48-101.
Personal injury; employer's liability; compensation, when.When personal injury is caused to an employee by accident or occupational disease, arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, such employee shall receive compensation therefor from his or her employer if the employee was not willfully negligent at the time of receiving such injury.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 1, p. 579; R.S.1913, § 3642; C.S.1922, § 3024; C.S.1929, § 48-101; Laws 1943, c. 113, § 1, p. 397; R.S.1943, § 48-101;
Laws 1971, LB 572, § 1.
Annotations
1. Accident or occupational disease
2. Arising out of and in the course of employment
3. Willful negligence
4. Aggravating preexisting injury or disease
5. Burden of proof
6. Sufficiency of evidence to sustain award
7. Appeal
8. Release
9. Injuries sustained outside state
10. Miscellaneous
1. Accident or occupational disease
Under Nebraska's workers' compensation statutes, the law compensates a worker only for injuries resulting from an accident or occupational disease. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
The accident requirement of the act is satisfied if the cause of the injury was of accidental character or the effect was unexpected or unforeseen, and happened suddenly and violently; and, furthermore, it is no longer necessary that the injury be caused by a single traumatic event, but the exertion in the employment must contribute in some material and substantial degree to cause the injury. The term "in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances surrounding the accident. The term "arising out of" describes the accident and its origin, cause, and character, i.e., whether it resulted from the risks arising within the scope or sphere of the employee's job. Union Packing Co. v. Klauschie, 210 Neb. 331, 314 N.W.2d 25 (1982).
Employee can recover for accumulated effects of occupational disease when disability occurs. Hauff v. Kimball, 163 Neb. 55, 77 N.W.2d 683 (1956).
Award will be sustained when injury, resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and preexisting disease combined to produce disability. Yakal v. Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co., 145 Neb. 365, 16 N.W.2d 531 (1944).
Physical exertion and exposure to smoke and fumes incidental to work of a city fireman in fighting fire does not constitute an accidental injury compensable under workmen's compensation law, where it appears that the disability was due to a preexisting heart disease. Brown v. City of Omaha, 141 Neb. 587, 4 N.W.2d 564 (1942).
Where sudden jerk of road grading machinery results in injury to back of employee, it is sufficient to constitute an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Jurgensen v. Rogers, 139 Neb. 30, 296 N.W. 341 (1941).
Where employee fails to show with reasonable certainty that there is a causal relation between accident and his disability, compensation will be denied. Hart v. American Community Stores Corp., 138 Neb. 149, 292 N.W. 387 (1940).
Claimant must show with reasonable certainty that alleged injury occurred and was caused by accident. Wayne County v. Lessman, 136 Neb. 311, 285 N.W. 579 (1939).
A claim for disability is properly allowed on evidence that employee suffered accidental injury to feet which caused arthritis. Flesch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 Neb. 1, 244 N.W. 925 (1932).
An injury which occurred in the course of employment unexpectedly and without the affirmative act or design of the employee is accidental. Van Vleet v. Public Service Co. of York, 111 Neb. 51, 195 N.W. 467 (1923).
The definition of "accident," as used in this section, includes injuries resulting from activities which create a series of repeated traumas ultimately producing disability. Hadfield v. Nebraska Med. Ctr., 21 Neb. App. 20, 838 N.W.2d 310 (2013).
2. Arising out of and in the course of employment
An employee leaving the premises of his or her employer in the usual and customary way after his or her work is ended is within the course of his or her employment within the meaning of this section. Zoucha v. Touch of Class Lounge, 269 Neb. 89, 690 N.W.2d 610 (2005).
An off-premises injury during a "coffee" or "rest" break may be found to have arisen in the course of employment under this section if the employer, in all the circumstances, including duration, shortness of the off-premises distance, and limitations on off-premises activity during the interval, can be deemed to have retained authority over the employee. Misek v. CNG Financial, 265 Neb. 837, 660 N.W.2d 495 (2003).
The phrases used in this section, "arising out of employment" and "in the course of employment", are not synonymous and must both be established in order for the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act to apply. A school teacher who was injured in the office of her husband, also a school teacher in the same school district, when a trapdoor was left open by workers installing cable wires, while helping her husband return computer equipment during a summer evening, was not acting "in the course of employment", so there is no need to address whether the injury arose out of the employment. Skinner v. Ogallala Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 262 Neb. 387, 631 N.W.2d 510 (2001).
This section compensates injury caused an employee by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. Under the going to and from work rule, injuries sustained by an employee while going to and coming from work do not arise out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of this section unless it is determined that a distinct causal connection exists between an employer-created condition and the occurrence of the injury. Where an employee, in the performance of his or her duties, is required to travel and an accident occurs while he or she is so engaged, the accident arises out of and in the course of his or her employment and is within the scope of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Under the special errand exception to the going to and from work rule, when an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on the employment, makes an off-premises journey which would not normally be compensable under the usual going to and from work rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment within the meaning of this section by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself. Torres v. Aulick Leasing, Inc., 258 Neb. 859, 606 N.W.2d 98 (2000).
This section compensates injury caused to an employee by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment; the phrases "arising out of" and "in the course of" are conjunctive and must both be established by a preponderance of the evidence. The phrase "arising out of", as used in this section, describes the accident and its origin, cause, and character, i.e., whether it resulted from the risks arising within the scope of the employee's job; the phrase "in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances surrounding the accident. An injury sustained by an employee while going to and from work, at a fixed place of employment, does not arise out of and in the course of employment; however, when an employer designates a lot as the proper place to park and provides a shuttle from that lot to the place of employment; an injury incurred in the designated lot arises out of and in the course of employment. La Croix v. Omaha Public Schools, 254 Neb. 1014, 582 N.W.2d 283 (1998).
Injuries resulting from horseplay may be within the scope of employment; such injuries are within the scope of employment and compensable if (1) the deviation was insubstantial and (2) the deviation does not measurably detract from the work. Varela v. Fisher Roofing Co., Inc., 253 Neb. 667, 572 N.W.2d 780 (1998).
For purposes of this section, an injury is accidental if either its cause was accidental in character or its effect was unexpected or unforeseen, it happened suddenly and violently, and the occurrence produced at the time objective symptoms of injury. The "course of employment" embraces all activities connected with changing clothes before and after work, as well as similar acts during work hours. Cox v. Fagen Inc., 249 Neb. 677, 545 N.W.2d 80 (1996).
The phrase "arising out of" describes the accident and its origin, cause, and character, i.e., whether it resulted from the risks arising within the scope of the employee's job; the phrase "in the course of" refers to time, place, and circumstances surrounding the accident. The two phrases are conjunctive; in order to recover, a claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of both. Johnson v. Holdrege Med. Clinic, 249 Neb. 77, 541 N.W.2d 399 (1996).
In a workers' compensation case based on an employee's heart attack, causation required for compensability consists of two parts: legal cause and medical cause. Rosemann v. County of Sarpy, 237 Neb. 252, 466 N.W.2d 59 (1991).
The phrase "arising out of" refers to an injury which is the basis of a workers' compensation claim and the injury's origin, cause, and character, that is, whether an employee's unexpected or unforeseen injury results from risks arising within the scope or sphere of employment. Rosemann v. County of Sarpy, 237 Neb. 252, 466 N.W.2d 59 (1991).
Under the "going and coming rule," if an employee is injured while going to or from the employee's workplace, the injury does not arise out of or in the course of the employment. Under the commercial traveler exception to the going and coming rule, where an employee is required to travel in the performance of the employee's duties and an accident occurs while the employee is so engaged, it arises out of and in the course of the worker's employment and is compensable. Reynolds v. School Dist. of Omaha, 236 Neb. 508, 461 N.W.2d 758 (1990).
Worker is an employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act in accordance with the factors used to determine employee status including the element of control and the nature of the work. Franklin v. Pawley, 215 Neb. 624, 340 N.W.2d 156 (1983).
An employee must show by competent medical testimony a causal connection between the alleged injury, the employment, and the disability. Caradori v. Frontier Airlines, 213 Neb. 513, 329 N.W.2d 865 (1983).
Where a tree blown over by violent wind crushed the victim-employee's car, breaking the victim's neck, the evidence did not establish that a hazard imposed upon the employee by reason of the employment was greater than that to which the public generally is subjected, and, therefore, the accident did not "arise out of" the employment. McGinn v. Douglas County Social Services Adm., 211 Neb. 72, 317 N.W.2d 764 (1982).
The plaintiff in a workmen's compensation case must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his disability is the result of an accident arising out of his employment, and when the disability is of a subjective nature, such as a psychogenic pain disorder, it requires competent medical testimony to show a causal connection between the alleged injury, the employment, and the disability. Davis v. Western Electric, 210 Neb. 771, 317 N.W.2d 68 (1982).
In determining whether injuries incurred off the employer's premises are compensable under this section, the court will look at the nature of the activity in which the employee was engaged at the time of the injury, not the nature of the organization that sponsored the activity. Gray v. State, 205 Neb. 853, 290 N.W.2d 651 (1980).
Injuries incurred in an accident that occurred on the way to a primarily social event sponsored by an organization some of whose activities are work-related are not compensable under this section. Gray v. State, 205 Neb. 853, 290 N.W.2d 651 (1980).
Where claimant's preexisting hip injury was aggravated in subsequent accident requiring hip joint replacement, court determined the injury was a section 48-121 case. Jeffers v. Pappas Trucking, Inc., 198 Neb. 379, 253 N.W.2d 30 (1977).
An injury, to be the basis of a cause of action under the Workmen's Compensation Act, must be caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Reis v. Douglas County Hospital, 193 Neb. 542, 227 N.W.2d 879 (1975).
The burden of proof is upon the claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his disability was caused by an accident out of and in the course of his employment. Satterfield v. Negel, 186 Neb. 332, 183 N.W.2d 237 (1971).
Where employee has returned to point of deviation and engages in the duties of his employment, he is within the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Murphy v. Hi-Way G.M.C. Sales & Service Corp., 178 Neb. 397, 133 N.W.2d 595 (1965).
In order to recover, a workman has the burden of establishing that injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Gibb v. Highway G.M.C. Sales & Service Corp., 178 Neb. 127, 132 N.W.2d 297 (1964).
To be compensable, injury must arise out of and in course of employment. Hahl v. Heyne, 156 Neb. 599, 57 N.W.2d 137 (1953).
To be compensable under this act, accidental injuries must arise out of and in the course of employment. Nelms v. Mahoney, 147 Neb. 626, 24 N.W.2d 558 (1946).
Burden rests upon claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Schwabauer v. State, 147 Neb. 620, 24 N.W.2d 431 (1946).
When employee selects a method of transportation of his own and injury results, though on the premises of the employer, liability does not exist where employee was not engaged in any mission for employer, and where employer exercised no control over employee or conveyance selected. Schank v. Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 385, 23 N.W.2d 557 (1946).
Where a man is employed with his own team and wagon and is injured while on his way to his barn to put away his team, the injury does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Wilbur v. Adams Lumber Co., 140 Neb. 48, 299 N.W. 268 (1941).
Where employee, to accomplish private purpose, wholly unconnected with employer's business, creates necessity for automobile trip which would not otherwise have been taken, injuries occurring on such trip are not compensable under workmen's compensation law. Weideman v. Milburn & Scott Co., 138 Neb. 205, 292 N.W. 594 (1940).
An injury is not compensable where employee, on his own initiative, leaves his line of duty under his employment for purposes of his own, and, while doing so, sustains injury. Burlage v. Lefebure Corp., 137 Neb. 671, 291 N.W. 100 (1940).
Where employee was drinking beer in a tavern in which he was fixing the refrigerator and was killed by a drunken companion, the death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Hopper v. Koenigstein, 135 Neb. 837, 284 N.W. 346 (1939).
One injured while leaving premises where employed, after work, is entitled to compensation. McDonald v. Richardson County, 135 Neb. 150, 280 N.W. 456 (1938).
Injury must arise out of and in course of employment. McCall v. Hamilton County Farmers Telephone Assn., 135 Neb. 70, 280 N.W. 254 (1938); Sheets v. Glenwood Telephone Co., 135 Neb. 56, 280 N.W. 238 (1938).
Compensation act does not authorize an award in case of death from a peril common to all. Klotz v. Swift & Co., 133 Neb. 400, 275 N.W. 667 (1937).
Compensation can be allowed only for personal injuries or death of an employee by accident arising out of and in course of his employment. Lang v. Gage County Electric Co., 133 Neb. 388, 275 N.W. 462 (1937).
Where evidence showed that plaintiff had sprained back while moving park benches in employ of city resulting in serious injuries, he was entitled to compensation. Meierjurgen v. City of Lincoln, 132 Neb. 896, 273 N.W. 804 (1937).
When an employee is assaulted and injured by his foreman while eating dinner furnished as a part of his wages, compensation may be allowed. Miller v. Reisch Co., 132 Neb. 338, 271 N.W. 853 (1937).
Exposure to cold resulting in injury is not compensable if it is the same as that to which the general public is exposed. Laudenklos v. Department of Roads & Irrigation, 132 Neb. 234, 271 N.W. 790 (1937).
Employment of carpenter by farmer to construct a machine shed on his farm is not in the course of the employer's occupation within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Guse v. Wessels, 132 Neb. 41, 270 N.W. 665 (1937).
Injury to officer in municipal fire department received while fighting fire on duty, is compensable under Workmen's Compensation Act. Dunlap v. City of Omaha, 131 Neb. 632, 269 N.W. 422 (1936).
The shooting of a traveling salesman by a highwayman, while driving from one town to another in furtherance of his employer's business, is compensable under Workmen's Compensation Act. Goodwin v. Omaha Printing Co., 131 Neb. 212, 267 N.W. 419 (1936).
If injury results from doing some act, even for employer's benefit, at a place and in a manner not contemplated by the parties, it does not arise out of employment. Albers v. Kipp, 130 Neb. 46, 263 N.W. 593 (1935).
Employee cannot recover compensation if, at time he was injured, he had departed from master's service, and was performing service for himself. Seversike v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 129 Neb. 754, 263 N.W. 151 (1935).
Heat prostration may be compensable accident if the workman is subjected to a greater hazard from heat than that to which the public in that locality is subjected. McNeil v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 129 Neb. 329, 261 N.W. 694 (1935).
Injury to employee caused by slipping on ice on public sidewalk while going to lunch on her own time did not arise out of and in course of employment. De Porte v. State Furniture Co., 129 Neb. 282, 261 N.W. 419 (1935).
When messenger boy was injured while riding bicycle, after his employer had directed him to take a street car, injury was compensable. Volcheck v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 128 Neb. 502, 259 N.W. 371 (1935).
In case of exposure to elements causing death from heart failure, claim is not compensable. Brady v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 127 Neb. 786, 257 N.W. 66 (1934).
Where employee was fatally injured while starting on trip in performance of his duties, dependents were entitled to compensation. Kirkpatrick v. Chocolate Sales Corporation, 127 Neb. 604, 256 N.W. 89 (1934).
Injury is compensable when received in performance of duty incidental to employment. Struve v. City of Fremont, 125 Neb. 463, 250 N.W. 663 (1933).
In order for an injury to arise out of employment, there must be a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Hall v. Austin Western Road Machinery Co., 125 Neb. 390, 250 N.W. 258 (1933).
Where employee, engaged in his employment on public street, is struck by a missile intentionally thrown at him without provocation, injury was compensable as arising out of employment. Good v. City of Omaha, 125 Neb. 307, 250 N.W. 61 (1933).
Compensable injury must be reasonably incident to employment, and, unless there is causal connection between working conditions and resulting injury, injury does not arise out of employment. Bergantzel v. Union Transfer Co., 124 Neb. 200, 245 N.W. 593 (1932).
Where employee was injured while returning truck to garage after making delivery for employer, injury occurred in the course of his employment. Conzuello v. Teague, 123 Neb. 574, 243 N.W. 779 (1932).
Where plaintiff school teacher and superintendent was injured while returning to place of employment from trip to city, on which trip he purchased some school supplies for employer, evidence was insufficient to prove injury was received in course of his employment. Babcock v. School District No. 107, 123 Neb. 491, 243 N.W. 831 (1932).
An injury arises out of course of employment when there is a reasonable causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the injury received while the employee is thus engaged. Speas v. Boone County, 119 Neb. 58, 227 N.W. 87 (1929).
An injury is received in the course of employment when, at the time the injury is received, the workman is engaged at the work he is employed to perform or in some duty incidental to that work. Speas v. Boone County, 119 Neb. 58, 227 N.W. 87 (1929).
Injuries to employee by reason of being required to work with incompetent, insane, or dangerous fellow servant arise out of employment. Dodson v. Woolworth Co., 118 Neb. 276, 224 N.W. 289 (1929).
An injury from a peril to which the public generally is exposed does not arise out of employment. Gale v. Krug Park Amusement Co., 114 Neb. 432, 208 N.W. 739 (1926).
Where a garage employee was sent on an errand and was injured while attempting to mount upon the running board of a truck going in the direction the employee was required to perform his errand, the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. McCrary v. Wolff, 109 Neb. 796, 192 N.W. 237 (1923).
An injury resulting from assault by fellow employee, not arising from any duty connected with employment but following personal altercation concerning matters not arising out of the performance of any service in the employment is not one arising out of employment. Urak v. Morris & Co., 107 Neb. 411, 186 N.W. 345 (1922).
Where the nature of the employment is such as to expose a worker to a wrongful act of another worker, which may reasonably be said to have been induced by the peculiar conditions of the employment, such an act may reasonably arise out of the employment. Socha v. Cudahy Packing Co., 105 Neb. 691, 181 N.W. 706 (1921).
Lighting a firework was not within the scope of the claimant's job, and thus, the accident leading to his injury did not arise out of his employment; horseplay analysis was unnecessary. Webber v. Webber, 28 Neb. App. 287, 942 N.W.2d 438 (2020).
The two phrases "arising out of" and "in the course of" in this section are conjunctive; in order to recover, a claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that both conditions exist. Webber v. Webber, 28 Neb. App. 287, 942 N.W.2d 438 (2020); Coughlin v. County of Colfax, 27 Neb. App. 41, 926 N.W.2d 675 (2019).
The "in the course of" requirement of this section has been defined as testing the work connection as to time, place, and activity; that is, it demands that the injury be shown to have arisen within the time and space boundaries of the employment, and in the course of an activity whose purpose is related to the employment. Coughlin v. County of Colfax, 27 Neb. App. 41, 926 N.W.2d 675 (2019).
The phrase "arising out of," as used in this section, describes the accident and its origin, cause, and character, i.e., whether it resulted from the risks arising within the scope of the employee's job; the phrase "in the course of," as used in this section, refers to the time, place, and circumstances surrounding the accident. Coughlin v. County of Colfax, 27 Neb. App. 41, 926 N.W.2d 675 (2019).
In cases governed by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, the "in the course of" requirement has been defined as testing the work connection as to the time, place, and activity; the injury must be shown to have arisen within the time and space boundaries of the employment, and in the course of an activity whose purpose is related to the employment. Brittain v. H & H Chevrolet, 21 Neb. App. 986, 845 N.W.2d 619 (2014).
Injuries sustained by an employee while going to and from work do not arise out of and in the course of employment unless it is determined that a distinct causal connection exists between an employer-created condition and the occurrence of the injury. Coffey v. Waldinger Corp., 11 Neb. App. 293, 649 N.W.2d 197 (2002).
The claimant's physical therapy related to his employment in the sense that the claimant's therapy was a necessary or reasonable activity that the claimant would not have undertaken but for his work-related back and elbow injuries, and therefore, the claimant's knee injury during physical therapy arose out of and was in the course of his employment. Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Neb. App. 666, 636 N.W.2d 884 (2001).
Injuries entitling employee to workers' compensation benefits arose out of his employment when he blacked out while driving a truck in the course of his employment. Nunn v. Texaco Trading & Transp., 3 Neb. App. 101, 523 N.W.2d 705 (1994).
3. Willful negligence
An employee is not willfully negligent under this section for violating an employer's safety rule when the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the safety rule was not always strictly enforced. Guico v. Excel Corp., 260 Neb. 712, 619 N.W.2d 470 (2000).
An employee who was willfully negligent at the time of his injury or death will not ordinarily be entitled to recover benefits under the workers' compensation law. Breckenridge v. Midlands Roofing Co., 222 Neb. 452, 384 N.W.2d 298 (1986).
The fact that an employee knew he was committing suicide will not, in all cases, constitute willful negligence. Friedeman v. State, 215 Neb. 413, 339 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
An employee who commits suicide is willfully negligent within the meaning of this act. Hannon v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, Inc., 186 Neb. 122, 181 N.W.2d 253 (1970).
Welding empty molasses tank without leaving air vent open or cleaning tank, where employee did not know such conduct was dangerous, did not constitute willful negligence so as to bar compensation. Richards v. Abts, 136 Neb. 741, 287 N.W. 199 (1939).
Lighting a match in a gas-filled room, in response to habit, after being warned against doing so is not necessarily willful negligence. Moise v. Fruit Dispatch Co., 135 Neb. 684, 283 N.W. 495 (1939).
Whether the acts of an employee constitute willful negligence is dependent upon his willingness to disregard it and maintain a course of conduct indicating a reckless indifference for his own safety. Richards v. Abts, 135 Neb. 347, 281 N.W. 611 (1938).
Employer, who attempts to avoid liability on ground that employee was willfully negligent, must prove a deliberate act knowingly done, or at least such conduct as evidences reckless indifference to his safety. Hoff v. Edgar, 133 Neb. 403, 275 N.W. 602 (1937).
An employee's violation of an employer's safety rule must be intentional in order for that employee to be held willfully negligent under this section. Spaulding v. Alliant Foodservice, 13 Neb. App. 99, 689 N.W.2d 593 (2004).
4. Aggravating preexisting injury or disease
An exertion- or stress-caused heart injury to which the claimant's preexisting heart disease or condition contributes is compensable only if the claimant shows that the exertion or stress encountered during employment is greater than that experienced during the ordinary nonemployment life of the employee or any other person. While legal cause is established by satisfying the "stress greater than nonemployment life" test, a claimant must still demonstrate medical causation. If it is claimed that an injury was the result of stress or exertion in the employment, medical causation is established by a showing by the preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed in some material and substantial degree to cause the injury. Leitz v. Roberts Dairy, 237 Neb. 235, 465 N.W.2d 601 (1991).
Injury lighting up a preexisting arthritic condition of spine is compensable. City of Omaha v. Casaubon, 138 Neb. 608, 294 N.W. 389 (1940).
Where injury, arising out of and in the course of employment, combines with preexisting disease to produce disability, recovery can be had by employee. Chatt v. Massman Construction Co., 138 Neb. 288, 293 N.W. 105 (1940).
Injury from fall accelerating a preexisting disease is compensable. Maul v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 137 Neb. 128, 288 N.W. 532 (1939).
Injury from strain or overexertion due to a physical condition predisposing the employee to injury is an injury under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act, even though, had the person been sound, the strain would not have been sufficient to occasion serious injury. Dymak v. Haskins Bros. & Co., 132 Neb. 308, 271 N.W. 860 (1937).
Mere exertion that would not of itself produce compensable disability, does not, when combined with preexisting disease, produce compensable disability. Gilkeson v. Northern Gas Engineering Co., 127 Neb. 124, 254 N.W. 714 (1934).
Where contract of employment was made in state between resident employee and employer having headquarters in state, compensation action is maintainable therein although injury was sustained in performing work outside state. Stone v. Thomson Co., 124 Neb. 181, 245 N.W. 600 (1932).
Where employee injured back and shoulder in course of employment thereby causing dormant disease to flare up, and resultant disability is due to the injury, he was entitled to compensation. Miller v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 123 Neb. 793, 244 N.W. 401 (1932).
5. Burden of proof
To recover under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, a claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an accident or occupational disease arising out of and occurring in the course of employment proximately caused an injury which resulted in disability compensable under the act. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
This court has expressly disapproved of language in previous opinions which imposed an enhanced degree of proof by an employee with a preexisting disability or condition who is prosecuting a claim under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. For an award based on disability, a claimant need only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment proximately caused an injury which resulted in compensable disability. Gray v. Fuel Economy Contracting Co., 236 Neb. 937, 464 N.W.2d 366 (1991).
The plaintiff has the burden to establish that an injury for which workers' compensation is sought arose out of and in the course of his employment. McGee v. Panhandle Technical Sys., 223 Neb. 56, 387 N.W.2d 709 (1986).
An employee has the burden of showing that her injury resulted from her accident at work and not from the natural progression of a preexisting condition. Taylor v. Benton, 205 Neb. 203, 286 N.W.2d 755 (1980).
The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to sustain his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Parrish v. Karl Kehm & Sons Contractors, 186 Neb. 252, 182 N.W.2d 422 (1970).
The burden is on plaintiff to prove a right to recover. Thelen v. J. C. Penney Co., 186 Neb. 53, 180 N.W.2d 693 (1970).
Claimant has burden of establishing that injury complained of was caused by accident arising out of and in course of his employment. Huston v. Gage County Electric Co., 134 Neb. 805, 279 N.W. 797 (1938).
Where employee dies suddenly and mysteriously while engaged in his work, burden is on the claimant to prove facts necessary to bring case within compensation law, and such proof must be something more than mere guess. Shamp v. Landy Clark Co., 134 Neb. 73, 277 N.W. 802 (1938).
Burden of proof rests upon claimant to show with reasonable certainty that his ailment was caused by the injury, and this proof must be made by substantial evidence leading either to the direct conclusion or a legitimate inference that such is the fact. Skochdopole v. State, 133 Neb. 440, 275 N.W. 665 (1937).
Claimant has burden of showing that he suffered injury resulting from accident arising out of and in course of his employment. Price v. Burlington Refrigerator Express Co., 131 Neb. 657, 269 N.W. 425 (1936).
Burden rests upon plaintiff to prove with reasonable certainty that employee met with injury or death in accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Porter v. Brinn-Jensen Co., 131 Neb. 611, 269 N.W. 96 (1936).
Where evidence fails to show any relationship between injury and the disease from which the employee died, burden of proof was not sustained. Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Kizer, 127 Neb. 34, 254 N.W. 690 (1934).
Burden of proof is on plaintiff and must be established by substantial evidence and not probabilities. Saxton v. Sinclair Refining Co., 125 Neb. 468, 250 N.W. 655 (1933).
Burden of proof is on employee. Parsons Oil Co. v. Schlitt, 125 Neb. 223, 249 N.W. 613 (1933).
When employee dies suddenly and mysteriously while engaged at work, burden of proof that death was accident arising out of employment rests on claimant hereunder. Mullen v. City of Hastings, 125 Neb. 172, 249 N.W. 560 (1933).
Burden of proof is on employee to prove personal injury caused by accident arose out of and in course of his employment. Townsend v. Loeffelbein, 123 Neb. 791, 244 N.W. 418 (1932); Bartlett v. Eaton, 123 Neb. 599, 243 N.W. 772 (1932).
6. Sufficiency of evidence to sustain award
A workers' compensation award cannot be based on mere possibility or speculation, and if an inference favorable to the plaintiff can only be reached on the basis thereof, he or she cannot recover. Gray v. Fuel Economy Contracting Co., 236 Neb. 937, 464 N.W.2d 366 (1991).
The rule of liberal construction applies to the Workmen's Compensation Act, but it is not applicable to the evidence offered in support of a claim made for benefits under the act. Parrish v. Karl Kehm & Sons Contractors, 186 Neb. 252, 182 N.W.2d 422 (1970).
Evidence of plaintiff was sufficient to prove injury in the course of his employment. Harrington v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 182 Neb. 434, 155 N.W.2d 355 (1967).
Award of compensation for permanent partial disability cannot be based on possibility or speculation. Stevens v. Josten-Wilbert Vault Co., 182 Neb. 322, 154 N.W.2d 764 (1967).
Claimant to compensation for permanent partial disability cannot be based on possibility or speculation. Stevens v. Josten-Wilbert Vault Co., 182 Neb. 322, 154 N.W.2d 764 (1967).
Claimant to compensation must establish right by preponderance of evidence. Dike v. Betz, 181 Neb. 580, 149 N.W.2d 750 (1967).
Where causation of injury is not shown by a preponderance of the evidence, claimant cannot recover. Kastanek v. Wilding, 181 Neb. 348, 148 N.W.2d 201 (1967).
Evidence was insufficient to show that workman killed at railroad crossing was at the time acting in the course of his employment. Oline v. Nebraska Nat. Gas Co., 177 Neb. 851, 131 N.W.2d 410 (1964).
Awards for compensation cannot be based upon speculative or conjectural evidence. Dennehy v. Lincoln Steel Works, 136 Neb. 269, 285 N.W. 590 (1939).
Awards cannot be based on possibilities or probabilities, but they must be supported by evidence showing that claimant incurred a disability arising out of and in the course of his employment. O'Connor v. Abbott, 134 Neb. 471, 279 N.W. 207 (1938).
Evidence was insufficient to sustain finding that plaintiff suffered an accident arising out of and in course of his employment. Loehr v. Alamito Dairy Co., 133 Neb. 444, 275 N.W. 596 (1937).
Evidence was insufficient to prove the claim that a workman who received compensation for a total disability caused by an injury in 1920, suffered total disability from a fall occurring in 1934. McGuire v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 132 Neb. 1, 270 N.W. 669 (1937).
An award for compensation cannot be based on possibility, probability, speculation, or conjecture, but burden is upon claimant to show that he suffered injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Milton v. City of Gordon, 129 Neb. 888, 263 N.W. 208 (1935).
Where employee was injured in course of employment and was never able to work thereafter, employee sustained burden of showing disability was due to accident and not to infectious disease. Truka v. McDonald, 127 Neb. 780, 257 N.W. 232 (1934).
Where the actual cause of death of employee is a matter of conjecture and speculation, the evidence is insufficient to sustain an award. Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. Petersen, 127 Neb. 476, 256 N.W. 37 (1934).
Accidental death, in compensation case, need not be established to a certainty, but only to a reasonable certainty. Aeschleman v. Haschenburger Co., 127 Neb. 207, 254 N.W. 899 (1934).
Award of compensation cannot be based on possibilities or probabilities. Huffman v. Great Western Sugar Co., 125 Neb. 302, 250 N.W. 70 (1933).
7. Appeal
Evidence established that music supervisor killed en route to judge music contest was not acting in the course of his employment at the time he was killed since he was not to be controlled or supervised by any of the defendants while judging the contest nor did his judging activities primarily benefit any of the defendants. This court will not overturn factfindings by the Workmen's Compensation Court unless they are clearly wrong. Stoll v. School Dist. (No. 1) of Lincoln, 207 Neb. 670, 301 N.W.2d 68 (1981).
Supreme Court may, upon trial de novo, consider fact that trial court gave credence to testimony of some witnesses rather than to contradictory testimony of others. Sherman v. Great Western Sugar Co., 127 Neb. 505, 255 N.W. 772 (1934).
Workmen's compensation cases are heard de novo in Supreme Court. Peterson v. Borden's Produce Co., 125 Neb. 404, 250 N.W. 240 (1933); Mullen v. City of Hastings, 125 Neb. 172, 249 N.W. 560 (1933).
Time for taking appeal is governed by statute and trial court has no power to extend time, directly or indirectly. Bradley v. Kalin, 125 Neb. 363, 250 N.W. 257 (1933).
Workmen's compensation cases are not exempted from provisions of statute relating to the settlement and allowance of bills of exceptions. Shaw v. Diers Bros. & Co, 124 Neb. 119, 245 N.W. 419 (1932).
Supreme Court has power, under this section, to reverse for inadequacy in amount of verdict, or, if excessive, to reverse and grant new trial if remittitur was not filed. Brown v. York Water Co., 104 Neb. 516, 177 N.W. 833 (1920).
8. Release
Release signed by employee binds his dependents after his death, in absence of fraud. Welton v. Swift & Co., 125 Neb. 455, 250 N.W. 661 (1933).
9. Injuries sustained outside state
Where all of the employees' services were performed in Nebraska, and no showing made that the industry had its situs at any other place save in Nebraska, recovery could be had, although contract of employment was made in another state. Solomon v. A. W. Farney, Inc., 130 Neb. 484, 265 N.W. 724 (1936).
Nebraska workmen's compensation law is not applicable where contract of employment was made in another state, and where employee was injured in said state in the performance of duties which were not incidental to an industry conducted in the state by the employer. Rigg v. Atlantic, Pacific & Gulf Oil Co., 129 Neb. 412, 261 N.W. 900 (1935).
Where employer is engaged in business in Nebraska but employee, while engaged in employer's business in another state, is injured, employee may recover compensation. Penwell v. Anderson, 125 Neb. 449, 250 N.W. 665 (1933).
10. Miscellaneous
Absent an amendment to the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act, an appellate court will not judicially create a “substantially certain” exception from the act’s intended exclusive jurisdiction over workplace injuries, so as to allow an employer to be sued in tort if the employer knew its tortious conduct was substantially certain to result in an employee’s injury. Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Co-op Assn., 286 Neb. 1, 834 N.W.2d 236 (2013).
By barring an employee’s estate from bringing a tort action against the employer for the employee’s accidental death in the workplace, the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act did not violate the estate’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Co-op Assn., 286 Neb. 1, 834 N.W.2d 236 (2013).
Delay, cost, and uncertainty are contrary to the underlying purposes of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act; the act was intended by the Legislature to simplify legal proceedings and to bring about a speedy settlement of disputes between the injured employee and the employer by taking the place of expensive court actions with tedious delays and technicalities. Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Co-op Assn., 286 Neb. 1, 834 N.W.2d 236 (2013).
The distinction made by the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act between employees who are intentional tort victims and nonemployees who are intentional tort victims, barring only employees who are injured by intentional torts of their employers from bringing a tort action, does not violate the equal protection, due process, or special legislation provisions of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions; the act was not designed to govern the rights of nonemployees, and thus employees and nonemployees are not similarly situated, the Legislature made a rational distinction between the two groups, and workers’ compensation law reflected policy choice that employers bear the costs of employees’ work-related injuries. Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Co-op Assn., 286 Neb. 1, 834 N.W.2d 236 (2013).
The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act’s different standards of exclusivity for employees versus employers, providing compensation under the act for employees injured by an employer’s willful negligence but not providing compensation under the act for employees injured by their own willful negligence, does not violate the equal protection, due process, or special legislation provisions of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions; employers and employees stand in different relations to the common undertaking and are not similarly situated, it was rational for the Legislature to recognize this fact when determining employers’ and employees’ rights and liabilities under the act, and it was not arbitrary for the Legislature to determine coverage under the act based on whose willful negligence caused the injury. Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Co-op Assn., 286 Neb. 1, 834 N.W.2d 236 (2013).
The primary object of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act is to do away with the inadequacies and defects of the common-law remedies; to destroy the common-law defenses; and, in the employments affected, to give compensation, regardless of the fault of the employer. Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Co-op Assn., 286 Neb. 1, 834 N.W.2d 236 (2013).
A common-law misrepresentation defense to govern when an applicant's misrepresentation will bar recovery of workers' compensation benefits is incompatible with the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, overruling Hilt Truck Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 204 Neb. 115, 281 N.W.2d 399 (1979). Bassinger v. Nebraska Heart Hosp., 282 Neb. 835, 806 N.W.2d 395 (2011).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is the employee's exclusive remedy against an employer for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Millard v. Hyplains Dressed Beef, 237 Neb. 907, 468 N.W.2d 124 (1991).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act should be construed liberally so that its beneficent purposes may not be thwarted by technical refinements of interpretation. Carter v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 234 Neb. 558, 452 N.W.2d 32 (1990).
Allegations that an employer intentionally concealed the dangers inherent in the workplace, intentionally inflicted injury resulting in occupational disease, and intentionally concealed the true nature and effect of the disease fall within the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, which is the exclusive remedy. Abbott v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 907, 443 N.W.2d 591 (1989).
An employer's intentional concealment of the dangers inherent in the work environment and the true nature and effect of an occupational disease does not constitute involuntary servitude—the use or threat of physical force or legal coercion to extract labor from an unwilling worker—and thus construing the Workers' Compensation Act to include such conduct does not violate U.S. Const. amend. XIII or Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 2. Abbott v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 907, 443 N.W.2d 591 (1989).
The exclusive remedy provided by the Workers' Compensation Act satisfies the due process requirements of Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 3, as well as the requirements of Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 13, that every person shall have a remedy by due course of law for any injury done to him or her. Abbott v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 907, 443 N.W.2d 591 (1989).
An employee's injuries are compensable as long as his employment duties put him in a position that he might not otherwise be in which exposes him to a greater risk, even though the risk is not greater than that of the general public. Nippert v. Shinn Farm Constr. Co., 223 Neb. 236, 388 N.W.2d 820 (1986).
The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy by the employee against the employer for any injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. Johnston v. State, 219 Neb. 457, 364 N.W.2d 1 (1985).
The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be construed liberally so that its beneficent purposes may not be thwarted by technical refinement of interpretation. Friedeman v. State, 215 Neb. 413, 339 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
While the act of suicide may be an independent intervening cause in some cases, it is certainly not so in those cases where the uncontrovertible evidence shows that, without the injury, there would have been no suicide; that the suicide was merely an act intervening between the injury and the death and part of an unbroken chain of events from the injury to the death. Friedeman v. State, 215 Neb. 413, 339 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
If coverage exists, Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive. Marlow v. Maple Manor Apartments, 193 Neb. 654, 228 N.W.2d 303 (1975).
The rule of liberal construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act applies to the law but not to the evidence. Barbaglia v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 190 Neb. 529, 209 N.W.2d 353 (1973).
The state, by its Legislature, has extensively entered the field of labor. Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131 N.W.2d 609 (1964).
Employee having compensable injury was not a malingerer when he labored under mental condition firmly and honestly believing such injury to be permanent, and for which mental condition treatment had been inadequate. Rexroat v. State, 142 Neb. 596, 7 N.W.2d 163 (1942).
Whatever the employee's physical condition may be, the employer is bound to compensate him for any impairment of his existing ability to perform the duties in which he is engaged, by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Hansen v. Paxton & Vierling Iron Works, 138 Neb. 589, 293 N.W. 415 (1940).
When city has no authority to control the details of the work or to direct the manner and mode of doing it, it is not liable to W.P.A. worker. Williams v. City of Wymore, 138 Neb. 256, 292 N.W. 726 (1940).
Suspicion of fraud, arising from recovery of compensation for two former accidents of similar nature, will not defeat claim for workmen's compensation. Klement v. H. P. Lau Co., 138 Neb. 144, 292 N.W. 381 (1940).
In all questions under workmen's compensation law, rules of technical construction will be avoided, and intention of Legislature will be determined from language of act as a whole. Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, 138 Neb. 117, 292 N.W. 59 (1940).
An employee is not necessarily precluded from recovering compensation by the mere fact that after the injury he receives a larger sum, as wages, than his former remuneration. Micek v. Omaha Steel Works, 136 Neb. 843, 287 N.W. 645 (1939); 135 Neb. 449, 282 N.W. 262 (1938).
Payment of employee's wages from federal funds does not relieve city from payment of compensation, where city had entire charge of directing and controlling work. Hendershot v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 606, 286 N.W. 909 (1939).
Statute should be liberally construed. Ludwickson v. Central States Electric Co., 135 Neb. 371, 281 N.W. 603 (1938).
The relief authorized by workmen's compensation law includes purpose to prevent employee's dependents from becoming a public charge. Westcoatt v. Lilley, 134 Neb. 376, 278 N.W. 854 (1938).
Court will give a liberal construction to the workmen's compensation law, so that its beneficent purposes may not be thwarted by technical refinement of interpretation. Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
Where a right has been created by statute which did not exist at common law, Legislature may impose restrictions thereon, and such restrictions become an integral part of the act and must be fully complied with in the manner prescribed. Ray v. Sanitary Garbage Co., 134 Neb. 178, 278 N.W. 139 (1938).
If plaintiff was injured while employed in improvement work on Missouri River, remedy is provided by workmen's compensation law rather than United States Seaman's Act. Belk v. Massman Construction Co., 133 Neb. 303, 275 N.W. 76 (1937).
Remedy under compensation law is exclusive where employee operating thereunder sustains an injury by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Jones v. Rossbach Coal Co., 130 Neb. 302, 264 N.W. 877 (1936).
Malingering is defined. Great Western Sugar Co. v. Hewitt, 127 Neb. 790, 257 N.W. 61 (1934).
Where employee unreasonably refuses to undergo simple operation which would relieve him from disability, compensation may be suspended. Simmerman v. Felthauser, 125 Neb. 795, 251 N.W. 831 (1934).
Workmen's Compensation Act is one of general interest to worker and employer alike, as well as to the state, and it should be so construed that technical refinements of interpretation will not defeat its purpose. Speas v. Boone County, 119 Neb. 58, 227 N.W. 87 (1929).
Workmen's Compensation Act is not applicable to a nonresident employer and a resident employee where contract of employment was made in this state for services to be performed in another state, and employer was not at the time of contract engaged in any trade, business, profession, or avocation in this state. Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N.W. 410 (1928).
Provision for jury trial in this section does not apply to compensation cases generally. Nosky v. Farmers Union Co-op. Assn., 109 Neb. 489, 191 N.W. 846 (1922).
An employee's deliberate or intentional defiance of a reasonable rule will disqualify that employee from receiving benefits if (1) the employer has a reasonable rule designed to protect the health and safety of the employee, (2) the employee has actual notice of the rule, (3) the employee has an understanding of the danger involved in the violation of the rule, (4) the rule is kept alive by bona fide enforcement by the employer, and (5) the employee does not have a bona fide excuse for the rule violation. These factors need not be met when an employee has accidentally violated a safety rule. Spaulding v. Alliant Foodservice, 13 Neb. App. 99, 689 N.W.2d 593 (2004).
An assault on an employee at the workplace because of purely personal motivations or animosity will not arise out of the employment unless the work is determined to have exacerbated the personal dispute or facilitated an assault that would not otherwise have been committed. The question of whether the employment does facilitate such an assault is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. Monahan v. United States Check Book Co., 4 Neb. App. 227, 540 N.W.2d 380 (1995).
Deceased was, as a matter of law, not an employee of defendant under Nebraska workmen's compensation law. Pryor v. Strawn, 73 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1934).
48-101.01.
Mental injuries and mental illness; first responder; frontline state employee; county correctional officer; legislative findings; evidentiary burden; compensation; when; first responder; mental health examination; resilience training; reimbursement; department; duties.(1) The Legislature finds and declares:
(a) The occupations of first responders are recognized as stressful occupations. Only our nation's combat soldiers endure more stress. Similar to military personnel, first responders face unique and uniquely dangerous risks in their sworn mission to keep the public safe. They rely on each other for survival to protect the communities they serve;
(b) On any given day, first responders can be called on to make life and death decisions, witness a young child dying with the child's grief-stricken family, make a decision that will affect a community member for the rest of such person's life, or be exposed to a myriad of communicable diseases and known carcinogens;
(c) On any given day, first responders protect high-risk individuals from themselves and protect the community from such individuals;
(d) First responders are constantly at significant risk of bodily harm or physical assault while they perform their duties;
(e) Constant, cumulative exposure to horrific events make first responders uniquely susceptible to the emotional and behavioral impacts of job-related stressors;
(f) Trauma-related injuries can become overwhelming and manifest in post-traumatic stress, which may result in substance use disorders and even, tragically, suicide; and
(g) It is imperative for society to recognize occupational injuries related to post-traumatic stress and to promptly seek diagnosis and treatment without stigma. This includes recognizing that mental injury and mental illness as a result of trauma is not disordered, but is a normal and natural human response to trauma, the negative effects of which can be ameliorated through diagnosis and effective treatment.
(2) Personal injury includes mental injuries and mental illness unaccompanied by physical injury for an employee who is a first responder, frontline state employee, or county correctional officer if such employee:
(a) Establishes that the employee's employment conditions causing the mental injury or mental illness were extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the normal conditions of the particular employment; and
(b) Establishes, through a mental health professional, the medical causation between the mental injury or mental illness and the employment conditions by medical evidence.
(3) The employee bears the burden of establishing the matters described in subsection (2) of this section by a preponderance of the evidence.
(4) Until January 1, 2028, a first responder may establish prima facie evidence of a personal injury that is a mental injury or mental illness if the first responder:
(a) Presents evidence that the first responder underwent a mental health examination by a mental health professional upon entry into such service or subsequent to such entry and before the onset of the mental injury or mental illness and such examination did not reveal the mental injury or mental illness for which the first responder seeks compensation;
(b) Presents testimony or an affidavit from a mental health professional stating the first responder suffers from a mental injury or mental illness caused by one or more events or series of events which cumulatively produced the mental injury or mental illness which brought about the need for medical attention and the interruption of employment;
(c) Presents evidence that such events or series of events arose out of and in the course of the first responder's employment; and
(d) Presents evidence that, prior to the employment conditions which caused the mental injury or mental illness, the first responder had participated in resilience training and updated the training at least annually thereafter.
