" in describing the contributory negligence that shall bar the plaintiff from recovery. McMullen v. Nash Sales Co., 112 Neb. 371, 199 N.W. 721 (1924).
Slight negligence of plaintiffs is no longer a defense but goes only in mitigation of damages. Holley v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 110 Neb. 541, 193 N.W. 710 (1923).
Where there is some evidence of contributory negligence, failure to give instruction on comparative negligence is error. Mares v. Chaloupka, 110 Neb. 199, 192 N.W. 397 (1923).
Where shown beyond reasonable dispute that plaintiff's negligence was more than slight in comparison with defendant's, action should be dismissed or verdict directed. Haffke v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Corp., 110 Neb. 125, 193 N.W. 257 (1923); Seiffert v. Hines, 108 Neb. 62, 187 N.W. 108 (1922); Frey v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 106 Neb. 333, 183 N.W. 567 (1921); Dodds v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 104 Neb. 692, 178 N.W. 258 (1920); Jensen v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 12 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1926); Gordon Fireproof Warehouse & Van Co. v. Hines, 272 F. 604 (8th Cir. 1921); Marshall v. Hines, 271 F. 165 (8th Cir. 1921).
Contributory negligence of plaintiff was more than slight as a matter of law and barred recovery. Sandberg v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 364 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1966).
Negligence of one party is to be compared with that of another, and is not to be evaluated standing alone. United States v. Bohachevsky, 324 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1963).
Negligence of contractor's employee was slight in comparison to negligence of railroad. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Blank, 167 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1948).
Court must dismiss case where plaintiff's negligence is more than slight as compared with defendant's. Rogers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 39 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1930).
2. Gross negligence of defendant
Whether or not an act or omission constitutes gross negligence is ascertainable by comparison with negligence of opposing party. Pierson v. Jensen, 150 Neb. 86, 33 N.W.2d 462 (1948).
Omission to explain that plaintiff's contributory negligence, however slight, will defeat recovery in case defendant's negligence falls short of being gross in comparison, was reversible error. Mitchell v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Corp., 114 Neb. 72, 206 N.W. 12 (1925).
There is no error in not instructing on comparative negligence, where defendant's negligence is not established. Lady v. Douglass, 105 Neb. 489, 181 N.W. 173 (1920).
3. Comparison
In awarding damages under the provisions of this section, it is the jury's responsibility to comparatively measure the amount of negligence on defendant's part to the contributory negligence, if any, on plaintiff's part by considering all the evidence presented on the issue. Sanwick v. Jenson, 244 Neb. 607, 508 N.W.2d 267 (1993).
Questions of contributory negligence shall be for the jury. Sierks v. Delk, 222 Neb. 360, 383 N.W.2d 778 (1986).
If the evidence shows that plaintiff's conduct may be negligent and a proximate cause of the accident, the issue of contributory negligence must be submitted to the jury. Davis v. Phillips, 215 Neb. 184, 337 N.W.2d 754 (1983).
In determining questions of slight and gross negligence, the process of comparison should measure the disparity between the quantum of the total negligence of defendant and the total negligence of the plaintiff. C. C. Natvig's Sons, Inc. v. Summers, 198 Neb. 741, 255 N.W.2d 272 (1977).
The words slight and gross as employed herein are comparative terms, and the negligence of the plaintiff or defendant is not to be evaluated as slight, gross, or otherwise, standing alone. Niemeyer v. Tichota, 190 Neb. 775, 212 N.W.2d 557 (1973).
The meaning of gross negligence under the comparative negligence rule is contrasted with its meaning under the guest passenger statute. Johnson v. Roueche, 188 Neb. 716, 199 N.W.2d 1 (1972).
Under facts in the case, instruction concerning the comparative negligence statute was required. Sober v. Smith, 179 Neb. 74, 136 N.W.2d 372 (1965).
Evidence was sufficient to take case to the jury under comparative negligence statute. Robins v. Sandoz, 177 Neb. 894, 131 N.W.2d 648 (1964).
Requirements of instruction on comparative negligence rule stated. Darnell v. Panhandle Coop Assn., 175 Neb. 40, 120 N.W.2d 278 (1963).
Instruction on comparative negligence was free from prejudicial error. Hiner v. Nelson, 174 Neb. 725, 119 N.W.2d 288 (1963).
Failure to give instruction on comparative negligence was prejudicial error. Carlson v. Chambers, 173 Neb. 166, 112 N.W.2d 729 (1962); Baty v. Wolff, 162 Neb. 1, 74 N.W.2d 913 (1956).
Instructions given properly stated the rule of comparative negligence. Pearson v. Schuler, 172 Neb. 353, 109 N.W.2d 537 (1961).
Statutory test is not based upon absolute degrees of negligence, but rather upon the relative degrees of negligence between the parties. Sayers v. Witte, 171 Neb. 750, 107 N.W.2d 676 (1961); Bezdek v. Patrick, 167 Neb. 754, 94 N.W.2d 482 (1959); Continental Can Co. v. Horton, 250 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1957).
Omission of element from instruction for making comparison was erroneous. Ripp v. Riesland, 170 Neb. 631, 104 N.W.2d 246 (1960).
Even though defendant is guilty of negligence as a matter of law, the amount of damages to be awarded is subject to the provisions of the comparative negligence act. Bezdek v. Patrick, 170 Neb. 522, 103 N.W.2d 318 (1960).
Unless reasonable minds cannot differ, trial court should leave duty of making comparison of negligence to the jury. O'Neill v. Henke, 167 Neb. 631, 94 N.W.2d 322 (1959); Zimmer v. Brandon, 134 Neb. 311, 278 N.W. 502 (1938); Casey v. Ford Motor Co., 108 Neb. 352, 187 N.W. 922 (1922).
Failure to submit instruction on comparative negligence was not prejudicial to plaintiff. Owen v. Moore, 166 Neb. 239, 88 N.W.2d 768 (1958).
Intent of statute is that the negligence of the parties shall be compared one with the other. Andelt v. County of Seward, 157 Neb. 527, 60 N.W.2d 604 (1953).
Where plaintiff did not make prima facie case under guest statute, comparison of degrees of negligence was unnecessary. Bishop v. Schofield, 156 Neb. 830, 58 N.W.2d 207 (1953).
In making comparison, there is no burden of proof on either party. Murray v. Pearson Appliance Store, 155 Neb. 860, 54 N.W.2d 250 (1952).
Plaintiff may recover only if his negligence is slight in comparison with that of the defendant which is gross. Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 152 Neb. 39, 40 N.W.2d 252 (1949).
Negligence of parties is to be compared one with the other in determining slight and gross negligence. Roby v. Auker, 151 Neb. 421, 37 N.W.2d 799 (1949).
Even though defendant may be guilty of negligence as a matter of law, question of comparison of negligence where plaintiff is guilty of some negligence should be left to jury. Blanchard v. Lawson, 148 Neb. 299, 27 N.W.2d 217 (1947).
The fact that plaintiff became so absorbed in his work as to detract him from a perilous position is not a defense to a charge of contributory negligence, but is a fact for consideration by the jury. Thomison v. Buehler, 147 Neb. 811, 25 N.W.2d 391 (1946).
Where there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether or not plaintiff was in pedestrian lane with green light in her favor, or was proceeding diagonally across street, contributory negligence of plaintiff and the degree or quality thereof was for the jury, and instruction on comparative negligence was proper. Hammond v. Morris, 147 Neb. 600, 24 N.W.2d 633 (1946).
Question of negligence and the degree of quality thereof, where motor vehicle being backed collided with pedestrian, was for jury. Chew v. Coffin, 144 Neb. 170, 12 N.W.2d 839 (1944).
When an action under guest statute is based on gross negligence, the comparative negligence statute is applicable. Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943).
All questions of negligence are for the jury. Lewis v. Rapid Transit Lines, 126 Neb. 158, 252 N.W. 804 (1934).
Instruction that plaintiff's damages should be reduced in proportion that her contributory negligence bore to the whole amount of damages was erroneous. Sgroi v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 124 Neb. 525, 247 N.W. 355 (1933).
Where both plaintiff and defendants are shown by evidence to have been negligent, court should instruct jury on comparative negligence of parties. Tempel v. Proffitt, 122 Neb. 249, 240 N.W. 285 (1932).
Failure to keep proper lookout was under circumstances of case for the jury. Giles v. Welsh, 122 Neb. 164, 239 N.W. 813 (1931).
Contributory negligence of one injured in collision between automobiles was for jury. Wortman v. Zimmerman, 119 Neb. 682, 230 N.W. 588 (1930).
Where there is evidence of negligence and contributory negligence, court must give instruction as to comparative negligence rule. Lieb v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 119 Neb. 222, 228 N.W. 364 (1929).
Unless evidence of defendant's negligence is legally insufficient or contributory negligence so clearly shown as to require verdict for plaintiff to be set aside, question is for the jury. Day v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 115 Neb. 711, 214 N.W. 647 (1927).
Where negligence by both parties is shown, it is error to instruct that plaintiff is not barred from recovery unless his negligence was gross in comparison with defendants. Gibson v. Kelkenny, 112 Neb. 524, 199 N.W. 838 (1924).
Unless plaintiff's negligence is more than slight, or defendant's negligence not gross in comparison, case should be submitted to jury. Traphagen v. Lincoln Traction Co., 110 Neb. 855, 195 N.W. 472 (1923); Baker v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 110 Neb. 246, 193 N.W. 341 (1923); Francis v. Lincoln Traction Co., 106 Neb. 243, 183 N.W. 293 (1921); Robison v. Troy Laundry Co., 105 Neb. 267, 180 N.W. 43 (1920).
Instruction that contributory negligence of plaintiff, if proved, would entitle defendant to verdict, was erroneous because it ignores comparative negligence rule. Davenport v. Intermountain R. L. & P. Co., 108 Neb. 387, 187 N.W. 905 (1922).
Where contributory negligence is shown, it is error to instruct jury to return verdict for plaintiff if they find defendant's negligence was proximate cause, without telling jury under what conditions plaintiff's negligence would defeat recovery. Bauer & Johnson Co. v. National Roofing Co., 107 Neb. 831, 187 N.W. 59 (1922); Morrison v. Scotts Bluff County, 104 Neb. 254, 177 N.W. 158 (1920).
The doctrine of contributory negligence or comparative fault, contained in this section, is a defense separate and distinct from that of assumption of risk and while assumption of risk may act as a complete defense, comparative fault may simply go to mitigate damages. McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc., 594 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1979).
Comparative negligence statute is applicable to automobile rear-end collision cases. McQueen v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 293 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1961).
Comparative negligence statute was not applicable to a guest passenger in automobile. Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1958).
Under comparative negligence statute, test is not based on absolute degrees of negligence but upon a comparative test of relative degrees of negligence between the parties. Continental Can Co. v. Horton, 250 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1957).
Where both parties are negligent, question of comparative negligence was matter for jury. Brunk v Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 207 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1953).
The criterion is extent of plaintiff's negligence in comparison with defendant's negligence. Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 202 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1953).
4. Miscellaneous
The trial court erred in failing to reduce plaintiff's recovery in an amount proportional to the amount of its agent's negligence, where the agent was negligent as a matter of law but not to a degree sufficient to bar the suit. City of LaVista v. Andersen, 240 Neb. 3, 480 N.W.2d 185 (1992).
To entitle defendant to summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence, defendant has the burden of proving, under the facts viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, that (1) plaintiff's contributory negligence was more than slight as a matter of law or (2) defendant's negligence was not gross in comparison to plaintiff's negligence as a matter of law. John v. OO (Infinity) S Development Co., 234 Neb. 190, 450 N.W.2d 199 (1990).
A defendant may plead contributory negligence by alleging in his answer that the plaintiff's injuries were the direct and proximate result of his own negligence. Bashus v. Turner, 218 Neb. 17, 352 N.W.2d 161 (1984).
In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or his property, all questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury. Krug v. Laughlin, 208 Neb. 367, 303 N.W.2d 311 (1981).
When, under the law and facts, the submission of the issue of comparative negligence is appropriate determination of the amount of damages is a jury question. Nickal v. Phinney, 207 Neb. 281, 298 N.W.2d 360 (1980).
Ordinarily the questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk are for the jury, but where the facts adduced with respect to those questions are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, a directed verdict is proper. Garcia v. Howard, 200 Neb. 57, 262 N.W.2d 190 (1978).
Rule that contributory negligence of more than certain percent will bar recovery not contemplated by statute nor would such a rule further administration of justice. Burney v. Ehlers, 185 Neb. 51, 173 N.W.2d 398 (1970).
On remand of case for trial on issue of damages only, contributory negligence should be considered only in mitigation of damages. Scofield v. Haskell, 180 Neb. 324, 142 N.W.2d 597 (1966).
Rendition of special verdict on degree of negligence required dismissal of action. Carlson v. Hanson, 166 Neb. 96, 88 N.W.2d 140 (1958).
An instruction, in language of an opinion of the Supreme Court construing statute, approved in numerous cases for many years, will not be held reversible error unless prejudicial. Patterson v. Kerr, 127 Neb. 73, 254 N.W. 704 (1934).
Degree of negligence comprehended by comparative negligence statute is not ordinarily applicable in actions involving motorists' guest statute. Sheehy v. Abboud, 126 Neb. 554, 253 N.W. 683 (1934).
If there is any testimony to support verdict in favor of party having the burden of proof it is error to direct verdict against him. LaFleur v. Poesch, 126 Neb. 263, 252 N.W. 902 (1934).
Statute merely changed legal effect of contributory negligence; burden of proof is placed on defendant. Schrage v. Miller, 123 Neb. 266, 242 N.W. 649 (1932).
Instruction approximately in words of statute was not materially erroneous for failure to further explain slight and gross negligence. Kelso v. Seward County, 117 Neb. 136, 219 N.W. 843 (1928).
A requested instruction was properly rejected as inconsistent with comparative negligence where it would instruct that one joint tort-feasor is entitled to contribution from others equally liable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act according to their share of the fault in causing the injury. Brassette v. Burlington Northern Inc., 687 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1982).
Application of Nebraska comparative negligence statute would be inappropriate in a strict liability case. Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976).
Conflicting evidence, set out, concerning collision at private farm railroad crossing presented issue to be resolved by jury. Kloewer v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 512 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1975).
It was a question for the jury whether passenger in automobile was guilty of contributory negligence in crossing accident case. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Beninger, 373 F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1967).
Where reasonable minds might differ as to existence of contributory negligence, question should be submitted to jury. Surface v. Safeway Stores, 169 F.2d 937 (8th Cir. 1948).
25-21,185.01.
Repealed. Laws 1992, LB 262, § 12.
25-21,185.02.
Repealed. Laws 1992, LB 262, § 12.
25-21,185.03.
Repealed. Laws 1992, LB 262, § 12.
25-21,185.04.
Repealed. Laws 1992, LB 262, § 12.
25-21,185.05.
Repealed. Laws 1992, LB 262, § 12.
25-21,185.06.
Repealed. Laws 1992, LB 262, § 12.
25-21,185.07.
Civil actions to which contributory negligence is a defense; sections applicable.Sections 25-21,185.07 to 25-21,185.12 shall apply to all civil actions to which contributory negligence may be, pursuant to law, a defense that accrue on or after February 8, 1992, for damages arising out of injury to or death of a person or harm to property regardless of the theory of liability. Actions accruing prior to February 8, 1992, shall be governed by the laws in effect immediately prior to such date. Nothing in sections 25-21,185.07 to 25-21,185.12 shall be construed to limit wrongful death claims brought pursuant to sections 30-809 and 30-810, but such claims shall be subject to sections 25-21,185.07 to 25-21,185.12.
Annotations
In an action that accrued after February 8, 1992, the jury should not be instructed with the "slight" and "gross" comparative negligence formulation. City of Wahoo v. NIFCO Mech. Systems, 306 Neb. 203, 944 N.W.2d 757 (2020).
The Legislature did not intend for the comparative negligence scheme to apply in actions based on strict liability after February 8, 1992. Shipler v. General Motors Corp., 271 Neb. 194, 710 N.W.2d 807 (2006).
25-21,185.08.
Civil actions to which contributory negligence is a defense; terms, defined.For purposes of sections 25-21,185.07 to 25-21,185.12:
(1) Claimant shall mean any person who brings or maintains an action described in section 25-21,185.07. If an action is brought through or on behalf of an estate, claimant shall mean the claimant's decedent. If an action is brought through or on behalf of a minor, claimant shall mean the minor;
(2) Economic damages shall mean monetary losses, including, but not limited to, medical expenses, loss of earnings and earning capacity, funeral costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, and loss of business or employment opportunities; and
(3) Noneconomic damages shall mean subjective, nonmonetary losses, including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, and humiliation, but shall not include economic damages.
Annotations
A request for inconvenience damages is subsumed within a plaintiff's request for mental pain and suffering damages, when the facts show that the plaintiff is actually seeking hedonic damages for the plaintiff's loss of enjoyment of life resulting from physical injuries. Golnick v. Callender, 290 Neb. 395, 860 N.W.2d 180 (2015).
Apart from an exception for anxiety damages associated with parasitic damages, a request for anxiety damages is usually subsumed with a plaintiff's request for mental pain and suffering damages. Golnick v. Callender, 290 Neb. 395, 860 N.W.2d 180 (2015).
25-21,185.09.
Civil actions to which contributory negligence is a defense; effect on recovery.Any contributory negligence chargeable to the claimant shall diminish proportionately the amount awarded as damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory negligence but shall not bar recovery, except that if the contributory negligence of the claimant is equal to or greater than the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought, the claimant shall be totally barred from recovery. The jury shall be instructed on the effects of the allocation of negligence.
Annotations
The language of this section allows a jury to compare a plaintiff's contributory negligence to the negligence of a defendant or defendants. It does not provide that the plaintiff's negligence may be applied in the plaintiff's cause of action based upon strict liability in tort. Shipler v. General Motors Corp., 271 Neb. 194, 710 N.W.2d 807 (2006).
It is prejudicial error for the trial court to not properly instruct a jury on the effects of its allocation of negligence in accordance with this section. The Nebraska Supreme Court has consistently understood the plain meaning of the word "instructed" in this section to require formal jury instructions. The verdict form is not a substitute for a proper instruction. The Nebraska Legislature has chosen to require that the jury be fully and openly informed before making its determinations with respect to contributory negligence and the attendant allocation of negligence. Russell v. Stricker, 262 Neb. 853, 635 N.W.2d 734 (2001).
Failure to instruct a jury with respect to the effects of its allocation of negligence in accordance with this section is prejudicial error. Moreover, a verdict form is not a substitute for a proper instruction. Pleiss v. Barnes, 260 Neb. 770, 619 N.W.2d 825 (2000).
This section requires the jury to be instructed regarding the effect of the allocation of negligence. Failing to instruct the jury as to the effect of the allocation of negligence is plain error. Fiscel v. Beach, 254 Neb. 678, 578 N.W.2d 52 (1998).
In those cases where the cause of action accrued on or after February 8, 1992, and in which contributory negligence is a defense, it is prejudicial error for the trial court to not properly instruct a jury on the effects of its allocation of negligence in accordance with this section. Wheeler v. Bagley, 254 Neb. 232, 575 N.W.2d 616 (1998).
The fact that plaintiff's negligence may have been more than slight as a matter of law under the prior slight-gross contributory negligence standard does not automatically equate with negligence that equals or exceeds defendant's under this section. Where reasonable minds may draw different conclusions and inferences regarding the negligence of plaintiff and the negligence of defendant such that plaintiff's negligence could be found to be less than 50 percent of the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought, the apportionment of fault must be submitted to the jury. Traphagan v. Mid-America Traffic Marking, 251 Neb. 143, 555 N.W.2d 778 (1996).
A wrongful death action brought in the name of a 6-year-old child's mother, as representative of the child's estate, was brought for the exclusive benefit of the child's next of kin, and thus, the child's father, as next of kin and beneficiary of the child's estate, was properly included in the court's instruction to the jury regarding the allocation of percentages of contributory negligence, even though the father was not brought into the action either as a claimant within the meaning of the statute that governed the defense of contributory negligence or as a third-party defendant. Curtis v. States Family Practice, 20 Neb. App. 234, 823 N.W.2d 224 (2012).
The trial court's refusal to determine a party negligent as a matter of law did not prejudice the other party, where evidence that both parties were negligent required the trial court to instruct the jury to weigh the relative contributions of the parties' negligence and the jury found both parties to be negligent. Howe v. Hinzman, 14 Neb. App. 544, 710 N.W.2d 669 (2006).
Where reasonable minds may draw different conclusions and inferences regarding the negligence of the parties, the apportionment of negligence is for the finder of fact. The purpose of the comparative negligence law is to allow triers of fact to compare relative negligence and to apportion damages on that basis. The determination of apportionment is solely a matter for the fact finder, and its action in this respect will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by credible evidence and bears a reasonable relationship to the respective elements of negligence proved at trial. Stinson v. City of Lincoln, 9 Neb. App. 642, 617 N.W.2d 456 (2000).
A determination that a plaintiff's negligence was more than slight as a matter of law under the slight/gross standard does not automatically translate into a finding that the same plaintiff's right to recovery would be barred under this section. Dutton v. Travis, 4 Neb. App. 875, 551 N.W.2d 759 (1996).
25-21,185.10.
Civil actions to which contributory negligence is a defense; multiple defendants; joint and several liability; when; allocation of liability.In an action involving more than one defendant when two or more defendants as part of a common enterprise or plan act in concert and cause harm, the liability of each such defendant for economic and noneconomic damages shall be joint and several.
In any other action involving more than one defendant, the liability of each defendant for economic damages shall be joint and several and the liability of each defendant for noneconomic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of noneconomic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of negligence, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.
Annotations
1. General
2. Timing
3. Miscellaneous
1. General
This section contemplates a process by which the finder of fact determines the total noneconomic damages suffered by the plaintiff as the result of injuries proximately caused by the negligence of multiple defendants; then, it allocates a portion of the total to each defendant "in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of negligence." Sinsel v. Olsen, 279 Neb. 38, 777 N.W.2d 54 (2009).
When, because of the settlement with one of the defendants, the action no longer involves multiple party defendants, then this section is no longer applicable. Tadros v. City of Omaha, 273 Neb. 935, 735 N.W.2d 377 (2007).
This section provides for allocation of damages among negligent tort-feasors only and does not provide for such allocation due to the acts of intentional tort-feasors. Brandon ex rel. Estate of Brandon v. County of Richardson, 261 Neb. 636, 624 N.W.2d 604 (2001).
Under tort law, where joint tort-feasors do not act as part of a common enterprise or plan, this section alters the common law by limiting a plaintiff's recovery of noneconomic damages from any one tort-feasor to that tort-feasor's proportionate liability in an action involving more than one defendant. Genetti v. Caterpillar, Inc., 261 Neb. 98, 621 N.W.2d 529 (2001).
Joint tort-feasors who are defendants in an action involving more than one defendant share joint and several liability to the claimant for economic damages. Ammon v. Nagengast, 24 Neb. App. 632, 895 N.W.2d 729 (2017).
2. Timing
Under the plain language of this section, there must be multiple defendants in a case before the allocation provisions of this section will operate. Because the provisions of this section affect only the apportionment of damages between multiple defendants after liability has been established, the proper timeframe to consider in determining whether there are, in fact, multiple defendants in a case is when the case is submitted to the finder of fact. Maxwell v. Montey, 262 Neb. 160, 631 N.W.2d 455 (2001).
The proper timeframe to consider whether there are multiple defendants is when the case is submitted to the finder of fact. Ammon v. Nagengast, 24 Neb. App. 632, 895 N.W.2d 729 (2017).
3. Miscellaneous
In an action that accrued after February 8, 1992, the jury should not be instructed with the "slight" and "gross" comparative negligence formulation. City of Wahoo v. NIFCO Mech. Systems, 306 Neb. 203, 944 N.W.2d 757 (2020).
With regard to contribution, liability for the loss among concurrent insurers should be allocated without regard to comparative fault or other subrogation-related questions such as lack of privity or the applicability of a contribution-among-joint tort-feasors statute. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Regent Ins. Co., 288 Neb. 25, 846 N.W.2d 170 (2014).
This section does not provide that one defendant's negligence may be compared to another in a cause of action for strict liability in tort. Shipler v. General Motors Corp., 271 Neb. 194, 710 N.W.2d 807 (2006).
The term "defendant" in this section includes a third-party defendant brought into an action pursuant to section 25-331. Slaymaker v. Breyer, 258 Neb. 942, 607 N.W.2d 506 (2000); Lackman v. Rousselle, 257 Neb. 87, 596 N.W.2d 15 (1999).
In order for defendants to be jointly and severally liable based on a joint enterprise theory, the plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the defendants shared a common pecuniary interest. Bahrs v. R M B R Wheels, Inc., 6 Neb. App. 354, 574 N.W.2d 524 (1998).
25-21,185.11.
Civil actions to which contributory negligence is a defense; release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement; effect.(1) A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable shall discharge that person from all liability to the claimant but shall not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. The claim of the claimant against other persons shall be reduced by the amount of the released person's share of the obligation as determined by the trier of fact.
(2) A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable shall preclude that person from being made a party or, if an action is pending, shall be a basis for that person's dismissal, but the person's negligence, if any, shall be considered in accordance with section 25-21,185.09.
Annotations
In an action that accrued after February 8, 1992, the jury should not be instructed with the "slight" and "gross" comparative negligence formulation. City of Wahoo v. NIFCO Mech. Systems, 306 Neb. 203, 944 N.W.2d 757 (2020).
An employer covered by workers' compensation is not a "released person" within the meaning of this section. Unless the employer's negligence is the sole cause of the accident, or when combined with the plaintiff's negligence is the sole cause of the accident, the defendant may not argue the negligence of an immune employer. Downey v. Western Comm. College Area, 282 Neb. 970, 808 N.W.2d 839 (2012).
The element of specific identification is only met when the reference in the release is so particular that a stranger can readily identify the released party and his or her identity is not in doubt. Podraza v. New Century Physicians of Neb., 280 Neb. 678, 789 N.W.2d 260 (2010).
There is a rebuttable presumption that a release benefits only those specifically designated; the unnamed party claiming under the release has the burden to show an actual intent to benefit him or her. Podraza v. New Century Physicians of Neb., 280 Neb. 678, 789 N.W.2d 260 (2010).
Under the intent rule, general releases which fail to specifically designate who is discharged either by name or by some other specific identifying terminology are inherently ambiguous, and the actual intent of the parties will govern. Podraza v. New Century Physicians of Neb., 280 Neb. 678, 789 N.W.2d 260 (2010).
When a claimant settles with a joint tort-feasor, the claimant forfeits joint and several liability for economic damages and cannot recover from a nonsettling joint tort-feasor more than that tort-feasor's proportionate share of liability. Tadros v. City of Omaha, 273 Neb. 935, 735 N.W.2d 377 (2007).
A claimant cannot recover from a nonsettling joint tort-feasor more than that tort-feasor's proportionate share in order to compensate for the fact that the claimant made a settlement with another that may prove to be inadequate. Ammon v. Nagengast, 24 Neb. App. 632, 895 N.W.2d 729 (2017).
When the claimant settles with a joint tort-feasor, the claimant forfeits joint and several liability. Ammon v. Nagengast, 24 Neb. App. 632, 895 N.W.2d 729 (2017).
25-21,185.12.
Civil actions to which contributory negligence is a defense; assumption of risk, defined; affirmative defense.Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense. Assumption of risk shall mean that (1) the person knew of and understood the specific danger, (2) the person voluntarily exposed himself or herself to the danger, and (3) the person's injury or death or the harm to property occurred as a result of his or her exposure to the danger.
Annotations
Before the defense of assumption of risk is submissible to a jury, the evidence must show that the plaintiff (1) knew of the specific danger, (2) understood the danger, and (3) voluntarily exposed himself or herself to the danger that proximately caused the damage. Pleiss v. Barnes, 260 Neb. 770, 619 N.W.2d 825 (2000).
25-21,186.
Emergency care at scene of emergency; persons relieved of civil liability, when.(1) No person who renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or other emergency gratuitously, shall be held liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering the emergency care or as a result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for medical treatment or care for the injured person.
(2) For purposes of this section, rendering emergency care at the scene of an accident or other emergency includes entering a motor vehicle to remove a child when entering the vehicle and removing the child is necessary to avoid immediate harm to the child.
Annotations
This section does not apply to a police officer responding to the scene of an automobile accident because his conduct was not gratuitous. Drake v. Drake, 260 Neb. 530, 618 N.W.2d 650 (2000).
25-21,187.
Contract or agreement; indemnity provision; against public policy; unenforceable; when; construction project; violation of safety practice; liability.(1) In the event that a public or private contract or agreement for the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building, structure, highway bridge, viaduct, water, sewer, or gas distribution system, or other work dealing with construction or for any moving, demolition, or excavation connected with such construction contains a covenant, promise, agreement, or combination thereof to indemnify or hold harmless another person from such person's own negligence, then such covenant, promise, agreement, or combination thereof shall be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable. This subsection shall not apply to construction bonds or insurance contracts or agreements.
(2) No professional architect, professional engineer, or professional land surveyor who is retained to perform professional services on a construction project and no employee of a professional architect, professional engineer, or professional land surveyor who is assisting or representing the professional architect, professional engineer, or professional land surveyor in the performance of professional services on a construction project shall be liable in tort for any case of personal injury to or death of any employee working on a construction project arising out of and in the course of employment on the construction project and occurring as a result of a violation of a safety practice by any third party unless the responsibility for supervision of safety practices has been assumed by contract or by other conduct. This subsection shall not be construed to establish, diminish, or abrogate any duty, standard of care, or liability of any person or individual except as expressly provided in this subsection.
Annotations
Maintenance of a building, within the meaning of subsection (1) of this section, does not encompass the ordinary activities associated with management of commercial property. Kuhn v. Wells Fargo Bank of Neb., 278 Neb. 428, 771 N.W.2d 103 (2009).
25-21,188.
Alienation of affections; criminal conversation; actions barred.No cause of action for (1) alienation of affections or (2) criminal conversation shall be allowed to commence after January 9, 1986.
Annotations
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is unavailable when it is predicated on conduct which leads to the dissolution of marriage, as such actions are barred by statute. Speer v. Dealy, 242 Neb. 542, 495 N.W.2d 911 (1993).
25-21,188.01.
Check or instrument; wrongful refusal to endorse; liability; attorney's fees; awarded when.Any payee, endorser, or endorsee on a check or instrument issued in payment for property subject to a lien under Chapter 52, article 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, or 14, or Chapter 54, article 2, or farm products subject to a security interest under article 9, Uniform Commercial Code, or Chapter 52, article 13, who wrongfully refuses to endorse such check or instrument to any other payee, endorser, or endorsee on such check or instrument who is a superior lienholder, superior secured party, or other person legally entitled to such check or instrument shall be liable to any payee, endorser, or endorsee entitled to such endorsement on such check or instrument for damages. A court shall assess attorney's fees and costs if, upon the motion of any party or the court itself, the court finds that any payee, endorser, or endorsee on a check or other instrument wrongfully refused to endorse such check or instrument in payment for property subject to a lien or farm products subject to a security interest or that an attorney or party brought or defended an action or any part of an action that was frivolous or that the action or any part of the action was interposed solely for delay or harassment. If a court finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceedings by other improper conduct, including, but not limited to, abuses of civil discovery procedures, the court shall assess attorney's fees and costs.
25-21,188.02.
Volunteer in free clinic or other facility; immunity; when.(1) A person credentialed under the Uniform Credentialing Act to practice as a physician, osteopathic physician, pharmacist, dentist, physician assistant, nurse, or physical therapist who, without the expectation or receipt of monetary or other compensation either directly or indirectly, provides professional services, of a kind which are eligible for reimbursement under the medical assistance program established pursuant to the Medical Assistance Act, as a volunteer in a free clinic or other facility operated by a not-for-profit organization as defined in section 25-21,190, by an agency of the state, or by any political subdivision shall be immune from civil liability for any act or omission which results in damage or injury unless such damage or injury was caused by the willful or wanton act or omission of such practitioner.
(2) The individual immunity granted by subsection (1) of this section shall not extend to any act or omission of such practitioner which results in damage or injury if:
(a) The free clinic or other facility is operated by a licensed hospital;
(b) The practitioner has been disciplined by the professional board having oversight over that practitioner in the previous five years at the time of the act or omission causing injury; or
(c) The damage or injury is caused by such practitioner (i) during the operation of any motor vehicle, airplane, or boat or (ii) while impaired by alcohol or any controlled substance enumerated in section 28-405.
Cross References
Medical Assistance Act, see section 68-901.
Uniform Credentialing Act, see section 38-101.
25-21,189.
Food; donations; limitations on liability.(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) Food shall mean articles used for food or drink for humans or animals and articles used for components of any such article; and
(b) Raw agricultural product shall mean any food in its raw or natural state, including all fruits that are washed, colored, or otherwise treated in their unpeeled natural form prior to marketing.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provisions of the law of this state, any person who makes a good faith donation to a charitable or nonprofit organization of prepared or perishable food or raw agricultural products which appear to be fit for human consumption when donated shall not be liable for damages in any civil action for any injury or death because of the condition of such food unless the injury or death is a direct result of the gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct of the donor.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provisions of the law of this state, a charitable or nonprofit organization which in good faith receives and distributes, without charge, food which the organization reasonably determines to be fit for human consumption when distributed shall not be liable for damages in any civil action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort for any injury or death because of the condition of such food.
(4) This section shall apply to all good faith donations of perishable food or raw agricultural products which are not readily marketable because of appearance, freshness, grade, surplus supply, or other conditions.
Cross References
Penalty for resale of donated foods, see section 28-1483.
25-21,190.
Not-for-profit organization, defined.As used in sections 25-21,190 to 25-21,193, unless the context otherwise requires, not-for-profit organization shall mean any not-for-profit entity which is exempt from federal income taxation pursuant to section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and listed as an exempt organization in section 501(c)(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), or (19) of the Internal Revenue Code and which is engaged in one or more activities within this state in furtherance of a purpose for which it is organized.
25-21,191.
Not-for-profit organization; director, officer, or trustee; immunity from civil liability.(1) On or after August 30, 1987, any person who serves as a director, officer, or trustee of a not-for-profit organization and who is not compensated for his or her services as a director, officer, or trustee on a salary or a prorated equivalent basis shall be immune from civil liability for any act or omission which results in damage or injury if such person was acting within the scope of his or her official functions and duties as a director, officer, or trustee unless such damage or injury was caused by the willful or wanton act or omission of such director, officer, or trustee.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to establish, diminish, or abrogate any duties that a director, officer, or trustee of a not-for-profit organization has to the not-for-profit organization for which the director, officer, or trustee serves.
(3) For purposes of this section, a director, officer, or trustee shall not be considered compensated solely by reason of the payment of his or her actual expenses incurred in attending meetings or in executing such office, the receipt of meals at meetings, or the receipt of gifts not exceeding a total value of one hundred dollars in any twelve consecutive months.
25-21,192.
Not-for-profit organization; limitation on immunity.The individual immunity granted by section 25-21,191 shall not extend to any act or omission of such director, officer, or trustee which results in damage or injury (1) caused by such director, officer, or trustee during the operation of any motor vehicle, airplane, or boat or (2) caused by such director, officer, or trustee while impaired by alcohol or any controlled substance enumerated in section 28-405.
25-21,193.
Not-for-profit organization; sections, how construed.Except as provided in section 25-21,191, sections 25-21,190 to 25-21,193 shall not be construed to establish, diminish, or abrogate any duty that a director, officer, or trustee of a not-for-profit organization has to any individual or organization.
25-21,194.
Repealed. Laws 2019, LB71, § 3.
25-21,195.
Repealed. Laws 1990, LB 594, § 1.
25-21,196.
Repealed. Laws 1990, LB 594, § 1.
25-21,197.
Repealed. Laws 1990, LB 594, § 1.
25-21,198.
Repealed. Laws 1990, LB 594, § 1.
25-21,199.
Repealed. Laws 1990, LB 594, § 1.
25-21,200.
Contract; void and unenforceable; definition.(1) A surrogate parenthood contract entered into shall be void and unenforceable. The biological father of a child born pursuant to such a contract shall have all the rights and obligations imposed by law with respect to such child.
(2) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires, a surrogate parenthood contract shall mean a contract by which a woman is to be compensated for bearing a child of a man who is not her husband.
25-21,201.
Actions against state; jurisdiction; enumeration of claims.The several district courts of the judicial districts of the state shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine (1) all claims or petitions for relief that may be presented to the Legislature and which may be by any law or by any rule or resolution of the Legislature referred to such courts for adjudication, (2) all setoffs, counterclaims, and claims for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, on the part of the state against any person making a claim against the state or against the person in whose favor such claim arose, (3) all cases in which the State of Nebraska has a lien or any other interest, apparent or real, upon or in any real estate in the state and in which any party may desire to have the lien or interest of the state fixed and determined or foreclosed and cut off, and permission is hereby given to any party to join the state as a party in any such actions or proceedings in such courts involving real estate in or upon which the state has, appears to have, or claims any interest or lien, and (4) all cases in which the State of Nebraska or the Board of Educational Lands and Funds of the State of Nebraska is the owner of or has or claims any interest in any bonds or other obligations of any drainage district, irrigation district, municipal corporation, other political or governmental subdivision of the State of Nebraska and in which any party may desire to have the ownership of or interest in such bonds or other obligations determined, the validity thereof adjudicated, or any rights and liabilities arising therefrom fixed and determined, and permission is hereby given to any party to join the State of Nebraska as a party in any such actions or proceedings in such courts involving the ownership or interest of the state or the Board of Educational Lands and Funds in such bonds or other obligations.
Source:Laws 1877, § 1, p. 19; R.S.1913, § 1177; C.S.1922, § 1100; C.S.1929, § 27-319; Laws 1937, c. 61, § 1, p. 239; Laws 1941, c. 49, § 1, p. 239; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 27-319; R.S.1943, § 24-319; Laws 1967, c. 137, § 1, p. 423;
Laws 1988, LB 864, § 1; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-319.
Cross References
Actions involving the state, attorney's fees and other expenses, see sections 25-1802 to 25-1807.
For limitation of actions, see section 25-218.
State Claims Board, see section 81-8,220.
State Contract Claims Act, see section 81-8,302.
State Miscellaneous Claims Act, see section 81-8,294.
State Tort Claims Act, see section 81-8,235.
Annotations
1. Permission to sue
2. Jurisdiction
3. Procedure
4. Miscellaneous
1. Permission to sue
This section covers all the claims and demands on which the state may be sued. Gentry v. State, 174 Neb. 515, 118 N.W.2d 643 (1962).
A special act of Legislature, waiving sovereignty of state and creating liability of state in favor of an individual, contravenes Article III, section 18, of the Constitution. Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 279 N.W. 482 (1938).
Suit to foreclose mortgage involving realty to which state has legal title cannot be maintained without state's consent. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Nordhues, 129 Neb. 379, 261 N.W. 687 (1935).
Legislative permission may be given to sue state for private property damaged for public use. Gledhill v. State, 123 Neb. 726, 243 N.W. 909 (1932).
Recovery cannot be had for damages caused by negligence of officer, agent or employee of state, without express provision therefor by law, even though suit is authorized by Legislature. Shear v. State, 117 Neb. 865, 223 N.W. 130 (1929).
Action growing out of contract originally authorized by legislative enactment and disallowed by auditor may be brought against state without permission of Legislature. Peterson v. State, 113 Neb. 546, 203 N.W. 1002 (1925).
State has waived its immunity only in cases expressly provided by statute. State ex rel. Davis v. Mortensen, 69 Neb. 376, 95 N.W. 831 (1903).
2. Jurisdiction
Where statutes provide an exclusive remedy against state and a particular forum for a judicial trial, one branch of Legislature alone cannot extend jurisdiction to another forum. Scotts Bluff County v. State, 133 Neb. 508, 276 N.W. 185 (1937).
District court of Lancaster County is given jurisdiction to try appeals upon claims disallowed by Auditor of Public Accounts. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 123 Neb. 674, 243 N.W. 891 (1932), 83 A.L.R. 1301 (1932).
Action growing out of contract, after claim has been presented to and disallowed wholly or in part by Auditor of Public Accounts, must be brought in district court of Lancaster County, and resolution of only one branch of Legislature cannot vest any other court with jurisdiction. McNeel v. State, 120 Neb. 674, 234 N.W. 786 (1931).
District court has no original jurisdiction and appeal must be taken in statutory manner from order of Auditor of Public Accounts or Secretary of State in allowing or disallowing claim. Pickus v. State, 115 Neb. 869, 215 N.W. 129 (1927); State v. Lancaster County Bank, 8 Neb. 218 (1879); State v. Stout, 7 Neb. 89 (1878).
3. Procedure
This section must be read together with sections 77-2407 and 77-2408 and Neb. Const., Art. VIII, section 9, in order to properly present a valid appeal to the district court from a denial of a contract claim against the state. VisionQuest, Inc. v. State, 222 Neb. 228, 383 N.W.2d 22 (1986).
Making an administrative agency a party defendant in an appeal under the provisions of § 60-420 or § 84-917(2) is not an action against the state within the meaning of this and following sections so as to require service of summons on the Governor and Attorney General. Leach v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 213 Neb. 103, 327 N.W.2d 615 (1982).
State was a necessary party to action to quiet title to land acquired for highway purposes. Rumbel v. Ress, 166 Neb. 839, 91 N.W.2d 36 (1958).
Board of Educational Lands and Funds was properly made party defendant under this section. County of Garden v. Schaaf, 145 Neb. 676, 17 N.W.2d 874 (1945).
State may be made a party defendant to suit to quiet title to real estate. Reavis v. State, 140 Neb. 442, 300 N.W. 344 (1941).
Where Legislature failed to provide method by which summons could be served on state in workman's compensation case, state was not subject to suit. Anstine v. State, 137 Neb. 148, 288 N.W. 525 (1939).
State's constitutional immunity from suit cannot be waived by voluntary general appearance by Attorney General. McShane v. Murray, 106 Neb. 512, 184 N.W. 147 (1921); O'Connor v. Slaker, 22 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1927).
Limitation does not run on claim against state until legislative leave has been given to sue. Commonwealth Power Co. v. State, 104 Neb. 439, 177 N.W. 745 (1920); Lancaster County v. State, 74 Neb. 211, 104 N.W. 187 (1905), affirmed on rehearing 74 Neb. 215, 107 N.W. 388 (1906).
Legislature may waive the running of the statute of limitations and it cannot be set up as a defense. Lancaster County v. State, 97 Neb. 95, 149 N.W. 331 (1914).
4. Miscellaneous
State's immunity from suit without its consent is unaffected by declaratory judgments statute. Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 160 Neb. 320, 70 N.W.2d 382 (1955).
Statutes authorizing suits against the state are to be strictly construed. Frye v. Sibbitt, 145 Neb. 600, 17 N.W.2d 617 (1945).
In authorized suit on claim against the state, case should be determined upon equitable principles based upon justice and right. Commonwealth Power Co. v. State, 104 Neb. 439, 177 N.W. 745 (1920).
Mandamus does not lie to compel state to perform contracts. State ex rel. Davis v. Mortensen, 69 Neb. 376, 95 N.W. 831 (1903).
25-21,202.
Actions against state; complaint; contents.The claimant shall, in all cases, file a complaint setting forth (1) the facts out of which the claim originally arose; (2) the action of the Legislature, or of any department of the government thereon, if any such has been had; (3) what person or persons is the owner or are the owners thereof, or in anywise interested therein; (4) that no assignment or transfer of the same, or any part thereof, or interest therein, has been made, except as stated in the complaint; and (5) that the claimant is justly entitled to the amount claimed therein from the state after allowance of all just credits and setoffs.
Source:Laws 1877, § 2, p. 20; R.S.1913, § 1178; C.S.1922, § 1101; C.S.1929, § 27-320; R.S.1943, § 24-320; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-320;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 50.
25-21,203.
Actions against state; summons; venue.When action is brought under section 25-21,201, summons shall be served upon the state in the manner provided for service of a summons in section 25-510.02. An action brought under subdivision (4) of section 25-21,201 may be brought in Lancaster County, Nebraska, or in any county in which the drainage district, irrigation district, municipal corporation, or other political or governmental subdivision whose bonds or other obligations are involved is situated either in whole or in part.
Source:Laws 1877, § 3, p. 20; R.S.1913, § 1179; C.S.1922, § 1102; C.S.1929, § 27-321; Laws 1937, c. 61, § 2, p. 240; Laws 1941, c. 49, § 2, p. 240; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 27-321; R.S.1943, § 24-321; Laws 1963, c. 130, § 1, p. 497;
Laws 1983, LB 447, § 13; Laws 1988, LB 864, § 2; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-321;
Laws 1997, LB 165, § 2.
Annotations
Suit brought against State Engineer by name was not sufficient to make the state a party to the action. Rumbel v. Ress, 166 Neb. 839, 91 N.W.2d 36 (1958).
Board of Educational Lands and Funds served with process in accordance with this section. County of Garden v. Schaaf, 145 Neb. 676, 17 N.W.2d 874 (1945).
25-21,204.
Actions against state; judgment.The court in which such action may be brought shall hear and determine the matter upon the testimony according to justice, as upon the amicable settlement of a controversy, and shall render award and judgment against the claimant, or the state, as upon the testimony justice may require.
Source:Laws 1877, § 4, p. 20; R.S.1913, § 1180; C.S.1922, § 1103; C.S.1929, § 27-322; R.S.1943, § 24-322; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-322.
Annotations
Statute forbids court from construing doubtful contract provision so that it operates oppressively against one of the parties. In re Appeal of the Roadmix Construction Corp., 143 Neb. 425, 9 N.W.2d 741 (1943); Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 123 Neb. 674, 243 N.W. 891 (1932).