(5) For purposes of this section, mental injuries and mental illness arising out of and in the course of employment unaccompanied by physical injury are not considered compensable if they result from any event or series of events which are incidental to normal employer and employee relations, including, but not limited to, personnel actions by the employer such as disciplinary actions, work evaluations, transfers, promotions, demotions, salary reviews, or terminations.
(6)(a) The Department of Health and Human Services shall provide reimbursement for the cost of any of the following to the extent not reimbursed by the first responder's employer: A mental health examination by a mental health professional upon entry into such service or subsequent to such entry and before the onset of a mental injury or mental illness for which compensation is sought; initial resilience training; and annual resilience training. The department shall pay reimbursement at a rate determined by the Critical Incident Stress Management Program under section 71-7104. Reimbursement for resilience training shall be subject to the annual limit set by such program under section 71-7104.
(b) To obtain reimbursement under this subsection, a first responder shall submit an application to the Department of Health and Human Services on a form and in a manner prescribed by the department.
(7) The Department of Health and Human Services shall maintain and annually update records of first responders who have completed annual resilience training.
(8) For purposes of this section:
(a) County correctional officer means a correctional officer employed by a high-population county whose:
(i) Position obligates such employee to maintain order and custody of inmates in a county jail; and
(ii) Duties involve regular and direct interaction with high-risk individuals;
(b) Custody means:
(i) Under the charge or control of a state institution or state agency and includes time spent outside of the state institution or state agency; or
(ii) In the custody of a county jail in a high-population county or in the process of being placed in the custody of a county jail in a high-population county;
(c) First responder means a sheriff, a deputy sheriff, a police officer, an officer of the Nebraska State Patrol, a volunteer or paid firefighter, or a volunteer or paid individual licensed under a licensure classification in subdivision (1) of section 38-1217 who provides medical care in order to prevent loss of life or aggravation of physiological or psychological illness or injury;
(d) Frontline state employee means an employee of the Department of Correctional Services or the Department of Health and Human Services whose duties involve regular and direct interaction with high-risk individuals;
(e) High-population county means a county with more than three hundred thousand inhabitants as determined by the most recent federal decennial census or the most recent revised certified count by the United States Bureau of the Census;
(f) High-risk individual means an individual in custody for whom violent or physically intimidating behavior is common, including, but not limited to, a committed offender as defined in section 83-170, a patient at a regional center as defined in section 71-911, a juvenile committed to a youth rehabilitation and treatment center, and a person in the custody of a county jail in a high-population county or in the process of being placed in the custody of a county jail in a high-population county;
(g) Mental health professional means:
(i) A practicing physician licensed to practice medicine in this state under the Medicine and Surgery Practice Act;
(ii) A practicing psychologist licensed to engage in the practice of psychology in this state as provided in section 38-3111 or as provided in similar provisions of the Psychology Interjurisdictional Compact;
(iii) A person licensed as an independent mental health practitioner under the Mental Health Practice Act; or
(iv) A professional counselor who holds a privilege to practice in Nebraska as a professional counselor under the Licensed Professional Counselors Interstate Compact; and
(h) Resilience training means training that meets the guidelines established by the Critical Incident Stress Management Program under section 71-7104 and that teaches how to adapt to, manage, and recover from adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats, or significant sources of stress.
(9) All other provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act apply to this section.
Source:Laws 2010, LB780, § 1; Laws 2012, LB646, § 2; Laws 2017, LB444, § 2; Laws 2020, LB963, § 1; Laws 2021, LB273, § 5; Laws 2021, LB407, § 1; Laws 2022, LB752, § 28; Laws 2023, LB191, § 6.
Cross References
Licensed Professional Counselors Interstate Compact, see section 38-4201.
Medicine and Surgery Practice Act, see section 38-2001.
Mental Health Practice Act, see section 38-2101.
Psychology Interjurisdictional Compact, see section 38-3901.
48-102.
Employer's liability; negligence; action; defenses denied.In all cases brought under sections 48-101 to 48-108, it shall not be a defense (a) that the employee was negligent, unless it shall also appear that such negligence was willful, or that the employee was in a state of intoxication; (b) that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow employee; or (c) that the employee had assumed the risks inherent in, or incidental to, or arising from the failure of the employer to provide and maintain safe premises and suitable appliances, which grounds of defense are hereby abolished.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 2, p. 579; R.S.1913, § 3643; C.S.1922, § 3025; C.S.1929, § 48-102; R.S.1943, § 48-102;
Laws 1971, LB 572, § 2.
Annotations
A common-law misrepresentation defense to govern when an applicant's misrepresentation will bar recovery of workers' compensation benefits is incompatible with the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, overruling Hilt Truck Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 204 Neb. 115, 281 N.W.2d 399 (1979). Bassinger v. Nebraska Heart Hosp., 282 Neb. 835, 806 N.W.2d 395 (2011).
The statutory defense under this section applies to employees, not applicants. Bassinger v. Nebraska Heart Hosp., 282 Neb. 835, 806 N.W.2d 395 (2011).
This section eliminates from workers' compensation proceedings the three common-law defenses of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant rule, and assumption of the risk, preserving only the employee's willful negligence and intoxication as defenses which the employer may raise. Estate of Coe v. Willmes Trucking, 268 Neb. 880, 689 N.W.2d 318 (2004).
Willful exposure to freezing weather was not a defense. Mead v. Missouri Valley Grain, Inc., 178 Neb. 553, 134 N.W.2d 243 (1965).
Allegation that disability was due to employee's failure to allow normal recovery constituted charge of willful negligence. Rexroat v. State, 142 Neb. 596, 7 N.W.2d 163 (1942).
Defense of assumption of risk is not available. Nedela v. Mares Auto Co., 110 Neb. 108, 193 N.W. 345 (1923).
Defense that plaintiff was willfully negligent was not established by evidence. Brown v. York Water Co., 104 Neb. 516, 177 N.W. 833 (1920).
48-103.
Employer's liability; defenses; when not available.If an employer, as defined in section 48-106, does not carry a policy of workers' compensation insurance nor qualify as a self-insurer or, in the case of an employer who is a lessor of one or more commercial motor vehicles leased to a self-insured motor carrier, is not a party to an effective agreement pursuant to section 48-115.02, he or she loses the right to interpose the three defenses mentioned in section 48-102 in any action brought against him or her for personal injury or death of an employee.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 3, p. 579; R.S.1913, § 3644; C.S.1922, § 3026; C.S.1929, § 48-103; R.S.1943, § 48-103;
Laws 1971, LB 572, § 3; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 25; Laws 1997, LB 474, § 1.
Annotations
Under this section, when an employer fails to carry workers' compensation insurance or an acceptable alternative and an injured employee elects to seek damages in a common-law action, the employer "loses the right to interpose" contributory negligence (unless the employee was intoxicated or willfully negligent), the fellow-servant rule, and assumption of the risk as defenses in the action. Estate of Coe v. Willmes Trucking, 268 Neb. 880, 689 N.W.2d 318 (2004).
48-104.
Repealed. Laws 1971, LB 572, § 33.
48-105.
Preceding sections; application.The provisions of sections 48-101 to 48-103 shall apply to any claim for the death of an employee arising under sections 30-809 and 30-810 concerning death by wrongful act.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 5, p. 580; R.S.1913, § 3646; C.S.1922, § 3028; C.S.1929, § 48-105; R.S.1943, § 48-105;
Laws 1971, LB 572, § 4; Laws 1994, LB 414, § 1.
48-106.
Employer; coverage
of act; excepted occupations; election to provide compensation.(1) The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall apply to the State
of Nebraska, to every governmental agency created by the state, and, except
as provided in this section, to every resident employer in this state and
nonresident employer performing work in this state who employs one or more
employees in the regular trade, business, profession, or vocation of such
employer.
(2) The act shall not apply to:
(a) A railroad company engaged in interstate or foreign commerce;
(b) Service performed by a worker who is a household domestic servant
in a private residence;
(c) Service performed by a worker when performed for an employer who
is engaged in an agricultural operation and employs only related employees;
(d) Service performed by a worker when performed for an employer who
is engaged in an agricultural operation and employs unrelated employees unless
such service is performed for an employer who during any calendar year employs
ten or more unrelated, full-time employees, whether in one or more locations,
on each working day for thirteen calendar weeks, whether or not such weeks
are consecutive. The act shall apply to an employer thirty days after the
thirteenth such week; and
(e) Service performed by a person who is engaged in an agricultural
operation, or performed by his or her related employees, when the service
performed is (i) occasional and (ii) for another person who is engaged in
an agricultural operation who has provided or will provide reciprocal or similar
service.
(3) If the employer is the state or any governmental agency created
by the state, the exemption from the act under subdivision (2)(d) of this
section does not apply.
(4) If the act applies to an employer because the employer meets the
requirements of subdivision (2)(d) of this section, all unrelated employees
shall be covered under the act and such employees' wages shall be considered
for premium purposes.
(5) If an employer to whom the act applies because the employer meets
the requirements of subdivision (2)(d) of this section subsequently does not
employ ten or more unrelated, full-time employees, such employer shall continue
to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage for the employees for
the remainder of the calendar year and for the next full calendar year. When
the required coverage period has expired, such employer may elect to return
to exempt status by (a) posting, continuously in a conspicuous place at the
employment locations of the employees for a period of at least ninety days,
a written or printed notice stating that the employer will no longer carry
workers' compensation insurance for the employees and the date such insurance
will cease and (b) thereafter no longer carrying a policy of workers' compensation
insurance. Failure to provide notice in accordance with this subsection voids
an employer's attempt to return to exempt status.
(6) An employer who is exempt from the act under subsection (2) of this
section may elect to bring the employees of such employer under the act. Such
election is made by the employer obtaining a policy of workers' compensation
insurance covering such employees. Such policy shall be obtained from a corporation,
association, or organization authorized and licensed to transact the business
of workers' compensation insurance in this state. If such an exempt employer
procures a policy of workers' compensation insurance which is in full force
and effect at the time of an accident to an employee of such employer, such
procurement is conclusive proof of the employer's and employee's election
to be bound by the act. Such an exempt employer who has procured a policy
of workers' compensation insurance may elect to return to exempt status by
(a) posting, continuously in a conspicuous place at the employment locations
of the employees for a period of at least ninety days, a written or printed
notice stating that the employer will no longer carry workers' compensation
insurance for the employees and the date such insurance will cease and (b)
thereafter no longer carrying a policy of workers' compensation insurance.
Failure to provide notice in accordance with this subsection voids an employer's
attempt to return to exempt status.
(7) Every employer exempted under subdivision (2)(d) of this section
who does not elect to provide workers' compensation insurance under subsection
(6) of this section shall give all unrelated employees at the time of hiring
or at any time more than thirty calendar days prior to the time of injury
the following written notice which shall be signed by the unrelated employee
and retained by the employer: "In this employment you will not be covered
by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and you will not be compensated
under the act if you are injured on the job or suffer an occupational disease.
You should plan accordingly." Failure to provide the notice required by this
subsection subjects an employer to liability under and inclusion in the act
for any unrelated employee to whom such notice was not given.
(8) An exclusion from coverage in any health, accident, or other insurance
policy covering a person employed by an employer who is exempt from the act
under this section which provides that coverage under the health, accident,
or other insurance policy does not apply if such person is entitled to workers'
compensation coverage is void as to such person if such employer has not elected
to bring the employees of such employer within the act as provided in subsection
(6) of this section.
(9) For purposes of this section:
(a) Agricultural operation means (i) the cultivation of land for the
production of agricultural crops, fruit, or other horticultural products or
(ii) the ownership, keeping, or feeding of animals for the production of livestock
or livestock products;
(b) Full-time employee means a person who is employed to work one-half
or more of the regularly scheduled hours during each pay period; and
(c) Related employee means a spouse of an employer and an employee related
to the employer within the third degree by blood or marriage. Relationship
by blood or marriage within the third degree includes parents, grandparents,
great grandparents, children, grandchildren, great grandchildren, brothers,
sisters, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, and spouses of the same. If the employer
is a partnership, limited liability company, or corporation in which all of
the partners, members, or shareholders are related within the third degree
by blood or marriage, then related employee means any employee related to
any such partner, member, or shareholder within the third degree by blood
or marriage.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 6, p. 580; R.S.1913, § 3647; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 1, p. 199; C.S.1922, § 3029; Laws 1927, c. 134, § 1, p. 363; C.S.1929, § 48-106; R.S.1943, § 48-106; Laws 1945, c. 111, § 1, p. 356; Laws 1957, c. 202, § 1, p. 707;
Laws 1971, LB 572, § 5; Laws 1972, LB 1298, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 26; Laws 2002, LB 417, § 1; Laws 2003, LB 210, § 1; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 1; Laws 2009, LB630, § 1; Laws 2010, LB829, § 1.
Annotations
1. State and governmental agencies
2. Regular trade or business of employer
3. Railroad companies
4. Farm laborers
5. Employment in this state
6. Applicability of act
7. Miscellaneous
1. State and governmental agencies
An enlisted member of the National Guard is not an employee within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Lind v. Nebraska National Guard, 144 Neb. 122, 12 N.W.2d 652 (1944).
State intended to waive its sovereignty and give its consent to be sued in actions arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but Legislature failed to provide manner for service of process. Anstine v. State, 137 Neb. 148, 288 N.W. 525 (1939).
One engaged by village to care for swimming pool and surrounding park is an employee within Workmen's Compensation Act. Schou v. Village of Hildreth, 127 Neb. 784, 257 N.W. 70 (1934).
Firemen of city of Omaha are in the service of a governmental agency and within act. Shandy v. City of Omaha, 127 Neb. 406, 255 N.W. 477 (1934).
County letting contract without requiring contractor to furnish insurance policy protecting contractor's employees, is jointly liable with contractor to its employee who received compensable injury. Standish v. Larsen-Merryweather Co., 124 Neb. 197, 245 N.W. 606 (1932).
Act applies to Department of Roads and Irrigation. Eidenmiller v. State, 120 Neb. 430, 233 N.W. 447 (1930).
County was employer of person employed in repairing bridges, although work did not take all his time. Davis v. Lincoln County, 117 Neb. 148, 219 N.W. 899 (1928).
2. Regular trade or business of employer
A workman who is injured while working on the residence property of his employer is not within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Retzlaff v. Dickinson, 141 Neb. 136, 2 N.W.2d 922 (1942).
Where a painter and paperhanger worked for owner on his residence, although he had on occasions worked on rental properties, injury sustained did not arise in the regular trade, business, profession, or vocation of his employer. Burkholder v. Clark, 140 Neb. 590, 300 N.W. 839 (1941).
City police officer, injured while transporting passengers to and from trains, is not performing an act within the regular trade, business, or vocation of city, and is not entitled to compensation. Coyne v. City of O'Neill, 139 Neb. 686, 298 N.W. 547 (1941).
Where contractor hired truck driver and truck to haul gravel in fulfillment of contract with county, contractor was employer within act. Showers v. Lund, 123 Neb. 56, 242 N.W. 258 (1932).
One engaged in buying and shipping poultry in carload lots to distant markets is engaged in business. Claus v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
Hod-carrier, injured in construction of apartment, was engaged in employer's regular business. Bauer v. Anderson, 114 Neb. 326, 207 N.W. 508 (1926).
Caring for buildings owned by person engaged in other business was not regular business, and employee repairing such building was not within Workmen's Compensation Act. Kaplan v. Gaskill, 108 Neb. 455, 187 N.W. 943 (1922).
3. Railroad companies
Employee of railroad engaged in interstate commerce is excluded. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Amack, 112 Neb. 437, 199 N.W. 724 (1924).
4. Farm laborers
In keeping with the language of subsection (2) of this section, excepting "employers" of farm and ranch laborers, it is the nature of the employer's business which determines the exception. Larsen v. D B Feedyards, 264 Neb. 483, 648 N.W.2d 306 (2002).
The nature of the employer's business determines the applicability of the farm laborer exemption, and the work performed by the employee does not. One employer may engage in two separate businesses, one subject to the workers' compensation law and one exempt. Bartunek v. Becker, 222 Neb. 126, 382 N.W.2d 300 (1986).
Under the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, it is the nature of the employer's business which determines the exemption, and not the work performed by the employee. Employers of farm or ranch laborers are generally exempt from the provisions of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act, and farm or ranch laborers injured while employed by one operating a farm or ranch are not entitled to receive any of the benefits of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act. Leppert v. Parker, 218 Neb. 63, 352 N.W.2d 180 (1984).
The whole character of an employee's employment must be considered to determine whether an employee is a farm laborer within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and an employee who works 45 hours per week performing the duties of cleaning pens, feeding livestock, plowing, disking, and building fences and pens on defendant's farm is a farm laborer within the act. The employee failed to meet the burden of showing that the classification of farm laborers as being exempt from the Workmen's Compensation Act's coverage had no rational basis, and therefore failed to overcome the presumption that said classification does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Otto v. Hahn, 209 Neb. 114, 306 N.W.2d 587 (1981).
Employer engaged in custom combining for public as a regular commercial business is not an employer of farm or ranch laborer. Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 184 Neb. 372, 167 N.W.2d 564 (1969).
Employer of farm or ranch labor, by the act of obtaining workmen's compensation insurance, becomes an employer within meaning of this section. Imus v. Bead Mountain Ranch, Inc., 183 Neb. 343, 160 N.W.2d 171 (1968).
A group of farmers operating a commercial hay grinding business was not exempt from liability. Campos v. Tomoi, 175 Neb. 555, 122 N.W.2d 473 (1963).
Employer of farm labor may elect to come under act. Keith v. Wilson, 165 Neb. 58, 84 N.W.2d 192 (1957).
Employee of livestock sales barn was not a farm or ranch laborer. Gruber v. Stickelman, 149 Neb. 627, 31 N.W.2d 753 (1948).
Whole character of employment must be looked to to determine whether person is farm laborer; person employed to operate a bulldozer was not. Oliver v. Ernst, 148 Neb. 465, 27 N.W.2d 622 (1947).
A carpenter employed by a farmer to construct a machine shed on farm did not make carpenter a farm laborer so as to exclude him from benefit of act. Guse v. Wessels, 132 Neb. 41, 270 N.W. 665 (1937).
Cooperative threshing association, though threshing for others, was included within the term employers of farm laborers. Keefover v. Vasey, 112 Neb. 424, 199 N.W. 799 (1924).
5. Employment in this state
The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act is not applicable where a resident employee's employment by a nonresident employer for services to be performed outside the state was neither in nor incidental to any trade, business, profession, or vocation carried on by the employer in this state. Jensen v. Floair, Inc., 211 Neb. 403, 318 N.W.2d 870 (1982).
Action may be maintained against nonresident employer performing work in this state. Rapp v. Hale, 170 Neb. 620, 103 N.W.2d 851 (1960).
Where headquarters of employer, industry in which engaged, and residence of employee all are in Nebraska, proceedings for compensation for total injury are maintainable hereunder. Esau v. Smith Bros., 124 Neb. 217, 246 N.W. 230 (1933).
Courts of Nebraska are without jurisdiction where plaintiff's employment was not in, or incidental to, any industry conducted in Nebraska. Freeman v. Higgins, 123 Neb. 73, 242 N.W. 271 (1932).
Workmen, engaged in Nebraska by Kansas employer, not engaged in business in Nebraska, to work in Kansas, are not within Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act. Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N.W. 410 (1928).
Employee, resident of Nebraska, contracting to perform labor in Iowa for Nebraska corporation and injured in Iowa, was within Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act. McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., 111 Neb. 609, 197 N.W. 615 (1924).
Pursuant to subdivision (2) of section 48-115, under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, an "employee" or "worker" is defined as every person in the service of an employer who is engaged in any trade, occupation, business, or profession as described in this section under any contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral or written. Morin v. Industrial Manpower, 13 Neb. App. 1, 687 N.W.2d 704 (2004).
6. Applicability of act
Pursuant to subdivision (2) of section 48-114, employers subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act include every person, firm, or corporation who is engaged in any trade, occupation, business, or profession as described in this section, and who has any person in service under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written. Morin v. Industrial Manpower, 13 Neb. App. 1, 687 N.W.2d 704 (2004).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act applies to every employer in this state, including nonresident employers performing work in this state, employing one or more employees, in the regular trade, business, profession, or vocation of such employer. Morin v. Industrial Manpower, 13 Neb. App. 1, 687 N.W.2d 704 (2004).
7. Miscellaneous
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act does not affect an insurance agent's duty to act with reasonable care, and the same is true for insurance brokers. Merrick v. Fischer, Rounds & Assocs., 305 Neb. 230, 939 N.W.2d 795 (2020).
An employee's illegal residence or work status does not bar an award of indemnity for permanent total loss of earning capacity. Moyera v. Quality Pork Internat., 284 Neb. 963, 825 N.W.2d 409 (2013).
The fact that the employer is engaged in farming does not remove from the coverage of the workers' compensation laws other businesses or occupations carried on by the employer which are otherwise under the coverage of those laws. Bartunek v. Becker, 222 Neb. 126, 382 N.W.2d 300 (1986).
The statutory employer provisions of section 48-116 do not supersede the exemption provisions of subsection (2) of this section. Nussbaum v. Wright, 217 Neb. 712, 350 N.W.2d 559 (1984).
One employer may operate two different businesses, one subject to the workmen's compensation law and one exempt, and obtain workmen's compensation insurance for the business which is subject to the law, without by that act triggering the election of coverage provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Brown v. Leavitt Lane Farm, 215 Neb. 522, 340 N.W.2d 4 (1983).
Where plaintiff was injured while engaged in improvement work on the Missouri River, Workmen's Compensation Act provided exclusive remedy. Belk v. Massman Construction Co., 133 Neb. 303, 275 N.W. 76 (1937).
Subcontractor is the only employer of employee injured in line of his duties. Boyd v. Humphreys, 117 Neb. 799, 223 N.W. 658 (1929).
Corporation subject to compensation is liable for injury to workman employed by independent contractor agreeing to protect corporation against liability for injuries to workmen, where such contractor was not required to procure insurance to protect his employees. Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N.W. 645 (1924).
Noninsuring employer is liable either for damages at common law or for compensation, at option of employee. Avre v. Sexton, 110 Neb. 149, 193 N.W. 342 (1923).
An insurance agent does not have an affirmative duty to tell an employer about the written notice and signature provisions contained in subsection (7) of this section. Hansmeier v. Hansmeier, 25 Neb. App. 742, 912 N.W.2d 268 (2018).
48-107.
Employer's liability; employee's willful negligence; burden of proof.In all actions at law brought pursuant to sections 48-101 to 48-108 the burden of proof to establish willful negligence of the injured employee shall be on the defendant.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 7, p. 580; R.S.1913, § 3648; C.S.1922, § 3030; C.S.1929, § 48-107; R.S.1943, § 48-107.
Annotations
The burden of proving intoxication as a defense is on the employer. Johnson v. Hahn Bros. Const. Inc., 188 Neb. 252, 196 N.W.2d 109 (1972).
Mere negligence of employee is not sufficient to preclude recovery, but such conduct must be shown as manifests a reckless disregard of consequences coupled with a consciousness that injury will naturally or probably result. Richards v. Abts, 136 Neb. 741, 287 N.W. 199 (1939).
Burden is on employer to establish willful negligence, and he must prove a deliberate act knowingly done or conduct evidencing reckless indifference to his own safety on part of employee. Hoff v. Edgar, 133 Neb. 403, 275 N.W. 602 (1937).
48-108.
Employer's liability; claim for legal
services or disbursements; lien; how established; payment.No
claim or agreement for legal services or disbursements in support of any demand
made or suit brought under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be
an enforceable lien against the amounts to be paid as damages or compensation
or be valid or binding in any other respect, unless the same be approved in
writing by a judge
of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. After such approval, if notice
in writing be given the defendant of such claim or agreement for legal services
and disbursements, the same shall be a lien against any amount thereafter
to be paid as damages or compensation. When the employee's compensation is
payable by the employer in periodical installments, the compensation court
shall fix, at the time of approval, the proportion of each installment to
be paid on account of legal services and disbursements.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 8, p. 581; R.S.1913, § 3649; C.S.1922, § 3031; C.S.1929, § 48-108; R.S.1943, § 48-108;
Laws 1974, LB 732, § 1; Laws 1975, LB 187, § 1; Laws 1978, LB 649, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 27; Laws 2010, LB908, § 1.
Annotations
The Workers' Compensation Court has jurisdiction to determine a fee dispute arising out of an attorney's lien perfected pursuant to this section, regardless of whether the attorney seeking enforcement had previously been discharged. Foster v. BryanLGH Med. Ctr. East, 272 Neb. 918, 725 N.W.2d 839 (2007).
Attorney's fees allowed by court were ordered applied on agreement entered into under this section. Miller v. Schlereth, 152 Neb. 805, 42 N.W.2d 865 (1950).
Fees for plaintiff's attorneys allowed and taxed as costs are the property of the attorneys for whose benefit they are taxed. Approval by trial judge is a nonjudicial act and no notice thereof to claimant is required. Solomon v. A. W. Farney, Inc., 136 Neb. 338, 286 N.W. 254 (1939).
Notice to compensation claimant is not condition precedent to approval of attorney's fees by trial judge. Arner v. Sioux County, 116 Neb. 394, 217 N.W. 603 (1928).
This section limits amounts attorney may lawfully charge and is constitutional as proper exercise of police power. Agreement for fees that is not approved is not enforceable. Dysart v. Yeiser, 110 Neb. 65, 192 N.W. 953 (1923).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether a health care insurer or HMO is obligated to share in the cost of obtaining reimbursement when the injured worker successfully asserts a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court's regulation of attorney fees and disbursement matters is limited to those which arise between the injured worker and the attorney representing the injured worker. Kaiman v. Mercy Midlands Medical & Dental Plan, 1 Neb. App. 148, 491 N.W.2d 356 (1992).
Limiting fees of attorneys under Workmen's Compensation Act is not unconstitutional as depriving of liberty of contract without due process. Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540 (1925).
48-109.
Elective compensation; schedule; duty.If both employer and employee become subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, both shall be bound by the schedule of compensation provided in such act, which compensation shall be paid in every case of injury or death caused by accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment, except accidents caused by or resulting in any degree from the employee's willful negligence as defined in section 48-151.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 9, p. 581; R.S.1913, § 3650; C.S.1922, § 3032; C.S.1929, § 48-109; Laws 1943, c. 113, § 2, p. 397; R.S.1943, § 48-109;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 28.
Annotations
1. Election
2. In course of employment
3. Not in course of employment
4. Occupational disease
5. Willful negligence
6. Miscellaneous
1. Election
A finding that one party is an "employer" under section 48-114 and a finding that the other relevant party is an "employee" under section 48-115 are necessary to engage this section, which binds the parties to the compensation schedule of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Kaiser v. Millard Lumber, Inc., 255 Neb. 943, 587 N.W.2d 875 (1999).
Act of employee in electing not to come under part II of the act is binding on his dependents. White v. National Window Cleaning Co., 132 Neb. 155, 271 N.W. 341 (1937).
Petition in action for damages was not defective for failure to allege that plaintiff had not elected to come under part II. Smith v. Fall, 122 Neb. 783, 241 N.W. 560 (1932).
2. In course of employment
The phrases in the course of and arising out of are not synonymous and impose a double condition for recovery. Reis v. Douglas County Hospital, 193 Neb. 542, 227 N.W.2d 879 (1975).
Act of seeking shelter from cold weather arose in the course of employment. Appleby v. Great Western Sugar Co., Inc., 176 Neb. 102, 125 N.W.2d 103 (1963).
A double condition is imposed and both must exist to sustain recovery. Simon v. Standard Oil Co., 150 Neb. 799, 36 N.W.2d 102 (1949).
Burden rests upon claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Schwabauer v. State, 147 Neb. 620, 24 N.W.2d 431 (1946).
Injuries to one dragging roads for county, when kicked by horse after suspending work during noon hour, arose in course of employment. Speas v. Boone County, 119 Neb. 58, 227 N.W. 87 (1929).
Injuries by reason of being required to work with incompetent, insane and dangerous fellow workmen arise out of employment. Dodson v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 118 Neb. 276, 224 N.W. 289 (1929).
Injury from being overcome by gas, although attributable in part to occupational disease, arose out of employment. Van Vleet v. Public Service Co. of York, 111 Neb. 51, 195 N.W. 467 (1923).
Injury to garage employee, who fell under truck while attempting to catch ride in performing errand for employer, arose out of employment. McCrary v. Wolff, 109 Neb. 796, 192 N.W. 237 (1923).
Workman on way to procure materials which it was his ordinary duty to procure, to be used in his work, injured in collision with streetcar, was acting in course of employment. Hugh Murphy Const. Co. v. Serck, 104 Neb. 398, 177 N.W. 747 (1920); Coster v. Thompson Hotel Co., 102 Neb. 585, 168 N.W. 191 (1918).
3. Not in course of employment
Workmen's Compensation Act does not authorize an award in case of injury or death from a tornado. Crow v. The Americana Crop Hail Pool, Inc., 176 Neb. 260, 125 N.W.2d 691 (1964).
If employee is injured while absent from the employment for lunch, the injury does not arise out of nor in the course of employment. Berry v. School District, 154 Neb. 787, 49 N.W.2d 617 (1951).
Where employee abandons his job and gets another, and while going to get his tools from his old job is killed, former employer is not liable under Workmen's Compensation Act where he owed no duty in connection with return of tools. Hammond v. Keim, 128 Neb. 310, 258 N.W. 478 (1935).
Death of workman on destruction of building by storm, peril being common to all mankind, did not arise out of employment. Gale v. Krug Park Amusement Co., 114 Neb. 432, 208 N.W. 739 (1926).
Injury in personal altercation between employees does not arise out of employment. Urak v. Morris & Co., 107 Neb. 411, 186 N.W. 345 (1922).
Where employee whose duty was to use elevator in trucking meat from floor to floor in packing house, after taking truck off elevator, returned to scuffle with operator, accident did not arise out of employment. Feda v. Cudahy Packing Co., 102 Neb. 110, 166 N.W. 190 (1918).
Employee assaulted by fellow workman, whether in anger or play, is not injured in course of employment. Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Lumber & Coal Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N.W. 509 (1916).
4. Occupational disease
Unexplained fall was not sufficient to show accident where workman was suffering from aortic stenosis. Cochran v. Bellevue Bridge Commission, 174 Neb. 761, 119 N.W.2d 292 (1963).
Existence of occupational disease before amendment to statute did not preclude recovery where disability occurred after amendment. Hauff v. Kimball, 163 Neb. 55, 77 N.W.2d 683 (1956).
Disability from which plaintiff was suffering lead poisoning, solely result of disease occupational in nature, was not compensable. Ritchey v. Herdt, 121 Neb. 874, 236 N.W. 926 (1931).
Injury attributable in part to accident is compensable, though employee was suffering from occupational disease. If injury and preexisting disease combine to produce disability, employee need not prove injury accelerated or aggravated disease. Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930).
Illness from disease arising from ordinary incidents of occupation, and reasonably resulting therefrom is not compensable. Blair v. Omaha Ice & Cold Storage Co., 102 Neb. 16, 165 N.W. 893 (1917).
5. Willful negligence
Willful negligence requires showing of deliberate act knowingly done, or reckless indifference to safety. Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
Where defense is willful negligence of employee, it is error to exclude testimony of witness that he had warned employee of danger prior to accident. Richards v. Abts, 135 Neb. 347, 281 N.W. 611 (1938).
6. Miscellaneous
If coverage exists, Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive. Marlow v. Maple Manor Apartments, 193 Neb. 654, 228 N.W.2d 303 (1975).
Where employee was not in any manner disabled from performing work that he had done prior to accident, claim for weekly benefits was not sustained. Wengler v. Grosshans Lumber Co., 173 Neb. 839, 115 N.W.2d 415 (1962).
An assault by a fellow employee may be an accident. Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 155 Neb. 714, 53 N.W.2d 203 (1952).
Fact that city fireman receives workmen's compensation does not deprive him of right to receive fireman's pension. City of Lincoln v. Steffensmeyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938).
Mere exertion which combines with preexisting disease to produce disability is not an accident causing compensable injury. Gilkeson v. Northern Gas Engineering Co., 127 Neb. 124, 254 N.W. 714 (1934).
Compensable injury can only arise while workman is engaged in or about the premises where his duties are required to be performed or his services require his presence. Hall v. Austin Western Road Machinery Co., 125 Neb. 390, 250 N.W. 258 (1933).
Employee has burden of proving that personal injury was caused to the employee by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Herbert v. State, 124 Neb. 312, 246 N.W. 454 (1933).
48-110.
Elective compensation; liability; scope.When employer and employee shall by agreement, express or implied, or otherwise as provided in section 48-112 accept the provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, compensation shall be made for personal injuries to or for the death of such employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, without regard to the negligence of the employer, according to the schedule provided in such act, in all cases except when the injury or death is caused by willful negligence on the part of the employee. The burden of proof of such fact shall be upon the employer.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 10, p. 581; R.S.1913, § 3651; C.S.1922, § 3033; C.S.1929, § 48-110; R.S.1943, § 48-110;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 29.
Annotations
When read with section 48-111, this section mandates that an employee surrenders his or her right to any method, form, or amount of compensation or determination thereof against his or her employer or workers' compensation insurer other than that as provided in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act when that employee sustains an injury, arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, that is covered by the act. Ihm v. Crawford & Co., 254 Neb. 818, 580 N.W.2d 115 (1998).
Employee may not recover for injuries resulting from his willful negligence. Bole v. S.M.S. Trucking Co., 187 Neb. 341, 190 N.W.2d 780 (1971).
Burden of establishing willful negligence is on employer. Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 155 Neb. 714, 53 N.W.2d 203 (1952).
School teacher was not entitled to compensation when injured while absent from place of employment for lunch. Berry v. School District, 154 Neb. 787, 49 N.W.2d 617 (1951).
Where transportation furnished to employee carried him only part way to work, and he was injured while walking the remaining distance, injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Lincoln Traction Co. v. Reason, 143 Neb. 512, 10 N.W.2d 344 (1943).
Where defense is willful negligence of employee any competent evidence tending to show knowledge by employee of the dangerous character of act which subsequently caused his death is admissible, and it was error to exclude testimony of witness that he had warned deceased of his danger. Richards v. Abts, 135 Neb. 347, 281 N.W. 611 (1938).
To avoid liability on ground of willful negligence, employer must prove a deliberate act knowingly done, or such conduct as evidences a reckless indifference to safety. Hoff v. Edgar, 133 Neb. 403, 275 N.W. 602 (1937).
Death of traveling salesman who was shot by highwayman while traveling from one town to another in furtherance of employer's business, was compensable. Goodwin v. Omaha Printing Co., 131 Neb. 212, 267 N.W. 419 (1936).
Where employee was shot accidentally while engaged in aiding fellow workman who was accomplishing private purpose, injury did not arise out of employment and was not compensable hereunder. Bergantzel v. Union Transfer Co., 124 Neb. 200, 245 N.W. 593 (1932).
Subcontractor, whose employee is injured while engaged in line of his duties by actionable negligence of original contractor, is employer under Workmen's Compensation Act, and original contractor is third person within meaning of statute subrogating employer to employee's or dependents' rights. Boyd v. Humphreys, 117 Neb. 799, 223 N.W. 658 (1929).
48-111.
Elective compensation; election; effect; exemption from liability; exception.Such agreement or the election provided for in section 48-112 shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form, or amount of compensation or determination thereof than as provided in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, and an acceptance of all the provisions of such act, and shall bind the employee himself or herself, and for compensation for his or her death shall bind his or her legal representatives, his or her surviving spouse and next of kin, as well as the employer, and the legal representatives of a deceased employer, and those conducting the business of the employer during bankruptcy or insolvency. For the purpose of this section, if the employer carries a policy of workers' compensation insurance, the term employer shall also include the insurer. The exemption from liability given an employer and insurer by this section shall also extend to all employees, officers, or directors of such employer or insurer, but such exemption given an employee, officer, or director of an employer or insurer shall not apply in any case when the injury or death is proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical aggression of such employee, officer, or director.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 11, p. 582; R.S.1913, § 3652; C.S.1922, § 3034; C.S.1929, § 48-111; R.S.1943, § 48-111; Laws 1965, c. 277, § 1, p. 798;
Laws 1975, LB 227, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 30.
Annotations
1. Remedy exclusivity
2. Exemption from liability
3. Miscellaneous
1. Remedy exclusivity
A public utility employee cannot maintain a separate suit against a city for an injury incurred on the job, because the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy of the injured public utility employee against the city where the public utility is an agency or department of the city. Hofferber v. City of Hastings, 275 Neb. 503, 747 N.W.2d 389 (2008).
This section and section 48-148 are routinely referred to by the Nebraska Supreme Court as the "exclusivity" provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Bennett v. Saint Elizabeth Health Sys., 273 Neb. 300, 729 N.W.2d 80 (2007).
When read with section 48-110, this section mandates that an employee surrenders his or her right to any method, form, or amount of compensation or determination thereof against his or her employer or workers' compensation insurer other than that as provided in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act when that employee sustains an injury, arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, that is covered by the act. Ihm v. Crawford & Co., 254 Neb. 818, 580 N.W.2d 115 (1998).
This section limits available remedies for injuries even when a statute is violated or crime is committed if the illegal feature of the conduct is not the causative factor in the injury. Kopfman v. Freedom Drilling Co., 220 Neb. 323, 370 N.W.2d 89 (1985).
Where plaintiff elected to take under the statute, and was paid compensation benefits by insurer, he cannot recover anything more in contract or tort. Pettigrew v. Home Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 312, 214 N.W.2d 920 (1974).
In compensation cases, the statute prescribes the entire scope of the right and remedy, and the parties are limited to the adjective procedure either expressly or by necessary implication set forth therein. McIntosh v. Standard Oil Co., 121 Neb. 92, 236 N.W. 152 (1931).
Employee who, by not affirmatively rejecting, has elected to be bound by Workmen's Compensation Act, has surrendered right of action against employer for injury through machine being left unguarded in violation of factory act. Navracel v. Cudahy Packing Co., 109 Neb. 506, 191 N.W. 659, 193 N.W. 768 (1923).
2. Exemption from liability
Where a surviving husband's deceased wife's employer was immune under section 48-148 from the surviving husband's suit against it for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress, a fellow employee of the deceased wife was also immune from the surviving husband's suit because under this section, the employer's immunity extended to the deceased wife's fellow employee. Pittman v. Western Engineering Co., 283 Neb. 913, 813 N.W.2d 487 (2012).
The exemption from liability given an employer and insurer by this section does not include employer's underinsured motorist carrier, even though said insurance carrier is also employer's workers' compensation carrier. Muller v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 252 Neb. 1, 560 N.W.2d 130 (1997).
The portion of this statute that exempts from liability negligent coemployees of an injured employee does not violate the open access provision of Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 13. Peterson v. Cisper, 231 Neb. 450, 436 N.W.2d 533 (1989).
3. Miscellaneous
Receipt and acceptance of workmen's compensation by city fireman does not bar his right to a fireman's pension. City of Lincoln v. Steffensmeyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938).
Parent's right of action for injury to minor son is not barred by Workmen's Compensation Act. Allen v. Trester, 112 Neb. 515, 199 N.W. 841 (1924).
An employee who has failed to file an election not to come under act has no right of action for damages for negligence of employer. Nedela v. Mares Auto Co., 106 Neb. 883, 184 N.W. 885 (1921).
Whether pension received from city by widow of deceased policeman is compensation, is not decided. Good v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 654, 168 N.W. 639 (1918).
48-112.
Elective compensation; presumption.In the occupations described in section 48-106, all contracts of employment shall be presumed to have been made with reference and subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Every such employer and every employee is presumed to accept and come under such sections.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 12, p. 582; R.S.1913, § 3653; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 2, p. 199; C.S.1922, § 3035; C.S.1929, § 48-112; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 17, p. 196; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-112; R.S.1943, § 48-112;
Laws 1971, LB 572, § 6; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 31.
Annotations
A public utility employee cannot maintain a separate suit against a city for an injury incurred on the job, because the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy of the injured public utility employee against the city where the public utility is an agency or department of the city. Hofferber v. City of Hastings, 275 Neb. 503, 747 N.W.2d 389 (2008).
Employee must be given notice under this section. Imus v. Bead Mountain Ranch, Inc., 183 Neb. 343, 160 N.W.2d 171 (1968).
Sale of seed corn upon a commission basis did not constitute salesman an employee. Bohy v. Pfister Hybrid Co., 179 Neb. 337, 138 N.W.2d 23 (1965).
Election of employee not to come under part II of act is binding on his dependents. White v. National Window Cleaning Co., 132 Neb. 155, 271 N.W. 341 (1937).
Where it was not disclosed whether contract was made before or after taking effect of act, presumption that act was applicable did not arise. Smith v. Fall, 122 Neb. 783, 241 N.W. 560 (1932).
Both parties are presumed to have contracted with reference to Workmen's Compensation Act and subject thereto. Dietz Club v. Niehaus, 110 Neb. 154, 193 N.W. 344 (1923); Avre v. Sexton, 110 Neb. 149, 193 N.W. 342 (1923); Nedela v. Mares Auto Co., 110 Neb. 108, 193 N.W. 345 (1923); Nosky v. Farmers Union Co-op. Assn., 109 Neb. 489, 191 N.W. 846 (1922).
Employer cannot take advantage of own fault to detriment of employee. Dietz Club v. Niehaus, 110 Neb. 154, 193 N.W. 344 (1923).
Noninsuring employer is liable either for damages at common law or compensation, at election of employee. Avre v. Sexton, 110 Neb. 149, 193 N.W. 342 (1923); Nedela v. Mares Auto Co., 110 Neb. 108, 193 N.W. 345 (1923).
Minor employee may elect under Workmen's Compensation Act. Navracel v. Cudahy Packing Co., 109 Neb. 506, 191 N.W. 659 (1922).
48-113.
Repealed. Laws 1971, LB 572, § 33.
48-114.
Employer, defined.The following shall constitute employers subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act: (1) The state and every governmental agency created by it; and (2) every person, firm, or corporation, including any public service corporation, who is engaged in any trade, occupation, business, or profession as described in section 48-106, and who has any person in service under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 14, p. 583; R.S.1913, § 3655; C.S.1922, § 3037; C.S.1929, § 48-114; R.S.1943, § 48-114;
Laws 1971, LB 572, § 7; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 32.
Annotations
A finding that one party is an "employer" under this section and a finding that the other relevant party is an "employee" under section 48-115 are necessary to engage section 48-109, which binds the parties to the compensation schedule of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Kaiser v. Millard Lumber, Inc., 255 Neb. 943, 587 N.W.2d 875 (1999).
In order to transfer liability from the general employer of a loaned employee to a borrowing employer, there must be some consensual arrangement sufficient to create a new employer-employee relationship. Shamburg v. Shamburg, 153 Neb. 495, 45 N.W.2d 446 (1950).
Cement finisher and plasterer, engaged to do specific work, where nothing was said about pay and for previous work payment had been made at hourly rate, and where owner directed how work should be done, is an employee and not an independent contractor. Peterson v. Christenson, 141 Neb. 151, 3 N.W.2d 204 (1942).
General provisions of compensation act are applicable to the state and every governmental agency created by it. Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, Inc., 138 Neb. 117, 292 N.W. 59 (1940).
Laborer hired by informal action of county board was county employee while working on county road project. Steward v. Deuel County, 137 Neb. 516, 289 N.W. 877 (1940).
Relation of employee and employer is not defeated by fact that employee receives the work under a plan of the federal government designed primarily to relieve unemployment. Hendershot v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 606, 286 N.W. 909 (1939).
One buying and shipping poultry in carload lots to distant markets is engaged in business. Compensation law applies to caretaker of carload of live poultry being shipped to market in another state. Claus v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
Subcontractor is employer of workman injured by negligence of original contractor, in line of duties for which he is employed by subcontractor. Boyd v. Humphreys, 117 Neb. 799, 223 N.W. 658 (1929).
Where employer, engaged in business in Nebraska, hires resident within state for services in another state incident to employer's business in Nebraska, Nebraska workmen's compensation law applies. Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N.W. 410 (1928).