Where state built a cheap, temporary and inadequate bridge, thereby damaging plaintiff's property, justice and right required payment of compensation therefor. Gledhill v. State, 123 Neb. 726, 243 N.W. 909 (1932).
"Justice and right" is construed in reference to damages caused by a bridge constructed by state and county jointly. Nine Mile Irr. Dist. v. State, 118 Neb. 522, 225 N.W. 679 (1929).
In case where legislative authority is given to sue state for property damages, court may, where "justice and right" require it, include interest in a judgment rendered against the state. City of Chadron v. State, 115 Neb. 650, 214 N.W. 297 (1927), rehearing denied 115 Neb. 657, 215 N.W. 137 (1927).
Under principle of "justice and right," state is not liable for loss of cattle through negligence of individual members of state surveying party. Benda v. State, 109 Neb. 132, 190 N.W. 211 (1922).
In authorized suit on claim against state, court should render judgment upon testimony as right and justice may require. Commonwealth Power Co. v. State, 104 Neb. 439, 177 N.W. 745 (1920).
It is the duty of the court to brush aside technical defenses, and lapse of time should not be permitted to defeat just claim. Lancaster County v. State, 97 Neb. 95, 149 N.W. 331 (1914).
25-21,205.
Actions against state; adjudicated claims; certified statement to Legislature; when transmitted.On the first day of each regular session of the Legislature, the clerks of the several district courts shall transmit a full and complete statement of all claims adjudicated in the courts during the previous year, certified by the clerk and signed by the judge of such court, showing the claimant, the amounts claimed, and the judgment rendered for or against the claimant.
Source:Laws 1877, § 5, p. 20; R.S.1913, § 1181; C.S.1922, § 1104; C.S.1929, § 27-323; R.S.1943, § 24-323; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-323;
Laws 1990, LB 822, § 18.
25-21,206.
Actions against state; where brought; procedure; transfer of actions.The state may be sued in the district court of Lancaster County in any matter founded upon or growing out of a contract, express or implied, originally authorized or subsequently ratified by the Legislature, or founded upon any law of the state. The complaint in such a case shall be as provided in section 25-21,202, summons shall issue and be served in the same manner as provided in section 25-21,203. The rules of pleading and practice in regard to other civil actions in the district court shall be observed in all actions by or against the state, as far as applicable except as otherwise provided in sections 25-21,201 to 25-21,218. If an action is commenced in a county other than as specified in this section or section 25-21,203, the court in which the action has been commenced shall have jurisdiction over such action, but upon timely motion by a defendant, the court shall transfer the action to the proper court in the county in which the action should or might have been commenced as provided in this section or section 25-21,203. The court in the county to which the action is transferred, in its discretion, may order the plaintiff to pay to the defendant all reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees of the defendant or defendants, incurred because of the improper venue or in proceedings to transfer such action.
Source:Laws 1877, § 6, p. 21; R.S.1913, § 1182; C.S.1922, § 1105; C.S.1929, § 27-324; R.S.1943, § 24-324;
Laws 1971, LB 576, § 1; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-324;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 51.
Annotations
This section expressly waives the State's sovereign immunity, but only if all requirements of the section are met. Burke v. Board of Trustees, 302 Neb. 494, 924 N.W.2d 304 (2019).
The waiver of immunity under this section is broad enough to encompass class action suits. Livengood v. Nebraska State Patrol Ret. Sys., 273 Neb. 247, 729 N.W.2d 55 (2007).
Where statutes provide an exclusive remedy against state and a particular forum for a judicial trial, one branch of Legislature alone cannot extend jurisdiction to another forum. Scotts Bluff County v. State, 133 Neb. 508, 276 N.W. 185 (1937).
Action against state based on contract must be brought in Lancaster County district court, and resolution of only one branch of Legislature cannot vest any other court with jurisdiction. McNeel v. State, 120 Neb. 674, 234 N.W. 786 (1931).
Allowance or disallowance of claim by Auditor of Public Accounts and Secretary of State may be reviewed by appeal to district court, pursuant to statutory requirements. Pickus v. State, 115 Neb. 869, 215 N.W. 129 (1927).
State may be sued in district court of county where Capital is located in matters founded on or growing out of contract, or founded on law. Peterson v. State, 113 Neb. 546, 203 N.W. 1002 (1925).
25-21,207.
Actions by state; counterclaims.In any civil action instituted by the state, except in actions for the collection of revenue, for school or other trust funds, or against defaulting officers and their sureties or insurance providers as specified in section 11-201, the defendant may, as matter of defense, plead any setoff, counterclaim, or cross-demand that he or she may have arising to him or her in his or her own right, and upon which an action could be maintained by him or her against the state.
Source:Laws 1877, § 7, p. 21; R.S.1913, § 1183; C.S.1922, § 1106; C.S.1929, § 27-325; R.S.1943, § 24-325; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-325;
Laws 2004, LB 884, § 14.
Annotations
In action by state against gasoline dealer to recover excise taxes, dealer may not counterclaim for taxes alleged to have been collected under void law, since the action is for the collection of revenue. State v. Smith, 135 Neb. 423, 281 N.W. 851 (1938).
Attorney General has no general authority to appear in suits against state in federal court and waive state's immunity from suit. O'Connor v. Slaker, 22 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1927).
25-21,208.
Actions to which state is a party; priority of trial; power to compel attendance of witnesses.Civil actions to which the state is a party shall, on motion of counsel on behalf of the state, have priority of trial over other civil actions; and the several district courts having jurisdiction to try actions to which the state is a party shall have power to compel attendance of witnesses, as is now had by such courts in other civil actions, and on payment of fees and mileage at the rate provided in section 81-1176 for state employees by the party desiring their attendance, may compel the attendance of witnesses from any county within the state.
Source:Laws 1877, § 8, p. 21; R.S.1913, § 1184; C.S.1922, § 1107; C.S.1929, § 27-326; R.S.1943, § 24-326;
Laws 1981, LB 204, § 33; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-326.
25-21,209.
Claims against state; fraud in statement or proof; penalty.Any person who corruptly practices, or attempts to practice, any fraud against the state in the proof, statement, establishment, or allowance of any claim or cause of action or any part thereof, in the matter out of which the same arose, shall ipso facto forfeit the same to the state; and it shall be the duty of the court in such case to find specifically that fraud was practiced, or attempted to be practiced, and to render judgment of forfeiture, and that the claimant be forever barred from prosecuting the same against the state, and for costs.
Source:Laws 1877, § 9, p. 21; R.S.1913, § 1185; C.S.1922, § 1108; C.S.1929, § 27-327; R.S.1943, § 24-327; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-327.
Annotations
Fraud was not practiced upon state in workmen's compensation case. Dietz v. State, 157 Neb. 324, 59 N.W.2d 587 (1953).
25-21,210.
Actions to which state is a party; fees; how paid and taxed.The fees of the sheriff, the clerk, or other officers, or of witnesses, in claims or suits to which the state is a party, shall be the same, and be paid and taxed in the same manner as in other civil actions in the district courts.
Source:Laws 1877, § 10, p. 22; R.S.1913, § 1186; C.S.1922, § 1109; C.S.1929, § 27-328; R.S.1943, § 24-328; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-328.
Cross References
Payment of docket fee in civil cases, see section 33-106.
25-21,211.
Judgment against state; certify to Director of Administrative Services; payment; insufficient funds.The court by which any judgment is rendered against the state shall certify such judgment to the Director of Administrative Services, who shall pay the same from any special fund or appropriation applicable to such judgment, and if no special fund or appropriation has been provided or made, then from any appropriations made to the department or institution, relating to which the cause of action arose. A certificate of the Director of Administrative Services, or of the chief officer of such department or institution, that the current appropriations will not permit payment of such judgment without great public inconvenience, shall operate as a stay of such judgment until the adjournment of the next regular session of the Legislature. When such stay is claimed or taken, interest shall run on such judgment from the date on which the court certified the judgment to the Director of Administrative Services at the rate set in section 45-103.
Source:Laws 1877, § 12, p. 22; R.S.1913, § 1188; C.S.1922, § 1110; C.S.1929, § 27-329; R.S.1943, § 24-329;
Laws 1979, LB 3, § 1; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-329;
Laws 2004, LB 692, § 1.
25-21,212.
Judgment against claimant; transmitted to other counties; how collected.In any action in which a judgment is rendered in any sum, or for costs, against the claimant, the clerk of the court in which such judgment is rendered shall make and transmit a certified copy thereof on application of the Attorney General or other counsel on behalf of the state, to the clerk of the district court of any county within the state and the same shall thereupon be filed and recorded in such court and become and be a judgment thereof. All judgments against the claimant or plaintiff shall be collected by execution as other judgments in the district courts.
Source:Laws 1877, § 13, p. 23; R.S.1913, § 1189; C.S.1922, § 1111; C.S.1929, § 27-330; R.S.1943, § 24-330; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-330;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 33.
25-21,213.
Appeals; procedure; notice of appeal by state; effect.Appeals from the several district courts to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in cases concerning constitutional issues, as in other civil cases, may be taken by either party within the same limitations of time as in other civil actions. No appeal or supersedeas bond shall be required of the state, and the filing of notice signed by the Governor, chief officer of the proper department, Attorney General, or counsel for the state of intention to take such proceedings shall operate as a supersedeas of such judgment until the time that final judgment in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court is rendered in the cause, but the same shall not so operate longer than six months unless proceedings in error or appeal are taken, and in case of the affirmance of such judgment or failure on the part of the state to take proceedings in error or appeal, after notice thereof, interest shall run and be computed on such judgment from its date.
Source:Laws 1877, § 14, p. 23; R.S.1913, § 1190; C.S.1922, § 1112; C.S.1929, § 27-331; R.S.1943, § 24-331; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-331; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 68.
25-21,214.
Judgment; payment; effect.Payment and receipt of the amount due on any judgment rendered in any action brought under the provisions of sections 25-21,201 to 25-21,215 shall be a full discharge of the state in such matter, and any final judgment shall forever bar further controversy upon the subject matter thereof.
Source:Laws 1877, § 15, p. 23; R.S.1913, § 1191; C.S.1922, § 1113; C.S.1929, § 27-332; R.S.1943, § 24-332; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-332.
25-21,215.
Change of venue; costs.Change of venue may be taken from the district court of the county in which the action is brought, as in other civil cases; and in every such case, all expenses of such trial which would be chargeable to the county in which the suit originated, had the cause been tried therein, as determined by the district judge of the county to which said cause has been transferred, shall be a charge upon the county in which the suit was commenced.
Source:Laws 1877, § 17, p. 24; R.S.1913, § 1192; C.S.1922, § 1114; C.S.1929, § 27-333; Laws 1935, c. 43, § 2, p. 162; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 27-333; R.S.1943, § 24-333; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-333.
25-21,216.
Bonds for costs, appeal, supersedeas, injunction, attachment; state or its agencies not required to give.No bond for costs, appeal, supersedeas, injunction, or attachment shall be required of the State of Nebraska, or of any state officer, state board, state commission, head of any state department, agent or employee of the state, the Director of Banking and Finance as receiver of insolvent state banks, or any receiver appointed on the application of the State of Nebraska, in any proceedings or court action in which said state, officer, board, commission, head of department, agent, or employee is a party litigant in its or his official capacity.
Source:Laws 1930, Spec. Sess., c. 8, § 1, p. 39; C.S.1929, § 20-2231; R.S.1943, § 24-334; Laws 1955, c. 80, § 1, p. 236; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-334.
Annotations
State is not required to furnish bond upon granting to it of temporary injunction. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956).
Section is applicable to state officers sued in their official capacity. Power Oil Co. v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 827, 295 N.W. 805 (1941).
State or a department thereof, need not give bond on appeal in condemnation proceedings. Peterson v. Department of Roads and Irrigation, 137 Neb. 354, 289 N.W. 370 (1939).
State need not execute appeal bond hereunder. State v. Odd Fellows Hall Assn., 123 Neb. 440, 243 N.W. 616 (1932).
25-21,217.
Judgment against state agency; liability of state.If judgment for costs or damages are rendered against any such litigant and such litigant fails, refuses, or neglects to pay the judgment within three months after the date of entry of the judgment, then the State of Nebraska shall be liable for the payment of the judgment and shall pay the same.
Source:Laws 1930, Spec. Sess., c. 8, § 2, p. 39; C.S.1929, § 20-2232; R.S.1943, § 24-335; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-335;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 22.
25-21,218.
Bonds or insurance of Director of Banking and Finance as receiver of insolvent banks; premium; payment by state.The State of Nebraska shall pay all premiums on bonds or equivalent commercial insurance policies that the Director of Banking and Finance may be required to give as receiver of insolvent state banks.
Source:Laws 1930, Spec. Sess., c. 8, § 3, p. 39; C.S.1929, § 20-2233; R.S.1943, § 24-336; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-336;
Laws 2004, LB 884, § 15.
25-21,219.
Forcible entry and detainer; jurisdiction; exceptions.The district and county courts shall have jurisdiction over complaints of unlawful and forcible entry into lands and tenements and the detention of the same and of complaints against those who, having a lawful and peaceable entry into lands or tenements, unlawfully and by force hold the same. If the court finds that an unlawful and forcible entry has been made and that the same lands or tenements are held by force or that the same, after a lawful entry, are held unlawfully, the court shall cause the party complaining to have restitution thereof. The court or the jury, as the situation warrants, shall inquire into the matters between the two litigants such as the amount of rent owing the plaintiff and the amount of damage caused by the defendant to the premises while they were occupied by him or her and render a judgment or verdict accordingly. This section shall not apply to actions for possession of any premises subject to the provisions of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act or the Mobile Home Landlord and Tenant Act.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 117, p. 309; C.S.1929, § 22-1201; R.S.1943, § 26-1,118; Laws 1965, c. 129, § 1, p. 468; R.R.S.1943, § 26-1,118;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 68; Laws 1974, LB 293, § 48; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 27; Laws 1984, LB 1113, § 1; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-568;
Laws 2021, LB320, § 1.
Cross References
Mobile Home Landlord and Tenant Act, see section 76-1450.
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, see section 76-1401.
Annotations
If the resolution of a forcible entry and detainer action requires a court to determine a title dispute, the court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 854 N.W.2d 774 (2014).
The county court was not required to dismiss a forcible entry and detainer action where the defendants merely alleged the existence of a title dispute in a pending district court case, the plaintiff obtained a continuance without confessing the nature of the pending district court action, and the district court action had been resolved by the time the county court was presented with evidence regarding a title dispute. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 854 N.W.2d 774 (2014).
The court has authority to proceed with the hearing of a forcible entry and detainer action until it is clearly established that the question to be determined is one of title. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 854 N.W.2d 774 (2014).
When a forcible entry and detainer action is ongoing, the mere averment that the title is in dispute in another action involving the same property does not automatically divest the court hearing the forcible entry and detainer action of jurisdiction. Instead, the court may proceed until the evidence discloses that the question involved is one of title. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 854 N.W.2d 774 (2014).
A district court's jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions arises out of legislative grant, and it is inherently limited by that grant. Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003).
A forcible entry and detainer action does not try the question of title, but only the immediate right of possession. Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003).
Because of the limited scope of a forcible entry and detainer action, when a district court hears such an action, it sits as a special statutory tribunal to summarily decide the issues authorized by the statute, and not as a court of general jurisdiction with the power to hear and determine other issues. Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003).
If the resolution of a forcible entry and detainer action requires a district court to determine a title dispute, it must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003).
The general rules of interpretation applying to forcible entry and detainer actions under this section also apply to actions brought under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Brennan v. Brennan, 214 Neb. 125, 332 N.W.2d 696 (1983).
The forcible entry and detainer statutes and the general stipulations for forfeiture in a lease are considered in equity for securing the rent, and not for forfeiting the lease, when the tenant acts in good faith and pays promptly on demand. McCombs Realty v. Western Auto Supply Co., 10 Neb. App. 962, 641 N.W.2d 77 (2002).
25-21,220.
Forcible entry and detainer; against whom proceedings may be had; provisions not exclusive.Proceedings under sections 25-21,219 to 25-21,235 may be had:
(1) In all cases against tenants holding over their terms, and a tenant shall be deemed to be holding over his or her term whenever the tenant has failed, neglected, or refused to pay the rent or any part thereof when the rent became due;
(2) In all cases when a tenant has threatened the health or safety of other tenants, the landlord, or the landlord's employees or agents, without the right of the tenant to cure the default;
(3) In all cases of sales of real estate or executions, orders, or other judicial process when the judgment debtor was in possession at the time of the entry of the judgment or decree by virtue of which such sale was made;
(4) In all cases of sale by executors or administrators or guardians and on partition if any of the parties to the partition were in possession at the commencement of the suit after such sales so made on execution or otherwise have been examined by the proper court and the sales adjudged legal; and
(5) In all cases when the defendant is a settler or occupier of lands or tenements, without color of title, and to which the complainant has the right of possession.
This section shall not be construed as limiting the provisions of sections 25-21,219 to 25-21,235.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 118, p. 309; C.S.1929, § 22-1202; R.S.1943, § 26-1,119;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 69; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-569;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 23; Laws 2016, LB221, § 1.
Annotations
An action in forcible entry and detainer will lie against a lessee not in actual physical possession, and pendency of equitable action in district court will not preclude it. Moritz v. S & H Shopping Centers, Inc., 197 Neb. 206, 247 N.W.2d 454 (1976).
25-21,221.
Forcible entry and detainer; notice to leave premises; when and how served.It shall be the duty of the party, desiring to commence an action under sections 25-21,219 to 25-21,235, to notify the adverse party to leave the premises for the possession of which the action is about to be brought. This notice shall be served at least three days before commencing the action by leaving a written copy with such adverse party, or at his usual place of abode, if he cannot be found. Where the defendant or his usual place of abode cannot be found in the county where the premises are located, such notice may be served by leaving such notice at or posting it on the detained premises.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 120, p. 310; C.S.1929, § 22-1204; Laws 1943, c. 48, § 2, p. 199; R.S.1943, § 26-1,121;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 71; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-571.
Annotations
The 3‑day notice or "notice to quit" is necessary to obtaining an order of restitution in a forcible entry and detainer action. I. P. Homeowners v. Morrow, 12 Neb. App. 119, 668 N.W.2d 515 (2003).
25-21,222.
Forcible entry and detainer; complaint; contents.The summons shall not issue until the plaintiff shall have filed his complaint in writing which shall particularly describe the premises so entered upon or detained, and shall set forth either an unlawful and forcible entry and detention, or an unlawful and forcible detention after a peaceable or lawful entry of the described premises. The complaint shall be copied into and made a part of the record.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 121, p. 310; C.S.1929, § 22-1205; R.S.1943, § 26-1,122;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 72; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-572.
25-21,223.
Forcible entry and detainer; summons; service; trial date.The summons shall be issued and directed with a copy of the complaint attached to the summons, shall state the cause of the complaint, the time and place of trial of the action for possession, and the answer day for other causes of action, and shall notify the defendant that if he or she fails to appear, judgment shall be entered against him or her. The summons may be served and returned as provided in sections 25-505.01 to 25-516.01, except that the summons shall be served within three days, excluding nonjudicial days, from the date of its issuance and shall be returnable within five days, excluding nonjudicial days, from the date of its issuance. If service cannot be made with reasonable diligence under such sections, service may be made by any person by leaving a copy of the summons at the detained premises and mailing a copy by first-class mail to the defendant's last-known address. The person making the service shall file with the court an affidavit stating with particularity the manner in which he or she made the service and, if service was not made as provided in sections 25-505.01 to 25-516.01, the reasons why service under such sections was unsuccessful. Trial of the action for possession shall be held not less than ten nor more than fourteen days after the date of issuance of the summons.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 122, p. 310; C.S.1929, § 22-1206; R.S.1943, § 26-1,123;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 73; Laws 1989, LB 230, § 1; R.S.Supp.,1989, § 24-573;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 52; Laws 2003, LB 760, § 5; Laws 2004, LB 1207, § 10.
Annotations
This section contemplates bifurcated proceedings wherever damages are warranted, distinguishing between the "trial of the action for possession" and "other causes of action." 132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, 313 Neb. 45, 982 N.W.2d 778 (2022).
This section is intended to facilitate a speedy determination of the immediate right to possession by allowing for bifurcated proceedings that prioritize the cause of action for forcible entry and detainer. 132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, 313 Neb. 45, 982 N.W.2d 778 (2022).
With its accelerated trial procedures, a forcible entry and detainer action is intended to avoid much of the expense and delay incident to the more cumbersome action of ejectment formerly employed at common law. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 854 N.W.2d 774 (2014).
25-21,224.
Forcible entry and detainer; failure of defendant to appear; effect.If the defendant does not appear in response to the summons, and it shall have been properly served, the court shall try the cause as though he were present.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 123, p. 310; C.S.1929, § 22-1207; R.S.1943, § 26-1,124;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 74; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-574.
25-21,225.
Forcible entry and detainer; continuance for more than seven days; undertaking required.No continuance shall be granted for a longer period than seven days, unless upon cause shown to the court of the existence of extraordinary causes and then not unless the defendant applying therefor shall give an undertaking to the adverse party, with good and sufficient surety to be approved by the court, conditioned for the payment of any rents that have or may accrue, and any additional damages that may be sustained by such adverse party by reason of the continuance, if judgment be rendered against the defendant.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 124, p. 311; C.S.1929, § 22-1208; R.S.1943, § 26-1,125;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 75; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-575.
Annotations
A court should not grant an indefinite continuance in a forcible entry and detainer action, because doing so defeats the speedy nature of the remedy. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 854 N.W.2d 774 (2014).
25-21,226.
Forcible entry and detainer; trial without jury; judgment; restitution; costs.If the suit is not continued or the place of trial changed, or if neither party demands a jury, the court shall try the cause. If, after hearing the evidence, the court shall conclude that the complaint is not true, the court shall enter judgment against the plaintiff for costs. If the court shall find that the complaint is true, judgment shall be entered against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for restitution of the premises and costs of suit. If the court shall find that the complaint is true in part, judgment shall be entered for the restitution of such part only, and the costs shall be taxed as the court shall deem just and equitable.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 125, p. 311; C.S.1929, § 22-1209; R.S.1943, § 26-1,126;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 76; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-576.
Annotations
This section pertains specifically to a cause of action for forcible entry and detainer; it does not inhibit any right to trial by jury that would otherwise arise incident to other causes of action. 132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, 313 Neb. 45, 982 N.W.2d 778 (2022).
25-21,227.
Forcible entry and detainer; trial by jury; verdict.If a jury is demanded by either party, the proceedings shall be in all respects as in other cases. If the jury shall find that the complaint is true, they shall render a general verdict of guilty against the defendant; if not true, then a general verdict of not guilty; if true in part, then a verdict setting forth the facts they find true.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 126, p. 311; C.S.1929, § 22-1210; R.S.1943, § 26-1,127;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 77; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-577.
Annotations
A forcible entry and detainer action is a civil suit subject to the normal rules of a civil proceeding, including the power of the court to sustain a motion for a directed verdict in favor of either party at the close of all evidence. Otto v. Hongsermeier Farms, 217 Neb. 45, 348 N.W.2d 422 (1984).
25-21,228.
Forcible entry and detainer; verdict; entry; judgment.The court shall enter the verdict upon the record and shall render such judgment in the action as if the facts authorizing the finding of such verdict had been found to be true by the court.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 127, p. 311; C.S.1929, § 22-1211; R.S.1943, § 26-1,128;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 78; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-578;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 34.
25-21,229.
Forcible entry and detainer; exceptions.Exceptions to the opinion of the judge of the court, in cases under sections 25-21,219 to 25-21,235, upon questions of law and evidence, may be taken by either party, whether tried by a jury or otherwise.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 128, p. 311; C.S.1929, § 22-1212; R.S.1943, § 26-1,129;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 79; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-579.
25-21,230.
Forcible entry and detainer; restitution; writ of execution; form.If a judgment of restitution is entered, the court shall, at the request of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, issue a writ of execution thereon which shall be in the following form as nearly as practicable:
The State of Nebraska, ................ County, ss.
To any Constable or Sheriff of ................ County:
Whereas, in a certain action for the forcible entry and detention, (or the forcible detention, as the case may be) of the following described premises, to wit: .................., lately tried before this court, wherein ................... was plaintiff, and ............. was defendant, judgment was entered on the ....... day of .......... A.D. ........, you therefor are hereby commanded to cause the defendant to be forthwith removed from the premises, and the plaintiff to have restitution of the same; also that you levy of the goods and chattels of the defendant, and make the costs aforesaid, and all accruing costs; and of this writ make legal service and due return. Witness my hand this ...... day of ......... A.D. ......, Clerk of the (County or District) Court.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 129, p. 312; C.S.1929, § 22-1213; R.S.1943, § 26-1,130;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 80; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-580;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 24; Laws 2004, LB 1207, § 11.
25-21,231.
Forcible entry and detainer; writ of execution; service; writ of error stays proceedings.The officer shall, within ten days after receiving the writ, execute the same by restoring the plaintiff to the possession of the premises, and shall levy and collect the costs, and make return as upon other executions. If the officer shall receive a notice from the court that the proceedings have been stayed by an allowance of a writ of error, he shall immediately delay all further proceedings upon the execution; and if the premises have been restored to the plaintiff, he shall immediately place the defendant in the possession thereof, and return the writ, with his proceedings and costs taxed thereon.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 130, p. 312; C.S.1929, § 22-1214; R.S.1943, § 26-1,131;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 81; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-581.
25-21,232.
Forcible entry and detainer; judgment; future action not barred.Judgments obtained under sections 25-21,219 to 25-21,235 shall not be a bar to any future action brought by either party.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 119, p. 310; C.S.1929, § 22-1203; R.S.1943, § 26-1,120;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 70; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-570;
Laws 2004, LB 1207, § 12.
Annotations
Forcible entry and detainer does not try the question of title, but only the immediate right of possession. An action of forcible entry and detainer is res judicata only as to the immediate right. Hogan v. Pelton, 210 Neb. 530, 315 N.W.2d 644 (1982).
25-21,233.
Forcible entry and detainer; appeal; procedure.Any party against whom judgment has been entered in an action of forcible entry and detention, or forcible detention only, of real property, may appeal as provided for in a civil action.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 131, p. 312; C.S.1929, § 22-1215; R.S.1943, § 26-1,132;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 82; Laws 1981, LB 42, § 13; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-582;
Laws 2004, LB 1207, § 13.
Annotations
In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the plain language of this section does not allow an immediate appeal of an order of restitution when the order implicates section 25-1315, meaning the order adjudicates fewer than all claims for relief or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, without being certified pursuant to section 25-1315(1). TDP Phase One v. The Club at the Yard, 307 Neb. 795, 950 N.W.2d 640 (2020).
25-21,234.
Forcible entry and detainer; appeal; operate as supersedeas, when; bond or surety required.No appeal shall operate as a supersedeas unless the appellant, within thirty days after the entry of the judgment, deposits with the clerk of the court in which the judgment was entered a cash bond or undertaking with at least one good and sufficient surety approved by the court conditioned in case of appeal by the plaintiff that he or she will satisfy the final judgment and costs and, in case of appeal by the defendant, that he or she will satisfy the final judgment and costs and will pay a reasonable rent for the premises during the time he or she shall have unlawfully withheld the same.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 132, p. 313; C.S.1929, § 22-1216; R.S.1943, § 26-1,133;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 83; Laws 1981, LB 42, § 14; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 28; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-583;
Laws 1999, LB 43, § 13; Laws 2004, LB 1207, § 14.
Annotations
Trial court had no obligation, under statute permitting correction of clerical mistakes in judgments, to set supersedeas bond pending borrower's appeal from order entered in forcible entry and detainer action, so as to prevent issuance of writ of restitution pending borrower's appeal from judgment entered in forcible entry and detainer action brought by lender who purchased property at trustees' sale after borrower defaulted on deed of trust; rather, it was borrower who should have posted supersedeas bond to prevent writ of restitution from being issued pending appeal. Enterprise Bank v. Knight, 20 Neb. App. 662, 832 N.W.2d 25 (2013).
25-21,235.
Forcible entry and detainer; restitution notwithstanding appeal; bond; conditions.In all actions of forcible entry and detention as well as of forcible detention only, notwithstanding the execution of an undertaking or filing of a proper cash bond for supersedeas or appeal, the judgment for restitution of the premises may be enforced, in the discretion of the court, or a judge thereof in vacation, upon the execution of a bond with sufficient surety, to defendant, or the deposit of a cash bond in such sum as the court shall fix, conditioned that in case the plaintiff shall finally be defeated he will pay the defendant his costs and all damages he may have suffered by reason of the execution of the judgment, the bond to be approved by the court or judge.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, § 133, p. 313; C.S.1929, § 22-1217; R.S.1943, § 26-1,134;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 84; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-584.
25-21,236.
Release of animal; liability to owner.(1) A person who intentionally, willfully, and without permission releases an animal lawfully confined for science, research, commerce, agriculture, or education is liable to the owner of the animal for damages, including the costs of restoring the animal to confinement and to its health condition prior to release and the costs for damage to real property caused by the released animal. If the release causes the failure of an experiment, the person shall also be liable for all costs of repeating the experiment, including replacement of the animals, labor, and materials.
(2) For purposes of this section, animal shall mean any warmblooded or coldblooded animal used in food, fur, or fiber production, agriculture, research, testing, or education and shall include dogs, cats, poultry, fish, and invertebrates.
(3) This section shall not apply to lawful activities of any governmental agency or employees or agents of such agency carrying out their duties prescribed by law.
25-21,237.
Repealed. Laws 2010, LB 216, § 1.
25-21,238.
Repealed. Laws 2010, LB 216, § 1.
25-21,239.
Leased trucks, truck-tractors, and trailers; liability of owner for damages.The owner of any truck, truck-tractor, whether with or without trailer, or trailer, leased for a period of less than thirty days or leased for any period of time and used for commercial purposes, shall be jointly and severally liable with the lessee and the operator thereof for any injury to or the death of any person or persons, or damage to or the destruction of any property resulting from the operation thereof in this state, except that the owner shall not be jointly and severally liable if there is in effect at the time the claim arises a valid liability insurance policy with coverage limits in the minimum amount of one million dollars per occurrence which is available to compensate any person with a claim arising out of the operation or use of the leased truck, truck-tractor, or trailer. This section shall not limit or reduce the owner's liability for his or her own acts or omissions which cause damage to any person or when the lessee is a related entity or by reason of any workers' compensation law.
Source:Laws 1957, c. 170, § 1, p. 591; R.R.S.1943, § 39-7,135; R.S.1943, (1988), § 39-6,193;
Laws 1993, LB 370, § 7; Laws 1997, LB 527, § 1.
Annotations
Where the plaintiff's injury resulted from the operation of a truck outside the State of Nebraska, there was no finding of liability under this section. Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., 278 Neb. 18, 767 N.W.2d 765 (2009).
A minivan used primarily as a passenger vehicle is not a truck under this section. Philpot v. Aguglia, 259 Neb. 573, 611 N.W.2d 93 (2000).
This section held inapplicable in workmen's compensation case arising from use of hoist, not the truck. Vangreen v. Interstate Machinery & Supply Co., 197 Neb. 29, 246 N.W.2d 652 (1976).
Section 39-6,193, imposing vicarious liability on owners-lessors of trucks is constitutional. Bridgeford v. U-Haul Co., 195 Neb. 308, 238 N.W.2d 443 (1976) (pursuant to Laws 1993, LB 370, section 7, language from section 39-6,193 was placed in section 25-21,239).
This section, imposing vicarious liability on owners-lessors of trucks for damages by lessees and operators of the leased trucks, is constitutional. Bridgeford v. U-Haul Co., 195 Neb. 308, 238 N.W.2d 443 (1976).
Section did not make lessee of trailer of lessor, and did not impute lessee's negligence to lessor under nonresident motor vehicle statute. Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1969).
25-21,240.
Claim or action for money damages; limitation.No claim or action seeking to recover money damages shall be brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Resolution Trust Corporation, or any other federal banking regulatory agency against any director or officer, including any former director or officer, of any insured financial depository institution as defined in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 unless such claim or action arises out of the gross negligence or willful or intentional misconduct of such director or officer during his or her term of office with such insured financial depository institution.
25-21,241.
Legislative findings and declarations.The Legislature finds and declares that:
(1) It is the policy of the state that the constitutional rights of citizens and organizations to be involved and participate freely in the process of government must be encouraged and safeguarded with great diligence. The information, reports, opinions, claims, arguments, and other expressions provided by citizens are vital to effective law enforcement, the operation of government, the making of public policy and decisions, and the continuation of representative democracy. The laws, courts, and other agencies of this state must provide the utmost protection for the free exercise of these petition, speech, and association rights;
(2) Civil actions for damages have been filed against citizens and organizations of this state as a result of the valid exercise of their constitutional rights to petition, speech, and association. There has been a disturbing increase in such strategic lawsuits against public participation in government;
(3) The threat of strategic lawsuits against public participation, personal liability, and burdensome litigation costs significantly chills and diminishes citizen participation in government, voluntary public service, and the exercise of these important constitutional rights. This abuse of the judicial process can and has been used as a means of intimidating, harassing, or punishing citizens and organizations for involving themselves in public affairs; and
(4) It is in the public interest and it is the purpose of sections 25-21,241 to 25-21,246 to strike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speech, and association, to protect and encourage public participation in government to the maximum extent permitted by law, to establish an efficient process for identification and adjudication of strategic lawsuits against public participation, and to provide for costs, attorney's fees, and actual damages.
25-21,242.
Terms, defined.For purposes of sections 25-21,241 to 25-21,246:
(1) Action involving public petition and participation shall mean an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim for damages that is brought by a public applicant or permittee and is materially related to any efforts of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge, or oppose the application or permission;
(2) Communication shall mean any statement, claim, allegation in a proceeding, decision, protest, writing, argument, contention, or other expression;
(3) Government body shall mean a city, a village, a political subdivision, a state agency, the state, the federal government, or a public authority, board, or commission; and
(4) Public applicant or permittee shall mean any person who has applied for or obtained a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use or permission to act from any government body or any person with an interest, connection, or affiliation with such person that is materially related to such application or permission.
25-21,243.
Defendant in action involving public petition and participation; action authorized; costs, attorney's fees, and damages; authorized; waiver; section, how construed.(1) A defendant in an action involving public petition and participation may maintain an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim to recover damages, including costs and attorney's fees, from any person who commenced or continued such action. Costs and attorney's fees may be recovered upon a demonstration that the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Other compensatory damages may only be recovered upon an additional demonstration that the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of petition, speech, or association rights.
(2) The right to bring an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim under this section may be waived only if it is waived specifically.
(3) Nothing in this section shall affect or preclude the right of any party to any recovery otherwise authorized by common law or by statute, rule, or regulation.
Annotations
Under subsection (1) of this section, a trial court must first determine as a matter of law whether the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, 17 Neb. App. 28, 756 N.W.2d 299 (2008).
25-21,244.
Action involving public petition and participation; damages; standard of proof; section, how construed.(1) In an action involving public petition and participation, the plaintiff may recover damages, including costs and attorney's fees, only if he or she, in addition to all other necessary elements, has established by clear and convincing evidence that any communication which gives rise to the action was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false, if the truth or falsity of such communication is material to the cause of action at issue.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit any constitutional, statutory, or common-law protections of defendants to actions involving public petition and participation.
25-21,245.
Action involving public petition and participation; motion to dismiss; when granted; duty to expedite.A motion to dismiss based on a failure to state a cause of action shall be granted when the moving party demonstrates that the action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim subject to the motion is an action involving public petition and participation unless the party responding to the motion demonstrates that the cause of action has a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. The court shall expedite and grant preference in the hearing of such motion.
25-21,246.
Action involving public petition and participation; motion for summary judgment; when granted.A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the moving party has demonstrated that the action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim subject to the motion is an action involving public petition and participation unless the party responding to the motion demonstrates that the action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim has a substantial basis in fact and law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. The court shall grant preference in the hearing of such motion.
25-21,247.
Health care payor or employee; immunity from criminal or civil liability; when.(1) For purposes of this section, health care payor shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) An insurer;
(b) A health maintenance organization;
(c) Medicare or medicaid;
(d) A legal entity which is self-insured and provides health care benefits for its employees; or
(e) A person responsible for administering the payment of health care expenses for another person or entity.
(2) Any health care payor or employee thereof who has reasonable cause to believe that there has been a violation of section 38-178 or 38-179 or a fraudulent insurance act described in the Insurance Fraud Act or section 28-631 may discuss or inquire of other health care payors about such violation or act. Any health care payor or employee so discussing or inquiring or responding to such an inquiry from another health care payor shall be immune from criminal penalty or from civil liability for slander, libel, defamation, or breach of the physician-patient privilege if the discussion, inquiry, or response is made in good faith without reckless disregard for the truth.
Cross References
Insurance Fraud Act, see section 44-6601.
25-21,248.
Terroristic threats; action authorized.Any individual, partnership, firm, limited liability company, corporation, company, society, or association, the state or any department, agency, or subdivision thereof, or any other public or private entity aggrieved by the actions of an individual convicted of a violation of section 28-311.01 shall have a cause of action for any loss or damage, including reasonable costs and attorney's fees, resulting from the underlying conduct which was the basis for the conviction.
25-21,249.
Equine activities; legislative intent.The Legislature recognizes that persons who participate in equine activities may incur injuries as a result of the risks involved in such activities. The Legislature also finds that the state and its citizens derive numerous economic and personal benefits from such activities. It is, therefor, the intent of the Legislature to encourage equine activities by providing reasonable standards for those involved in such activities.
25-21,250.
Equine activities; terms, defined.For purposes of sections 25-21,249 to 25-21,253:
(1) Engages in an equine activity means riding, training, assisting in medical treatment of, driving, or being a passenger upon an equine, whether mounted or unmounted, or being a passenger upon an equine-drawn vehicle, or any person assisting a participant or assisting show management. Engages in an equine activity does not include being a spectator at an equine activity except in cases when the spectator places himself or herself in an unauthorized area;
(2) Equine means a horse, pony, donkey, mule, hinny, or llama;
(3) Equine activity means:
(a) Equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances, or parades that involve any or all breeds of equines and any of the equine disciplines, including, but not limited to, dressage, hunter, and jumper horse shows, grand-prix jumping, three-day events, combined training, rodeos, driving, pulling, cutting, polo, steeplechasing, English and western performance riding, endurance trail riding, western games, and hunting;
(b) Equine training or teaching activities or both;
(c) Boarding equines;
(d) Riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine belonging to another, whether or not the owner has received some monetary consideration or other thing of value for the use of the equine or is permitting a prospective purchaser of the equine to ride, inspect, or evaluate the equine;
(e) Rides, trips, hunts, or other equine activities of any type however informal or impromptu that are sponsored by an equine activity sponsor; and
(f) Placing or replacing horseshoes on an equine;
(4) Equine activity sponsor means an individual, group, club, partnership, limited liability company, or corporation, whether or not the sponsor is operating for profit or nonprofit, which sponsors, organizes, or provides the facilities for an equine activity, including, but not limited to, pony clubs, 4-H clubs, hunt clubs, riding clubs, school and college-sponsored classes, programs, and activities, therapeutic riding programs, and operators, instructors, and promoters of equine facilities, including, but not limited to, stables, clubhouses, ponyride strings, fairs, and arenas at which the equine activity is held;
(5) Equine professional means a person engaged for compensation:
(a) In instructing a participant or renting to a participant an equine for the purpose of riding, driving, or being a passenger upon the equine; or
(b) In renting equipment or tack to a participant;
(6) Inherent risks of equine activities means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of equine activities, including, but not limited to:
(a) The propensity of an equine to behave in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or around them;
(b) The unpredictability of an equine's reaction to such things as sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons, or other animals;
(c) Certain hazards such as surface and subsurface conditions;
(d) Collisions with other equines or objects; and
(e) The potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing to maintain control over the equine or not acting within his or her ability; and
(7) Participant means any person, whether amateur or professional, who engages in an equine activity whether or not a fee is paid to participate in the equine activity.
25-21,251.
Equine activities; liability and claims; limitations.Except as provided in section 25-21,252, (1) an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person, which includes a corporation, limited liability company, or partnership, shall not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities and (2) no participant nor participant's representative shall make any claim against, maintain an action against, or recover from an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person for injury, loss, damage, or death of the participant resulting from any of the inherent risks of equine activities.
25-21,252.
Equine activities; applicability of other laws; liability enumerated.(1) Sections 25-21,249 to 25-21,253 shall not apply to the horseracing industry as regulated in sections 2-1201 to 2-1229.
(2) Nothing in section 25-21,251 prevents or limits the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person if the equine activity sponsor, equine professional, or person:
(a) Provided the equipment or tack and the equipment or tack caused the injury because the equine activity sponsor or professional failed to reasonably and prudently inspect or maintain the equipment or tack;
(b) Provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity and determine the ability of the participant to safely manage the particular equine based on the participant's representations of his or her ability;
(c) Owns, leases, rents, or otherwise is in lawful possession and control of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries or death because of a dangerous latent condition which was known or should have been known to the equine activity sponsor, equine professional, or person and for which warning signs were not conspicuously posted;
(d) Commits an act or omission which a reasonable, prudent person would not have done or omitted under the same or similar circumstances or which constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant and that act or omission was a proximate cause of the injury; or
(e) Intentionally injures the participant.
(3) Nothing in section 25-21,251 prevents or limits the liability of an equine activity sponsor or an equine professional under product liability laws.
25-21,253.
Equine activities; signs and contracts; requirements.(1) Every equine professional shall post and maintain signs which contain the following warning notice:
WARNING
Under Nebraska Law, an equine professional is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant in equine activities resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities, pursuant to sections 25-21,249 to 25-21,253.
The warning notice signs shall be placed in a clearly visible location on or near stables, corrals, or arenas where the equine professional conducts equine activities if such stables, corrals, or arenas are owned, leased, rented, managed, or controlled by the equine professional. The placement of warning notice signs shall be such that they may be readily seen by participants in equine activities. The warning notice signs shall have black letters with each letter of the word "WARNING" a minimum of three inches in height and the rest of the letters a minimum of one inch in height.
(2) Every written contract entered into by an equine professional for providing professional services, instruction, or rental of equipment or tack or an equine to a participant, whether or not the contract involves equine activities on or off the location or site of the equine professional's business, shall contain in clearly readable print the warning notice specified in subsection (1) of this section.
25-21,254.
Legislative intent.The Legislature finds and declares that protection of the environment is enhanced by the public's voluntary compliance with environmental requirements and the local counterpart or extension of such requirements and that the public will benefit from incentives to identify and remedy environmental compliance issues. The Legislature further declares that it is in the public interest to encourage such activities by assuring limited protection of environmental audit findings and of providing fair treatment of those who report environmental audit findings to regulatory authorities.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
25-21,255.
Terms, defined.For the purposes of sections 25-21,254 to 25-21,264:
(1) Environmental audit means any document dated and labeled as a confidential environmental audit and prepared pursuant to a specific written directive to review compliance with an environmental requirement or requirements, including any report, finding, communication, or opinion or any draft of a report, finding, communication, or opinion, related to and prepared as a result of a voluntary self-evaluation that is done in good faith;
(2) Environmental requirement means an environmental protection requirement contained in (a) the Environmental Protection Act, the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act, the Nebraska Chemigation Act, the Pesticide Act, the Petroleum Products and Hazardous Substances Storage and Handling Act, or federal law, a rule or regulation adopted and promulgated pursuant to such acts or laws, a permit or order issued pursuant to such acts or laws, or an agreement entered into or court order issued pursuant to any of the foregoing or (b) an ordinance or other legally binding requirement of a local governmental unit under authority granted by state or federal law relating to environmental protection;
(3) Person means any individual, partnership, limited liability company, association, public or private corporation, trustee, receiver, assignee, agent, municipality, other governmental subdivision, public agency, other legal entity, or any officer or governing or managing body of any public or private corporation, municipality, governmental subdivision, public agency, or other legal entity; and
(4) Voluntary self-evaluation means a self-initiated assessment, audit, or review, not otherwise expressly required by environmental requirements, that is performed by any person for himself, herself, or itself, either by an employee of such person assigned the responsibility of performing such assessment, audit, or review or by a consultant engaged by such person specifically for the purpose of performing such assessment, audit, or review to determine whether such person is in compliance with environmental requirements.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
Environmental Protection Act, see section 81-1532.
Integrated Solid Waste Management Act, see section 13-2001.
Nebraska Chemigation Act, see section 46-1101.
Pesticide Act, see section 2-2622.
Petroleum Products and Hazardous Substances Storage and Handling Act, see section 81-15,117.
25-21,256.
Environmental audit; use as evidence prohibited; exceptions.(1) An environmental audit prepared under sections 25-21,254 to 25-21,264 is not admissible as evidence in any civil or administrative proceeding or enforcement proceedings under local ordinances, except (a) as provided in sections 25-21,257 to 25-21,259, (b) an agency having regulatory authority may obtain and review such audit for the limited purposes of determining if the audit exists and if any exceptions to the liability provisions of sections 25-21,254 to 25-21,264 exist with respect to the audit, (c) with respect to the generation, storage, transport, or disposal of radioactive material, low-level radioactive waste, and high-level radioactive waste as defined in section 71-3503, and (d) no protections are given under this section with respect to violations which would likely result or have resulted in a significant adverse impact on the public health or the environment.
(2) Neither any person who conducted the audit nor any person to whom the audit results are disclosed can be compelled to testify regarding any matter which was the subject of the audit and which is addressed in the environmental audit.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
25-21,257.
Environmental audit; use as evidence; waiver.Except as provided in section 25-21,259, the person for whom the environmental audit was prepared, whether the audit was prepared by the person, by an employee of the person, or by a consultant hired by the person, may waive the protection provided in section 25-21,256 only by an express waiver.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
25-21,258.