Corporation subject to Workmen's Compensation Act is liable as employer to injured workman employed by independent contractor, who has agreed to protect corporation from such liability, where contractor is not required to procure insurance for protection of employees. Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N.W. 645 (1924).
Pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section, employers subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act include every person, firm, or corporation who is engaged in any trade, occupation, business, or profession as described in section 48-106, and who has any person in service under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written. Morin v. Industrial Manpower, 13 Neb. App. 1, 687 N.W.2d 704 (2004).
48-115.
Employee and worker, defined; inclusions; exclusions; waiver; election of coverage.The terms employee and worker are used interchangeably and have the same meaning throughout the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Such terms include the plural and all ages and both sexes. For purposes of the act, employee or worker shall be construed to mean:
(1) Every person in the service of the state or of any governmental agency created by it, including the Nebraska National Guard and members of the military forces of the State of Nebraska, under any appointment or contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral or written;
(2) Every person in the service of an employer who is engaged in any trade, occupation, business, or profession as described in section 48-106 under any contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral or written, including aliens and also including minors. Minors for the purpose of making election of remedies under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall have the same power of contracting and electing as adult employees.
As used in subdivisions (1) through (11) of this section, the terms employee and worker shall not be construed to include any person whose employment is not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of his or her employer.
If an employee subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act suffers an injury on account of which he or she or, in the event of his or her death, his or her dependents would otherwise have been entitled to the benefits provided by such act, the employee or, in the event of his or her death, his or her dependents shall be entitled to the benefits provided under such act, if the injury or injury resulting in death occurred within this state, or if at the time of such injury (a) the employment was principally localized within this state, (b) the employer was performing work within this state, or (c) the contract of hire was made within this state;
(3) Volunteer firefighters of any fire department of any rural or suburban fire protection district, city, village, or nonprofit corporation, which fire department is organized under the laws of the State of Nebraska. Such volunteers shall be deemed employees of such rural or suburban fire protection district, city, village, or nonprofit corporation while in the performance of their duties as members of such department and shall be considered as having entered and as acting in the regular course and scope of their employment from the instant such persons commence responding to a call to active duty, whether to a fire station or other place where firefighting equipment that their company or unit is to use is located or to any activities that the volunteer firefighters may be directed to do by the chief of the fire department or some person authorized to act for such chief. Such volunteers shall be deemed employees of such rural or suburban fire protection district, city, village, or nonprofit corporation until their return to the location from which they were initially called to active duty or until they engage in any activity beyond the scope of the performance of their duties, whichever occurs first.
Members of such volunteer fire department, before they are entitled to benefits under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, shall be recommended by the chief of the fire department or some person authorized to act for such chief for membership therein to the board of directors of the rural or suburban fire protection district or nonprofit corporation, the mayor and city commission, the mayor and council, or the chairperson and board of trustees, as the case may be, and upon confirmation shall be deemed employees of such entity. Members of such fire department after confirmation to membership may be removed by a majority vote of the entity's board of directors or governing body and thereafter shall not be considered employees of such entity. Firefighters of any fire department of any rural or suburban fire protection district, nonprofit corporation, city, or village shall be considered as acting in the performance and within the course and scope of their employment when performing activities outside of the corporate limits of their respective districts, cities, or villages, but only if directed to do so by the chief of the fire department or some person authorized to act for such chief;
(4) Members of the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, any city, village, county, or interjurisdictional emergency management organization, or any state emergency response team, which agency, organization, or team is regularly organized under the laws of the State of Nebraska. Such members shall be deemed employees of such agency, organization, or team while in the performance of their duties as members of such agency, organization, or team;
(5) Any person fulfilling conditions of probation, or community service as defined in section 29-2277, pursuant to any order of any court of this state who shall be working for a governmental body, or agency as defined in section 29-2277, pursuant to any condition of probation, or community service as defined in section 29-2277. Such person shall be deemed an employee of the governmental body or agency for the purposes of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act;
(6) Volunteer ambulance drivers and attendants and emergency care providers who are members of an emergency medical service for any county, city, village, rural or suburban fire protection district, nonprofit corporation, or any combination of such entities under the authority of section 13-303. Such volunteers shall be deemed employees of such entity or combination thereof while in the performance of their duties as ambulance drivers or attendants or emergency care providers and shall be considered as having entered into and as acting in the regular course and scope of their employment from the instant such persons commence responding to a call to active duty, whether to a hospital or other place where the ambulance they are to use is located or to any activities that the volunteer ambulance drivers or attendants or emergency care providers may be directed to do by the chief or some person authorized to act for such chief of the volunteer ambulance service or emergency care service. Such volunteers shall be deemed employees of such county, city, village, rural or suburban fire protection district, nonprofit corporation, or combination of such entities until their return to the location from which they were initially called to active duty or until they engage in any activity beyond the scope of the performance of their duties, whichever occurs first. Before such volunteer ambulance drivers or attendants or emergency care providers are entitled to benefits under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, they shall be recommended by the chief or some person authorized to act for such chief of the volunteer ambulance service or emergency care service for membership therein to the board of directors of the rural or suburban fire protection district or nonprofit corporation, the governing body of the county, city, or village, or combination thereof, as the case may be, and upon such confirmation shall be deemed employees of such entity or combination thereof. Members of such volunteer ambulance or emergency care service after confirmation to membership may be removed by majority vote of the entity's board of directors or governing body and thereafter shall not be considered employees of such entity. Volunteer ambulance drivers and attendants and emergency care providers for any county, city, village, rural or suburban fire protection district, nonprofit corporation, or any combination thereof shall be considered as acting in the performance and within the course and scope of their employment when performing activities outside of the corporate limits of their respective county, city, village, or district, but only if directed to do so by the chief or some person authorized to act for such chief;
(7) Members of a law enforcement reserve force appointed in accordance with section 81-1438. Such members shall be deemed employees of the county or city for which they were appointed;
(8) Any offender committed to the Department of Correctional Services who is employed pursuant to section 81-1827. Such offender shall be deemed an employee of the Department of Correctional Services solely for purposes of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act;
(9) An executive officer of a corporation elected or appointed under the provisions or authority of the charter, articles of incorporation, or bylaws of such corporation who owns less than twenty-five percent of the common stock of such corporation or an executive officer of a nonprofit corporation elected or appointed under the provisions or authority of the charter, articles of incorporation, or bylaws of such corporation who receives annual compensation of more than one thousand dollars from such corporation. Such executive officer shall be an employee of such corporation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
An executive officer of a corporation who owns twenty-five percent or more of the common stock of such corporation or an executive officer of a nonprofit corporation who receives annual compensation of one thousand dollars or less from such corporation shall not be construed to be an employee of the corporation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act unless such executive officer elects to bring himself or herself within the provisions of the act. Such election shall be in writing and filed with the secretary of the corporation and with the workers' compensation insurer. Such election shall be effective upon receipt by the insurer for the current policy and subsequent policies issued by such insurer and shall remain in effect until the election is terminated, in writing, by the officer and the termination is filed with the insurer or until the insurer ceases to provide coverage for the corporation, whichever occurs first. Any such termination of election shall also be filed with the secretary of the corporation. If insurance is provided through a master policy or a multiple coordinated policy pursuant to the Professional Employer Organization Registration Act on or after January 1, 2012, then such election or termination of election shall also be filed with the professional employer organization. If coverage under the master policy or multiple coordinated policy ceases, then such election shall also be effective for a replacement master policy or multiple coordinated policy obtained by the professional employer organization and shall remain in effect for the new policy as provided in this subdivision. If such an executive officer has not elected to bring himself or herself within the provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act pursuant to this subdivision and a health, accident, or other insurance policy covering such executive officer contains an exclusion of coverage if the executive officer is otherwise entitled to workers' compensation coverage, such exclusion is null and void as to such executive officer.
It is the intent of the Legislature that the changes made to this subdivision by Laws 2002, LB 417, shall apply to policies of insurance against liability arising under the act with an effective date on or after January 1, 2003, but shall not apply to any such policy with an effective date prior to January 1, 2003;
(10) Each individual employer, partner, limited liability company member, or self-employed person who is actually engaged in the individual employer's, partnership's, limited liability company's, or self-employed person's business on a substantially full-time basis who elects to bring himself or herself within the provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Such election shall be in writing and filed with the workers' compensation insurer. Such election shall be effective upon receipt by the insurer for the current policy and subsequent policies issued by such insurer and shall remain in effect until the election is terminated, in writing, by such person and the termination is filed with the insurer or until the insurer ceases to provide coverage for the business, whichever occurs first. If insurance is provided through a master policy or a multiple coordinated policy pursuant to the Professional Employer Organization Registration Act on or after January 1, 2012, then such election or termination of election shall also be filed with the professional employer organization. If coverage under the master policy or multiple coordinated policy ceases, then such election shall also be effective for a replacement master policy or multiple coordinated policy obtained by the professional employer organization and shall remain in effect for the new policy as provided in this subdivision. If any such person who is actually engaged in the business on a substantially full-time basis has not elected to bring himself or herself within the provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act pursuant to this subdivision and a health, accident, or other insurance policy covering such person contains an exclusion of coverage if such person is otherwise entitled to workers' compensation coverage, such exclusion shall be null and void as to such person; and
(11) An individual lessor of a commercial motor vehicle leased to a motor carrier and driven by such individual lessor who elects to bring himself or herself within the provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Such election is made if he or she agrees in writing with the motor carrier to have the same rights as an employee only for purposes of workers' compensation coverage maintained by the motor carrier. For an election under this subdivision, the motor carrier's principal place of business must be in this state and the motor carrier must be authorized to self-insure liability under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Such an election shall (a) be effective from the date of such written agreement until such agreement is terminated, (b) be enforceable against such self-insured motor carrier in the same manner and to the same extent as claims arising under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act by employees of such self-insured motor carrier, and (c) not be deemed to be a contract of insurance for purposes of Chapter 44. Section 48-111 shall apply to the individual lessor and the self-insured motor carrier with respect to personal injury or death caused to such individual lessor by accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of performing services for such self-insured motor carrier in connection with such lease while such election is effective.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 15, p. 583; R.S.1913, § 3656; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 4, p. 201; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 1, p. 519; C.S.1922, § 3038; Laws 1927, c. 39, § 1, p. 169; C.S.1929, § 48-115; Laws 1933, c. 90, § 1, p. 362; Laws 1941, c. 93, § 1, p. 370; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-115; R.S.1943, § 48-115; Laws 1959, c. 222, § 1, p. 782; Laws 1961, c. 233, § 1, p. 689; Laws 1963, c. 282, § 1, p. 841; Laws 1967, c. 289, § 1, p. 788; Laws 1967, c. 291, § 1, p. 793; Laws 1969, c. 391, § 1, p. 1373;
Laws 1973, LB 25, § 1; Laws 1973, LB 150, § 1; Laws 1973, LB 239, § 2; Laws 1975, LB 186, § 1; Laws 1976, LB 782, § 14;
Laws 1977, LB 199, § 1; Laws 1981, LB 20, § 1; Laws 1983, LB 185, § 1; Laws 1984, LB 776, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 528, § 6; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 33; Laws 1987, LB 353, § 1; Laws 1993, LB 121, § 282; Laws 1994, LB 884, § 63; Laws 1996, LB 43, § 8; Laws 1997, LB 138, § 38; Laws 1997, LB 474, § 2; Laws 1998, LB 1010, § 1; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 1; Laws 2002, LB 417, § 2; Laws 2003, LB 332, § 1; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 1; Laws 2010, LB579, § 14; Laws 2020, LB1002, § 42.
Cross References
Professional Employer Organization Registration Act, see section 48-2701.
Annotations
1. State and governmental agencies
2. Employer's regular business
3. Casual employment
4. Independent contractor
5. Employee
6. Miscellaneous
1. State and governmental agencies
Member of posse called into service by sheriff was entitled to compensation. Anderson v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 155 Neb. 590, 52 N.W.2d 814 (1952).
To authorize recovery as a fireman under this section, it must appear: (1) That there was a regularly organized fire department as distinguished from an unorganized group; (2) that the injured workman was a member of such organization; and (3) that he was recommended by the chief of the fire department and confirmed by the governing board of the municipality. Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb. 1044, 26 N.W.2d 15 (1947).
Terms employee and workman include every person in the service of the state or of any governmental agency created by it, under any appointment or contract of hire. Steward v. Deuel County, 137 Neb. 516, 289 N.W. 877 (1940).
While state intended to waive its sovereignty and to give consent to be sued under Workmen's Compensation Act, failure to provide manner of service of process, prior to 1940 amendment, rendered state immune. Anstine v. State, 137 Neb. 148, 288 N.W. 525 (1939).
Employee of city on W.P.A. project is an employee of city under compensation act. Hendershot v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 606, 286 N.W. 909 (1939).
Fireman of city of Omaha was entitled to benefits of workmen's compensation law. Shandy v. City of Omaha, 127 Neb. 406, 255 N.W. 477 (1934).
Employee of county in connection with maintenance and protection of bridges had compensable status as employee. Davis v. Lincoln County, 117 Neb. 148, 219 N.W. 899 (1928).
Fireman employed by city has compensable status. City of Fremont v. Lea, 115 Neb. 565, 213 N.W. 820 (1927).
Employee of National Guard is entitled to compensation. Nebraska Nat. Guard v. Morgan, 112 Neb. 432, 199 N.W. 557 (1924).
Under former law, excluding from act those whose employment was not for the purpose of gain or profit, employees of governmental agencies were not entitled to compensation, such as a janitor employed by city school district. Ray v. School Dist. of Lincoln, 105 Neb. 456, 181 N.W. 140 (1920).
Police are protected by act. Rooney v. City of Omaha, 105 Neb. 447, 181 N.W. 143 (1920).
2. Employer's regular business
A carpenter employed by farmer to build machine shop on farm is not in the course of employer's occupation within meaning of Workmen's Compensation Act. Guse v. Wessels, 132 Neb. 41, 270 N.W. 665 (1937).
Hod-carrier injured in construction of apartment was engaged in employer's regular business. Bauer v. Anderson, 114 Neb. 326, 207 N.W. 508 (1926).
Painting building of wholesale drug corporation was work within usual course of trade. Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N.W. 645 (1924).
Preparing for encampment of National Guard was regular business. Nebraska Nat. Guard v. Morgan, 112 Neb. 432, 199 N.W. 557 (1924).
Caring for buildings owned by person engaged in other business is not regular business, and workman injured in repairing same was not entitled to compensation. Kaplan v. Gaskill, 108 Neb. 455, 187 N.W. 943 (1922).
3. Casual employment
Employee hired for a day at a time on any sale day by livestock sales barn was not a casual employee. Gruber v. Stickelman, 149 Neb. 627, 31 N.W.2d 753 (1948).
Where employment is casual and not within the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer, recovery cannot be had under Workmen's Compensation Act. McConnell v. Johnston, 139 Neb. 619, 298 N.W. 346 (1941).
The term casual is construed to mean occasional, coming at certain times without regularity, in distinction from stated or regular. Hiestand v. Ristau, 135 Neb. 881, 284 N.W. 756 (1939).
Workman cleaning snow from street intersections and suffering injury, was not casual employee and was entitled to compensation hereunder. Sentor v. City of Lincoln, 124 Neb. 403, 246 N.W. 924 (1933).
Employment was not casual. Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N.W. 645 (1924); Nebraska Nat. Guard v. Morgan, 112 Neb. 432, 199 N.W. 557 (1924); Nosky v. Farmers Union Co-op. Assn., 109 Neb. 489, 191 N.W. 846 (1922); Kaplan v. Gaskill, 108 Neb. 455, 187 N.W. 943 (1922); Nedela v. Mares Auto Co., 106 Neb. 883, 184 N.W. 885 (1921).
Where a person enters the employment of another to render a particular service that is not continuous or regular but only occasional or incidental to the business, the employment is casual. Petrow & Giannou v. Shewan, 108 Neb. 466, 187 N.W. 940 (1922).
Unloading coal cars at irregular intervals is casual employment. Bridger v. Lincoln Feed & Fuel Co., 105 Neb. 222, 179 N.W. 1020 (1920).
4. Independent contractor
Person who contracts to supply all labor, construct a barn according to a plan furnished, furnishes own tools, and receives a definite amount for the work done, is an independent contractor. Lowe v. Chicago Lumber Co., 135 Neb. 735, 283 N.W. 841 (1939).
Person who contracted to unload coal at specified price per ton, with right to employ his own assistants and determine how work should be done, was an independent contractor. Prescher v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 132 Neb. 648, 273 N.W. 48 (1937).
Independent contractor is defined. Hines v. Martel Telephone Co., 127 Neb. 398, 255 N.W. 233 (1934).
Solicitor for advertising contracts on percentage basis, paying own traveling expenses and working without control or direction from employer, was not employee within meaning of this act. Johnston v. Smith, 123 Neb. 716, 243 N.W. 894 (1932).
Evidence established that deceased, owner and manager of insurance agency, was independent contractor. Priest v. Business Men's Protective Assn., 117 Neb. 198, 220 N.W. 255 (1928).
Contractor for construction of highway is independent contractor. Potter v. Scotts Bluff County, 112 Neb. 318, 199 N.W. 507 (1924).
Plumber is an independent contractor, and not an employee within Workmen's Compensation Act. Petrow & Giannou v. Shewan, 108 Neb. 466, 187 N.W. 940 (1922).
One employed by a contractor as superintendent of construction is not an independent contractor. Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller & Paine, 240 F. 376 (8th Cir. 1917).
5. Employee
Officers of a corporation are within the definition of "employee" for purposes of the Nebraska workers' compensation law. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Deyle, 225 Neb. 82, 402 N.W.2d 859 (1987).
While one entering into a contract for hire in this state for work to be performed elsewhere, standing alone, may be a statutory employee under the provisions of subsection (2)(c) of this section, unless the employer, who is a nonresident, is performing work in this state, it is not a statutory employer as defined by sections 48-114 and 48-106(1). Absent a statutory employer, the provisions of section 48-101 have no application. Jensen v. Floair, 212 Neb. 740, 326 N.W.2d 19 (1982).
Under the facts, the claimant was too involved with the ownership and management of the business to be considered an employee. Williams v. Williams Janitorial Service, 207 Neb. 344, 299 N.W.2d 160 (1980).
Under the facts of this case, the Workmen's Compensation Court was clearly wrong in finding that the two defendants were joint employers of the plaintiff but was correct in finding an employer-employee relationship between one of the defendants and the plaintiff. White v. Western Commodities, Inc., 207 Neb. 75, 295 N.W.2d 704 (1980).
Employee, as distinguished from a servant generally, must serve under a contract of hire. Shamburg v. Shamburg, 153 Neb. 495, 45 N.W.2d 446 (1950).
Truck driver, owning and operating his own truck and paid according to amount of gravel hauled, but subject to order and directions of owner of gravel pit, was employee entitled to compensation. Westcoatt v. Lilley, 134 Neb. 376, 278 N.W. 854 (1938).
Volunteer firemen in village are not employees of village within workmen's compensation law until they have been recommended for membership by chief of the fire department and been confirmed by chairman and board of trustees. Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Village of Creston, 129 Neb. 850, 263 N.W. 220 (1935).
One engaged by village to care for swimming pool and park whose compensation was twenty dollars a week plus receipts from pool, was an employee. Schou v. Village of Hildreth, 127 Neb. 784, 257 N.W. 70 (1934).
Village marshal was not an employee within meaning of Workmen's Compensation Act. Suverkrubbe v. Village of Fort Calhoun, 127 Neb. 472, 256 N.W. 47 (1934).
Salesman selling on a commission is an employee and not independent contractor. Aeschleman v. Haschenburger Co., 127 Neb. 207, 254 N.W. 899 (1934).
Truck owner, engaged by contractor furnishing gravel for county highway, was not independent contractor but an employee, and county letting contract without requiring contractor to furnish insurance policy protecting contractor's employees, was jointly liable with contractor to its employees who received compensable injury. Standish v. Larsen-Merryweather Co., 124 Neb. 197, 245 N.W. 606 (1932).
Where plaintiff did repair work on call from time to time for hardware store, under its orders and direction, although he furnished his own tools and equipment, he was an employee within meaning of this section. Cole v. Minnick, 123 Neb. 871, 244 N.W. 785 (1932).
Whether party is employee or independent contractor must be determined from facts of particular case. Truck driver hauling gravel for county highway was an employee hereunder. Showers v. Lund, 123 Neb. 56, 242 N.W. 258 (1932).
Caretaker of live poultry being shipped to market in another state is employee, not independent contractor. Claus v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
Every person in the employ of the state or a governmental agency thereof is an employee within the meaning of the act. Eidenmiller v. State, 120 Neb. 430, 233 N.W. 447 (1930).
Where workman engaged in dragging roads for county was injured by horse while caring for it during noon hour, accident arose out of and in course of employment and was compensable hereunder. Speas v. Boone County, 119 Neb. 58, 227 N.W. 87 (1929).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, illegal aliens are included in the definition of employees or workers. Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 18 Neb. App. 202, 778 N.W.2d 504 (2009).
Pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section, the terms "employee" and "worker" do not include any person whose employment is not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of his or her employer. Morin v. Industrial Manpower, 13 Neb. App. 1, 687 N.W.2d 704 (2004).
Pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section, under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, an "employee" or "worker" is defined as every person in the service of an employer who is engaged in any trade, occupation, business, or profession as described in section 48-106 under any contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral or written. Morin v. Industrial Manpower, 13 Neb. App. 1, 687 N.W.2d 704 (2004).
6. Miscellaneous
An employee's illegal residence or work status does not bar an award of indemnity for permanent total loss of earning capacity. Moyera v. Quality Pork Internat., 284 Neb. 963, 825 N.W.2d 409 (2013).
Where a claimant is under a conditional offer of employment at the time of an alleged injury, the Workers' Compensation Court does not have jurisdiction, pursuant to this section, to make a determination of compensability. Gebhard v. Dixie Carbonic, 261 Neb. 715, 625 N.W.2d 207 (2001).
A finding that one party is an "employer" under section 48-114 and a finding that the other relevant party is an "employee" under this section are necessary to engage section 48-109, which binds the parties to the compensation schedule of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Kaiser v. Millard Lumber, Inc., 255 Neb. 943, 587 N.W.2d 875 (1999).
Subsection (2) of this section recognizes that a contract for hire may be expressed or implied, including a contract with minors. Larson v. Hometown Communications, Inc., 248 Neb. 942, 540 N.W.2d 339 (1995).
Under subsection (2) of this section, the right to recover workers' compensation benefits is in the employee, even if the employee is a minor. Lawson v. Smith, 241 Neb. 639, 489 N.W.2d 566 (1992).
Under the facts of this case, the claimant was a loaned employee but there was no consensual relationship sufficient to create a new employer-employee relationship. Therefore, the lending employer remained liable for his workmen's compensation. B & C Excavating Co. v. Hiner, 207 Neb. 248, 298 N.W.2d 155 (1980).
Minor driving truck loaded with crude oil was legally permitted to work. Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
A working partner is not entitled to compensation as an employee. Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.2d 641 (1947).
Officer of township engaging in removal of obstructions from highway although not part of his official duties, was not employee hereunder. Vandenburg v. Center Township, 123 Neb. 544, 243 N.W. 636 (1932), affirmed on rehearing, 124 Neb. 790, 248 N.W. 310 (1933).
Salesman, injured in Iowa, where he was hired, his work being directed from Omaha office, was covered by Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act. Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930).
Minor employee, between fourteen and sixteen, may maintain action at common law for injuries while employed in laundry, against employer failing to procure employment certificate, and such minor need not have been classified in order to sue. Benner v. Evans Laundry Co., 117 Neb. 701, 222 N.W. 630 (1929).
Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act does not apply to workman engaged in Nebraska by Kansas employer to work in Kansas, where injured. Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N.W. 410 (1928).
Corporation subject to Workmen's Compensation Act is liable to workman employed by independent contractor, where insurance was not required. Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N.W. 645 (1924).
Provision of this section restricting parent's right of recovery for injuries to minor was unconstitutional, as not germane. Allen v. Trester, 112 Neb. 515, 199 N.W. 841 (1924).
The record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the worker was self-employed and that the worker did not comply with subsection (10) of this section. Nerison v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 17 Neb. App. 161, 757 N.W.2d 21 (2008).
48-115.01.
Employee; extend coverage; when.Sections 48-115, 48-115.01, and 48-146 shall be so construed as to effectuate their general purpose to extend workers' compensation coverage to additional employees and officers as soon as the same may be done under the Constitution of Nebraska.
48-115.02.
Lessor of commercial motor vehicles; agreement with self-insured motor carrier; authorized; effect.An employer who is a lessor of one or more commercial motor vehicles leased to a self-insured motor carrier, may agree with the self-insured motor carrier that benefits under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act with respect to personal injury or death to the driver or drivers employed by such lessor caused by accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of performing services for the self-insured motor carrier in connection with such lease shall be paid by the self-insured motor carrier in the same manner and to the same extent as benefits under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act are paid to or on behalf of employees of the self-insured motor carrier. To participate in an agreement under this section the motor carrier's principal place of business must be in this state and the motor carrier must be authorized to self-insure liability under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
Such an agreement shall (1) constitute compliance by such lessor with the requirements of section 48-145 with respect to such driver or drivers, but only insofar as liability for personal injury or death to the driver or drivers employed by such lessor caused by accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of performing services for such self-insured motor carrier in connection with such lease is concerned, (2) be enforceable against such self-insured motor carrier in the same manner and to the same extent as claims arising under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act by employees of such self-insured motor carrier, and (3) not be deemed to be a contract of insurance for purposes of Chapter 44. Section 48-111 shall apply to such lessor, the driver or drivers employed by such lessor, and the self-insured motor carrier with respect to personal injury or death caused to such driver or drivers by accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of performing services for such self-insured motor carrier in connection with such lease while such an agreement is effective.
48-116.
Employers; evasion of law; what constitutes; exceptions.Any person, firm, or corporation creating or carrying into operation any scheme, artifice, or device to enable him or her, them, or it to execute work without being responsible to the workers for the provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be included in the term employer, and with the immediate employer shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation herein provided for and be subject to all the provisions of such act. This section, however, shall not be construed as applying to an owner who lets a contract to a contractor in good faith, or a contractor, who, in good faith, lets to a subcontractor a portion of his or her contract, if the owner or principal contractor, as the case may be, requires the contractor or subcontractor, respectively, to procure a policy or policies of insurance from an insurance company licensed to write such insurance in this state, which policy or policies of insurance shall guarantee payment of compensation according to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act to injured workers.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 16, p. 584; R.S.1913, § 3657; C.S.1922, § 3039; C.S.1929, § 48-116; R.S.1943, § 48-116;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 35.
Annotations
1. Scheme, artifice, or device
2. Carrying of insurance
3. Effect of election
4. Miscellaneous
1. Scheme, artifice, or device
There was insufficient evidence presented by the plaintiff to prove that the defendant employed a scheme, artifice, or device by either conferring the actual employer with apparent authority through manifestations to the homeowner or entering a joint venture with the actual employer. Kohout v. Bennett Constr., 296 Neb. 608, 894 N.W.2d 821 (2017).
There was no evidence in this case that the contract between the parties that controlled their relationship was a sham to conceal the true arrangement of the parties. Spulak v. Estep, 216 Neb. 523, 344 N.W.2d 475 (1984).
School (an owner of property on which the work is performed) was not liable as a statutory employer by virtue of section 48-116 where the work being done by the independent contractor would not ordinarily be done by employees of the owner in view of the owner's past practices and the practices of employers in comparable businesses, regardless of whether the owner's employees could have done the work. Overruling a portion of Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N.W. 645 (1924). Franklin v. Pawley, 215 Neb. 624, 340 N.W.2d 156 (1983).
Dealer's agreement for sale of seed corn was not an arrangement to evade provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act. Bohy v. Pfister Hybrid Co., 179 Neb. 337, 138 N.W.2d 23 (1965).
Burden is on workman to prove by a preponderance of evidence that employer set up a scheme, artifice, or device to defeat provisions of workmen's compensation law. O'Brien v. Barnard, 145 Neb. 596, 17 N.W.2d 611 (1945).
Owner of residence, who employs workman to remodel and move it, is not an employer within the Workmen's Compensation Act, even though the sole income of the owner is derived from rental of property. Retzlaff v. Dickinson, 141 Neb. 136, 2 N.W.2d 922 (1942).
Where liability would not attach if employment was direct, proviso constituting as employer person using scheme, artifice, or device to escape responsibility does not apply. McConnell v. Johnston, 139 Neb. 619, 298 N.W. 346 (1941).
Where city furnished materials and equipment for a W.P.A. project, but had no authority to control the details of the work or to direct the mode and manner of doing it, the arrangement did not constitute a device to enable the city to execute work without being responsible. Williams v. City of Wymore, 138 Neb. 256, 292 N.W. 726 (1940).
Scheme, artifice, or device do not necessarily imply fraud, and agreement of independent contractor to protect corporation employing him from liability for injuries to employees is a device. Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N.W. 645 (1924).
A statutory employer is a principal who employs a scheme, artifice, or device to avoid workmen's compensation law. Petznick v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 698 (D. Neb. 1983).
2. Carrying of insurance
When one employs an uninsured contractor, he becomes an employer under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and is entitled to the protection of the provisions thereof as to what acts are covered and what are not. Wilbur v. Adams Lumber Co., 140 Neb. 48, 299 N.W. 268 (1941).
The liability of a third party for failing to require a contractor to carry compensation insurance is an imputed one, and separate notice of accident and claim for compensation from that given to contractor is not required. Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, Inc., 138 Neb. 117, 292 N.W. 59 (1940).
An unperformed agreement by contractor to carry compensation insurance does not relieve owner from liability. Hiestand v. Ristau, 135 Neb. 881, 284 N.W. 756 (1939).
Owner of building, used in conducting owner's business, who contracts with contractor for certain repairs to said building is an employer within the terms of statute unless it be shown that the contractor was required to procure compensation insurance for protection of his employees. New Masonic Temple Assn. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 134 Neb. 731, 279 N.W. 475 (1938).
Owner of building used in conducting owner's business who enters into contract with contractor for certain repairs is an employer within meaning of law unless it be shown that the contractor was required to procure compensation insurance for protection of his employees. Jones v. Rossbach Coal Co., 130 Neb. 302, 264 N.W. 877 (1936).
Where evidence failed to establish that minor son had been emancipated or that direct contract of hire existed between father and son, county which had contracted with father to do road work was not liable to minor because it failed to require the father to carry insurance. Holt County v. Mullen, 126 Neb. 102, 252 N.W. 799 (1934).
County letting contract without requiring contractor to furnish insurance policy protecting contractor's employees, is jointly liable with contractor to its employee who received compensable injury. Standish v. Larsen-Merryweather Co., 124 Neb. 197, 245 N.W. 606 (1932).
Section does not include owner who requires contractor to take out compensation insurance, or contractor who requires subcontractor to do so. Matthews v. G. A. Crancer Co., 117 Neb. 805, 223 N.W. 661 (1929).
Contention that defendants became employer within compensation law, by failure to require insurance to be taken out, was not sustained by evidence. Petrow & Giannou v. Shewan, 108 Neb. 466, 187 N.W. 940 (1922).
3. Effect of election
An employee who has properly elected not to come under part II of the Workmen's Compensation Act, cannot recover compensation from owner and owner does not become employer, even though owner does not require immediate employer to carry compensation insurance. White v. National Window Cleaning Co., 132 Neb. 155, 271 N.W. 341 (1937).
4. Miscellaneous
The party claiming to be an employee under this section has the burden of proof to show that he or she is in fact an employee of the subcontractor and that the principal contractor has failed to ensure that the subcontractor carries workers' compensation insurance. Aboytes-Mosqueda v. LFA Inc., 306 Neb. 277, 944 N.W.2d 765 (2020).
The statutory employer provisions of this section do not supersede the exemption provisions of section 48-106(2). Nussbaum v. Wright, 217 Neb. 712, 350 N.W.2d 559 (1984).
General test of whether work being done by an independent contractor is within this section is whether the work would ordinarily be done by employees of the owner in view of the owner's past practices and the practices of employers in comparable businesses. Rogers v. Hansen, 211 Neb. 132, 317 N.W.2d 905 (1982).
A statutory employer who pays benefits under the joint and several liability created by this section is entitled to indemnity from the actual employer. Duffy Brothers Constr. Co. v. Pistone Builders, Inc., 207 Neb. 360, 299 N.W.2d 170 (1980).
Immediate employer is not a necessary party to a proceeding against a statutory employer. Gardner v. Kothe, 172 Neb. 364, 109 N.W.2d 405 (1961).
Independent contractor employing farm labor was not subject to act. Keith v. Wilson, 165 Neb. 58, 84 N.W.2d 192 (1957).
This section has no application to the relation of a bona fide vendor and vendee. Heider v. Stoughton, 150 Neb. 741, 35 N.W.2d 814 (1949).
County was employer of workman on county road project, even though workman was hired by foreman employed by city and even though no record was made of oral authorization to employ help. Steward v. Deuel County, 137 Neb. 516, 289 N.W. 877 (1940).
Owners of building may be liable as third persons for death of workman through their negligence while in service of lessee's contractor. Tralle v. Hartman Furn. & Carpet Co., 116 Neb. 418, 217 N.W. 952 (1928).
48-117.
Employers; evasion of law; compensation; calculation.When compensation is claimed from or proceedings taken against a person, firm, or corporation under section 48-116, the compensation shall be calculated with reference to the wage the worker was receiving from the person by whom he or she was immediately employed at the time of the injury.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 17, p. 585; R.S.1913, § 3658; C.S.1922, § 3040; C.S.1929, § 48-117; R.S.1943, § 48-117;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 36.
Annotations
Where the wage is certain, employment is continuous, and contract of hire is definite, compensation will be computed according to the terms of contract in force at the time of the accident. Redfern v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 145 Neb. 288, 16 N.W.2d 196 (1944).
Injured workman, working only one day in week, was only entitled to compensation upon basis of amount actually paid. Johnsen v. Benson Food Center, 143 Neb. 421, 9 N.W.2d 749 (1943).
Receipt and acceptance of workmen's compensation by city fireman does not deprive him of right to fireman's pension. City of Lincoln v. Steffensmeyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938).
Where contract was for thirty hours a week at fifty cents an hour, compensation award on basis of weekly wage of thirty dollars was error. Drum v. Omaha Steel Works, 129 Neb. 273, 261 N.W. 351 (1935).
48-118.
Third-party claims; subrogation.When a third person is liable to the employee or to the dependents for the injury or death of the employee, the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employee or to the dependents against such third person. The recovery by such employer shall not be limited to the amount payable as compensation to such employee or dependents, but such employer may recover any amount which such employee or his or her dependents should have been entitled to recover.
Any recovery by the employer against such third person, in excess of the compensation paid by the employer after deducting the expenses of making such recovery, shall be paid forthwith to the employee or to the dependents and shall be treated as an advance payment by the employer on account of any future installments of compensation.
Nothing in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be construed to deny the right of an injured employee or of his or her personal representative to bring suit against such third person in his or her own name or in the name of the personal representative based upon such liability, but in such event an employer having paid or paying compensation to such employee or his or her dependents shall be made a party to the suit for the purpose of reimbursement, under the right of subrogation, of any compensation paid.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 18, p. 585; R.S.1913, § 3659; C.S.1922, § 3041; Laws 1929, c. 135, § 1, p. 489; C.S.1929, § 48-118; R.S.1943, § 48-118; Laws 1963, c. 283, § 1, p. 844;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 37; Laws 1994, LB 594, § 1; Laws 1997, LB 854, § 1; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 2; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 2; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 2.
Annotations
1. Who is third person
2. Refusal of employer to sue
3. Suit by employee
4. Subrogation
5. Choice of law
6. Notice provisions
7. Miscellaneous
1. Who is third person
There is a strong presumption that a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employees. Bacon v. DBI/SALA, 284 Neb. 579, 822 N.W.2d 14 (2012).
“Third person” under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act includes any person other than the employer or those whom the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act makes an employer. Bacon v. DBI/SALA, 284 Neb. 579, 822 N.W.2d 14 (2012).
“Third person” under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act is an entity with which there is no employer-employee relationship. Bacon v. DBI/SALA, 284 Neb. 579, 822 N.W.2d 14 (2012).
An employee can bring suit against a third party at any time, provided that his or her employer be made a party if that employer has paid compensation benefits to the employee. Polinski v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 251 Neb. 14, 554 N.W.2d 636 (1996).
Employee may sue third person for injuries received, but employer having paid compensation must be made a party. Niemeyer v. Forburger, 172 Neb. 876, 112 N.W.2d 276 (1961).
Employer may be made party to suit by employee against third person. Vontress v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 170 Neb. 789, 104 N.W.2d 331 (1960).
Owner requiring contractor to take out compensation insurance is third person as respects employees of contractor. Matthews v. G. A. Crancer Co., 117 Neb. 805, 223 N.W. 661 (1929).
Subcontractor is immediate employer of his workmen and all others are third parties even though interested in enterprise. Boyd v. Humphreys, 117 Neb. 799, 223 N.W. 658 (1929).
A third-party settlement is deemed compensation. Thomas v. Lincoln Public Schools, 9 Neb. App. 965, 622 N.W.2d 705 (2001).
2. Refusal of employer to sue
On refusal by employer liable for compensation to sue third person for negligence resulting in injury, not death, of employee, latter may sue in own behalf, and consent by employer to employee's action is equivalent to refusal. Luckey v. Union P. R. R. Co., 117 Neb. 85, 219 N.W. 802 (1928).
Right to bring action rests with employer until he has neglected or refused to sue. O'Donnell v. Baker Ice Mach. Co., 114 Neb. 9, 205 N.W. 561 (1925).
3. Suit by employee
An employer's vested subrogation interest in settlement proceeds is not extinguished when the injured employee pursued the claim against the alleged tort-feasor out of time. Combined Insurance v. Shurter, 258 Neb. 958, 607 N.W.2d 492 (2000).
If an employer is not joined in an action, there must be a recovery before the nonjoined employer is liable for attorney fees; joined parties may be liable for costs even if there is no recovery. In apportioning cost pursuant to this section, the critical factor is not whether there is a recovery, but whether the employer has participated sufficiently in the litigation to be considered "joined". Janssen v. Tomahawk Oil Co., Ltd., 254 Neb. 370, 576 N.W.2d 787 (1998).
Employee's right of action against third persons for negligence survives death of wrongdoer. Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N.W.2d 856 (1949).
Section does not prevent employee from suing third party responsible for his injury in his own name but requires that employer, having paid compensation, be made party. Oliver v. Nelson, 128 Neb. 160, 258 N.W. 69 (1934).
If workman, injured by negligence of third party, obtains assignment from employer of right to bring action, it may be maintained by workman directly against third party. Thomas v. Otis Elevator Co., 103 Neb. 401, 172 N.W. 53 (1919).
Employee has right to sue third party, though he has settled with employer for compensation, but must make employer a party. Muncaster v. Graham Ice Cream Co., 103 Neb. 379, 172 N.W. 52 (1919).
4. Subrogation
An employer’s right to a future credit against an employee’s recovery in an action related to a workers’ compensation claim does not depend upon who brought the action which led to the employee’s recovery or who happens to “recover” first. Bacon v. DBI/SALA, 284 Neb. 579, 822 N.W.2d 14 (2012).
The beneficent purposes of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act do not require narrow interpretation of an employer’s statutory subrogation rights; the act’s beneficent purposes are to provide an injured worker with prompt relief from the adverse economic effects caused by a work-related injury or occupational disease, and concern the employee’s ability to promptly obtain workers’ compensation benefits, not the employee’s ability to additionally retain recovery against negligent third parties in tort actions. Bacon v. DBI/SALA, 284 Neb. 579, 822 N.W.2d 14 (2012).
The policies behind the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act favor a liberal construction in favor of the employer’s statutory right to subrogate against culpable third parties; workers’ compensation acts generally seek to balance the rights of injured workers against the costs to the businesses that provide employment, and in order to reach this balance, most acts liberally allow employers to shift liability onto third parties whenever possible. Bacon v. DBI/SALA, 284 Neb. 579, 822 N.W.2d 14 (2012).
The workers’ compensation subrogation statute was not intended to draw a distinction which would grant the right to a future credit in recovery from actions brought by the employer, but deny that right in actions brought by the employee; such a distinction would be arbitrary insofar as it would depend on who first brought suit, and insofar as the timing of the suit would change the amount of recovery. Bacon v. DBI/SALA, 284 Neb. 579, 822 N.W.2d 14 (2012).
This section grants an employer who has paid workers' compensation benefits to an employee injured as a result of the actions of a third party a subrogation interest against payments made by the third party. Burns v. Nielsen, 273 Neb. 724, 732 N.W.2d 640 (2007).
When an employer, rather than taking advantage of its opportunity to have the settlement set aside, seeks to share in the settlement proceeds under this section, the employer is obligated to pay a reasonable portion of the employee's attorney fees under this section, and any defect in the notice provided to the employer is waived. Turney v. Werner Enters., Inc., 260 Neb. 440, 618 N.W.2d 437 (2000).
An amendment to this section allowing an equitable distribution between an injured employee and the employer or insurer of a settlement from a third-party is substantive rather than procedural in nature; thus, the statute as it was in effect at the time of the employee's injury controls, and the employee is not entitled to an equitable distribution of the settlement. Jackson v. Branick Indus., Inc., 254 Neb. 950, 581 N.W.2d 53 (1998).
Ordinarily, one who creates a fund which benefits a workers' compensation subrogee is entitled to reimbursement for that portion of a reasonable attorney fee attributable to the benefit conferred; however, a workers' compensation subrogee is not liable for any portion of a fee exacted by an attorney who, because of a conflict of interest, abandoned protection of the subrogee's rights. Lawson v. Smith, 241 Neb. 639, 489 N.W.2d 566 (1992).
The right of an employer to subrogation for amounts paid to the injured employee as workmen's compensation payments is well established in Nebraska statutory law. Turner v. Metro Area Transit, 220 Neb. 189, 368 N.W.2d 809 (1985).
Ordinarily a division of attorneys' fees is not required where the subrogation interest of the employer or its insurance carrier is fully and adequately represented by its own counsel and where the services of the employee's attorney were not relied upon to effect the subrogation recovery. Schulz v. General Wholesale Coop. Co., Inc., 195 Neb. 410, 238 N.W.2d 463 (1976).
Subrogated interest of employer for computation and allocation of fees and expenses is measured by the workmen's compensation liability relieved or discharged by recovery against third party. Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444, 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973).
This section requires the joinder of an employer for purposes of subrogation and reimbursement. Rogers v. Western Electric Co., 179 Neb. 359, 138 N.W.2d 423 (1965).
Joinder of employer by employee in suit against third party is required for purpose of subrogation and reimbursement. American Province Real Estate Corp. v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 178 Neb. 348, 133 N.W.2d 466 (1965).
Employer was made party defendant in action by employee against third party because of right of subrogation. Singles v. Union P. R.R. Co., 174 Neb. 816, 119 N.W.2d 680 (1963).
Compensation carrier, who becomes obligated for compensation payments, may seek reimbursement. Fisher v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 171 Neb. 804, 107 N.W.2d 740 (1961).
Subcontractor made party defendant for purpose of subrogation. Rumsey v. Schollman Bros. Co., 156 Neb. 251, 55 N.W.2d 668 (1952).
This section is for the benefit of the employer so he may recover from third person. Danner v. Walters, 154 Neb. 506, 48 N.W.2d 635 (1951).
Where a party made a defendant for sole purpose of protecting his subrogation rights adopts and seeks to maintain the position of a plaintiff, a judgment for costs may be rendered against him. Rehn v. Bingaman, 152 Neb. 171, 40 N.W.2d 673 (1950).
Characteristics of statutory subrogation and equitable subrogation are the same. Burks v. Packer, 143 Neb. 373, 9 N.W.2d 471 (1943).
Employer was made party defendant to protect subrogation rights. Jones v. Rossbach Coal Co., 130 Neb. 302, 264 N.W. 877 (1936); Erwin v. Watson Bros. Transfer Co., 129 Neb. 64, 260 N.W. 565 (1935); McDonnell v. Wasenmiller, 74 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1934).
Measure of employer's right of subrogation hereunder is reimbursement from third person whose negligence caused employee's death, for full amount of compensation paid by employer to employee's dependent, together with the expenses thereof. Goeres v. Goeres, 124 Neb. 720, 248 N.W. 75 (1933).
Employer has statutory right of subrogation to extent of amounts properly paid under workmen's compensation law, plus expenses of recovering such damages from third person. Bronder v. Otis Elevator Co., 121 Neb. 581, 237 N.W. 671 (1931).
Employer must be joined as defendant by virtue of right of subrogation. Vandervert v. Robey, 118 Neb. 395, 225 N.W. 36 (1929).
Subrogation hereunder is not barred by employer's concurrent negligence. Graham v. City of Lincoln, 106 Neb. 305, 183 N.W. 569 (1921).
If employee settles with third person, by whose negligence he was injured, employer is entitled to have amount applied on compensation, and notwithstanding settlement, employer has right to recover against negligent third party to extent of compensation awarded. Hugh Murphy Const. Co. v. Serck, 104 Neb. 398, 177 N.W. 747 (1920).
Employer or carrier does not have subrogation rights against the independent contractual rights which the employee might have against an insurance company. Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 285 F.Supp. 920 (D. Neb. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1970).
Employer was made party to determine subrogation rights. Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1961).
The fact that employer's negligence concurred with negligence of third person does not bar employer's right to subrogation. Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller & Paine, 240 F. 376 (8th Cir. 1917).
5. Choice of law
An employer's or insurer's subrogation interest in an injured employee's recovery from a third-party tort-feasor is determined by the law of the state in which the employee obtained workers' compensation benefits. Turney v. Werner Enters., Inc., 260 Neb. 440, 618 N.W.2d 437 (2000).
The Workers' Compensation Court lacks jurisdiction to resolve disputes between employers and employees concerning the management of suits against third parties brought in courts of general jurisdiction or the division of funds obtained from a suit against a third party in a court of general jurisdiction. Because the existence of federal jurisdiction is a matter of federal law rather than state law, this section cannot, by itself, confer jurisdiction on federal courts to resolve subrogation disputes between employers and employees. The term "district court", as it is used in this section, does not exclusively mean federal district courts which have been conferred with jurisdiction by some federal statute; rather, it includes the district courts of the State of Nebraska as well. Miller v. M.F.S. York/Stormor, 257 Neb. 100, 595 N.W.2d 878 (1999).
This section does not take away or abridge the right of removal to federal court if that right otherwise exists. State v. Northwestern Engineering Co., 69 F.Supp. 347 (D. Neb. 1946).
6. Notice provisions
A reading of this section makes it quite clear that strict compliance with the written, certified, or registered mail notice provision was not intended to be mandatory and jurisdictional, and such notice may be waived in writing or may be implied from unequivocal conduct. The employer, through its "unequivocal conduct" of seeking to share in the settlement proceeds, has ratified the employee's settlement with the tort-feasor and thereby waived the objections it might have had to such settlement based on a lack of notice under this section. Combined Insurance v. Shurter, 258 Neb. 958, 607 N.W.2d 492 (2000).
Substantial compliance with the notice requirement of this section is sufficient, and the requirement is met when the other party receives actual notice of a third-party claim and an opportunity to join in its prosecution. Where subrogated employer did not receive notice of certain discovery proceedings, but did have actual knowledge of the lawsuit in which the third-party claim was asserted, notice requirement of statute deemed satisfied. The notice required by this section may be waived in writing, or waiver may be implied from unequivocal conduct. The extent of a subrogated employer's participation in third-party litigation initiated by an injured employee is the critical factor in determining whether the employer has joined the action within the meaning of this section. Subrogated employer failed to join in prosecution of injured employee's third-party lawsuit where employer did nothing more than file an answer and respond to two sets of interrogatories. Austin v. Scharp, 258 Neb. 410, 604 N.W.2d 807 (1999).
The purpose of the 1963 amendment to this section would allow the attorney fees to be prorated and one party must give to the other party notice of filing of suit. Turner v. Metro Area Transit, 220 Neb. 189, 368 N.W.2d 809 (1985).
Substantial rather than literal compliance with notice provisions of this section is sufficient and strict compliance is not jurisdictional. Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251, 220 N.W.2d 8 (1974).
Notice to workmen's compensation carrier of suit against third party is immaterial to proration of fees and expenses where carrier is made party and attorneys for carrier carried their share of trial load, and it is desirable there should be an agreement for apportionment. Kitchin v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 382 F.Supp. 42 (D. Neb. 1974).
7. Miscellaneous
This section and sections 48-118.01 through 48-118.04 should be read as a whole. In re Estate of Evertson, 295 Neb. 301, 889 N.W.2d 73 (2016).
Where an employer refuses to make lump-sum periodic lifetime workmen's compensation benefits due an employee or dependents, and where a recovery is made against a third party, the obligation of the employer to continue to make lifetime payments is not extinguished but merely suspended for the period of time the employer's share of the recovery satisfies the continuing obligation due the employee. In calculating the fees and expenses of both an employee and an employer, in connection with the recovery of damages from a third party, where a lump-sum agreement is not reached, the fees and expenses are to be deducted immediately from the recovery, and the employer's share of such fees and expenses is to be repaid weekly by the employer to the employee over the period of time benefit payments are due to the employee. Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806, 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986).
Under this section, where an action is filed before a particular court and prosecuted to a final conclusion, whether by settlement or judgment, that court alone has jurisdiction to resolve any controversy relating to division of fees and expenses. Moyer v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 212 Neb. 680, 325 N.W.2d 648 (1982).
Workmen's Compensation Act bars action by third party tort-feasor against employer for contribution or indemnity based on claim arising from the injury. Vangreen v. Interstate Machinery & Supply Co., 197 Neb. 29, 246 N.W.2d 652 (1976).
An employer can bring an action directly against a third party tort-feasor for injuries suffered by an employee, but only a personal representative of a deceased employee can bring an action for wrongful death, which action must be filed within two years after death. United Materials, Inc. v. Landreth, 196 Neb. 525, 244 N.W.2d 164 (1976).
Truck rental agreement, as modified, did not create relationship of employer and employee. United States F. & G. Co. v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 179 Neb. 565, 139 N.W.2d 222 (1966).
Civil liability of third person for causing death of employee is not changed by Workmen's Compensation Act. Luckey v. Union P. R. R. Co., 117 Neb. 85, 219 N.W. 802 (1928).
Act recognizes common-law liability of third persons for negligent injury to employee. Tralle v. Hartman Furniture & Carpet Co., 116 Neb. 418, 217 N.W. 952 (1928).
A voluntary payment made by a workers' compensation insurer after the statute of limitations has run does not remove the bar of the statute of limitations. In workers' compensation cases, an advance payment by an employer does not remove the bar of a statute of limitations which had already run at the time of the payment from a third-party lawsuit. The statute of limitations bars further suit against an employer if 2 years pass without a payment of workers' compensation from the employer, including by way of an advance payment from a third-party suit against a tort-feasor before the 2-year statute runs, by direct payment by the employer or its insurer, or by a payment caused to be made by the employer. Thomas v. Lincoln Public Schools, 9 Neb. App. 965, 622 N.W.2d 705 (2001).
An injured employee may use the common fund doctrine to shift an appropriate share of the cost of workers' compensation litigation to a health care insurer who directly and substantially benefits by the litigation through reimbursement. Kaiman v. Mercy Midlands Medical & Dental Plan, 1 Neb. App. 148, 491 N.W.2d 356 (1992).
Under facts in this settled case, costs were prorated between employee and intervening compensation carrier in same proportion they shared in benefits; each to pay own attorney's fees. Carter v. Par-Kan Construction Co., 348 F.Supp. 1295 (D. Neb. 1972).
Absent express contract of indemnity between seller of crane and purchaser, the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act insulated purchaser from contribution or indemnity in favor of seller in action by purchaser's employee for injuries sustained while dismantling crane. Petznick v. Clark Equipment Co., 333 F.Supp. 913 (D. Neb. 1971).
48-118.01.
Third-party claims; procedure; attorney's fees.Before making a claim or bringing suit against a third person by the employee or his or her personal representative or by the employer or his or her workers' compensation insurer, thirty days' notice shall be given to the other potential parties, unless such notice is waived in writing, of the opportunity to join in such claim or action and to be represented by counsel. If a party entitled to notice cannot be found, the clerk of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall become the agent of such party for giving notice as required in this section. The notice when given to the clerk of the compensation court shall include an affidavit setting forth the facts, including the steps taken to locate such party.
After the expiration of thirty days, for failure to receive notice or other good cause shown, the district court before which the action is pending shall allow either party to intervene in such action, and if no action is pending then the district court in which it could be brought shall allow either party to commence such action. Each party shall have an equal voice in the claim and the prosecution of such suit, and any dispute arising shall be passed upon by the court before which the case is pending and if no action is pending then by the district court in which such action could be brought.
If the employee or his or her personal representative or the employer or his or her workers' compensation insurer join in prosecuting such claim and are represented by counsel, the reasonable expenses and the attorney's fees shall be, unless otherwise agreed upon, divided between such attorneys as directed by the court before which the case is pending and if no action is pending then by the district court in which such action could be brought.
Annotations
In this section, the use of the term "the court" refers to the district court. In re Estate of Evertson, 295 Neb. 301, 889 N.W.2d 73 (2016).
This section and sections 48-118 through 48-118.04 should be read as a whole. In re Estate of Evertson, 295 Neb. 301, 889 N.W.2d 73 (2016).
This section requires that a subrogation claim against a third-party tort-feasor for workers' compensation benefits paid to a claimant must be brought in the district court. In re Estate of Evertson, 295 Neb. 301, 889 N.W.2d 73 (2016).
48-118.02.
Third-party claims; expenses and attorney's fees; apportionment.If either party after receiving notice under section 48-118.01 fails, by and through his or her attorney, to join in the third-party claim or suit, such party waives any and all claims or causes of action for improper prosecution of the third-party suit or inadequacy of a settlement made in accordance with section 48-118.04. The party bringing the claim or prosecuting the suit is entitled to deduct from any amount recovered the reasonable expenses of making such recovery, including a reasonable sum for attorney's fees. Such expenses and attorney's fees shall be prorated (1) to the amounts payable to the employer or his or her workers' compensation insurer under the right of subrogation established in section 48-118 and (2) to the amount in excess of such amount payable to the employer or his or her workers' compensation insurer under the right of subrogation. Such expenses and attorney's fees shall be apportioned by the court between the parties as their interests appear at the time of such recovery.
Annotations
This section and sections 48-118 through 48-118.04 should be read as a whole. In re Estate of Evertson, 295 Neb. 301, 889 N.W.2d 73 (2016).
When an employer has a subrogation interest in the recovery in a worker's third-party claim, the party bringing the claim or prosecuting the suit is entitled to deduct from any amount recovered the reasonable expenses of making such recovery, including a reasonable sum for attorney fees. Sterner v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 19 Neb. App. 339, 805 N.W.2d 696 (2011).
48-118.03.
Third-party claims; failure to give notice; effect.If either party makes a claim or prosecutes a third-party action without giving notice to the other party, the party bringing the claim and prosecuting such action shall not deduct expenses or attorney's fees from the amount payable to the other party.
Annotations
This section and sections 48-118 through 48-118.04 should be read as a whole. In re Estate of Evertson, 295 Neb. 301, 889 N.W.2d 73 (2016).
48-118.04.
Third-party claims; settlement; requirements.(1) A settlement of a third-party claim under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is void unless:
(a) Such settlement is agreed upon in writing by the employee or his or her personal representative and the workers' compensation insurer of the employer, if there is one, and if there is no insurer, then by the employer; or
(b) In the absence of such agreement, the court before which the action is pending determines that the settlement offer is fair and reasonable considering liability, damages, and the ability of the third person and his or her liability insurance carrier to satisfy any judgment.
(2) If the employee or his or her personal representative or the employer or his or her workers' compensation insurer do not agree in writing upon distribution of the proceeds of any judgment or settlement, the court, upon application, shall order a fair and equitable distribution of the proceeds of any judgment or settlement.
Annotations
1. Fair and equitable distribution
2. Miscellaneous
1. Fair and equitable distribution
A distribution of the proceeds of a judgment or settlement under subsection (2) of this section must be fair and equitable to both the employee and the employer or its insurer. Kroemer v. Omaha Track Equip., 296 Neb. 972, 898 N.W.2d 661 (2017).
The phrase "fair and equitable distribution," as used in this section, was not intended to permit the subrogation interest of an employer or workers' compensation insurer to be subject to equitable defenses. Burns v. Nielsen, 273 Neb. 724, 732 N.W.2d 640 (2007).
The purpose of this section is to prevent a fair and reasonable settlement between an employee and third-party tort-feasor from being delayed because the parties cannot agree on how the proposed settlement should be distributed. Burns v. Nielsen, 273 Neb. 724, 732 N.W.2d 640 (2007).
This section does not adopt a "made whole" doctrine, nor does it adopt any other specific rule for making a fair and equitable distribution, but instead leaves the distribution to the court's discretion. Turco v. Schuning, 271 Neb. 770, 716 N.W.2d 415 (2006).
Statutory subrogation under this section requires a fair and equitable distribution to be determined by the trial court under the facts of each case. Sterner v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 19 Neb. App. 339, 805 N.W.2d 696 (2011).
This section does not require an injured worker to be "made whole" before a subrogated compensation carrier is entitled to a portion of the settlement. Sterner v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 19 Neb. App. 339, 805 N.W.2d 696 (2011).
2. Miscellaneous
Although the trial court did not abuse its discretion in approving an injured employee's settlement of his third-party suit for $150,000, the court's allocation of zero to an employer who had a subrogation interest exceeding $200,000 was untenable. Kroemer v. Omaha Track Equip., 296 Neb. 972, 898 N.W.2d 661 (2017).
Because this section should be read along with sections 48-118 through 48-118.03, the use of the term "the court" in this section refers to the district court. In re Estate of Evertson, 295 Neb. 301, 889 N.W.2d 73 (2016).
District courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over proceedings for the fair and equitable distribution of settlement proceeds from third-party tort-feasors subject to subrogation in workers' compensation cases. In re Estate of Evertson, 295 Neb. 301, 889 N.W.2d 73 (2016).
This section does not authorize the district court to punish an employer beyond the penalties expressly prescribed by the workers' compensation statutes. Burns v. Nielsen, 273 Neb. 724, 732 N.W.2d 640 (2007).
Third-party settlements are void unless agreed to in writing by the employee, or the employee's personal representative, and the employer, or the employer's insurer. Sterner v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 19 Neb. App. 339, 805 N.W.2d 696 (2011).
48-118.05.
Third-party claims; Workers' Compensation Trust Fund; subrogation rights.In any case in which an injured employee is entitled to benefits from the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund for injuries occurring before December 1, 1997, as provided in section 48-128 and recovery is had against the third party liable to the employee for the injury, the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee against such third party to the extent of the benefits due to him or her or which shall become due to him or her from such fund, subject to the rights of the employer and his or her workers' compensation insurer.
48-119.
Compensation; from what date computed.No compensation shall be allowed for the first seven calendar days of disability, except as provided in section 48-120, but if disability extends beyond the period of seven calendar days, compensation shall begin on the eighth calendar day of disability, except that if such disability continues for six weeks or longer, compensation shall be computed from the date disability began. For purposes of this section, a partial day of disability shall be deemed a calendar day of disability.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 19, p. 585; R.S.1913, § 3660; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 5, p. 202; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 1, p. 520; C.S.1922, § 3042; C.S.1929, § 48-119; R.S.1943, § 48-119;
Laws 1999, LB 216, § 2.
Annotations
For scheduled disabilities caused by repetitive trauma, the date disability begins is the same as the date of injury for whole body impairments caused by repetitive trauma. That date is when the employee discontinues work and seeks medical treatment, despite being paid wages while he continued to work. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
Compensation is to be computed from the date of the injury. Hobza v. Seedorff Masonry, Inc., 259 Neb. 671, 611 N.W.2d 828 (2000).
After injury has continued for six weeks, compensation should be computed from date of injury. Park v. School District No. 27, Richardson Cty., 127 Neb. 767, 257 N.W. 219 (1934).
48-120.
Medical, surgical, and hospital services; employer's liability; fee schedule; physician, right to select; procedures; powers and duties; court; powers; dispute resolution procedure; managed care plan.(1)(a) The employer is liable for all reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services, including plastic surgery or reconstructive surgery but not cosmetic surgery when the injury has caused disfigurement, appliances, supplies, prosthetic devices, and medicines as and when needed, which are required by the nature of the injury and which will relieve pain or promote and hasten the employee's restoration to health and employment, and includes damage to or destruction of artificial members, dental appliances, teeth, hearing instruments, and eyeglasses, but, in the case of dental appliances, hearing instruments, or eyeglasses, only if such damage or destruction resulted from an accident which also caused personal injury entitling the employee to compensation therefor for disability or treatment, subject to the approval of and regulation by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, not to exceed the regular charge made for such service in similar cases.
(b) Except as provided in section 48-120.04, the compensation court shall establish schedules of fees for such services. The compensation court shall review such schedules at least biennially and adopt appropriate changes when necessary. The compensation court may contract with any person, firm, corporation, organization, or government agency to secure adequate data to establish such fees. The compensation court shall publish and furnish to the public the fee schedules established pursuant to this subdivision and section 48-120.04. The compensation court may establish and charge a fee to recover the cost of published fee schedules.
(c) Reimbursement for inpatient hospital services provided by hospitals located in or within fifteen miles of a Nebraska city of the metropolitan class or primary class and by other hospitals with fifty-one or more licensed beds shall be according to the Diagnostic Related Group inpatient hospital fee schedule or the trauma services inpatient hospital fee schedule established in section 48-120.04.
(d) A workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, self-insured employer, or managed care plan certified pursuant to section 48-120.02 may contract with a provider or provider network for medical, surgical, or hospital services. Such contract may establish fees for services different than the fee schedules established under subdivision (1)(b) of this section or established under section 48-120.04. Such contract shall be in writing and mutually agreed upon prior to the date services are provided.
(e) The provider or supplier of such services shall not collect or attempt to collect from any employer, insurer, government, or injured employee or dependent or the estate of any injured or deceased employee any amount in excess of (i) the fee established by the compensation court for any such service, (ii) the fee established under section 48-120.04, or (iii) the fee contracted under subdivision (1)(d) of this section, including any finance charge or late penalty.
(2)(a) The employee has the right to select a physician who has maintained the employee's medical records prior to an injury and has a documented history of treatment with the employee prior to an injury or a physician who has maintained the medical records of an immediate family member of the employee prior to an injury and has a documented history of treatment with an immediate family member of the employee prior to an injury. For purposes of this subsection, immediate family member means the employee's spouse, children, parents, stepchildren, and stepparents. The employer shall notify the employee following an injury of such right of selection in a form and manner and within a timeframe established by the compensation court. If the employer fails to notify the employee of such right of selection or fails to notify the employee of such right of selection in a form and manner and within a timeframe established by the compensation court, then the employee has the right to select a physician. If the employee fails to exercise such right of selection in a form and manner and within a timeframe established by the compensation court following notice by the employer pursuant to this subsection, then the employer has the right to select the physician. If selection of the initial physician is made by the employee or employer pursuant to this subsection following notice by the employer pursuant to this subsection, the employee or employer shall not change the initial selection of physician made pursuant to this subsection unless such change is agreed to by the employee and employer or is ordered by the compensation court pursuant to subsection (6) of this section. If compensability is denied by the workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured employer, (i) the employee has the right to select a physician and shall not be made to enter a managed care plan and (ii) the employer is liable for medical, surgical, and hospital services subsequently found to be compensable. If the employer has exercised the right to select a physician pursuant to this subsection and if the compensation court subsequently orders reasonable medical services previously refused to be furnished to the employee by the physician selected by the employer, the compensation court shall allow the employee to select another physician to furnish further medical services. If the employee selects a physician located in a community not the home or place of work of the employee and a physician is available in the local community or in a closer community, no travel expenses shall be required to be paid by the employer or his or her workers' compensation insurer.
(b) In cases of injury requiring dismemberment or injuries involving major surgical operation, the employee may designate to his or her employer the physician or surgeon to perform the operation.
(c) If the injured employee unreasonably refuses or neglects to avail himself or herself of medical or surgical treatment furnished by the employer, except as herein and otherwise provided, the employer is not liable for an aggravation of such injury due to such refusal and neglect and the compensation court or judge thereof may suspend, reduce, or limit the compensation otherwise payable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
(d) If, due to the nature of the injury or its occurrence away from the employer's place of business, the employee or the employer is unable to select a physician using the procedures provided by this subsection, the selection requirements of this subsection shall not apply as long as the inability to make a selection persists.
(e) The physician selected may arrange for any consultation, referral, or extraordinary or other specialized medical services as the nature of the injury requires.
(f) The employer is not responsible for medical services furnished or ordered by any physician or other person selected by the employee in disregard of this section. Except as otherwise provided by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, the employer is not liable for medical, surgical, or hospital services or medicines if the employee refuses to allow them to be furnished by the employer.
(3) No claim for such medical treatment is valid and enforceable unless, within fourteen days following the first treatment, the physician giving such treatment furnishes the employer a report of such injury and treatment on a form prescribed by the compensation court. The compensation court may excuse the failure to furnish such report within fourteen days when it finds it to be in the interest of justice to do so.
(4) All physicians and other providers of medical services attending injured employees shall comply with all the rules and regulations adopted and promulgated by the compensation court and shall make such reports as may be required by it at any time and at such times as required by it upon the condition or treatment of any injured employee or upon any other matters concerning cases in which they are employed. All medical and hospital information relevant to the particular injury shall, on demand, be made available to the employer, the employee, the workers' compensation insurer, and the compensation court. The party requesting such medical and hospital information shall pay the cost thereof. No such relevant information developed in connection with treatment or examination for which compensation is sought shall be considered a privileged communication for purposes of a workers' compensation claim. When a physician or other provider of medical services willfully fails to make any report required of him or her under this section, the compensation court may order the forfeiture of his or her right to all or part of payment due for services rendered in connection with the particular case.
(5) Whenever the compensation court deems it necessary, in order to assist it in resolving any issue of medical fact or opinion, it shall cause the employee to be examined by a physician or physicians selected by the compensation court and obtain from such physician or physicians a report upon the condition or matter which is the subject of inquiry. The compensation court may charge the cost of such examination to the workers' compensation insurer. The cost of such examination shall include the payment to the employee of all necessary and reasonable expenses incident to such examination, such as transportation and loss of wages.
(6) The compensation court shall have the authority to determine the necessity, character, and sufficiency of any medical services furnished or to be furnished and shall have authority to order a change of physician, hospital, rehabilitation facility, or other medical services when it deems such change is desirable or necessary. Any dispute regarding medical, surgical, or hospital services furnished or to be furnished under this section may be submitted by the parties, the supplier of such service, or the compensation court on its own motion for informal dispute resolution by a staff member of the compensation court or an outside mediator pursuant to section 48-168. In addition, any party or the compensation court on its own motion may submit such a dispute for a medical finding by an independent medical examiner pursuant to section 48-134.01. Issues submitted for informal dispute resolution or for a medical finding by an independent medical examiner may include, but are not limited to, the reasonableness and necessity of any medical treatment previously provided or to be provided to the injured employee. The compensation court may adopt and promulgate rules and regulations regarding informal dispute resolution or the submission of disputes to an independent medical examiner that are considered necessary to effectuate the purposes of this section.
(7) For the purpose of this section, physician has the same meaning as in section 48-151.
(8) The compensation court shall order the employer to make payment directly to the supplier of any services provided for in this section or reimbursement to anyone who has made any payment to the supplier for services provided in this section. No such supplier or payor may be made or become a party to any action before the compensation court.
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured employer may contract for medical, surgical, hospital, and rehabilitation services to be provided through a managed care plan certified pursuant to section 48-120.02. Once liability for medical, surgical, and hospital services has been accepted or determined, the employer may require that employees subject to the contract receive medical, surgical, and hospital services in the manner prescribed in the contract, except that an employee may receive services from a physician selected by the employee pursuant to subsection (2) of this section if the physician so selected agrees to refer the employee to the managed care plan for any other treatment that the employee may require and if the physician so selected agrees to comply with all the rules, terms, and conditions of the managed care plan. If compensability is denied by the workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured employer, the employee may leave the managed care plan and the employer is liable for medical, surgical, and hospital services previously provided. The workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured employer shall give notice to employees subject to the contract of eligible service providers and such other information regarding the contract and manner of receiving medical, surgical, and hospital services under the managed care plan as the compensation court may prescribe.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 20, p. 585; R.S.1913, § 3661; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 6, p. 202; Laws 1919, c. 91, § 1, p. 228; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 1, p. 520; C.S.1922, § 3043; C.S.1929, § 48-120; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 19, p. 197; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-120; R.S.1943, § 48-120; Laws 1965, c. 278, § 1, p. 799; Laws 1969, c. 388, § 2, p. 1359; Laws 1969, c. 392, § 1, p. 1376;
Laws 1975, LB 127, § 1; Laws 1978, LB 529, § 2; Laws 1979, LB 215, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 38; Laws 1987, LB 187, § 1; Laws 1992, LB 360, § 13; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 2; Laws 1998, LB 1010, § 2; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 3; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 3; Laws 2007, LB588, § 1; Laws 2009, LB195, § 51; Laws 2011, LB152, § 1; Laws 2015, LB480, § 2.
Annotations
1. Liability
2. Travel expense
3. Physician's fee
4. Miscellaneous
1. Liability
An employer may contest any future workers' compensation claims for medical treatment on the basis that such treatment is unrelated to the original work-related injury or occupational disease, or that the treatment is unnecessary or inapplicable, only after a Form 50 physician has been appointed and prescribed treatment. Rogers v. Jack's Supper Club, 308 Neb. 107, 953 N.W.2d 9 (2021).
Where there was sufficient evidence to support a factual finding that knee surgery was not required by the prior work-related injury, the Workers' Compensation Court did not err in denying compensation for the surgery under an award of future medical treatment. Pearson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Milling Co., 285 Neb. 568, 828 N.W.2d 154 (2013).
If an employer has sufficient knowledge of an injury to an employee to be aware that medical treatment is necessary, it has the affirmative and continuing duty to supply medical treatment that is prompt, in compliance with the statutory prescription on choice of doctors, and adequate; if the employer fails to do so, the employee may make suitable independent arrangements at the employer's expense. Clark v. Alegent Health Neb., 285 Neb. 60, 825 N.W.2d 195 (2013).
If compensability is denied by the employer, the employee has the right to select a physician and the employer is liable for medical services subsequently found to be compensable. Clark v. Alegent Health Neb., 285 Neb. 60, 825 N.W.2d 195 (2013).
Once it has been determined that the need for future medical care is probable, the employer is liable for any future care shown to be reasonably necessary under this section. Sellers v. Reefer Systems, 283 Neb. 760, 811 N.W.2d 293 (2012).
An employee's injury which occurs en route to a required medical appointment that is related to a compensable injury is also compensable, as long as the chosen route is reasonable and practical. Straub v. City of Scottsbluff, 280 Neb. 163, 784 N.W.2d 886 (2010).
Before an order for future medical benefits may be entered pursuant to this section, there should be a stipulation of the parties or evidence in the record to support a determination that future medical treatment will be reasonably necessary to relieve the injured worker from the effects of the work-related injury or occupational disease. Foote v. O'Neill Packing, 262 Neb. 467, 632 N.W.2d 313 (2001).
The history of this section clearly manifests a legislative intent to make medical benefits available to a disabled worker without regard to any time limitation measured from the last date of payment, when an award is entered, so long as further medical treatment is reasonably necessary to relieve the worker from the effects of the work-related injury or occupational disease. Foote v. O'Neill Packing, 262 Neb. 467, 632 N.W.2d 313 (2001).
The Workers' Compensation Court may allow an employee to recover the reasonable value of necessary home nursing care furnished by the employee's spouse. Kidd v. Winchell's Donut House, 237 Neb. 176, 465 N.W.2d 442 (1991).
While a disabled employee may not be required to undergo surgery, an unreasonable refusal to submit to surgery, taking into account the risk involved to the employee, the nature of the surgery, and the likelihood of improving the condition, may result in the forfeiture or reduction of compensation benefits, as may be appropriate. Yarns v. Leon Plastics, Inc., 237 Neb. 132, 464 N.W.2d 801 (1991).
The cost of a penile implant is a compensable medical procedure under this section. Canas v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 Neb. 164, 459 N.W.2d 533 (1990).
Generally, pursuant to this section, an employee may be reimbursed for nursing care in the employee's home or at a nursing home, when such care is necessitated by a work-related injury, so long as the cost of the care is fair and reasonable. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Deyle, 234 Neb. 537, 451 N.W.2d 910 (1990).
An employer is liable only for those reasonable medical expenses incurred as a result of a compensable accident. Expenses not shown by the evidence to have been incurred as a result of a compensable accident are not allowable as charges against the employer. Hare v. Watts Trucking Service, 220 Neb. 403, 370 N.W.2d 143 (1985).
Even though there is no present prospect for improvement of a condition of total and permanent disability or of further rehabilitation, the employer continues to be responsible under this section for further nursing care and therapy. S. & S. LP Gas Co. v. Ramsey, 201 Neb. 751, 272 N.W.2d 47 (1978).
An employer is liable to an injured employee for reasonable medical and hospital services and medicines which are necessary to relieve or cure injury suffered by the employee. Spiker v. John Day Co., 201 Neb. 503, 270 N.W.2d 300 (1978).
An injured employee may recover the reasonable value of necessary nursing care furnished to him by his wife while he was cared for at home. Spiker v. John Day Co., 201 Neb. 503, 270 N.W.2d 300 (1978); overruling Claus v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
The liability of an employer to an injured employee for reasonable medical and hospital services and medicine which are necessary as a result of injury, is not limited to only those situations in which the employee may be cured or his disability reduced by further treatment. Spiker v. John Day Co., 201 Neb. 503, 270 N.W.2d 300 (1978).
When undisputed evidence shows plaintiff will require medicines and medical and hospital services in the future as a result of his injuries they shall, subject to approval by the Workmen's Compensation Court, be supplied by defendant. Shotwell v. Industrial Builders, Inc., 187 Neb. 320, 190 N.W.2d 624 (1971).
In absence of showing of unreasonableness, hospital and nurse expense incurred will be allowed. Gourley v. City of Grand Island, 168 Neb. 538, 96 N.W.2d 309 (1959).
Where further medical services would not improve condition, liability for same ceases. Peek v. Ayres Auto Supply, 155 Neb. 233, 51 N.W.2d 387 (1952).
Medical services necessary in treating injury to eye were recoverable. Gruber v. Stickelman, 149 Neb. 627, 31 N.W.2d 753 (1948).
Where evidence shows that further medical, hospital, and surgical services would not definitely improve condition of an injured employee, employer's liability to furnish such services ceases. Paulson v. Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 1012, 26 N.W.2d 11 (1947).
Employer is liable for reasonable medical and hospital services when award provides for further medical, surgical, and hospital care. Gilmore v. State, 146 Neb. 647, 20 N.W.2d 918 (1945).
Employer is liable for reasonable hospital and medical services and medicines, when needed, and approved by compensation commissioner. Summers v. Railway Express Agency, 134 Neb. 237, 278 N.W. 476 (1938).
Where evidence shows that further medical, surgical, and hospital services would not improve condition of injured employee, employer's liability for such services ceases. Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
Employer providing medical attention during three weeks subsequent to injury is not liable for medical expenses after blood poisoning developed. Epsten v. Hancock-Epsten Co., 101 Neb. 442, 163 N.W. 767 (1917).
The general rule under this section is that, should a court determine a medical treatment for a condition unrelated to a work-related injury is medically reasonable and necessary to treat the underlying work-related injury, the medical treatment is required by the nature of the injury and is compensable. Carr v. Ganz, 26 Neb. App. 14, 916 N.W.2d 437 (2018).
Under subsection (1)(a) of this section, an employer is liable for all reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services which are required by the nature of the injury and which will relieve pain or promote and hasten the employee's restoration to health and employment. Yost v. Davita, Inc., 23 Neb. App. 482, 873 N.W.2d 435 (2015).
Before an order for future medical benefits may be entered pursuant to subsection (1)(a) of this section, there must be explicit evidence that future medical treatment is reasonably necessary to relieve the injured worker from the effects of the work-related injury. Adams v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 17 Neb. App. 708, 774 N.W.2d 761 (2009).
The trial judge did not err in ordering the employer to pay for medication, because the judge's determination that the medication was necessary to treat both the work-related side effects of pain medication and the unrelated condition of sleep apnea was not clearly wrong. Zitterkopf v. Aulick Indus., 16 Neb. App. 829, 753 N.W.2d 370 (2008).
Medical expenses incurred before the date of an employee's accident in a repetitive trauma case may be compensable if they are reasonably necessary and related to the compensable injury. Tomlin v. Densberger Drywall, 14 Neb. App. 288, 706 N.W.2d 595 (2005).
Making a home handicapped-accessible was an "appliance" and "supply" for which the employer of injured employee was liable. Koterzina v. Copple Chevrolet, 1 Neb. App. 1000, 510 N.W.2d 467 (1993).
2. Travel expense
Because this section makes the employer liable for reasonable medical and hospital services, the employer must also pay the cost of travel incident to and reasonably necessary for obtaining these services. Armstrong v. State, 290 Neb. 205, 859 N.W.2d 541 (2015).
An injured employee was not entitled to payment for travel expenses to Massachusetts where the trial court properly found that a physician was available in the local community or in a closer community than Massachusetts. Savage v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 208 Neb. 676, 305 N.W.2d 375 (1981).
Travel expenses to obtain medical treatment may be allowed. Pavel v. Hughes Brothers, 167 Neb. 727, 94 N.W.2d 492 (1959).
Injured workman was entitled to recover travel expense incurred to obtain medical treatment. Pittenger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 166 Neb. 858, 91 N.W.2d 31 (1958).
Employer may be held liable for medical and hospital services, including cost of travel reasonably necessary for obtaining such services. Newberry v. Youngs, 163 Neb. 397, 80 N.W.2d 165 (1956).
3. Physician's fee
Workmen's compensation court may allow medical expenses in accordance with medical fee schedule approved by the court. Schoenrock v. School Dist. of Nebraska City, 179 Neb. 621, 139 N.W.2d 547 (1966).
Employer is liable for reasonable medical and hospital expense and medicines as and when needed. Brewer v. Hilberg, 173 Neb. 863, 115 N.W.2d 437 (1962).
Physician is entitled to fee for making examination of employee after hearing before compensation commissioner and before trial in district court, to determine if surgical operation on employee as demanded by employer would be reasonably safe and beneficial. Solomon v. A. W. Farney, Inc., 130 Neb. 484, 265 N.W. 724 (1936).
Family physician, chosen by employee to aid operating surgeon selected by employer, may recover for such services and post-operative attention to patient from the employer. Wingate v. Evans Model Laundry, 123 Neb. 844, 244 N.W. 635 (1932).
4. Miscellaneous
The term "payor" as used in subsection (8) of this section is limited to third-party payors, such as health insurance carriers. VanKirk v. Central Community College, 285 Neb. 231, 826 N.W.2d 277 (2013).
Upon receipt of payment from an employer, a supplier or provider of services becomes obligated to reimburse an employee any amounts he or she has previously paid. VanKirk v. Central Community College, 285 Neb. 231, 826 N.W.2d 277 (2013).
An employer is not responsible for medical services furnished or ordered by any physician or other person selected by an injured employee in disregard of subdivision (2)(a) of this section. Clark v. Alegent Health Neb., 285 Neb. 60, 825 N.W.2d 195 (2013).
Under subdivision (2)(a) of this section, an employee has the right to select a physician who has maintained the employee's medical records prior to an injury and has a documented history of treatment with the employee prior to the injury. The employer shall notify the employee following an injury of such right of selection in a form and manner within the timeframe established by the compensation court. Clark v. Alegent Health Neb., 285 Neb. 60, 825 N.W.2d 195 (2013).
Under subsection (b) of this section, the fee schedule is applicable to payments made by third-party payors. Pearson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Milling Co., 282 Neb. 400, 803 N.W.2d 489 (2011).
This section, while not affording the Workers' Compensation Court with jurisdiction to resolve every disagreement that may arise with respect to the rights and obligations of a third-party insurer, clearly provides that the Workers' Compensation Court shall order an employer to directly reimburse medical care providers and medical insurers for the reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services supplied to a workers' compensation claimant pursuant to this section. Kimminau v. Uribe Refuse Serv., 270 Neb. 682, 707 N.W.2d 229 (2005).
This section does not require the court to have a physician examine plaintiff when medical evidence on cause is lacking. The statute applies only to issues of medical fact or opinion in cases where liability has been established and issues arise over such things as refusal or necessity of medical treatment. The statute grants the court discretionary power. Coco v. Austin Co., 212 Neb. 95, 321 N.W.2d 448 (1982).
If psychiatric treatment is prescribed, refusal of the treatment may be deemed unreasonable in view of the absence of any physical suffering in the treatment. Davis v. Western Electric, 210 Neb. 771, 317 N.W.2d 68 (1982).
The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court has continuing authority to determine the necessity, character, and sufficiency of medical services furnished or to be furnished and to order a change therein when it deems such change is desirable or necessary. S. & S. LP Gas Co. v. Ramsey, 201 Neb. 751, 272 N.W.2d 47 (1978).
Ordinarily, an employee's right to recover the cost of medical and hospital services and medicines depends upon his having paid for services or incurred a liability to pay for them. Spiker v. John Day Co., 201 Neb. 503, 270 N.W.2d 300 (1978).
Exclusive original jurisdiction to determine claims under workmen's compensation law is in compensation commissioner. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Walker, 128 Neb. 327, 258 N.W. 550 (1935).
Plaintiff in action against noninsuring employer for personal injuries has not waived right of action, or brought himself within Workmen's Compensation Act, by accepting payment of hospital bill. Brown v. York Water Co., 104 Neb. 516, 177 N.W. 833 (1920).
Employer is not liable for medical services procured by employee, where latter unreasonably refuses services of physician procured by employer. Radil v. Morris & Co., 103 Neb. 84, 170 N.W. 363 (1919).
The meaning of subsection (4) of this section is plain and unambiguous. When an injured worker is seeking compensation for an injury from his employer and the employer seeks relevant information from the injured worker's treating physician regarding that injury, that information is not privileged. Scott v. Drivers Mgmt., Inc., 14 Neb. App. 630, 714 N.W.2d 23 (2006).
Under certain circumstances, an injured worker should be reimbursed for the relocation costs when the relocation is undertaken upon a doctor's recommendation due to a work injury. Relocation expenses, pursuant to a doctor's recommendations, in order to lessen necessary medical treatment, additional injury, and pain, are within a liberal definition of "medical services" under this section. Hoffart v. Fleming Cos., 10 Neb. App. 524, 634 N.W.2d 37 (2001).
A health care insurer cannot be a party to the underlying workers' compensation case which, if successful, results in the reimbursement of the health care insurer, nor can it be later joined after a successful result. Kaiman v. Mercy Midlands Medical & Dental Plan, 1 Neb. App. 148, 491 N.W.2d 356 (1992).
48-120.01.
Terms, defined.As used in section 48-120, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) Plastic surgery shall mean that branch of surgery concerned with the repair or restoration of lost, injured, or deformed body parts chiefly by transfer of tissue; and
(2) Reconstructive surgery shall mean surgery which restores or tends to restore an injured or deformed structure.
48-120.02.
Managed care plan; certification; application; requirements; conditions; dispute resolution procedure; required; independent medical examiner; compensation court; powers and duties; Attorney General; duties.(1) Any person or entity may make written application to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court to have a plan certified that provides management of quality treatment to injured employees for injuries and diseases compensable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Any such person or entity having a relationship with a workers' compensation insurer or any such person or entity having a relationship with an employer for which a plan is being proposed for its own employees shall make full disclosure of such relationship to the compensation court under rules and regulations to be adopted and promulgated by the compensation court. Each application for certification shall be accompanied by a reasonable fee prescribed by the compensation court. A plan may be certified to provide services in a limited geographic area. A certificate is valid for the period the compensation court prescribes unless earlier revoked or suspended pursuant to subsection (4) or (5) of this section. Application for certification shall be made in the form and manner and shall set forth information regarding the proposed plan for providing services as the compensation court may prescribe. The information shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) A list of the names of all providers of medical, surgical, and hospital services under the managed care plan, together with a statement that all licensing, certification, or registration requirements for the providers are current and in good standing in this state or the state in which the provider is practicing; and
(b) A description of the places and manner of providing services under the plan.
(2) The compensation court shall certify a managed care plan if the compensation court finds that the plan:
(a) Proposes to provide quality services that meet uniform treatment standards which may be prescribed by the compensation court and all medical, surgical, and hospital services that may be required by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act in a manner that is timely, effective, and convenient for the employee;
(b) Is reasonably geographically convenient to employees it serves;
(c) Provides appropriate financial incentives to reduce service costs and utilization without sacrificing the quality of service;
(d) Provides adequate methods of peer review, utilization review, and dispute resolution to prevent inappropriate, excessive, or not medically necessary treatment and excludes participation in the plan by those individuals who violate treatment standards;
(e) Provides a procedure for the resolution of medical disputes;
(f) Provides aggressive case management for injured employees and provides a program for early return to work and cooperative efforts by the employees, the employer, and the managed care plan to promote workplace health and safety consultative and other services;
(g) Provides a timely and accurate method of reporting to the compensation court necessary information regarding medical, surgical, and hospital service cost and utilization to enable the compensation court to determine the effectiveness of the plan;
(h) Authorizes employees to receive medical, surgical, and hospital services from a physician who is not a member of the managed care plan if such physician has been selected by the employee pursuant to subsection (2) of section 48-120 and if such physician agrees to refer the employee to the managed care plan for any other treatment that the employee may require and agrees to comply with all the rules, terms, and conditions of the managed care plan;
(i) Authorizes necessary emergency medical treatment for an injury which is provided by a provider of medical, surgical, and hospital services who is not a part of the managed care plan;
(j) Does not discriminate against or exclude from participation in the plan any category of providers of medical, surgical, or hospital services and includes an adequate number of each category of providers of medical, surgical, and hospital services to give employees convenient geographic accessibility to all categories of providers and adequate flexibility to choose a physician to provide medical, surgical, and hospital services from among those who provide services under the plan;
(k) Provides an employee the right to change the physician initially selected to provide medical, surgical, and hospital services under the plan at least once; and
(l) Complies with any other requirement the compensation court determines is necessary to provide quality medical, surgical, and hospital services to injured employees.
The compensation court may accept findings, licenses, certifications, or registrations of other state agencies as satisfactory evidence of compliance with a particular requirement of this subsection.
(3) An employee shall exhaust the dispute resolution procedure of the certified managed care plan prior to filing a petition or otherwise seeking relief from the compensation court on an issue related to managed care. If an employee has exhausted the dispute resolution procedure of the managed care plan, the employee may seek a medical finding by an independent medical examiner pursuant to section 48-134.01. No petition may be filed with the compensation court pursuant to section 48-173 solely on the issue of the reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment unless a medical finding on such issue has been rendered by an independent medical examiner pursuant to section 48-134.01. If the compensation court subsequently orders reasonable medical services previously refused to be furnished to the employee by a physician who is a member of the managed care plan, the compensation court shall allow the employee to select another physician to furnish further medical services if the physician so selected complies with all rules, terms, and conditions of the managed care plan and refers the employee to the managed care plan for any other treatment that the employee may require.
(4) The compensation court may refuse to certify a managed care plan or a three-judge panel of the compensation court may, after notice and hearing, revoke or suspend the certification of a managed care plan that unfairly restricts direct access within the managed care plan to any category of provider of medical, surgical, or hospital services. Direct access within the managed care plan is unfairly restricted if direct access is denied and the treatment or service sought is within the scope of practice of the profession to which direct access is sought and is appropriate under the standards of treatment adopted by the managed care plan or, in instances where the compensation court has adopted standards of treatment, the standards adopted by the compensation court.
(5) The compensation court may refuse to certify a managed care plan if the compensation court finds that the plan for providing medical, surgical, and hospital services fails to meet the requirements of this section. A three-judge panel of the compensation court may, after notice and hearing, revoke or suspend the certification of a managed care plan if the panel finds that the plan fails to meet the requirements of this section or that service under the plan is not being provided in accordance with the terms of a certified plan.