Environmental audit; use as evidence; exceptions.The protection created by section 25-21,256 does not apply to:
(1) Documents or information required to be developed, maintained, or reported pursuant to any environmental requirements;
(2) Documents or other information required to be available or furnished to a regulatory agency pursuant to any environmental requirements or any other law;
(3) Documents or information maintained or developed relating to grants or other financial assistance sponsored by the state or federal government;
(4) Information obtained by a regulatory agency through observation, inspection, sampling, or monitoring pursuant to an environmental requirement; or
(5) Information obtained through any source independent of the environmental audit.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
25-21,259.
Environmental audit; admissible as evidence; when.(1) An environmental audit is admissible as evidence in any civil or administrative proceeding or enforcement proceedings under local ordinances if a court of record determines that:
(a)(i) The environmental audit shows evidence that the person for which the environmental audit was prepared is not or was not in compliance with an environmental requirement; and
(ii) The person did not initiate, after the audit, appropriate efforts to achieve compliance with the environmental requirement or complete in good faith any necessary permit application promptly after the noncompliance with the environmental requirement was discovered and, as a result, the person did not or will not achieve compliance with the environmental requirement or complete the necessary permit application within a reasonable amount of time; or
(b) The protection provided in section 25-21,256 is being asserted for a fraudulent purpose or the environmental audit was prepared in order to avoid disclosure of information in an investigative, administrative, or judicial proceeding that was underway, that was imminent, or for which the person had been provided written notification that an investigation into a specific violation had been initiated; or
(c) The information contained in the environmental audit shows (i) violations which would likely result in or have resulted in a significant adverse impact on the public health or the environment or (ii) water contamination.
(2) For the purposes of subdivision (1)(a) of this section, if the evidence shows noncompliance with more than one environmental requirement by a person, the person may demonstrate to the court that appropriate efforts to achieve compliance were or are being taken by instituting a comprehensive program that establishes a phased schedule of actions to be taken to bring the person into compliance with all of such environmental requirements.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
25-21,260.
Voluntary self-evaluation; disclose possible violations.A person performing a voluntary self-evaluation may disclose in writing a possible violation of an environmental requirement to an agency having regulatory authority showing:
(1) A description of the possible violation;
(2) The date of discovery of the possible violation and, if known, the date the possible violation occurred; and
(3) Actions taken to correct the possible violation and, if applicable, a schedule to achieve compliance.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
25-21,261.
Voluntary self-evaluation; disclosure; effect; exceptions.(1) If disclosure is made pursuant to section 25-21,260 and the agency having regulatory authority has approved the action taken or the schedule to achieve compliance, as appropriate, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld, the person is not liable for civil penalties unless (a) the disclosure was not made within sixty days after knowledge of the information disclosed was obtained by the person and was not disclosed to the agency having regulatory authority prior to the agency having knowledge of the violation contained in the disclosure, (b) the disclosure did not arise out of a voluntary self-evaluation, (c) the person making the disclosure did not initiate the appropriate efforts to achieve compliance, did not pursue compliance with due diligence, and did not correct the noncompliance as soon as reasonably practicable after discovery of the violation during the course of the environmental audit, (d) the person making the disclosure did not cooperate with the agency having regulatory authority with regard to the violation disclosed regarding investigation of the issues identified in the disclosure, (e) the violation was due to a lack of good faith efforts to understand or comply with environmental requirements, (f) the violation was knowing and willful, or (g) the violation would likely result or has resulted in significant adverse impact on the public health or the environment. If the noncompliance under subdivision (c) of this subsection is the failure to obtain a permit, appropriate efforts to correct the noncompliance may be demonstrated by the submission of a complete permit application within a reasonable time and a permit for such activities is subsequently issued by the agency.
(2) This section does not apply to violations of the terms of any agreement entered into or court order or administrative order issued pursuant to an environmental requirement, including, but not limited to, consent decrees or plea agreements.
(3) This section does not preclude the agency having regulatory authority from seeking the recovery of any economic benefit resulting from noncompliance with an environmental requirement.
(4) For purposes of this section, (a) if a person is required, under an environmental requirement, under a specific permit condition, or under an order issued by the agency, to make a disclosure to an agency having regulatory authority with regard to the violation disclosed, the disclosure is not voluntary with respect to that agency, and (b) repeat violations or closely related additional violations within five years after a previous violation shall be prima facie evidence of a lack of good faith efforts to comply with environmental requirements.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
25-21,262.
Regulatory authority; sections; how construed.Except as specifically provided in sections 25-21,254 to 25-21,261, such sections do not affect the regulatory authority that any department or agency has to require any action associated with the information disclosed.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
25-21,263.
Privileges; sections; how construed.Sections 25-21,254 to 25-21,262 do not limit, waive, or abrogate the scope or nature of any statutory or common-law privilege, including the work-product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
25-21,264.
Venue.The district court of the county in which the facility is located or, if all parties agree, the district court of Lancaster County shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under section 25-21,259.
Cross References
Applicability to Residential Lead-Based Paint Professions Practice Act, see section 71-6331.01.
25-21,265.
Repealed. Laws 2012, LB 705, § 1.
25-21,266.
Repealed. Laws 2012, LB 705, § 1.
25-21,267.
Repealed. Laws 2012, LB 705, § 1.
25-21,268.
Repealed. Laws 2012, LB 705, § 1.
25-21,269.
Repealed. Laws 2012, LB 705, § 1.
25-21,270.
Change of name; authority of district court.The district court shall have authority to change the names of persons, towns, villages and cities within this state.
Source:Laws 1871, p. 62; R.S.1913, § 5315; C.S.1922, § 4608; C.S.1929, § 61-101; R.S.1943, § 61-101; R.S.1943, (1996), § 61-101.
Annotations
Whether a minor child's surname may be changed depends on, and is determined by, the best interests of the child. Factors to be considered are (1) the misconduct by one of the child's parents, (2) a parent's failure to support the child, (3) parental failure to maintain contact with the child, (4) the length of time that a surname has been used for or by the child, and (5) whether the child's surname is different from the surname of the child's custodial parent. Additionally, a court may consider the child's reasonable preference for a surname; the effect of the name change on the child's relationship with each parent; community respect associated with the surname; the difficulties, harassment, or embarrassment associated with either the present or proposed surname; and the identification of the child as part of the family unit. In re Change of Name of Andrews, 235 Neb. 170, 454 N.W.2d 488 (1990).
Change of name of minor child granted only when the substantial welfare of the child requires the change. Spatz v. Spatz, 199 Neb. 332, 258 N.W.2d 814 (1977).
Decree is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and evidence must be produced that there is sufficient and reasonable cause for change of name. In re Taminosian, 97 Neb. 514, 150 N.W. 824 (1915).
25-21,271.
Change of name; persons; procedure; clerk of the district court; duty.(1) Any person desiring to change his or her name shall file a petition in the district court of the county in which such person may be a resident, setting forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide citizen of such county for at least one year prior to the filing of the petition, (b) the address of the petitioner, (c) the date of birth of the petitioner, (d) the cause for which the change of petitioner's name is sought, and (e) the name asked for.
(2)(a) Except as provided in subdivision (2)(b) of this section, notice of the filing of the petition shall be published in a newspaper in the county, and if no newspaper is printed in the county, then in a newspaper of general circulation therein. The notice shall be published (i) once a week for four consecutive weeks if the petitioner is nineteen years of age or older at the time the action is filed and (ii) once a week for two consecutive weeks if the petitioner is under nineteen years of age at the time the action is filed.
(b) The court may waive the notice requirement of subdivision (2)(a) of this section upon a showing by the petitioner that such notice would endanger the petitioner.
(3) In an action involving a petitioner under nineteen years of age who has a noncustodial parent, notice of the filing of the petition shall be sent by certified mail within five days after publication to the noncustodial parent at the address provided to the clerk of the district court pursuant to subsection (1) of section 42-364.13 for the noncustodial parent if he or she has provided an address. The clerk of the district court shall provide the petitioner with the address upon request.
(4) It shall be the duty of the district court, upon being duly satisfied by proof in open court of the truth of the allegations set forth in the petition, that there exists proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the petitioner, and that notice of the filing of the petition has been given as required by this section, to order and direct a change of name of such petitioner and that an order for the purpose be entered by the court.
(5) The clerk of the district court shall deliver a copy of any name-change order issued by the court pursuant to this section to the Department of Health and Human Services for use pursuant to sections 28-376 and 28-718 and to the sex offender registration and community notification division of the Nebraska State Patrol for use pursuant to section 29-4004.
Source:Laws 1871, p. 62; R.S.1913, § 5316; C.S.1922, § 4609; C.S.1929, § 61-102; R.S.1943, § 61-102; Laws 1963, c. 367, § 1, p. 1184;
Laws 1994, LB 892, § 1; Laws 1995, LB 161, § 1; R.S.1943, (1996), § 61-102;
Laws 2010, LB147, § 1; Laws 2018, LB193, § 35; Laws 2022, LB519, § 1.
Annotations
The mere fact that a petitioner is an inmate is not a substantial reason for denying a petition for name change. In re Change of Name of Picollo, 12 Neb. App. 174, 668 N.W.2d 712 (2003).
When considering a petition for name change, a district court must make findings sufficiently definitive that if an appeal is taken, the appellate court can determine whether or not the request for a name change was arbitrarily denied. In re Change of Name of Picollo, 12 Neb. App. 174, 668 N.W.2d 712 (2003).
25-21,272.
Change of name; town, village, or city; procedure.(1) Whenever it may be desirable to change the name of any town, village, or city in any county of the state, a petition for that purpose may, in like manner, be filed in the district court of such county, signed by a majority of the legal voters of such town, village, or city, setting forth the cause why such change is desirable and the name desired to be substituted.
(2) Notice of the filing of the petition shall be published once a week for four consecutive weeks in a newspaper in the county, and if no newspaper is printed in the county, then in a newspaper of general circulation therein.
(3) The court, upon being satisfied by proof that the prayer of the petitioners is reasonable and just, that notice as required in this section has been given, that two-thirds of the legal voters of such town, village, or city desire the change, and that there is no other town, village, or city in the state of the name prayed for, may order the change prayed for in such petition.
Source:Laws 1871, p. 62; R.S.1913, § 5317; C.S.1922, § 4610; C.S.1929, § 61-103; R.S.1943, § 61-103;
Laws 1995, LB 161, § 2; R.S.1943, (1996), § 61-103.
25-21,273.
Change of name; effect; costs; how taxed; exception.(1) Unless the petitioner is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in accordance with sections 25-2301 to 25-2310, all proceedings under sections 25-21,270 to 25-21,272 shall be at the cost of the petitioner, for which fee-bill or execution may issue as in civil cases.
(2) Any change of names under such sections shall not in any manner affect or alter any right of action, legal process, or property.
Source:Laws 1871, p. 63; R.S.1913, § 5318; C.S.1922, § 4611; C.S.1929, § 61-104; R.S.1943, § 61-104; R.S.1943, (1996), § 61-104;
Laws 2023, LB157, § 4.
25-21,274.
Motor vehicle collision with domestic animal; principles applied.(1) In any civil action brought by the owner, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle or by his or her personal representative or assignee or by the owner of the livestock for damages resulting from collision of a motor vehicle with any domestic animal or animals on a public highway, the following shall apply:
(a) The plaintiff's burden of proving his or her case shall not shift at any time to the defendant;
(b) The fact of escaped livestock is not, by itself, sufficient to raise an inference of negligence against the defendant; and
(c) The standard of care shall be according to principles of ordinary negligence and shall not be strict or absolute liability.
(2) For purposes of this section, highway and motor vehicle have the same meaning as in section 39-101.
Annotations
This section does not displace the common-law elements of res ipsa loquitur and does not prevent a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction in appropriate circumstances; it simply clarifies that the fact of escaped livestock is, standing alone, insufficient to raise an inference of negligence. McLaughlin Freight Lines v. Gentrup, 281 Neb. 725, 798 N.W.2d 386 (2011).
25-21,275.
Diversion of utility services; terms, defined.For purposes of sections 25-21,275 to 25-21,278, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) Bypassing means the act of attaching, connecting, or in any manner affixing any wire, cord, socket, motor, pipe, or other instrument, device, or contrivance to the utility supply system or any part of the system in such a manner as to transmit, supply, or use any utility service without passing through an authorized meter or other device provided for measuring, registering, determining, or limiting the amount of electricity, gas, or water consumed. Bypassing also means the act of employing any means to obtain the use or benefit of electricity, gas, or water without paying for the use at the rate established by the supplier of such utilities;
(2) Customer means the person responsible for payment for utility services for the premises and includes employees and agents of the customer;
(3) Person means any individual, firm, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, and other legal entity;
(4) Tampering means the act of damaging, altering, adjusting, or in any manner interfering with or obstructing the action or operation of any meter or other device provided for measuring, registering, determining, or limiting the amount of electricity, gas, or water consumed;
(5) Unauthorized metering means the act of removing, moving, installing, connecting, reconnecting, or disconnecting any meter or metering device for utility service by a person other than an authorized employee or agent of such utility;
(6) Utility means any person or entity lawfully operating in whole or in part for the purpose of supplying electricity, gas, water, including steam, or any combination thereof, to the public or to any person;
(7) Utility service means the provision of electricity, gas, steam, water, or any other service or commodity furnished by the utility for compensation; and
(8) Utility supply system means and includes all wires, conduits, pipes, cords, sockets, motors, meters, instruments, load control equipment, and other devices used by the utility for the purpose of providing utility services.
25-21,276.
Diversion of utility services; civil actions; recovery authorized.(1) A utility may bring a civil action for damages against any person who commits, authorizes, solicits, aids, abets, or attempts (a) bypassing, (b) tampering, or (c) unauthorized metering when such act results in damages to the utility. A utility may bring a civil action for damages pursuant to this section against any person receiving the benefit of utility service through means of bypassing, tampering, or unauthorized metering.
(2) In any civil action brought pursuant to this section, the utility shall be entitled, upon proof of willful or intentional bypassing, tampering, or unauthorized metering, to recover as damages:
(a) The amount of actual damage or loss if the amount of the damage or loss is susceptible of reasonable calculation; or
(b) Liquidated damages of seven hundred fifty dollars if the amount of actual damage or loss is not susceptible of reasonable calculation.
In addition to damage or loss under subdivision (a) or (b) of this subsection, the utility may recover all reasonable expenses and costs incurred on account of the bypassing, tampering, or unauthorized metering, including, but not limited to, disconnection, reconnection, service calls, equipment, costs of the suit, and reasonable attorneys' fees in cases within the scope of section 25-1801.
25-21,277.
Diversion of utility services; rebuttable presumption; when.(1) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a tenant or occupant at any premises where bypassing, tampering, or unauthorized metering is proven to exist caused or had knowledge of such bypassing, tampering, or unauthorized metering if the tenant or occupant (a) had access to the part of the utility supply system on the premises where the bypassing, tampering, or unauthorized metering is proven to exist and (b) was responsible or partially responsible for payment, either directly or indirectly, to the utility or to any other person for utility services to the premises.
(2) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a customer at any premises where bypassing, tampering, or unauthorized metering is proven to exist caused or had knowledge of such bypassing, tampering, or unauthorized metering if the customer controlled access to the part of the utility supply system on the premises where the bypassing, tampering, or unauthorized metering was proven to exist.
25-21,278.
Diversion of utility services; additional remedies.The remedies provided by sections 25-21,275 to 25-21,278 shall be deemed to be supplemental and additional to powers conferred by existing laws. The remedies provided in sections 25-21,275 to 25-21,278 are in addition to and not in limitation of any other civil or criminal statutory or common-law remedies.
25-21,279.
Action to seek injunction; authorized.Any victim as defined in section 29-119 may pursue a civil action to seek an injunction to enforce the Nebraska Crime Victim's Reparations Act and sections 81-1843 to 81-1851.
Cross References
Nebraska Crime Victim's Reparations Act, see section 81-1841.
25-21,280.
School, educational service unit, early childhood education program, school nurse, medication aide, and nonmedical staff person; physician; health care professional; pharmacist; immunity; when.(1) Any person employed by a school approved or accredited by the State Department of Education, employed by an educational service unit and working in a school approved or accredited by the department, or employed by an early childhood education program approved by the department who serves as a school nurse or medication aide or who has been designated and trained by the school, educational service unit, or program as a nonmedical staff person to implement the emergency response to life-threatening asthma or systemic allergic reactions protocols adopted by the school, educational service unit, or program shall be immune from civil liability for any act or omission in rendering emergency care for a person experiencing a potentially life-threatening asthma or allergic reaction event on school grounds, in a vehicle being used for school purposes, in a vehicle being used for educational service unit purposes, at a school-sponsored activity or athletic event, at a facility used by the early childhood education program, in a vehicle being used for early childhood education program purposes, or at an activity sponsored by the early childhood education program which results in damage or injury unless such damage or injury was caused by the willful or wanton act or omission of such employee.
(2) The individual immunity granted by subsection (1) of this section shall not extend to the school district, educational service unit, or early childhood education program and shall not extend to any act or omission of such employee which results in damage or injury if the damage or injury is caused by such employee while impaired by alcohol or any controlled substance enumerated in section 28-405.
(3) Any school nurse, such nurse's designee, or other designated adult described in section 79-224 shall be immune from civil liability for any act or omission described in such section which results in damage or injury unless such damage or injury was caused by the willful or wanton act or omission of such school nurse, nurse's designee, or designated adult.
(4) A physician or other health care professional may issue a non-patient-specific prescription for medication for response to life-threatening asthma or anaphylaxis to a school, an educational service unit, or an early childhood education program as described in subsection (1) of this section. The physician or other health care professional shall be immune from liability for issuing such prescription unless he or she does not exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in signing the prescription. In no circumstance shall a physician or other health care professional be liable for the act or omission of another who provides or in any way administers the medication prescribed by the physician or other health care professional.
(5) A pharmacist may dispense medication pursuant to a non-patient-specific prescription for response to life-threatening asthma or anaphylaxis to a school, an educational service unit, or an early childhood education program as described in subsection (1) of this section. The pharmacist shall be immune from liability for dispensing medication pursuant to a non-patient-specific prescription unless the pharmacist does not exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in dispensing the medication. In no circumstance shall a pharmacist be liable for the act or omission of another who provides or in any way administers the medication dispensed by the pharmacist.
(6) For purposes of this section, the name of the school, educational service unit, or early childhood education program shall serve as the patient name on the non-patient-specific prescription.
25-21,281.
Tampering with anhydrous ammonia or anhydrous ammonia equipment; effect on liability.(1) Any person who owns, maintains, or installs anhydrous ammonia equipment, uses anhydrous ammonia for any lawful purpose, sells anhydrous ammonia for any lawful purposes, or transports anhydrous ammonia in a manner prescribed by law shall not be liable to any person who tampers with, or assists in tampering with, such anhydrous ammonia, or such anhydrous ammonia equipment, for personal injury, wrongful death, or any other economic or noneconomic damages arising out of such tampering, unless such liability is a result of the willful, wanton, reckless, or intentional acts or omissions of such person.
(2) For purposes of this section:
(a) Anhydrous ammonia equipment means any equipment used in the application of anhydrous ammonia for agricultural purposes that meets all applicable safety requirements established by state and federal statutes and regulations or any container or storage facility used to store anhydrous ammonia in a manner that meets all applicable safety requirements established by state and federal statutes and regulations; and
(b) Tampering with anhydrous ammonia means intentionally, knowingly, and unlawfully gaining access or attempting to gain access to anhydrous ammonia or anhydrous ammonia equipment.
25-21,282.
Immunity from liability; exceptions.(1) A person who donates fire control or rescue equipment to a fire department or a political subdivision for use by its fire department shall not be liable for civil damages for personal injuries, property damage or loss, or death caused by the fire control or rescue equipment after donation, except for injury, damage, loss, or death caused by the donor's intentional or reckless conduct or gross negligence.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a vendor or manufacturer of fire control or rescue equipment.
(3) For purposes of this section:
(a) Fire control or rescue equipment means any vehicle, equipment, tool, communications equipment, or protective gear used in firefighting, rescue services, or emergency medical services;
(b) Fire department means any paid or volunteer fire department, company, association, or organization or first-aid, rescue, or emergency squad serving a city, village, county, township, or rural or suburban fire protection district or any other public or private fire department; and
(c) Person means any individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, fire department, public corporation, other legal or commercial entity, or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality.
25-21,283.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-21,283 to 25-21,289 shall
be known and may be cited as the Successor Asbestos-Related Liability Act.
25-21,284.
Terms, defined.For purposes of the Successor Asbestos-Related
Liability Act:
(1) Asbestos claim means
any claim, wherever or whenever made, for damages, losses, indemnification,
contribution, or other relief arising out of, based on, or in any way related
to asbestos, including:
(a)
Any claim involving the health effects of exposure to asbestos, including
a claim for personal injury or death, mental or emotional injury, risk of
disease or other injury, or the costs of medical monitoring or surveillance;
(b) Any claim made by
or on behalf of any person exposed to asbestos, or a representative, spouse,
parent, child, or other relative of the person; and
(c) Any claim for damage or loss
caused by the installation, presence, or removal of asbestos;
(2) Corporation means
a corporation for profit, including a domestic corporation organized under
the laws of this state or a foreign corporation organized under laws other
than the laws of this state;
(3) Successor asbestos-related liabilities means liabilities,
whether known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, absolute or contingent,
accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated, or due or to become due,
that are related to asbestos claims and were assumed or incurred by a corporation
as a result of or in connection with a merger or consolidation, or the plan
of merger or consolidation related to the merger or consolidation with or
into another corporation, or that are related in any way to asbestos claims
based on the exercise of control or the ownership of stock of the corporation
before the merger or consolidation. Successor asbestos-related liabilities
includes liabilities that, after the time of the merger or consolidation for
which the fair market value of total gross assets is determined under section 25-21,287,
were or are paid or otherwise discharged, or committed to be paid or otherwise
discharged, by or on behalf of the corporation, or by a successor corporation,
or by or on behalf of a transferor, in connection with settlements, judgments,
or other discharges in this state or another jurisdiction;
(4) Successor corporation
means a corporation that assumes or incurs or has assumed or incurred successor
asbestos-related liabilities that is a successor and became a successor before
January 1, 1972, or is any of that successor corporation's successors; and
(5) Transferor means
a corporation from which successor asbestos-related liabilities are or were
assumed or incurred.
25-21,285.
Cumulative successor asbestos-related
liabilities of successor corporation; limitations; applicability.(1) The limitations in
section 25-21,286 shall apply to any successor corporation.
(2) The limitations in
section 25-21,286 shall not apply to:
(a) Workers' compensation benefits paid by or on behalf
of an employer to an employee under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act
or a comparable workers' compensation law of another jurisdiction;
(b) Any claim against
a successor corporation that does not constitute a successor asbestos-related
liability;
(c)
Any obligation under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.,
as amended, or under any collective-bargaining agreement; or
(d) A successor corporation
that, after a merger or consolidation, continued in the business of mining
asbestos or in the business of selling or distributing asbestos fibers or
in the business of manufacturing, distributing, removing, or installing asbestos-containing
products which were the same or substantially the same as those products previously
manufactured, distributed, removed, or installed by the transferor.
Cross References
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, see section 48-1,110.
25-21,286.
Successor corporation; liability;
limitation.(1)
Except as further limited in subsection (2) of this section, the cumulative
successor asbestos-related liabilities of a successor corporation are limited
to the fair market value of the total gross assets of the transferor determined
as of the time of the merger or consolidation. The successor corporation does
not have responsibility for successor asbestos-related liabilities in excess
of this limitation.
(2) If the transferor
had assumed or incurred successor asbestos-related liabilities in connection
with a prior merger or consolidation with a prior transferor, then the fair
market value of the total gross assets of the prior transferor determined
as of the time of the earlier merger or consolidation shall be substituted
for the limitation in subsection (1) of this section for purposes of determining
the limitation of liability of a successor corporation.
25-21,287.
Successor corporation; limitations;
fair market value of total gross assets.(1) A successor corporation may establish the fair market
value of total gross assets for the purpose of the limitations under section 25-21,286 through any method reasonable under the circumstances, including:
(a) By reference to the
going concern value of the assets or to the purchase price attributable to
or paid for the assets in an arms-length transaction; or
(b) In the absence of
other readily available information from which the fair market value can be
determined, by reference to the value of the assets recorded on a balance
sheet.
(2)
Total gross assets include intangible assets.
(3) To the extent total gross assets
include any liability insurance that was issued to the transferor whose assets
are being valued for purposes of this section, the applicability, terms, conditions,
and limits of such insurance shall not be affected by this section, nor shall
this section otherwise affect the rights and obligations of an insurer, transferor,
or successor corporation under any insurance contract or any related agreements,
including, without limitation, preenactment settlements resolving coverage-related
disputes and the rights of an insurer to seek payment for applicable deductibles,
retrospective premiums, or self-insured retentions or to seek contribution
from a successor corporation for uninsured or self-insured periods or periods
when insurance is uncollectible or otherwise unavailable. Without limiting
the foregoing, to the extent total gross assets include such liability insurance,
a settlement of a dispute concerning any such liability insurance coverage
entered into by a transferor or successor corporation with the insurers of
the transferor before July 15, 2010, shall be determinative of the total coverage
of such liability insurance to be included in the calculation of the transferor's
total gross assets.
25-21,288.
Fair market value of total gross
assets; adjustment.(1)
Except as provided in subsections (2) through (4) of this section, the fair
market value of total gross assets at the time of the merger or consolidation
shall increase annually at a rate equal to the sum of:
(a) The prime rate as
listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each
calendar year since the merger or consolidation, unless the prime rate is
not published in that edition of the Wall Street Journal, in which case any
reasonable determination of the prime rate on the first day of the year may
be used; and
(b)
One percent.
(2)
The rate found in subsection (1) of this section shall not be compounded.
(3) The adjustment of
the fair market value of total gross assets shall continue as provided in
subsection (1) of this section until the date the adjusted value is first
exceeded by the cumulative amounts of successor asbestos-related liabilities
paid or committed to be paid by or on behalf of the successor corporation
or a predecessor or by or on behalf of a transferor after the time of the
merger or consolidation for which the fair market value of total gross assets
is being determined.
(4)
No adjustment of the fair market value of total gross assets shall be applied
to any liability insurance that is included in total gross assets under subsection
(3) of section 25-21,287.
25-21,289.
Act, how construed; applicability
of act.(1)
The courts of this state shall construe the provisions of the Successor Asbestos-Related
Liability Act liberally with regard to successor corporations.
(2) The act shall apply
to all asbestos claims filed against a successor corporation on or after July
15, 2010. The act also shall apply to any pending asbestos claims against
a successor corporation in which trial has not commenced as of July 15, 2010,
except that any provisions of the act which would be unconstitutional if applied
retroactively shall be applied prospectively only.
25-21,290.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-21,290
to 25-21,296 shall be known and may be cited as the Exploited Children's Civil
Remedy Act.
25-21,291.
Terms, defined.For purposes
of the Exploited Children's Civil Remedy Act:
(1) Access software
provider means a provider of software, including client or server software,
or enabling tools that do any one or more of the following: (a) Filter, screen,
allow, or disallow content; (b) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content;
or (c) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize,
reorganize, or translate content;
(2)
Aid or assist another with the creation, distribution, or active acquisition
of child pornography means help a principal in some appreciable manner with
the creation, distribution, or active acquisition of a visual depiction of
sexually explicit conduct which has a child as one of its participants or
portrayed observers. The term also includes knowingly employing, forcing,
authorizing, inducing, or otherwise causing a child to engage in any visual
depiction of sexually explicit conduct which has a child as one of its participants
or portrayed observers. No parent, stepparent, legal guardian, or person with
custody and control of a child, knowing the content thereof, may consent to
such child engaging in any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct which
has a child as one of its participants or portrayed observers;
(3) Cable operator
means any person or group of persons (a) who provides cable service over a
cable system and directly or through one or more affiliates owns a significant
interest in such cable system or (b) who otherwise controls or is responsible
for, through any arrangement, the management and operation of such a cable
system;
(4) Child has the same meaning as in section 28-1463.02;
(5)
Create means to knowingly create, make, manufacture, direct, publish, finance,
or in any manner generate;
(6) Distribute means the actual, constructive,
or attempted transfer from one person, source, or location to another person,
source, or location. The term includes, but is not limited to, renting, selling,
delivering, displaying, advertising, trading, mailing, procuring, circulating,
lending, exhibiting, transmitting, transmuting, transferring, disseminating,
presenting, or providing any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct
which has a child as one of its participants or portrayed observers;
(7) Interactive computer
service means any information service system or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions;
(8) Participant means a child who appears in any visual depiction
of sexually explicit conduct and is portrayed or actively engaged in acts
of sexually explicit conduct appearing therein;
(9) Portrayed observer
means a child who appears in any visual depiction where sexually explicit
conduct is likewise portrayed or occurring within the child's presence or
in the child's proximity;
(10) Sexually explicit conduct has the same
meaning as in section 28-1463.02;
(11) Telecommunications service means the offering
of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes
of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless
of the facilities used; and
(12) Visual depiction has the same meaning
as in section 28-1463.02.
25-21,292.
Civil action authorized; recovery;
attorney's fees and costs; injunctive relief.(1) Any participant or portrayed
observer in a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct or his or her
parent or legal guardian who suffered or continues to suffer personal or psychological
injury as a result of such participation or portrayed observation may bring
a civil action against any person who knowingly and willfully (a) created,
distributed, or actively acquired such visual depiction while in this state
or (b) aided or assisted with the creation, distribution, or active acquisition
of such visual depiction while such person or the person aided or assisted
was in this state.
(2)
A plaintiff who prevails in a civil action brought pursuant to the Exploited
Children's Civil Remedy Act may recover his or her actual damages, which are
deemed to be a minimum of one hundred fifty thousand dollars, plus any and
all attorney's fees and costs reasonably associated with the civil action.
In addition to all other remedies available under the act, the court may also
award temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief as the court
deems necessary and appropriate.
(3) This section does not create a cause
of action if the participant was sixteen years of age or older at the time
the visual depiction was created and the participant willfully and voluntarily
participated in the creation of the visual depiction.
(4) No law enforcement officer
engaged in his or her law enforcement duties, governmental entity, provider
of interactive computer service, provider of telecommunications service, or
cable operator is subject to a civil action under the Exploited Children's
Civil Remedy Act.
25-21,293.
Time for bringing action; limitation.Notwithstanding
any other provisions of law, any action to recover damages under the Exploited
Children's Civil Remedy Act shall be filed within three years after the later
of:
(1)
The conclusion of any related criminal prosecution against the person or persons
from whom recovery is sought;
(2) The receipt of actual or constructive
notice sent or given to the participant or portrayed observer or his or her
parent or legal guardian by a member of a law enforcement entity informing
the participant or portrayed observer or his or her parent or legal guardian
that the entity has identified the person:
(a) Who created, distributed, or actively
acquired the visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct containing the
participant or portrayed observer; or
(b) Who aided or assisted another person
with the creation, distribution, or active acquisition of the visual depiction
of sexually explicit conduct containing the participant or portrayed observer;
or
(3) The participant or portrayed observer reaching the age of eighteen
years.
25-21,294.
Use of pseudonym.In any action
brought pursuant to the Exploited Children's Civil Remedy Act, a plaintiff
may request to use a pseudonym instead of his or her legal name in all court
proceedings and records. Upon finding that the use of a pseudonym is proper,
the court shall ensure that the pseudonym is used in all court proceedings
and records.
25-21,295.
Defendant; defenses not available.It is
not a defense to a cause of action brought pursuant to the Exploited Children's
Civil Remedy Act that the defendant:
(1)
Did not know the participant or portrayed observer appearing in the visual
depiction of sexually explicit conduct;
(2) Did not appear in the visual depiction
of sexually explicit conduct containing the participant or portrayed observer;
or
(3) Did not commit, assist with the commission of, or personally
observe the commission of acts of sexually explicit conduct portrayed in the
visual depiction containing the participant or portrayed observer.
25-21,296.
Attorney General; powers.To prevent
ongoing and further exploitation of any person who was a participant or portrayed
observer or his or her parent or legal guardian, the Attorney General, upon
request, may pursue cases on behalf of any participant or portrayed observer
or his or her parent or legal guardian who has a bona fide cause of action
under the Exploited Children's Civil Remedy Act. All damages obtained shall
go to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. For his or her role in pursuing a civil
action under the act, the Attorney General may seek all of his or her reasonable
attorney's fees and costs associated with the civil action.
25-21,297.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-21,297 to 25-21,301 shall be known and may be cited as the Human Trafficking Victims Civil Remedy Act.
25-21,298.
Terms, defined.For purposes of the Human Trafficking Victims Civil Remedy Act:
(1) Human trafficking means labor trafficking, labor trafficking of a minor, sex trafficking, or sex trafficking of a minor, as those terms are defined in section 28-830; and
(2) Trafficking victim has the same meaning as in section 28-830.
25-21,299.
Civil action authorized; recovery; attorney's fees and costs; order of attachment.(1) Any trafficking victim, his or her parent or legal guardian, or personal representative in the event of such victim's death, who suffered or continues to suffer personal or mental injury, death, or any other damages proximately caused by such human trafficking may bring a civil action against any person who knowingly (a) engaged in human trafficking of such victim within this state or (b) aided or assisted in the human trafficking of such victim within this state.
(2) A plaintiff who prevails in a civil action brought pursuant to the Human Trafficking Victims Civil Remedy Act may recover his or her damages proximately caused by the actions of the defendant plus any and all attorney's fees and costs reasonably associated with the civil action.
(3) Damages recoverable pursuant to subsection (2) of this section include all damages otherwise recoverable under the law and include, but are not limited to:
(a) The physical pain and mental suffering the plaintiff has experienced and is reasonably certain to experience in the future;
(b) The reasonable value of the medical, hospital, nursing, and care and supplies reasonably needed by and actually provided to the plaintiff and reasonably certain to be needed and provided in the future;
(c) The reasonable value of transportation, housing, and child care reasonably needed and actually incurred by the plaintiff;
(d) The reasonable value of the plaintiff's labor and services the plaintiff has lost because he or she was a trafficking victim;
(e) The reasonable monetary value of the harm caused by the documentation and circulation of the human trafficking;
(f) The reasonable costs incurred by the plaintiff to relocate away from the defendant or the defendant's associates;
(g) In the event of death, damages available as in other actions for wrongful death; and
(h) The reasonable costs incurred by the plaintiff to participate in the criminal investigation or prosecution or attend criminal proceedings related to trafficking the plaintiff.
(4) In addition to all remedies available under this section, the court may enter an order of attachment pursuant to sections 25-1001 to 25-1010.
25-21,300.
Time for bringing action; limitation.Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any action to recover damages under the Human Trafficking Victims Civil Remedy Act shall be filed within ten years after the later of:
(1) The conclusion of any related criminal prosecution against the person or persons from whom recovery is sought;
(2) The receipt of actual or constructive notice sent or given to the trafficking victim or his or her parent or legal guardian by a member of a law enforcement entity informing the victim or his or her parent or legal guardian that the entity has identified the person who knowingly (a) engaged in human trafficking of such victim or (b) aided or assisted with the human trafficking of such victim;
(3) The time at which the human trafficking of the trafficking victim ended if he or she was eighteen years of age or older; or
(4) The victim reaching the age of majority if the victim was under eighteen years of age at the time he or she was a victim of human trafficking.
25-21,301.
Use of pseudonym.In any action brought pursuant to the Human Trafficking Victims Civil Remedy Act, a plaintiff may request to use a pseudonym instead of his or her legal name in all court proceedings and records. Upon finding that the use of a pseudonym is proper, the court shall ensure that the pseudonym is used in all court proceedings and records.
25-21,302.
Property used in commission of certain crimes; forfeiture; proceeding; confiscating authority; duties; seizure of property; proceedings; petition; Attorney General; duties; answer; hearing; disposition of proceeds.(1)(a) In addition to any other civil or criminal penalties provided by law, any property used in the commission of a violation of the Child Pornography Prevention Act or section 28-813, 28-831, 28-1102, 28-1103, 28-1104, 28-1105, 28-1105.01, or 28-1107 may be forfeited through a proceeding as provided in this section.
(b) The following property shall be subject to forfeiture if used or intended for use as an instrumentality in or used in furtherance of a violation of the Child Pornography Prevention Act or section 28-813, 28-831, 28-1102, 28-1103, 28-1104, 28-1105, 28-1105.01, or 28-1107:
(i) Conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels;
(ii) Books, records, telecommunication equipment, or computers;
(iii) Money or weapons;
(iv) Everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange for an act in violation and all proceeds traceable to the exchange;
(v) Negotiable instruments and securities;
(vi) Any property, real or personal, directly or indirectly acquired or received in a violation or as an inducement to violate;
(vii) Any property traceable to proceeds from a violation; and
(viii) Any real property, including any right, title, and interest in the whole of or any part of any lot or tract of land, used in furtherance of a violation of the Child Pornography Prevention Act or section 28-813, 28-831, 28-1102, 28-1103, 28-1104, 28-1105, 28-1105.01, or 28-1107.
(c)(i) No property used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier is subject to forfeiture under this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in charge of the property is a consenting party or privy to a violation of the Child Pornography Prevention Act or section 28-813, 28-831, 28-1102, 28-1103, 28-1104, 28-1105, 28-1105.01, or 28-1107.
(ii) No property is subject to forfeiture under this section by reason of any act or omission proved by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted without his or her actual knowledge or consent. If the confiscating authority has reason to believe that the property is leased or rented property, then the confiscating authority shall notify the owner of the property within five days after the confiscation or within five days after forming reason to believe that the property is leased or rented property.
(iii) Forfeiture of property encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party if such party neither had actual knowledge of nor consented to the act or omission.
(2) No property shall be forfeited under this section, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by the owner to have been committed or omitted without his or her actual knowledge or consent.
(3) Seizure without process may be made if the seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a search warrant.
(4)(a) When any property is seized under this section, proceedings shall be instituted within a reasonable period of time from the date of seizure or the subject property shall be immediately returned to the party from whom seized.
(b) A petition for forfeiture shall be filed by the Attorney General or a county attorney in the name of the State of Nebraska and may be filed in the county in which the seizure is made, the county in which the criminal prosecution is brought, or the county in which the owner of the seized property is found. Forfeiture proceedings may be brought in the district court or the county court. A copy of the petition shall be served upon the following persons by service of process in the same manner as in civil cases:
(i) The owner of the property if the owner's address is known;
(ii) Any secured party who has registered a lien or filed a financing statement as provided by law if the identity of the secured party can be ascertained by the entity filing the petition by making a good faith effort to ascertain the identity of the secured party;
(iii) Any other bona fide lienholder or secured party or other person holding an interest in the property in the nature of a security interest of whom the seizing law enforcement agency has actual knowledge; and
(iv) Any person in possession of property subject to forfeiture at the time that it was seized.
(5) If the property is a motor vehicle subject to titling under the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act or a vessel subject to titling under the State Boat Act, and if there is any reasonable cause to believe that the motor vehicle or vessel has been titled, inquiry of the Department of Motor Vehicles shall be made as to what the records of the department show as to who is the record owner of the motor vehicle or vessel and who, if anyone, holds any lien or security interest that affects the motor vehicle or vessel.
(6) If the property is a motor vehicle or vessel and is not titled in the State of Nebraska, then an attempt shall be made to ascertain the name and address of the person in whose name the motor vehicle or vessel is licensed, and if the motor vehicle or vessel is licensed in a state which has in effect a certificate of title law, inquiry of the appropriate agency of that state shall be made as to what the records of the agency show as to who is the record owner of the motor vehicle or vessel and who, if anyone, holds any lien, security interest, or other instrument in the nature of a security device that affects the motor vehicle or vessel.
(7) If the property is of a nature that a financing statement is required by the laws of this state to be filed to perfect a security interest affecting the property and if there is any reasonable cause to believe that a financing statement covering the security interest has been filed under the laws of this state, inquiry shall be made as to what the records show as to who is the record owner of the property and who, if anyone, has filed a financing statement affecting the property.
(8) If the property is an aircraft or part thereof and if there is any reasonable cause to believe that an instrument in the nature of a security device affects the property, inquiry shall be made as to what the records of the Federal Aviation Administration show as to who is the record owner of the property and who, if anyone, holds an instrument in the nature of a security device which affects the property.
(9) If the answer to an inquiry states that the record owner of the property is any person other than the person who was in possession of it when it was seized or states that any person holds any lien, encumbrance, security interest, other interest in the nature of a security interest, mortgage, or deed of trust that affects the property, the record owner and also any lienholder, secured party, other person who holds an interest in the property in the nature of a security interest, or holder of an encumbrance, mortgage, or deed of trust that affects the property is to be named in the petition of forfeiture and is to be served with process in the same manner as in civil cases.
(10) If the owner of the property cannot be found and served with a copy of the petition of forfeiture or if no person was in possession of the property subject to forfeiture at the time that it was seized and the owner of the property is unknown, there shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the proceeding is pending an affidavit to such effect, whereupon the clerk of the court shall publish notice of the hearing addressed to "the Unknown Owner of ............," filling in the blank space with a reasonably detailed description of the property subject to forfeiture. Service by publication shall be completed in the same manner as is provided in the code of civil procedure for the service of process in civil actions in the district courts of this state.
(11) No proceedings instituted pursuant to this section shall proceed to hearing unless the judge conducting the hearing is satisfied that this section has been complied with. Any answer received from an inquiry required by this section shall be introduced into evidence at the hearing.
(12)(a) An owner of property that has been seized shall file an answer within thirty days after the completion of service of process. If an answer is not filed, the court shall hear evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture and forfeit the property to the seizing law enforcement agency. If an answer is filed, a time for hearing on forfeiture shall be set within thirty days after filing the answer or at the succeeding term of court if court would not be in session within thirty days after filing the answer. The court may postpone the forfeiture hearing to a date past the time any criminal action is pending against the owner upon request of any party.
(b) If the owner of the property has filed an answer denying that the property is subject to forfeiture, then the burden is on the petitioner to prove that the property is subject to forfeiture. However, if an answer has not been filed by the owner of the property, the petition for forfeiture may be introduced into evidence and is prima facie evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture. The burden of proof placed upon the petitioner in regard to property forfeited under this section shall be by clear and convincing evidence.
(c) At the hearing any claimant of any right, title, or interest in the property may prove his or her lien, encumbrance, security interest, other interest in the nature of a security interest, mortgage, or deed of trust to be bona fide and created without actual knowledge or consent that the property was to be used so as to cause the property to be subject to forfeiture.
(d) If it is found that the property is subject to forfeiture, then the judge shall forfeit the property. However, if proof at the hearing discloses that the interest of any bona fide lienholder, any secured party, any other person holding an interest in the property in the nature of a security interest, or any holder of a bona fide encumbrance, mortgage, or deed of trust is greater than or equal to the present value of the property, the court shall order the property released to him or her. If the interest is less than the present value of the property and if the proof shows that the property is subject to forfeiture, the court shall order the property forfeited.
(13) Unless otherwise provided in this section, all personal property which is forfeited under this section shall be liquidated and, after deduction of court costs and the expense of liquidation, the proceeds shall be remitted to the county treasurer of the county in which the seizure was made. The county treasurer shall remit all such proceeds from property forfeited pursuant to this section to the State Treasurer for distribution in accordance with Article VII, section 5, of the Constitution of Nebraska.
(14) All money forfeited under this section shall be remitted in the same manner as provided in subsection (13) of this section.
(15) All real estate forfeited under this section shall be sold to the highest bidder at a public auction for cash, the auction to be conducted by the county sheriff or his or her designee at such place, on such notice, and in accordance with the same procedure, as far as practicable, as is required in the case of sales of land under execution at law. The proceeds of the sale shall first be applied to the cost and expense in administering and conducting the sale, then to the satisfaction of all mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and encumbrances of record on the property. The remaining proceeds shall be remitted in the same manner as provided in subsection (13) of this section.
(16) The forfeiture procedure set forth in this section is the sole remedy of any claimant, and no court shall have jurisdiction to interfere therewith by replevin, by injunction, by supersedeas, or by any other manner.
Cross References
Child Pornography Prevention Act, see section 28-1463.01.
Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act, see section 60-101.
State Boat Act, see section 37-1201.
25-21,303.
Property used in commission of certain crimes; forfeiture; law enforcement agency or prosecuting attorney; report to Auditor of Public Accounts; contents; report to Legislature.(1) For all money, securities, negotiable instruments, firearms, conveyances, or real estate seized pursuant to section 25-21,302, the appropriate law enforcement agency or, as provided in subsection (5) of this section, the prosecuting attorney shall provide a written report of the forfeiture to the Auditor of Public Accounts. The report shall include:
(a) The date of the seizure;
(b) The type of property seized, such as a vehicle, currency, or a firearm;
(c) A description of the property seized, including, if applicable, the make, model, year, and serial number of the property seized;
(d) The street name and traffic direction where the seizure occurred, such as eastbound, westbound, southbound, or northbound;
(e) The crime for which the suspect was charged;
(f) The disposition of the property seized through the forfeiture process, such as the property was returned to the suspect, returned to a third-party owner, sold, destroyed, or retained by law enforcement;
(g) The basis for disposition of the seized property, such as the suspect was found not guilty, agreement for disposition, criminal forfeiture, or civil forfeiture;
(h) The value of the property forfeited;
(i) If the seizure resulted from a motor vehicle stop, (i) whether a warning or citation was issued, an arrest was made, or a search was conducted and (ii) the characteristics of the race or ethnicity of the suspect. The identification of such characteristics shall be based on the observation and perception of the law enforcement officer responsible for reporting the motor vehicle stop. The information shall not be required to be provided by the suspect; and
(j) Any additional information the Nebraska State Patrol, a county sheriff, any city or village police department, or any other law enforcement agency in this state, as the case may be, deems appropriate.
(2) The appropriate law enforcement agency or prosecuting attorney shall report to the Auditor of Public Accounts all instances in which property seized for forfeiture was returned to its owner either because the forfeiture was not pursued or for any other reason.
(3) Reports shall be made on an annual basis in a manner prescribed by the Auditor of Public Accounts. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall submit a report to the Legislature on the nature and extent of such seizures on an annual basis. Such report shall be submitted electronically.
(4) For forfeitures resulting from the activities of multijurisdictional law enforcement entities, a law enforcement entity other than a Nebraska law enforcement entity shall, on its own initiative, report the information required by this section.
(5) The prosecuting attorney is not required to report information required by this section unless he or she has been notified by the Auditor of Public Accounts that the appropriate law enforcement agency has not reported the information required by this section.
25-2201.
Process; style.The style of all processes shall be "The State of Nebraska, .............. county." It shall be under the seal of the court from whence the same shall issue, shall be signed by the clerk, and dated the day it issued.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 880, p. 547; R.S.1913, § 8549; C.S.1922, § 9500; C.S.1929, § 20-2201; R.S.1943, § 25-2201.
Cross References
Constitutional requirements, see Article V, section 24, Constitution of Nebraska.
Annotations
Summons with venue laid in county where action was brought, but directed to sheriff of another county for service upon defendant there, was proper. Alden Merc. Co. v. Randall, 102 Neb. 738, 169 N.W. 433 (1918).
Presumption exists that original summons was issued under seal. Herold v. Coates, 88 Neb. 487, 129 N.W. 998 (1911).
Legislature intended to establish a uniform rule with respect to legal procedure. Motion for new trial may be filed on Memorial Day. Tully v. Grand Island Tel. Co., 87 Neb. 822, 128 N.W. 508 (1910).
Writ of mandamus must be issued by clerk under seal of court. State ex rel. Hansen v. Carrico, 86 Neb. 448, 125 N.W. 1110 (1910).
Process headed, "The State of Nebraska, County of Gage, to the sheriff of said county," was proper. Hoyt v. Little, 55 Neb. 71, 75 N.W. 56 (1898).
Process for violation of city ordinance should run in the name of "The People of the State of Nebraska" and not in name of city. City of Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101 (1875).
25-2202.
Service when sheriff is a party or is interested.An order for a provisional remedy or any other process, in an action wherein the sheriff is a party, or is interested, shall be directed to the coroner. If both these officers are interested, the process shall be directed to and executed by a person appointed by the court or judge.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 881, p. 547; R.S.1913, § 8550; C.S.1922, § 9501; C.S.1929, § 20-2202; R.S.1943, § 25-2202.
Annotations
Where sheriff is party, private person may be deputized to serve process. Mysenburg v. Leisure, 63 Neb. 239, 88 N.W. 478 (1901).
25-2203.
Process; special process server; return; appointed on motion; fees.The court or judge, for good cause, may appoint a person, corporation, partnership, or limited liability company to serve a particular process or order which person or entity shall have the same power to execute it which the sheriff has. The person or entity may be appointed on the motion of the party obtaining the process or order, and the return must be verified by affidavit. Such appointment may be made in the form of a general order of the court for the purpose of service of process or orders which may be sought by the movant. The person or entity shall be entitled to the fees allowed to the sheriff for similar services.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 882, p. 547; R.S.1913, § 8551; C.S.1922, § 9502; C.S.1929, § 20-2203; R.S.1943, § 25-2203;
Laws 1994, LB 1224, § 38.
Annotations
Justice of the peace may deputize a private person to serve a summons. Mysenburg v. Leisure, 63 Neb. 239, 88 N.W. 478 (1901).
Constable cannot deputize person to serve process; county judge or justice may. Gilbert v. Brown, 9 Neb. 90, 2 N.W. 376 (1879).
25-2204.
Clerks of courts; writs and orders; issuance; praecipes.All writs and orders for provisional remedies and process of every kind, shall be issued by the clerks of the several courts. Before they shall be issued a praecipe shall be filed with the clerk, demanding the same; which praecipe shall be for the direction of the clerk, and not material to the papers in the case after the issuing of such writ or process.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 883, p. 547; R.S.1913, § 8552; C.S.1922, § 9503; C.S.1929, § 20-2204; R.S.1943, § 25-2204.
Annotations
In compensation case, where claimant filed notice of appeal with compensation commissioner and filed petition on appeal in district court, right of review attached, it became duty of clerk to issue summons without praecipe being filed. McIntosh v. Standard Oil Co., 121 Neb. 92, 236 N.W. 152 (1931).
Writ of mandamus issued by judge is void. State ex rel. Hansen v. Carrico, 86 Neb. 448, 125 N.W. 1110 (1910).
Clerk of district court may issue writ of commitment after sentence without special directions by court or judge. Rhodes v. Meyer, 225 F.Supp. 80 (D. Neb. 1963).
25-2205.
Case file and record; preservation.The clerk of each of the courts shall maintain and preserve a case file and a record of all documents delivered to him or her for that purpose in every action or special proceeding. Retention and disposition of the records shall be determined by the State Records Administrator pursuant to the Records Management Act.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 884, p. 547; R.S.1913, § 8553; C.S.1922, § 9504; C.S.1929, § 20-2205; R.S.1943, § 25-2205;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 36.
Cross References
Records Management Act, see section 84-1220.
Annotations
Papers are filed in office of clerk of district court only when deposited with the proper officer in his office and received by him in his official capacity. Jolliffe v. City of North Platte, 139 Neb. 431, 297 N.W. 666 (1941).
This section requires the clerk of the trial court to file all documents delivered to him or her for that purpose. State v. Muse, 15 Neb. App. 13, 721 N.W.2d 661 (2006).
25-2206.
Papers; endorsement.The clerk of the court shall endorse upon every paper filed with him, the day of filing it; and upon every order for a provisional remedy, and upon every undertaking given under the same, the day of its return to his office.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 885, p. 547; R.S.1913, § 8554; C.S.1922, § 9505; C.S.1929, § 20-2206; R.S.1943, § 25-2206.
Annotations
This section requires the clerk of the trial court to endorse the day of filing upon any document delivered to him or her for that purpose. State v. Muse, 15 Neb. App. 13, 721 N.W.2d 661 (2006).
25-2207.
Record of service of summons; entry as evidence.The clerk of the court shall, upon the return of every summons served, enter upon the record the name of the defendant or defendants summoned and the day of the service upon each one. The entry shall be evidence of the service of the summons in case of the loss thereof.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 886, p. 548; R.S.1913, § 8555; C.S.1922, § 9506; C.S.1929, § 20-2207; R.S.1943, § 25-2207;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 37.
25-2208.
Judicial records; duty to keep.The clerk of the court shall keep the records, books and papers appertaining to the court, and record its proceedings.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 887, p. 548; R.S.1913, § 8556; C.S.1922, § 9507; C.S.1929, § 20-2208; R.S.1943, § 25-2208.
Annotations
Section is mandatory and clerk must make complete record, though fees and costs not tendered. State v. Several Parcels of Land, 82 Neb. 51, 117 N.W. 450 (1908).
Clerk is liable to county for expense of replacing books lost through his negligence. Toncray v. Dodge County, 33 Neb. 802, 51 N.W. 235 (1892).
25-2209.
Clerk of district court; required records enumerated.(1) The clerk of the district court shall keep records, to be maintained on the court's electronic case management system, called the register of actions, the trial docket, the judge's docket notes, the financial record, the general index, the judgment index, and the case file. Retention and disposition of the records shall be determined by the State Records Administrator pursuant to the Records Management Act.
(2) The case file, numbered in chronological order, shall contain the complaint or petition and subsequent pleadings in the case file. The case file may be maintained as an electronic document through the court's electronic case management system, on microfilm, or in a paper volume and disposed of when determined by the State Records Administrator pursuant to the Records Management Act.
(3) For purposes of this section:
(a) Financial record means the financial accounting of the court, including the recording of all money receipted and disbursed by the court and the receipts and disbursements of all money held as an investment;
(b) General index means the alphabetical listing of the names of the parties to the suit, both direct and inverse, with the case number where all proceedings in such action may be found;
(c) Judge's docket notes means the notations of the judge detailing the actions in a court proceeding and the entering of orders and judgments;
(d) Judgment index means the alphabetical listing of all judgment debtors and judgment creditors;
(e) Register of actions means the official court record and summary of the case; and
(f) Trial docket means a list of pending cases as provided in section 25-2211.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 321, p. 448; G.S.1873, c. 57, § 321, p. 579; R.S.1913, § 8557; C.S.1922, § 9508; C.S.1929, § 20-2209; R.S.1943, § 25-2209;
Laws 1971, LB 128, § 1; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 13;
Laws 2011, LB17, § 4; Laws 2018, LB193, § 38.
Cross References
Records Management Act, see section 84-1220.
Annotations
Appearance docket is required to be kept by clerk of district court. Solomon v. A. W. Farney, Inc., 136 Neb. 338, 286 N.W. 254 (1939).
Failure of court in decree of confirmation to direct clerk to make entry on journal that court is satisfied of legality of such sale is not prejudicial where clerk had, in fact, made such entry. Erwin v. Brunke, 133 Neb. 745, 277 N.W. 48 (1938).
Satisfaction of judgment entered on appearance docket is not such as contemplated by law. Knaak v. Brown, 115 Neb. 260, 212 N.W. 431 (1927).
Court may order that paid judgment be canceled of record. Manker v. Sine, 47 Neb. 736, 66 N.W. 840 (1896).
25-2210.
Repealed. Laws 2018, LB193, § 97.
25-2211.
Trial docket.The trial docket shall be available for the court on the first day of each month setting forth each case pending in the order of filing of the complaint to be called for trial. For the purpose of arranging the trial docket, an issue shall be considered as made up when either party is in default of a pleading. If the defendant fails to answer, the cause for the purpose of this section shall be deemed to be at issue upon questions of fact, but in every such case the plaintiff may move for and take such judgment as he or she is entitled to, on the defendant's default, on or after the day on which the action is set for trial. No witnesses shall be subpoenaed in any case while the cause stands upon issue of law. Whenever the court regards the answer in any case as frivolous and put in for delay only, no leave to answer or reply shall be given unless upon payment of all costs then accrued in the action. When the number of actions filed exceeds three hundred, the judge or judges of the district court for the county may, by rule or order, classify them in such manner as they may deem expedient and cause them to be placed according to such classifications upon different trial dockets and the respective trial dockets may be proceeded with and causes thereon tried, heard, or otherwise disposed of, concurrently by one or more of the judges. Provision may be made by rule of court that issues of fact shall not be for trial at any term when the number of pending actions exceeds three hundred, except upon such previous notice of trial as may be prescribed thereby.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 323, p. 448; Laws 1887, c. 94, § 1, p. 647; Laws 1899, c. 83, § 1, p. 338; R.S.1913, § 8559; C.S.1922, § 9510; C.S.1929, § 20-2211; R.S.1943, § 25-2211; Laws 1951, c. 74, § 2(1), p. 230;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 54; Laws 2018, LB193, § 39.
Annotations
Demurrer ore tenus is recognized as permissible practice. Dickinson v. Lawson, 125 Neb. 646, 251 N.W. 656 (1933).
Assignment of cases for trial at beginning of term is only provisional, and may be advanced by continuance of preceding cases. Poggensee v. Feddern, 75 Neb. 584, 106 N.W. 654 (1906).
It is not essential to trial that case appear on docket. Shelby v. St. James Orphan Asylum, 66 Neb. 40, 92 N.W. 155 (1902).
County judge must make docket of term cases on first day of term. Bond v. Wycoff, 42 Neb. 214, 60 N.W. 564 (1894).
25-2211.01.
Repealed. Laws 2018, LB193, § 97.
25-2211.02.
Repealed. Laws 2018, LB193, § 97.
25-2212.
Repealed. Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 29.
25-2213.
Clerks of courts of record other than district courts; duties.The provisions of sections 25-2204 to 25-2211 shall, as far as applicable, apply to clerks of other courts of record.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 888, p. 548; R.S.1913, § 8562; C.S.1922, § 9513; C.S.1929, § 20-2214; R.S.1943, § 25-2213; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 14;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 40.
25-2214.
Clerks of courts; general powers and duties.The clerk of each of the courts shall exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred and imposed upon him by other provisions of this code, by other statutes and by the common law. In the performance of his duties he shall be under the direction of his court. It shall be the duty of the clerk of each of said courts to prepare and file the annual inventory statement with the county board of his county of all county personal property in his custody or possession, as provided in sections 23-346 to 23-350.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 889, p. 548; R.S.1913, § 8563; C.S.1922, § 9514; C.S.1929, § 20-2215; Laws 1939, c. 28, § 21, p. 159; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 20-2215; R.S.1943, § 25-2214.
Annotations
Although the appellate court's mandate did not state that buyout payments were to be made to the clerk of the district court, the district court had authority to make such an order, because the proper place to pay a judgment is the clerk of the court in which the judgment is obtained. Robertson v. Jacobs Cattle Co., 292 Neb. 195, 874 N.W.2d 1 (2015).
Although the clerk of the district court is authorized to spread upon the court journal the proceedings had and relief granted by the court, and to that extent is responsible for entry of the judgment, such clerk has no authority to perform the judicial function of rendering a judgment. Building Systems, Inc. v. Medical Center, Ltd., 228 Neb. 168, 421 N.W.2d 773 (1988).
Where petition on appeal is filed in district court in compensation case, it is clerk's duty to issue summons, and place same in hands of proper officer for service, without praecipe being filed. McIntosh v. Standard Oil Co., 121 Neb. 92, 236 N.W. 152 (1931).
Supreme Court will not issue mandamus to clerk unless district court has refused. State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Houseworth, 63 Neb. 658, 88 N.W. 858 (1902).
Money paid to clerk, pursuant to order or judgment of court, is received in official capacity, and sureties are liable for failure to account therefor. Bantley v. Baker, 61 Neb. 92, 84 N.W. 603 (1900).
Clerk of court is the proper custodian of money paid into court. Dirks v. Juel, 59 Neb. 353, 80 N.W. 1045 (1899).
Money paid to clerk in mortgage foreclosure proceeding before judgment was not received in official capacity. Commercial Inv. Co. v. Peck, 53 Neb. 204, 73 N.W. 452 (1897).
Mandamus will not lie in Supreme Court to compel clerk of district court to issue execution on judgment when no application for such order has been made to district court. State ex rel. Ogden v. Frank, 52 Neb. 553, 72 N.W. 857 (1897).
District court has jurisdiction to direct clerk in the performance of his official duties. State ex rel. Solmon v. Moores, 29 Neb. 122, 45 N.W. 278 (1890).
Clerks perform their duties under the direction of the court. State v. Wahrman, 11 Neb. App. 101, 644 N.W.2d 572 (2002).
25-2214.01.
Clerk of district court; money or property received; powers and duties.(1) Whenever any money or other property is received by the clerk of the district court, he or she shall carefully manage it and may, when the money cannot immediately be paid out to its rightful owner, deposit the money in interest-bearing accounts in insured banking or savings institutions. Any interest accrued from such deposit shall be paid over to the county treasurer to be credited to the county general fund, except that when the funds so deposited belonged to a deceased person whose personal representative has not yet been appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, then the interest accruing on such money shall be paid to the estate of such person after the appointment of a personal representative and upon order of the court.
(2) Any property other than money which is received by the clerk of the district court shall be held by him or her in safekeeping until claimed by the rightful owner or, if there is a dispute as to the ownership of such property, until ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction to give possession of the property to some person.
25-2218.
Common law; applicability.The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to this code.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 1, p. 394; R.S.1913, § 8567; C.S.1922, § 9518; C.S.1929, § 20-2219; R.S.1943, § 25-2218.
Annotations
1. Construction
2. Miscellaneous
1. Construction
Liberal construction cannot, for the purpose of embracing other persons than those to whom a statute is expressly made applicable, supply that which the Legislature has omitted. Downing v. Schwenck, 138 Neb. 395, 293 N.W. 278 (1940).
Provisions of code of civil procedure must be liberally construed. Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. North, 125 Neb. 723, 251 N.W. 895 (1933).
Liberal construction required sustaining of jurisdiction of district court in workmen's compensation case on filing of petition for appeal, and to require clerk to issue summons without praecipe. McIntosh v. Standard Oil Co., 121 Neb. 92, 236 N.W. 152 (1931).
Statute, providing how and who may intervene, should be liberally construed. Webb v. Patterson, 114 Neb. 346, 207 N.W. 522 (1926).
Petition should be liberally construed as against objection that it stated two causes of action instead of one jointly. Pier v. Cauley, 98 Neb. 80, 152 N.W. 298 (1915).
Remedial statute should be liberally construed. Rine v. Rine, 91 Neb. 248, 135 N.W. 1051 (1912).
Statutory procedure for adoption of children should be liberally construed. Ferguson v. Herr, 64 Neb. 659, 94 N.W. 542 (1903), reversing 64 Neb. 649, 90 N.W. 625 (1902).
Where petition is first attacked by objection to introduction of testimony, it will be liberally construed. Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Ruby, 60 Neb. 216, 82 N.W. 629 (1900).
Courts are prohibited from applying rule of strict construction to provisions of code of civil procedure. Kearney Electric Co. v. Laughlin, 45 Neb. 390, 63 N.W. 941 (1895).
2. Miscellaneous
This section, along with another section, forms the basis of the right to bring a cross-suit. Rogers v. Western Electric Co., 179 Neb. 359, 138 N.W.2d 423 (1965).
Where party sought to reserve right to introduce further evidence, trial court abused discretion in denying defendant leave to withdraw motion to dismiss and introduce further evidence. Adams v. Seeley, 94 Neb. 243, 142 N.W. 541 (1913).
Cross-petition for relief against the plaintiff is recognized. Armstrong v. Mayer, 69 Neb. 187, 95 N.W. 51 (1903).
25-2219.
Deputies of ministerial officers; acts; effect.Any duty enjoined by this code upon a ministerial officer, and any act permitted to be done by him, may be performed by his lawful deputy.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 893, p. 548; R.S.1913, § 8568; C.S.1922, § 9519; C.S.1929, § 20-2220; R.S.1943, § 25-2219.
Annotations
Performance of duties of an office by a de facto incumbent gives him no claim to the official compensation. McCollough v. County of Douglas, 150 Neb. 389, 34 N.W.2d 654 (1948).
Deputy sheriff may conduct foreclosure sale. Richardson v. Hahn, 63 Neb. 294, 88 N.W. 527 (1901).
Deputy clerk may settle bill of exceptions, though clerk not absent. Brownell & Co. v. Fuller, 54 Neb. 586, 74 N.W. 1105 (1898).
Deputy sheriff may act for sheriff in appraising property. Nebraska Loan & Building Assn. v. Marshall, 51 Neb. 534, 71 N.W. 63 (1897).
25-2220.
Oaths and affirmations.Whenever an oath is required by this code, the affirmation of a person conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, shall have the same effect.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 894, p. 549; R.S.1913, § 8569; C.S.1922, § 9520; C.S.1929, § 20-2221; R.S.1943, § 25-2220.
Annotations
It is not contempt of court to decline to be sworn by taking the usual oath, since the witness has the right to affirm. Wilcox v. State, 46 Neb. 402, 64 N.W. 1072 (1895).
25-2221.
Time; how computed; offices may be closed, when; federal holiday schedule observed; exceptions.Except as may be otherwise more specifically provided, the period of time within which an act is to be done in any action or proceeding shall be computed by excluding the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run. The last day of the period so computed shall be included unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a day during which the offices of courts of record may be legally closed as provided in this section, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day on which the office will be open.
All courts and their offices may be closed on Saturdays, Sundays, days on which a specifically designated court is closed by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and these holidays: New Year's Day, January 1; Birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., the third Monday in January; President's Day, the third Monday in February; Arbor Day, the last Friday in April; Memorial Day, the last Monday in May; Juneteenth National Independence Day, June 19; Independence Day, July 4; Labor Day, the first Monday in September; Indigenous Peoples' Day and Columbus Day, the second Monday in October; Veterans Day, November 11; Thanksgiving Day, the fourth Thursday in November; the day after Thanksgiving; Christmas Day, December 25; and all days declared by law or proclamation of the Governor to be holidays. Such days shall be designated as nonjudicial days. If any such holiday falls on Sunday, the following Monday shall be a holiday. If any such holiday falls on Saturday, the preceding Friday shall be a holiday. Court services shall be available on all other days. If the date designated by the state for observance of any legal holiday pursuant to this section, except Veterans Day, is different from the date of observance of such holiday pursuant to a federal holiday schedule, the federal holiday schedule shall be observed.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 895, p. 549; R.S.1913, § 8570; C.S.1922, § 9521; C.S.1929, § 20-2222; R.S.1943, § 25-2221; Laws 1959, c. 108, § 1, p. 437; Laws 1967, c. 151, § 1, p. 448; Laws 1969, c. 844, § 1, p. 3179;
Laws 1973, LB 34, § 1; Laws 1975, LB 218, § 1; Laws 1978, LB 855, § 1; Laws 1988, LB 821, § 1; Laws 1988, LB 909, § 1; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 55; Laws 2003, LB 760, § 6; Laws 2011, LB669, § 17; Laws 2020, LB848, § 2; Laws 2022, LB29, § 1.
Annotations
1. Scope
2. Miscellaneous
1. Scope
In the absence of a more specific rule, this section's rule for computing time applies in calculating whether an action is barred by the statute of limitations. Schuemann v. Timperley, 314 Neb. 298, 989 N.W.2d 921 (2023).
In the absence of a specific imperative to the contrary, this section applies to administrative rules and regulations. Strode v. Saunders Cty. Bd. of Equal., 283 Neb. 802, 815 N.W.2d 856 (2012).
The application of this section is not limited to proceedings in a court, and this section applies to matters of practice which are not necessarily enunciated in statutes. Strode v. Saunders Cty. Bd. of Equal., 283 Neb. 802, 815 N.W.2d 856 (2012).
This section establishes a uniform rule applicable alike to the construction of statutes and to matters of practice, which the Nebraska Supreme Court has regularly applied in computing time periods specified in other statutes. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
This section controls the method of computing the statutory filing deadline imposed by section 32-707.01. State ex rel. Wieland v. Beermann, 246 Neb. 808, 523 N.W.2d 518 (1994).
When a statute requires an act to be done a certain number of days before a known event, the fact that the last day for the action to be done in order to give the appropriate number of days falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday postpones the time for performance to the next following business day. State v. Tasich, 242 Neb. 870, 496 N.W.2d 538 (1993).
When the period within which an act is to be done in any action or proceeding is given in terms of months or years, the last day of the period is the appropriate anniversary of the triggering act or event, unless that anniversary falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or court holiday. Licht v. Association Servs., Inc., 236 Neb. 616, 463 N.W.2d 566 (1990).
Defendant was afforded an extra day to file his appeal because one month from the overruling of his motion for a new trial was a Sunday. State v. Bridger, 223 Neb. 250, 388 N.W.2d 831 (1986).
Excluding September 5, 1969, the last day on which work was done, the last day of the four-year period of limitations was September 5, 1973. George P. Rose Sodding & Grading Co. v. Dennis, 195 Neb. 221, 237 N.W.2d 418 (1976).
Due to intervening weekend and holiday, transcript on appeal was timely filed. Knoefler Honey Farms v. County of Sherman, 193 Neb. 95, 225 N.W.2d 855 (1975).
This section does not require courts to be closed on Saturday. Rhodes v. Crites, 173 Neb. 501, 113 N.W.2d 611 (1962).
All courts may be open for business on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in the discretion of the court. Rhodes v. Star Herald Printing Co., 173 Neb. 496, 113 N.W.2d 658 (1962).
This section establishes a uniform rule applicable alike to the construction of statutes and matters of practice. State ex rel. Smith v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 152 Neb. 676, 42 N.W.2d 297 (1950).
Where a statute provides that it shall take effect from and after its passage and approval, the day of its passage is excluded in computing the time it goes into effect. Wilson & Co. v. County of Otoe, 140 Neb. 518, 300 N.W. 415 (1941).
In determining the time within which an appeal can be taken, the last day should be included even though it is a holiday for the purposes of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Taylor Dairy Products Company v. Owen, 139 Neb. 603, 298 N.W. 332 (1941).
This section is general in application and does not control where there is special provision directing method of computing time. Garrett v. State, 118 Neb. 373, 224 N.W. 860 (1929).
When the last day of the two-year period to redeem land sold at tax sale falls on Sunday, the owner's right of redemption exists during all of the next day. Counselman v. Samuels, 93 Neb. 168, 139 N.W. 862 (1913).
In filing motion for new trial where last day is a holiday, it is included. Tully v. Grand Island Tel. Co., 87 Neb. 822, 128 N.W. 508 (1910).
Special provision for entering judgment by justice of peace as to computation of time was not controlled by this section. Calland v. Wagner, 86 Neb. 755, 126 N.W. 375 (1910).
Section controls on computation of time, although period be days, months or years. When last day falls on Sunday, it is excluded. Johnston v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co., 86 Neb. 165, 125 N.W. 153 (1910).
If the last day of the time within which an appeal bond must be given falls on Sunday, bond may be given on Monday. Deere, Wells & Co. v. Hodges, 59 Neb. 288, 80 N.W. 897 (1899).
Section applies to construction of statutes, as well as practice. McGinn v. State, 46 Neb. 427, 65 N.W. 46 (1895).
On summons in justice court, service three days before trial, including day of service, is sufficient. White v. German Ins. Co., 15 Neb. 660, 20 N.W. 30 (1884).
On appeal from justice court, where tenth day falls on Sunday, bond filed on Monday is proper. Monell & Lashley v. Terwilliger, 8 Neb. 360, 1 N.W. 246 (1879).
In computing time from a designated date, first day should be excluded and last day of period included. In re Schmidt, 54 F.Supp. 262 (D. Neb. 1944).
2. Miscellaneous
In conjunction with this section and subsection (13) of section 49-801, a political subdivision has until the end of the last day of the 6-month period after a claimant has filed a tort claim upon which to make a final disposition of such claim. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
When the 10th day after a judgment is a Saturday or Sunday, a motion for new trial is timely filed on the following Monday. Wanha v. Long, 255 Neb. 849, 587 N.W.2d 531 (1998).
Uniform rule is established applicable alike to construction of statutes and matters of practice. Ruan Transport Corp. v. Peake, Inc., 163 Neb. 319, 79 N.W.2d 575 (1956).
Applied to computation of time for filing motion for new trial. Harsche v. Czyz, 157 Neb. 699, 61 N.W.2d 265 (1953).
Where notice is required to be published "for at least one week," publication September 3, in weekly paper, of notice of meeting on eleventh, is sufficient, although paper was published also on tenth. Bancroft Drainage Dist. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 102 Neb. 455, 167 N.W. 731 (1918).
Section applied; requirement of two weeks' publication of application for liquor license was not met. Pelton v. Drummond, 21 Neb. 492, 32 N.W. 593 (1887).
25-2222.
Sureties; affidavit of qualifications; effect.Ministerial officers, whose duty it is to take security on undertakings, bonds and recognizances, provided by this code, shall require the person offered as surety to make an affidavit of his qualifications. The taking of such an affidavit shall not exempt any ministerial officer, or other officer acting in a ministerial capacity, from any liability to which he might otherwise be subject for taking insufficient surety.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 894, p. 549; Laws 1905, c. 179, § 1, p. 672; R.S.1913, § 8571; C.S.1922, § 9522; Laws 1923, c. 112, § 1, p. 270; Laws 1927, c. 68, § 1, p. 231; C.S.1929, § 20-2223; R.S.1943, § 25-2222;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 145.
Annotations
Where county judge in probate matter approves appeal bond without required affidavit of qualification and justification of sureties, a surety on bond is estopped from alleging its invalidity, notwithstanding statute requires such affidavit. In re Estate of Kothe, 131 Neb. 531, 268 N.W. 464 (1936), opinion vacated on rehearing, 131 Neb. 780, 270 N.W. 117 (1936).
Appeal bond to review judgment of county court in probate proceeding may be amended. In re Estate of Hoagland, 128 Neb. 219, 258 N.W. 538 (1935).
Letters testamentary are not void or subject to collateral attack because sureties on executor's bond failed to make affidavit as to qualifications. In re Estate of Hoferer, 116 Neb. 254, 216 N.W. 826 (1927).
Section is not applicable to sheriff taking recognizances under criminal code. Berrer v. Moorhead, 22 Neb. 687, 36 N.W. 118 (1888).
Clerk taking insufficient security on stay of execution is liable. Brock v. Hopkins, 5 Neb. 231 (1876).
25-2223.
Sureties; justification; requirements.The surety in every undertaking, bond and recognizance, provided by this code, must be a resident of this state and must have property, liable to execution, situate in the county in this state in which such undertaking, bond or recognizance is to be given and filed, worth at least double the sum to be secured, beyond the amount of all liens and encumbrances thereon and his exemptions therein; but this provision shall not be held to apply to incorporated surety companies authorized by the laws of this state to transact business. Except in the case of incorporated surety companies, where there are two or more sureties in the same undertaking, bond or recognizance, they must, in the aggregate, have the qualifications prescribed in this section.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 898, p. 549; Laws 1897, c. 96, § 1, p. 379; R.S.1913, § 8572; C.S.1922, § 9523; Laws 1923, c. 112, § 2, p. 270; C.S.1929, § 20-2224; R.S.1943, § 25-2223.
Annotations
Sureties on appeal or supersedeas bond are required to justify, or bond may be quashed. Fisher v. Keeler, 142 Neb. 79, 5 N.W.2d 143 (1942).
Where appeal bond on appeal from county court was given with but one surety and was otherwise defective and appellant refused to amend bond notwithstanding appellee's repeated and specific objections, district court had no jurisdiction and should have sustained motions for nonsuit and dismissal. In re Estate of Kothe, 131 Neb. 531, 268 N.W. 464 (1936), opinion vacated on rehearing, 131 Neb. 780, 270 N.W. 117 (1936).
Court may permit amendment of bond by adding affidavit of justification. In re Estate of Hoagland, 128 Neb. 219, 258 N.W. 538 (1935).
Letters testamentary are not void or subject to collateral attack because sureties on executor's bond failed to make affidavit as to qualifications. In re Estate of Hoferer, 116 Neb. 254, 216 N.W. 826 (1927).
Residence in county is not essential unless specifically required by statute. State ex rel. Lions Ins. Co. v. Baker, 45 Neb. 39, 63 N.W. 139 (1895).
25-2224.
Cases not provided for in this code; procedure.If a case ever arise in which an action for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong, cannot be had under this code, the practice heretofore in use may be adopted so far as may be necessary to prevent a failure of justice.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 901, p. 550; R.S.1913, § 2573; C.S.1922, § 9524; C.S.1929, § 20-2225; R.S.1943, § 25-2224.
Annotations
1. Remedies retained
2. Practice and procedure
3. Miscellaneous
1. Remedies retained
Writ of prohibition may still be used in this state. State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676 (1937).
Writ of error coram nobis exists in this state. Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 261 N.W. 339 (1935).
This section provides for and contemplates continuance of existing common-law remedies available at and prior to adoption of the civil code. Hamaker v. Patrick, 123 Neb. 809, 244 N.W. 420 (1932).
While writ of certiorari has been abolished, principles of writ have been preserved by error proceedings. Engles v. Morgenstern, 85 Neb. 51, 122 N.W. 688 (1909).
Common-law remedies are continued in force where code has failed to provide a remedy. Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co. v. Curtis, 38 Neb. 520, 57 N.W. 161 (1893).
Common-law and equity practice is available for vacating decrees for fraud. Smithson v. Smithson, 37 Neb. 535, 56 N.W. 300 (1893).
2. Practice and procedure
Provisions of civil code not only abolish bills of equity with discovery as incident thereto but prevent incorporation in petitions and answers essential elements on which discovery, under former procedure, was based. Marshall v. Rowe, 126 Neb. 817, 254 N.W. 480 (1934).
Party may have equitable relief in probate court; equity pleading applicable. Genau v. Abbott, 68 Neb. 117, 93 N.W. 942 (1903).
Procedure in original actions in Supreme Court may be prescribed by its order or in accordance with its rules. In re Petition of Attorney General, 40 Neb. 402, 58 N.W. 945 (1894).
Section does not give right to supersede judgment of removal by county board. State ex rel. Dodson v. Meeker, 19 Neb. 444, 27 N.W. 427 (1886).
3. Miscellaneous
Purpose of this section was to assure that courts should interpret the code of civil procedure in a liberal spirit. Mathews v. Hedlund, 82 Neb. 825, 119 N.W. 17 (1908).
Section is not applicable where remedy provided by code is lost by laches. Flint v. Chaloupka, 81 Neb. 87, 115 N.W. 535 (1908).
25-2225.
Special statutory proceedings; procedure; how affected by this code.Where, by general or special statute, a civil action, legal or equitable, is given and the mode of proceeding therein is prescribed, this code shall not affect the proceedings under such statute, until the Legislature shall otherwise provide; but in all such cases, as far as it may be consistent with the statute giving such action, and practicable under this code, the proceedings shall be conducted in conformity thereto. Where the statute designates by name or otherwise the kind of action, but does not prescribe the mode of proceedings therein, such action shall be commenced and prosecuted in conformity to this code; where the statute gives an action, but does not designate the kind of action, or prescribe the mode of proceeding therein, such action shall be held to be the civil action of this code and proceeded in accordingly.
Source:R.S.1867, Code § 903, p. 550; Laws 1867, § 1, p. 71; R.S.1913, § 8574; C.S.1922, § 9525; C.S.1929, § 20-2226; R.S.1943, § 25-2225.
Annotations
In a summary proceeding under section 32-624 before a district court judge, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny discovery. Nebraska Republican Party v. Shively, 311 Neb. 160, 971 N.W.2d 128 (2022).
During pendency of an appeal in district court in workmen's compensation case, plaintiff has the right to dismiss action without prejudice. Chilen v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 135 Neb. 619, 283 N.W. 366 (1939).
Proceedings in election contest case should be in harmony with provisions of the code of civil procedure, except where controlled by specific provisions of special act. Swan v. Bowker, 135 Neb. 405, 281 N.W. 891 (1938).
In mandamus proceedings no pleading is authorized other than the writ and the answer; intervention should be denied. State ex rel. Randall v. Hall, 125 Neb. 236, 249 N.W. 756 (1933).
District court on filing of petition for appeal, will proceed in accordance with compensation act, and requirement of praecipe before issuance of summons does not apply. McIntosh v. Standard Oil Co., 121 Neb. 92, 236 N.W. 152 (1931).
Special proceeding before Supreme Court Justice to compel election commissioner to file nomination acceptance and place name on ballot is civil action, and must be brought in county where cause of action arose. State ex rel. Meissner v. McHugh, 120 Neb. 356, 233 N.W. 1 (1930).
Special divorce statute requires plaintiff to give actual notice to nonresident defendant whose address is known. Williams v. Williams, 101 Neb. 369, 163 N.W. 147 (1917).
Original actions in Supreme Court are governed by code. State v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 771, 111 N.W. 118 (1907).
Divorce is special proceeding. Eager v. Eager, 74 Neb. 827, 105 N.W. 636, 107 N.W. 254 (1905).
25-2226.
Terms, defined.The words found in Chapter 25 shall be construed and held to mean as follows: Complainant means plaintiff; bill means complaint; suit means action or civil action; and decree means judgment; and all other words and terms found in Chapter 25, heretofore applicable to the chancery practice hereby repealed, shall be so construed and held as to carry out the intention of such chapter, prevent a failure of justice, and give adequate relief in all cases.
Source:Laws 1867, § 5, p. 71; R.S.1913, § 8575; C.S.1922, § 9526; C.S.1929, § 20-2227; R.S.1943, § 25-2226;
Laws 2002, LB 876, § 56.
Annotations
A judgment and a decree are synonymous terms. Spencer v. Spencer, 165 Neb. 675, 87 N.W.2d 212 (1957).
Decree of divorce is judgment. Wharton v. Jackson, 107 Neb. 288, 185 N.W. 428 (1921).
25-2227.
Legal notices; week, defined.Wherever the statutes of Nebraska provide for the publication of notices any number of weeks, or for any number of weeks, the term week shall be construed to mean either a period of time known as a calendar week beginning on Sunday and ending with Saturday, or any period of seven consecutive days beginning with the date of the first publication of notice; Provided, however, nothing herein contained shall be held to apply to any notice published prior to April 17, 1915.
Source:Laws 1915, c. 222, § 1, p. 491; C.S.1922, § 9527; C.S.1929, § 20-2228; R.S.1943, § 25-2227.
Annotations
Notice of publication of formation of drainage district was sufficient. Prucka v. Eastern Sarpy Drainage Dist., 157 Neb. 284, 59 N.W.2d 761 (1953).
Construction of statute providing for notice of time and place of proving will was not affected by this section. Johnson v. Richards, 155 Neb. 552, 52 N.W.2d 737 (1952).
Section is constitutional. Did not change construction of statutes providing for publication in weekly newspapers. In re Estate of Johnson, 99 Neb. 275, 155 N.W. 1100 (1916).
25-2228.
Legal notices; how published.(1) All legal publications and notices of whatever kind or character that may by law be required to be published a certain number of days or a certain number of weeks shall be legally published when they have been published in one issue in each week in a daily, semiweekly, or triweekly newspaper, such publication in such daily, semiweekly, or triweekly paper or papers to be made upon any one day of the week upon which such paper is published. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing the publication of such legal notices and publications in weekly newspapers. Any newspaper publishing such legal notices or publications as provided in this section shall be otherwise qualified under existing law to publish such notices or publications. All legal publications and all notices of whatever kind or character that may be required by law to be published a certain number of days or a certain number of weeks, shall be and hereby are declared to be legally published when they shall have been published once a week in a weekly, semiweekly, triweekly, or daily newspaper for the number of weeks, covering the period of publication. For the purpose of this section, when a newspaper is published regularly four or more times each week, it shall be deemed a daily newspaper.
(2) Beginning October 1, 2022, all legal publications and notices of whatever kind or character that may by law be required to be published a certain number of days or a certain number of weeks shall also be posted by the newspaper publishing such legal publications or notices on a statewide website established and maintained as a repository for such notices by a majority of Nebraska newspapers. A website posting or a failure to make such website posting under this subsection shall not affect the validity of the publication or notice published under subsection (1) of this section.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 202, § 1, p. 481; C.S.1922, § 9528; Laws 1923, c. 100, § 1, p. 255; Laws 1927, c. 63, § 1, p. 225; C.S.1929, § 20-2229; R.S.1943, § 25-2228; Laws 1943, c. 47, § 1, p. 198;
Laws 1996, LB 299, § 21; Laws 2022, LB840, § 1.
Annotations
If a publication day falls upon a holiday, publication the preceding day complies with this section. Hollstein v. Adams, 187 Neb. 781, 194 N.W.2d 216 (1972).
This section supersedes and effectively abrogates contrary provision of statute and home rule charter. Skag-Way Department Stores, Inc. v. City of Grand Island, 176 Neb. 169, 125 N.W.2d 529 (1964).
Last part of section refers only to number of times notice is required to be published and not to duration of notice. Johnson v. Richards, 155 Neb. 552, 52 N.W.2d 737 (1952).
25-2229.
Constables; contracts authorized.(1) In counties having a population of one hundred thousand or more inhabitants, each judge of the county court may contract with one constable for purposes of serving or otherwise executing, according to law, and returning writs or other legal process. Such constables shall not be considered employees of the state or its political subdivisions. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the terms of such contract shall be prescribed by the State Court Administrator.
(2) In counties having more than one contracted constable, the party requesting the constable to serve or otherwise execute any legal process may designate by name the constable who shall serve or otherwise execute such legal process.
Source:Laws 1941, c. 36, § 7, p. 149; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 22-1512; R.S.1943, § 26-1,183; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,183;
Laws 1984, LB 13, § 45; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-5,106; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 15;
Laws 1999, LB 319, § 3.
25-2230.
Constables; bond; approval; amount.Constables in county court shall give bond in the amount of five thousand dollars signed by two or more sureties who shall each qualify in twice the amount of the bond, or by some responsible surety or bonding company authorized by law to execute surety bonds in this state, to be approved by the presiding judge of the district court of the county to be conditioned upon the faithful discharge of his or her duties as constable.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XV, § 181, p. 325; C.S.1929, § 22-1511; R.S.1943, § 26-1,182;
Laws 1971, LB 959, § 3; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,182;
Laws 1984, LB 13, § 44; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-5,105.
25-2231.
Constables; authority; violation; penalty.In serving all civil process and in doing his or her duties generally, when not otherwise restricted by law, the authority of a constable shall extend throughout the territory in which the judges of the county court who appointed him or her have jurisdiction, and in executing and serving process issued by courts inferior to the district court, he or she shall have and exercise the same authority and powers over goods and chattels and the persons or parties and in serving process as is granted by law to a sheriff under like process issued from courts of record. Any constable who shall knowingly perform or attempt to perform any official act outside of the territory in which the court which appointed him or her has jurisdiction shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars or shall be imprisoned for not more than ten days.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XV, § 177, p. 324; C.S.1929, § 22-1507; R.S.1943, § 26-1,178; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,178;
Laws 1984, LB 13, § 42; Laws 1988, LB 1030, § 12; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-5,101.
25-2232.
Sheriffs; general powers.All sheriffs shall be ministerial officers in county courts in their respective jurisdictions' civil and criminal cases, and civil and criminal processes may be executed by them throughout the jurisdiction.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XV, § 171, p. 323; C.S.1929, § 22-1501; R.S.1943, § 26-1,172; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,172;
Laws 1984, LB 13, § 40; Laws 1988, LB 1030, § 11; R.S.Supp,1988, § 24-595; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 16.
25-2233.
Sheriff; service of process.It shall be the duty of every sheriff to serve and execute all warrants, writs, precepts, executions, and other legal process to him or her directed and delivered.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XV, § 172, p. 324; C.S.1929, § 22-1502; R.S.1943, § 26-1,173; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,173;
Laws 1984, LB 13, § 41; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-596; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 17.
25-2234.
Sheriff; return of process.It shall be the duty of every sheriff to make due return of all legal process to him or her directed and by him or her delivered or served by certified or registered mail, at the proper office and on the proper return day thereof, or if the judgment is recorded in the district court, appealed, or stayed, upon which he or she has an execution, on notice thereof, to return the execution, stating thereon such facts.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XV, § 173, p. 324; C.S.1929, § 22-1503; Laws 1933, c. 44, § 4, p. 253; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 22-1503; R.S.1943, § 26-1,174; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,174;
Laws 1987, LB 93, § 7; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-597; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 18;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 41.
25-2235.
Sheriff; process; return; contents.It shall be the duty of every sheriff, on the receipt of any writ or other legal process, except subpoenas, to note thereon the time of receiving the same. The sheriff shall also state in his or her return on the same the time and manner of executing it.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XV, § 174, p. 324; C.S.1929, § 22-1504; R.S.1943, § 26-1,175; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,175; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-598; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 19.
25-2236.
Constables and sheriffs; return of not found; when made.No officer shall make a return on any process of "not found" as to any defendant, unless he shall have been once at least to the usual place of residence of the defendant, if such defendant has any in the jurisdiction of the court.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XV, § 175, p. 324; C.S.1929, § 22-1505; R.S.1943, § 26-1,176; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,176; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-599.
25-2237.
Constables and sheriffs; take person into custody; procedure.When it shall become the duty of the officer to take the body of any person to the jail of the county, he shall deliver to the sheriff or jailer a certified copy of the execution, commitment or other processes, whereby he holds such person in custody, and return the original to the clerk who issued the same, which copy shall be sufficient authority to the sheriff or jailer to keep the prisoner in jail until discharged by due course of law.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XV, § 178, p. 325; C.S.1929, § 22-1508; R.S.1943, § 26-1,179; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,179; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-5,102.
25-2238.
Sheriffs; money collected; accounting and payment.Sheriffs shall pay over to the party entitled thereto all money received in his or her official capacity if demand is made by such party, or such party's agent or attorney, at any time before he or she returns the writ upon which he or she has received it. If not paid over by that time, the sheriff shall pay the same to the clerk of the county court when he or she returns the writ.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XV, § 179, p. 325; C.S.1929, § 22-1509; R.S.1943, § 26-1,180; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,180;
Laws 1984, LB 13, § 43; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-5,103; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 20.
25-2239.
Sheriffs; neglect of duty; penalty; how recovered.Sheriffs shall be liable to twenty percent penalty upon the amount of damages for which judgment may be entered against them for failing to make return, making false return, or failing to pay over money collected or received in his or her official capacity. Such judgment must include, in addition to the damages and costs, the penalty herein provided.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XV, § 180, p. 325; C.S.1929, § 22-1510; R.S.1943, § 26-1,181; R.S.1943, (1979), § 26-1,181; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-5,104; Laws 1992, LB 1059, § 21.
25-2240.
Civil action; settlement; payment
of costs.The
parties to a civil action may, as part of a settlement of the action, agree
to the payment of costs of the action.
25-2301.
Terms, defined.For purposes of sections 25-2301 to 25-2310:
(1) Case includes any suit, action, or proceeding; and
(2) In forma pauperis means the permission given by the court for a party to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs or security.
Annotations
The "fees" specified in subsection (2) of this section do not include a party's attorney fees. State v. Ortega, 290 Neb. 172, 859 N.W.2d 305 (2015).