(6) The Attorney General, when requested by the administrator of the compensation court, may file a motion pursuant to section 48-162.03 for an order directing representatives of a certified managed care plan to appear before a three-judge panel of the compensation court and show cause as to why the panel should not revoke or suspend certification of the plan pursuant to subsection (4) or (5) of this section. The Attorney General shall be considered a party for purposes of such motion. The Attorney General may appear before the three-judge panel and present evidence that the managed care plan unfairly restricts direct access within the plan, that the plan fails to meet the requirements of this section, or that service under the plan is not being provided in accordance with the terms of a certified plan. The presiding judge shall rule on a motion of the Attorney General pursuant to this subsection and, if applicable, shall appoint judges of the compensation court to serve on the three-judge panel. The presiding judge shall not serve on such panel. Appeal from a suspension or revocation pursuant to subsection (4) or (5) of this section shall be in accordance with section 48-185. No such appeal shall operate as a supersedeas.
(7) The compensation court may adopt and promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement this section.
Source:Laws 1993, LB 757, § 3; Laws 1998, LB 1010, § 3; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 4; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 3; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 3.
48-120.03.
Generic drugs; use.Any person or entity that dispenses medicines and medical supplies, as required by section 48-120, shall dispense the generic drug equivalent unless:
(1) A generic drug equivalent is unavailable; or
(2) The prescribing physician specifically provides in writing that a nongeneric drug must be dispensed.
48-120.04.
Diagnostic
Related Group inpatient hospital fee schedule; trauma services inpatient hospital fee schedule; established;
applicability; adjustments; methodology; hospital; duties; reports; compensation
court; powers and duties.(1) This section applies
only to hospitals identified in subdivision (1)(c) of section 48-120.
(2) For inpatient discharges on or after January 1, 2008,
the Diagnostic Related Group inpatient hospital fee schedule shall be as set
forth in this section, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (1)(d)
of section 48-120. Adjustments shall be made annually as provided in this
section, with such adjustments to become effective each January 1.
(3) For inpatient
trauma discharges on or after January 1, 2012, the trauma services inpatient
hospital fee schedule shall be as set forth in this section, except as otherwise
provided in subdivision (1)(d) of section 48-120. Adjustments shall be made
annually as provided in this section, with such adjustments to become effective
each January 1.
(4) For
purposes of this section:
(a) Current Medicare Factor is derived from the Diagnostic
Related Group Prospective Payment System as established by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services under the United States Department of Health
and Human Services and means the summation of the following components:
(i) Hospital-specific Federal Standardized Amount, including
all wage index adjustments and reclassifications;
(ii) Hospital-specific Capital Standard Federal Rate, including
geographic, outlier, and exception adjustment factors;
(iii) Hospital-specific Indirect Medical Education Rate, reflecting
a percentage add-on for indirect medical education costs and related capital;
and
(iv) Hospital-specific Disproportionate Share Hospital Rate,
reflecting a percentage add-on for disproportionate share of low-income patient
costs and related capital;
(b) Current Medicare Weight means the weight assigned to each
Medicare Diagnostic Related Group as established by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services under the United States Department of Health and Human
Services;
(c) Diagnostic Related Group means the Diagnostic Related
Group assigned to inpatient hospital services using the public domain classification
and methodology system developed for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services under the United States Department of Health and Human Services;
(d) Trauma
means a major single-system or multisystem injury requiring immediate medical
or surgical intervention or treatment to prevent death or permanent disability;
(e) Workers' Compensation
Factor means the Current Medicare Factor for each hospital multiplied by one
hundred fifty percent except
for inpatient hospital trauma services; and
(f) Workers'
Compensation Trauma Factor for inpatient hospital trauma services means the
Current Medicare Factor for each hospital multiplied by one hundred sixty
percent.
(5) The Diagnostic Related
Group inpatient hospital fee schedule shall include at least thirty-eight
of the most frequently utilized Medicare Diagnostic Related Groups for workers'
compensation with the goal that the fee schedule covers at least ninety percent
of all workers' compensation inpatient hospital claims submitted by hospitals
identified in subdivision (1)(c) of section 48-120. Rehabilitation Diagnostic
Related Groups shall not be included in the Diagnostic Related Group inpatient
hospital fee schedule. Claims for inpatient trauma services shall not be reimbursed
under the Diagnostic Related Group inpatient hospital fee schedule established
under this section. Claims
for inpatient trauma services prior to January 1, 2012, shall be reimbursed
under the fees established by the compensation court pursuant to subdivision
(1)(b) of section 48-120 or as contracted pursuant to subdivision (1)(d) of
such section. Claims
for inpatient trauma services on or after January 1, 2012, for Diagnostic
Related Groups subject to the Diagnostic Related Group inpatient hospital
fee schedule shall be reimbursed under the trauma services inpatient hospital
fee schedule established in this section, except as otherwise provided in
subdivision (1)(d) of section 48-120.
(6) The trauma
services inpatient hospital fee schedule shall be established by the following
methodology:
(a) The trauma services reimbursement amount required under the
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be equal to the Current Medicare
Weight multiplied by the Workers' Compensation Trauma Factor for each hospital;
(b) The Stop-Loss
Threshold amount shall be the trauma services reimbursement amount calculated
in subdivision (6)(a) of this section multiplied by one and one-quarter;
(c) For charges
over the Stop-Loss Threshold amount of the schedule, the hospital shall be
reimbursed the trauma services reimbursement amount calculated in subdivision
(6)(a) of this section plus sixty-five percent of the charges over the Stop-Loss
Threshold amount; and
(d) For charges less than the Stop-Loss Threshold amount of the
schedule, the hospital shall be reimbursed the lower of the hospital's billed
charges or the trauma services reimbursement amount calculated in subdivision
(6)(a) of this section.
(7) The
Diagnostic Related Group inpatient hospital fee schedule shall be established
by the following methodology:
(a) The Diagnostic Related Group reimbursement amount required
under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be equal to the Current
Medicare Weight multiplied by the Workers' Compensation Factor for each hospital;
(b) The Stop-Loss Threshold amount shall be the Diagnostic
Related Group reimbursement amount calculated in subdivision (7)(a) of
this section multiplied by two and one-half;
(c) For charges over the Stop-Loss Threshold amount of the
schedule, the hospital shall be reimbursed the Diagnostic Related Group reimbursement
amount calculated in subdivision (7)(a) of this section plus
sixty percent of the charges over the Stop-Loss Threshold amount; and
(d) For charges less than the Stop-Loss Threshold amount of
the schedule, the hospital shall be reimbursed the lower of the hospital's
billed charges or the Diagnostic Related Group reimbursement amount calculated
in subdivision (7)(a) of this section.
(8) For charges for all other
stays or services that are not reimbursed under the Diagnostic
Related Group inpatient hospital fee schedule or the trauma services inpatient hospital fee schedule or
are not contracted for under subdivision (1)(d) of section 48-120, the hospital
shall be reimbursed under the schedule of fees established by the compensation
court pursuant to subdivision (1)(b) of section 48-120.
(9) Each hospital shall assign
and include a Diagnostic Related Group on each workers' compensation claim
submitted. The workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured
employer may audit the Diagnostic Related Group assignment of the hospital.
(10) The chief executive officer
of each hospital shall sign and file with the administrator of the compensation
court by October 15 of each year, in the form and manner prescribed by the
administrator, a sworn statement disclosing the Current Medicare Factor of
the hospital in effect on October 1 of such year and each item and amount
making up such factor.
(11) Each hospital, workers'
compensation insurer, risk management pool, and self-insured employer shall
report to the administrator of the compensation court by October 15 of each
year, in the form and manner prescribed by the administrator, the total number
of claims submitted for each Diagnostic Related Group, the number of claims for each Diagnostic Related Group
that included trauma services, the
number of times billed charges exceeded the Stop-Loss Threshold amount for
each Diagnostic Related Group,
and the number of times billed charges exceeded the Stop-Loss Threshold amount
for each trauma service.
(12) The compensation court
may add or subtract Diagnostic Related Groups in striving to achieve the goal
of including those Diagnostic Related Groups that encompass at least ninety
percent of the inpatient hospital workers' compensation claims submitted by
hospitals identified in subdivision (1)(c) of section 48-120. The administrator
of the compensation court shall annually make necessary adjustments to comply
with the Current Medicare Weights and shall annually adjust the Current Medicare
Factor for each hospital based on the annual statement submitted pursuant
to subsection (10) of this section.
48-121.
Compensation; schedule; total, partial, and temporary disability; injury to specific parts of the body; amounts and duration of payments.The following schedule of compensation is hereby established for injuries resulting in disability:
(1) For total disability, the compensation during such disability shall be sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the wages received at the time of injury, but such compensation shall not be more than the maximum weekly income benefit specified in section 48-121.01 nor less than the minimum weekly income benefit specified in section 48-121.01, except that if at the time of injury the employee receives wages of less than the minimum weekly income benefit specified in section 48-121.01, then he or she shall receive the full amount of such wages per week as compensation. Nothing in this subdivision shall require payment of compensation after disability shall cease;
(2) For disability partial in character, except the particular cases mentioned in subdivision (3) of this section, the compensation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the difference between the wages received at the time of the injury and the earning power of the employee thereafter, but such compensation shall not be more than the maximum weekly income benefit specified in section 48-121.01. This compensation shall be paid during the period of such partial disability but not beyond three hundred weeks. Should total disability be followed by partial disability, the period of three hundred weeks mentioned in this subdivision shall be reduced by the number of weeks during which compensation was paid for such total disability;
(3) For disability resulting from permanent injury of the classes listed in this subdivision, the compensation shall be in addition to the amount paid for temporary disability, except that the compensation for temporary disability shall cease as soon as the extent of the permanent disability is ascertainable. For disability resulting from permanent injury of the following classes, compensation shall be: For the loss of a thumb, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during sixty weeks. For the loss of a first finger, commonly called the index finger, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during thirty-five weeks. For the loss of a second finger, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during thirty weeks. For the loss of a third finger, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during twenty weeks. For the loss of a fourth finger, commonly called the little finger, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during fifteen weeks. The loss of the first phalange of the thumb or of any finger shall be considered to be equal to the loss of one-half of such thumb or finger and compensation shall be for one-half of the periods of time above specified, and the compensation for the loss of one-half of the first phalange shall be for one-fourth of the periods of time above specified. The loss of more than one phalange shall be considered as the loss of the entire finger or thumb, except that in no case shall the amount received for more than one finger exceed the amount provided in this schedule for the loss of a hand. For the loss of a great toe, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during thirty weeks. For the loss of one of the toes other than the great toe, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during ten weeks. The loss of the first phalange of any toe shall be considered equal to the loss of one-half of such toe, and compensation shall be for one-half of the periods of time above specified. The loss of more than one phalange shall be considered as the loss of the entire toe. For the loss of a hand, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during one hundred seventy-five weeks. For the loss of an arm, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during two hundred twenty-five weeks. For the loss of a foot, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during one hundred fifty weeks. For the loss of a leg, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during two hundred fifteen weeks. For the loss of an eye, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during one hundred twenty-five weeks. For the loss of an ear, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during twenty-five weeks. For the loss of hearing in one ear, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during fifty weeks. For the loss of the nose, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of daily wages during fifty weeks.
In any case in which there is a loss or loss of use of more than one member or parts of more than one member set forth in this subdivision, but not amounting to total and permanent disability, compensation benefits shall be paid for the loss or loss of use of each such member or part thereof, with the periods of benefits to run consecutively. The total loss or permanent total loss of use of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or hearing in both ears, or of any two thereof, in one accident, shall constitute total and permanent disability and be compensated for according to subdivision (1) of this section. In all other cases involving a loss or loss of use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or hearing in both ears, or of any two thereof, total and permanent disability shall be determined in accordance with the facts. Amputation between the elbow and the wrist shall be considered as the equivalent of the loss of a hand, and amputation between the knee and the ankle shall be considered as the equivalent of the loss of a foot. Amputation at or above the elbow shall be considered as the loss of an arm, and amputation at or above the knee shall be considered as the loss of a leg. Permanent total loss of the use of a finger, hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye shall be considered as the equivalent of the loss of such finger, hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye. In all cases involving a permanent partial loss of the use or function of any of the members mentioned in this subdivision, the compensation shall bear such relation to the amounts named in such subdivision as the disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries named therein.
If, in the compensation court's discretion, compensation benefits payable for a loss or loss of use of more than one hand, arm, foot, or leg, or any combination thereof, resulting from the same accident or illness, do not adequately compensate the employee for such loss or loss of use and such loss or loss of use results in at least a thirty percent loss of earning capacity, the compensation court shall, upon request of the employee, determine the employee's loss of earning capacity consistent with the process for such determination under subdivision (1) or (2) of this section, and in such a case the employee shall not be entitled to compensation under this subdivision. Loss or loss of use of multiple parts of the same arm, including the hand and fingers, or loss or loss of use of multiple parts of the same leg, including the foot and toes, resulting from the same accident or illness shall not entitle the employee to compensation under subdivision (1) or (2) of this section.
If the employer and the employee are unable to agree upon the amount of compensation to be paid in cases not covered by the schedule, the amount of compensation shall be settled according to sections 48-173 to 48-185. Compensation under this subdivision shall not be more than the maximum weekly income benefit specified in section 48-121.01 nor less than the minimum weekly income benefit specified in section 48-121.01, except that if at the time of the injury the employee received wages of less than the minimum weekly income benefit specified in section 48-121.01, then he or she shall receive the full amount of such wages per week as compensation;
(4) For disability resulting from permanent disability, if immediately prior to the accident the rate of wages was fixed by the day or hour, or by the output of the employee, the weekly wages shall be taken to be computed upon the basis of a workweek of a minimum of five days, if the wages are paid by the day, or upon the basis of a workweek of a minimum of forty hours, if the wages are paid by the hour, or upon the basis of a workweek of a minimum of five days or forty hours, whichever results in the higher weekly wage, if the wages are based on the output of the employee; and
(5) The employee shall be entitled to compensation from his or her employer for temporary disability while undergoing physical or medical rehabilitation and while undergoing vocational rehabilitation whether such vocational rehabilitation is voluntarily offered by the employer and accepted by the employee or is ordered by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court or any judge of the compensation court.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 21, p. 586; R.S.1913, § 3662; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 7, p. 202; Laws 1919, c. 91, § 2, p. 228; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 1, p. 521; C.S.1922, § 3044; C.S.1929, § 48-121; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 41, p. 210; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-121; R.S.1943, § 48-121; Laws 1945, c. 112, § 1, p. 357; Laws 1949, c. 160, § 1, p. 403; Laws 1951, c. 152, § 1, p. 617; Laws 1953, c. 162, § 1, p. 506; Laws 1955, c. 186, § 1, p. 527; Laws 1957, c. 203, § 1, p. 710; Laws 1957, c. 204, § 1, p. 716; Laws 1959, c. 223, § 1, p. 784; Laws 1963, c. 284, § 1, p. 847; Laws 1963, c. 285, § 1, p. 854; Laws 1965, c. 279, § 1, p. 800; Laws 1967, c. 288, § 1, p. 783; Laws 1969, c. 388, § 3, p. 1360; Laws 1969, c. 393, § 1, p. 1378;
Laws 1971, LB 320, § 1; Laws 1973, LB 193, § 1; Laws 1974, LB 710, § 1; Laws 1974, LB 807, § 1; Laws 1974, LB 808, § 1; Laws 1975, LB 198, § 1; Laws 1977, LB 275, § 1; Laws 1978, LB 446, § 1; Laws 1979, LB 114, § 1; Laws 1979, LB 358, § 1; Laws 1983, LB 158, § 1; Laws 1985, LB 608, § 1; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 4; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 5; Laws 2007, LB588, § 4; Laws 2024, LB1017, § 1. Effective Date: July 19, 2024
Annotations
1. Permanent total disability
2. Temporary total disability
3. Partial disability
4. Permanent injury, specific classes
5. Disability generally
6. Whole body impairment
7. Vocational rehabilitation
8. Earning power
9. Labor market or hub community
10. Average weekly wage
11. Miscellaneous
1. Permanent total disability
A worker is not, as a matter of law, totally disabled under this section solely because the worker's disability prevents him or her from working full time. Armstrong v. State, 290 Neb. 205, 859 N.W.2d 541 (2015).
In a workers' compensation case, total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness. It means that because of an injury, (1) a worker cannot earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature, that he or she was trained for or accustomed to perform or (2) the worker cannot earn wages for work for any other kind of work which a person of his or her mentality and attainments could do. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
Under the "odd-lot doctrine," total disability may be found in the case of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor market. The essence of the test is the probable dependability with which claimant can sell his services in a competitive labor market, undistorted by such factors as business booms, sympathy of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or the superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise above his crippling handicaps. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
Total disability in the context of the workers' compensation law does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, but means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature, that he or she was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any other kind of work which a person of his or her mentality and attainments could do. Mata v. Western Valley Packing, 236 Neb. 584, 462 N.W.2d 869 (1990).
An employee's return to work does not in every case terminate an employee's total disability from a work-related injury. Pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) of this section, an employee's disability is determined by the employee's diminution of employability or impairment of earning power or earning capacity, and is not necessarily determined by a physician's evaluation and assessment of the employee's loss of bodily function. Heiliger v. Walters & Heiliger Electric, Inc., 236 Neb. 459, 461 N.W.2d 565 (1990).
Total disability in the context of the workers' compensation law does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, but means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature, that he or she was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any other kind of work which a person of his or her mentality and attainments could do. Luehring v. Tibbs Constr. Co., 235 Neb. 883, 457 N.W.2d 815 (1990).
Whether a partial loss or loss of use of two members results in total and permanent disability is to be determined in accordance with the facts. Evidence shows that plaintiff was permanently totally disabled as a matter of law. Krijan v. Mainelli Constr. Co., 216 Neb. 186, 342 N.W.2d 662 (1984).
An employee may be totally disabled but still able, on occasion, to obtain trivial employment. Craig v. American Community Stores, Inc., 205 Neb. 286, 287 N.W.2d 426 (1980).
An employee who has permanent total disability from separate accidents is entitled to compensation out of the Second Injury Fund even though the injuries were schedule injuries. Camp v. Blount Bros. Corp., 195 Neb. 459, 238 N.W.2d 634 (1976).
A claimant who sustains the loss of use of his right hand and a permanent partial loss of use of his right leg is entitled to compensation under subdivision (1) of this section for that proportion of the compensation allowed for total disability as the extent of the loss of the use of the two members bears to the total loss of such members. Wiekhorst v. Rural Electric Co., Inc., 186 Neb. 445, 183 N.W.2d 747 (1971).
An employee may be totally disabled for all practical purposes and yet be able to obtain trivial occasional employment. Brockhaus v. L. E. Ball Constr. Co., 180 Neb. 737, 145 N.W.2d 341 (1966).
Injury sustained to both feet under extraordinary conditions resulted in permanent total disability. Mead v. Missouri Valley Grain, Inc., 178 Neb. 553, 134 N.W.2d 243 (1965).
Award of total disability, which resulted from conversion reaction following injury to back, was sustained. Haskett v. National Biscuit Co., 177 Neb. 915, 131 N.W.2d 597 (1964).
An injury to fingers only on both hands does not authorize an award for total and permanent disability. Runyan v. Lockwood Graders, Inc., 176 Neb. 676, 127 N.W.2d 186 (1964).
There may be total permanent disability even though there is only a permanent partial loss of bodily function. Nordahl v. Erickson, 174 Neb. 204, 116 N.W.2d 275 (1962).
Workman was entitled to award for total disability from an occupational disease. Riggs v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 173 Neb. 70, 112 N.W.2d 531 (1961).
Total disability is defined in terms of employability and earning capacity. Rapp v. Hale, 170 Neb. 620, 103 N.W.2d 851 (1960).
Where employee was wholly unable to perform the duties of former employment or work of like nature, he was entitled to recover for permanent total disability. Tilghman v. Mills, 169 Neb. 665, 100 N.W.2d 739 (1960).
Permanent total disability may result from unusual and extraordinary condition arising from injury to specific members. Haler v. Gering Bean Co., 163 Neb. 748, 81 N.W.2d 152 (1957).
Total disability can only be held to exist where workman is unable to get, hold, or do any substantial amount of remunerative work, either in his previous occupation or in any other established field of employment for which he is fitted. Elliott v. Gooch Feed Mill Co., 147 Neb. 612, 24 N.W.2d 561 (1946).
Workman was totally disabled when he was unable, on account of his injury, to perform or to obtain any substantial amount of labor, either in his particular line of work or in any other for which he would be fitted except for the injury. Elliott v. Gooch Feed Mill Co., 147 Neb. 309, 23 N.W.2d 262 (1946).
Total disability exists only where workman is unable to get, hold, or do any substantial amount of remunerative work. Micek v. Omaha Steel Works, 136 Neb. 843, 287 N.W. 645 (1939).
Where employee was totally disabled and was earning twenty-four dollars a week at time of injury, he was entitled to compensation after the first three hundred weeks and for the remainder of his life at the rate of forty-five percent of his weekly wage. Montgomery v. Milldale Farm & Live Stock Improvement Co., 124 Neb. 347, 246 N.W. 734 (1933).
Where injury affected the whole nervous system in such manner as to disable claimant from doing any work, he was entitled to an award for total disability. Nebraska Nat. Guard v. Morgan, 112 Neb. 432, 199 N.W. 557 (1924).
Where injury wholly unfitted employee for the work he was engaged in at the time he received his injuries, an award for total disability was justified. Troxcil v. Morris & Co., 107 Neb. 817, 186 N.W. 978 (1922).
2. Temporary total disability
A workers- compensation claimant who leaves a job with an employer responsible for an injury in order to pursue more desirable employment does not waive temporary total disability benefits simply because the employer responsible for the injury would have accommodated light-duty restrictions during postsurgical recovery periods necessitated by the injury. Zwiener v. Becton Dickinson-East, 285 Neb. 735, 829 N.W.2d 113 (2013).
Under subdivision (5) of this section, an injured employee may not undertake rehabilitation on his or her own and receive temporary total disability benefits without approval from either the court or his or her former employer. Bixenmann v. H. Kehm Constr., 267 Neb. 669, 676 N.W.2d 370 (2004).
Because benefits received during vocational rehabilitation under subsection (5) of this section may be "temporary total disability" benefits, a species of total disability benefits, and where such benefits are followed by "partial disability" benefits, pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the 300-week period shall be reduced by the number of weeks during which compensation was paid for such total disability. Sheldon-Zimbelman v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., 258 Neb. 568, 604 N.W.2d 396 (2000).
An employee awarded temporary total disability payments is entitled to suspension of a prior unrelated award for a permanent partial disability caused by a previous accident until the temporary total disability payments cease. Anderson v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 254 Neb. 1007, 581 N.W.2d 424 (1998).
Claimant was entitled to maximum for total temporary disability. Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 155 Neb. 714, 53 N.W.2d 203 (1952).
Award of temporary total disability and partial permanent disability was proper. Riggins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 11 N.W.2d 810 (1943).
An employee is not prevented from receiving compensation for temporary total disability to perform the duties in which he is engaged at the time of an accident merely because he is then receiving an unrelated allowance for a permanent partial disability from a previous accident. Hansen v. Paxton & Vierling Iron Works, 138 Neb. 589, 293 N.W. 415 (1940).
An award of temporary partial disability is authorized, even though permanent partial disability must also be computed for loss of specific member. Dennehy v. Lincoln Steel Works, 136 Neb. 269, 285 N.W. 590 (1939).
Rule for determining compensation allowable for permanent partial loss of injured members, and temporary total disability, is stated. Poast v. Omaha Merchants Exp. & Trans. Co., 107 Neb. 516, 186 N.W. 540 (1922).
Allowance may be made for temporary total disability in addition to allowance for permanent partial loss of use of finger. Ulaski v. Morris & Co., 106 Neb. 782, 184 N.W. 946 (1921).
The 300-week limitation found in subsection (2) of this section does not apply to benefits for temporary total disability awarded under subsection (1) of this section. Heppler v. Omaha Cable, 16 Neb. App. 267, 743 N.W.2d 383 (2007).
3. Partial disability
Pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section, permanent partial disability benefits are measured not by loss of bodily function, but by reduction in or loss of earning power or employability. Picard v. P & C Group 1, 306 Neb. 292, 945 N.W.2d 183 (2020).
Worker's compensation benefits awarded under subsection (2) of this section are not measured by loss of bodily function, but by reduction in earning power or employability. An employee's disability as a basis for compensation under subsections (1) and (2) of this section is determined by the employee's diminution of employability or impairment of earning power or earning capacity and is not necessarily determined by a physician's evaluation and assessment of the employee's loss of bodily function. Frauendorfer v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 263 Neb. 237, 639 N.W.2d 125 (2002).
Compensation for permanent partial disability to the body as a whole is compensated on the basis of loss of earning capacity and employability rather than functional or medical loss. Musil v. J.A. Baldwin Manuf. Co., 233 Neb. 901, 448 N.W.2d 591 (1989).
Where pain is sufficiently severe to prevent a normal function of a body member, a partial loss results within the purview of this section. Cain v. La Grange Steel Erectors, Inc., 195 Neb. 272, 237 N.W.2d 640 (1976).
Workman sustained a permanent partial disability from organic heart disease and a cardiac arrest. Arlauskas v. Western Electric Co., 180 Neb. 790, 145 N.W.2d 925 (1966).
Rule for computation of allowance for permanent partial disability applied. Gourley v. City of Grand Island, 168 Neb. 538, 96 N.W.2d 309 (1959).
Injury to back justified award for permanent partial disability. Pittenger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 166 Neb. 858, 91 N.W.2d 31 (1958).
Permanent partial disability is compensated for by award based on difference between wages received at time of injury and earning power thereafter. Turner v. Beatrice Foods Co., 165 Neb. 338, 85 N.W.2d 721 (1957).
Compensation for two-member permanent partial disability is determined by first applying percentage of disability to wage rate. Paulsen v. City of Lincoln, 156 Neb. 872, 58 N.W.2d 336 (1953).
Rule for computation of award for temporary partial disability is stated. Peek v. Ayres Auto Supply, 155 Neb. 233, 51 N.W.2d 387 (1952).
Extent of permanent disability is not finally determinable until employee is restored to health insofar as the nature of his injuries will permit. Allen v. Department of Roads & Irrigation, 149 Neb. 837, 32 N.W.2d 740 (1948).
Where there is a permanent partial disability, employee is entitled to compensation for three hundred weeks from date of injury. Klement v. H. P. Lau Co., 138 Neb. 144, 292 N.W. 381 (1940).
Where claimant has sustained loss of use of hand and loss of use of leg, he is entitled to such compensation under subdivision (1) as the extent of loss of the use of two members will bear to the total loss of use of such members. Fallis v. Vogel, 137 Neb. 598, 290 N.W. 461 (1940).
Where injuries are not permanent in character, an award may be made for total disability followed by partial disability. Mutchie v. M. L. Rawlings Ice Co., 122 Neb. 297, 240 N.W. 267 (1932).
Method of computing permanent partial disability is by applying percentage of disability to period of compensation. Lewis v. Allied Contractors, 118 Neb. 605, 225 N.W. 770 (1929).
Where there is a permanent partial loss of hand and feet, compensation should be allowed under subdivision (1). Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661, 222 N.W. 42 (1928).
Where employee suffered permanent partial disability to his legs, he was entitled to recover such proportion of compensation under subdivision (1) as the extent of his loss would bear to the total loss of such members. Schlesselman v. Trav. Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 332, 199 N.W. 498 (1924); Frost v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 109 Neb. 161, 190 N.W. 208 (1922).
Where injury results in permanent partial loss of use of both arms, employee is entitled to recover such proportion of compensation allowed for total disability as the extent of the loss would bear to total loss of such members. Johnson v. David Cole Creamery Co., 109 Neb. 707, 192 N.W. 127 (1923).
Compensation allowable for permanent partial disability is such proportion of entire loss as disability produced bears to whole. Hall v. Germantown State Bank, 105 Neb. 709, 181 N.W. 609 (1921).
Where there are permanent injuries to two or more fingers, allowance should be made for permanent partial loss of hand. Updike Grain Co. v. Swanson, 103 Neb. 872, 174 N.W. 862 (1919).
Pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section, where a trial court is not called upon to make a determination of loss of earning power until after completion of vocational rehabilitation, the court is not required to retroactively look to the extent of loss of earning power as of the date of maximum medical improvement and disregard the documented change in loss of earning power flowing from completion of vocational rehabilitation. Grandt v. Douglas County, 14 Neb. App. 219, 705 N.W.2d 600 (2005).
Under this section, when dealing with temporary partial disability, one cannot be earning wages at a similar job with the same employer and at the same time have suffered a 100-percent loss of earning capacity. Kam v. IBP, Inc., 12 Neb. App. 855, 686 N.W.2d 631 (2004).
Subsection (2) of this section provides for the compensation court to reduce the period for which partial disability benefits are recoverable when total disability is followed by partial disability, but does not allow the court to make a similar reduction in benefits when partial disability is followed by total disability. Bennett v. J. C. Robinson Seed Co., 7 Neb. App. 525, 583 N.W.2d 370 (1998).
4. Permanent injury, specific classes
Although subsection (3) of this section does not refer to the body parts listed in its first paragraph as "members," for decades, this court has referred to those listed body parts as "members" or, more specifically, "scheduled members." Espinoza v. Job Source USA, 313 Neb. 559, 984 N.W.2d 918 (2023).
To recover an award based on loss of earning capacity under subsection (3) of this section, an employee must prove a loss or loss of use of more than one member or parts of more than one member set forth in this subdivision. An employee with multiple injuries along the same extremity may suffer a loss or loss of use of more than one member or parts of more than one member set forth in this subdivision. Espinoza v. Job Source USA, 313 Neb. 559, 984 N.W.2d 918 (2023).
An employee suffering a below-the-knee amputation was not entitled to consecutive amounts of disability benefits for the loss of his five toes, his foot, and his leg, because subdivision (3) of this section explicitly states that a below-the-knee amputation is the equivalent of a loss of a foot and because, as a general rule, a party may not have double recovery for a single injury. Melton v. City of Holdrege, 309 Neb. 385, 960 N.W.2d 298 (2021).
Disability as a basis for compensation under subdivision (3) of this section is determined by the loss of use of a body member, not loss of earning power. Lenz v. Central Parking System of Neb., 288 Neb. 453, 848 N.W.2d 623 (2014).
The extent of disability to a scheduled member under subdivision (3) of this section can be expressed in terms of percent. Lenz v. Central Parking System of Neb., 288 Neb. 453, 848 N.W.2d 623 (2014).
The third paragraph of subdivision (3) of this section does not require expert proof of permanent physical restrictions assigned to each injured member in order to perform the loss of earning capacity assessment thereunder. Rodgers v. Nebraska State Fair, 288 Neb. 92, 846 N.W.2d 195 (2014).
The amendment by 2007 Neb. Laws, L.B. 588, to subdivision (3) of this section, which permits an employee to recover benefits for loss of earning capacity from a loss or loss of use of more than one member resulting in at least a 30-percent loss of earning capacity, was substantive, rather than procedural, and, therefore, did not apply retroactively to a claimant injured in an accident before the effective date of the amendment. Smith v. Mark Chrisman Trucking, 285 Neb. 826, 829 N.W.2d 717 (2013).
For scheduled disabilities under subsection (3) of this section, a worker is compensated for his or her loss of use of a body member, loss of earning power is immaterial in determining compensation under subsection (3). Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
Under this section, impairments to the body as a whole are compensated in terms of loss of earning power or capacity, but impairments of scheduled members are compensated on the basis of loss of physical function. The test for determining whether a disability is to a scheduled member or to the body as a whole is the location of the residual impairment, not the situs of the injury. Snyder v. IBP, Inc., 235 Neb. 319, 455 N.W.2d 157 (1990).
The language concerning the partial loss of use of multiple members contained in subsection (3) of this section applies only where the losses of use are the consequence of injuries sustained in a single compensable accident. Rodriquez v. Prime Meat Processors, 228 Neb. 55, 421 N.W.2d 32 (1988).
An employee suffering a schedule injury is entitled only to the compensation provided for in subsection (3) of this section, unless some unusual or extraordinary condition as to the other members or parts of the body develops as a result of the injury. Evans v. American Community Stores, 222 Neb. 538, 385 N.W.2d 91 (1986).
An injury that results in the inability to produce tears to wash the eye is a scheduled injury to the eye. Doggett v. Brunswick Corp., 217 Neb. 166, 347 N.W.2d 877 (1984).
When a "schedule injury" results in unusual or extraordinary conditions which affect other parts of the body, recovery is not limited to the amount specified in the schedule. In this case, where a fractured femur healed in such a way that a deformity developed which affected the hip and other parts of the body, the employee was entitled to benefits beyond those in the schedule. Scamperino v. Federal Envelope Co., 205 Neb. 508, 298 N.W.2d 477 (1980).
Compensation under subdivisions (1) and (2) herein are not available for schedule injuries compensable under subdivision (3), except under unusual conditions. Broderson v. Federal Chemical Co., 199 Neb. 278, 258 N.W.2d 137 (1977).
Compensation for disability resulting from a specific injury listed in subdivision (3) is limited to the amount specified. Guerin v. Insurance Co. of North America, 183 Neb. 30, 157 N.W.2d 779 (1968).
In the absence of other extraordinary physical injury, compensation for loss of foot cannot exceed the amount specified in subdivision (3) of this section. Burrious v. North Platte Packing Co., 182 Neb. 122, 153 N.W.2d 353 (1967).
Loss of fingers on both hands alone does not entitle employee to compensation for permanent total disability. Runyan v. State, 179 Neb. 371, 138 N.W.2d 484 (1965).
The extent of permanent disability is not finally determinable until the employee is restored to good health insofar as the nature of his injuries will permit. Uzendoski v. City of Fullerton, 177 Neb. 779, 131 N.W.2d 193 (1964).
Compensation under subdivision (3) includes the loss of binocular vision of the eye. Brewer v. Hilberg, 173 Neb. 863, 115 N.W.2d 437 (1962).
Loss of teeth and cut on lip were not compensable under subdivision (3). Wengler v. Grosshans Lumber Co., 173 Neb. 839, 115 N.W.2d 415 (1962).
Compensation was not limited to loss of use of leg where disability was also to back. Gilbert v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 156 Neb. 750, 57 N.W.2d 770 (1953).
Method of computing award for permanent partial loss of use of both hands stated. Paulsen v. City of Lincoln, 156 Neb. 702, 57 N.W.2d 666 (1953).
Combination of injuries to right and left wrists was sufficient to produce total disability. Franzen v. Blakley, 155 Neb. 621, 52 N.W.2d 833 (1952).
As it relates to an accidental injury to an eye, capable of industrial use and injured in industry, intent of section is to compensate for loss occasioned thereby to extent provided. Gruber v. Stickelman, 149 Neb. 627, 31 N.W.2d 753 (1948).
In a claim for compensation under subdivision (3), it is immaterial whether an industrial disability is present or not. Bronson v. City of Fremont, 143 Neb. 281, 9 N.W.2d 218 (1943).
In providing compensation for loss of eye it was the legislative intent to indemnify the injured workman to the full extent of his industrial loss occasioned thereby. Bolen v. Buller, 143 Neb. 237, 9 N.W.2d 204 (1943).
Where injury destroys the sight of an eye for industrial purposes, although with artificial means vision may be partially restored, an employee is entitled to compensation for loss of an eye. Otoe Food Products Co. v. Cruickshank, 141 Neb. 298, 3 N.W.2d 452 (1942).
Award for loss of use of eye is not based upon the amount of vision which existed previous to the accident, but is a specific amount to compensate to the full extent the industrial loss sustained. Ames v. Sanitary District, 140 Neb. 879, 2 N.W.2d 530 (1942).
Where fingers are injured and the disability resulting therefrom is normal, compensation cannot be awarded in addition to that provided in the statutory schedule for loss of use of fingers. Ottens v. Western Contracting Co., 139 Neb. 78, 296 N.W. 431 (1941).
Where claimant does not suffer any industrial disability as the result of an accident, he is not entitled to recover for total disability under subdivision (1), but this does not prevent recovery of compensation under subdivision (3) where there is impairment of physiological functions. Schmidt v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 546, 290 N.W. 250 (1940).
Injury resulting in loss of use of hand is compensable exclusively under subdivision (3) providing schedule for specific injuries. Huff v. Omaha Cold Storage Co., 136 Neb. 907, 287 N.W. 764 (1939).
The provisions of subdivision (3) are exclusive, and the employee may not recover for the loss of stereoscopic vision plus the loss of an eye, the stereoscopic vision being incidental to the loss. Carlson v. Condon-Kiewit Co., 135 Neb. 587, 283 N.W. 220 (1939).
Where effect of injury to finger only is usual and natural one, compensation cannot be allowed for loss of use of hand. Greseck v. Farmers Union Elevator Co., 123 Neb. 755, 243 N.W. 898 (1932).
Claimant for compensation who has sustained injury to both legs and both hands, is entitled to recover such proportion of compensation allowed for total disability, as the extent of loss of the several members bears to the total loss of two such members. Radford v. Smith Bros., Inc., 123 Neb. 13, 241 N.W. 753 (1932).
Loss of use of leg compensable as if leg had been removed. Schroeder v. Holt County, 113 Neb. 736, 204 N.W. 815 (1925).
Compensation for the loss of an eye is confined exclusively to amount specified for loss of eye. Abel Constr. Co. v. Goodman, 105 Neb. 700, 181 N.W. 713 (1921).
Compensation for permanent loss of use of leg is limited to amount specified for loss of leg. Hull v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 102 Neb. 246, 166 N.W. 628 (1918).
Loss of toe does not entitle employee to compensation unless injury has impaired earning power. Epsten v. Hancock-Epsten Co., 101 Neb. 442, 163 N.W. 767 (1917).
Where deep cut severed the tendons in wrist and severed the ulnar nerve, award for permanent loss of use of hand was justified. Miller v. Morris & Co., 101 Neb. 169, 162 N.W. 417 (1917).
Under subsection (3) of this section, if a worker has a two-member injury, compensation shall be determined by the facts, and the existing or concurrent injury to another part of the body is one of these facts, even if that injury is not to a member as defined in that same subsection. Xayaseng v. Chief Indus., Inc., 7 Neb. App. 911, 586 N.W.2d 472 (1998).
5. Disability generally
This section provides compensation for three categories of job-related disabilities. Subdivision (1) sets the amount of compensation for total disability; subdivision (2) sets the amount of compensation for partial disability, except in cases covered by subdivision (3); and subdivision (3) sets out "schedule" injuries to specified parts of the body with compensation established therefor. Picard v. P & C Group 1, 306 Neb. 292, 945 N.W.2d 183 (2020).
Disability, in contrast to impairment, is an economic inquiry in a workers' compensation case. It can be determined only within the context of the personal, social, or occupational demands or statutory or regulatory requirements that the individual is unable to meet because of the impairment. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
Disability is determined by diminution of employability or impairment of earning power or capacity, not necessarily by a physician's evaluation of loss of bodily function. Sherard v. Bethphage Mission, Inc., 236 Neb. 900, 464 N.W.2d 343 (1991).
Disability is defined in terms of employability and earning capacity rather than in terms of loss of bodily function. McGee v. Panhandle Technical Sys., 223 Neb. 56, 387 N.W.2d 709 (1986).
Disability under the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act is defined in terms of employability and earning capacity rather than in terms of loss of bodily function. Minshall v. Plains Mfg. Co., 215 Neb. 881, 341 N.W.2d 906 (1983).
An employee who suffered back pain approximately one-half hour after doing heavy lifting suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment and is entitled to workmen's compensation. Disability is defined in terms of employability and earning capacity rather than bodily function. Thus, one who is in constant pain, unable to lift anything, and whose condition is aggravated by prolonged sitting or standing may be totally disabled. Wolfe v. American Community Stores, 205 Neb. 763, 290 N.W.2d 195 (1980).
Disability under this section is defined in terms of employability, not bodily function. Craig v. American Community Stores, Inc., 205 Neb. 286, 287 N.W.2d 426 (1980).
Disability under this section refers to loss of earning power rather than loss of bodily function; latter loss important only as it relates to earning capacity. Colgrove v. City of Wymore, 184 Neb. 712, 171 N.W.2d 639 (1969).
Disability is determinable by a consideration of employability and earnings. Spangler v. Terry Carpenter, Inc., 177 Neb. 740, 131 N.W.2d 159 (1964).
Disability under subdivisions (1) and (2) is defined in terms of employability and earning capacity rather than in terms of loss of bodily function. Wheeler v. Northwestern Metal Co., 175 Neb. 841, 124 N.W.2d 377 (1963).
Disability under subdivisions (1) and (2) refers to loss of earning power rather than loss of bodily function. Thinnes v. Kearney Packing Co., 173 Neb. 123, 112 N.W.2d 732 (1962).
Disability under first two subdivisions is defined in terms of employability and earning capacity. Pavel v. Hughes Brothers, 167 Neb. 727, 94 N.W.2d 492 (1959).
6. Whole body impairment
If, by the point of maximum medical improvement, a claimant has developed a whole body impairment in addition to a scheduled member injury, the question is whether the work-related injury proximately caused the whole body impairment. If both injuries arose from the same work-related injury, because the scheduled member injury resulted in the whole body impairment in a natural and continuous sequence of events and the whole body impairment would not have occurred but for the work-related injury, then the claimant is entitled to disability benefits for the whole body impairment. Moyera v. Quality Pork Internat., 284 Neb. 963, 825 N.W.2d 409 (2013).
Whether a claimant's compensable scheduled member injury has resulted in a whole body impairment and loss of earning power is a question of fact. Moyera v. Quality Pork Internat., 284 Neb. 963, 825 N.W.2d 409 (2013).
Whether a claimant's scheduled member loss has caused a whole body impairment is properly resolved under a proximate cause inquiry at the point of the claimant's maximum medical improvement, when the claimant's permanent impairment is assessed. Moyera v. Quality Pork Internat., 284 Neb. 963, 825 N.W.2d 409 (2013).
When a whole body injury is the result of a scheduled member injury, the member injury should be considered in the assessment of the whole body impairment. Under such circumstances, the trial court should not enter a separate award for the member injury in addition to the award for loss of earning capacity. To allow both awards creates an impermissible double recovery. Bishop v. Specialty Fabricating Co., 277 Neb. 171, 760 N.W.2d 352 (2009).
When a worker sustains a scheduled member injury and a whole body injury in the same accident, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act does not prohibit the court from considering the impact of both injuries in assessing the loss of earning capacity. In making such an assessment, the court must consider whether the scheduled member injury adversely affects the worker such that the loss of earning capacity cannot be fairly and accurately assessed without considering the impact of the scheduled member injury upon the worker's employability. Bishop v. Specialty Fabricating Co., 277 Neb. 171, 760 N.W.2d 352 (2009).
When a whole body injury is the result of a scheduled member injury, the member injury should be considered in the assessment of whole body impairment. An impermissible double recovery occurs if a separate award for a member injury is allowed in addition to an award for loss of earning capacity. Madlock v. Square D Co., 269 Neb. 675, 695 N.W.2d 412 (2005).
When a worker sustains a scheduled member injury and a whole body injury in the same accident, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act does not prohibit the court from considering the impact of both injuries in assessing the loss of earning capacity. In making such an assessment, the court must determine whether the scheduled member injury adversely affects the worker such that the loss of earning capacity cannot be fairly and accurately assessed without considering the impact of the scheduled member injury upon the worker's employability. Zavala v. ConAgra Beef Co., 265 Neb. 188, 655 N.W.2d 692 (2003).
Impairments of the body as a whole are compensated in terms of loss of earning power or capacity rather than in terms of loss of physical function. Snyder v. IBP, Inc., 222 Neb. 534, 385 N.W.2d 424 (1986).
7. Vocational rehabilitation
A vocational rehabilitation plan seeking to place a part-time hourly employee who suffered a permanent impairment in employment where the employee would earn wages similar to those based upon a calculation of average weekly wage under subdivision (4) of this section would best achieve the goal of restoring the employee to suitable employment. Becerra v. United Parcel Service, 284 Neb. 414, 822 N.W.2d 327 (2012).
A plain reading of subdivision (5) of this section requires that an employer must first offer, and the employee accept, vocational rehabilitation, or such rehabilitation must be court ordered before an employee becomes eligible for temporary total disability benefits. Bixenmann v. H. Kehm Constr., 267 Neb. 669, 676 N.W.2d 370 (2004); Thach v. Quality Pork International, 253 Neb. 544, 570 N.W.2d 830 (1997).
Pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, a claimant is not entitled to temporary total disability benefits merely because he or she undergoes rehabilitation up to the time of maximum medical improvement, but, rather, is entitled to compensation for such reasonable period of time as is spent undergoing rehabilitation and he or she is therefore unable to work. Stansbury v. HEP, Inc., 248 Neb. 706, 539 N.W.2d 28 (1995).