The plain language of the in forma pauperis statutes, taken as a whole, does not excuse a litigant who seeks the status of a pauper from paying the cost of a premium for a replevin bond pursuant to section 25-1098. Jacob v. Schlichtman, 261 Neb. 169, 622 N.W.2d 852 (2001).
Although jurisdiction is vested in an appellate court upon timely filing of a notice of appeal and an affidavit of poverty, some duties are still required of the lower court. This section requires the lower court to act if it determines that the allegations of poverty are untrue. In re Interest of Noelle F. & Sarah F., 249 Neb. 628, 544 N.W.2d 509 (1996).
Generally, in the absence of good cause evident in the record, it is necessary for a party appealing to personally sign the affidavit in support of her or his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Mere absence from the jurisdiction of the court from which the appeal is being taken, without more, does not show good cause for a party's failure to sign a poverty affidavit. In re Interest of T.W. et al., 234 Neb. 966, 453 N.W.2d 436 (1990).
As an alternative to depositing a docket fee, a person who is unable to pay the required fee may file an affidavit of poverty and proceed with an appeal in forma pauperis. State v. Hunter, 234 Neb. 567, 451 N.W.2d 922 (1990).
In order to perfect an appeal in forma pauperis, all that is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court is to file a notice of appeal and an affidavit signed by the appellant, as required by this section. In re Interest of N.L.B., 234 Neb. 280, 450 N.W.2d 676 (1990).
Courts must make specific findings of fact that establish the expected fees and costs and the ability of the appellant to pay those costs within the time required before denying the appellant in forma pauperis status for an appeal under this section. Fine v. Fine, 4 Neb. App. 101, 537 N.W.2d 642 (1995).
Where, after petitioner's appeal was dismissed by Nebraska Supreme Court for failure to deposit cash or bond and United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, sections 25-2301 to 25-2307 were enacted permitting appeal in forma pauperis, judgment was vacated, and cause remanded for reconsideration. Huffman v. Boersen, 406 U.S. 337 (1972).
25-2301.01.
Application; contents.Any county or state court, except the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, may authorize the commencement, prosecution, defense, or appeal therein, of a civil or criminal case in forma pauperis. An application to proceed in forma pauperis shall include an affidavit stating that the affiant is unable to pay the fees and costs or give security required to proceed with the case, the nature of the action, defense, or appeal, and the affiant's belief that he or she is entitled to redress.
Annotations
The timing of the appellant's execution of the poverty affidavit is not, like an "affiant" personally signing the "affidavit," fundamental to the concept of an "affidavit" set forth in this section. State v. Blake, 310 Neb. 769, 969 N.W.2d 399 (2022).
By obtaining permission to proceed in forma pauperis, a party is not granted the payment of his or her attorney fees. State v. Ortega, 290 Neb. 172, 859 N.W.2d 305 (2015).
In a juvenile’s appeal from a delinquency proceeding, the poverty affidavit of the juvenile’s parent may be filed in support of the juvenile’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, and a parent is a party who may state a belief that the juvenile is entitled to relief. In re Interest of Edward B., 285 Neb. 556, 827 N.W.2d 805 (2013).
The filing of a poverty affidavit, properly confirmed by oath or affirmation, serves as a substitute for the docket fee for an appeal. An in forma pauperis appeal is perfected when the appellant timely files a notice of appeal and an affidavit of poverty. In re Interest of Edward B., 285 Neb. 556, 827 N.W.2d 805 (2013).
Failure to file an application separate from the poverty affidavit under this section does not divest the court of jurisdiction. State v. McLemore, 261 Neb. 452, 623 N.W.2d 315 (2001).
This section does not require that a separate application to proceed in forma pauperis be filed in addition to the poverty affidavit as long as the poverty affidavit itself contains some indication that a defendant is requesting or applying for in forma pauperis status. State v. Campbell, 260 Neb. 1021, 620 N.W.2d 750 (2001).
If a request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted by the district court, an appellate court obtains jurisdiction when the notice of appeal is timely filed, and any failure of the affidavit to state the nature of the action or that the affiant is entitled to redress under this section will not divest the court of jurisdiction. State v. Dallmann, 260 Neb. 937, 621 N.W.2d 86 (2000).
The absence of language in a poverty affidavit indicating the nature of the action being appealed and that the affiant is entitled to redress will not divest an appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal where the district court has already granted the application for in forma pauperis status on appeal. State v. Grant, 9 Neb. App. 919, 623 N.W.2d 337 (2001).
25-2301.02.
Application; objection; hearing; appeal.(1) An application to proceed in forma pauperis shall be granted unless there is an objection that the party filing the application (a) has sufficient funds to pay costs, fees, or security or (b) is asserting legal positions which are frivolous or malicious. The objection to the application shall be made within thirty days after the filing of the application or at any time if the ground for the objection is that the initial application was fraudulent. Such objection may be made by the court on its own motion or on the motion of any interested person. The motion objecting to the application shall specifically set forth the grounds of the objection. An evidentiary hearing shall be conducted on the objection unless the objection is by the court on its own motion on the grounds that the applicant is asserting legal positions which are frivolous or malicious. If no hearing is held, the court shall provide a written statement of its reasons, findings, and conclusions for denial of the applicant's application to proceed in forma pauperis which shall become a part of the record of the proceeding. If an objection is sustained, the party filing the application shall have thirty days after the ruling or issuance of the statement to proceed with an action or appeal upon payment of fees, costs, or security notwithstanding the subsequent expiration of any statute of limitations or deadline for appeal. In any event, the court shall not deny an application on the basis that the appellant's legal positions are frivolous or malicious if to do so would deny a defendant his or her constitutional right to appeal in a felony case.
(2) In the event that an application to proceed in forma pauperis is denied and an appeal is taken therefrom, the aggrieved party may make application for a transcript of the hearing on in forma pauperis eligibility. Upon such application, the court shall order the transcript to be prepared and the cost shall be paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid. The appellate court shall review the decision denying in forma pauperis eligibility de novo on the record based on the transcript of the hearing or the written statement of the court.
Annotations
1. General
2. Appeals
3. Frivolous or malicious complaints
1. General
By not timely ruling on an inmate's in forma pauperis application, the district court functionally abandoned its statutory duty to determine the validity of the inmate's application. Haynes v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 314 Neb. 771, 993 N.W.2d 97 (2023).
Under subsection (1) of this section, a trial court cannot deny in forma pauperis status based on the frivolous or malicious nature of the appeal where a defendant has a constitutional right to appeal in a felony case, and a hearing is required on an objection to a party's application for in forma pauperis status, whether the objection is based on the applicant's ability to pay or the applicant is asserting a frivolous position, except where the objection is made on the court's own motion on the grounds that the legal positions asserted by the applicant are frivolous or malicious. State on behalf of Jakai C. v. Tiffany M., 292 Neb. 68, 871 N.W.2d 230 (2015).
Following a denial of an application to proceed in forma pauperis, under subsection (1) of this section, a party may either proceed with the trial action or appeal the ruling denying in forma pauperis status. Glass v. Kenney, 268 Neb. 704, 687 N.W.2d 907 (2004).
Except in those cases where the denial of in forma pauperis status would deny a defendant his or her constitutional right to appeal in a felony case, this section allows the court on its own motion to deny in forma pauperis status on the basis that the legal positions asserted by the applicant are frivolous or malicious, provided that the court issue a written statement of its reasons, findings, and conclusions for denial. In re Change of Name of Pattangall, 23 Neb. App. 131, 868 N.W.2d 816 (2015).
Except in those cases where the denial of in forma pauperis status would deny a defendant his or her constitutional right to appeal in a felony case, this section allows the court on its own motion, or upon objection by an interested party, to deny in forma pauperis status on the basis that the legal positions asserted by the applicant are frivolous or malicious. Gray v. Kenney, 22 Neb. App. 739, 860 N.W.2d 214 (2015).
This section supersedes the requirement set forth in Flora v. Escudero, 247 Neb. 260, 526 N.W.2d 643 (1995), that a court provide a hearing before denying any application to proceed in forma pauperis. Moore v. Nebraska Bd. of Parole, 12 Neb. App. 525, 679 N.W.2d 427 (2004).
2. Appeals
The district court's abandonment of its statutory duty to determine the validity of the inmate's application did not divest the appellate court of jurisdiction. Haynes v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 314 Neb. 771, 993 N.W.2d 97 (2023).
The right to interlocutory appeal of the denial of in forma pauperis status in subsection (1) of this section applies only to denials made pursuant to the two bases for denial set forth in that subsection. Robinson v. Houston, 298 Neb. 746, 905 N.W.2d 636 (2018).
A petitioner for habeas corpus relief whose initial motion to proceed in forma pauperis was denied and who takes a timely interlocutory appeal from that denial, accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, is not required to file a second appeal where the district court erroneously denies the second in forma pauperis motion in order to obtain appellate review of the initial denial. Campbell v. Hansen, 298 Neb. 669, 905 N.W.2d 519 (2018).
When an in forma pauperis application is denied and the applicant seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis in order to obtain appellate review of that denial, the trial court does not have authority to issue an order that would interfere with such appellate review. Campbell v. Hansen, 298 Neb. 669, 905 N.W.2d 519 (2018).
A trial court does not have authority to deny an in forma pauperis application once an in forma pauperis application is denied and the applicant wishes to seek interlocutory appellate review of the denial. Mumin v. Frakes, 298 Neb. 381, 904 N.W.2d 667 (2017).
A trial court has the authority to deny an in forma pauperis application requested to commence, prosecute, defend, or appeal a case if the court finds the applicant has sufficient funds or the legal positions being asserted therein are frivolous or malicious. Mumin v. Frakes, 298 Neb. 381, 904 N.W.2d 667 (2017).
An appellate court obtains jurisdiction over an appeal challenging the denial of an application to proceed in forma pauperis upon the filing of a proper application to proceed in forma pauperis and a poverty affidavit with the party's timely notice of appeal. State v. Carter, 292 Neb. 16, 870 N.W.2d 641 (2015).
A district court’s denial of in forma pauperis status is reviewed de novo on the record based on the transcript of the hearing or the written statement of the court. Peterson v. Houston, 284 Neb. 861, 824 N.W.2d 26 (2012); In re Change of Name of Pattangall, 23 Neb. App. 131, 868 N.W.2d 816 (2015); Gray v. Kenney, 22 Neb. App. 739, 860 N.W.2d 214 (2015).
An appellate court obtains jurisdiction over an appeal upon the timely filing of a notice of appeal and a proper in forma pauperis application and affidavit, without literal payment of the fees, costs, or security mentioned in subsection (1) of this section. Glass v. Kenney, 268 Neb. 704, 687 N.W.2d 907 (2004).
Under this section, there is a statutory right of interlocutory appellate review of a decision denying in forma pauperis eligibility. Glass v. Kenney, 268 Neb. 704, 687 N.W.2d 907 (2004).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, in order to perfect his appeal, the appellant had 30 days from the district court's denial of his application to proceed in forma pauperis in which to file a docket fee with the clerk of the district court. Martin v. McGinn, 267 Neb. 931, 678 N.W.2d 737 (2004).
3. Frivolous or malicious complaints
The trial court properly denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis on the basis that the party asserted only frivolous legal positions in the party's underlying motion for postconviction relief. State v. Carter, 292 Neb. 16, 870 N.W.2d 641 (2015).
The filing of an action in an improper venue does not make the legal position asserted by a plaintiff "frivolous or malicious" for purposes of in forma pauperis status. Castonguay v. Retelsdorf, 291 Neb. 220, 865 N.W.2d 91 (2015).
When, pursuant to this section, a trial court denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on its own motion on the ground that the party seeking leave is asserting legal positions which are frivolous or malicious, its order shall include the court’s reasons for such conclusion. Peterson v. Houston, 284 Neb. 861, 824 N.W.2d 26 (2012).
A frivolous legal position pursuant to this section is one wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on the law or on the evidence. Except in those cases where the denial of in forma pauperis status would deny a defendant his or her constitutional right to appeal in a felony case, this section allows the court on its own motion to deny in forma pauperis status on the basis that the legal positions asserted by the applicant are frivolous or malicious, provided that the court issue a written statement of its reasons, findings, and conclusions for denial. This section contains no requirement that the court grant leave to amend the underlying petition before denying a request to proceed in forma pauperis. Cole v. Blum, 262 Neb. 1058, 637 N.W.2d 606 (2002).
A frivolous legal position is one wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on the law or on the evidence. In re Change of Name of Pattangall, 23 Neb. App. 131, 868 N.W.2d 816 (2015); Gray v. Kenney, 22 Neb. App. 739, 860 N.W.2d 214 (2015); Tyler v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 13 Neb. App. 795, 701 N.W.2d 847 (2005).
For the purposes of the statute governing applications to proceed in forma pauperis, a "frivolous legal position" is one wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on the law or on the evidence. Lenz v. Hicks, 20 Neb. App. 431, 824 N.W.2d 769 (2012).
The former clients' action against the attorney was not frivolous, and thus, the denial of their petition to proceed in forma pauperis for the failure to plead a cause of action was not warranted; liberally construed, the former clients' action alleged that the attorney committed legal malpractice in his representation of them in a bankruptcy case. Lenz v. Hicks, 20 Neb. App. 431, 824 N.W.2d 769 (2012).
A court may not immediately deny an application to proceed in forma pauperis on the ground the proposed complaint is illegible, as such does not fulfill the requirement of this section that the court find that the complaint was actually frivolous or malicious as a prerequisite to denying the application. Tyler v. Natvig, 17 Neb. App. 358, 762 N.W.2d 621 (2009).
Principles of liberal construction apply to the review of a denial of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis upon the ground that the complaint was frivolous. Tyler v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 13 Neb. App. 795, 701 N.W.2d 847 (2005).
A court is not required to conduct a hearing before denying an application to proceed in forma pauperis if the court has objected to the application on its own motion on the ground that the legal positions asserted therein are frivolous or malicious, and if the court provides a written statement of its reasons, findings, and conclusions for denying the application to proceed in forma pauperis. Moore v. Nebraska Bd. of Parole, 12 Neb. App. 525, 679 N.W.2d 427 (2004).
25-2302.
Costs of action.In any civil or criminal case in which a party is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the court shall direct the responsible officer of the court to issue and serve all the necessary writs, process, and proceedings and perform all such duties without charge.
25-2303.
Process; costs; payment by county.In any civil or criminal case in which a party is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the court shall direct that the expense of process by publication, if such process is required by the court, be paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
25-2304.
Witness; subpoena; process; fees; payment by county.In any civil or criminal case in which a party is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the court may order witnesses to be subpoenaed if the court finds that they have evidence material and necessary to the case and that they are within the judicial district in which the court is held or within one hundred miles of the place of trial. In such case the process and the fees of the witnesses shall be paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
25-2305.
Appeal; printing of record; cost paid by county.In civil or criminal cases in which a party is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the court shall direct that the expenses of printing the record on appeal, if such printing is required by the appellate court, be paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
Annotations
To be effective, a poverty affidavit must show on its face, by the certificate of an authorized officer before whom it is taken, evidence that it was duly sworn to by the party making the affidavit. State v. Hunter, 234 Neb. 567, 451 N.W.2d 922 (1990).
25-2306.
Transcripts; costs; payment by county.In any civil or criminal case in which a party is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the court shall order transcripts to be furnished without cost if the suit or appeal is not frivolous but presents a substantial question and if the transcript is needed to prepare, present, or decide the issue presented by the case or appeal. Such costs shall be paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
25-2307.
Appellate briefs; costs; payment by county.In any civil or criminal case in which a party is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, on appeal the court shall direct that the expense of printing of the appellate briefs, if such printing is required by the court, be paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
Annotations
The expense of photocopying is included in the expense of "printing", which is required under this section to be paid by the county when a party has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. Heathman v. Kenney, 263 Neb. 966, 644 N.W.2d 558 (2002).
A district court has jurisdiction to hear a motion for reimbursement of costs sought under this section, and an order entered thereon is appealable as a summary application in an action after judgment. State v. Patterson, 18 Neb. App. 255, 778 N.W.2d 756 (2010).
Neither this section nor Heathman v. Kenney, 263 Neb. 966, 644 N.W.2d 558 (2002), support a conclusion that a request for reimbursement of printing costs must be made during the pendency of the appeal. State v. Patterson, 18 Neb. App. 255, 778 N.W.2d 756 (2010).
The words "on appeal" in this section follow the requirement that a party be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis and precede the requirement that the county pay for printing of the appellate briefs; therefore, the logical interpretation is that the expense of printing of appellate briefs is to be reimbursed to a party who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. State v. Patterson, 18 Neb. App. 255, 778 N.W.2d 756 (2010).
25-2308.
Repealed. Laws 1999, LB 689, § 17.
25-2309.
Satisfaction of costs; when.In the event any person prosecutes or defends a case in forma pauperis successfully, any and all cost deferred by the court under sections 25-2301 to 25-2310 shall be first satisfied out of any money paid in satisfaction of judgment.
25-2310.
Fraudulent practices; penalty.Anyone who fraudulently fails to disclose material assets or income for the purpose of invoking the privileges of sections 25-2301 to 25-2310 is guilty of perjury and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as provided in section 28-915.
25-2401.
Interpreters; public policy.It is hereby declared to be the policy of this state that the constitutional rights of persons unable to communicate the English language cannot be fully protected unless interpreters are available to assist such persons in legal proceedings. It is the intent of sections 25-2401 to 25-2407 to provide a procedure for the appointment of such interpreters to avoid injustice and to assist such persons in their own defense.
Annotations
A defendant does not waive his due process rights by failing to request an interpreter. But the absence of such request by a defendant or defense counsel is a fact relevant to whether the court should have recognized on its own that the defendant needed interpretative services. State v. Bol, 294 Neb. 248, 882 N.W.2d 674 (2016).
Even though a defendant might not speak grammatically correct English, where the record satisfactorily demonstrates that such defendant had a sufficient command of the English language to understand questions posed and answers given, a court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint an interpreter. State v. Bol, 294 Neb. 248, 882 N.W.2d 674 (2016).
Generally, a defendant in a criminal proceeding may be entitled to have an interpreter provided only where he or she timely requests one, or it is otherwise brought to the trial court's attention that the defendant or a witness has a language difficulty that may prevent meaningful understanding of, or communication in, the proceeding. State v. Bol, 294 Neb. 248, 882 N.W.2d 674 (2016).
The appointment of an interpreter for an accused at trial is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial court. State v. Bol, 294 Neb. 248, 882 N.W.2d 674 (2016).
Minor or isolated inaccuracies, omissions, interruptions, or other defects in translation are inevitable and do not warrant relief where the translation is on the whole reasonably timely, complete, and accurate, and the defects do not render the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Tapia-Reyes v. Excel Corp., 281 Neb. 15, 793 N.W.2d 319 (2011).
The requirement that an interpreter provide an accurate translation implicates a defendant's due process right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, the ultimate question being whether the translator's performance has rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Tapia-Reyes v. Excel Corp., 281 Neb. 15, 793 N.W.2d 319 (2011).
If a defendant understands and communicates reasonably well in the English language, the mere fact that such defendant might be able to accomplish self-expression a little better in another language does not warrant utilizing an interpreter at trial. State v. Topete, 221 Neb. 771, 380 N.W.2d 635 (1986).
25-2402.
Terms, defined.For the purposes of sections 25-2401 to 25-2407 unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) Deaf or hard of hearing person means a person whose hearing impairment, with or without amplification, is so severe that he or she may have difficulty in auditorily processing spoken language without the use of an interpreter or a person with a fluctuating or permanent hearing loss which may adversely affect the ability to understand spoken language without the use of an interpreter or other auxiliary aid;
(2) Person unable to communicate the English language means a person who cannot readily understand or communicate the English language; and
(3) Proceeding means any legal proceeding or any hearing preliminary thereto involving persons unable to communicate the English language or deaf or hard of hearing persons unable to communicate by a spoken language.
25-2403.
Interpreter; appointment.In any proceeding the presiding judge shall appoint an interpreter to assist any person unable to communicate the English language for preparation and trial of his or her case.
25-2404.
Interpreters; qualifications.No person shall be appointed as an interpreter pursuant to sections 25-2401 to 25-2407 unless such person is readily able to communicate with the person unable to communicate the English language, translate the proceedings for him or her, and accurately repeat and translate the statements of such person to the jury, judge, and officials before whom such proceeding takes place.
25-2405.
Interpreters;
oath.Every interpreter, except those certified under the rules of the Supreme
Court and who have taken the prescribed oath of office, appointed
pursuant to sections 25-2401 to 25-2407, before entering upon his or her duties
as such, shall take an oath that he or she will, to the best of his or her
skill and judgment, make a true interpretation to such person unable to communicate
the English language of all the proceedings in a language which such person
understands and that he or she will, in the English language, repeat the statements
of such person to the court, jury, or officials before whom such proceeding
takes place.
Annotations
A court interpreter is not required to recite an oath at the beginning of each proceeding if the interpreter is already certified under the rules of the Nebraska Supreme Court. State v. Garcia, 27 Neb. App. 705, 936 N.W.2d 1 (2019).
A trial court can accept, without further inquiry, an interpreter's representation that he or she is a certified court interpreter. State v. Garcia, 27 Neb. App. 705, 936 N.W.2d 1 (2019).
25-2406.
Interpreters;
fees and expenses.The fees and expenses of an
interpreter shall be fixed and ordered paid by the judge before whom such
proceeding takes place, in accordance with a fee schedule established by the
Supreme Court, and be paid out of the General Fund with funds appropriated
to the Supreme Court for that purpose or
from other funds, including grant money, made available to the Supreme Court
for such purpose.
25-2407.
Interpreters; qualifications.Any person who serves as an interpreter for persons unable to communicate the English language in court proceedings or probation services as provided in subsection (6) of section 29-2259 shall meet the standards adopted by the Supreme Court. Such standards shall require that interpreters demonstrate the ability to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both receptively and expressively, using any necessary special vocabulary. A person appointed to interpret for deaf and hard of hearing persons shall be a licensed interpreter as defined in section 20-151 or, if a licensed interpreter is unavailable, an interpreter licensed under the laws of another state.
25-2501.
Intent and purpose.It is the intent and purpose of sections 25-2501 to 25-2506 to establish a uniform procedure to be used in acquiring private property for a public purpose by the State of Nebraska and its political subdivisions and by all privately owned public utility corporations and common carriers which have been granted the power of eminent domain. Such sections shall not apply to:
(1) Water transmission and distribution pipelines and their appurtenances and common carrier pipelines and their appurtenances;
(2) Public utilities and cities of all classes and villages when acquiring property for a proposed project involving the acquisition of rights or interests in ten or fewer separately owned tracts or when the acquisition is within the corporate limits of any city or village;
(3) Sanitary and improvement districts organized under sections 31-727 to 31-762 when acquiring easements for a proposed project involving the acquisition of rights or interests in ten or fewer separately owned tracts;
(4) Counties and municipalities which acquire property through the process of platting or subdivision or for street or highway construction or improvements;
(5) Common carriers subject to regulation by the Federal Railroad Administration of the United States Department of Transportation; or
(6) The Nebraska Department of Transportation when acquiring property for highway construction or improvements.
Source:Laws 1973, LB 187, § 1; Laws 1978, LB 917, § 1; Laws 1994, LB 441, § 2; Laws 2002, LB 176, § 1; Laws 2017, LB339, § 81.
Annotations
The purpose of the hearing provided for in the uniform procedure for acquiring property for public use is merely to explain the taking and to inform landowners of their procedural rights. Seward County Board of Commissioners v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 242 N.W.2d 849 (1976).
25-2502.
Terms, defined.As used in sections 25-2501 to 25-2506 and 70-301, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) Agency shall include the State of Nebraska and any department, board, commission, or similar entity thereof which possesses the authority to acquire property either with or without the use of eminent domain, any political subdivision of the State of Nebraska, and any privately owned public utility corporation or common carrier not exempted by section 25-2501 which possesses the authority to acquire property through the use of eminent domain;
(2) Property shall include any right or interest in real property, including but not limited to easements, but shall not include easements for public utilities located adjacent to and within ten feet of a public road right-of-way; and
(3) Negotiations shall mean communications between representatives of the agency and the property owner or his representatives who are specifically authorized to attempt to reach agreement on terms by which the agency shall acquire such property.
25-2503.
Agency; notice; contents.Any agency which proposes to acquire private property for a public purpose shall give notice of such proposed acquisition at least forty-five days before beginning negotiations for such acquisition. The notice shall be directed to each owner of property over or across which any right or interest is to be acquired and shall be deemed properly given if delivered personally or mailed by registered or certified mail addressed to the property owner and to the address shown on the tax records in the office of the county treasurer, except that such notice shall be sufficient if given to the administrator or executor of the estate of a deceased person, the trustee of a trust estate, the guardian of the estate of a minor or incompetent person, or a conservator. The notice shall (1) describe the property proposed to be acquired and the compensation to be given for such property, (2) include a statement of the authority for the acquisition, (3) include the nature of and necessity and purpose for which the land shall be used, (4) include the title, right, or interest in the property to be acquired, (5) specify the amount of property needed for the public purpose, (6) include the reasons for selecting the proposed location or route, and (7) state that if approval of any other agency is required, the condemner shall set forth which other agency's approval shall be necessary and, when the acquisition involves a highway, power line, telephone line, or similar project, shall include a map showing the proposed route to be followed by the project.
Annotations
A notice of acquisition sent to a landowner prior to beginning condemnation proceedings constitutes a privileged communication during statutorily required negotiations and, thus, may be excluded pursuant to section 27-408. In re Application of SID No. 384 of Douglas County, 259 Neb. 351, 609 N.W.2d 679 (2000).
25-2504.
Agency; hearing; where held; relocations; notice; hearings.After giving notice pursuant to section 25-2503, the agency shall hold a public hearing on the proposed project and acquisition at least thirty days before beginning negotiations for such acquisition. Notice of such public hearing shall be published at least ten days prior to such hearing in a legal newspaper published in and of general circulation in each county, if such a newspaper exists, or if no such newspaper is published in the county, notice shall be published in a newspaper which has been designated as the official legal notice publication by the county board and is of general circulation in the county or counties in which the hearing is to be held. When the proposed acquisition consists of property from more than one county, a hearing shall be held in the county seat of each county. When the proposed acquisition is countywide in scope, the hearing shall be held at the county seat. When the proposed acquisition involves a lesser area, the hearing shall be held in a location convenient to the property to be acquired. When the proposed acquisition involves property located outside this state, the hearing shall be held at the principal office of the agency.
At the hearing, the agency shall explain the nature of and necessity for the project for which it seeks to acquire property, the reasons for selecting the particular location or route, the right of each owner of property to be represented by an attorney and to negotiate and accept or reject the offer of damages which will be sustained by the proposed acquisition, and the right to require that such damages be determined pursuant to the procedures for acquisition by eminent domain. The agency shall hear and consider any objections from any person.
If the agency relocates the proposed project following such hearing and such relocation would require the acquisition of rights or interests in the property of more than ten additional owners of separately owned tracts to whom notice was not previously given, the agency shall give notice as provided in section 25-2503 to such additional owners and shall hold a public hearing as provided in this section with reference solely to that part of the project which has been relocated; Provided, that the time restrictions in section 25-2503 and this section shall not be applicable to any such additional notice, hearing, or negotiations.
Annotations
A notice of acquisition sent to a landowner prior to beginning condemnation proceedings constitutes a privileged communication during statutorily required negotiations and, thus, may be excluded pursuant to section 27-408. In re Application of SID No. 384 of Douglas County, 259 Neb. 351, 609 N.W.2d 679 (2000).
The grant of eminent domain for municipal airport authorities renders the units immune from zoning regulations. Seward County Board of Commissioners v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 242 N.W.2d 849 (1976).
25-2505.
Public notice; public hearings; when not required; hearing by school district.Any agency acquiring property on a willing buyer-willing seller basis or by gift, devise, or any other form of voluntary transfer shall not be required to give the notice set forth in section 25-2503 if such agency has no planned project involving acquisition of the specific property, or any part thereof, through the use of eminent domain or the agency has no authority to use eminent domain for acquisition of property, but such agency shall hold a public hearing at least thirty days prior to consummation of the transaction whereby such property is acquired which public hearing and public notice of the same shall comply, where applicable, with section 25-2504. A school district may conduct any hearing required by this section as a part of the agenda at a regular or special meeting of its school board or board of education at the board's usual meeting place or at such other location within the school district as the board may designate.
25-2506.
Sections, how construed.Sections 25-2501 to 25-2506 shall be construed to be cumulative and independent legislation and complete in themselves.
25-2601.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-2601 to 25-2622 shall be known and may be cited as the Uniform Arbitration Act.
25-2602.
Repealed. Laws 1997, LB 151, § 14.
25-2602.01.
Validity of arbitration agreement.(a) A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
(b) A provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable,
except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract, if the provision is entered into voluntarily and willingly.
(c) The Uniform Arbitration Act applies to arbitration agreements between
employers and employees or between their respective representatives.
(d) Contract provisions agreed to by the parties to a contract control
over contrary provisions of the act other than subsections (e) and (f) of
this section.
(e) Subsections (a) and (b) of this section do not apply to a claim
for workers' compensation.
(f) Subsection (b) of this section does not apply to:
(1) A claim arising out of personal injury based on tort;
(2) A claim under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act;
(3) Any agreement between parties covered by the Motor Vehicle Industry Regulation Act; and
(4) Except as provided in section 44-811, any agreement concerning or
relating to an insurance policy other than a contract between insurance companies
including a reinsurance contract.
(g) When a conflict exists, the Uniform Arbitration Act shall not apply
to the Uniform Act on Interstate Arbitration and Compromise of Death Taxes
and sections 44-811, 44-4824, 54-404 to 54-406, 60-2701 to 60-2709, and 70-1301
to 70-1329.
Cross References
Motor Vehicle Industry Regulation Act, see section 60-1401.
Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, see section 48-1125.
Uniform Act on Interstate Arbitration and Compromise of Death Taxes, see section 77-3315.
Annotations
A delegation of arbitrability of future policyholder claims in an agreement concerning or relating to an insurance policy is invalid under subdivision (f)(4) of this section. Citizens of Humanity v. Applied Underwriters, 299 Neb. 545, 909 N.W.2d 614 (2018).
The Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986, by its terms, preempts the application of subdivision (f)(4) of this section to foreign risk retention groups. Speece v. Allied Professionals Ins. Co., 289 Neb. 75, 853 N.W.2d 169 (2014).
Under the federal McCarran-Ferguson Act, state law regulating the business of insurance controls over federal law that does not specifically govern insurance. Subsection (f)(4) of this section regulates the insurer-insured contractual relationship and, thus, the business of insurance. It is therefore not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010).
Under the federal McCarran-Ferguson Act, subsection (f)(4) of this section is preempted by the Federal Crop Insurance Act and regulations thereunder that specifically relate to the business of insurance and require arbitration of disputes. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010).
With specified exceptions, agreements to arbitrate future controversies concerning an insurance policy are invalid under subsection (f)(4) of this section, unless federal law preempts this provision. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010).
The public policy of the state did not change until this section became effective on June 11, 1997. Any contract clause allowing for predispute binding arbitration entered into before that date is void as against public policy. Millennium Solutions, Inc. v. Davis, 258 Neb. 293, 603 N.W.2d 406 (1999).
25-2602.02.
Contract; statement required.The following statement shall appear in capitalized, underlined type adjoining the signature block of any standardized agreement in which binding arbitration is the sole remedy for dispute resolution: THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS AN ARBITRATION PROVISION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES.
Annotations
When a contract containing an arbitration clause is governed by federal law, the failure to include the statutory language of this section does not make the arbitration clause unenforceable. Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel v. Hunan, Inc., 276 Neb. 700, 757 N.W.2d 205 (2008).
When a contract which attempts to establish binding arbitration as the sole remedy fails to strictly comply with this section, the arbitration clause is voidable and unenforceable. Kramer v. Eagle Eye Home Inspections, 14 Neb. App. 691, 716 N.W.2d 749 (2006).
25-2603.
Proceedings to compel or stay arbitration.(a) On application of a party showing an agreement described in section 25-2602.01 and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall be denied.
(b) On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if found for the moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration.
(c) If an issue referable to arbitration under the alleged agreement is involved in an action or proceeding pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear applications under subsection (a) of this section, the application shall be made therein. Otherwise and subject to section 25-2619, such application may be made in any court of competent jurisdiction.
(d) Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefor has been made under this section or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect thereto only. When the application is made in such action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include such stay.
(e) An order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or bona fides or because any fault or grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been shown.
Annotations
This section does not defeat the Federal Arbitration Act's objective, expressed in 9 U.S.C. 4 (2012), that if the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereon. Cullinane v. Beverly Enters. - Neb., 300 Neb. 210, 912 N.W.2d 774 (2018).
Under subsection (a) of this section, on application of a party showing a valid arbitration agreement and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order for the moving party; otherwise, the application shall be denied. Cullinane v. Beverly Enters. - Neb., 300 Neb. 210, 912 N.W.2d 774 (2018).
Although this section specifies that the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists should be "summarily" tried, this section does not preclude the right to a jury trial in every circumstance. Omaha Cold Storage Terminals v. Patterson, 15 Neb. App. 548, 733 N.W.2d 219 (2007).
25-2604.
Appointment of arbitrators by court.If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of arbitrators, this method shall be followed. In the absence thereof, or if the agreed method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator appointed fails or is unable to act and a successor has not been duly appointed, the court on application of a party shall appoint one or more arbitrators, except that the court shall always appoint an odd number of arbitrators. An arbitrator so appointed has all the powers of one specifically named in the agreement. Upon appointment an arbitrator shall disclose his or her hourly or daily rate for arbitration services.
25-2604.01.
Arbitrators; disqualification.Any person proposed for nomination by all parties or all party arbitrators to serve as a neutral arbitrator shall disqualify himself or herself, upon demand of any party to the arbitration agreement made before the commencement of the proceedings, on any of the grounds specified in section 24-739 for disqualification of a judge or on the ground that such person is an employee or independent contractor of an industry, trade, or professional association of which only one party is a member if the grounds were known or should have been known by the movant.
25-2605.
Majority action by arbitrators.The powers of the arbitrators may be exercised by a majority unless otherwise provided by the agreement or by the Uniform Arbitration Act.
25-2606.
Hearing.Unless otherwise provided by the agreement:
(a) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for the hearing and cause notification to the parties to be served personally or by registered or certified mail not less than ten days before the hearing. Appearance at the hearing waives such notice. The arbitrators may adjourn the hearing from time to time as necessary and, on request of a party and for good cause, or upon their own motion, may postpone the hearing to a time not later than the date fixed by the agreement for making the award unless the parties consent to a later date. The arbitrators may hear and determine the controversy upon the evidence produced notwithstanding the failure of a party duly notified to appear. The court on application may direct the arbitrators to proceed promptly with the hearing and determination of the controversy;
(b) The parties are entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy, and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing; and
(c) The hearing shall be conducted by all the arbitrators but a majority may determine any question and render a final award. If, during the course of the hearing, an arbitrator for any reason ceases to act, the remaining arbitrator or arbitrators appointed to act as neutrals may continue with the hearing and determination of the controversy.
Arbitration proceedings shall take place in the county designated in section 25-403.01 unless the parties otherwise agree at a time subsequent to the arising of the controversy.
Annotations
The lack of a formal notice of hearing in compliance with this section of the postponement of a hearing previously scheduled and correctly noticed did not invalidate an award where evidence supported the conclusion that the parties to the arbitration had actual notice of the postponed hearing in advance. Damrow v. Murdoch, 15 Neb. App. 920, 739 N.W.2d 229 (2007).
The trial court did not err in finding that lack of a formal notice under this section was an insufficient ground to vacate an arbitration award. Damrow v. Murdoch, 15 Neb. App. 920, 739 N.W.2d 229 (2007).
25-2607.
Representation by attorney.A party has the right to be represented by an attorney at any proceeding or hearing under the Uniform Arbitration Act. A waiver thereof prior to the proceeding or hearing is ineffective.
25-2608.
Witnesses, subpoenas, depositions.(a) The arbitrators may issue or cause to be issued subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses, for the taking of depositions, and for the production of books, records, documents, and other evidence and shall have the power to administer oaths. Subpoenas so issued shall be served and, upon application to the court by a party or the arbitrators, enforced in the manner provided by law for the service and enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action.
(b) On application of a party and for use as evidence, the arbitrators may permit a deposition to be taken, in the manner and upon the terms designated by the arbitrators, of a witness who cannot be subpoenaed or is unable to attend the hearing.
(c) All provisions of law compelling a person under subpoena to testify are applicable.
(d) Fees for attendance as a witness shall be the same as for a witness in the county court.
25-2609.
Award.(a) The award shall be in writing and signed by the arbitrators joining in the award. The arbitrators shall deliver a copy to each party personally or by registered or certified mail or as provided in the agreement.
(b) An award shall be made within the time fixed therefor by the agreement or, if not so fixed, within such time as the court orders on application of a party but not more than thirty days after the hearing. The parties may extend the time in writing either before or after the expiration thereof. A party waives the objection that an award was not made within the time required unless he or she notifies the arbitrators of his or her objection prior to the delivery of the award to him or her.
Annotations
Pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, an arbitration award signed by only one of three arbitrators required to sign the award was defective in form but not in substance, and thus the parties were permitted to make timely application to modify or correct the award under subsection (a)(3) of section 25-2614. Hartman v. City of Grand Island, 265 Neb. 433, 657 N.W.2d 641 (2003).
The appellant waived an objection under this section where there was nothing in the record to support a conclusion that he notified the
arbitrators of his objection prior to the delivery of the award. Damrow v.
Murdoch, 15 Neb. App. 920, 739 N.W.2d 229 (2007).
25-2610.
Change of award by arbitrators.On application of a party or, if an application to the court is pending under section 25-2612, 25-2613, or 25-2614, on submission to the arbitrators by the court under such conditions as the court may order, the arbitrators may modify or correct the award upon the grounds stated in subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(3) of section 25-2614 or for the purpose of clarifying the award. The application shall be made within twenty days after delivery of the award to the applicant. Written notice thereof shall be given forthwith to the opposing party, stating he or she must serve his or her objections thereto, if any, within ten days from the notice. The award so modified or corrected is subject to the provisions of sections 25-2612 to 25-2614.
Annotations
An award does not become so vague and indefinite as to be unenforceable simply because a party can argue that a portion of it may be unclear or ambiguous. The Nebraska Court of Appeals erred in finding the award ambiguous and in ordering a remand to the arbitrator for clarification. Signal 88 v. Lyconic, 310 Neb. 824, 969 N.W.2d 651 (2022).
An award may be recommitted for clarification where it is ambiguous to such an extent that it is impossible to determine its meaning and intent. However, remand for clarification is not the preferred course. When possible, courts should avoid remanding on the basis of ambiguity because of the interest in prompt and final arbitration. Signal 88 v. Lyconic, 310 Neb. 824, 969 N.W.2d 651 (2022).
In considering an application for confirmation of an arbitration award, the court has limited authority under this statutory section to remand to the arbitrator to clarify an ambiguous award. Signal 88 v. Lyconic, 310 Neb. 824, 969 N.W.2d 651 (2022).
Where an ambiguity can be resolved by the record, the district court need not remand for clarification; but where the ambiguity is not resolved by the record, the court must remand for clarification. Signal 88 v. Lyconic, 310 Neb. 824, 969 N.W.2d 651 (2022).
25-2611.
Fees and expenses of arbitration.Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration shall be paid as provided in the award.
25-2612.
Confirmation of award.Within sixty days of the application of a party, the court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in sections 25-2613 and 25-2614.
Annotations
Courts must give extreme deference to the arbitrator's conclusions; the standard of judicial review of arbitral awards is among the narrowest known to law. Signal 88 v. Lyconic, 310 Neb. 824, 969 N.W.2d 651 (2022).
Strong deference is due to an arbitrative tribunal, because when parties agree to arbitration, they agree to accept whatever reasonable uncertainties might arise from the process. Signal 88 v. Lyconic, 310 Neb. 824, 969 N.W.2d 651 (2022).
Under Nebraska's Uniform Arbitration Act, a court may not overrule an arbitrator's decision simply because the court believes that its own interpretation of the contract, or the facts, would be the better one. Signal 88 v. Lyconic, 310 Neb. 824, 969 N.W.2d 651 (2022).
Where arbitration is contemplated, the courts are not equipped to provide the same judicial review given to structured judgments defined by procedural rules and legal principles. Parties should be aware that they get what they bargain for and that arbitration is far different from adjudication. Signal 88 v. Lyconic, 310 Neb. 824, 969 N.W.2d 651 (2022).
Within sixty days of the application of a party, the court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award. The court's obligation is mandatory rather than discretionary. Signal 88 v. Lyconic, 310 Neb. 824, 969 N.W.2d 651 (2022).
When a party seeks to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to Nebraska's Uniform Arbitration Act, a court must confirm that award unless a party has sought to vacate, modify, or correct the award and grounds for such vacation, modification, or correction exist. Garlock v. 3DS Properties, 303 Neb. 521, 930 N.W.2d 503 (2019).
This section does not allow for the exercise of discretion by the court when a request of confirmation is made where there has been no application for vacation or modification. Drummond v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 258, 785 N.W.2d 829 (2010).
The appellees filed a motion under this section seeking to confirm an arbitration award. Damrow v. Murdoch, 15 Neb. App. 920, 739 N.W.2d 229 (2007).
25-2613.
Vacating an award.(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award when:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section 25-2606, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party;
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 25-2603, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; or
(6) An arbitrator was subject to disqualification pursuant to section 25-2604.01 and failed, upon receipt of timely demand, to disqualify himself or herself as required by such section.
The fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
(b) An application under this section shall be made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that if predicated upon corruption, fraud, or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety days after such grounds are known or should have been known.
(c) In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in subdivision (a)(5) of this section, the court may order a rehearing before the new arbitrators chosen as provided in the agreement or, in the absence thereof, by the court in accordance with section 25-2604, or if the award is vacated on grounds set forth in subdivisions (a)(3) and (a)(4) of this section, the court may order a rehearing before the arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed in accordance with section 25-2604. The time within which the agreement requires the award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from the date of the order.
(d) If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the award is pending, the court shall confirm the award.
Annotations
1. Grounds for vacating awards - generally
2. Grounds for vacating awards - partiality
3. Grounds for vacating awards - exceeding power
4. Miscellaneous
1. Grounds for vacating awards - generally
An arbitration award will not be vacated on grounds immaterial to the award. State v. Nebraska Assn. of Pub. Employees, 313 Neb. 259, 984 N.W.2d 103 (2023).
Grounds as to form do not warrant the vacatur of an award. State v. Nebraska Assn. of Pub. Employees, 313 Neb. 259, 984 N.W.2d 103 (2023).
Arbitration awards governed by the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act cannot be vacated on the grounds that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
Courts lack the authority to vacate arbitration awards governed by the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act on the grounds that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
Serious legal or factual error by the arbitrator does not, standing on its own, provide a basis for vacating an award. City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
A court may refuse to enforce an arbitration award that is contrary to a public policy that is explicit, well defined, and dominant. Such a public policy must be ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedents, not from general considerations of supposed public interests; but the arbitration award need not itself violate positive law to be unenforceable as against public policy. State v. Henderson, 277 Neb. 240, 762 N.W.2d 1 (2009).
Pursuant to subsection (a)(6) of this section, the district court lacked authority to vacate the arbitrator's award pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act on the basis that it was inequitable. Hartman v. City of Grand Island, 265 Neb. 433, 657 N.W.2d 641 (2003).
The trial court did not err in finding that lack of a formal notice under section 25-2606 was an insufficient ground to vacate an arbitration award. Damrow v. Murdoch, 15 Neb. App. 920, 739 N.W.2d 229 (2007).
2. Grounds for vacating awards - partiality
"Evident partiality" exists under subsection (a)(2) of this section when a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration. City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
The circumstances under which an arbitrator's rulings alone could demonstrate the requisite partiality to vacate an award must be quite rare. City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
3. Grounds for vacating awards - exceeding power
In determining whether an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers under subsection (a)(3) of this section, a court's review is limited to whether the awarded relief exceeded the limits of the arbitrator's powers as defined by the contract and does not include whether the arbitrator somehow failed to meet a minimum requirement. State v. Nebraska Assn. of Pub. Employees, 313 Neb. 259, 984 N.W.2d 103 (2023).
It is only when the arbitrator issues an award that simply reflects the arbitrator's personal notions of justice rather than drawing its essence from the contract that a court may find that the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers. City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
Subsection (a)(3) of this section is interpreted under the rubric outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(4) found in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 186 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013). City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
The sole question presented when a party claims that an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers is whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties' contract, not whether he or she got its meaning right or wrong. City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
To vacate an arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, the party must show more than that the arbitrator committed an error—or even a serious error. City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
4. Miscellaneous
Arbitration in Nebraska is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act if it arises from a contract involving interstate commerce; otherwise, it is governed by the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act. City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
25-2614.
Modification or correction of award.(a) Upon application made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award when:
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.
(b) If the application is granted, the court shall modify and correct the award so as to effect its intent and shall confirm the award as so modified and corrected. Otherwise, the court shall confirm the award as made.
(c) An application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative with an application to vacate the award.
Annotations
Pursuant to subsection (a) of section 25-2609, an arbitration award signed by only one of three arbitrators required to sign the award was defective in form but not in substance, and thus the parties were permitted to make application to modify or correct the award under subsection (a)(3) of this section. Hartman v. City of Grand Island, 265 Neb. 433, 657 N.W.2d 641 (2003).
Under subsection (a)(1) of this section, an "evident miscalculation of figures" occurs when there is a mathematical error in the arbitration award that is both obvious and unambiguous. Jones v. Summit Ltd. Partnership Five, 262 Neb. 793, 635 N.W.2d 267 (2001).
25-2615.