An employee, unless he or she is otherwise qualified to receive temporary total disability benefits, is entitled to such benefits only while undergoing rehabilitation which has been ordered by the compensation court. Bindrum v. Foote & Davies, 235 Neb. 903, 457 N.W.2d 828 (1990).
When prescribed as the only form of appropriate vocational rehabilitation for an injured employee, direct job placement is vocational rehabilitation within the meaning of subsection (5) of this section. Bindrum v. Foote & Davies, 235 Neb. 903, 457 N.W.2d 828 (1990).
A plan of direct job placement, when prescribed as the only form of appropriate vocational rehabilitation for an injured employee, is vocational rehabilitation within the meaning of subsection (5) of this section. Carter v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 234 Neb. 558, 452 N.W.2d 32 (1990).
An employee undergoing rehabilitation services is entitled to receive compensation for temporary disability in addition to other benefits under the act. Behrens v. Ken Corp., 191 Neb. 625, 216 N.W.2d 733 (1974).
8. Earning power
"Earning power," as used in subdivision (2) of this section, is not synonymous with wages, but includes eligibility to procure employment generally, ability to hold a job obtained, and capacity to perform the tasks of the work, as well as the ability of the worker to earn wages in the employment in which the worker is engaged or for which he or she is fitted. Picard v. P & C Group 1, 306 Neb. 292, 945 N.W.2d 183 (2020); Weichel v. Store Kraft Mfg. Co., 10 Neb. App. 276, 634 N.W.2d 276 (2001).
Earning capacity determinations, for workers- compensation purposes, should not be distorted by factors such as business booms, sympathy of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or the superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise above his crippling handicaps. Zwiener v. Becton Dickinson-East, 285 Neb. 735, 829 N.W.2d 113 (2013).
Earning power, as used in subsection (2) of this section, is not synonymous with wages, but includes eligibility to procure employment generally, ability to hold a job obtained, and capacity to perform the tasks of the work, as well as the ability of the worker to earn wages in the employment in which he or she is fitted. Frauendorfer v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 263 Neb. 237, 639 N.W.2d 125 (2002).
Workers' compensation benefits are not measured by loss of bodily function, but by reduction in earning power or employability. Earning power is not synonymous with wages, but includes eligibility to procure employment generally, ability to hold a job obtained, and capacity to perform the tasks of the work, as well as the ability of the worker to earn wages in the employment in which he or she is engaged or for which he or she is fitted. Variano v. Dial Corp., 256 Neb. 318, 589 N.W.2d 845 (1999).
"Earning power," as used in subsection (2) of this section, is not synonymous with wages, but includes eligibility to procure employment generally, ability to hold a job obtained, and capacity to perform the tasks of the work, as well as the ability of the worker to earn wages in the employment in which he is engaged or for which he is fitted. Cords v. City of Lincoln, 249 Neb. 748, 545 N.W.2d 112 (1996).
Earning power, as used in subsection (2) of this provision, is measured by an evaluation of a worker's general eligibility to procure and hold employment, the worker's capacity to perform the required tasks, and the worker's ability to earn wages in employment for which he or she is engaged or fitted. Thom v. Lutheran Medical Center, 226 Neb. 737, 414 N.W.2d 810 (1987).
"Earning power", as used in this section, is not synonymous with wages, but includes eligibility to procure employment generally, ability to hold a job obtained, and capacity to perform the tasks of the work, as well as the ability to earn wages. Guerra v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 211 Neb. 433, 318 N.W.2d 887 (1982).
"Earning power", as used in this section, includes the ability to procure employment generally, to hold a job, and to perform the tasks of the work, as well as the ability to earn wages. Akins v. Happy Hour, Inc., 209 Neb. 236, 306 N.W.2d 914 (1981).
Earning power is not synonymous with wages, but includes eligibility to procure employment generally. Frederick v. Cargill, Inc., 165 Neb. 589, 86 N.W.2d 575 (1957).
Earning power is not synonymous with wages. Anderson v. Cowger, 158 Neb. 772, 65 N.W.2d 51 (1954).
9. Labor market or hub community
A claimant who moved from a large labor market to a small labor market after her injury was not required to show her loss of earning power in both the large and the small labor market when her move for low cost housing was in good faith and motivated by economic necessity. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
A trial judge was not clearly wrong in concluding that a claimant could not reasonably seek employment in the large labor market 75 miles away, considering costs of fuel, insurance, maintenance for a vehicle, and claimant's limited physical ability to make such a commute. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
If a workers' compensation claimant relocates to a new community in good faith, the new community will serve as the hub community from which to assess the claimant's loss of earning power. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
In determining whether to include surrounding communities as part of the relevant labor market for assessing the claimant's loss of earning power, both the court-appointed vocational rehabilitation experts and the trial judge should consider the following factors: (1) availability of transportation, (2) duration of the commute, (3) length of workday the claimant is capable of working, (4) ability of the person to make the commute based on his or her physical condition, (5) economic feasibility of a person in the claimant's position working in that location, and (6) whether others who live in the claimant's hub community regularly seek employment in the prospective area. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
The first step in identifying the relevant labor market for assessing a claimant's loss of earning power in a workers' compensation case is to determine whether the hub is where the injury occurred, or where the claimant resided when the injury occurred, or where the claimant resided at the time of the hearing. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
Communities surrounding the workers' compensation claimant's hub community should be considered part of that claimant's labor market for purposes of determining that claimant's earning capacity, but only to the extent that it would be reasonable for the claimant to seek employment in that location. Giboo v. Certified Transmission Rebuilders, 275 Neb. 369, 746 N.W.2d 362 (2008).
If a workers' compensation claimant cannot show a legitimate motive behind his or her postinjury relocation to a new community, the community where the claimant resided at the time the injury occurred will serve as the hub community from which to assess earning capacity. Giboo v. Certified Transmission Rebuilders, 275 Neb. 369, 746 N.W.2d 362 (2008).
When an employee injured in one community relocates to a new community, the new community will serve as the hub community from which to assess the claimant's earning capacity for purposes of workers' compensation, provided that the change of community was done in good faith and not for improper motives. Giboo v. Certified Transmission Rebuilders, 275 Neb. 369, 746 N.W.2d 362 (2008).
Whether it would be reasonable for a workers' compensation claimant to seek employment outside his or her hub community should be based on the totality of the circumstances, with regard for such factors as (1) availability of transportation, (2) duration of the commute, (3) length of the workday the claimant is capable of working, (4) ability of the person to make the commute based on his or her physical condition, and (5) economic feasibility of a person in the claimant's position working in that location. Regard might also be given to the more generalized inquiry of whether others who live in the claimant's hub community regularly seek employment in the prospective area. Giboo v. Certified Transmission Rebuilders, 275 Neb. 369, 746 N.W.2d 362 (2008).
10. Average weekly wage
In calculating the average weekly wage, a part-time hourly employee with a permanent disability is treated as though he or she had worked a 40-hour workweek. Becerra v. United Parcel Service, 284 Neb. 414, 822 N.W.2d 327 (2012).
As to hourly employees, subsection (4) of this section alters the computation of average weekly wage under section 48-126 only to the extent that it requires that a minimum of 40 hours per week be utilized in making the computation, which would result in part-time hourly employees with permanent disabilities being treated as though they had worked a 40-hour workweek. Ramsey v. State, 259 Neb. 176, 609 N.W.2d 18 (2000).
In determining the average weekly wage of a self-employed claimant, business expenses should be deducted, and the business expenses set forth on a claimant's tax return shall be presumed correct. Either party may rebut this presumption of correctness by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that certain business expenses distort the claimant's true rate of compensation at the time of the accident. Hull v. Aetna Ins. Co., 249 Neb. 125, 541 N.W.2d 631 (1996).
A self-employed claimant's average weekly wage under subsection (2) of this section shall be based upon the claimant's gross income less business expenses, i.e., net income. Hull v. Aetna Ins. Co., 247 Neb. 713, 529 N.W.2d 783 (1995).
11. Miscellaneous
In a workers' compensation proceeding, the medical impairment rating given by a doctor may be an important factor for determining a claimant's impairment rating. Bower v. Eaton Corp., 301 Neb. 311, 918 N.W.2d 249 (2018).
A return to work at wages equal to those received before the injury may be considered, but it does not preclude a finding that the workers- compensation claimant is either partially or totally disabled. Zwiener v. Becton Dickinson-East, 285 Neb. 735, 829 N.W.2d 113 (2013).
An employee's illegal residence or work status does not bar an award of indemnity for permanent total loss of earning capacity. Moyera v. Quality Pork Internat., 284 Neb. 963, 825 N.W.2d 409 (2013).
In assessing a claimant's disability in a workers' compensation case, physical restrictions and impairment ratings are important, but once the claimant establishes the cause of disability, the trial judge is not limited to this evidence and may also rely on the claimant's testimony to determine the extent of the disability. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
This section does not prohibit a worker from concurrently receiving statutory benefits for separate injuries arising out of separate accidents, so long as the combined payments do not exceed the maximum weekly rate allowed by section 48-121.01. Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, 264 Neb. 282, 646 N.W.2d 643 (2002).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, past wage history, even if the claimant's position with the employer was only temporary, is not considered. Cox v. Fagen Inc., 249 Neb. 677, 545 N.W.2d 80 (1996).
All calculations to be made under this section, and amendments thereto, have reference to wages, percentages, and results as of the time of injury. McGowan v. Lockwood Corp., 245 Neb. 138, 511 N.W.2d 118 (1994).
Termination of payments for permanent partial disability was proper because plaintiff was not entitled to compensation in excess of the prescribed statutory maximum amount of weekly compensation. Foreman v. State, 240 Neb. 716, 483 N.W.2d 752 (1992).
The mere fact that after an injury an employee receives or is offered his former wages or a larger sum does not necessarily preclude a recovery under workers' compensation. Schmid v. Nebraska Intergov. Risk Mgt. Assn., 239 Neb. 412, 476 N.W.2d 243 (1991).
A given condition cannot at one time be both temporary and permanent. Yarns v. Leon Plastics, Inc., 237 Neb. 132, 464 N.W.2d 801 (1991).
In relation to "total disability" under subsection (1) of this section and "disability partial in character" under subsection (2) of this section, "temporary" and "permanent" refer to duration of disability; "total" and "partial" mean the degree of diminished employability or impaired earning capacity. Sherard v. Bethphage Mission, Inc., 236 Neb. 900, 464 N.W.2d 343 (1991).
Loss of earning capacity or earning power is relevant only to impairment of the body as a whole. Impairment to a scheduled member is measured on the basis of loss of physical function. Yager v. Bellco Midwest, 236 Neb. 888, 464 N.W.2d 335 (1991).
The ability to communicate in English, if relevant, should be considered in determining the magnitude of a worker's disability. Mata v. Western Valley Packing, 236 Neb. 584, 462 N.W.2d 869 (1990).
In making the calculations to determine a worker's benefits, an amendatory act may not be applied retroactively, and the statute as it existed at the time of injury governs. Canas v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 Neb. 164, 459 N.W.2d 533 (1990).
When a worker has reached maximum recovery, the remaining disability is permanent and such worker is no longer entitled to compensation for temporary disability. Musil v. J.A. Baldwin Manuf. Co., 233 Neb. 901, 448 N.W.2d 591 (1989).
Injuries to the body as a whole are compensated under subdivisions (1) and (2) of this section, and refer to loss of employability and earning capacity, and not functional and medical loss alone. Kleiva v. Paradise Landscapes, 227 Neb. 80, 416 N.W.2d 21 (1987).
The Second Injury Fund may be considered a statutory employer for the purposes of payment of disability during rehabilitation. Parker v. St. Elizabeth Comm. Health Ctr., 226 Neb. 526, 412 N.W.2d 469 (1987).
This section does not require that the 300-week period of compensation be reduced by the number of weeks during which compensation is paid under subsection (3). Parker v. St. Elizabeth Comm. Health Ctr., 226 Neb. 526, 412 N.W.2d 469 (1987).
The statutory scheme found herein is meant to compensate impairments of the body as a whole in terms of employability and loss of earning capacity, but to compensate impairments of scheduled members, rather, on the basis of loss of physical function. Nordby v. Gould, 213 Neb. 372, 329 N.W.2d 118 (1983).
In the case of an occupational disease the "date of the injury", within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, is the date when the disability is first incurred. Therefore, the maximum compensable rate is that rate in effect on the "date of the injury". Osteen v. A.C. and S., Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 307 N.W.2d 514 (1981).
This court can overturn the factfindings of the Workmen's Compensation Court that plaintiff's injury was to a member rather than to his body as a whole only if the finding is not supported by sufficient competent evidence. In this case the treating surgeon's testimony as to the site of the injury, possible future difficulties, disability, and resulting limitations, along with testimony by another medical expert, supported the finding that plaintiff suffered a schedule injury of the leg. Goers v. Bud Irons Excavating, 207 Neb. 579, 300 N.W.2d 29 (1980).
A compensable injury to the ball and socket of the hip joint, where the residual impairment is not limited to the leg, is not a schedule injury under subdivision (3), but a disability under subdivision (1) or (2) relating to earning capacity and employability. Jeffers v. Pappas Trucking, Inc., 198 Neb. 379, 253 N.W.2d 30 (1977).
In a claim for compensation hereunder, it is immaterial whether an industrial disability is present or not. Sopher v. Nebraska P.P. Dist., 191 Neb. 402, 215 N.W.2d 92 (1974).
Losses in bodily function are important only insofar as they relate to earning capacity and loss thereof. Shotwell v. Industrial Builders, Inc., 187 Neb. 320, 190 N.W.2d 624 (1971).
This section discussed in connection with controversy over reason for delay in making payments. Marshall v. Columbus Steel Supply, 187 Neb. 102, 187 N.W.2d 607 (1971).
Under Nebraska statute, any workmen's compensation policy is required to cover all of the employer's liability and all compensation awarded under the act. Neeman v. Otoe County, 186 Neb. 370, 183 N.W.2d 269 (1971).
Determination of amount of award is governed by law in force at time of accident. Chadd v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Neb. 483, 89 N.W.2d 586 (1958).
Disability under subdivisions (1) and (2) is measured in terms of employability and earning capacity rather than in terms of loss of bodily function. Miller v. Peterson, 165 Neb. 344, 85 N.W.2d 700 (1957).
In a claim for compensation under subdivision (3) of this section, it is immaterial whether an industrial disability is present or not. Paulson v. Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 1012, 26 N.W.2d 11 (1947).
Action was properly brought under this section where evidence showed employee was regular part-time employee under contract of hire at forty cents per hour. Redfern v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 145 Neb. 288, 16 N.W.2d 196 (1944).
Claimant was entitled to award as made in second original action, employer having ceased payment on prior award. Rexroat v. State, 142 Neb. 596, 7 N.W.2d 163 (1942).
Compensation act provides for automatic reduction of compensation after certain periods of time to cover the situation of partial rehabilitation of employee who has received a permanent injury. Ludwickson v. Central States Electric Co., 142 Neb. 308, 6 N.W.2d 65 (1942).
Amount paid under void settlement agreement by employer should be deducted from amount of award of compensation. Steward v. Deuel County, 137 Neb. 516, 289 N.W. 877 (1940).
Fact that employee receives larger wages after injury than before does not necessarily preclude recovery of compensation. Micek v. Omaha Steel Works, 135 Neb. 449, 282 N.W. 262 (1938).
Receipt of workmen's compensation did not bar city fireman from receiving fireman's pension. City of Lincoln v. Steffensmeyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938).
In cases not covered by schedule, amount of award and degree of disability is for the court to determine. Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
An agreement to pay compensation must be approved by a compensation commissioner or compensation court or it is void, and part payment does not make such agreement actionable at common law. Duncan v. A. Hospe Co., 133 Neb. 810, 277 N.W. 339 (1938).
Parties are entitled to a final determination of the character of the disability, the full amount to be recovered, and the times when this amount shall be paid. Dymak v. Haskins Bros. & Co., 132 Neb. 308, 271 N.W. 860 (1937).
Where compensation commissioner erred in computing compensation and allowed too much, employee is not entitled to attorney's fee on appeal to district court. Truka v. McDonald, 127 Neb. 780, 257 N.W. 232 (1934).
Workman may receive concurrent compensation for two or more injuries provided combined amounts do not exceed fifteen dollars a week. Peterson v. Borden's Produce Co., 125 Neb. 404, 250 N.W. 240 (1933).
For disability resulting from permanent injury, the compensation to be allowed is a percentum of the daily wages during a time specified. Davis v. Lincoln County, 117 Neb. 148, 219 N.W. 899 (1928).
A workers' compensation claimant may receive permanent or temporary workers' compensation benefits for either partial or total disability. Yost v. Davita, Inc., 23 Neb. App. 482, 873 N.W.2d 435 (2015).
To compute an employee's statutory benefits pursuant to this section, the court should mathematically apply the statutory percentage set forth in this section to the difference between the injured employee's preinjury average weekly wage and the employee's postinjury average weekly wage. Haro v. Beef America, 9 Neb. App. 957, 622 N.W.2d 170 (2001).
Subsection (4) of this section requires part-time output workers with permanent disabilities to be treated as though they worked a minimum of a 40-hour workweek or a 5-day workweek. Fordham v. West Lumber Co., 2 Neb. App. 716, 513 N.W.2d 52 (1994).
48-121.01.
Maximum and minimum weekly income benefit; amounts; Governor; power to suspend.(1)(a)(i) Commencing July 1, 1991, the maximum weekly income benefit under sections 48-121 and 48-122 shall be two hundred sixty-five dollars.
(ii) Commencing June 1, 1994, the maximum weekly income benefit under sections 48-121 and 48-122 shall be three hundred ten dollars.
(iii) Commencing January 1, 1995, the maximum weekly income benefit under sections 48-121 and 48-122 shall be three hundred fifty dollars.
(b) Commencing January 1, 1996, and each January 1 thereafter, the maximum weekly income benefit under sections 48-121 and 48-122 shall be one hundred percent, computed to the next higher whole dollar, of the state average weekly wage determined pursuant to section 48-121.02, except that for the purposes of calendar years commencing after 1996, the Governor may not later than November 15, 1996, and not later than each November 15 thereafter, conduct a public hearing after not less than thirty days' notice to consider whether he or she should issue an order to suspend the effectiveness of the change in the maximum weekly income benefit otherwise required by this subdivision for the ensuing calendar year. In order to make his or her decision, the Governor shall consider such factors as recent trends in economic conditions in the state, general wage levels, workers' compensation benefit levels, and workers' compensation premium levels. After such hearing but not later than November 30 immediately thereafter, the Governor may issue an order to suspend the effectiveness of the change in the maximum weekly income benefit otherwise required by this subdivision for the ensuing calendar year.
(2) The minimum weekly income benefit under sections 48-121 and 48-122 shall be forty-nine dollars.
Annotations
Section 48-121 does not prohibit a worker from concurrently receiving statutory benefits for separate injuries arising out of separate accidents, so long as the combined payments do not exceed the maximum weekly rate allowed by this section. Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, 264 Neb. 282, 646 N.W.2d 643 (2002).
48-121.02.
State average weekly wage; how determined.For purposes of section 48-121.01, the state average weekly wage shall be determined by the administrator of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court as follows: On or before October 1 of each year, the total insured wages reported to the Department of Labor for the preceding calendar year, excluding federal employees, shall be divided by the average monthly number of employees insured under the Employment Security Law. Such average monthly number of employees shall be determined by dividing the total number of employees insured under the Employment Security Law reported for such calendar year by twelve. The state average annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by fifty-two, and the state average weekly wage thus determined shall be rounded to the nearest whole cent. The state average weekly wage as so determined shall be applicable for the calendar year commencing January 1 following the October 1 determination.
Cross References
Employment Security Law, see section 48-601.
48-122.
Compensation; injuries causing death; amount and duration of payments; computation of wages; expenses of burial; alien dependents; appointment of attorney in fact; bond; filing required.(1) If death results from injuries and the deceased employee leaves one or more dependents dependent upon his or her earnings for support at the time of injury, the compensation, subject to section 48-123, shall be not more than the maximum weekly income benefit specified in section 48-121.01 nor less than the minimum weekly income benefit specified in section 48-121.01, except that if at the time of injury the employee receives wages of less than the minimum weekly income benefit specified in section 48-121.01, then the compensation shall be the full amount of such wages per week, payable in the amount and to the persons enumerated in section 48-122.01 subject to the maximum limits specified in this section and section 48-122.03.
(2) When death results from injuries suffered in employment, if immediately prior to the accident the rate of wages was fixed by the day or hour, or by the output of the employee, the weekly wages shall be taken to be computed upon the basis of a workweek of a minimum of five days, if the wages are paid by the day, or upon the basis of a workweek of a minimum of forty hours, if the wages are paid by the hour, or upon the basis of a workweek of a minimum of five days or forty hours, whichever results in the higher weekly wage, if the wages are based on the output of the employee.
(3) Upon the death of an employee, resulting through personal injuries as defined in section 48-151, whether or not there are dependents entitled to compensation, the reasonable expenses of burial, not exceeding eleven thousand dollars, without deduction of any amount previously paid or to be paid for compensation or for medical expenses, shall be paid to his or her dependents, or if there are no dependents, then to his or her personal representative. Beginning in 2023, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall annually adjust the dollar limitation in this subsection. The adjusted limitation shall be equal to the then current limitation adjusted by the greater of one percent or the percentage change, for the preceding year, in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, as prepared by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Any adjustment shall be effective on July 1. The adjustment shall not exceed two and three-quarters percent per annum. If the amount so adjusted is not a multiple of one hundred dollars, the amount shall be rounded to the nearest multiple of one hundred dollars.
(4) Compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act to alien dependents who are not residents of the United States shall be the same in amount as is provided in each case for residents, except that at any time within one year after the death of the injured employee the employer may at his or her option commute all future installments of compensation to be paid to such alien dependents. The amount of the commuted payment shall be determined as provided in section 48-138.
(5)(a)(i) Except as provided in subdivision (5)(a)(ii) of this section, the consular officer of the nation of which the employee, whose injury results in death, is a citizen shall be regarded as the sole legal representative of any alien dependents of the employee residing outside of the United States and representing the nationality of the employee.
(ii) At any time prior to the final settlement, a nonresident alien dependent may file with the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court a power of attorney designating any suitable person residing in this state to act as attorney in fact in proceedings under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. If the compensation court determines that the interests of the nonresident alien dependent will be better served by such person than by the consular officer, the compensation court shall appoint such person to act as attorney in fact in such proceedings. In making such determination the court shall consider, among other things, whether a consular officer's jurisdiction includes Nebraska and the responsiveness of the consular officer to attempts made by an attorney representing the employee to engage such consular officer in the proceedings.
(b) Such consular officer or appointed person shall have in behalf of such nonresident alien dependents the exclusive right to institute proceedings for, adjust, and settle all claims for compensation provided by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and to receive the distribution to such nonresident alien dependents of all compensation arising thereunder.
(c) A person appointed under subdivision (5)(a)(ii) of this section shall furnish a bond satisfactory to the compensation court conditioned upon the proper application of any money received as compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Before the bond is discharged, such appointed person shall file with the compensation court a verified account of receipts and disbursements of such money.
(d) For purposes of this section, consular officer means a consul general, vice consul general, or vice consul or the representative of any such official residing within the State of Nebraska.
(6) The changes made to this section by Laws 2019, LB418, apply to cases under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act that are pending on September 1, 2019, and to cases filed on or after such date.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 22, p. 588; R.S.1913, § 3663; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 8, p. 205; Laws 1919, c. 91, § 3, p. 232; C.S.1922, § 3045; C.S.1929, § 48-122; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 40, p. 209; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-122; R.S.1943, § 48-122; Laws 1945, c. 112, § 2, p. 361; Laws 1949, c. 160, § 2, p. 406; Laws 1951, c. 152, § 2, p. 620; Laws 1953, c. 162, § 2, p. 509; Laws 1955, c. 186, § 2, p. 530; Laws 1957, c. 203, § 2, p. 713; Laws 1957, c. 204, § 2, p. 719; Laws 1959, c. 223, § 2, p. 787; Laws 1963, c. 284, § 2, p. 850; Laws 1963, c. 285, § 2, p. 858; Laws 1965, c. 279, § 2, p. 803; Laws 1967, c. 288, § 2, p. 786; Laws 1969, c. 393, § 2, p. 1381;
Laws 1971, LB 320, § 2; Laws 1973, LB 193, § 2; Laws 1974, LB 710, § 2; Laws 1975, LB 198, § 2; Laws 1977, LB 275, § 2; Laws 1978, LB 446, § 2; Laws 1979, LB 114, § 2; Laws 1981, LB 234, § 1; Laws 1983, LB 158, § 2; Laws 1985, LB 608, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 39; Laws 1997, LB 853, § 1; Laws 2012, LB738, § 1; Laws 2019, LB418, § 1; Laws 2020, LB963, § 2.
Annotations
1. Dependency
2. Medical and burial allowance
3. Miscellaneous
1. Dependency
This section identifies the ongoing obligation of the employer to pay medical expenses to a dependent following the death of the employee. Olivotto v. DeMarco Bros. Co., 273 Neb. 672, 732 N.W.2d 354 (2007).
Where a deceased father had partially contributed to the support of a child residing with a former wife, such child was a partial dependent. James v. Rainchief Constr. Co., 197 Neb. 818, 251 N.W.2d 367 (1977).
A dependent in fact is a person who was dependent upon the earnings of the deceased for support. Warner v. State, 190 Neb. 643, 211 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
In order to sustain a claim of partial dependency, plaintiff must show that employee regularly contributed to dependent an average amount for a reasonable time prior to the accident. Lighthill v. McCurry, 175 Neb. 547, 122 N.W.2d 468 (1963).
Where employee died while proceedings were pending on appeal, cause would be remanded to determine rights of parties as to dependency. Smith v. Stevens, 173 Neb. 723, 114 N.W.2d 724 (1962).
Common-law wife was a dependent entitled to compensation for death of husband. Bourelle v. Soo-Crete, Inc., 165 Neb. 731, 87 N.W.2d 371 (1958).
Plaintiff was awarded relief to which she was entitled under this and succeeding two sections. Gilmore v. State, 148 Neb. 10, 26 N.W.2d 296 (1947).
Wife living apart from husband may be entitled to compensation for husband's death if she was dependent upon him. Bulman v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corporation, 144 Neb. 342, 13 N.W.2d 403 (1944).
To make out case of dependency, payments must be shown to have come from wages earned by the workman. Freburg v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 142 Neb. 868, 8 N.W.2d 209 (1943).
There must be proof of dependency in fact and not mere legal dependency to sustain an award of compensation for death of an employee. Meyer v. Nielsen Chevrolet Co., 137 Neb. 6, 287 N.W. 849 (1939).
Compensation awarded to dependents is that proportion of injured person's income paid to them for reasonable time prior to the injury. Kral v. Lincoln Steel Works, 136 Neb. 31, 284 N.W. 761 (1939).
Compensation to dependents in cases of death are fixed and determined by statute. Summers v. Railway Express Agency, 134 Neb. 237, 278 N.W. 476 (1938).
Action by injured employee, pending at time of death, may be revived by dependents giving bond or by administrator without bond, and pleadings for revivor must state facts sufficient to bring applicant within statutes. Palmer v. Saunders County, 117 Neb. 484, 221 N.W. 99 (1928).
Evidence was sufficient to show mother was wholly dependent on deceased son, and entitled to compensation as such. Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Watkins, 113 Neb. 619, 204 N.W. 391 (1925).
Where deceased had been sending periodically sums of money for support of mother in Italy, she was entitled to compensation as dependent. Venuto v. Carter Lake Club, 105 Neb. 568, 181 N.W. 377 (1921), 104 Neb. 782, 178 N.W. 760 (1920).
Commutation of compensation payments for benefit of nonresident alien dependents discussed and rule stated. Bailey v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 99 Neb. 109, 155 N.W. 237 (1915).
2. Medical and burial allowance
Award for burial expense reduced to maximum allowed by statute at time of accident. Martin v. Frear, 184 Neb. 266, 167 N.W.2d 69 (1969).
Death benefits payable are fixed by this section. Copple v. Bowlin, 172 Neb. 467, 110 N.W.2d 117 (1961).
Widow of deceased employee was entitled to allowance for medical and funeral expense in addition to compensation at percentage of wage for three hundred and twenty-five weeks. Cole v. M. L. Rawlings Ice Co., 139 Neb. 439, 297 N.W. 652 (1941).
This section provides for burial allowance without deduction from other compensation. Aeschleman v. Haschenburger Co., 127 Neb. 207, 254 N.W. 899 (1934).
3. Miscellaneous
Workmen's compensation court and district court properly converted deceased's compensation of one-fourth of transportation charges into a daily wage rate and then to a five-day weekly wage rate. Loeffelholz v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 183 Neb. 112, 158 N.W.2d 219 (1968).
Award for accidental death could not rest upon possibilities, probabilities, or conjectural evidence. Wynia v. Hoesing, 167 Neb. 136, 91 N.W.2d 404 (1958).
Death from occupational disease is compensable. Hauff v. Kimball, 163 Neb. 55, 77 N.W.2d 683 (1956).
Claimant was entitled to receive the proportion of the maximum weekly amount allowed by statute that his average contribution from his wages to support of foster parents bore to the total of his wages received. McKelvey v. Barton Mills, Inc., 152 Neb. 120, 40 N.W.2d 407 (1949).
City fireman was not barred from receiving fireman's pension by having received workmen's compensation. City of Lincoln v. Steffensmeyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938).
48-122.01.
Compensation; schedule.Compensation under section 48-122 shall be payable in the amount and to the following persons subject to the maximum limits specified in sections 48-122 and 48-122.03:
(1) If there is a widow or widower and no children of the deceased, as defined in section 48-124, to such widow or widower, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wage of the deceased, during widowhood or widowerhood;
(2) To the widow or widower, if there is a child or children living with the widow or widower, sixty percent of the average weekly wage of the deceased, or fifty-five percent, if such child is not or such children are not living with a widow or widower, and, in addition thereto, fifteen percent for each child. When there are two or more such children, the indemnity benefits payable on account of such children shall be divided among such children, share and share alike;
(3) Two years' indemnity benefits in one lump sum shall be payable to a widow or widower upon remarriage;
(4) To the children, if there is no widow or widower, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of such wage for one child, and fifteen percent for each additional child, divided among such children, share and share alike;
(5) The income benefits payable on account of any child under this section shall cease when he or she dies, marries, or reaches the age of nineteen, or when a child over such age ceases to be physically or mentally incapable of self-support, or if actually dependent ceases to be actually dependent, or, if enrolled as a full-time student in any accredited educational institution, ceases to be so enrolled or reaches the age of twenty-five. A child who originally qualified as a dependent by virtue of being less than nineteen years of age may, upon reaching age nineteen, continue to qualify if he or she satisfies the tests of being physically or mentally incapable of self-support, actual dependency, or enrollment in an educational institution;
(6) To each parent, if actually dependent, twenty-five percent;
(7) To the brothers, sisters, grandparents, and grandchildren, if actually dependent, twenty-five percent to each such dependent. If there should be more than one of such dependents, the total income benefits payable on account of such dependents shall be divided share and share alike;
(8) The income benefits of each beneficiary under subdivisions (6) and (7) of this section shall be paid until he or she, if a parent or grandparent, dies, marries, or ceases to be actually dependent, or, if a brother, sister, or grandchild, dies, marries, or reaches the age of nineteen or if over that age ceases to be physically or mentally incapable of self-support, or ceases to be actually dependent; and
(9) A person ceases to be actually dependent when his or her income from all sources exclusive of workers' compensation income benefits is such that, if it had existed at the time as of which the original determination of actual dependency was made, it would not have supported a finding of dependency. In any event, if the present annual income of an actual dependent person including workers' compensation income benefits at any time exceeds the total annual support received by the person from the deceased employee, the workers' compensation benefits shall be reduced so that the total annual income is no greater than such amount of annual support received from the deceased employee. In all cases, a person found to be actually dependent shall be presumed to be no longer actually dependent three years after each time as of which the person was found to be actually dependent. This presumption may be overcome by proof of continued actual dependency as defined in this subdivision and section 48-124.
48-122.02.
Compensation; cessation of income benefits; income benefits.Upon the cessation of income benefits under section 48-122.01 to or on account of any person, the income benefits of the remaining persons entitled to income benefits for the unexpired part of the period during which their income benefits are payable shall be that which such persons would have received if they had been the only persons entitled to income benefits at the time of the decedent's death.
48-122.03.
Compensation; maximum weekly income benefits in case of death.The maximum weekly income benefits payable for all beneficiaries in case of death shall not exceed seventy-five percent of the average weekly wage of the deceased, subject to the maximum limits in section 48-122. The maximum aggregate limitation shall not operate in case of payment of two years' income benefits to the widow or widower upon remarriage, as provided under subdivision (3) of section 48-122.01, to prevent the immediate recalculation and payments of benefits to the remaining beneficiaries as provided under section 48-122.02. The classes of beneficiaries specified in subdivisions (1), (2), and (4) of section 48-122.01 shall have priority over all other beneficiaries in the apportionment of income benefits. If there is a widow or widower and a child or children and the maximums specified in section 48-122 and this section prevent full payment under either maximum, the compensation shall be apportioned between the widow or widower and the child or children on a pro rata basis. If there is more than one child living with the widow or widower and no child or children living separately, the apportionment shall be on the pro rata basis of sixty percent to the widow or widower and fifteen percent divided among the children. If there is more than one child not living with the widow or widower and no child or children living with her or him, the apportionment shall be on the pro rata basis of fifty-five percent to the widow or widower and twenty percent divided among the children. If one or more children are living with and one or more children are not living with her or him, the apportionment shall be on the pro rata basis of fifty-five percent to the widow or widower and twenty percent divided among the children. If the provisions of this section should prevent payment to other beneficiaries of the income benefits to the full extent otherwise provided for, the gross remaining amount of income benefits payable to such other beneficiaries shall be apportioned by class, proportionate to the interest of each class in the remaining amount. Parents shall be considered to be in one class and those specified in subdivision (7) of section 48-122.01 in another class.
48-123.
Compensation; death of employee receiving disability payments; schedule.The death of an injured employee prior to the expiration of the period within which he or she would receive such disability payment shall be deemed to end such disability, and all liability for the remainder of such payment which he or she would have received in case he or she had lived shall be terminated, but the employer shall thereupon be liable for the following death benefit in lieu of any further disability indemnity: If the injury so received by such employee was the cause of his or her death and such deceased employee leaves dependents as hereinbefore specified, the death benefit shall be a sum sufficient, when added to the indemnity which shall at the time of death have been paid or become payable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act to such deceased employee, to make the total compensation for the injury and death equal to the full amount which such dependents would have been entitled to receive under section 48-122, in case the accident had resulted in immediate death; and such benefits shall be payable in the same manner and subject to the same terms and conditions in all respects as payments made under such section. No deduction shall be made for the amount which may have been paid for medical and hospital services and medicines or for the expenses of burial. If the employee dies from some cause other than the injury, there shall be no liability for compensation to accrue after his or her death.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 23, p. 589; R.S.1913, § 3664; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 9, p. 207; C.S.1922, § 3046; C.S.1929, § 48-123; R.S.1943, § 48-123;
Laws 1973, LB 193, § 6; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 41.
Annotations
Where injured employee dies during pendency of litigation, payment of compensation will be made in accordance with this section. Smith v. Stevens, 173 Neb. 723, 114 N.W.2d 724 (1962).
Employer was not liable for death benefit hereunder where evidence was not sufficient to support claim of compensable injury. Kuhtnick v. Carey, 124 Neb. 762, 248 N.W. 89 (1933), 124 Neb. 761, 248 N.W. 92 (1933).
Action by injured employee, pending at time of death, may be revived by dependents or administrator. Palmer v. Saunders County, 117 Neb. 484, 221 N.W. 99 (1928).
48-124.
Dependents; terms, defined.The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be dependent for support upon a deceased employee: (1) A wife upon a husband with whom she is living or upon whom she is actually dependent at the time of his injury or death; (2) a husband upon a wife with whom he is living or upon whom he is actually dependent at the time of her injury or death; and (3) a child or children under the age of nineteen years, or over such age, if physically or mentally incapable of self-support, or any child nineteen years of age or over who is actually dependent, or any child between nineteen and twenty-five years of age who is enrolled as a full-time student in any accredited educational institution.
The term child shall include a posthumous child, a child legally adopted or for whom adoption proceedings are pending at the time of death, an actually dependent child in relation to whom the deceased employee stood in the place of a parent for at least one year prior to the time of death, an actually dependent stepchild, or a child born out of wedlock. Child shall not include a married child unless receiving substantially entire support from the employee. Grandchild shall mean a child, as above defined, of a child, as above defined, except that as to the latter child, the limitations as to age in the above definition do not apply.
Brother or sister shall mean a brother or sister under nineteen years of age, or nineteen years of age or over and physically or mentally incapable of self-support, or nineteen years of age or over and actually dependent. The terms brother and sister shall include stepbrothers and stepsisters, half brothers and half sisters, and brothers and sisters by adoption but shall not include married brothers or married sisters unless receiving substantially entire support from the employee.
Parent shall mean a mother or father, a stepparent, a parent by adoption, a parent-in-law, and any person who for more than one year immediately prior to the death of the employee stood in the place of a parent to him or her, if actually dependent in each case.
Actually dependent shall mean dependent in fact upon the employee and shall refer only to a person who received more than half of his or her support from the employee and whose dependency is not the result of failure to make reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment. When used as a noun, the word dependent shall mean any person entitled to death benefits. No person shall be considered a dependent, unless he or she be a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears to him or her the relation of widow, widower, lineal descendant, ancestor, brother, or sister. Questions as to who constitute dependents and the extent of their dependency shall initially be determined as of the date of the accident to the employee, and the death benefit shall be directly recoverable by and payable to the dependent or dependents entitled thereto or their legal guardians or trustees. No dependent of any injured employee shall be deemed, during the life of such employee, a party in interest to any proceeding by him or her for the enforcement or collection of any claim for compensation, nor as respects the compromise thereof by such employee.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 24, p. 590; R.S.1913, § 3665; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 3, p. 531; C.S.1922, § 3047; C.S.1929, § 48-124; R.S.1943, § 48-124; Laws 1949, c. 161, § 1, p. 409;
Laws 1971, LB 499, § 2; Laws 1973, LB 193, § 7; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 42; Laws 1989, LB 22, § 7; Laws 1997, LB 128, § 1; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 5.
Annotations
1. Wife
2. Children
3. Parents
4. Miscellaneous
1. Wife
Common-law wife was a dependent entitled to compensation. Bourelle v. Soo-Crete, Inc., 165 Neb. 731, 87 N.W.2d 371 (1958).
Where wife was living apart from husband, and did not recognize his obligation to support her, recovery could not be had for death of husband. Bulman v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corporation, 144 Neb. 342, 13 N.W.2d 403 (1944).
Wife, involuntarily confined in insane asylum at time of husband's death, was living with husband within provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act. Harrison v. Cargill Commission Co., 126 Neb. 185, 252 N.W. 899 (1934).
Where common-law marriage was invalid, claimant was not the widow and not entitled to compensation hereunder. Collins v. Hoag & Rollins, Inc., 122 Neb. 805, 241 N.W. 766 (1932).
2. Children
Subsection (3) of this section is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Neb. Const. art. I, sections 1 and 25, because it discriminates against illegitimate children by mandating a heavier burden of proof as opposed to a lesser burden of proof required of legitimate children. Findaya W. v. A-T.E.A.M. Co., 249 Neb. 838, 546 N.W.2d 61 (1996).
Determination of child's dependency is a question of fact unless child lived with parent at parent's death. James v. Rainchief Constr. Co., 197 Neb. 818, 251 N.W.2d 367 (1977).
Child wholly dependent takes death benefits to the exclusion of children partially dependent. Copple v. Bowlin, 172 Neb. 467, 110 N.W.2d 117 (1961).
Where child of divorced parents did not live with and had not received support from father, child was not a dependent so as to be entitled to compensation upon death of employee father. Meyer v. Nielsen Chevrolet Co., 137 Neb. 6, 287 N.W. 849 (1939).
Children seeking compensation as dependents of deceased must show actual dependency upon deceased. Palmer v. Hamer, 133 Neb. 362, 275 N.W. 322 (1937).
Contention of employer that children are entitled to compensation only from date widow remarried, was denied. Aeschleman v. Haschenburger Co., 127 Neb. 207, 254 N.W. 899 (1934).
A plain reading of this section shows that "an actually dependent stepchild" is a separate qualifying relationship from that between the deceased employee and "an actually dependent child in relation to whom the deceased employee stood in the place of a parent for at least one year prior to the time of death." State v. Soto, 11 Neb. App. 667, 659 N.W.2d 1 (2003).
3. Parents
Parents are not presumed to be dependents of minor children but may be found so to be on the facts of the individual case. McKelvey v. Barton Mills, Inc., 152 Neb. 120, 40 N.W.2d 407 (1949).
Payment by son to parents upon indebtedness do not make out a case of partial dependency upon son for support. Freburg v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 142 Neb. 868, 8 N.W.2d 209 (1943).
Where contributions are made by a son to support of needy parents over a reasonable period of time and with reasonable certainty as to amounts and when contributed, a finding of partial dependency of parents upon deceased employee is warranted. Kral v. Lincoln Steel Works, 136 Neb. 31, 284 N.W. 761 (1939).
Evidence was sufficient to establish nonresident mother's dependency. Venuto v. Carter Lake Club, 104 Neb. 782, 178 N.W. 760 (1920).
Dependency is not based solely upon a present legal obligation to support, and is not determined by the fact that a decedent had or had not actually contributed to the support of a parent before the date of the accident. Parson v. Murphy, 101 Neb. 542, 163 N.W. 847, L.R.A. 1918F 479 (1917).
4. Miscellaneous
Question of dependency is to be determined in accordance with the fact situation existing at time of injury. Lighthill v. McCurry, 175 Neb. 547, 122 N.W.2d 468 (1963).
Questions of dependency upon death of employee are to be determined in accordance with this section. Smith v. Stevens, 173 Neb. 723, 114 N.W.2d 724 (1962).
Dependency in fact is not created by contributions made by an employee for purposes other than support of the claimed dependent. Pieters v. Drake-Williams-Mount Co., 142 Neb. 315, 6 N.W.2d 69 (1942).
Where employee, in absence of fraud, signed release, it is binding on dependents after his death. Welton v. Swift & Co., 125 Neb. 455, 250 N.W. 661 (1933).
Dependents are not necessary parties in interest in compensation action brought in employee's lifetime. Employee's settlement, while in full possession of mental faculties, in absence of fraud, binds dependents. Bliss v. Woods, 120 Neb. 790, 235 N.W. 334 (1931).
Action to recover compensation for death may be by adult dependent, guardian or trustee of minor dependent, or by executor or administrator of deceased. Coster v. Thompson Hotel Co., 102 Neb. 585, 168 N.W. 191 (1918).
48-125.
Compensation; method of payment; payment by prepaid card; agreement; disclosure of fees or charges; election to rescind agreement; delay; appeal; attorney's fees; interest.(1) Except as hereinafter provided, all amounts of compensation payable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be payable periodically in accordance with the methods of payment of wages of the employee at the time of the injury or death or by a method of payment as provided in subsection (2) of this section. Such payments shall be sent directly to the person entitled to compensation or his or her designated representative except as otherwise provided in section 48-149 or subsection (2) of this section.
(2)(a) After an injury or death subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool and the employee, the other person entitled to compensation, or a legal representative acting on behalf of such employee or other person entitled to compensation may enter into a written or electronic agreement that periodic or lump-sum payments to the employee or other person entitled to compensation may be made by check or by direct deposit, prepaid card, or similar electronic payment system.
(b) Payments made by direct deposit, prepaid card, or similar electronic payment system pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to attachment or garnishment or held liable in any way for any debts, except as provided in section 48-149; and an agreement pursuant to this subsection shall include notice of this fact. If an amount is withheld pursuant to section 48-149, sufficient information to identify the jurisdiction, the case number or similar identifying information, and the amount withheld shall be provided to the employee or other person entitled to compensation or his or her legal representative at or near the time of withholding.
(c) Prior to entering into an agreement pursuant to this subsection for payment by prepaid card, the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool shall provide to the employee or other person entitled to compensation information regarding the locations where such card may be used by the employee or other person.