Judgment or decree on award.Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award, a judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other judgment or decree. Costs of the application and of the proceedings subsequent thereto and disbursements may be awarded by the court.
25-2616.
Repealed. Laws 2018, LB193, § 97.
25-2617.
Application to court; procedure.Except as otherwise provided, an application to the court under the Uniform Arbitration Act shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner and upon the notice provided by law or rule of court for the making and hearing of motions. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, notice of an initial application for an order shall be served in the manner provided by law for the service of a summons in an action.
25-2618.
District court; jurisdiction; act; how construed.(a) The term court shall mean any district court of this state. The making of an agreement described in section 25-2602.01 providing for arbitration in this state confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement under the Uniform Arbitration Act and to enter judgment on an award thereunder.
(b) Nothing in the Uniform Arbitration Act shall be construed to empower the Commission of Industrial Relations to order that any party under its jurisdiction submit to, or contract to submit to, arbitration.
Annotations
Jurisdiction over confirmation of arbitration awards is conferred upon the district court, and the county court has no such jurisdiction. MBNA America Bank v. Hansen, 16 Neb. App. 536, 745 N.W.2d 609 (2008).
25-2618.01.
Small Claims Court; jurisdiction; when; transfer limited; appeal.(a) Whenever the amount of a controversy subject to the terms of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement is within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court under section 25-2802, a party may submit the controversy to the Small Claims Court for ultimate resolution under sections 25-2801 to 25-2807.
(b) A controversy submitted to the Small Claims Court under this section shall not be transferred to the regular docket of the county court under section 25-2805.
(c) In all appeals involving cases submitted under subsection (a) of this section, the judgment shall be affirmed unless:
(i) The judgment was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(ii) There was evident partiality or corruption by the judge or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(iii) The judge exceeded his or her powers;
(iv) The judge refused to postpone the trial upon sufficient cause being shown therefor, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section 25-2606, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party;
(v) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 25-2603, and the party did not participate in the Small Claims Court hearing without raising the objection; or
(vi) The judge was subject to disqualification and failed, upon receipt of timely demand, to disqualify himself or herself as required by law.
25-2619.
Venue.An initial application shall be made to the court of the county in which the agreement provides the arbitration hearing shall be held or, if the hearing has been held, in the county in which it was held. Otherwise the application shall be made in the county where the adverse party resides or has a place of business or, if he or she has no residence or place of business in this state, to the court of any county. All subsequent applications shall be made to the court hearing the initial application unless the court otherwise directs.
25-2620.
Appeals.(a) An appeal may be taken from:
(1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made under section 25-2603;
(2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under subsection (b) of section 25-2603;
(3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) An order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act.
(b) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action.
Annotations
An order denying an application to vacate an arbitration award is not a final and appealable order; such an order may be reviewed upon an appeal from an order confirming the arbitration award. Cinatl v. Prososki, 307 Neb. 477, 949 N.W.2d 505 (2020).
When this section is silent regarding the appealability of an arbitration-related order, an appellate court looks to section 25-1902 to determine whether the order is final and appealable. Cinatl v. Prososki, 307 Neb. 477, 949 N.W.2d 505 (2020).
This section authorizes appellate jurisdiction to review certain arbitration-related orders, such as an order denying an application to compel arbitration or an order granting an application to stay arbitration. But this section does not address whether a party may appeal an order granting an application to compel arbitration or to stay judicial proceedings. Appellate jurisdiction to review an order compelling arbitration and staying the action is determined by looking to the general final order statute, section 25-1902. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018).
An order compelling arbitration or staying judicial proceedings pending arbitration is a final order under the second category of section 25-1902. It affects a substantial right in an independent special proceeding because it disposes of all the issues presented. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010).
The list of appealable arbitration orders under this section is not exclusive. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010).
In reviewing a trial court's decision to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award under Nebraska's Uniform Arbitration Act, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the trial court's ruling regarding questions of law; however, the trial court's factual findings will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel v. Hunan, Inc., 276 Neb. 700, 757 N.W.2d 205 (2008).
Under subsection (a)(5) of this section, an order which vacates an arbitrator's award without directing a rehearing is appealable, whereas an order which vacates an award and directs a rehearing is not appealable. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Struss, 261 Neb. 435, 623 N.W.2d 308 (2001).
25-2621.
Act not retroactive.The Uniform Arbitration Act applies only to agreements made subsequent to August 30, 1987.
25-2622.
Act, how construed.The Uniform Arbitration Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
25-2701.
Rules of procedure; county court power to seal records.(1) All
provisions in the codes of criminal and civil procedure governing actions
and proceedings in the district court not in conflict with statutes specifically
governing procedure in county courts and related to matters for which no specific
provisions have been made for county courts shall govern and apply to all
actions and proceedings in the county court.
(2) County
courts may seal records of a person as provided under sections 43-2,108.01
to 43-2,108.05.
Annotations
As subsection (1) of this section makes clear, all provisions of the
criminal and civil procedure code govern all actions in the county court.
State v. Lebeau, 280 Neb. 238, 784 N.W.2d 921 (2010).
This section applies to the prosecution of city ordinances. State v.
Lebeau, 280 Neb. 238, 784 N.W.2d 921 (2010).
On appeal from a county or municipal court, notice of appeal and bond must be filed within ten days after rendition of judgment and this period cannot be prolonged by filing a motion for new trial. Edward Frank Rozman Co. v. Keillor, 195 Neb. 587, 239 N.W.2d 779 (1976).
25-2702.
Appearances; representation; attorney; qualification.No person shall appear in the county court to represent another, or act as attorney therein for any person other than himself or herself, unless he or she is regularly admitted as an attorney in this state.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. I, § 14, p. 282; C.S.1929, § 22-114; R.S.1943, § 26-115;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 85; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 29; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-585.
25-2703.
Cities and villages; prosecution of complaints; ordinances; file with court.Any city or village attorney may sign and prosecute complaints in the county court for any violation of any ordinance of the city or village for which he or she is attorney.
After January 1, 1974, no city or village may prosecute complaints for violations of ordinances unless such city or village has on file with the court a current copy of the ordinances of such city or village. Subject to guidelines provided by the State Court Administrator, the court shall prescribe the form in which such ordinances shall be filed.
25-2704.
Summons; pleadings; time for filings; trial date; telephonic or videoconference hearing; authorized.(1) In any civil action in county court, the summons, pleadings, and time for filings shall be the same as provided for civil actions in district court. A case shall stand for trial at the earliest available time on the trial docket after the issues therein are or, according to the times fixed for pleading, should have been made up.
(2) All nonevidentiary hearings, and any evidentiary hearings approved by the county court and by stipulation of all parties that have filed an appearance, may be heard by the court telephonically or by videoconferencing or similar equipment at any location within the judicial district as ordered by the court and in a manner that ensures the preservation of an accurate record. Such hearings shall not include trials before a jury. Hearings conducted in this manner shall be consistent with the public's access to the courts.
Source:Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 35; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-535;
Laws 1997, LB 363, § 1; Laws 1998, LB 234, § 9; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 57; Laws 2008, LB1014, § 12; Laws 2018, LB193, § 42.
25-2705.
Trial by jury;
demand for; exceptions; time; laws
applicable.(1) Either
party to any case in county court, except criminal cases arising under city
or village ordinances, traffic infractions, other infractions, and any matter
arising under the Nebraska Probate Code or the Nebraska Uniform Trust Code,
may demand a trial by jury. In civil cases, the demand shall be in writing
and shall be filed with the court:
(a) By a plaintiff
on the date the complaint is filed with the court;
(b) By a defendant on
or before the date the answer is filed with the court;
(c) By a counterclaimant
on the date the counterclaim is filed with the court;
(d) By a counterclaim
defendant on or before the date the reply to the counterclaim is filed with
the court;
(e) By a third-party plaintiff on the date the third-party complaint
is filed with the court;
(f) By a third-party defendant on or before the date the answer
to the third-party complaint is filed with the court;
(g) By a cross-claimant
on the date the cross-claim is filed with the court; and
(h) By a cross-claim
defendant on or before the date the answer to the cross-claim is filed with
the court.
(2) All
provisions of law relating to juries in the district courts shall apply to
juries in the county courts, and the district court jury list shall be used,
except that juries in the county courts shall consist of six persons.
Source:Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 36; Laws 1973, LB 6, § 1; Laws 1973, LB 548, § 1; Laws 1975, LB 481, § 5; Laws 1979, LB 534, § 6; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 18; Laws 1987, LB 77, § 4; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-536;
Laws 2003, LB 130, § 116; Laws 2011, LB669, § 19.
Cross References
Nebraska Probate Code, see section 30-2201.
Nebraska Uniform Trust Code, see section 30-3801.
Annotations
1. Constitutionality of statute
2. When right exists
3. Necessity for demand
4. Miscellaneous
1. Constitutionality of statute
This section, which denies jury trials for criminal cases arising under city or village ordinances or from traffic infractions, is unconstitutional to the extent it denies a jury trial to defendants charged with third-offense driving while intoxicated or greater who are subject to a sentence of up to 6 months in jail and a 15-year operator's license suspension. State v. Wiltshire, 241 Neb. 817, 491 N.W.2d 324 (1992).
There is no right to a jury trial for violations of municipal ordinances. State v. Blair, 230 Neb. 775, 433 N.W.2d 518 (1988).
Where the constitutionality of this section, insofar as it requires the defendant to request a jury trial, was not raised at any time prior to appeal, it will not be considered on appeal. State v. Hiross, 211 Neb. 319, 318 N.W.2d 291 (1982).
This section, providing for jury trials in the municipal courts except criminal cases arising under city or village ordinances, does not violate Article I, section 6, of Nebraska Constitution. State v. Flores, 209 Neb. 302, 307 N.W.2d 523 (1981).
2. When right exists
A defendant is not entitled to a jury trial in a prosecution for violation of a municipal ordinance. State v. Cozzens, 241 Neb. 565, 490 N.W.2d 184 (1992).
A demand for a jury trial by a defendant is necessary to involve the statutory right to a jury trial. State v. Miller, 226 Neb. 576, 412 N.W.2d 849 (1987).
This section does not provide a right to a jury trial for the violation of a municipal ordinance where the offense charged is petty. State v. Richter, 225 Neb. 871, 408 N.W.2d 324 (1987).
A defendant who appears pro se must make a proper demand for a jury trial pursuant to this section or that right will be deemed waived. State v. Lafler, 224 Neb. 613, 399 N.W.2d 808 (1987).
In municipal court prosecution for operating a vehicle while under the influence, defendant enjoys no constitutional right to trial by jury, and untimely request constituted waiver. State v. Nielsen, 199 Neb. 597, 260 N.W.2d 321 (1977).
There is no constitutional right to trial before a twelve-member jury on a petit offense. State v. Soester, 199 Neb. 477, 259 N.W.2d 921 (1977).
Under this section, defendant is expressly granted the right to a jury trial in the county court and municipal court. State v. Young, 194 Neb. 544, 234 N.W.2d 196 (1975).
3. Necessity for demand
To invoke this statutory right, an accused must make a demand for a jury trial by filing a timely request in accordance with the court rules. State v. Bishop, 224 Neb. 522, 399 N.W.2d 271 (1987).
As reflected by this section, the right to a jury trial is part of our fundamental law. State v. Kennedy, 224 Neb. 164, 396 N.W.2d 722 (1986).
Challenger of this section must show he or she would receive a benefit by a declaration of invalidity before standing will be allowed. State v. Lynch, 223 Neb. 849, 394 N.W.2d 651 (1986).
A demand is required to invoke the statutory right to a jury trial. State v. Vernon, 218 Neb. 539, 356 N.W.2d 887 (1984).
There is no constitutional right to a jury trial for an offense carrying a minimum sentence of six months or less and, while this section gives a statutory right to a jury trial in such cases, a demand must be made in order to invoke this right. State v. Mangelsen, 207 Neb. 213, 297 N.W.2d 765 (1980).
4. Miscellaneous
No right to jury trial if charged under municipal ordinance equivalent to section 39-669.07. State v. Lynch, 223 Neb. 849, 394 N.W.2d 651 (1986).
A defendant in a criminal case may make an oral request for a jury trial at the time of arraignment or may make the request in writing according to the rules set by the trial court. State v. Gerber, 206 Neb. 75, 291 N.W.2d 403 (1980).
Supreme Court will take judicial notice of all rules of district, separate juvenile, county, municipal, and workmen's compensation courts on file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. State v. Barrett, 200 Neb. 553, 264 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
Under this section, a trial court is not required to advise a defendant, charged with a petty offense, of his or her statutory right to a jury trial or the time and manner which must be followed to invoke that right, even if he elects to proceed pro se, when that defendant is penalized only by fine. State v. Golden, 8 Neb. App. 601, 599 N.W.2d 224 (1999).
25-2706.
County court; certify proceedings to district court; when; avoidance of county court jurisdiction; recovery of costs prohibited.The county court shall certify proceedings to the district court of the county in which an action is pending (1) when the pleadings or discovery proceedings indicate that the amount in controversy is greater than the jurisdictional amount in subdivision (5) of section 24-517 and a party to the action requests the transfer or (2) when the relief requested is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the district court. The county court shall file a certification of the case file and costs with the district court within ten days after entry of the transfer order. The action shall then be tried and determined by the district court as if the proceedings were originally brought in such district court, except that no new pleadings need be filed unless ordered by the district court.
If it is determined, upon adjudication, that the allegations of either party to such action are asserted with the intention solely of avoiding the jurisdiction of the county court, the offending party shall not recover any costs in the county court or the district court.
Source:Laws 1983, LB 137, § 3; Laws 1986, LB 750, § 2; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-302.01;
Laws 1991, LB 422, § 2; Laws 1993, LB 69, § 1; Laws 2001, LB 269, § 2; Laws 2018, LB193, § 43.
Annotations
This section does not require a district court to issue a new summons for service of process when an action has been certified to it from the county court under this section. Hunt v. Trackwell, 262 Neb. 688, 635 N.W.2d 106 (2001).
Plaintiff may not transfer jurisdiction of a case from county court to district court by simply filing the county court transcript in the district court. Collection Bureau of Grand Island, Inc. v. Fry, 9 Neb. App. 277, 610 N.W.2d 442 (2000).
25-2707.
Garnishment; amount in excess of jurisdiction of county court; transfer to district court; proceedings certified.Whenever proceedings under sections 25-1011 and 25-1026 to 25-1031.01, or under section 25-1056, are had in any county court and it shall appear by the pleadings or other answers to interrogatories filed by the garnishee that there is an amount in excess of the jurisdictional dollar amount specified in section 24-517, or property with a value of more than such amount, the title or ownership of which is in dispute, or when at any time during such proceedings it shall appear from the evidence or other pleadings that there is property of the value of more than the jurisdictional dollar amount specified in section 24-517, the title or ownership of which is in dispute, such court shall proceed no further. Within ten days after entry of the transfer order, the county court shall file with the district court of the county in which the action is pending a certification of the case file and costs. The matter shall be tried and determined by the district court as if the proceedings were originally had in district court, except that no new pleadings need be filed except as ordered by the district court.
Source:Laws 1961, c. 116, § 1, p. 358; R.S.1943, § 24-502.01;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 40; Laws 1986, LB 749, § 1; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-540;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 44.
25-2708.
Estates, guardianships,
conservatorships, and trusts; real estate; certificate of pending proceeding;
filing; county judge; duties;
guardian or conservator; filing required.In
any proceeding in the county court involving (1) the probate of wills, (2)
the administration of estates, (3) the determination of heirs, (4) the determination
of inheritance tax, (5) guardianships, (6) conservatorships, where real estate
is any part of the assets of the estate or proceeding, or (7) trusts, where
real estate is specifically described as an asset of the trust, the county
judge before whom the proceeding is pending shall issue a certificate which
shall be filed with the register of deeds of the county in which the real
estate is located within ten days after the description of the real estate
is filed in the proceeding. A
guardian or conservator shall file a copy of his or her letters with the register
of deeds in every county in which the ward has real property or an interest
in real property. The certificate shall be in the following form:
This is to certify that there is pending in the county court
of ........................... County, a proceeding .........................................................
(describe proceeding and name of person involved)
in which the following described real estate is involved,
to wit:
.........................................................
(describe real estate)
............................................
County Judge
Source:Laws 1969, c. 240, § 1, p. 885;
Laws 1971, LB 41, § 1; R.S.Supp.,1971, § 24-562.01;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 59; Laws 1975, LB 481, § 7; Laws 1980, LB 694, § 1; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-559;
Laws 2003, LB 130, § 117; Laws 2011, LB157, § 1.
25-2709.
Probate, adoption, trust jurisdiction; continuances.In all proceedings within the probate, guardianship, conservatorship, adoption, or trust jurisdiction of the county court when a date for a hearing has been fixed and when no action is taken by the court at the time so fixed, the cause shall stand continued from day to day as a matter of law and may thereafter be heard and determined by the court without further notice at any time, except that any party who has filed an appearance or pleading in such proceedings shall be given such notice of the hearing in such manner as the court shall direct.
Source:Laws 1951, c. 55, § 1, p. 188; R.S.1943, § 24-528.01;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 53; Laws 1977, LB 167, § 1; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-553.
25-2710.
Fees and costs; payment; effect.It shall be lawful for any person liable for the payment of any fees and costs charged or taxed in any civil or criminal action, or in any proceeding authorized by law to be brought in the county court, to pay such costs and fees to the county judge or to the clerk of the county court, and such payment shall operate as a satisfaction of such person's liability to all concerned. Each county court may accept credit cards as a means of payment for any money due the court.
Source:Laws 1909, c. 40, § 1, p. 226; R.S.1913, § 1242; C.S.1922, § 1165; C.S.1929, § 27-545; R.S.1943, § 24-549;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 30; Laws 1988, LB 370, § 1; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-530.
25-2711.
Clerk; liable for fees; accounting; indigent person; waiver of fees, when.It shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to demand the payment of all fees in advance in civil cases. He or she shall be charged with all fees earned by the court and shall be required to account for the same. Upon written application by and such evidence as the court may require from an indigent person, the clerk of the court may be directed, by a judge of the court by a written order, to file all necessary pleadings and to issue necessary process thereon to meet the requirements of justice, in which case no fees shall be charged and collected by the clerk of the court from such person except upon final order or judgment in the action, and in that case the clerk shall not be charged with the fees in the case and required to account for the same unless the same are collected by him or her.
25-2712.
Fees and costs; amount; transmit to State Treasurer; deposited in General Fund.Fees and costs in the county court shall be those provided by Chapter 33. Each clerk of the court shall, not later than the fifteenth day of the month following the calendar month in which they were received, transmit all such fees and costs received together with any interest or other income accumulated as a result of section 25-2713 and any fees for credit card use, reduced by any costs incurred as a result of credit card use and any other bank charges, to the State Treasurer who shall deposit the same in the General Fund.
Source:Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 32; Laws 1975, LB 286, § 2; Laws 1985, LB 326, § 1;
Laws 1988, LB 370, § 3; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-532.
25-2713.
Clerk of county court; invest money received; rules.When any money received by the clerk of the county court is not immediately paid out and the investment of such money is not otherwise provided for by law, the clerk of the county court shall invest such money or portion thereof as may be provided for by rules issued by the Supreme Court.
Source:Laws 1985, LB 326, § 2;
Laws 1986, LB 891, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 10; Laws 1988, LB 370, § 4; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-532.01.
25-2714.
Legacies, devises, distributive shares; unclaimed; payment to judge; effect.In case of an executor of a last will and testament which has been admitted to probate in any county court in this state, and in case of an administrator of the estate of a deceased intestate, upon making a satisfactory showing to the court of the inability of such an executor to find any legatee or devisee named in such will, or of the inability of an administrator to find an heir at law to which the county court has ordered payment to be made out of funds in his hands, or in case such legatee, devisee or an heir at law is found, and shall refuse to accept the legacy, devise, or amount ordered paid by the county court to such heir at law, or in case of any creditor whose claim has been allowed and who cannot be found or to whom for any reason payment cannot be made by such executor or administrator to such claimant, it shall be lawful for such executor or administrator to pay the county judge of the county having the settlement of such estate in charge, the amount of such legacy, devise or sum so ordered paid to an heir at law, or the amount of such claim so allowed and unpaid, for the use and benefit of such persons, and such payment shall discharge such executor or administrator from all further liability with reference thereto.
Source:Laws 1909, c. 40, § 1, p. 226; R.S.1913, § 1242; C.S.1922, § 1165; C.S.1929, § 27-545; R.S.1943, § 24-550; Laws 1967, c. 139, § 1, p. 425; R.S.Supp.,1969, § 24-550;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 60; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-560.
25-2715.
Fees, legacies, devises, distributive shares; payment to claimant; record.It shall be the duty of the county judge to pay any fees, money, costs, legacies, devises, or sums due creditors, held by him, to the person entitled thereto, upon proof of his identity to the satisfaction of the judge. A plain record shall be kept of all such fees, money, costs, legacies, devises, and money due heirs, creditors, or other persons, paid as aforesaid, and the same shall always be open to the inspection of the public.
Source:Laws 1909, c. 40, § 2, p. 227; R.S.1913, § 1243; Laws 1921, c. 105, § 1, p. 376; C.S.1922, § 1166; C.S.1929, § 27-546; R.S.1943, § 24-551; Laws 1967, c. 139, § 2, p. 426; R.R.S.1943, § 24-551;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 61; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-561.
25-2716.
Unclaimed funds; judge; payment to successor.Upon the expiration of any judge's term of office, he shall pay to his successor in office, any fees, money, costs, legacies, devises or money due any heir, creditor, or other person, in his possession, which have not been paid to the persons entitled thereto, or applied as provided by law.
Source:Laws 1909, c. 40, § 2, p. 227; R.S.1913, § 1243; Laws 1921, c. 105, § 1, p. 376; C.S.1922, § 1166; C.S.1929, § 27-546; R.S.1943, § 24-552; Laws 1967, c. 139, § 3, p. 426; R.R.S.1943, § 24-552;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 62; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-562.
25-2717.
Unclaimed funds; payment to State Treasurer; disposition.If any fees, money, condemnation awards, legacies, devises, sums due creditors, or costs due or belonging to any heir, legatee, or other person or persons have not been paid to or demanded by the person or persons entitled to the funds within three years from the date the funds were paid to the county judge or his or her predecessors in office, it shall be the duty of the county judge to notify the State Treasurer of the fees, money, condemnation awards, legacies, devises, sums due creditors, or costs remaining. When directed by the State Treasurer, the county judge shall remit the fees, money, condemnation awards, legacies, devises, sums due creditors, or costs to the State Treasurer for deposit in the Unclaimed Property Trust Fund pursuant to section 69-1317. Such payment shall release the bond of the county judge making such payment of all liability for such fees, money, condemnation awards, legacies, devises, sums due creditors, and costs due to heirs, legatees, or other persons paid in compliance with this section.
Source:Laws 1909, c. 40, § 2, p. 227; R.S.1913, § 1243; Laws 1921, c. 105, § 1, p. 376; C.S.1922, § 1166; C.S.1929, § 27-546; R.S.1943, § 24-553; Laws 1949, c. 49, § 1, p. 157; Laws 1967, c. 139, § 4, p. 427; R.R.S.1943, § 24-553;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 63; Laws 1978, LB 860, § 1; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-563;
Laws 1992, Third Spec. Sess., LB 26, § 2; Laws 2019, LB406, § 2; Laws 2021, LB532, § 2.
Cross References
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, see section 69-1329.
25-2718.
Offer of judgment; effect; as evidence.If the defendant, at any time before trial, offers in writing to allow judgment to be taken against him for a specified sum, the plaintiff may immediately have judgment therefor, with the costs then accrued. If he does not accept such offer before the trial, and fails to recover in the action a sum equal to the offer, he shall not recover costs accrued after the offer and costs shall be adjudged against him; but the offer and failure to accept it cannot be given in evidence, to affect the recovery, otherwise than as to costs as above provided.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. X, § 102, p. 305; C.S.1929, § 22-1006; R.S.1943, § 26-1,103;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 38; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-538.
25-2719.
Judgments; notice; to whom sent.Within three days after entry of any judgment, the clerk of the county court shall send notice of the judgment by first-class United States mail to each party's attorney or attorneys of record or, if none, to an individual defendant at his or her usual place of residence, if known, and to a defendant not an individual to any proper recipient of summons for that party as designated by law.
25-2720.
Repealed. Laws 1998, LB 234, § 12.
25-2720.01.
Power to set
aside, vacate, or modify judgments or orders.The
county court, including the Small
Claims Court and the county court when sitting as a juvenile court,
shall have the power to set aside default judgments and to vacate or modify
its own judgments or orders during or after the term at which such judgments
or orders were made in the same manner as provided for actions filed in the
district court.
Annotations
Under this section, the county court may take certain actions as provided by the Nebraska Constitution or statutes for actions filed in the district court, and it does not confer additional equity jurisdiction on the county court. In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Maronica B., 314 Neb. 597, 992 N.W.2d 457 (2023).
County courts have the power to vacate or modify their own judgments and orders during or after the term in which they were made in the same manner as provided for district courts under section 25-2001. In re Interest of Luz P. et al., 295 Neb. 814, 891 N.W.2d 651 (2017).
Courts have the power to vacate or modify their own judgments and orders at any time during the term at which they were pronounced. But this power may not be used to circumvent the Legislature's power to fix the time limit to take an appeal. A court may not vacate an order or judgment and reinstate it at a later date just for the purpose of extending the time for appeal. One exception to this rule against using a court's power to vacate as a tool to extend the time for appeal is where a clerk fails to provide notice of a judgment to a party, thereby impairing the party's ability to appeal. In re Interest of Luz P. et al., 295 Neb. 814, 891 N.W.2d 651 (2017).
25-2721.
Judgment; execution; lien on real estate; conditions.(1) Any person having a judgment rendered by a county court may request the clerk of such court to issue execution on the judgment in the same manner as execution is issued upon other judgments rendered in the county court and direct the execution on the judgment to any county in the state. Such person may request that garnishment, attachment, or any other aid to execution be directed to any county without the necessity of filing a transcript of the judgment in the receiving county, and any hearing or proceeding with regard to such execution or aid in execution shall be heard in the court in which the judgment was originally rendered.
(2) Any person having a judgment rendered by a county court may cause a transcript thereof to be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court in any county of this state. When the transcript is so filed and entered upon the judgment index, such judgment shall be a lien on real estate in the county where the transcript is filed, and when the transcript is so filed and entered upon such judgment index, the clerk of such court may issue execution thereupon in like manner as execution is issued upon judgments rendered in the district court.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 14, § 18, p. 267; R.S.1913, § 1221; C.S.1922, § 1144; C.S.1929, § 27-532; R.S.1943, § 24-532;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 39; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-539;
Laws 1991, LB 422, § 3; Laws 2009, LB35, § 15; Laws 2018, LB193, § 45.
Annotations
Under subsection (2) of this section, a judgment rendered by a county court does not automatically become a lien on real estate. A judgment rendered by a county court is only a personal judgment against the debtor. In order for a county court's judgment to become a lien on real estate, it must be transcribed to a district court. Mousel Law Firm, P.C. v. The Townhouse, Inc., 259 Neb. 113, 608 N.W.2d 571 (2000).
25-2722.
Record; certification required; effect.Every record made in any county court, excepting original orders, judgments and decrees thereof, shall have attached thereto a certificate signed by the judge of such court, showing the date of such record and the county in which the same is made, and it shall not be necessary to call such judge or his successor in office to prove such record so certified.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 14, § 34, p. 270; R.S.1913, § 1234; C.S.1922, § 1157; C.S.1929, § 27-536; R.S.1943, § 24-540;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 67; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-567.
25-2723.
Probate books, enumeration.The probate books shall consist of a probate record, a fee book, a general index to probate records, an index to wills deposited, and such additional records as are needed to carry out the provisions of the Nebraska Probate Code.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 14, § 32, p. 270; Laws 1895, c. 31, § 1, p. 156; Laws 1909, c. 41, § 1, p. 228; R.S.1913, § 1233; C.S.1922, § 1156; C.S.1929, § 27-535; R.S.1943, § 24-535;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 54; Laws 1975, LB 481, § 6; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-554.
Cross References
Nebraska Probate Code, see section 30-2201.
25-2724.
Probate record; retention.The probate record shall be permanently retained on microfilm or in its original form in accordance with the Records Management Act. Evidence shall be retained as required by the Supreme Court.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 14, § 32, p. 270; Laws 1895, c. 31, § 1, p. 156; Laws 1909, c. 41, § 1, p. 228; R.S.1913, § 1233; C.S.1922, § 1156; C.S.1929, § 27-535; R.S.1943, § 24-536;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 55; Laws 1989, LB 229, § 1; R.S.Supp.,1989, § 24-555.
Cross References
Records Management Act, see section 84-1220.
25-2725.
Fee book; contents.The fee book shall contain an entry of the title of all probate proceedings, the date of each paper issued or filed, and the date of all orders and judgments entered therein together with an exact amount of all fees allowed, taxed and paid in each proceeding, showing the names of the persons entitled to and receiving the same, and for what services such fees were taxed or paid.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 14, § 32, p. 270; Laws 1895, c. 31, § 1, p. 156; Laws 1909, c. 41, § 1, p. 228; R.S.1913, § 1233; C.S.1922, § 1156; C.S.1929, § 27-535; R.S.1943, § 24-537;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 56; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-556.
25-2726.
General index; contents.The general index to probate records shall contain an alphabetical list of all estate matters brought before the court, the file number of the estate, the name of each estate administered upon, or guardianship or other probate matter presented to the court for its determination, the number and page of the fee book in which the costs are taxed in each matter, and the book and page in the probate record where all such matters are recorded, sufficiently definite to enable the finding of such proceedings from the general index.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 14, § 33, p. 270; Laws 1909, c. 41, § 1, p. 228; R.S.1913, § 1233; C.S.1922, § 1156; C.S.1929, § 27-535; R.S.1943, § 24-538;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 57; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-557.
25-2727.
Index to wills deposited; contents.The index to wills deposited shall contain a memorandum of the date of each will deposited with the county judge for safekeeping, the names of the testators in alphabetical order, the name of the party delivering each will to the county judge, and a column in which shall be noted the final disposition of such will, whether returned to the testator, filed for probate, or otherwise disposed of.
Source:G.S.1873, c. 14, § 33, p. 270; Laws 1895, c. 31, § 1, p. 156; Laws 1909, c. 41, § 1, p. 228; R.S.1913, § 1233; C.S.1922, § 1156; C.S.1929, § 27-535; R.S.1943, § 24-539;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 58; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-558.
25-2728.
Appeals; parties; applicability of sections.(1) Any party in a civil case and any defendant in a criminal case may appeal from the final judgment or final order of the county court to the district court of the county where the county court is located. In a criminal case, a prosecuting attorney may obtain review by exception proceedings pursuant to sections 29-2317 to 29-2319.
(2) Sections 25-2728 to 25-2738 shall not apply to:
(a) Appeals in eminent domain proceedings as provided in sections 76-715 to 76-723;
(b) Appeals in proceedings in the county court sitting as a juvenile court as provided in sections 43-2,106 and 43-2,106.01;
(c) Appeals in matters arising under the Nebraska Probate Code as provided in section 30-1601;
(d) Appeals in matters arising under the Nebraska Uniform Trust Code;
(e) Appeals in matters arising under the Health Care Surrogacy Act as provided in section 30-1601;
(f) Appeals in adoption proceedings as provided in section 43-112;
(g) Appeals in inheritance tax proceedings as provided in section 77-2023; and
(h) Appeals in domestic relations matters as provided in section 25-2739.
Source:Laws 1981, LB 42, § 1; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 19; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 11; Laws 1989, LB 182, § 8; R.S.Supp.,1989, § 24-541.01; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 69;
Laws 1994, LB 1106, § 2; Laws 1995, LB 538, § 2; Laws 2000, LB 921, § 25; Laws 2003, LB 130, § 118; Laws 2010, LB800, § 3; Laws 2018, LB104, § 20.
Cross References
Health Care Surrogacy Act, see section 30-601.
Nebraska Probate Code, see section 30-2201.
Nebraska Uniform Trust Code, see section 30-3801.
Annotations
A county court's order overruling the defendant's motion to seal records, filed years after her case had been dismissed, was a final, appealable order, because the order ruled on a postjudgment motion and affected a substantial right. The right invoked was the statutory right to remove the record of the defendant's citation from the public record, no mere technical right. State v. Coble, 299 Neb. 434, 908 N.W.2d 646 (2018).
The method of obtaining district court review of decisions rendered by the county court is by appeal pursuant to this section. Miller v. Brunswick, 253 Neb. 141, 571 N.W.2d 245 (1997).
Under subsection (2) of this section, order of county court dismissing motion to remove personal representative was appealable. In re Estate of Snover, 233 Neb. 198, 443 N.W.2d 894 (1989).
Pursuant to subsections (1) and (4) of this section, an appeal from a determination by the county court, juvenile division, that a juvenile lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his parent under the provisions of section 43-247(3), is properly taken to the district court; the Supreme Court has no authority to hear such an appeal which does not involve the termination of parental rights. In re Interest of J.S.O., 231 Neb. 529, 436 N.W.2d 837 (1989).
The right to appeal the final order or judgment of a county court grounded in this section and section 29-611 does not include a constitutionally grounded right to a speedy appeal. State v. Schroder, 218 Neb. 860, 359 N.W.2d 799 (1984).
The right to appeal from orders of a county court sitting as a juvenile court, insofar as that right is vested in the child's custodian, is vested only in individuals or entities having legal custody of such a child, and not in those persons having only possession of the child. In re Interest of S.R., 217 Neb. 528, 352 N.W.2d 141 (1984).
The docket fee requirement contained in section 25-2729 necessarily applies to appeal brought by a prosecuting attorney pursuant to sections 29-824 to 29-826, because this section does not expressly exclude sections 29-824 to 29-826 from the application of section 25-2729. State v. McArthur, 12 Neb. App. 657, 685 N.W.2d 733 (2004).
25-2729.
Appeals; procedure.(1) In order to perfect an appeal from the county court, the appealing party shall within thirty days after the entry of the judgment or final order complained of:
(a) File with the clerk of the county court a notice of appeal; and
(b) Deposit with the clerk of the county court a docket fee of the district court for cases originally commenced in district court.
(2) Satisfaction of the requirements of subsection (1) of this section shall perfect the appeal and give the district court jurisdiction of the matter appealed.
(3) The entry of a judgment or final order occurs when the clerk of the court places the file stamp and date upon the judgment or final order. For purposes of determining the time for appeal, the date stamped on the judgment or final order shall be the date of entry.
(4) In appeals from the Small Claims Court only, the appealing party shall also, within the time fixed by subsection (1) of this section, deposit with the clerk of the county court a cash bond or undertaking, with at least one good and sufficient surety approved by the court, in the amount of fifty dollars conditioned that the appellant will satisfy any judgment and costs that may be adjudged against him or her.
(5) A notice of appeal or docket fee filed or deposited after the announcement of a decision or final order but before the entry of the judgment or final order shall be treated as filed or deposited after the entry of the judgment or final order and on the day of entry.
(6) The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal shall be terminated as to all parties (a) by a timely motion for a new trial under section 25-1144.01, (b) by a timely motion to alter or amend a judgment under section 25-1329, or (c) by a timely motion to set aside the verdict or judgment under section 25-1315.02, and the full time for appeal fixed in subsection (1) of this section commences to run from the entry of the order ruling upon the motion filed pursuant to subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection. When any motion terminating the time for filing a notice of appeal is timely filed by any party, a notice of appeal filed before the court announces its decision upon the terminating motion shall have no effect, whether filed before or after the timely filing of the terminating motion. A new notice of appeal shall be filed within the prescribed time from the entry of the order ruling on the motion. No additional fees are required for such filing. A notice of appeal filed after the court announces its decision or order on the terminating motion but before the entry of the order is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry of the order.
(7) The party appealing shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal upon all parties who have appeared in the action or upon their attorney of record. Proof of service shall be filed with the notice of appeal.
(8) If an appellant fails to comply with any provision of subsection (4) or (7) of this section, the district court on motion and notice may take such action, including dismissal of the appeal, as is just.
Source:Laws 1981, LB 42, § 2; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 20; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 12; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-541.02;
Laws 1994, LB 1106, § 3; Laws 1995, LB 538, § 3; Laws 1995, LB 598, § 1; Laws 1999, LB 43, § 15; Laws 2000, LB 921, § 26; Laws 2018, LB193, § 46.
Annotations
1. Procedure
2. Miscellaneous
1. Waiver
Per subsection (3) of this section, a judge's signature and a court's seal reflect the court's act of rendering judgment. State v. Linn, 248 Neb. 809, 539 N.W.2d 435 (1995).
As an alternative to depositing a docket fee, a person who is unable to pay the required fee may file an affidavit of poverty and proceed with an appeal in forma pauperis. State v. Hunter, 234 Neb. 567, 451 N.W.2d 922 (1990).
To vest appellate jurisdiction in the district court from county court, all that is required is the timely filed notice of appeal and timely deposit of the district court docket fee. Rorick Partnership v. Haug, 228 Neb. 364, 422 N.W.2d 365 (1988).
An order that a juvenile is a juvenile within the meaning of section 43-202(3) is a final order. In order to appeal from a final order of a county court, notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days from the rendition of judgment. In re Interest of Aufenkamp, 214 Neb. 297, 333 N.W.2d 681 (1983).
A journal entry signed by the judge and filed is all that subsection (3) of this section required for a final order filed in 1998; a file stamp was not required. State v. Solomon, 16 Neb. App. 368, 744 N.W.2d 475 (2008).
Pursuant to this section, a judgment is entered by the clerk of the court by placing the file stamp and date upon a rendered judgment. State v. Wahrman, 11 Neb. App. 101, 644 N.W.2d 572 (2002).
Pursuant to this section and section 25-1301, a judgment is entered when the clerk of the court places a file stamp and date upon it. State v. Wilcox, 9 Neb. App. 933, 623 N.W.2d 329 (2001).
To vest jurisdiction from the county court to the district court, a party must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the final order. If no notice of appeal is timely filed, the district court does not obtain jurisdiction, and thus, a higher appellate court cannot obtain jurisdiction from the district court. State v. Mitchell, 8 Neb. App. 659, 600 N.W.2d 497 (1999).
2. Miscellaneous
When a party is appealing a decision involving a conditional use permit under this section, an appellate court acquires jurisdiction only if, within thirty days of the decision, (1) a notice of appeal is filed with the governmental entity that made the decision or with the county clerk and (2) the required district court docket fee is deposited with the governmental entity that made the decision or with the county clerk. Preserve the Sandhills v. Cherry County, 313 Neb. 668, 986 N.W.2d 265 (2023).
When a trial court order intended to finally dispose of a matter is announced but not rendered or entered pursuant to section 25-1301, but a party nonetheless files an otherwise timely notice of appeal, the appellate court has "potential jurisdiction" which "springs" into full jurisdiction when section 25-1301 is complied with. Rosen Auto Leasing v. Jordan, 15 Neb. App. 1, 720 N.W.2d 911 (2006).
The docket fee requirement contained in this section necessarily applies to appeals brought by a prosecuting attorney pursuant to sections 29-824 to 29-826, because section 25-2728 does not expressly exclude sections 29-824 to 29-826 from the application of this section. State v. McArthur, 12 Neb. App. 657, 685 N.W.2d 733 (2004).
Where the State is appealing an order of a county court granting a motion for the return of seized property or to suppress evidence pursuant to sections 29-824 to 29-826, the State must comply with the standard procedures for appeal as provided in this section, as well as with the requirements specified within sections 29-824 to 29-826; failure to do so deprives the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to review the order. State v. McArthur, 12 Neb. App. 657, 685 N.W.2d 733 (2004).
25-2730.
Appeal; operate as supersedeas; when; bond; criminal cases; appeal; effect.(1) In cases involving a money judgment or a judgment for the possession of specified personal property, no appeal shall operate as a supersedeas unless the appellant within thirty days after the entry of the judgment deposits with the clerk of the county court a cash bond or an undertaking with at least one good and sufficient surety approved by the court. In cases involving a money judgment, the bond or undertaking shall be in the amount of the judgment, costs, and estimated interest pending appeal and conditioned that the appellant shall pay the judgment, interest, and costs adjudged against him or her on appeal. In cases involving a judgment for the possession of specified personal property, the bond or undertaking shall be in an amount at least double the value of the property and conditioned that the appellant shall pay all costs and damages adjudged against him or her on appeal and deliver the property in accordance with the judgment on appeal.
(2) In appeals in cases of forcible entry and detainer, no appeal shall operate as a supersedeas unless the party appealing shall deposit an undertaking or cash bond in accordance with section 25-21,234.
(3) In appeals in criminal cases, the execution of judgment and sentence, other than any sentence to a period of confinement, shall be suspended during the appeal. Execution of a sentence to a period of confinement shall be suspended only if (a) the county court, in its discretion, allows the defendant to continue at liberty under the prior recognizance or bail or (b) the defendant enters into a written recognizance to the State of Nebraska, with surety or sureties approved by the county court or with a cash bond, filed with the clerk of the county court. The condition of the recognizance shall be that the defendant will prosecute the appeal without delay and abide and perform the judgment and sentence of the district court. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the county court shall fix the amount of the recognizance or cash bond, which shall be a reasonable amount. The cash bond shall be returned upon the fulfillment of the conditions of the bond.
(4) In appeals in cases under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, no appeal shall operate as a supersedeas of any writ of restitution unless the defendant deposits an undertaking or cash bond in accordance with section 76-1447.
(5) In all other cases, perfection of an appeal shall not stay the proceedings.
(6) In any case, the district court, on motion after notice and hearing and upon such terms as justice shall require, may stay any order or judgment appealed from, order a renewal or additional surety of an undertaking, or order the amount of the undertaking or recognizance increased or decreased. The action of the district court shall be certified by the clerk to the clerk of the county court.
Source:Laws 1981, LB 42, § 3; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 21; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 13; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-541.03;
Laws 1993, LB 782, § 1; Laws 1995, LB 538, § 4; Laws 1999, LB 43, § 16.
Cross References
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, see section 76-1401.
Annotations
Language in subsection (6) of this section authorizing the district court to order the amount of the bond undertaking increased or decreased permitted the reduction of the appeal bond to a recognizance bond secured by a signature. State v. Griffin, 270 Neb. 578, 705 N.W.2d 51 (2005).
In order to prove right to attorney fee, attorney for special administrator and successor personal representative must show services were performed when supersedeas was not in effect. In re Estate of Wagner, 222 Neb. 699, 386 N.W.2d 448 (1986).
25-2731.
Appeal; transcript; contents; clerk; duties.(1) Upon perfection of the appeal, the clerk of the county court shall transmit within ten days to the clerk of the district court a certified copy of the transcript and the docket fee, whereupon the clerk of the district court shall file the appeal. A copy of any bond or undertaking shall be transmitted to the clerk of the district court within ten days of filing.
(2) The Supreme Court shall, by rule and regulation, specify the method of ordering the transcript and the form and content of the transcript.
Source:Laws 1981, LB 42, § 4; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 22; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 14; Laws 1988, LB 352, § 24; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-541.04;
Laws 2018, LB193, § 47.
25-2732.
Testimony; preservation; bill of exceptions; cost.(1) Testimony in all civil and criminal cases in county court shall be preserved by multi-track recorders, but the court may order the use of a court reporter in any case.
(2) Standards for equipment for recording testimony and rules for using such equipment shall be prescribed by the Supreme Court. Such standards shall require that the equipment be capable of multiple-track recording and of instantaneous monitoring by the clerk or other court employee operating the equipment.
(3) The transcription of such testimony, when certified to by the stenographer or court reporter who made it and settled by the court as such, shall constitute the bill of exceptions in the case. The cost of preparing the bill of exceptions shall be paid initially by the party for whom it is prepared.
(4) The procedure for preparation, settlement, signature, allowance, certification, filing, and amendment of a bill of exceptions shall be governed by rules of practice prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Source:Laws 1981, LB 42, § 5; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 23; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 15; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-541.05;
Laws 2007, LB213, § 2.
Annotations
Revocation of probation need not be reversed solely on the ground that, through inadvertence, a complete record of the hearing resulting in the revocation was not preserved so long as a sufficient record exists to establish the grounds for revocation by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Schulz, 221 Neb. 473, 378 N.W.2d 165 (1985).
25-2733.
Appeals; district court; review record; disposition; costs.(1) In all cases the district court shall review the case for error appearing on the record made in the county court. The district court shall render a judgment which may affirm, affirm but modify, or reverse the judgment or final order of the county court. If the district court reverses, it may enter judgment in accordance with its findings or remand the case to the county court for further proceedings consistent with the judgment of the district court. Within two judicial days after the decision of the district court becomes final, the clerk of the district court shall issue a mandate in appeals from the county court and transmit the mandate in appeals to the clerk of the county court on the form prescribed by the Supreme Court together with a copy of such decision.
(2) The ordering, preparing, signing, filing, correcting, and amending of the bill of exceptions shall be governed by the rules of practice prescribed by the Supreme Court.
(3) The judgment of the district court shall vacate the judgment in the county court. The taxation of costs in the district court shall include the costs in the county court. If a judgment of the county court is affirmed or affirmed but modified, interest on the amount of the judgment in the district court that does not exceed the amount of the judgment in the county court shall run from the date of entry of the judgment appealed from the county court.
Source:Laws 1981, LB 42, § 6; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 24; Laws 1988, LB 352, § 25; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-541.06;
Laws 1994, LB 1106, § 4; Laws 1995, LB 538, § 5; Laws 2000, LB 921, § 27; Laws 2008, LB1014, § 13.