(d) Pursuant to an agreement under this subsection, compensation may be transferred by electronic funds transfer or other electronic means to the trust account of an attorney representing the employee or other person entitled to compensation, for the benefit of such employee or other person. The payment or transfer shall include or be accompanied by information sufficient to identify the nature of the payment being made, including the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool and the employee or other person entitled to compensation.
(e) If an employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool imposes any fees or other charges relating to payment by direct deposit, prepaid card, or a similar electronic payment system, prior to entering into an agreement pursuant to this subsection the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool shall disclose such fees or charges to the employee or other person entitled to compensation.
(f) Any payment or transfer made pursuant to this subsection by direct deposit, prepaid card, or similar electronic payment system shall be in the full amount of the lump-sum or periodic payment awarded or paid pursuant to section 48-121 to the employee or other person entitled to compensation.
(g) A prepaid card offered by the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool shall:
(i) Allow the employee or other person entitled to compensation to apply, initiate, transfer, and load payments with no charge by the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool;
(ii) For the initial prepaid card, be distributed or delivered to the employee or other person entitled to compensation with no charge by the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool; and
(iii) Provide the employee or other person entitled to compensation, with respect to each payment made to the prepaid card in accordance with this subsection, at least one method of accessing the full payment without fees.
(h) An employee, another person entitled to compensation, or a legal representative acting on behalf of such employee or other person entitled to compensation may elect at any time to rescind the agreement under this subsection regarding the method of payment by providing written or electronic notice of such rescission to the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool that is a party to such agreement. If such election is made, the employer, workers’ compensation insurer, or risk management pool shall change the method of payment to the method of payment of wages of the employee at the time of the injury or death under subsection (1) of this section as soon as practicable after receiving the information necessary to do so and in a manner that allows the employer, workers’ compensation insurer, or risk management pool to comply with the requirements of subsection (3) of this section without making a delinquent payment. The employer, workers’ compensation insurer, or risk management pool is not required to rescind any payment transaction already made or made to comply with subsection (3) of this section.
(i) An employer, a workers' compensation insurer, or a risk management pool or an agent of any such entity shall not engage in unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices in relation to the method of payment. No employer, workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or agent of any such entity shall discharge, penalize, or in any other manner discriminate against any employee or other person entitled to compensation because such employee or other person has not consented to receive payments by check or by direct deposit, prepaid card, or a similar electronic payment system.
(j) An employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool that elects to make payment using a prepaid card shall comply with the requirements of 12 C.F.R. part 1005, as such part existed on April 1, 2018.
(3) Fifty percent shall be added for waiting time for all delinquent payments after thirty days' notice has been given of disability or after thirty days from the entry of a final order, award, or judgment of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, except that for any award or judgment against the state in excess of one hundred thousand dollars which must be reviewed by the Legislature as provided in section 48-1,102, fifty percent shall be added for waiting time for delinquent payments thirty days after the effective date of the legislative bill appropriating any funds necessary to pay the portion of the award or judgment in excess of one hundred thousand dollars.
(4)(a) Whenever the employer refuses payment of compensation or medical payments subject to section 48-120, or when the employer neglects to pay compensation for thirty days after injury or neglects to pay medical payments subject to such section after thirty days' notice has been given of the obligation for medical payments, and proceedings are held before the compensation court, a reasonable attorney's fee shall be allowed the employee by the compensation court in all cases when the employee receives an award. Attorney's fees allowed shall not be deducted from the amounts ordered to be paid for medical services nor shall attorney's fees be charged to the medical providers.
(b) If the employer files an appeal from an award of a judge of the compensation court and fails to obtain any reduction in the amount of such award, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall allow the employee a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed as costs against the employer for such appeal.
(c) If the employee files an appeal from an order of a judge of the compensation court denying an award and obtains an award or if the employee files an appeal from an award of a judge of the compensation court when the amount of compensation due is disputed and obtains an increase in the amount of such award, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court may allow the employee a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed as costs against the employer for such appeal.
(d) A reasonable attorney's fee allowed pursuant to this subsection shall not affect or diminish the amount of the award.
(5) When an attorney's fee is allowed pursuant to this section, there shall further be assessed against the employer an amount of interest on the final award obtained, computed from the date compensation was payable, as provided in section 48-119, until the date payment is made by the employer. For any injury occurring prior to August 30, 2015, the interest rate shall be equal to the rate of interest allowed per annum under section 45-104.01, as such rate may from time to time be adjusted by the Legislature. For any injury occurring on or after August 30, 2015, the interest rate shall be equal to six percentage points above the bond investment yield, as published by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, of the average accepted auction price for the first auction of each annual quarter of the twenty-six-week United States Treasury bills in effect on the date of entry of the judgment. Interest shall apply only to those weekly compensation benefits awarded which have accrued as of the date payment is made by the employer. If the employer pays or tenders payment of compensation, the amount of compensation due is disputed, and the award obtained is greater than the amount paid or tendered by the employer, the assessment of interest shall be determined solely upon the difference between the amount awarded and the amount tendered or paid.
(6) For purposes of this section:
(a) Direct deposit means the transfer of payments into an account of a financial institution chosen by the employee or other person entitled to compensation; and
(b) Prepaid card means a prepaid debit card that provides access to an account with a financial institution established directly or indirectly by the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool to which payments are transferred.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 25, p. 591; R.S.1913, § 3666; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 9 1/2, p. 208; Laws 1919, c. 91, § 4, p. 234; C.S.1922, § 3048; C.S.1929, § 48-125; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 20, p. 197; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-125; R.S.1943, § 48-125;
Laws 1973, LB 169, § 1; Laws 1975, LB 187, § 2; Laws 1983, LB 18, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 43; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 110;
Laws 1992, LB 360, § 14; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 6; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 5; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 4; Laws 2009, LB630, § 3; Laws 2011, LB151, § 1; Laws 2015, LB480, § 3; Laws 2018, LB957, § 1.
Annotations
1. Attorney's fees allowed
2. Attorney's fees not allowed
3. Reasonable controversy
4. Waiting time
5. Miscellaneous
1. Attorney's fees allowed
The requested fees need not have been incurred under a fee agreement in order to be recoverable as reasonable attorney fees under subdivision (4)(b) of this section. Sellers v. Reefer Systems, 305 Neb. 868, 943 N.W.2d 275 (2020).
Interest that is assessed when a claimant is awarded attorney fees on an enforcement motion is calculated from the time each installment of benefits became due to the date of payment, rather than being assessed on the full amount of benefits owed from the first date that compensation was payable. Russell v. Kerry, Inc., 278 Neb. 981, 775 N.W.2d 420 (2009).
An employee is entitled to reasonable attorney fees when he or she obtains an increase, however trivial, in the amount of a workers' compensation award upon review. Hagelstein v. Swift-Eckrich, Div. of ConAgra, 261 Neb. 305, 622 N.W.2d 663 (2001).
Payment of a court-approved lump-sum settlement is subject to the provisions of this section. Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the phrase "reduction in the amount of such award" includes an attempt to apportion the responsibility for payment of an award among insurers and the Second Injury Fund. The elements required to establish the Second Injury Fund's liability are (1) a prior permanent partial disability known to the employer and hindering the employee's employability, (2) a subsequent compensable injury causing permanent disability to the employee, and (3) a combined permanent disability substantially greater in degree or percentage than would have resulted from the subsequent injury considered alone. The Second Injury Fund's liability cannot be determined until and unless the employee's subsequent injury is permanent. Miller v. Meister & Segrist, 255 Neb. 805, 587 N.W.2d 399 (1998).
The Second Injury Fund is "employer" within the meaning of this section. If the Second Injury Fund, on appeal, fails to obtain reduction of award of Workers' Compensation Court on rehearing, employee is entitled to reasonable attorney fees for appeal, to be assessed against the Second Injury Fund. Sherard v. Bethphage Mission, Inc., 236 Neb. 900, 464 N.W.2d 343 (1991).
Mere reduction of one aspect of the compensation award without a corresponding reduction of the total award does not mean that the employer obtained a reduction of the award such that the employee is not entitled to an attorney fee. Schlotfeld v. Mel's Heating & Air Conditioning, 233 Neb. 488, 445 N.W.2d 918 (1989).
Where there is no reasonable controversy regarding an employee's entitlement to workers' compensation, this section authorizes an award to the employee of an attorney fee and a fifty-percent payment for waiting time on delinquent payments. Roesler v. Farmland Foods, 232 Neb. 842, 442 N.W.2d 398 (1989).
Where an award for permanent partial disability is made on rehearing, following an award for temporary total disability, the employee is entitled to an award of attorney fees on the rehearing. Mulder v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 219 Neb. 241, 361 N.W.2d 572 (1985).
An amendment to a workmen's compensation statute which provides for the payment of attorney fees relates to the remedy and affects procedure only, and does not interfere with substantive rights. Therefore, such fees as are provided may be taxed as an item of costs in entering judgment on a claim that arose before the amendatory act was passed. Smith v. Fremont Contract Carriers, 218 Neb. 652, 358 N.W.2d 211 (1984).
Statutory language, "reduction in the amount of such award", ordinarily refers to the total amount of the award to the employee and not to a reduction in the amount to be paid by a specific defendant who is liable to pay a portion of the award. The Second Injury Fund, within the meaning of this section, is an employer and if, on appeal to this court, it fails to obtain any reduction in the amount of the award on rehearing, the employee is entitled to a reasonable sum as attorney fees in this court, to be assessed against the fund. Pollard v. Wright's Tree Service, Inc., 212 Neb. 187, 322 N.W.2d 397 (1982).
Where an employer applies for a rehearing from an award by a single judge of the Workmen's Compensation Court and obtains a reduction in the award, the Workmen's Compensation Court should not allow the employee attorney fees for the rehearing. But if the employer then appeals to this court and fails to obtain a further reduction, then the employee should be awarded attorney fees for the appeal. Goers v. Bud Irons Excavating, 207 Neb. 579, 300 N.W.2d 29 (1980).
Attorney's fee of one thousand five hundred dollars allowed to claimant-appellee. Alcaraz v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 207 Neb. 255, 298 N.W.2d 160; Mohr v. Soil Mover Manufacturing Co., 207 Neb. 261, 298 N.W.2d 166 (1980).
Reasonable attorney's fee normally allowed where compensation court award is not reduced on appeal. Harrington v. State, 198 Neb. 4, 251 N.W.2d 653 (1977).
A reasonable attorney's fee is generally granted an employee if the employer appeals but fails to obtain a reduction of the award. Weikhorst v. Rural Electric Co., Inc., 186 Neb. 445, 183 N.W.2d 747 (1971).
Where award of compensation was affirmed, employee was entitled to an attorney's fee for services of attorney in Supreme Court. Welke v. City of Ainsworth, 179 Neb. 496, 138 N.W.2d 808 (1965).
Attorney's fee was properly awarded to plaintiff's attorneys upon affirmance of award for permanent total disability. Haskett v. National Biscuit Co., 177 Neb. 915, 131 N.W.2d 597 (1964).
Attorney's fee was properly allowed for services in Supreme Court. Appleby v. Great Western Sugar Co., Inc., 176 Neb. 102, 125 N.W.2d 103 (1963).
Allowance of attorney's fee was proper. Shada v. Whitney, 172 Neb. 220, 109 N.W.2d 167 (1961).
When employer refuses to pay compensation, attorney's fee can be allowed for services in compensation court. Pavel v. Hughes Brothers, Inc., 167 Neb. 727, 94 N.W.2d 492 (1959).
Where award of workmen's compensation court was affirmed, attorney's fee was properly allowed. Sears v. City of Omaha, 164 Neb. 869, 83 N.W.2d 857 (1957).
Where employer on appeal failed to obtain reduction in award, attorney's fee was authorized. Haler v. Gering Bean Co., 163 Neb. 748, 81 N.W.2d 152 (1957).
Statute limits the right to an attorney's fee to a specific situation. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Kennard, 162 Neb. 220, 75 N.W.2d 553 (1956).
Where employer failed to secure reduction of award, attorney's fee was authorized. Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
Attorney's fee was properly allowed. Dietz v. State, 157 Neb. 324, 59 N.W.2d 587 (1953).
Attorney's fee was allowed for services in Supreme Court. Schneider v. Village of Shickley, 156 Neb. 683, 57 N.W.2d 527 (1953).
Where employer failed to secure reduction in award on appeal to Supreme Court, attorney's fee was allowable. Anderson v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 155 Neb. 590, 52 N.W.2d 814 (1952).
Allowance of attorney's fee was proper. Miller v. Schlereth, 152 Neb. 805, 42 N.W.2d 865 (1950).
Where employer fails to obtain reduction of award in both district and Supreme Court, attorney's fee in each court may be allowed. Werner v. Nebraska Power Co., 149 Neb. 408, 31 N.W.2d 315 (1948).
Where employer appeals from award of district court and fails to obtain reduction in amount of award, Supreme Court will allow attorneys' fees for services in appellate court. McRae v. Ulrich, Inc., 147 Neb. 214, 22 N.W.2d 697 (1946).
When employer appeals to Supreme Court from an award of compensation and fails to obtain reduction in amount of award, Supreme Court will allow employee a reasonable attorney's fee. Gilmore v. State, 146 Neb. 647, 20 N.W.2d 918 (1945).
Attorney's fee should be allowed whenever employer appeals to district court and fails to obtain reduction in amount of award. Weitz v. Johnson, 143 Neb. 452, 9 N.W.2d 788 (1943).
Where award of compensation by district court is affirmed upon appeal, a reasonable attorney's fee for appellate services is taxable against employer as costs. Chatt v. Massman Construction Co., 138 Neb. 288, 293 N.W. 105 (1940).
Amendment of statute allowing attorneys' fees affected remedy only and applied to cases which arose prior to the amendment. Solomon v. A. W. Farney, Inc., 136 Neb. 338, 286 N.W. 254 (1939).
Allowance for services in Supreme Court was proper. Ludwickson v. Central States Electric Co., 135 Neb. 371, 281 N.W. 603 (1938).
Additional attorney's fee for services in Supreme Court should be allowed where no reduction in award is obtained. Perkins v. Young, 133 Neb. 234, 274 N.W. 596 (1937).
Where employer on appeal to district court secured reduction in award, employee was not entitled to attorney's fees there, but where further appeal was taken to Supreme Court and no further reduction obtained, attorney's fees for services in appellate court were proper. Harmon v. J. H. Wiese Co., 121 Neb. 137, 236 N.W. 186 (1931).
Compensation claimant is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, where appealing employer fails to reduce award. Davis v. Lincoln County, 117 Neb. 148, 219 N.W. 899 (1928); Western Newspaper Union v. Dee, 108 Neb. 303, 187 N.W. 919 (1922); Derr v. Kirkpatrick, 106 Neb. 403, 184 N.W. 91 (1921); Ulaski v. Morris & Co., 106 Neb. 782, 184 N.W. 946 (1921).
Additional fees are allowable for services in Supreme Court where appealing employer fails to reduce award. Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Watkins, 113 Neb. 619, 204 N.W. 391 (1925); Derr v. Kirkpatrick, 106 Neb. 403, 184 N.W. 91 (1921).
When an attorney fee is allowed pursuant to this section, interest shall be assessed on the final award of weekly compensation benefits, not "medical payments." Bronzynski v. Model Electric, 14 Neb. App. 355, 707 N.W.2d 46 (2005).
An award of attorney fees under this section was remanded for evidence and specific findings as to the appropriate amount in accordance with Harmon v. Irby Constr. Co., 258 Neb. 420, 604 N.W.2d 813 (1999). Cochran v. Bill's Trucking, 10 Neb. App. 48, 624 N.W.2d 338 (2001).
The Second Injury Fund is an employer for purposes of this section. If the Second Injury Fund files an unsuccessful appeal, attorney fees are to be taxed against the Second Injury Fund and not against the employer. Bryson v. Vickers, Inc., 7 Neb. App. 595, 584 N.W.2d 44 (1998).
2. Attorney's fees not allowed
By filing a release pursuant to section 48-139(3), a worker waives his or her right to ask for penalties and attorney fees under this section. Holdsworth v. Greenwood Farmers Co-op, 286 Neb. 49, 835 N.W.2d 30 (2013).
Because the employee did not receive an award in a proceeding before the compensation court, attorney fees cannot be awarded under subsection (1) of this section. The unequivocal language of this section clearly reads that an award of attorney fees is a prerequisite before interest on the compensation amount due to a claimant may be awarded under subsection (2) of this section. Blizzard v. Chrisman's Cash Register Co., 261 Neb. 445, 623 N.W.2d 655 (2001).
An employee is not entitled to an award of attorney fees when the employer, on appeal, obtains a reduction in the employee's overall award. Ira v. Swift-Eckrich, 251 Neb. 411, 558 N.W.2d 40 (1997).
This statute does not authorize the award of an attorney fee where there exists a reasonable controversy between the parties as to the entitlement of compensation. Beavers v. IBP, Inc., 222 Neb. 647, 385 N.W.2d 896 (1986).
If the employer received a reduction of the award of the compensation court, the employee's attorney fees in this court will not be taxed as costs against the employer. Hare v. Watts Trucking Service, 220 Neb. 403, 370 N.W.2d 143 (1985).
In a workmen's compensation case an employee may not withhold evidence of medical expense at the first hearing, inadvertent though it might be, and then claim on rehearing that an attorney fee should be awarded because the award was increased. Smith v. Fremont Contract Carriers, 218 Neb. 652, 358 N.W.2d 211 (1984).
Where an employer has obtained a termination of a previous running award for temporary total disability, it cannot be said that such employer has failed to obtain "any reduction in the amount of such award" so as to be liable for attorney fees within the meaning of this statute. Butler v. Midwest Supply Co., 212 Neb. 421, 322 N.W.2d 815 (1982).
Where an employer applies for a rehearing from an award by a single judge of the Workmen's Compensation Court and obtains a reduction in the award, the Workmen's Compensation Court should not allow the employee attorney fees for the rehearing. But if the employer then appeals to this court and fails to obtain a further reduction, then the employee should be awarded attorney fees for the appeal. Goers v. Bud Irons Excavating, 207 Neb. 579, 300 N.W.2d 29 (1980).
Under facts in this case, an award of an attorney's fee was not permitted. Reis v. Douglas County Hospital, 193 Neb. 542, 227 N.W.2d 879 (1975).
No attorney fee may be assessed against employer who offered no evidence in compensation court and alleged the award was correct and should be affirmed in the district court. Breed v. Interstate Glass Co., 188 Neb. 284, 196 N.W.2d 169 (1972).
An attorney's fee cannot be allowed for legal services where employer obtains a reduction of award on his appeal. Harrington v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 182 Neb. 434, 155 N.W.2d 355 (1967).
Where district court denied an award of compensation, attorney's fee was not authorized on reversal by Supreme Court. Tilghman v. Mills, 169 Neb. 665, 100 N.W.2d 739 (1960).
Where appealing party is not employer, attorney's fee cannot be allowed. Franzen v. Blakley, 155 Neb. 621, 52 N.W.2d 833 (1952).
Attorney's fee allowed for services in district court but disallowed in Supreme Court where district court increased award and Supreme Court reduced it. Solheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37 N.W.2d 212 (1949).
Where employer secured modification of award in Supreme Court, attorney's fee in that court could not be allowed. Sporcic v. Swift & Co., 149 Neb. 489, 31 N.W.2d 404, modifying 149 Neb. 246, 30 N.W.2d 891 (1948).
The right to tax attorney's fees in compensation cases is purely statutory, and award for services rendered in compensation court is not authorized. Faulhaber v. Roberts Dairy Co., 147 Neb. 631, 24 N.W.2d 571 (1946).
When plaintiff is denied award in both compensation court and district court, Supreme Court cannot allow attorney's fee. Elliott v. Gooch Feed Mill Co., 147 Neb. 309, 23 N.W.2d 262 (1946).
Attorney's fee is not allowable to employee who appeals from adverse decision in the district court which denied an award of compensation and Supreme Court holds employee entitled to compensation. Lee v. Lincoln Cleaning & Dye Works, 145 Neb. 124, 15 N.W.2d 330 (1944).
Section does not authorize allowance of attorney's fees where employee takes an appeal. Rexroat v. State, 143 Neb. 333, 9 N.W.2d 305 (1943).
Attorney's fee is not allowable where an employee is denied recovery in compensation court, and, on appeal to district court, an award of compensation is made. Schirmer v. Cedar County Farmers Tel. Co., 139 Neb. 182, 296 N.W. 875 (1941).
Allowance of attorney's fee is erroneous where employer has not neglected or refused to pay compensation, or appealed from an award made to the employee. Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
Where district court, on appeal from compensation commissioner, fixed date when payment of compensation should begin at later date than that fixed by compensation commissioner, such change amounted to reduction of the award, and district court had no authority to allow attorney's fee for plaintiff's attorney. Mulvey v. City of Lincoln, 131 Neb. 279, 267 N.W. 459 (1936).
Where employer is entitled to a reduction on appeal, employee is not entitled to an attorney's fee. Truka v. McDonald, 127 Neb. 780, 257 N.W. 232 (1934).
Where employer on appeal to district court secured reduction in award, employee was not entitled to attorney's fees there, but where further appeal was taken to Supreme Court and no further reduction obtained, attorney's fees for services in appellate court were proper. Harmon v. J. H. Wiese Co., 121 Neb. 137, 236 N.W. 186 (1931).
Compensation claimant is not entitled to attorney's fee where he, and not employer, appeals. Updike Grain Co. v. Swanson, 104 Neb. 661, 178 N.W. 618 (1920).
3. Reasonable controversy
A reasonable controversy existed due to an unanswered question of law regarding the timing of permanent disability payments in a case involving an amputation. Melton v. City of Holdrege, 309 Neb. 385, 960 N.W.2d 298 (2021).
A "reasonable controversy" for the purpose of this section exists if (1) there is a question of law previously unanswered by the Supreme Court, which question must be answered to determine a right or liability for disposition of a claim under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, or (2) the properly adduced evidence would support reasonable but opposite conclusions by the compensation court about an aspect of an employee's claim, which conclusions affect allowance or rejection of an employee's claim, in whole or in part. Picard v. P & C Group 1, 306 Neb. 292, 945 N.W.2d 183 (2020).
Whether a reasonable controversy exists under this section is a question of fact. Picard v. P & C Group 1, 306 Neb. 292, 945 N.W.2d 183 (2020).
For the purposes of this section, a reasonable controversy exists if (1) there is a question of law previously unanswered by the Supreme Court, which question must be answered to determine a right or liability for disposition of a claim under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, or (2) if the properly adduced evidence would support reasonable but opposite conclusions by the compensation court about an aspect of an employee's claim, which conclusions affect allowance or rejection of an employee's claim, in whole or in part. When there is some conflict in the medical testimony adduced at trial, reasonable but opposite conclusions could be reached by the compensation court. Nichols v. Fairway Bldg. Prods., 294 Neb. 657, 884 N.W.2d 124 (2016).
A reasonable controversy between an employer and an employee as to the payment of workers' compensation benefits can be shown by evidence adduced at trial but unknown at the time benefits were denied. Armstrong v. State, 290 Neb. 205, 859 N.W.2d 541 (2015).
A reasonable controversy under this section may exist if the properly adduced evidence would support reasonable but opposite conclusions by the Workers' Compensation Court concerning an aspect of an employee's claim for workers' compensation, which conclusions affect allowance or rejection of an employee's claim, in whole or in part. Stacy v. Great Lakes Agri Mktg., 276 Neb. 236, 753 N.W.2d 785 (2008).
To avoid the penalty provided for in this section, an employer need not prevail in the employee's claim—it simply must have an actual basis in law or fact for disputing the claim and refusing compensation. Stacy v. Great Lakes Agri Mktg., 276 Neb. 236, 753 N.W.2d 785 (2008).
Whether a reasonable controversy exists under this section is a question of fact. Stacy v. Great Lakes Agri Mktg., 276 Neb. 236, 753 N.W.2d 785 (2008); Carter v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 234 Neb. 558, 452 N.W.2d 32 (1990); Davis v. Crete Carrier Corp., 15 Neb. App. 241, 725 N.W.2d 562 (2006).
A reasonable controversy under this section may exist (1) if there is a question of law previously unanswered by the appellate courts, which question must be answered to determine a right or liability for disposition of a claim under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, or (2) if the properly adduced evidence would support reasonable but opposite conclusions by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court concerning an aspect of an employee's claim for workers' compensation, which conclusions affect allowance or rejection of an employee's claim, in whole or in part. To avoid the penalty provided for in this section, an employer need not prevail in the employee's claim, but must have an actual basis in law or fact for disputing the claim and refusing compensation. Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting & Painting, 266 Neb. 526, 667 N.W.2d 167 (2003).
This section authorizes a 50-percent penalty payment for waiting time involving delinquent payment of compensation and an attorney fee, where there is no reasonable controversy regarding an employee's claim for workers' compensation. A reasonable controversy may exist if there is a question of law previously unanswered by the Supreme Court, which question must be answered to determine a right or liability for disposition of a claim under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Hobza v. Seedorff Masonry, Inc., 259 Neb. 671, 611 N.W.2d 828 (2000).
This section authorizes a 50-percent penalty payment for waiting time where the employer fails to pay compensation after 30 days' notice of the disability and where no reasonable controversy exists regarding the employee's claim for benefits. Waiting-time penalties apply to final adjudicated awards or final orders of the Workers' Compensation Court. The purpose of the 30-day waiting-time penalty and the provision for attorney fees is to encourage prompt payment by making delay costly if the award has been finally established. The only legitimate excuse for delay in the payment of workers' compensation benefits is the existence of a genuine dispute from a medical or legal standpoint that any liability exists, and the fact that an employer is considering an appeal with no appeal actually filed is not sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of genuine medical or legal doubt as to liability. Gaston v. Appleton Elec. Co., 253 Neb. 897, 573 N.W.2d 131 (1998).
This section authorizes a 50-percent penalty payment for waiting time where the employer fails to pay compensation after 30 days' notice of the disability and where no reasonable controversy exists regarding the employee's claim for benefits. Waiting-time penalties apply to final adjudicated awards. The purpose of the 30-day waiting-time penalty and the provision for attorney fees is to encourage prompt payment by making delay costly if the award has been finally established. The only legitimate excuse for delay in the payment of workers' compensation benefits is the existence of a genuine dispute from a medical or legal standpoint that any liability exists, and the fact that an employer is considering filing an application for review with no such application actually filed is not a sufficient reason to sustain a finding of genuine medical or legal doubt as to liability. In order to refrain from paying workers' compensation benefits and to avoid the penalty assessable under this section, the employer must demonstrate that he or she has an actual basis, in law or fact, for disputing the employee's claim. Roth v. Sarpy Cty. Highway Dept., 253 Neb. 703, 572 N.W.2d 786 (1998).
The concept of the presence of a reasonable controversy is to be applied only to the determination as to whether an employee is entitled to the statutory penalties, not including attorney fees, as set out in this section. Snyder v. IBP, Inc., 235 Neb. 319, 455 N.W.2d 157 (1990).
Under this section, the concept of reasonable controversy is to be applied only to determinations of statutory penalties, not including attorney fees. Behrens v. American Stores Packing Co., 234 Neb. 25, 449 N.W.2d 197 (1989).
Although the total amount of compensation may be in dispute, the employer has a duty to promptly pay any undisputed compensation, and the only legitimate excuse for delay of compensation is the existence of genuine doubt from a medical or legal standpoint that any liability exists. Musil v. J.A. Baldwin Manuf. Co., 233 Neb. 901, 448 N.W.2d 591 (1989).
To avoid the payments assessable under this section, an employer need not prevail in opposition to an employee's claim for compensation, but must have an actual basis, in law or fact, for disputing the employee's claim and refraining from payment of compensation. Musil v. J.A. Baldwin Manuf. Co., 233 Neb. 901, 448 N.W.2d 591 (1989).
Whether a reasonable controversy exists for the purpose of determining whether an attorney fee or delay penalty should be awarded under the provisions of this section is a question of fact. Roesler v. Farmland Foods, 232 Neb. 842, 442 N.W.2d 398 (1989).
Whether a reasonable controversy exists under this section is a question of fact for the Workers' Compensation Court. Tlamka v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 225 Neb. 789, 408 N.W.2d 291 (1987).
Reasonable controversy existed requiring denial of waiting time. Attorney's fee was properly allowed. Shamburg v. Shamburg, 153 Neb. 495, 45 N.W.2d 446 (1950).
A reasonable controversy under this section may exist (1) if there is a question of law previously unanswered by the appellate courts, which question must be answered to determine a right or liability for disposition of a claim under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, or (2) if the properly adduced evidence would support reasonable but opposite conclusions by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court concerning an aspect of an employee's claim for workers' compensation, which conclusions affect allowance or rejection of an employee's claim, in whole or in part. Davis v. Crete Carrier Corp., 15 Neb. App. 241, 725 N.W.2d 562 (2006); Milliken v. Premier Indus., 13 Neb. App. 330, 691 N.W.2d 855 (2005).
To avoid the penalty provided for in this section, an employer need not prevail in the employee's claim, but must have an actual basis in law or fact for disputing the claim and refusing compensation. Davis v. Crete Carrier Corp., 15 Neb. App. 241, 725 N.W.2d 562 (2006).
To avoid the penalty provided for in this section, an employer need not prevail in the employee's claim, but must have an actual basis in law or fact for disputing the claim and refusing compensation. Milliken v. Premier Indus., 13 Neb. App. 330, 691 N.W.2d 855 (2005).
The fact that an insurance company makes a settlement offer by itself does not show the existence of a reasonable controversy regarding the employee's claim for benefits pursuant to this section. Kubik v. Union Ins. Co., 4 Neb. App. 831, 550 N.W.2d 691 (1996).
4. Waiting time
This section authorizes a 50-percent penalty payment for waiting time involving delinquent payment of compensation and an attorney fee, where there is no reasonable controversy regarding an employee's claim for workers' compensation. Picard v. P & C Group 1, 306 Neb. 292, 945 N.W.2d 183 (2020).
This section authorizes a 50-percent payment for waiting time involving delinquent payment of compensation and attorney fees where there is no reasonable controversy regarding an employee's claim for workers' compensation. Nichols v. Fairway Bldg. Prods., 294 Neb. 657, 884 N.W.2d 124 (2016); Mendoza v. Omaha Meat Processors, 225 Neb. 771, 408 N.W.2d 280 (1987); Davis v. Crete Carrier Corp., 15 Neb. App. 241, 725 N.W.2d 562 (2006); Milliken v. Premier Indus., 13 Neb. App. 330, 691 N.W.2d 855 (2005).
The waiting-time penalty and attorney fees for waiting-time proceedings provided under this section are rights under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Holdsworth v. Greenwood Farmers Co-op, 286 Neb. 49, 835 N.W.2d 30 (2013).
No waiting-time penalty is required for an employer's delinquent payment of medical expenses, because such expenses do not constitute compensation within the meaning of this section. VanKirk v. Central Community College, 285 Neb. 231, 826 N.W.2d 277 (2013).
Even if an employer disputes in good faith the total compensation owed a claimant pending trial, the employer must pay any portion of the claim for which it admits liability. Lagemann v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 277 Neb. 335, 762 N.W.2d 51 (2009).
If an appellate court determines that no reasonable controversy existed regarding a claim for workers' compensation benefits, the employer must pay waiting-time penalties from the date of the award until it pays the benefits under the appellate court's mandate. Lagemann v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 277 Neb. 335, 762 N.W.2d 51 (2009).
There are two circumstances under this section in which the 30-day time limit applies for the payment of compensation: (1) upon the employee's notice of disability if no reasonable controversy exists regarding the claim or (2) after a final adjudicated award if one of the parties appeals and a reasonable controversy existed regarding the claim pending trial. Lagemann v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 277 Neb. 335, 762 N.W.2d 51 (2009).
When a party appeals a workers' compensation award to an appellate court, the award is not final and the waiting-time period for payment of benefits does not commence to run until the appellate court's mandate is filed in the Workers' Compensation Court. Lagemann v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 277 Neb. 335, 762 N.W.2d 51 (2009).
Where a reasonable controversy exists between an employer and an employee as to the payment of workers' compensation, the employer is not liable for the waiting-time penalties during the time the case is pending in the courts for final determination. Lagemann v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 277 Neb. 335, 762 N.W.2d 51 (2009).
Under former law, in order to harmonize this section and sections 48-199 and 48-1,102 in the context of waiting-time penalties in a manner which is consistent with the overall purpose of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, the Supreme Court holds that in order to avoid assessment of a waiting-time penalty with respect to that portion of a workers' compensation award against the State which exceeds $50,000, the State must request review and appropriation of such amount during the first legislative session following the date the award became final and must pay such amount within 30 calendar days after the approval of the appropriation by the Legislature. Soto v. State, 270 Neb. 40, 699 N.W.2d 819 (2005).
Under former law, with respect to that portion of a workers' compensation award against the State which exceeds $50,000, the 30-day period specified in subsection (1) of this section does not begin until the first day after the judgment becomes final on which the State could request review and appropriation pursuant to section 48-1,102 during a regular session of the Legislature. A waiting-time penalty may be assessed pursuant to this section if payment is not made within 30 calendar days thereafter. Soto v. State, 269 Neb. 337, 693 N.W.2d 491 (2005).
Under former law, for purposes of subsection (1) of this section, compensation sent within 30 days of the notice of disability or the entry of a final order, award, or judgment of compensation is not delinquent. Brown v. Harbor Fin. Mortgage Corp., 267 Neb. 218, 673 N.W.2d 35 (2004).
This section authorizes a 50-percent penalty payment for waiting time involving the delinquent payment of compensation and an attorney fee, where there is no reasonable controversy regarding an employee's claim for workers' compensation. Whether a reasonable controversy exists pertinent to this section is a question of fact. McBee v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 255 Neb. 903, 587 N.W.2d 687 (1999).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, a workers' compensation insurer's bad faith refusal to timely authorize needed medical treatment for an employee's work-related injury is completely intertwined with the employee's work-related injury; thus, the employee's remedy is limited to that provided for under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Ihm v. Crawford & Co., 254 Neb. 818, 580 N.W.2d 115 (1998).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, where the total amount of compensation due for permanent disability is in dispute, the employer has a duty under the provisions of subsection (1) to pay within 30 days of the notice of disability any undisputed compensation; the only legitimate excuse for delay in the payment is the existence of a genuine dispute from a medical or legal standpoint that any liability exists. Grammer v. Endicott Clay Products, 252 Neb. 315, 562 N.W.2d 332 (1997).
Under this section, the 50-percent penalty for waiting time applies only when payments are delinquent after 30 days' notice has been given of disability or there is no reasonable controversy and the employer refuses payment or neglects to pay compensation for 30 days after injury. In the latter situation, a reasonable attorney fee shall be allowed if the employee receives an award after proceedings in the compensation court. Briggs v. Consolidated Freightways, 234 Neb. 410, 451 N.W.2d 278 (1990).
Where there is no reasonable controversy regarding an employee's entitlement to workers' compensation, this section authorizes award to the employee of an attorney fee and a 50-percent payment for waiting time on delinquent payments, and the worker is entitled to recover interest on the payments which have accrued at the time payment is made by the employer. Musil v. J.A. Baldwin Manuf. Co., 233 Neb. 901, 448 N.W.2d 591 (1989).
Where there is no reasonable controversy regarding an employee's claim for workers' compensation, this section authorizes the award to the employee of an attorney fee and a fifty-percent payment for waiting time on delinquent payments. Rodriquez v. Prime Meat Processors, 228 Neb. 55, 421 N.W.2d 32 (1988).
Where a reasonable controversy exists between the parties as to the payment of workers' compensation, which is a fact question, an injured employee is not entitled to the statutory penalties for waiting time. McGee v. Panhandle Technical Sys., 223 Neb. 56, 387 N.W.2d 709 (1986).
The right to tax attorney fees is purely statutory, and where a reasonable controversy exists between the parties as to the payment of compensation, an injured employee is not entitled to the statutory penalties for waiting time. Savage v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 208 Neb. 676, 305 N.W.2d 375 (1981).
The provision of this section providing added amount for waiting time does not impose a penalty to an individual within prohibition of Article VII, section 5, of the Constitution. University of Nebraska at Omaha v. Paustian, 190 Neb. 840, 212 N.W.2d 704 (1973).
Penalty for delinquent payments not allowable where delay is due to a reasonable controversy as to amount and number of payments and litigation required to determine limitation. Marshall v. Columbus Steel Supply, 187 Neb. 102, 187 N.W.2d 607 (1971).
Waiting time begins to run when employer receives notice of disability, not when notice given to carrier. Gill v. Hrupek, 184 Neb. 436, 168 N.W.2d 377 (1969).
Penalty for waiting time should not be allowed where reasonable controversy exists. Wheeler v. Northwestern Metal Co., 175 Neb. 841, 124 N.W.2d 377 (1963).
Where defense made raised a question of law of first impression, waiting time penalty was not appropriate. Hauff v. Kimball, 163 Neb. 55, 77 N.W.2d 683 (1956).
Where reasonable controversy exists, imposition of penalty for waiting time is not authorized. Faulhaber v. Roberts Dairy Co., 147 Neb. 631, 24 N.W.2d 571 (1946).
Where reasonable controversy exists between an employer and an employee as to employer's liability, employer is not liable for penalty for waiting time or for allowance of attorney's fees. Redfern v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 145 Neb. 288, 16 N.W.2d 196 (1944).
Where contentions of employer present a reasonable controversy, penalty for waiting time will not be allowed, although a reasonable attorney's fee should be allowed for appellate services where award is affirmed. Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, Inc., 138 Neb. 117, 292 N.W. 59 (1940).
Where a reasonable controversy exists, employer is not liable for penalty for waiting time during the time the cause is pending in the courts for final determination. Steward v. Deuel County, 137 Neb. 516, 289 N.W. 877 (1940).
If there is a reasonable controversy over the liability of employer for compensation, he is not liable for the penalty for waiting time. Hiestand v. Ristau, 135 Neb. 881, 284 N.W. 756 (1939).
Penalty is recoverable, where no reasonable controversy exists, and employer withholds periodic payment. Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Watkins, 113 Neb. 619, 204 N.W. 391 (1925); Western Newspaper Union v. Dee, 108 Neb. 303, 187 N.W. 919 (1922); Abel Const. Co. v. Goodman, 105 Neb. 700, 181 N.W. 713 (1921).
Penalty is not recoverable, where reasonable controversy exists, until employer's obligation is definitely ascertained or settled, in exercise of proper diligence on his part. McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., 111 Neb. 609, 197 N.W. 615 (1924); McCrary v. Wolff, 109 Neb. 796, 192 N.W. 237 (1923); Hall v. Germantown State Bank, 105 Neb. 709, 181 N.W. 609 (1921); Osborn v. Omaha Structural Steel Co., 105 Neb. 216, 179 N.W. 1022 (1920); Updike Grain Co. v. Swanson, 104 Neb. 661, 178 N.W. 618 (1920).
Penalty provision is constitutional and does not violate due process. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wickline, 103 Neb. 21, 170 N.W. 193 (1918).
Subsection (1) of this section requiring that payments be sent directly to the person entitled to compensation within 30 days of the award and imposing waiting-time penalties if the statute is violated is applicable to orders approving lump-sum settlements. Harris v. Iowa Tanklines, 20 Neb. App. 513, 825 N.W.2d 457 (2013).
When a workers' compensation settlement check is sent from an insurance carrier to the employer's counsel, but not to the claimant or his or her counsel, within 30 days after the entry of the award, it is not sent directly to the claimant within the statutorily prescribed time, as would warrant the imposition of waiting-time penalties. Harris v. Iowa Tanklines, 20 Neb. App. 513, 825 N.W.2d 457 (2013).
Workers' compensation payment sent directly to the claimant's counsel within 30 days after the entry of the award is in compliance with the section requiring that payments be sent directly to the person entitled to compensation within 30 days of the award and imposing waiting-time penalties if the statute is violated. Harris v. Iowa Tanklines, 20 Neb. App. 513, 825 N.W.2d 457 (2013).
Workers' compensation statute requiring that payments be sent directly to the person entitled to compensation within 30 days of the award does not include any requirement that there be actual prejudice suffered by the claimant before waiting-time penalties are appropriate. Harris v. Iowa Tanklines, 20 Neb. App. 513, 825 N.W.2d 457 (2013).
Where there is no reasonable controversy, this section authorizes the award of attorney fees. Davis v. Crete Carrier Corp., 15 Neb. App. 241, 725 N.W.2d 562 (2006).
A 50-percent waiting-time penalty cannot be awarded on the basis of an award of delinquent medical payments; a waiting-time penalty is available only on awards of delinquent payments of disability or indemnity benefits. Bronzynski v. Model Electric, 14 Neb. App. 355, 707 N.W.2d 46 (2005).
The purpose of the 30-day waiting-time penalty and the provision for attorney fees, as provided in this section, is to encourage prompt payment by making delay costly if the award has been finally established. Milliken v. Premier Indus., 13 Neb. App. 330, 691 N.W.2d 855 (2005).
5. Miscellaneous
Interest may be assessed only when attorney fees are allowed. VanKirk v. Central Community College, 285 Neb. 231, 826 N.W.2d 277 (2013).
The prohibition against assessing attorney fees against medical providers set forth in the last sentence of subdivision (2)(a) of this section cannot be avoided by instead filing an action in the district court seeking fees under the common fund doctrine. Walentine, O'Toole v. Midwest Neurosurgery, 285 Neb. 80, 825 N.W.2d 425 (2013).
A workers' compensation trial judge has continuing jurisdiction to enforce an employer's obligation to pay benefits pending the employer's appeal of the judge's previous order imposing a penalty and costs for a delayed payment. Russell v. Kerry, Inc., 278 Neb. 981, 775 N.W.2d 420 (2009).
An employer's appeal from a postjudgment proceeding to enforce a workers' compensation award does not disturb the finality of an award imposing a continuing obligation on the employer to pay benefits. Russell v. Kerry, Inc., 278 Neb. 981, 775 N.W.2d 420 (2009).
Preaward interest, as assessed by an enforcement order in a workers' compensation proceeding, is not a penalty but a means of fully compensating the claimant for not having use of the money that the employer owed. Russell v. Kerry, Inc., 278 Neb. 981, 775 N.W.2d 420 (2009).
When an employer appeals a benefits award, it will not be excused from paying compensation 30 days following the date of the award unless the employer has an actual basis in law or fact for disputing the award. Lagemann v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 277 Neb. 335, 762 N.W.2d 51 (2009).
Under former law, "such payments" contained in the second sentence of subsection (1) of this section refers to all "amounts of compensation" provided for in the first sentence of said subsection. Brown v. Harbor Fin. Mortgage Corp., 267 Neb. 218, 673 N.W.2d 35 (2004).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the award of attorney fees pursuant to this section must be calculated on a case-by-case basis, and particular attention should be given to the amount of legal work performed in relation to the amount of the unpaid medical bill and the amount of the unpaid medical bill in relation to the workers' compensation award received. Harmon v. Irby Constr. Co., 258 Neb. 420, 604 N.W.2d 813 (1999).
The filing of a cross-appeal by an employer constitutes the filing of an appeal within the meaning of this section. An award of attorney fees pursuant to section 25-824(2) may eliminate any prejudice in not awarding attorney fees pursuant to this section. U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Taborski, 253 Neb. 770, 572 N.W.2d 81 (1998).
"Compensation," used in subsection (1) of this section in reference to additional sums for waiting time, an attorney fee, and interest, means periodic disability or indemnity benefits payable on account of the employee's work-related injury or death. When a court awards attorney fees against an employer pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the employer shall be liable for interest pursuant to subsection (2). Koterzina v. Copple Chevrolet, 249 Neb. 158, 542 N.W.2d 696 (1996).
The employer's liability for interest exists, and execution for interest may issue, even when the judgment is silent as to interest. Sherard v. State, 244 Neb. 743, 509 N.W.2d 194 (1993).
This section applies to final adjudicated awards. The award in this case was not final, and the penalty did not commence to run until 30 days after the mandate of the Supreme Court had been filed in the compensation court. Leitz v. Roberts Dairy, 239 Neb. 907, 479 N.W.2d 464 (1992).
When a workers' compensation case is remanded for a rehearing on an issue as to which this court has determined that a proper rehearing has not been held, the hearing held after remand is a rehearing in which expenses and attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to this section. Snyder v. IBP, Inc., 235 Neb. 319, 455 N.W.2d 157 (1990).