Annotations
1. Standard of review
2. Miscellaneous
1. Standard of review
Appeals in adoption proceedings are reviewed by the district court and Supreme Court for error appearing on the record. In re Guardianship of T.C.W., 235 Neb. 716, 457 N.W.2d 282 (1990).
Under subsection (1) of this section, on appeal of a county court's judgment rendered in a bench trial of a law action, the county court's factual findings have the effect of a verdict and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous; as appellate courts reviewing a judgment in a bench trial of a law action in the county court, the Supreme Court and a district court do not reweigh evidence, but consider the judgment in the light most favorable to the successful party and resolve evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful party, who is entitled to every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence. Dammann v. Litty, 234 Neb. 664, 452 N.W.2d 522 (1990).
On appeal of a county court's judgment rendered in a bench trial of a law action, the district court reviews the case for error appearing on the record made in the county court, and the factual findings made by the county court have the effect of a verdict and will not be set aside unless such findings are clearly erroneous. In re Estate of Goltl, 233 Neb. 53, 443 N.W.2d 884 (1989).
Under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the district court and the Nebraska Supreme Court review appeals from the municipal court, other than those arising from the small claims division thereof, for error appearing on the record. Kuehl v. Diesel Power Equip. Co., 228 Neb. 353, 422 N.W.2d 361 (1988).
Under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section the district court and the Nebraska Supreme Court generally shall review appeals from the municipal court (now merged with the county court) for error appearing on the record. If the district court determines to reverse the case, it may enter judgment in accordance with its findings. Communications Workers of America v. Abrahamson, 228 Neb. 335, 422 N.W.2d 547 (1988).
In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, the district court acts as an intermediate court of appeal, and, as such, its review is limited to an examination of the county court record for error or abuse of discretion. State v. Sock, 227 Neb. 646, 419 N.W.2d 525 (1988).
On appeal of a county court's judgment rendered in a bench trial of a law action, the district court reviews the case for error appearing on the record made in the county court. Holden v. Urban, 224 Neb. 472, 398 N.W.2d 699 (1987).
Matters involving appointments of personal representatives, on appeal to the district court and the Supreme Court, are reviewed for error appearing on the record. In re Estate of Casselman, 219 Neb. 653, 365 N.W.2d 805 (1985).
A district court, on criminal appeals from the county court, acts as an intermediate court of appeals reviewing the record for error. State v. Schroder, 218 Neb. 860, 359 N.W.2d 799 (1984).
Appeals in criminal matters from the county or municipal court to the district court are not reviewed de novo upon the record; they are reviewed for error appearing on the record in the county or municipal court. State v. Kaiser, 218 Neb. 556, 356 N.W.2d 890 (1984).
In probate proceedings, the Supreme Court's scope of review is limited to error appearing on the record. In re Estate of Massie, 218 Neb. 103, 353 N.W.2d 735 (1984).
Review of an order appointing a conservator is for error appearing on the record made in the county court. In re Estate of Oltmer, 214 Neb. 830, 336 N.W.2d 560 (1983).
The district court and higher appellate courts generally review judgments from a small claims court for error appearing on the record. Schmunk v. Aquatic Solutions, 29 Neb. App. 940, 962 N.W.2d 581 (2021).
District courts and higher appellate courts generally review appeals from county courts for error appearing on the record. Lesser v. Eagle Hills Homeowners' Assn., 20 Neb. App. 423, 824 N.W.2d 77 (2012).
2. Miscellaneous
An order of a district court becomes final for the purpose of issuing a mandate under this section only after the time for appeal has run. State v. Beyer, 260 Neb. 670, 619 N.W.2d 213 (2000).
Except in the most unusual of cases, for a question of constitutionality to be considered on appeal, it must have been properly raised in the trial court, and if not so raised, it will be considered to have been waived. State v. Moore, 235 Neb. 955, 458 N.W.2d 232 (1990).
A motion for a new trial is not properly presented to the district court when it sits as an intermediate appellate court. A motion for a new trial is proper only in the trial court. Collection Bureau of Lincoln v. Loos, 233 Neb. 30, 443 N.W.2d 605 (1989).
Except in the most unusual cases, to be considered on appeal a question of constitutionality must have been properly raised in the trial court. State v. Moore, 226 Neb. 347, 411 N.W.2d 345 (1987).
Review of an order appointing a guardian or a conservator is for error appearing on the record made in county court. In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Sim, 225 Neb. 181, 403 N.W.2d 721 (1987).
A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is to be presented to the county court as the fact finder, not to the district court which sat as an appellate court. State v. Ferris, 216 Neb. 606, 344 N.W.2d 668 (1984).
In cases involving appeals from the county court to the district court prior to the effective date of this section, wherein it appears obvious from the record filed in this court that both the parties and the district judge considered the county court bill of exceptions as having been received in evidence, we will so consider it on appeal to this court. Blaha GMC-Jeep, Inc. v. Frerichs, 211 Neb. 103, 317 N.W.2d 894 (1982).
A statement of errors filed pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. of Cty. Cts. 52(I)(G) (rev. 1993) must be filed with the district court within 10 days of the filing of the bill of exceptions, rather than within 10 days of the filing of the notice of appeal. State v. Stuthman, 2 Neb. App. 317, 509 N.W.2d 410 (1993).
An appellant who has incorporated a properly drafted statement of errors directly into a notice of appeal from a judgment of the county court has satisfied the requirement in Neb. Ct. R. of Cty. Cts. 52(I)(G) (rev. 1992) concerning the timely filing of a statement of errors with the district court. State v. Nelson, 2 Neb. App. 289, 509 N.W.2d 232 (1993).
25-2734.
Repealed. Laws 2008, LB 1014, § 80.
25-2735.
Appeal; surety; liability.When an appeal shall be dismissed or when judgment shall be entered in the district court against the appellant, the sureties in the undertaking shall be liable to the appellee for the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs recovered against the appellant, but not to exceed the amount of the undertaking.
25-2736.
Appeal; procedural dismissal; effect.If an appeal is dismissed for procedural reasons, the clerk of the district court shall certify the order without cost to the county court. Thereafter the proceedings in the county court shall continue as if no appeal had been taken.
25-2737.
Appeal; appellant; pay costs; when.In all cases involving a money judgment, if any person appealing from a judgment rendered in his or her favor shall not recover a greater sum than the amount for which judgment was rendered, besides costs and the interest accruing thereon, such appellant shall pay the costs of such appeal.
Annotations
In all matters arising under the Nebraska Probate Code, if it shall appear to the district court that an appeal was taken vexatiously or for delay, the court shall adjudge that the appellant shall pay the cost thereof, including an attorney fee, under subsection (2) of this section. In re Estate of Miller, 231 Neb. 723, 437 N.W.2d 793 (1989).
25-2738.
Appeals; when not allowed.No appeal shall be allowed from judgments rendered on confession.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 82, art. XI, § 116, p. 309; C.S.1929, § 22-1114; R.S.1943, § 26-1,117;
Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 51; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-551.
25-2739.
Domestic relations judgment or final order; appeal.A judgment rendered or final order made by a county court in a domestic relations matter as defined in section 25-2740 may be reversed, vacated, or modified by the Court of Appeals in the same manner as judgments and final orders of the district court under sections 25-1911 to 25-1929.
25-2740.
Domestic relations matters; district, county, and separate juvenile courts; jurisdiction; procedure.(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) Domestic relations matters means proceedings under sections 28-311.09 and 28-311.10 (including harassment protection orders and valid foreign harassment protection orders), sections 28-311.11 and 28-311.12 (including sexual assault protection orders and valid foreign sexual assault protection orders), the Conciliation Court Law and sections 42-347 to 42-381 (including dissolution, separation, annulment, custody, and support), section 43-512.04 (including child support or medical support), section 42-924 (including domestic protection orders), sections 43-1401 to 43-1418 (including paternity determinations and parental support), and sections 43-1801 to 43-1803 (including grandparent visitation); and
(b) Paternity or custody determinations means proceedings to establish the paternity of a child under sections 43-1411 to 43-1418 or proceedings to determine custody of a child under section 42-364.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, in domestic relations matters, a party shall file his or her petition or complaint and all other court filings with the clerk of the district court. The party shall state in the petition or complaint whether such party requests that the proceeding be heard by a county court judge or by a district court judge. If the party requests the case be heard by a county court judge, the county court judge assigned to hear cases in the county in which the matter is filed at the time of the hearing is deemed appointed by the district court and the consent of the county court judge is not required. Such proceeding is considered a district court proceeding, even if heard by a county court judge, and an order or judgment of the county court in a domestic relations matter has the force and effect of a district court judgment. The testimony in a domestic relations matter heard before a county court judge shall be preserved as provided in section 25-2732.
(3) In addition to the jurisdiction provided for paternity or custody determinations under subsection (2) of this section, a county court or separate juvenile court which already has jurisdiction over the child whose paternity or custody is to be determined has jurisdiction over such paternity or custody determination.
Source:Laws 1997, LB 229, § 2; Laws 1998, LB 218, § 1; Laws 1998, LB 1041, § 2; Laws 2004, LB 1207, § 16; Laws 2008, LB280, § 2; Laws 2008, LB1014, § 14; Laws 2017, LB289, § 1.
Cross References
Conciliation Court Law, see section 42-802.
Annotations
Under subsection (3) of this section, the jurisdiction conferred on a county court to decide custody issues refers to a county court sitting as a juvenile court. Subsection (3) confers concurrent jurisdiction over a custody determination involving a juvenile who has been adjudicated under the juvenile code. This concurrent jurisdiction is not original, however, because the conditions of section 43-2,113 must first be satisfied. Those conditions require a district court to transfer the case to juvenile court and the juvenile court to consent to the transfer. Molczyk v. Molczyk, 285 Neb. 96, 825 N.W.2d 435 (2013).
Jurisdiction under section 24-312(3) is separate from the invocation of jurisdiction under this section. Mahmood v. Mahmud, 279 Neb. 390, 778 N.W.2d 426 (2010).
In the exercise of its jurisdiction over a custody modification proceeding, a county court sitting as a juvenile court cannot permanently modify child custody through the mere adoption of a case plan pursuant to section 43-285(2). In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63, 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009).
This section, combined with sections 24-517 and 43-247, vests juvenile courts and county courts sitting as juvenile courts with jurisdiction over a custody modification proceeding if the court already has jurisdiction over the juvenile under a separate provision of section 43-247. In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63, 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009).
25-2741.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-2741 to 25-2749 shall be known and may be cited as the County Court Expedited Civil Actions Act.
25-2742.
Civil actions; applicability of act.(1) The County Court Expedited Civil Actions Act applies to civil actions in county court in which the sole relief sought is a money judgment and in which the claim of each plaintiff is less than or equal to the county court jurisdictional amount set forth in subdivision (5) of section 24-517, including damages of any kind, penalties, interest accrued before the filing date, and attorney's fees, but excluding prejudgment interest accrued after the filing date, postjudgment interest, and costs.
(2) The act does not apply to Small Claims Court actions or domestic relations matters or paternity or custody determinations as defined in section 25-2740.
(3) For the purposes of the act, side means all litigants with generally common interests in the litigation.
25-2743.
Plaintiffs; certification of relief sought; applicability of laws and rules; jurisdictional amount; restriction on judgment; termination of proceedings; conditions; counterclaim.(1) Eligible plaintiffs may elect to proceed under the County Court Expedited Civil Actions Act by certifying that the relief sought meets the requirements of section 25-2742. The certification must be on a form approved by the Supreme Court, signed by all plaintiffs and their attorneys, if represented, and filed with the complaint. The certification is not admissible to prove a plaintiff's damages in any proceeding.
(2) Except as otherwise specifically provided, the Nebraska laws and court rules that are applicable to civil actions are applicable to actions under the act.
(3) A party proceeding under the act may not recover a judgment in excess of the county court jurisdictional amount set forth in subdivision (5) of section 24-517, nor may a judgment be entered against a party in excess of such amount, excluding prejudgment interest that accrues after the filing date, postjudgment interest, and costs. The jury, if any, must not be informed of the county court jurisdictional amount. If the jury returns a verdict for damages in excess of the county court jurisdictional amount for or against a party, the court shall not enter judgment on that verdict in excess of such amount, exclusive of the prejudgment interest that accrues after the filing date, postjudgment interest, and costs.
(4) Upon timely application of any party, the county court may terminate application of the act and enter such orders as are appropriate under the circumstances if:
(a) The moving party makes a specific showing of substantially changed circumstances sufficient to render the application of the act unfair; or
(b) A party has in good faith filed a counterclaim that seeks relief other than that allowed under the act.
(5) A party may assert a counterclaim only if the counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim. Any such counterclaim is subject to the county court jurisdictional limit on damages under the act, unless the court severs the counterclaim or certifies the action to district court pursuant to section 25-2706 on the grounds that the amount in controversy exceeds the county court jurisdictional limit.
25-2744.
Discovery; expert; limitations; motion to modify.(1) Except upon agreement of the parties or leave of court granted upon a showing of good cause, all discovery under the County Court Expedited Civil Actions Act must be completed no later than sixty days before trial.
(2) Except upon agreement of the parties or leave of court granted upon a showing of good cause, discovery under the act is subject to the following additional limitations:
(a) Each side shall serve no more than ten interrogatories on any other side;
(b) Each side shall serve no more than ten requests for production on any other side;
(c) Each side shall serve no more than ten requests for admission on any other side. This limit does not apply to requests for admission of the genuineness of documents that a party intends to offer into evidence at trial;
(d) One deposition of each party may be taken. With regard to corporations, partnerships, voluntary associations, or any other groups or entities named as a party, the entity or one officer, member, or employee of such entity may be deposed; and
(e) Each side may take the deposition of up to two nonparties.
(3) Each side is entitled to one expert, except upon agreement of the parties or leave of court granted upon a showing of good cause. A treating health care provider is counted as an expert for purposes of this subsection.
(4) A motion for leave of court to modify the limitations set forth in this section must be in writing and must set forth the proposed additional discovery or expert and the reasons establishing good cause.
25-2745.
Motions.(1) Any party may file any motion permitted under rules adopted by the Supreme Court for pre-answer motions.
(2) A motion for summary judgment must be filed no later than ninety days before trial.
25-2746.
Action; time limitations.An action under the County Court Expedited Civil Actions Act should ordinarily be submitted to the jury or the court within two business days from the commencement of trial. Unless the court allows additional time for good cause shown, each side shall be allowed no more than six hours to complete jury selection, opening statements, presentation of evidence, examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and closing arguments. Time spent on objections, bench conferences, and challenges for cause to a juror are not included in the time limit.
25-2747.
Evidence; stipulation; document; objections; Nebraska Evidence Rules; applicability; health care provider report; form.(1) Parties to an action under the County Court Expedited Civil Actions Act should stipulate to factual and evidentiary matters to the greatest extent possible.
(2) For purposes of the act, the court may overrule objections based on authenticity and hearsay to the admission of a document, notwithstanding the absence of testimony or certification from a custodian or other qualified witness, if:
(a) The party offering the document gives notice to all other parties of the party's intention to offer the document into evidence at least ninety days in advance of trial. The notice must be given to all parties together with a copy of any document intended to be offered;
(b) The document on its face appears to be what the proponent claims it is;
(c) The document on its face appears not to be hearsay or appears to fall within a hearsay exception set forth in Nebraska law; and
(d) The objecting party has not raised a substantial question as to the authenticity or trustworthiness of the document.
(3) Except as otherwise specifically provided by the act, the Nebraska Evidence Rules are applicable to actions under the act.
(4) Nothing in subsection (2) of this section authorizes admission of a document that contains hearsay within hearsay, unless the court determines from the face of the document that each part of the combined statements conforms with a hearsay exception set forth in Nebraska law.
(5) Any authenticity or hearsay objections to a document as to which notice has been provided under subdivision (2)(a) of this section must be made within thirty days after receipt of the notice.
(6)(a) The report of any treating health care provider concerning the plaintiff may be used in lieu of deposition or in-court testimony of the health care provider, so long as the report offered into evidence is on a form adopted for such purpose by the Supreme Court and is signed by the health care provider making the report.
(b) The Supreme Court shall adopt a form for the purposes of subdivision (6)(a) of this section.
(c) Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a copy of any completed health care provider report under subdivision (6)(a) of this section must be served on all parties at least ninety days in advance of trial. Any objections to the health care provider statement, including an objection that the statement is incomplete or does not otherwise comply with this subsection, must be made within thirty days after receipt of the statement. For good cause shown, the court may issue such orders regarding the health care provider report as justice may require, including an order permitting a health care provider to supplement the report.
(d) Any party against whom a health care provider report may be used has the right, at the party's own initial expense, to cross-examine by deposition the health care provider signing the report, and the deposition may be used at trial.
(e) The deposition of the health care provider and the discovery of facts or opinions held by an expert are not counted for purposes of the numerical limits of section 25-2744.
Cross References
Nebraska Evidence Rules, see section 27-1103.
25-2748.
Rules and forms; Supreme Court; powers.The Supreme Court may promulgate rules and forms for actions governed by the County Court Expedited Civil Actions Act, and such rules and forms shall not be in conflict with the act.
25-2749.
Act; applicability.The County Court Expedited Civil Actions Act applies to civil actions filed on or after January 1, 2022.
25-2801.
Designation.Each county court shall have a Small Claims Department which shall be designated the Small Claims Court.
Annotations
Small claims court is a department of county court, and as such, small claims court does not have general equity jurisdiction. Scherbak v. Kissler, 245 Neb. 10, 510 N.W.2d 318 (1994).
In an appeal to the district court from the Small Claims Court, a party has the right to appear by his own counsel. Simon v. Lieberman, 193 Neb. 321, 226 N.W.2d 781 (1975).
25-2802.
Jurisdiction.(1) The Small Claims Court shall have subject matter jurisdiction in all civil actions of any type when the amount of money or damages or the value of the personal property claimed does not exceed the jurisdictional amount specified in subsection (4) of this section, exclusive of interest and costs.
(2) The Small Claims Court shall have subject matter jurisdiction in civil matters when the plaintiff seeks to disaffirm, avoid, or rescind a contract or agreement for the purchase of goods or services not in excess of the jurisdictional amount specified in subsection (4) of this section, exclusive of interest and costs.
(3) The Small Claims Court shall have jurisdiction when the party defendant or his or her agent resides or is doing business within the county or when the cause of action arose within the county.
(4) The jurisdictional amount is six thousand dollars from July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025. The jurisdictional amount is seven thousand five hundred dollars beginning July 1, 2025.
Source:Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 22; Laws 1976, LB 629, § 1;
Laws 1979, LB 117, § 1; Laws 1985, LB 373, § 2; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-522;
Laws 1997, LB 3, § 1; Laws 2001, LB 9, § 1; Laws 2010, LB695, § 1; Laws 2024, LB139, § 1. Operative Date: July 1, 2024
25-2803.
Parties; representation.(1) Parties in the Small Claims Court may be individuals, partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, unions, associations, or any other kind of organization or entity.
(2) No party shall be represented by an attorney in the Small Claims Court except as provided in sections 25-2804 and 25-2805.
(3) An individual shall represent himself or herself in the Small Claims Court. A partnership shall be represented by a partner or one of its employees. A limited liability company shall be represented by a member, a manager, or one of its employees. A union shall be represented by a union member or union employee. A corporation shall be represented by one of its employees. An association shall be represented by one of its members or by an employee of the association. Any other kind of organization or entity shall be represented by one of its members or employees.
(4) Only a party, natural or otherwise, who has been a party to the transaction with the defendant for which the claim is brought may file and prosecute a claim in the Small Claims Court.
(5) No party may file an assigned claim in the Small Claims Court.
(6) No party shall file more than two claims within any calendar week nor more than ten claims in any calendar year in the Small Claims Court.
(7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a personal representative of a decedent's estate, a guardian, or a conservator may be a party in the Small Claims Court.
Source:Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 23; Laws 1987, LB 77, § 1; Laws 1987, LB 536, § 2; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-523;
Laws 1993, LB 121, § 174; Laws 2010, LB712, § 5; Laws 2019, LB71, § 1.
25-2804.
Actions; how commenced; fee; hearing; notice; setoff or counterclaim; limitations; default judgment; actions authorized.(1) Actions in the Small Claims Court shall be commenced by the plaintiff by filing a claim personally, by mail, or by another method established by Supreme Court rules.
(2) At the time of the filing of the claim, the plaintiff shall pay a fee of six dollars and twenty-five cents to the clerk. One dollar and twenty-five cents of such fee shall be remitted to the State Treasurer for credit to the Nebraska Retirement Fund for Judges through June 30, 2021. Beginning July 1, 2021, two dollars of such fee shall be remitted to the State Treasurer for credit to the Nebraska Retirement Fund for Judges.
(3) Upon filing of a claim in the Small Claims Court, the court shall set a time for hearing and shall cause notice to be served upon the defendant. Notice shall be served not less than five days before the time set for hearing. Notice shall consist of a copy of the complaint and a summons directing the defendant to appear at the time set for hearing and informing the defendant that if he or she fails to appear, judgment will be entered against him or her. Notice shall be served in the manner provided for service of a summons in a civil action. If the notice is to be served by certified mail, the clerk shall provide the plaintiff with written instructions, prepared and provided by the State Court Administrator, regarding the proper procedure for service by certified mail. The cost of service shall be paid by the plaintiff, but such cost and filing fee shall be added to any judgment given the plaintiff.
(4) The defendant may file a setoff or counterclaim. Any setoff or counterclaim shall be filed and a copy delivered to the plaintiff at least two days prior to the time of trial. If the setoff or counterclaim exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the Small Claims Court as established pursuant to section 25-2802, the court shall cause the entire matter to be transferred to the regular county court docket and set for trial.
(5) No prejudgment actions for attachment, garnishment, replevin, or other provisional remedy may be filed in the Small Claims Court.
(6) All forms that may be required by this section shall be prescribed by the Supreme Court.
(7) For a default judgment rendered by a Small Claims Court (a) the default judgment may be appealed as provided in section 25-2807, (b) if a motion for a new trial, by the procedure provided in sections 25-1142, 25-1144, and 25-1144.01, is filed ten days or less after entry of the default judgment, the court may act upon the motion without a hearing, or (c) if more than ten days have passed since the entry of the default judgment, the court may set aside, vacate, or modify the default judgment as provided in section 25-2720.01. Parties may be represented by attorneys for the purpose of filing a motion for a new trial or to set aside, vacate, or modify a default judgment.
Source:Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 24; Laws 1973, LB 226, § 7; Laws 1975, LB 283, § 1; Laws 1979, LB 117, § 2; Laws 1980, LB 892, § 1; Laws 1982, LB 928, § 17;
Laws 1983, LB 447, § 14; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 14; Laws 1985, LB 373, § 3; Laws 1986, LB 125, § 1; Laws 1987, LB 77, § 2; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-524;
Laws 2000, LB 921, § 28; Laws 2005, LB 348, § 4; Laws 2010, LB712, § 6; Laws 2020, LB1028, § 5; Laws 2021, LB17, § 4; Laws 2021, LB355, § 3.
Annotations
A general appearance waives any defects in the process or notice, the steps preliminary to its issuance, or in the service or return thereof. Harris v. Eberhardt, 215 Neb. 240, 338 N.W.2d 53 (1983).
25-2805.
Trial without
jury; transfer to county court; fee;
jury demand; timeframe.All matters
in the Small Claims Court shall be tried to the court without a jury. Except
as provided in section 25-2618.01, any defendant in an action or such defendant's
attorney may transfer the case to the regular docket of the county court by
giving notice to the court at least two days prior to the time set for the
hearing. Upon such notice the case shall be transferred to the regular docket
of the county court. The party causing
the transfer of a case from the Small Claims Court to the regular docket shall
pay as a fee the difference between the fee for filing a claim in Small Claims
Court and the fee for filing a claim on the regular docket.
In any action transferred to the regular docket, there shall be no motions
challenging pleadings unless
ordered by the court upon a showing that any such procedure is necessary to
the prompt and just determination of the action. In any action transferred to the regular docket, a defendant
shall file an answer. Any jury demand in cases transferred from the Small
Claims Court to county court shall be made within the timeframes provided
in section 25-2705.
Source:Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 25; Laws 1975, LB 283, § 2; Laws 1980, LB 892, § 2;
Laws 1981, LB 42, § 11; Laws 1984, LB 13, § 15; Laws 1987, LB 77, § 3; R.S.Supp.,1988, § 24-525;
Laws 1997, LB 151, § 10; Laws 2002, LB 876, § 58; Laws 2011, LB669, § 20.
Annotations
A suit brought in Small Claims Court and transferred to the regular docket of municipal court prior to the time set for hearing in Small Claims Court is subject to the provisions of law and rules of the court applicable to proceedings in municipal court. State ex rel. Simpson v. Vondrasek, 203 Neb. 693, 279 N.W.2d 860 (1979).
When a defendant transfers a case from small claims court to county court pursuant to this section, the plaintiff is not entitled to request a jury trial in the county court action. Dollison v. Mercy Servs. Corp., 7 Neb. App. 555, 584 N.W.2d 674 (1998).
25-2806.
Pleadings required; informal disposition; judgment.No formal pleadings other than the claim and notice, and the counterclaim or setoff and notice if appropriate, shall be required in the Small Claims Court and the hearing and disposition of all matters shall be informal so that the rules of evidence, except those relating to privileged communications, shall not apply, with the sole object of providing a prompt and just settlement of the issues. When a money judgment is entered, payment shall be made forthwith after time for appeal has run or execution may issue as in other cases in the county court. When a judgment for the return of personal property is entered, return shall be made forthwith after time for appeal has run or an order of delivery may issue as in other cases in the county court.
Annotations
The entire matter in Small Claims Court is on a very informal basis, with a minimum of procedural requirements. Harris v. Eberhardt, 215 Neb. 240, 338 N.W.2d 53 (1983).
Because no formal pleadings are required in Small Claims Court, a decision of that court will be affirmed on appeal if it can be founded on any theory supported by the evidence. Fuchser v. Jacobson, 205 Neb. 786, 290 N.W.2d 449 (1980).
The formal rules of evidence do not apply in small claims court. Flodman v. Robinson, 22 Neb. App. 943, 864 N.W.2d 716 (2015).
25-2807.
Appeals.Unless the controversy is subject to the Uniform Arbitration Act, any party may appeal to the district court as provided in sections 25-2728 to 25-2738. Parties may be represented by attorneys on appeal.
Source:Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 27; Laws 1975, LB 283, § 3; Laws 1980, LB 892, § 3;
Laws 1981, LB 42, § 12; R.S.1943, (1985), § 24-527;
Laws 1997, LB 151, § 11.
Cross References
Uniform Arbitration Act, see section 25-2601.
Annotations
A party appealing a judgment entered in a small claims court may be assisted by an attorney in perfecting an appeal of the judgment from the small claims court to the district court. Gibbons v. Don Williams Roofing, Inc., 261 Neb. 470, 623 N.W.2d 662 (2001).
Because no formal pleadings are required in Small Claims Court, a decision of that court will be affirmed on appeal if it can be founded on any theory supported by the evidence. Fuchser v. Jacobson, 205 Neb. 786, 290 N.W.2d 449 (1980).
Filing a notice of appeal falls within the "on appeal" language in this section, and consequently, an attorney may sign a notice of appeal on behalf of a party appealing from a small claims court decision. Hayes v. Applegarth, 10 Neb. App. 351, 631 N.W.2d 547 (2001).
25-2901.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-2901 to 25-2921 shall be known and may be cited as the Dispute Resolution Act.
25-2902.
Legislative findings.The Legislature finds that:
(1) The resolution of certain disputes and offenses can be costly and time consuming in the context of a formal judicial proceeding;
(2) Employing restorative justice and mediation to address disputes can provide an avenue for efficiently reducing the volume of matters which burden the court system in this state;
(3) Restorative justice practices and programs can meet the needs of Nebraska's residents by providing forums in which persons may participate in voluntary or court-ordered resolution of juvenile and adult offenses in an informal and less adversarial atmosphere;
(4) Employing restorative justice can provide an avenue for repair, healing, accountability, and community safety to address the harm experienced by victims as a result of an offense committed by youth or adult individuals;
(5) Restorative justice practices and programs are grounded in a wide body of research and evidence showing individuals who participate in restorative justice practices and programs are less likely to reoffend;
(6) Unresolved disputes of those who do not have the resources for formal resolution may be of small social or economic magnitude individually but are collectively of enormous social and economic consequences;
(7) Many seemingly minor conflicts between individuals may escalate into major social problems unless resolved early in an atmosphere in which the persons involved can discuss the dispute or offense through a private and informal yet structured process;
(8) There is a need in our society to reduce acrimony and improve relationships between people in conflict which has a long-term benefit of a more peaceful community of people;
(9) There is a compelling need in a complex society for dispute resolution and restorative justice whereby people can participate in creating comprehensive, lasting, and realistic resolutions to conflicts and offenses;
(10) Mediation can increase the public's access to dispute resolution and thereby increase public regard and usage of the legal system; and
(11) Office-approved nonprofit dispute resolution centers can make a substantial contribution to the operation and maintenance of the courts of this state by preserving the court's scarce resources for those disputes and offenses which cannot be resolved by means other than litigation.
25-2903.
Terms, defined.For purposes of the Dispute Resolution Act:
(1) Approved center means a center that has applied for and received approval from the director under section 25-2909;
(2) Center means a nonprofit organization or a court-established program which makes dispute resolution procedures and restorative justice services available;
(3) Council means the Advisory Council on Dispute Resolution;
(4) Director means the Director of the Office of Dispute Resolution;
(5) Dispute resolution process means a process by which the parties involved in a dispute voluntarily agree to enter into informal discussion and negotiation with the assistance of a mediator;
(6) Mediation means the intervention into a dispute by a third party who has no decisionmaking authority and is impartial to the issues being discussed;
(7) Mediator means a person trained in the process of mediation who assists parties in dispute to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of their conflict;
(8) Office means the Office of Dispute Resolution;
(9) Restorative justice facilitator means a person trained to facilitate restorative justice practices as a staff member or affiliate of an approved center; and
(10) Restorative justice means practices, programs, or services described in section 25-2912.01 that emphasize repairing the harm caused to victims and the community by persons who have caused the harm or committed an offense.
25-2904.
Office of Dispute Resolution; established; director; qualifications; duties.The Office of Dispute Resolution is hereby established in the office of the State Court Administrator. The director of the office shall be hired by the Supreme Court. The director may but need not be an attorney and shall be hired on the basis of his or her training and experience in mediation, restorative justice, and dispute resolution. The director shall administer the Dispute Resolution Act and shall serve as staff to the council.
25-2905.
Advisory Council on Dispute Resolution; created; members.The Advisory Council on Dispute Resolution is hereby created. The council shall be comprised of individuals from a variety of disciplines who are trained and knowledgeable in mediation, restorative justice, and dispute resolution and selected to be representative of the geographical and cultural diversity of the state and to reflect gender fairness. The council shall consist of fifteen voting members. The membership shall include a district court judge, county court judge, and juvenile court judge and a representative from the Office of Probation Administration, the Nebraska State Bar Association, and the Nebraska County Attorneys Association. Nominations for the remaining members may be solicited from such entities and from the Nebraska Mediation Association, the Public Counsel, social workers, mental health professionals, diversion program administrators, educators, law enforcement entities, crime victim advocates, and former participants in restorative justice programs and related fields. The council shall be appointed by the Supreme Court or its designee. The Supreme Court or its designee shall not be restricted to the solicited list of nominees in making its appointments. Two nonvoting, ex officio members shall be appointed by the council from among the approved centers.
25-2906.
Council; members; terms; vacancy; officers.The initial members of the council and the new members required by the changes to section 25-2905 made by Laws 2019, LB595, shall be appointed for terms of one, two, or three years. All subsequent appointments shall be made for terms of three years. Any vacancy on the council shall be filled and shall last for the duration of the term vacated. Appointments to the council required by changes to section 25-2905 made by Laws 2019, LB595, shall be made within ninety days after September 1, 2019. The council shall select a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, and such other officers as it deems necessary.
25-2907.
Council; powers and duties; members; expenses.(1) The council shall advise the director on the administration of the Dispute Resolution Act.
(2) The council shall meet at least four times per year and at other times deemed necessary to perform its functions. Members of the council shall be reimbursed for expenses as provided in sections 81-1174 to 81-1177.
(3) The council may appoint task forces to carry out its work. Task force members shall have knowledge of, responsibility for, or interest in an area related to the duties of the council.
25-2908.
Director; duties.Consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Dispute Resolution Act and in consultation with the council, the director shall:
(1) Approve centers which meet requirements for approval;
(2) Develop and supervise a uniform system of reporting and collecting statistical data from approved centers;
(3) Develop and supervise a uniform system of evaluating approved centers;
(4) Prepare a yearly budget for the implementation of the act and distribute funds to approved centers;
(5) Develop and administer guidelines for a sliding scale of fees to be charged by approved centers;
(6) Develop, initiate, or approve curricula and training sessions for mediators and staff of approved centers and of courts;
(7) Establish volunteer training programs;
(8) Promote public awareness of the restorative justice and dispute resolution process;
(9) Apply for and receive funds from public and private sources for carrying out the purposes and obligations of the act;
(10) Develop and supervise a uniform system to create and maintain a roster of approved centers and victim youth conferencing and other restorative justice facilitators who are affiliated with approved centers. The roster shall be made available to courts and county attorneys;
(11) Enhance the sustainability of approved centers;
(12) Support approved centers in the implementation of restorative justice programs;
(13) Coordinate the development and implementation of new restorative justice programs;
(14) Develop and administer a uniform system for reporting and collecting statistical data regarding restorative justice programs from approved centers;
(15) Develop and administer a uniform system for evaluating restorative justice programs administered by approved centers;
(16) Develop and administer a uniform system for evaluating quality assurance and fidelity to established restorative justice principles;
(17) Coordinate software and data management system quality assurance for the office and the approved centers;
(18) Coordinate restorative justice training sessions for restorative justice facilitators and staff of approved centers and the courts;
(19) Review and provide analyses of state and federal laws and policies and judicial branch policies relating to restorative justice programs for juvenile populations and adult populations;
(20) Promote public awareness of the restorative justice and dispute resolution process under the Dispute Resolution Act; and
(21) Seek and identify funds from public and private sources for carrying out new and ongoing restorative justice programs.
25-2909.
Grants; application; contents; approved centers; reports.(1) The office shall annually award grants to approved centers. It is the intent of the Legislature that centers be established and grants distributed statewide.
(2) A center or an entity proposing a center may apply to the office for approval to provide services under the Dispute Resolution Act by submitting an application which includes:
(a) A strategic plan for the operation of the center;
(b) The center's objectives;
(c) The areas of population to be served;
(d) The administrative organization;
(e) Record-keeping procedures;
(f) Procedures for intake, for scheduling, and for conducting and terminating restorative justice programs and dispute resolution sessions;
(g) Qualifications for mediators and restorative justice facilitators for the center;
(h) An annual budget for the center;
(i) The results of an audit of the center for a period covering the previous year if the center was in operation for such period; and
(j) Proof of 501(c)(3) status under the Internal Revenue Code or proof of establishment by a court.
(3) The office may specify additional criteria for approval and for grants as it deems necessary.
(4) Annual reports shall be required of each approved center. The reports shall include the number and types of cases handled in the year and a showing of continued compliance with the act.
25-2910.
Approved center; funding; fees.An approved center may use sources of funds, both public and private, in addition to funds appropriated by the Legislature. An approved center may require each party to pay a fee to help defray costs based upon ability to pay. A person shall not be denied services solely because of an inability to pay the fee.
25-2911.
Restorative justice programs and dispute resolution; types of cases; referral of cases.(1) The following types of cases may be accepted for restorative justice programs and dispute resolution at an approved center:
(a) Civil claims and disputes, including, but not limited to, consumer and commercial complaints, disputes between neighbors, disputes between business associates, disputes between landlords and tenants, and disputes within communities;
(b) Disputes concerning child custody, parenting time, visitation, or other access and other areas of domestic relations;
(c) Juvenile offenses and disputes involving juveniles when appropriate, which shall be determined according to the policies and procedures provided for in section 25-2918;
(d) Disputes involving youth that occur in families, in educational settings, and in the community at large;
(e) Adult criminal offenses and disputes involving juvenile, adult, or community victims when appropriate, which shall be determined according to the policies and procedures provided for in section 25-2918; and
(f) Contested guardianship and contested conservatorship proceedings.
(2) Restorative justice practices at an approved center may be used in addition to any other condition, consequence, or sentence imposed by a court, a probation officer, a diversion program, a school, or another community program.
(3) An approved center may accept cases referred by a court, an attorney, a law enforcement officer, a social service agency, a school, or any other interested person or agency or upon the request of the parties involved. A case may be referred prior to the commencement of formal judicial proceedings or may be referred as a pending court case. If a court refers a case to an approved center, the center shall provide information to the court as to whether an agreement was reached. If the court requests a copy of the agreement, the center shall provide it.
25-2912.
Restorative justice or dispute resolution process; procedures.Before the restorative justice or dispute resolution process begins, an approved center shall provide the parties with a written statement setting forth the procedures to be followed.
25-2912.01.
Restorative justice practices, restorative justice services, or restorative justice programs; activities to repair harm.Restorative justice practices, restorative justice services, or restorative justice programs include, but are not limited to, victim youth conferences, victim-offender mediation, family group conferences, circles, peer-to-peer mediation, truancy mediation, victim or community panels, and community conferences. Restorative justice programs may involve restorative projects or classes and facilitated meetings attended voluntarily by the victim, the victim's representatives, or a victim surrogate and the victim's supporters, as well as the youth or adult individual who caused harm and that individual's supporters, whether voluntarily or following a referral for assessment by court order. These meetings may also include community members, when appropriate. By engaging the parties to the offense or harm in voluntary dialogue, restorative justice provides an opportunity for healing for the victim and the individual who harmed the victim by:
(1) Holding the individual who caused harm accountable and providing the individual a platform to accept responsibility and gain empathy for the harm he or she caused to the victim and community;
(2) Providing the victim a platform to describe the impact that the harm had upon himself or herself or his or her family and to identify detriments experienced or any losses incurred;
(3) Providing the opportunity to enter into a reparation plan agreement; and
(4) Enabling the victim and the individual who caused harm the opportunity to agree on consequences to repair the harm, to the extent possible. This includes, but is not limited to, apologies, community service, reparation, restitution, restoration, and counseling.
25-2912.02.
Best practices; policies and procedures.The office and the approved centers shall strive to conduct restorative justice programs in accordance with best practices, including evidence-based programs, and shall adopt policies and procedures to accomplish this goal.
25-2913.
Mediators and restorative justice facilitators; qualifications; compensation; powers and duties.(1) Mediators and restorative justice facilitators of approved centers shall have completed at least thirty hours of basic mediation training, including conflict resolution techniques, neutrality, agreement writing, and ethics. An initial apprenticeship with an experienced mediator shall be required for at least three sessions for all mediators without prior mediation experience.
(2) In addition to the basic mediation training required under subsection (1) of this section:
(a) For disputes involving marital dissolution, parenting, or child custody, mediators of approved centers shall have additional training in family mediation; and
(b) For disputes involving harm done to others or the community, restorative justice facilitators of approved centers shall have additional restorative justice training that has been approved by the office. Such training should include, but not be limited to, topics such as restorative justice basics, trauma-informed practices, juvenile developmental characteristics, and crime victimization.
(3) An approved center may provide for the compensation of mediators and restorative justice facilitators, utilize the services of volunteer mediators and restorative justice facilitators, or utilize the services of both paid and volunteer mediators and restorative justice facilitators.
(4) The mediator or restorative justice facilitator shall provide an opportunity for the parties to achieve a mutually acceptable resolution of their dispute, in joint or separate sessions, as appropriate, including a reparation plan agreement regarding reparations through dialogue and negotiation. A mediator shall be impartial, neutral, and unbiased and shall make no decisions for the parties.
(5) The mediator or restorative justice facilitator shall officially terminate the process if the parties are unable to agree or if, in the judgment of the mediator, the agreement would be unconscionable. The termination shall be without prejudice to either party in any other proceeding.
(6) The mediator or restorative justice facilitator has no authority to make or impose any adjudicatory sanction or penalty upon the parties.
(7) The mediator or restorative justice facilitator shall be aware of and recommend outside resources to the parties whenever appropriate. The mediator or restorative justice facilitator shall advise participants to obtain legal review of agreements as necessary.
25-2914.
Confidentiality; exceptions.(1) Any verbal, written, or electronic communication made in or in connection with matters referred to mediation which relates to the controversy or dispute being mediated and agreements resulting from the mediation, whether made to the mediator, the staff of an approved center, a party, or any other person attending the mediation session, shall be confidential.
(2) Mediation proceedings shall be regarded as settlement negotiations, and no admission, representation, or statement made in mediation, not otherwise discoverable or obtainable, shall be admissible as evidence or subject to discovery.
(3) A mediator shall not be subject to process requiring the disclosure of any matter discussed during mediation proceedings unless all the parties consent to a waiver.
(4) Confidential communications and materials are subject to disclosure when all parties agree in writing to waive confidentiality regarding specific verbal, written, or electronic communications relating to the mediation session or the agreement.
(5) This section shall not apply if a party brings an action against the mediator or center, if the communication was made in furtherance of a crime or fraud, or if this section conflicts with other legal requirements.
25-2914.01.
Verbal, written, or electronic communication; confidentiality; privileged; disclosure; when; activities of juvenile; limit on evidence.(1) Any verbal, written, or electronic communication made in or in connection with matters referred to a restorative justice program which relates to the controversy or dispute undergoing restorative justice and agreements resulting from the restorative justice program, whether made to the restorative justice facilitator, the staff of an approved center, a party, or any other person attending the restorative justice program, shall be confidential and privileged.
(2) No admission, confession, or incriminating information obtained from a juvenile in the course of any restorative justice program that is conducted in conjunction with proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Act or as directed by a court, including, but not limited to, school-based disciplinary proceedings, juvenile diversion, court-ordered detention, or probation, shall be admitted into evidence against such juvenile, except as rebuttal or impeachment evidence, in any future adjudication hearing under the Nebraska Juvenile Code or in any criminal proceeding. Such admission, confession, or incriminating information may be considered by a court at sentencing or by a juvenile court during disposition proceedings.
(3) Confidential communications and materials are subject to disclosure when all parties to the restorative justice program agree in writing to waive confidentiality regarding specific verbal, written, or electronic communications relating to the restorative justice program or the agreement.
(4) This section shall not apply if:
(a) A party brings an action against the restorative justice facilitator or approved center;
(b) The communication was made in furtherance of a crime or fraud;
(c) The communication is required to be reported under section 28-711 and is a new allegation of child abuse or neglect which was not previously known or reported; or
(d) This section conflicts with other legal requirements.
Cross References
Nebraska Juvenile Code, see section 43-2,129.
25-2915.
Immunity; exceptions.No mediator, restorative justice facilitator, staff member, or member of a governing board of an approved center may be held liable for civil damages for any statement or decision made in the process of restorative justice or dispute resolution unless such person acted in a manner exhibiting willful or wanton misconduct.
25-2916.
Agreement; contents.(1) If the parties involved in mediation reach an agreement, the agreement may be reduced to writing and signed by the parties. The agreement shall set forth the settlement of the issues and the future responsibilities of each party. If a court referred the case, the agreement as signed and approved by the parties may be presented to the court as a stipulation and, if approved by the court, shall be enforceable as an order of the court.
(2) If the parties involved in a restorative justice program reach a reparation plan agreement, the agreement may be reduced to writing and signed by the parties. The agreement shall set forth the reparations agreed upon by the parties to repair the specific circumstances of the offense. These may include, but are not limited to, service to the victim, an apology to the victim, financial restitution, services for the individual who caused the harm, community service, or any other reparation agreed upon by the parties. The agreement shall specify the time period during which such individual must comply with the requirements specified therein.
25-2917.
Tolling of civil statute of limitations; when.During the period of the restorative justice or dispute resolution process, any applicable civil statute of limitations shall be tolled as to the parties. The tolling shall commence on the date the approved center accepts the case and shall end on the date of the last restorative justice or mediation session. This period shall be no longer than sixty days without consent of all the parties.
25-2918.
Rules and regulations.(1) The Supreme Court, upon recommendation by the director in consultation with the council, shall adopt and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the Dispute Resolution Act.
(2) The office may adopt and promulgate policies and procedures to carry out the Dispute Resolution Act.
25-2919.
Application of act.The Dispute Resolution Act shall apply only to approved centers and mediators and restorative justice facilitators of such centers.
25-2920.
Director; report.The director shall provide an annual report regarding the implementation of the Dispute Resolution Act. The report shall be available to the public on the Supreme Court's website. The report shall include the number and types of disputes received, the disposition of the disputes, any problems encountered, and any recommendations to address problems.
25-2921.
Dispute Resolution Cash Fund; created; use; investment.The Dispute Resolution Cash Fund is created. The State Court Administrator shall administer the fund. The fund shall consist of proceeds received pursuant to subdivision (9) of section 25-2908 and section 33-155. The fund shall be used to supplement the administration of the office and the support of the approved centers. Any money in the fund available for investment shall be invested by the state investment officer pursuant to the Nebraska Capital Expansion Act and the Nebraska State Funds Investment Act.
Source:Laws 1996, LB 922, § 2; Laws 2003, LB 760, § 8; Laws 2009, First Spec. Sess., LB3, § 12; Laws 2011, LB378, § 18; Laws 2019, LB595, § 22.
Cross References
Nebraska Capital Expansion Act, see section 72-1269.
Nebraska State Funds Investment Act, see section 72-1260.
25-2922.
Repealed. Laws 2009, LB 1, § 1.
25-2923.
Repealed. Laws 2009, LB 1, § 1.
25-2924.
Repealed. Laws 2009, LB 1, § 1.
25-2925.
Repealed. Laws 2009, LB 1, § 1.
25-2926.
Repealed. Laws 2009, LB 1, § 1.
25-2927.
Repealed. Laws 2009, LB 1, § 1.
25-2928.
Repealed. Laws 2009, LB 1, § 1.
25-2929.
Repealed. Laws 2009, LB 1, § 1.
25-2930.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-2930 to 25-2942 shall be known and may be cited as the Uniform Mediation Act.
25-2931.
Terms, defined.For purposes of the Uniform Mediation Act:
(1) Mediation means a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.
(2) Mediation communication means a statement, whether oral or in a record or verbal or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a mediator.
(3) Mediator means an individual who conducts a mediation.
(4) Nonparty participant means a person, other than a party or mediator, that participates in a mediation.
(5) Mediation party means a person that participates in a mediation and whose agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute.
(6) Person means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(7) Proceeding means:
(A) a judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative process, including related prehearing and post-hearing motions, conferences, and discovery; or
(B) a legislative hearing or similar process.
(8) Record means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(9) Sign means:
(A) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol with the present intent to authenticate a record; or
(B) to attach or logically associate an electronic symbol, sound, or process to or with a record with the present intent to authenticate a record.
25-2932.
Scope.(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the Uniform Mediation Act applies to a mediation in which:
(1) the mediation parties are required to mediate by statute or court or administrative agency rule or referred to mediation by a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator;
(2) the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a record that demonstrates an expectation that mediation communications will be privileged against disclosure; or
(3) the mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who holds himself or herself out as a mediator, or the mediation is provided by a person that holds itself out as providing mediation.
(b) The Uniform Mediation Act does not apply to a mediation:
(1) relating to the establishment, negotiation, administration, or termination of a collective-bargaining relationship;
(2) relating to a dispute that is pending under or is part of the processes established by a collective-bargaining agreement, except that the act applies to a mediation arising out of a dispute that has been filed with an administrative agency or court;
(3) conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case; or
(4) conducted under the auspices of:
(A) a primary or secondary school if all the parties and the mediator are students; or
(B) a correctional institution for youths or a juvenile center if all the parties and the mediator are residents of that institution.
(c) If the parties agree in advance in a signed record or a record of proceeding so reflects that all or part of a mediation is not privileged, the privileges under sections 25-2933 to 25-2935 do not apply to the mediation or part agreed upon. However, such sections apply to a mediation communication made by a person that has not received actual notice of the agreement before the communication is made.
25-2933.
Privilege against disclosure; admissibility; discovery.(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 25-2935, a mediation communication is privileged as provided in subsection (b) of this section and is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence in a proceeding unless waived or precluded as provided by section 25-2934.
(b) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply:
(1) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication.
(2) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication and may prevent any other person from disclosing a mediation communication of the mediator.
(3) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication of the nonparty participant.
(c) Evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its disclosure or use in a mediation.
25-2934.
Waiver and preclusion of privilege.(a) A privilege under section 25-2933 may be waived in a record or orally during a proceeding if it is expressly waived by all parties to the mediation and:
(1) in the case of the privilege of a mediator, it is expressly waived by the mediator; and
(2) in the case of the privilege of a nonparty participant, it is expressly waived by the nonparty participant.
(b) A person that discloses or makes a representation about a mediation communication which prejudices another person in a proceeding is precluded from asserting a privilege under section 25-2933, but only to the extent necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the representation or disclosure.
(c) A person that intentionally uses a mediation to plan, attempt to commit, or commit a crime or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity is precluded from asserting a privilege under section 25-2933.
25-2935.
Exceptions to privilege.(a) There is no privilege under section 25-2933 for a mediation communication that is:
(1) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement;
(2) available to the public under sections 84-712 to 84-712.09 or made during a session of a mediation which is open, or is required by law to be open, to the public;
(3) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of violence;
(4) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit a crime, or conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity;
(5) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator;
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediation party, nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on conduct occurring during a mediation; or
(7) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploitation in a proceeding in which a child or adult protective services agency is a party.
(b) There is no privilege under section 25-2933 if a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that the mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(1) a court proceeding involving a felony; or
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a proceeding to prove a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication referred to in subdivision (a)(6) or (b)(2) of this section.
(d) If a mediation communication is not privileged under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, only the portion of the communication necessary for the application of the exception from nondisclosure may be admitted. Admission of evidence under subsection (a) or (b) of this section does not render the evidence, or any other mediation communication, discoverable or admissible for any other purpose.
25-2936.
Prohibited mediator reports.(a) Except as required in subsection (b) of this section, a mediator may not make a report, assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a mediation to a court, administrative agency, or other authority that may make a ruling on the dispute that is the subject of the mediation.
(b) A mediator may disclose:
(1) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was reached, and attendance;
(2) a mediation communication as permitted under section 25-2935; or
(3) a mediation communication evidencing abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploitation of an individual to a public agency responsible for protecting individuals against such mistreatment.
(c) A communication made in violation of subsection (a) of this section may not be considered by a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator.
25-2937.
Confidentiality.Unless subject to the Open Meetings Act or sections 84-712 to 84-712.09, mediation communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of this state.
Cross References
Open Meetings Act, see section 84-1407.
25-2938.
Mediator's disclosure of conflicts of interest; background.(a) Before accepting a mediation, an individual who is requested to serve as a mediator shall:
(1) make an inquiry that is reasonable under the circumstances to determine whether there are any known facts that a reasonable individual would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the mediator, including a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the mediation and an existing or past relationship with a mediation party or foreseeable participant in the mediation; and
(2) disclose any such known fact to the mediation parties as soon as is practical before accepting a mediation.
(b) If a mediator learns any fact described in subdivision (a)(1) of this section after accepting a mediation, the mediator shall disclose it as soon as is practicable.
(c) An individual who is requested to serve as a mediator shall disclose the mediator's qualifications to mediate a dispute.
(d) A person that violates subsection (a), (b), or (g) of this section is precluded by the violation from asserting a privilege under section 25-2933.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (g) do not apply to an individual acting as a judge.
(f) The Uniform Mediation Act does not require that a mediator have a special qualification by background or profession.
(g) A mediator must be impartial, unless after disclosure of the facts required in subsections (a) and (b) of this section to be disclosed, the parties agree otherwise.
25-2939.
Participation in mediation.An attorney may represent, or other individual designated by a party may accompany the party to, and participate in a mediation. A waiver of representation or participation given before the mediation may be rescinded.
25-2940.
Relation to federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.The Uniform Mediation Act modifies, limits, or supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. 7001 et seq., but the Uniform Mediation Act does not modify, limit, or supersede 15 U.S.C. 7001(c) or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in 15 U.S.C. 7003(b).
25-2941.
Uniformity of application and construction.In applying and construing the Uniform Mediation Act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
25-2942.
Application to existing agreements or referrals.(a) The Uniform Mediation Act governs a mediation pursuant to a referral or an agreement to mediate made on or after August 31, 2003.
(b) On or after January 1, 2004, the Uniform Mediation Act governs an agreement to mediate whenever made.
(c) The Uniform Mediation Act is intended to address issues of privilege and does not diminish any other mediation requirements of the statutes of Nebraska.
25-2943.
Referral of civil
cases to mediation or alternative dispute resolution; rules of practice.A court may refer a civil case, including a contested guardianship or contested conservatorship
proceeding, to mediation or another form of alternative dispute
resolution and, unless otherwise ordered following a hearing upon a motion
to object to such referral, may state a date for the case to return to court.
Such date shall be no longer than ninety days after the date the order was
signed unless the court grants an extension upon request of the parties. Any
agreement or resolution made in mediation or another form of alternative dispute
resolution shall be voluntarily entered into by the parties. An individual
trial court, an appellate court, or the Supreme Court on its own initiative
may adopt rules of practice governing the procedures for referral of cases
to mediation and other forms of dispute resolution. Such services may be provided
by approved centers on a sliding scale of fees under the Dispute Resolution
Act.
Cross References
Dispute Resolution Act, see section 25-2901.
25-3001.
Terms, defined.For purposes of sections 25-3001 to 25-3004:
(1) Eligible low-income person means any person (a) whose income is less than one hundred twenty-five percent of the federal poverty level, (b) who is financially eligible under the service provider's eligibility guidelines, (c) who resides in one of the counties in the service provider's area, and (d) who has a civil legal problem that falls within the guidelines established by the Commission on Public Advocacy;
(2) Service area means the counties in Nebraska defined by the commission as the area to be served by a service provider; and
(3) Service provider means a nonprofit entity that is engaged in or desires to become engaged in the provision of free civil legal services to eligible low-income persons.
25-3002.
Legal Aid and Services Fund; created; use; investment.The Legal Aid and Services Fund is created. Money in the fund shall be used to provide civil legal services to eligible low-income persons. The Commission on Public Advocacy shall distribute all money in the fund periodically in the form of grants to service providers of civil legal services to eligible low-income persons as determined by the commission pursuant to section 25-3004. Any money in the fund available for investment shall be invested by the state investment officer pursuant to the Nebraska Capital Expansion Act and the Nebraska State Funds Investment Act. Any money left in the Legal Aid and Services Fund on December 31 of any year shall be distributed in the following year.
Cross References
Nebraska Capital Expansion Act, see section 72-1269.
Nebraska State Funds Investment Act, see section 72-1260.
25-3003.
Commission on Public Advocacy; duties.(1) The Commission on Public Advocacy shall establish eligibility criteria and guidelines to determine on an annual basis (a) the service areas, (b) the legal services to be provided and the priorities for providing the services, which shall be determined in accordance with subsection (1) of section 25-3004, and (c) the service provider or providers for each service area. The commission shall annually certify one or more service providers for each service area. A single service provider may be certified for more than one service area. Such certification entitles the service provider to a distribution of funds as defined and determined by section 25-3004.
(2) The commission shall accept applications for certification on an annual basis from entities interested in providing free civil legal services to eligible low-income persons. In the application, each applicant shall certify to the commission that the applicant intends to provide free civil legal services to eligible low-income persons as determined by the commission.
25-3004.
Service provider; receipt of funds; eligibility; powers and duties; audit.(1) Each service provider certified by the Commission on Public Advocacy shall be eligible to receive funds from the Legal Aid and Services Fund to provide free civil legal services to eligible low-income persons in the service area for which it is certified. The funds granted to each service provider from the Legal Aid and Services Fund shall be determined by the commission. Grants shall be awarded to legal service providers that provide direct legal representation of eligible low-income persons.
(2) Each service provider is authorized to use funds received from the Legal Aid and Services Fund to provide legal services in civil matters to any eligible low-income person.
(3) A service provider which has received funds from the Legal Aid and Services Fund shall be audited annually. For any service provider receiving funds pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, such audit shall include confirmation of the direct legal representation described in subsection (1) of this section, as shown through an entry of appearance as attorney in a court action, an execution of a retainer agreement, or any similar confirmation of actual legal representation.
25-3005.
Legislative intent.It is the intent of the Legislature to expand the capacity to provide civil legal services to eligible low-income persons equally throughout the state.
25-3006.
Definitions.For purposes of sections 25-3005 to 25-3010, the definitions found in section 25-3001 apply.
25-3007.
Civil Legal
Services Program; created; use of appropriations; Commission on Public Advocacy; duties.The Civil Legal Services Program is created. Appropriations
to the program and money in the Civil Legal Services Fund shall be used to
provide grants for civil legal services to eligible low-income persons. The Commission on Public Advocacy shall
distribute grants pursuant to section 25-3008.
25-3008.
Grant recipients;
requirements; application; audit.(1) The Commission on Public Advocacy shall
establish guidelines for submission of applications for grants to provide
civil legal services to eligible low-income persons. To be eligible for a
grant under this section, a civil legal services provider shall:
(a) Be a nonprofit organization chartered in Nebraska;
(b) Employ or contract with attorneys admitted to practice
before the Nebraska Supreme Court and the United States District Courts;
(c) Have offices located throughout the state;
(d) Have as its principal purpose and mission the delivery
of civil legal services to eligible low-income persons who are residents of
Nebraska;
(e) Distribute its resources equitably throughout the state;
(f) Be a recipient of financial assistance for the delivery
of civil legal services from the Legal Services Corporation established by
the federal Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. 2996 et seq.; and
(g) Certify that any grant funds received pursuant to this
section will be used to supplement any existing funds used by the applicant
and that such funds will not replace other funds appropriated or awarded by
a state agency to provide civil legal services to any eligible low-income
person.
(2) A civil legal services provider seeking a grant under
this section shall file an application with the commission on forms provided by the commission. The application
shall include a place for the provider to certify to the commission that
it will provide free civil legal services to eligible low-income persons upon
receipt of a grant under this section.
(3) The commission shall
review the applications and determine which civil legal services providers
shall receive grants under this section and the amount of the grants. Grant
recipients shall use the grant funds to provide free civil legal services
to eligible low-income persons.
(4) An independent certified public accountant shall annually
audit the books and accounts of each grant recipient. The grant recipients
shall provide the results of such audit to the commission.
25-3009.
Civil Legal Services Fund; created; investment.The Civil Legal Services Fund is created. Any money remaining in the fund at the end of a calendar year shall be distributed in the following calendar year. Any money in the fund available for investment shall be invested by the state investment officer pursuant to the Nebraska Capital Expansion Act and the Nebraska State Funds Investment Act.
Cross References
Nebraska Capital Expansion Act, see section 72-1269.
Nebraska State Funds Investment Act, see section 72-1260.
25-3010.
Civil Legal Services Fund; how funded.Beginning January 1, 2007, a fee of one dollar shall be taxed as costs in each criminal proceeding, including traffic infractions and misdemeanors, filed in all courts of this state for violations of state law or city or village ordinances. No such fee shall be collected in any juvenile court proceeding or when waived under section 29-2709. Such fee shall be remitted to the State Treasurer on forms prescribed by the State Treasurer within ten days after the close of each calendar quarter. The State Treasurer shall credit the money to the Civil Legal Services Fund.
25-3101.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-3101 to 25-3107 shall be known and may be cited as the Structured Settlements Transfers Protection Act.
25-3102.
Act; purpose; applicability.The purpose of the Structured Settlements Transfers Protection Act is to protect structured settlement recipients involved in the process of transferring structured settlement payment rights. The act does not apply to structured settlements of claims for workers' compensation benefits.
25-3103.
Terms, defined.For purposes of the Structured Settlements Transfers Protection Act:
(1) Annuity issuer means an insurer that has issued a contract to be used to fund periodic payments under a structured settlement;
(2) Applicable federal rate means the most recently published applicable rate used to determine the present value of an annuity, as issued by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to section 7520 of the Internal Revenue Code as defined in section 49-801.01;
(3) Dependent means a payee's spouse and minor children and any other family member and other person for whom the payee is legally obligated to provide support, including spousal maintenance;
(4) Discount or finance charge means the sum of all charges payable directly or indirectly from assigned structured settlement payments and imposed directly or indirectly by the transferee as an incident to a transfer of structured settlement payment rights. Discount or finance charge includes interest charges, discounts, and other compensation for the time value of money, all application, origination, processing, underwriting, closing, filing, and notary fees and all similar charges, and all charges for commissions or brokerage services. Discount or finance charge does not include any fee or other obligation incurred by a payee to obtain independent professional advice concerning a transfer of structured settlement payment rights or any charges, commissions, costs, brokerage fees, or other fees which the payee has agreed to pay to a nonaffiliated third party in connection with the transfer;
(5) Discounted present value means, with respect to a proposed transfer of structured settlement payment rights, the fair present value of future payments, as determined by discounting the payments to the present using the most recently published applicable federal rate used to determine the present value of an annuity as the discount rate;
(6) Interested parties means, with respect to any structured settlement:
(a) The payee;
(b) Any beneficiary irrevocably designated under the annuity contract to receive payments following the payee's death or, if such designated beneficiary is a minor, the designated beneficiary's parent or guardian;
(c) The annuity issuer;
(d) The structured settlement obligor; and
(e) Any other party that has continuing rights or obligations under the structured settlement;
(7) Payee means a Nebraska resident who is receiving tax-free payments under a structured settlement and proposes to make a transfer of payment rights under the structured settlement. Payee does not include a Nebraska resident who is receiving payments under a structured settlement of a workers' compensation claim;
(8) Qualified assignment agreement means an agreement providing for a qualified assignment within the meaning of section 130 of the Internal Revenue Code as defined in section 49-801.01;
(9) Structured settlement means an arrangement for periodic payment of damages for personal injuries or sickness established by a settlement, agreement, or judgment in resolution of a tort claim;
(10) Structured settlement obligor means the party that has the obligation to make continuing periodic payments to the payee under a structured settlement agreement or a qualified assignment agreement;
(11) Structured settlement payment rights means rights to receive periodic payments, including lump-sum payments under a structured settlement, whether from the settlement obligor or the annuity issuer if the payee is a resident in the state;
(12) Transfer means a sale, assignment, pledge, hypothecation, or other form of alienation or encumbrance made by a payee for consideration;
(13) Transfer agreement means the agreement providing for transfer of structured settlement payment rights from a payee to a transferee; and
(14) Transferee means a person who is receiving or will receive structured settlement payment rights resulting from a transfer.
25-3104.
Transfer of payment rights; court order; requirements.(1) No direct or indirect transfer of structured settlement payment rights is effective, and no structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer is required to make a payment directly or indirectly to a transferee of structured settlement payment rights, unless the transfer has been authorized in advance in a final order of a court of competent jurisdiction based on the court's written express findings that:
(a) The transfer complies with the requirements of the Structured Settlements Transfers Protection Act;
(b) The transferee has provided to the payee a disclosure statement in no smaller than fourteen-point type specifying:
(i) The amounts and due dates of the structured settlement payments to be transferred;
(ii) The aggregate amount of the payments;
(iii) The discounted present value of the payments, together with the discount rate used in determining the discounted present value;
(iv) The gross amount payable to the payee in exchange for the payments;
(v) An itemized listing of all brokers' commissions, service charges, application fees, processing fees, closing costs, filing fees, referral fees, administrative fees, legal fees, notary fees, and other commissions, fees, costs, expenses, and charges payable by the payee or deductible from the gross amount otherwise payable to the payee;
(vi) The net amount payable to the payee after deduction of all commissions, fees, costs, expenses, and charges described in subdivision (1)(b)(v) of this section;
(vii) The quotient, expressed as a percentage, obtained by dividing the net payment amount by the discounted present value of the payments. Such quotient shall be disclosed in the following statement "The net amount that you will receive from us in exchange for your future structured settlement payments represents ....% of the estimated current value of the payments.";
(viii) The effective annual interest rate. Such rate shall be disclosed in the following statement "Based on the amount that you will receive from us and the amounts and timing of the structured settlement payments that you are turning over to us, you will, in effect, be paying interest to us at a rate of ....% per year."; and
(ix) The amount of any penalty and the aggregate amount of any liquidated damages, including penalties, payable by the payee in the event of a breach of the transfer agreement by the payee;
(c) The transfer is in the best interests of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents, and the net amount payable to the payee is not unfair, unjust, or unreasonable under existing circumstances;
(d) The payee has received, or waived his or her right to receive, independent professional advice regarding the legal, tax, and financial implications of the transfer;
(e) The transferee has given written notice of the transferee's name, address, and taxpayer identification number to the annuity issuer and the structured settlement obligor and has filed a copy of the notice with the court;
(f) The transfer agreement provides that any disputes between the parties will be governed by the laws of Nebraska and that Nebraska is the proper place of venue to bring any cause of action arising out of a breach of the agreement; and
(g) The transfer does not contravene any applicable statute or order of any court or other government authority.
(2) The court may not authorize a transfer if the court makes an express written finding that the transfer contravenes the public policy of this state.
(3) The transfer agreement shall also provide that the parties agree to the jurisdiction of any Nebraska court of competent jurisdiction. If the transfer would contravene the terms of the structured settlement or the standards set forth in subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the court may grant, deny, or impose conditions upon the proposed transfer as the court deems just and proper under the facts and circumstances, upon the filing of a written objection by any interested party and after considering the objection and any response to it. Any order approving a transfer must require that the transferee indemnify the annuity issuer and the structured settlement obligor for any liability including reasonable costs and attorney's fees arising from compliance by the issuer or obligor with the order of the court.
(4) A provision in a transfer agreement giving a transferee power to confess judgment against a payee is unenforceable to the extent the amount of the judgment would exceed the amount paid by the transferee to the payee, less any payments received from the structured settlement obligor or the payee.
(5) With respect to a transfer of structured settlement payment rights a transferee may not contract for or receive a discount or finance charge that would result in an effective annual rate in excess of the maximum interest rate per year applicable in Nebraska to a consumer loan as set forth in section 45-101.03.
25-3105.
Jurisdiction; hearing; notice.(1) The Nebraska court that approved the structured settlement agreement has jurisdiction over an application for authorization of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights. If a Nebraska court did not approve the structured settlement agreement, a person shall file an application under section 25-3104 in the district court for the county in which the payee resides.
(2) Not less than twenty days before the scheduled hearing on an application for authorization of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights under section 25-3104, the transferee shall file with the court and all interested parties a notice of the proposed transfer and the application for its authorization. The notice shall include:
(a) A copy of the transferee's application to the court;
(b) A copy of the transfer agreement;
(c) A copy of the disclosure statement required under section 25-3104; and
(d) Notice that an interested party is entitled to support, oppose, or otherwise respond to the transferee's application, either in person or by counsel, by submitting written comments to the court or by participating in the hearing, and notification of the time and place of the hearing and notification of the manner in which and the time by which written responses to the application must be filed in order to be considered by the court. Written responses to the application shall be filed within fifteen days after service of the transferee's notice.
25-3106.
Waiver prohibited; failure to meet conditions; effect.The provisions of sections 25-3103 to 25-3105 may not be waived. No payee who proposes to make a transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall incur a penalty, forfeit an application fee or other payment, or otherwise incur any liability to the proposed transferee based on the failure of the transfer to satisfy the conditions of section 25-3104.
25-3107.
Act; applicability.The Structured Settlements Transfers Protection Act applies to any transfer of structured settlement payment rights under a transfer agreement entered into on or after January 1, 2002.
25-3201.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-3201 to 25-3207 shall be known and may be cited as the Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitations Act.
25-3202.
Terms, defined.For purposes of the Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitations Act:
(1) Claim means a right of action that may be asserted in a civil action or proceeding and includes a right of action created by statute;
(2) State means a state, commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a foreign country, or a political subdivision of any of them; and
(3) Resident means an individual who is domiciled in this state, a corporation that is either incorporated or has its principal place of business in this state, or an unincorporated entity that has its principal place of business in this state.
25-3203.
Conflict of laws; limitation periods.(1)(a) Except as provided by section 25-3205 and subsection (2) of this section, if a claim is substantively based:
(i) Upon the law of one other state, the limitation period of that state applies; or
(ii) Upon the law of more than one state, the limitation period of one of those states chosen by the law of conflict of laws of this state applies.
(b) The limitation period of this state applies to all other claims.
(2) If a cause of action arises outside of this state and the action is barred under the applicable statute of limitations of the place where it arose, the action may be maintained in this state if the plaintiff is a resident of this state who has owned the cause of action since it accrued and the cause of action is not barred under the applicable statute of limitations of this state.
25-3204.
Rules applicable to computation of limitation period.If the statute of limitations of another state applies to the assertion of a claim in this state, the other state’s relevant statutes and other rules of law governing tolling and accrual apply in computing the limitation period, but its statutes and other rules of law governing conflict of laws do not apply.
25-3205.
Unfairness.If the court determines that the limitation period of another state applicable under section 25-3203 or 25-3204 is substantially different from the limitation period of this state and has not afforded a fair opportunity to sue upon, or imposes an unfair burden in defending against, the claim, the limitation period of this state applies.
25-3206.
Future claims.The Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitations Act applies to claims accruing after July 14, 2006.
25-3207.
Uniformity of application and construction.The Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitations Act shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of the Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitations Act among states enacting it.
25-3301.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-3301 to 25-3309 shall be known and may be cited as the Nonrecourse Civil Litigation
Act.
25-3302.
Terms, defined.For purposes of the
Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act:
(1) Civil litigation
funding company means a person or entity that enters into a nonrecourse civil
litigation funding transaction with a consumer;
(2) Consumer means a person residing
or domiciled in Nebraska or who elects to enter into a transaction under the
act, whether it be in person, over the Internet, by facsimile, or by any other
electronic means, and who has a pending legal claim and is represented by
an attorney at the time he or she receives the nonrecourse civil litigation
funding;
(3) Legal claim means a civil claim or action; and
(4) Nonrecourse
civil litigation funding means a transaction in which a civil litigation funding
company purchases and a consumer assigns the contingent right to receive an
amount of the potential proceeds of the consumer's legal claim to the civil
litigation funding company out of the proceeds of any realized settlement,
judgment, award, or verdict the consumer may receive in the legal claim.
25-3303.
Contracts for nonrecourse civil litigation
funding; right to cancel; notice; statements required.(1) All contracts for nonrecourse civil
litigation funding shall comply with the following requirements:
(a) The contract
shall be completely filled in and contain on the front page, appropriately
headed and in at least twelve-point bold type, the following disclosures:
(i) The total
dollar amount to be funded to the consumer;
(ii) An itemization of one-time fees;
(iii) The total
dollar amount to be repaid by the consumer, in six-month intervals for thirty-six
months, and including all fees;
(iv) The total dollar amount in broker fees
that are involved in the transaction; and
(v) The annual percentage rate of return,
calculated as of the last day of each six-month interval, including frequency
of compounding;
(b) The contract shall provide that the consumer may cancel the
contract within five business days following the consumer's receipt of funds
without penalty or further obligation. The contract shall contain the following
notice written in a clear and conspicuous manner: "CONSUMER'S RIGHT TO CANCELLATION:
YOU MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT WITHOUT PENALTY OR FURTHER OBLIGATION WITHIN
FIVE BUSINESS DAYS FROM THE DATE YOU RECEIVE FUNDING FROM (insert name of
civil litigation funding company)." The contract also shall specify that in
order for the cancellation to be effective, the consumer shall either return
the full amount of disbursed funds to the civil litigation funding company
by delivering the civil litigation funding company's uncashed check to the
civil litigation funding company's offices in person, within five business
days after the disbursement of funds, or mail a notice of cancellation and
include in that mailing a return of the full amount of disbursed funds in
the form of the civil litigation funding company's uncashed check or a registered
or certified check or money order, by insured, registered, or certified United
States mail, postmarked within five business days after receiving funds from
the civil litigation funding company, to the address specified in the contract
for the cancellation;
(c) The contract shall contain the following statement in at least
twelve-point boldface type: "THE CIVIL LITIGATION FUNDING COMPANY AGREES THAT
IT SHALL HAVE NO RIGHT TO AND WILL NOT MAKE ANY DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO
THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERLYING LEGAL CLAIM OR ANY SETTLEMENT OR RESOLUTION
THEREOF AND THAT THE RIGHT TO MAKE THOSE DECISIONS REMAINS SOLELY WITH YOU
AND YOUR ATTORNEY IN THE LEGAL CLAIM.";
(d) The contract shall contain an acknowledgment
by the consumer that such consumer has reviewed the contract in its entirety;
(e) The contract
shall contain the following statement in at least twelve-point boldface type
located immediately above the place on the contract where the consumer's signature
is required: "DO NOT SIGN THIS CONTRACT BEFORE YOU READ IT COMPLETELY OR IF
IT CONTAINS ANY BLANK SPACES. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO A COMPLETELY FILLED IN COPY
OF THIS CONTRACT. BEFORE YOU SIGN THIS CONTRACT YOU SHOULD OBTAIN THE ADVICE
OF AN ATTORNEY. DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, YOU MAY WANT TO CONSULT A
TAX, PUBLIC OR PRIVATE BENEFIT PLANNING, OR FINANCIAL PROFESSIONAL. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT YOUR ATTORNEY IN THE LEGAL CLAIM HAS PROVIDED NO TAX, PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
BENEFIT PLANNING, OR FINANCIAL ADVICE REGARDING THIS TRANSACTION.";
(f) The contract
shall contain a written acknowledgment by the attorney representing the consumer
in the legal claim that states all of the following:
(i) The attorney representing
the consumer in the legal claim has reviewed the contract and all costs and
fees have been disclosed including the annualized rate of return applied to
calculate the amount to be paid by the consumer;
(ii) The attorney representing
the consumer in the legal claim is being paid on a contingency basis per a
written fee agreement;
(iii) All proceeds of the civil litigation will be disbursed via
the trust account of the attorney representing the consumer in the legal claim
or a settlement fund established to receive the proceeds of the civil litigation
from the defendant on behalf of the consumer;
(iv) The attorney representing
the consumer in the legal claim is following the written instructions of the
consumer with regard to the nonrecourse civil litigation funding;
(v) The attorney
representing the consumer in the legal claim shall not be paid or offered
to be paid commissions or referral fees; and
(vi) Whether the attorney
representing the consumer in the legal claim does or does not have a financial
interest in the civil litigation funding company; and
(g) All contracts to the
consumer shall have in plain language, in a box with bold fifteen-point font
stating the following in capitalized letters: "IF THERE IS NO RECOVERY OF
ANY MONEY FROM YOUR LEGAL CLAIM OR IF THERE IS NOT ENOUGH MONEY TO PAY THE
CIVIL LITIGATION FUNDING COMPANY BACK IN FULL, YOU WILL NOT OWE THE CIVIL
LITIGATION FUNDING COMPANY ANYTHING IN EXCESS OF YOUR RECOVERY UNLESS YOU
HAVE VIOLATED THIS PURCHASE AGREEMENT.".
(2) If a dispute arises between the consumer
and the civil litigation funding company concerning the contract for nonrecourse
civil litigation funding, the responsibilities of the attorney representing
the consumer in the legal claim shall be no greater than the attorney's responsibilities
under the Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct.
25-3304.
Civil litigation funding company;
prohibited acts.(1)
The civil litigation funding company shall not pay or offer to pay commissions
or referral fees to any attorney or employee of a law firm or to any medical
provider, chiropractor, or physical therapist or their employees for referring
a consumer to the civil litigation funding company.
(2) The civil
litigation funding company shall not accept any commissions, referral fees,
or rebates from any attorney or employee of a law firm or any medical provider,
chiropractor, or physical therapist or their employees.
(3) The civil
litigation funding company shall not advertise false or intentionally misleading
information regarding such company's product or services.
(4) The civil
litigation funding company shall not knowingly provide nonrecourse civil litigation
funding to a consumer who has previously sold and assigned an amount of such
consumer's potential proceeds from the legal claim to another civil litigation
funding company without first buying out that civil litigation funding company's
entire accrued balance unless otherwise agreed in writing by the civil litigation
funding companies and the consumer.
25-3305.
Assessment of fees; restrictions;
calculations.(1)
A civil litigation funding company may not assess fees for any period exceeding
thirty-six months from the date of the contract with the consumer.
(2) Fees assessed
by the civil litigation funding company shall compound at least semiannually
but shall not compound based on any lesser time period.
(3) In calculating
the annual percentage fee or rate of return, a civil litigation funding company
shall include all charges payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and
shall compute the rate based only on amounts actually received and retained
by a consumer.
25-3306.
Effect of communication on privileges.No communication
between the attorney and the civil litigation funding company as it pertains
to the nonrecourse civil litigation funding contract shall limit, waive, or
abrogate the scope or nature of any statutory or common-law privilege, including
the work-product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege.
25-3307.
Civil litigation funding company;
registration required; application; form; renewal.(1) Unless a civil litigation funding
company has first registered pursuant to the Nonrecourse Civil Litigation
Act, the civil litigation funding company cannot engage in the business of
nonrecourse civil litigation funding.
(2) A civil
litigation funding company shall submit an application of registration to
the Secretary of State in a form prescribed by the Secretary of State. An
application filed under this subsection is a public record and shall contain
information that allows the Secretary of State to make an evaluation of the
character, fitness, and financial responsibility of the company such that
the Secretary of State may determine that the business will be operated honestly
or fairly within the purposes of the act. For purposes of determining a civil
litigation funding company's character, fitness, and financial responsibility,
the Secretary of State shall request a company to submit: A copy of the company's
articles of incorporation, articles of organization, certificate of limited
partnership, or other organizational documents; proof of registration with
a Nebraska registered agent; and proof of a surety bond or irrevocable letter
of credit issued and confirmed by a financial institution authorized by law
to transact business in the State of Nebraska that is equal to double the
amount of the largest funding in the past calendar year or fifty thousand
dollars, whichever is greater.
(3) A civil litigation funding company may
apply to renew a registration by submitting an application for renewal in
a form prescribed by the Secretary of State. An application filed under this
subsection is a public record. The registration shall contain current information
on all matters required in an original registration.
25-3308.
Registration fee; renewal fee.(1) An application for registration or renewal of registration under section 25-3307 shall be accompanied by either an application for registration fee or a renewal of registration fee, as applicable.
(2) The Secretary of State may, by rule and regulation, establish fees for applications for registration and renewals of registration at rates sufficient to cover the costs of administering the Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act, in the event any such fees are required. Such fees shall be collected by the Secretary of State and remitted to the State Treasurer for credit to the Secretary of State Cash Fund.
25-3309.
Secretary of State; issue certificate
of registration or renewal of registration; refusal to issue; grounds; suspend,
revoke, or refuse renewal; temporary certificate; submission of data; contents;
report.(1) The Secretary of State shall issue a certificate
of registration to a civil litigation funding company who complies with subsection
(2) of section 25-3307 or a renewal of registration under subsection (3) of
section 25-3307.
(2) The Secretary of State may refuse to issue a certificate of registration
if the Secretary of State determines that the character, fitness, or financial
responsibility of the civil litigation funding company are such as to warrant
belief that the business will not be operated honestly or fairly within the
purposes of the Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act.
(3) The Secretary of State may suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew a
certificate of registration for conduct that would have justified denial of
registration under subsection (2) of section 25-3307 or for violating section 25-3304.
(4) The Secretary of State may deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew
a certificate of registration only after proper notice and an opportunity
for a hearing. The Administrative Procedure Act applies to the Nonrecourse
Civil Litigation Act.
(5) The Secretary of State may issue a temporary certificate of registration
while an application for registration or renewal of registration is pending.
(6) The Secretary of State shall require a civil litigation funding
company registered pursuant to the act to annually submit certain data, in
a form prescribed by the Secretary of State that contains:
(a) The number of nonrecourse civil litigation fundings;
(b) The amount of nonrecourse civil litigation fundings;
(c) The number of nonrecourse civil litigation fundings required to
be repaid by the consumer;
(d) The amount charged to the consumer, including, but not limited to,
the annual percentage fee charged to the consumer and the itemized fees charged
to the consumer; and
(e) The dollar amount and number of cases in which the realization to
the civil litigation funding company was less than contracted.
(7) The Secretary of State shall annually prepare and electronically submit a report to the Clerk
of the Legislature and to the Judiciary Committee of the Legislature on the
status of nonrecourse civil litigation funding activities in the state. The
report shall include aggregate information reported by registered civil litigation
funding companies.
Cross References
Administrative Procedure Act, see section 84-920.
25-3401.
Prisoner; civil actions; in forma pauperis litigation; limitation; finding by court that action was frivolous.(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) Civil action means a legal action seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or any appeal filed in any court in this state that relates to or involves a prisoner's conditions of confinement. Civil action does not include a motion for postconviction relief or petition for habeas corpus relief;
(b) Conditions of confinement means any circumstance, situation, or event that involves a prisoner's custody, transportation, incarceration, or supervision;
(c) Correctional institution means any state or local facility that incarcerates or detains any adult accused of, charged with, convicted of, or sentenced for any crime;
(d) Frivolous means the law and evidence supporting a litigant's position is wholly without merit or rational argument; and
(e) Prisoner means any person who is incarcerated, imprisoned, or otherwise detained in a correctional institution.
(2)(a) A prisoner who has filed three or more civil actions, commenced after July 19, 2012, that have been found to be frivolous by a court of this state or a federal court for a case originating in this state shall not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis for any further civil actions without leave of court. A court shall permit the prisoner to proceed in forma pauperis if the court determines that the person is in danger of serious bodily injury.
(b) A court may include in its final order or judgment in any civil action a finding that the action was frivolous.
(c) A finding under subdivision (2)(b) of this section shall be reflected in the record of the case.
(d) This subsection does not apply to judicial review of disciplinary procedures in adult institutions administered by the Department of Correctional Services governed by sections 83-4,109 to 83-4,123.
Annotations
The right to interlocutory appeal of the denial of in forma pauperis status in subsection (1) of section 25-2301.02 applies only to denials made pursuant to the two bases for denial set forth in that subsection, and not to denials based on the "three strikes" provision in this section. Robinson v. Houston, 298 Neb. 746, 905 N.W.2d 636 (2018).
A district court's denial of in forma pauperis under this section is reviewed de novo on the record based on the transcript of the hearing or written statement of the court. Mumin v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 25 Neb. App. 89, 903 N.W.2d 483 (2017).
The district court erred when it failed to make determinations as to whether any or all of the prisoner's previous
civil actions were related to or involved the prisoner's conditions of confinement, as further defined in subdivision
(1)(b) of this section, were motions for postconviction relief, or were petitions for habeas corpus relief. Mumin v.
Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 25 Neb. App. 89, 903 N.W.2d 483 (2017).
The definition of "civil action" in this section expressly excludes petitions for habeas corpus relief from consideration in determining whether a prisoner has filed three or more civil actions that have been found to be frivolous. Gray v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 24 Neb. App. 713, 898 N.W.2d 380 (2017).
The standard of review for denial of in forma pauperis under this section is de novo on the record. Gray v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 24 Neb. App. 713, 898 N.W.2d 380 (2017).
25-3501.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-3501 to 25-3508 shall be known and may be cited as the Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act.
25-3502.
Definitions.In the Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act:
(1) Consent means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary authorization by an individual with legal capacity to give authorization.
(2) Depicted individual means an individual whose body is shown in whole or in part in an intimate image.
(3) Disclosure means transfer, publication, or distribution to another person. Disclose has a corresponding meaning.
(4) Identifiable means recognizable by a person other than the depicted individual:
(A) from an intimate image itself; or
(B) from an intimate image and identifying characteristic displayed in connection with the intimate image.
(5) Identifying characteristic means information that may be used to identify a depicted individual.
(6) Individual means a human being.
(7) Intimate image means a photograph, film, video recording, or other similar medium that shows:
(A) the uncovered genitals, pubic area, anus, or female post-pubescent nipple of a depicted individual; or
(B) a depicted individual engaging in or being subjected to sexual conduct.
(8) Person means an individual, estate, business or nonprofit entity, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or other legal entity.
(9) Sexual conduct includes:
(A) masturbation;
(B) genital, anal, or oral sex;
(C) sexual penetration of, or with, an object;
(D) bestiality; or
(E) the transfer of semen onto a depicted individual.
25-3503.
Civil action.(a) In this section:
(1) Harm includes physical harm, economic harm, and emotional distress whether or not accompanied by physical or economic harm.
(2) Private means:
(A) created or obtained under circumstances in which a depicted individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy; or
(B) made accessible through theft, bribery, extortion, fraud, false pretenses, voyeurism, or exceeding authorized access to an account, message, file, device, resource, or property.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 25-3504, a depicted individual who is identifiable and who suffers harm from a person's intentional disclosure or threatened disclosure of an intimate image that was private without the depicted individual's consent has a cause of action against the person if the person knew or acted with reckless disregard for whether:
(1) the depicted individual did not consent to the disclosure;
(2) the intimate image was private; and
(3) the depicted individual was identifiable.
(c) The following conduct by a depicted individual does not establish by itself that the individual consented to the disclosure of the intimate image which is the subject of an action under the Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act or that the individual lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy:
(1) consent to creation of the image; or
(2) previous consensual disclosure of the image.
(d) A depicted individual who does not consent to the sexual conduct or uncovering of the part of the body depicted in an intimate image of the individual retains a reasonable expectation of privacy even if the image was created when the individual was in a public place.
25-3504.
Exceptions to liability.(a) In this section:
(1) Child means an unemancipated individual who is less than nineteen years of age.
(2) Parent means an individual recognized as a parent under law of this state other than the Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act.
(b) A person is not liable under the act if the person proves that disclosure of, or a threat to disclose, an intimate image was:
(1) made in good faith in:
(A) law enforcement;
(B) a legal proceeding; or
(C) medical education or treatment;
(2) made in good faith in the reporting or investigation of:
(A) unlawful conduct; or
(B) unsolicited and unwelcome conduct;
(3) related to a matter of public concern or public interest; or
(4) reasonably intended to assist the depicted individual.
(c) Subject to subsection (d) of this section, a defendant who is a parent, legal guardian, or individual with legal custody of a child is not liable under the act for a disclosure or threatened disclosure of an intimate image, as defined in subdivision (7)(A) of section 25-3502, of the child.
(d) If a defendant asserts an exception to liability under subsection (c) of this section, the exception does not apply if the plaintiff proves the disclosure was:
(1) prohibited by law other than the act; or
(2) made for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, humiliation, degradation, or monetary or commercial gain.
(e) Disclosure of, or a threat to disclose, an intimate image is not a matter of public concern or public interest solely because the depicted individual is a public figure.
25-3505.
Remedies.(a) In an action under the Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act, a prevailing plaintiff may recover as compensation:
(1)(A) economic and noneconomic damages proximately caused by the defendant's disclosure or threatened disclosure, including damages for emotional distress whether or not accompanied by other damages; or
(B) if the actual damages are incapable of being quantified or difficult to quantify, presumed damages not to exceed ten thousand dollars against each defendant in an amount that bears a reasonable relationship to the probable damages incurred by the prevailing plaintiff. In determining the amount of presumed damages under subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section, consideration must be given to the age of the parties at the time of the disclosure or threatened disclosure, the number of disclosures or threatened disclosures made by the defendant, the breadth of distribution of the image by the defendant, and other exacerbating or mitigating factors; and
(2) an amount equal to any monetary gain made by the defendant from disclosure of the intimate image.
(b) In an action under the act, the court may award a prevailing plaintiff:
(1) reasonable attorney's fees and costs; and
(2) additional relief, including injunctive relief.
(c) The act does not affect a right or remedy available under law of this state other than the act.
25-3506.
Statute of limitations.(a) An action under subsection (b) of section 25-3503 for:
(1) an unauthorized disclosure may not be brought later than four years from the date the disclosure was discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and
(2) a threat to disclose may not be brought later than four years from the date of the threat to disclose.
(b) This section is subject to section 25-213.
25-3507.
Construction.(a) In an action brought under the Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act, no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as a person disclosing any information provided by another information content provider unless the provider or user of such interactive computer service is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of the information provided through the Internet or any other interactive service.
(b) No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable under the act on account of:
(1) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(2) any action taken to enable or make available to any information content provider or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section.
(c) Nothing in the Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act shall be construed to impose liability on an interactive computer service for content provided by another person.
(d) The Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act must be construed to be consistent with 47 U.S.C. 230, as such section existed on January 1, 2019.
(e) The act may not be construed to alter the law of this state on sovereign immunity.
(f) For purposes of this section, information content provider and interactive computer service have the same meanings as in 47 U.S.C. 230, as such section existed on January 1, 2019.
25-3508.
Uniformity of application and construction.In applying and construing the Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
25-3509.
Plaintiff's privacy.In any action brought pursuant to the Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act, a plaintiff may request to use a pseudonym instead of his or her legal name in all court proceedings and records. Upon finding that the use of a pseudonym is proper, the court shall ensure that the pseudonym is used in all court proceedings and records.
Cross References
Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act, see section 25-3501.
25-3601.
Act, how cited.Sections 25-3601 to 25-3604 shall be known and may be cited as the COVID-19 Liability Act.
Cross References
Health Care Crisis Protocol Act, see section 71-2701.
25-3602.
Terms, defined.For purposes of the COVID-19 Liability Act:
(1) COVID-19 means the novel coronavirus identified as SARS-CoV-2, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 or a virus mutating therefrom, and the health conditions or threats associated with the disease caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 or a virus mutating therefrom;
(2) Federal public health guidance means and includes written or oral guidance related to COVID-19 issued by any of the following:
(a) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the United States Department of Health and Human Services;
(b) The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; or
(c) The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and
(3)(a) Person means:
(i) Any natural person;
(ii) Any sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability partnership, corporation, limited liability company, business trust, estate, trust, unincorporated association, or joint venture;
(iii) The State of Nebraska and any political subdivision of the state;
(iv) Any school, college, university, institution of higher education, religious organization, or charitable organization; or
(v) Any other legal or commercial entity.
(b) Person includes an employee, director, governing board, officer, agent, independent contractor, or volunteer of a person listed in subdivision (3)(a) of this section.
Cross References
Health Care Crisis Protocol Act, see section 71-2701.
25-3603.
Exposure or potential exposure to COVID-19; civil action; when permitted.A person may not bring or maintain a civil action seeking recovery for any injuries or damages sustained from exposure or potential exposure to COVID-19 on or after May 26, 2021, if the act or omission alleged to violate a duty of care was in substantial compliance with any federal public health guidance that was applicable to the person, place, or activity at issue at the time of the alleged exposure or potential exposure.
Cross References
Health Care Crisis Protocol Act, see section 71-2701.
25-3604.
Act; how construed.The COVID-19 Liability Act shall not be construed to:
(1) Create, recognize, or ratify a claim or cause of action of any kind;
(2) Eliminate or satisfy a required element of a claim or cause of action of any kind;
(3) Affect rights or coverage limits under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act;
(4) Abrogate, amend, repeal, alter, or affect any statutory or common law immunity or limitation of liability; or
(5) Constitute a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the State of Nebraska or any political subdivision of the state.
Cross References
Health Care Crisis Protocol Act, see section 71-2701.
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, see section 48-1,110.