"Compensation", used in subsection (1) of this section in reference to additional sums for waiting time, an attorney fee, and interest, means periodic disability or indemnity benefits payable on account of the employee's work-related injury or death. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Deyle, 234 Neb. 537, 451 N.W.2d 910 (1990).
Ordinarily, the term "reduction in the amount of such award" refers to the total amount of the award to the employee. However, the "amount of such award" includes the issue of total disability. Behrens v. American Stores Packing Co., 228 Neb. 18, 421 N.W.2d 12 (1988).
A workmen's compensation insurance carrier for an employer should be deemed to be an employer within the meaning of this section. Neeman v. Otoe County, 186 Neb. 370, 183 N.W.2d 269 (1971).
An agreement to pay compensation must be approved by a compensation commissioner or compensation court or it is void, and part payment does not make such agreement actionable at common law. Duncan v. A. Hospe Co., 133 Neb. 810, 277 N.W. 339 (1938).
An award of attorney fees is a prerequisite before interest on the compensation amount due to a claimant may be awarded under this section. Davis v. Crete Carrier Corp., 15 Neb. App. 241, 725 N.W.2d 562 (2006).
48-125.01.
Compensation; penalties for attempted avoidance of payment.Any employer who knowingly transfers, sells, encumbers, assigns, or in any manner disposes of, conceals, secretes, or destroys any property or records belonging to such employer, after one of his or her employees has been injured within the purview of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, and with intent to avoid the payment of compensation under such act to such employee or his or her dependents, shall be guilty of a Class I misdemeanor. In any case when such employer is a corporation, any officer or employee thereof, if knowingly participating or acquiescing in the act with intent to avoid the payment of compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, shall be also individually guilty of a Class I misdemeanor as well as jointly and severally liable with such corporation for any fine imposed upon the corporation. In any case when such employer is a limited liability company, any member or manager thereof, if knowingly participating or acquiescing in the act with intent to avoid the payment of compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, shall be also individually guilty of a Class I misdemeanor as well as jointly and severally liable with such limited liability company for any fine imposed upon the limited liability company. In any case when such employer is a limited partnership or a limited liability partnership, any general partner, if knowingly participating or acquiescing in the act with intent to avoid the payment under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, shall also be guilty of a Class I misdemeanor as well as jointly and severally liable with such limited partnership or limited liability partnership, and limited partners shall not be liable.
Source:Laws 1971, LB 572, § 20; Laws 1977, LB 40, § 270; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 44; Laws 1994, LB 884, § 64; Laws 2003, LB 210, § 2.
48-125.02.
State employee claim; Prompt Payment Act applicable; other claims; processing of claim; requirements; failure to pay; effect; presumption of payment.(1) Regarding payment of a claim for medical, surgical, or hospital services for a state employee under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, the Prompt Payment Act applies.
(2) For claims other than claims under subsection (1) of this section regarding payment of a claim for medical, surgical, or hospital services for an employee under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act:
(a) The workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured employer shall notify the provider within fifteen business days after receiving a claim as to what information is necessary to process the claim. Failure to notify the provider assumes the workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured employer has all information necessary to pay the claim. The workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured employer shall pay providers in accordance with sections 48-120 and 48-120.04 within thirty business days after receipt of all information necessary to process the claim. Failure to pay the provider within the thirty days will cause the workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured employer to reimburse the provider's billed charges instead of the scheduled or contracted fees;
(b) If a claim is submitted electronically, the claim is presumed to have been received on the date of the electronic verification of receipt by the workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured employer or its clearinghouse. If a claim is submitted by mail, the claim is presumed to have been received five business days after the claim has been placed in the United States mail with first-class postage prepaid. The presumption may be rebutted by sufficient evidence that the claim was received on another day or not received at all; and
(c) Payment of a claim by the workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insured employer means the receipt of funds by the provider. If payment is submitted electronically, the payment is presumed to have been received on the date of the electronic verification of receipt by the provider or the provider's clearinghouse. If payment is submitted by mail, the payment is presumed to have been received five business days after the payment has been placed in the United States mail with first-class postage prepaid. The presumption may be rebutted by sufficient evidence that the payment was received on another day or not received at all.
Cross References
Prompt Payment Act, see section 81-2401.
48-126.
Wages, defined; calculation.Wherever in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act the term wages is used, it shall be construed to mean the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident. It shall not include gratuities received from the employer or others, nor shall it include board, lodging, or similar advantages received from the employer, unless the money value of such advantages shall have been fixed by the parties at the time of hiring, except that if the workers' compensation insurer shall have collected a premium based upon the value of such board, lodging, and similar advantages, then the value thereof shall become a part of the basis of determining compensation benefits. In occupations involving seasonal employment or employment dependent upon the weather, the employee's weekly wages shall be taken to be one-fiftieth of the total wages which he or she has earned from all occupations during the year immediately preceding the accident, unless it be shown that during such year, by reason of exceptional causes, such method of computation does not fairly represent the earnings of the employee. In such a case, the period for calculation shall be extended so far as to give a basis for the fair ascertainment of his or her average weekly earnings. In continuous employments, if immediately prior to the accident the rate of wages was fixed by the day or hour or by the output of the employee, his or her weekly wages shall be taken to be his or her average weekly income for the period of time ordinarily constituting his or her week's work, and using as the basis of calculation his or her earnings during as much of the preceding six months as he or she worked for the same employer, except as provided in sections 48-121 and 48-122. The calculation shall also be made with reference to the average earnings for a working day of ordinary length and exclusive of earnings from overtime, except that if the insurance company's policy of insurance provides for the collection of a premium based upon such overtime, then such overtime shall become a part of the basis of determining compensation benefits.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 26, p. 592; R.S.1913, § 3667; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 10, p. 208; C.S.1922, § 3049; Laws 1927, c. 39, § 2, p. 17; C.S.1929, § 48-126; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 39, p. 208; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-126; R.S.1943, § 48-126; Laws 1953, c. 163, § 1(1), p. 512; Laws 1957, c. 204, § 3, p. 721;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 45; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 5.
Annotations
1. Seasonal employment
2. Continuous employment
3. Board and lodging
4. Miscellaneous
1. Seasonal employment
Seasonal employment refers to occupations which can be carried on only at certain seasons or fairly definite portions of the year, and does not include such occupations as may be carried on through the entire year. Hiestand v. Ristau, 135 Neb. 881, 284 N.W. 756 (1939).
Employment for handling and delivery of coal for retail coal dealer was not seasonal employment. Hogsett v. Cinek Coal & Feed Co., 127 Neb. 393, 255 N.W. 546 (1934).
Seasonal refers to occupation ordinarily performed in certain seasons. Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Watkins, 113 Neb. 619, 204 N.W. 391 (1925).
Work of caretaker of club house was not seasonal. Dietz Club v. Niehaus, 110 Neb. 154, 193 N.W. 344 (1923).
2. Continuous employment
Deceased was not engaged in continuous employment where he was a truck driver hired on a per trip basis and employer was under no obligation to rehire deceased after each trip. Loeffelholz v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 183 Neb. 112, 158 N.W.2d 219 (1968).
Employment was continuous where employee was hired to work one day each week. Newberry v. Youngs, 163 Neb. 397, 80 N.W.2d 165 (1956).
Bridge building is not seasonal employment. Gorham v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 129 Neb. 277, 261 N.W. 353 (1935).
Where employee had been employed for a period of several months on the basis of a weekly salary, and shortly before accident his salary was changed from a weekly to hourly basis, rule of continuous employment should be applied. Mutchie v. M. L. Rawlings Ice Co., 122 Neb. 297, 240 N.W. 267 (1932).
3. Board and lodging
Allowance for board and lodging must represent a reasonably definite economic gain to the employee before it can be considered as wages. Solheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37 N.W.2d 212 (1949).
Where money value of board, lodging, and washing furnished to employee is fixed at time of hiring, it is considered as part of wages in determining amount of compensation due. City of Omaha v. Casaubon, 138 Neb. 608, 294 N.W. 389 (1940).
Cost of meals and lodging furnished employee by employer under agreement made at time of hiring was part of such employee's wages hereunder. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Geary, 123 Neb. 851, 244 N.W. 797 (1932).
4. Miscellaneous
Net profits or net income of a subchapter S corporation do not necessarily qualify as "wages." Bortolotti v. Universal Terrazzo & Tile Co., 304 Neb. 219, 933 N.W.2d 851 (2019).
The determination of "wages" for an employee-shareholder of a subchapter S corporation is a fact-specific inquiry. Bortolotti v. Universal Terrazzo & Tile Co., 304 Neb. 219, 933 N.W.2d 851 (2019).
"Wages" do not include payments received solely because of the recipient's status as an S corporation shareholder; rather, "wages" are compensation for the recipient's activities as a corporate employee. Bortolotti v. Universal Terrazzo & Tile Co., 304 Neb. 219, 933 N.W.2d 851 (2019).
When an employee paid by the hour suffers a work-related injury that results in permanent injury or death, the employee’s average weekly wage is calculated by multiplying the rate of wages by a 40-hour workweek rather than by averaging that employee’s actual wages over the 6 months before the accident. Becerra v. United Parcel Service, 284 Neb. 414, 822 N.W.2d 327 (2012).
The language "ordinarily constituting his or her week's work" precludes an automatic mathematical calculation based on the past 6 months' work; the goal of any average income test is to produce an honest approximation of the claimant's probable future earning capacity. Mueller v. Lincoln Public Schools, 282 Neb. 25, 803 N.W.2d 408 (2011).
Where the worker has insufficient work history to be able to calculate his or her average weekly income based on as much of the preceding 6 months as he or she worked for the same employer, then what would ordinarily constitute that employee's week's work and, thus, that employee's average weekly income should, if possible, be estimated by considering the preceding 6 months of other employees working similar jobs for similar employers. Powell v. Estate Gardeners, 275 Neb. 287, 745 N.W.2d 917 (2008).
In determining the average weekly wage, those weeks which are abnormal may be excluded from the 26 weeks preceding the accident. Canas v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 Neb. 164, 459 N.W.2d 533 (1990).
Money amounts negotiated between a union and employers based on hours worked by union member employees and to be paid directly to the union to cover such things as health and welfare and pensions are not to be included within the term "wages," unless the money value of such advantages to the employee has been agreed upon and fixed by the employer and employee at the time of hiring. Briggs v. Consolidated Freightways, 234 Neb. 410, 451 N.W.2d 278 (1990).
Money amounts negotiated between a union and employer based on hours worked by union member employees and to be paid directly to the union to cover such things as health and welfare and pensions are not to be included within the term wages, unless the money value of such advantages to the employee has been agreed upon and fixed by the employer and employee at the time of hiring. Schlotfeld v. Mel's Heating & Air Conditioning, 233 Neb. 488, 445 N.W.2d 918 (1989).
Where decedent is unable to work for employer during the six months preceding his death, his wages are calculated by his earnings during as much of the last six months that he worked. Clifford v. Harchelroad Chevrolet, 229 Neb. 78, 425 N.W.2d 331 (1988).
Wages are to be computed according to the contract of hire in force at the time of the accident. Hayes v. A.M. Cohron, Inc., 224 Neb. 579, 400 N.W.2d 244 (1987).
Base figure in calculating award is the wage in force at the time of the accident. Chadd v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Neb. 483, 89 N.W.2d 586 (1958).
Employee hired for a day at a time six or seven times a month was entitled to have compensation based on the money rate at which service was recompensed. Gruber v. Stickelman, 149 Neb. 627, 31 N.W.2d 753 (1948).
Wages under the Workmen's Compensation Act are to be computed according to the terms of the contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident. Redfern v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 145 Neb. 288, 16 N.W.2d 196 (1944).
Where employment is not continuous, calculation of wages should be made at the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed. Weitz v. Johnson, 143 Neb. 452, 9 N.W.2d 788 (1943).
Where employment is not seasonal and not continuous, compensation must be based upon the contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident. Cole v. M. L. Rawlings Ice Co., 139 Neb. 439, 297 N.W. 652 (1941).
Term wages is construed to mean the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident, where employment is neither seasonal nor continuous. Carlson v. Condon-Kiewit Co., 135 Neb. 587, 283 N.W. 220 (1939).
Receipt and acceptance of workmen's compensation by city fireman does not bar him from receiving fireman's pension. City of Lincoln v. Steffensmeyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938).
Wages should be computed ordinarily according to the terms of contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident. Drum v. Omaha Steel Works, 129 Neb. 273, 261 N.W. 351 (1935).
Compensation claimant's employment was not continuous, or seasonal, or dependent upon the weather, and, therefore, first sentence of this section governs wages. Davis v. Lincoln County, 117 Neb. 148, 219 N.W. 899 (1928).
In this section, the Legislature dealt with the possible inequity that could result from abnormally high work weeks in the context of average weekly wage calculations. Arbtin v. Puritan Mfg. Co., 13 Neb. App. 540, 696 N.W.2d 905 (2005).
Payments to an employee are included in an employee's wage if the payments do not constitute actual reimbursement for actual incurred expenses, but, rather, represent real and definite economic gain to the employee. McGinnis v. Metro Package Courier, Inc., 5 Neb. App. 538, 561 N.W.2d 587 (1997).
Employer may not reduce average weekly wage by amount of "road allowance" included in wages unless such allowance was agreed upon at the time of hiring and did not represent a real and reasonably definite economic gain to the employee. Logan v. Rocky Mountain Rental, 3 Neb. App. 173, 524 N.W.2d 816 (1994).
48-126.01.
Wages or compensation rate; basis
of computation.(1)(a) In
determining the compensation to be paid any member of the military forces
of this state, any member of a law enforcement reserve force, or any member of the Nebraska
Emergency Management Agency, any city, village, county, or interjurisdictional
emergency management organization, or any state emergency response team, which military forces, law enforcement reserve
force, or emergency management agency,
organization, or team is organized under the laws of the State
of Nebraska, or any person fulfilling conditions of probation, or community
service as defined in section 29-2277, pursuant to any order of any court
of this state who shall be working for a governmental body, or agency as defined
in section 29-2277, pursuant to any condition of probation, or community service
as defined in section 29-2277, for injuries resulting in disability or death
received in the performance of his or her duties as a member of such military
forces, reserve force, agency,
organization, or team, or pursuant to
an order of any court, the wages of such a member or person shall be taken
to be those received by him or her from his or her regular employer, and he
or she shall receive such proportion thereof as he or she is entitled to under
the provisions of section 48-121.
(b) If a member or person under subdivision (1)(a) of this section is
not regularly employed by some other person, for the purpose of such determination,
it shall be deemed and assumed that he or she is receiving income from his
or her business or from other employment equivalent to wages in an amount
one and one-half times the maximum weekly
income benefit specified in section 48-121.01.
(c) If
the wages received for the performance of duties as a member of such military
forces, reserve force, agency,
organization, or team exceed the wages
received from a regular employer, such member shall be entitled to a rate
of compensation based upon wages received as a member of such military forces,
reserve force, agency,
organization, or team.
(2) In determining
the compensation rate to be paid any member of a volunteer fire department
in any rural or suburban fire protection district, city, village, or nonprofit
corporation or any member of a volunteer emergency medical service, which
fire department or emergency medical service is organized under the laws of
the State of Nebraska, for injuries resulting in disability or death received
in the performance of his or her duties as a member of such fire department
or emergency medical service, it shall be deemed and assumed that his or her
wages are in an amount one and one-half times the maximum weekly income benefit
specified in section 48-121.01 or the wages received by such member from his
or her regular employment, whichever is greater. Any member of such volunteer
fire department or volunteer emergency medical service shall not lose his
or her volunteer status under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act if such
volunteer receives reimbursement for expenses, reasonable benefits, or a nominal
fee, a nominal per call fee, a nominal per shift fee, or combination thereof.
It shall be conclusively presumed that a fee is nominal if the fee does not
exceed twenty percent of the amount that otherwise would be required to hire
a permanent employee for the same services.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 26, p. 592; R.S.1913, § 3667; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 10, p. 208; C.S.1922, § 3049; Laws 1927, c. 39, § 2, p. 171; C.S.1929, § 48-126; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 39, p. 208; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-126; R.S.1943, § 48-126; Laws 1953, c. 163, § 1(2), p. 513; Laws 1955, c. 186, § 3, p. 532; Laws 1959, c. 224, § 1, p. 790; Laws 1961, c. 233, § 2, p. 691; Laws 1967, c. 289, § 2, p. 790; Laws 1969, c. 394, § 1, p. 1384;
Laws 1973, LB 239, § 3; Laws 1973, LB 25, § 2; Laws 1976, LB 782, § 15;
Laws 1986, LB 528, § 7; Laws 1996, LB 43, § 9; Laws 1997, LB 138, § 39; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 7; Laws 2014, LB961, § 10.
48-127.
Compensation; willful negligence; intoxication; effect.If the employee is injured by reason of his or her intentional willful negligence, or by reason of being in a state of intoxication, neither he or she nor his or her beneficiaries shall receive any compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 27, p. 592; R.S.1913, § 3668; C.S.1922, § 3050; C.S.1929, § 48-127; R.S.1943, § 48-127;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 46.
Annotations
Whether or not effected by this section, employee's acceptance of benefits under Workmen's Compensation Act ordinarily constitutes release to employer of claims at law arising from the injury. Edelman v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing, Inc., 189 Neb. 763, 205 N.W.2d 340 (1973).
The burden of proving intoxication as a defense is on the employer. Johnson v. Hahn Bros. Constr. Inc., 188 Neb. 252, 196 N.W.2d 109 (1972).
Deviation from authorized route of travel was not willful negligence. Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
Participant in fight was not willfully negligent. Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 155 Neb. 714, 53 N.W.2d 203 (1952).
Moving of well-digging machinery so as to come in contact with electric power line was not willful negligence. Schroeder v. Sharp, 153 Neb. 73, 43 N.W.2d 572 (1950).
Willful, as used in this section, means deliberate act; conduct evidencing reckless indifference to safety; more than want of ordinary care. Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb. 1044, 26 N.W.2d 15 (1947).
Disobedience of order not to smoke did not constitute willful negligence. Moise v. Fruit Dispatch Co., 135 Neb. 684, 283 N.W. 495 (1939).
Where defense is willful negligence, any competent evidence tending to show knowledge by employee of the dangerous character of the act which subsequently caused his death should be received, and it was error to exclude testimony of witness that he had warned deceased of his danger. Richards v. Abts, 135 Neb. 347, 281 N.W. 611 (1938).
In view of holding that accident by which employee met his death did not arise out of his employment, question of his willful negligence, though doubtful, was not decided. Feda v. Cudahy Packing Co., 102 Neb. 110, 166 N.W. 190 (1918).
48-128.
Compensation; injury increasing disability; second injury; additional compensation; claim.(1) For injuries occurring before December 1, 1997:
(a) If an employee who has a preexisting permanent partial disability whether from compensable injury or otherwise, which is or is likely to be a hindrance or obstacle to his or her obtaining employment or obtaining reemployment if the employee should become unemployed and which was known to the employer prior to the occurrence of a subsequent compensable injury, receives a subsequent compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial or in permanent total disability so that the degree or percentage of disability caused by the combined disabilities is substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the last injury, considered alone and of itself, and if the employee is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of the combined disabilities, the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the degree or percentage of disability which would have resulted from the last injury had there been no preexisting disability. For the additional disability, the employee shall be compensated out of the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund. If the subsequent compensable injury of such an employee shall result in the death of the employee and it shall be determined that the death would not have occurred except for such preexisting permanent partial disability, the employer shall pay the compensation benefits prescribed by this subsection for a period not exceeding three hundred twenty-five weeks, and for any compensation benefits payable after such period of three hundred twenty-five weeks, the dependents shall be compensated out of the fund.
(b) In order to qualify under this subsection, the employer must establish by written records that the employer had knowledge of the preexisting permanent partial disability at the time that the employee was hired or at the time the employee was retained in employment after the employer acquired such knowledge.
(c) As used in this subsection, preexisting permanent partial disability shall mean any preexisting permanent condition, whether congenital or the result of injury or disease, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee should become unemployed. No condition shall be considered a preexisting permanent partial disability under this subsection unless it would support a rating of twenty-five percent loss of earning power or more or support a rating which would result in compensation payable for a period of ninety weeks or more for disability for permanent injury as computed under subdivision (3) of section 48-121.
(2) Any money in the Second Injury Fund on July 1, 2000, shall be transferred to the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 28, p. 592; R.S.1913, § 3669; C.S.1922, § 3051; C.S.1929, § 48-128; R.S.1943, § 48-128; Laws 1947, c. 174, § 1, p. 559; Laws 1949, c. 161, § 2, p. 411; Laws 1955, c. 185, § 1, p. 525; Laws 1955, c. 186, § 4, p. 532; Laws 1967, c. 290, § 1, p. 792;
Laws 1971, LB 505, § 1; Laws 1974, LB 881, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 47; Laws 1986, LB 1037, § 1; Laws 1987, LB 398, § 41; Laws 1988, LB 1034, § 1; Laws 1992, LB 1006, § 92;
Laws 1993, LB 757, § 8; Laws 1997, LB 854, § 2; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 6.
Annotations
Generally, Nebraska applies the full-responsibility rule and does not apportion the recovery for two or more successive work-related injuries outside of this section. Picard v. P & C Group 1, 306 Neb. 292, 945 N.W.2d 183 (2020).
In order for the employer to qualify under subsection (1)(b) of this section, the employer must establish by written records that the employer had knowledge of the preexisting permanent partial disability at the time that the employee was hired or at the time the employee was retained in employment after the employer acquired such knowledge. Ashland-Greenwood Public Schools v. Thorell, 15 Neb. App. 114, 723 N.W.2d 506 (2006).
The purpose of the written records requirement of this section is to put in place a strictly limited method of proving a predicate fact before liability for benefits may be shifted to the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund. Ashland-Greenwood Public Schools v. Thorell, 15 Neb. App. 114, 723 N.W.2d 506 (2006).
The purpose of this section is to provide employers with an incentive to hire those who suffer from permanent disability, but the statute restricts the benefits to those employers who consciously hire those they know to be suffering from prior permanent disabilities. Ashland-Greenwood Public Schools v. Thorell, 15 Neb. App. 114, 723 N.W.2d 506 (2006).
The written records requirement of this section is merely evidentiary, and must be sensibly construed so as not to defeat the statute's larger remedial purpose. Ashland-Greenwood Public Schools v. Thorell, 15 Neb. App. 114, 723 N.W.2d 506 (2006).
This section does not require possession of the written records by the employer at the time of the subsequent injury or at the time the claim for contribution from the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund is made. Ashland-Greenwood Public Schools v. Thorell, 15 Neb. App. 114, 723 N.W.2d 506 (2006).
48-129.
Compensation; joint employers; liability.In case any employee for whose injury or death compensation is payable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall, at the time of the injury, be employed and paid jointly by two or more employers, as defined in section 48-114, such employers shall contribute to the payment of such compensation in proportion to their several wage liabilities to such employee. If one or more, but not all, of such employers should be subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, then the liability of such of them as are so subject shall be to pay that proportion of the entire compensation which their proportionate wage liability bears to the entire wages of the employee, except that nothing in this section shall prevent employers from making any arrangement between themselves for a different distribution of the ultimate burden of compensation.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 29, p. 592; R.S.1913, § 3670; C.S.1922, § 3052; C.S.1929, § 48-129; R.S.1943, § 48-129;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 48.
Annotations
Under the facts of this case, the claimant was a loaned employee but there was no consensual relationship sufficient to create a new employer-employee relationship. Therefore, the lending employer remained liable for his workmen's compensation. B & C Excavating Co. v. Hiner, 207 Neb. 248, 298 N.W.2d 155 (1980).
Sections 48-129 and 48-168, R.R.S.1943, gives the Workmen's Compensation Court jurisdiction to consider the issue of joint employment. White v. Western Commodities, Inc., 207 Neb. 75, 295 N.W.2d 704 (1980).
Under the facts of this case, the Workmen's Compensation Court was clearly wrong in finding that the two defendants were joint employers of the plaintiff but was correct in finding an employer-employee relationship between one of the defendants and the plaintiff. White v. Western Commodities, Inc., 207 Neb. 75, 295 N.W.2d 704 (1980).
Joint employment and pro rata liability for compensation payments under this section exist only where there is an agreement between employers as to salary, wages, hours of employment, and terms of service. Henning v. City of Hebron, 186 Neb. 381, 183 N.W.2d 756 (1971).
In absence of joint arrangement, there cannot be any joint employment. Solheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37 N.W.2d 212 (1949).
Joint employer is required to pay only that proportion of compensation which his proportionate wage bears to entire wages of employee. Summers v. Railway Express Agency, 134 Neb. 237, 278 N.W. 476 (1938).
To constitute joint employment, there must be concert of action between employers as to wages, hours of service, and term of service. Suverkrubbe v. Village of Fort Calhoun, 127 Neb. 472, 256 N.W. 47 (1934).
48-130.
Compensation; savings; insurance; other benefits; not factors.No savings or insurance of the injured employee or any contribution made by him or her to any benefit fund or protective association independent of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be taken into consideration in determining the compensation to be paid thereunder; nor shall benefits derived from any other source than those paid or caused to be paid by the employer as herein provided be considered in fixing compensation under such act.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 30, p. 593; R.S.1913, § 3671; C.S.1922, § 3053; C.S.1929, § 48-130; R.S.1943, § 48-130;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 49.
Annotations
Pursuant to this section, the payment of private insurance benefits does not entitle an employer to reduce an employee's benefits due under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting & Painting, 266 Neb. 526, 667 N.W.2d 167 (2003).
Pension benefits made under city ordinance did not affect the right of plaintiff to claim and receive under Workmen's Compensation Act. Novotny v. City of Omaha, 207 Neb. 535, 299 N.W.2d 757 (1980).
Receipt of workmen's compensation does not bar city fireman from right to fireman's pension. City of Lincoln v. Steffensmeyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938).
Receipt by city fireman of pension will not bar widow from compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act. Shandy v. City of Omaha, 127 Neb. 406, 255 N.W. 477 (1934).
Question whether pension paid by city to widow of deceased policeman would be benefits derived from any other source, was discussed, but not decided. Good v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 654, 168 N.W. 639 (1918).
No provision in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act limits an employee's ability to receive workers' compensation benefits because he or she is simultaneously receiving unemployment benefits. Hernandez v. JBS USA, 20 Neb. App. 634, 828 N.W.2d 765 (2013).
An employer's exercise of its statutory right to pursue its subrogation claim against a tort-feasor who injured its employee is not "causing" the payment of workers' compensation. Thomas v. Lincoln Public Schools, 9 Neb. App. 965, 622 N.W.2d 705 (2001).
Payment of private insurance benefits, even if made pursuant to an employer-funded plan, does not entitle an employer to reduce an employee's benefits due under the Workers' Compensation Act. Nunn v. Texaco Trading & Transp., 3 Neb. App. 101, 523 N.W.2d 705 (1994).
48-131.
Compensation; waiver by employee invalid.No agreement by an employee to waive his or her rights to compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be valid.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 31, p. 593; R.S.1913, § 3672; C.S.1922, § 3054; C.S.1929, § 48-131; R.S.1943, § 48-131;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 50.
Annotations
On payments of compensation without agreement of settlement, statutory limitations did not take effect until one year from last payment. Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661, 222 N.W. 42 (1928).
48-132.
Compensation; employees or dependents under disability; rights; enforcement.If an injured employee or a dependent is mentally incompetent or is a minor at the time when any right or privilege accrues to him or her under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, his or her guardian or next friend may, in his or her behalf, claim and exercise such right or privilege.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 32, p. 593; R.S.1913, § 3673; C.S.1922, § 3055; C.S.1929, § 48-132; R.S.1943, § 48-132; Laws 1961, c. 234, § 1, p. 692;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 51.
Cross References
For definitions of incompetent person and guardian, see section 30-2902.
Annotations
Failure of guardian to bring action does not bar right of minor from asserting rights after becoming of age. Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
The act relating to filing claims for compensation makes no exception in favor of minors. Ray v. Sanitary Garbage Co., 134 Neb. 178, 278 N.W. 139 (1938).
Where claimant knew her condition from day to day, and knew she had a present total disability, she was not excused from filing claim within time prescribed by statute by continuous confinement to bed as the result of injury. Park v. School District No. 27, Richardson Cty., 127 Neb. 767, 257 N.W. 219 (1934).
Minor employee, of an age where legally permitted to work, may elect to come under Workmen's Compensation Act. Navracel v. Cudahy Packing Co., 109 Neb. 506, 191 N.W. 659 (1922).
48-133.
Compensation; notice of injury; time; service.No proceedings for compensation for an injury under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be maintained unless a notice of the injury shall have been given to the employer as soon as practicable after the happening thereof; Provided, that all disputed claims for compensation or benefits shall be first submitted to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. The notice shall be in writing and shall state in ordinary language the time, place, and cause of the injury. It shall be signed by the person injured, or by a person in his or her behalf, or in the event of his or her death, by his or her legal representative or by a person in his or her behalf. The notice shall be served upon the employer or an agent thereof. Such service may be made by delivering the notice to the person on whom it is to be served, or leaving it at his or her residence or place of business, or by sending it by certified or registered mail addressed to the person or corporation on whom it is to be served at his or her last-known residence or place of business. A notice given pursuant to this section shall not be held invalid or insufficient by reason of any inaccuracy in stating the time, place, or cause of the injury, unless it is shown that it was the intention to mislead, and the employer, or the insurance company carrying such risk, as the case may be, was in fact misled thereby. Want of such written notice shall not be a bar to proceedings under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, if it be shown that the employer had notice or knowledge of the injury.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 33, p. 593; R.S.1913, § 3674; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 11, p. 209; C.S.1922, § 3056; C.S.1929, § 48-133; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 21, p. 198; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-133; R.S.1943, § 48-133; Laws 1961, c. 234, § 2, p. 692;
Laws 1977, LB 144, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 52; Laws 1987, LB 93, § 16.
Annotations
1. Notice of injury
2. Claim for compensation
3. Miscellaneous
1. Notice of injury
An employee is not required to give an opinion as to the cause of an injury in order to satisfy the notice requirement under this section. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
Under this section, an employer has sufficient notice or knowledge of a worker's injury if a reasonable person would conclude that the injury is potentially compensable and that the employer should therefore investigate the matter further. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
When an employer's foreman, supervisor, or superintendent has knowledge of the employee's injury, that knowledge is imputed to the employer. Knowledge imputed to an employer can satisfy this section's notice requirement. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
When the parties do not dispute the facts concerning reporting and notice, whether such facts constitute sufficient notice to the employer under this section presents a question of law. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009); Unger v. Olsen's Ag. Lab., 19 Neb. App. 459, 809 N.W.2d 813 (2012).
A lack of prejudice is not an exception to the requirement of notice under this section. Scott v. Pepsi Cola Co., 249 Neb. 60, 541 N.W.2d 49 (1995).
In place of indispensable written notice, this section contemplates a situation in which an employer has notice or knowledge sufficient to lead a reasonable person to conclude that an employee's injury is potentially compensable and that, therefore, the employer should investigate the matter further. Thompson v. Monfort of Colorado, 221 Neb. 83, 375 N.W.2d 601 (1985).
Employee is required to give notice in writing as soon as practicable after the accident. Seymour v. Journal-Star Printing Co., 174 Neb. 150, 116 N.W.2d 297 (1962).
Where employer had actual notice, written notice was not required. Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
Request for medical services was sufficient notice. Gilbert v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 156 Neb. 750, 57 N.W.2d 770 (1953).
Where employee, with full knowledge of his injury, fails to file notice of claim within six months after injury, his claim is barred. Surratt v. Otoe Food Products Co., 146 Neb. 854, 21 N.W.2d 862 (1946).
Lack of written notice to employer is not bar to proceedings if employer has notice or knowledge of the injury. Perkins v. Young, 133 Neb. 234, 274 N.W. 596 (1937).
Timely notice to or knowledge of a foreman, whose duty requires him to report accidents to his employer, is sufficient. Clary v. R. S. Proudfit Co., 124 Neb. 582, 247 N.W. 417 (1933).
Employee's failure to give timely notice of claim is not necessarily defense where injury is latent and progressive, and notice is given within six months from time he has knowledge of compensable disability. Flesch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 Neb. 1, 244 N.W. 925 (1932).
Verbal notice to physician of employer, indirectly threatening suit, is not such notice as complies herewith. Samland v. Ford Motor Co., 123 Neb. 819, 244 N.W. 404 (1932).
Written notice to employer is not necessary where he had actual notice of employee's injury. Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930).
For purposes of notice or knowledge under this section, the employer equates to the insurer, and vice versa. Snowden v. Helget Gas Products, 15 Neb. App. 33, 721 N.W.2d 362 (2006).
Knowledge of an employee's injury gained by the employee's foreman, supervisor, or superintendent in a representative capacity for an employer is knowledge imputed to the employer and notice to an employer sufficient for the notice requirement of this section. Snowden v. Helget Gas Products, 15 Neb. App. 33, 721 N.W.2d 362 (2006).
This section provides an exception to the written notice rule if it can be shown that the employer had notice or knowledge of the injury sufficient to lead a reasonable person to conclude that an employee's injury is potentially compensable, which in turn would create a responsibility of the employer to investigate the matter. Snowden v. Helget Gas Products, 15 Neb. App. 33, 721 N.W.2d 362 (2006).
A lack of prejudice is not an exception to the requirement of notice. Williamson v. Werner Enters., 12 Neb. App. 642, 682 N.W.2d 723 (2004).
This section requires notice of the injury, not merely notice of the accident. Williamson v. Werner Enters., 12 Neb. App. 642, 682 N.W.2d 723 (2004).
Where an employee experienced an unusual event, promptly perceived substantial pain that the employee connected with the event, within days sought medical treatment which the employee related to the event, and failed to notify the employer of the injury for approximately 5 months, such notice was not given as soon as practicable. Williamson v. Werner Enters., 12 Neb. App. 642, 682 N.W.2d 723 (2004).
2. Claim for compensation
Where an occupational disease results from continual absorption of small quantities of a deleterious substance from the employment environment over a period of time, the afflicted employee is considered "injured" only when the accumulated effects of the substance manifest themselves, which is when the employee becomes disabled and entitled to compensation. The statute of limitations runs from the date when the disability first occurred. Osteen v. A.C. and S., Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 307 N.W.2d 514 (1981).
A claim made within six months after occurrence of disability is a condition prerequisite to the bringing of action for compensation benefits. Raymond v. Buckridge, Inc., 195 Neb. 212, 237 N.W.2d 412 (1976).
Furnishing by employer of medical services and medicines dispenses with necessity of making claim within six months after injury. Gourley v. City of Grand Island, 168 Neb. 538, 96 N.W.2d 309 (1959).
Where employee failed to establish connection between accident and disability, consideration of question of failure to file claim in time was unnecessary. Cole v. Cushman Motor Works, 159 Neb. 97, 65 N.W.2d 330 (1954).
Where time for filing of claim expires in lifetime of employee, it is a bar to claim by his dependents after his death. McCoy v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 156 Neb. 95, 54 N.W.2d 373 (1952).
Where employee has made claim within six months against employer, he is not required to make separate claim against third party who failed to require employer to carry insurance. Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, Inc., 138 Neb. 117, 292 N.W. 59 (1940).
A demand for payment of medical expenses under the compensation act is a claim for compensation. Schmidt v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 546, 290 N.W. 250 (1940).
Minor dependents of deceased employee are not excepted from provisions of statute as to time for filing claims. Ray v. Sanitary Garbage Co., 134 Neb. 178, 278 N.W. 139 (1938).
Failure to comply with statutory requirements as to filing claim precludes recovery. Johansen v. Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Assn., 133 Neb. 118, 274 N.W. 393 (1937).
In case of physical or mental incapacity resulting from injury, the statutory limitations as to notice and commencement of action do not begin to run until six months after removal of such incapacity. Mulvey v. City of Lincoln, 131 Neb. 279, 267 N.W. 459 (1936).
Exception is made in case of latent and progressive injury, and claim must be made within six months after employee acquired knowledge of disability. Park v. School District No. 27, Richardson Cty., 127 Neb. 767, 257 N.W. 219 (1934).
Claim must be made within six months and petition filed within one year of death of employee. Welton v. Swift & Co., 125 Neb. 455, 250 N.W. 661 (1933).
Where claimant was informed by his doctor of progressive cataracts forming in the lenses of both eyes, he was not excused from filing claim on the ground that condition was latent. Kurtz v. Sunderlund Bros. Co., 124 Neb. 776, 248 N.W. 84 (1933).
Where claim is made within six months of time real nature of injury was first discovered, it was timely made. Clary v. R. S. Proudfit Co., 124 Neb. 582, 247 N.W. 417 (1933).
Where claim for compensation was made within six months from time real nature of injury was first discovered by use of X-rays, it was timely made. Montgomery v. Milldale Farm & Live Stock Improvement Co., 124 Neb. 347, 246 N.W. 734 (1933).
Where injury is latent and of progressive nature and culminates in a compensable disability, claim may be filed within a year after date of culmination thereof. Marler v. Grainger Bros., 123 Neb. 517, 243 N.W. 622 (1932).
Failure to file claim or bring suit within specified time does not defeat right to compensation where injury is latent and notice has been given and action commenced within statutory period after employee has knowledge of such compensable injury. Astuto v. V. Ray Gould Co., 123 Neb. 138, 242 N.W. 375 (1932).
Recovery is not barred where employee makes claim of employer within two months after injury and lodges claim with commissioner within seven months thereof. Palmer v. Saunders County, 117 Neb. 484, 221 N.W. 99 (1928).
Latent injuries, progressive in nature, entitle employee to compensation when disability is discovered to exist and, in such cases, failure to make claim within six months after the accident will not deprive employee of rights. McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., 111 Neb. 609, 197 N.W. 615 (1924); Selders v. Cornhusker Oil Co., 111 Neb. 300, 196 N.W. 316 (1923); Johansen v. Union Stock Yards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N.W. 511 (1916).
Knowledge of employer that employee has received an injury will not dispense with necessity of making claim for compensation. Good v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 654, 168 N.W. 639 (1918).
Time for bringing of proceeding begins to run from the time physical or mental incapacity is removed. Simon v. Cathroe Co., 101 Neb. 211, 162 N.W. 633 (1917).
This section contemplates a situation where an employer has notice or knowledge sufficient to lead a reasonable person to conclude that an employee's injury is potentially compensable and that therefore, the employer should investigate the matter further. Williamson v. Werner Enters., 12 Neb. App. 642, 682 N.W.2d 723 (2004).
3. Miscellaneous
Agreement to pay compensation must be approved by compensation commissioner or compensation court or it is void, and part payment will not make such agreement actionable at common law. Duncan v. A. Hospe Co., 133 Neb. 810, 277 N.W. 339 (1938).
Where the underlying facts are undisputed, or if disputed, the factual finding of the trial court was not clearly erroneous, the question of whether this section bars the claim is a question of law upon which the appellate court must make a determination independent of that of the trial court. Unger v. Olsen's Ag. Lab., 19 Neb. App. 459, 809 N.W.2d 813 (2012).
48-134.
Injured employee; physical examination; duty to submit.After an employee has given notice of an injury, as provided in section 48-133, and from time to time thereafter during the continuance of his or her disability, he or she shall, if so requested by the employer or the insurance company carrying such risk, submit himself or herself to an examination by a physician or surgeon legally authorized to practice medicine under the laws of the state in which he or she practices, furnished and paid for by the employer, or the insurance company carrying such risk, as the case may be. The employee shall have the right to have a physician provided and paid for by himself or herself present at the examination. The unreasonable refusal of the employee to submit to such examination shall deprive him or her of the right to compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act during the continuance of such refusal, and the period of such refusal shall be deducted from the period during which compensation would otherwise be payable.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 34, p. 594; R.S.1913, § 3675; C.S.1922, § 3057; C.S.1929, § 48-134; R.S.1943, § 48-134; Laws 1969, c. 395, § 1, p. 1385;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 53.
Annotations
This section places the selection of the physician solely within the employer's or insurance company's discretion, so long as the physician is legally authorized as set out in this section. Behrens v. American Stores Packing Co., 234 Neb. 25, 449 N.W.2d 197 (1989).
Inquiry respecting extent of an injury to employee should be directed to his condition at time of examination or trial. Dymak v. Haskins Bros. & Co., 132 Neb. 308, 271 N.W. 860 (1937).
Woman employee refusing to permit injection to render kidney opaque for purpose of X-ray photograph, was not thereby deprived of right to compensation. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wickline, 103 Neb. 681, 173 N.W. 689 (1919), 103 Neb. 21, 170 N.W. 193, 6 A.L.R. 1267 (1918).
The fundamental question of the compensability of an employee's claim stands separate from whether the employee can be deprived of benefits under this section during the time of an unreasonable refusal to undergo an employer's medical examination. Hale v. Vickers, Inc., 10 Neb. App. 627, 635 N.W.2d 458 (2001).
48-134.01.
Independent medical examiner system; list of physicians; duties; fee schedule; selection of examiner; procedures before examiner; findings; immunity.(1) The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may develop and implement an independent medical examiner system consistent with the requirements of this section. As part of such system, the compensation court by a majority vote of the judges thereof may create, maintain, and periodically validate a list of physicians that it finds to be the most qualified and to be highly experienced and competent in their specific fields of expertise and in the treatment of work-related injuries to serve as independent medical examiners from each of the health care specialties that the compensation court finds most commonly used by injured employees. The compensation court may establish a fee schedule for services rendered by independent medical examiners and may adopt and promulgate any rules and regulations considered necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.
(2) An independent medical examiner shall render medical findings on the medical condition of an employee and related issues as specified under this section. The independent medical examiner shall not be the employee's treating physician and shall not have treated the employee with respect to the injury for which the claim is being made or the benefits are being paid.
(3) If the parties to a dispute cannot agree on an independent medical examiner of their own choosing, the compensation court shall assign an independent medical examiner from the list of qualified examiners to render medical findings in any dispute relating to the medical condition of a claimant and related issues, including, but not limited to, whether the injured employee is able to perform any gainful employment temporarily or permanently, what physical restrictions, if any, would be imposed on the employee's employment, whether the injured employee has reached maximum medical improvement, the existence and extent of any permanent physical impairment, the reasonableness and necessity of any medical treatment previously provided, or to be provided, to the injured employee, and any other medical questions which may pertain to causality and relatedness of the medical condition to the employment.
(4) The compensation court may adopt and promulgate rules and regulations pertaining to the procedures before the independent medical examiner, including the parties' ability to propound questions relating to the medical condition of the employee and related issues to be submitted to the independent medical examiner. In addition to the review of records and information, the independent medical examiner may examine the employee as often as the examiner determines necessary to render medical findings on the questions propounded by the parties or by the compensation court.
(5) The independent medical examiner shall submit a written report to the compensation court, the employer, and the employee stating the examiner's medical findings on the issues raised and providing a description of findings sufficient to explain the basis of those findings. The fee for the examination and report shall be paid by the employer.
(6) The written report of the independent medical examiner's findings shall be admissible in a proceeding before the compensation court and may be received into evidence by the compensation court on its own motion.
(7) Any physician acting without malice and within the scope of the physician's duties as an independent medical examiner shall be immune from civil liability for making any report or other information available to the compensation court or for assisting in the origination, investigation, or preparation of the report or other information so provided.
Annotations
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, the "reasonableness and necessity" of medical treatment and "causality and relatedness of the medical condition to the employment" are separate and distinct questions upon which an independent examiner may be asked to opine. Miller v. Regional West Med. Ctr., 278 Neb. 676, 722 N.W.2d 872 (2009).
This section is applicable only to medical issues arising in cases where liability has been established. Owen v. American Hydraulics, Inc., 254 Neb. 685, 578 N.W.2d 57 (1998).
48-135.
Autopsy; cost; payment.Except as provided in section 23-1824, in all death claims, where the cause of death is obscure or disputed, any interested party may require an autopsy, the cost of such autopsy to be borne by the party demanding the same.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 35, p. 594; R.S.1913, § 3676; C.S.1922, § 3058; C.S.1929, § 48-135; R.S.1943, § 48-135;
Laws 1999, LB 46, § 3.
48-136.
Compensation; voluntary
settlements.The interested parties shall have
the right to settle all matters of compensation between themselves with the
consent of the workers' compensation insurer, if any, and in accordance with
the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. No such settlement shall be binding unless the
settlement is in accordance with such act.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 36, p. 595; R.S.1913, § 3677; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 12, p. 209; C.S.1922, § 3059; C.S.1929, § 48-136; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 22, p. 199; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-136; R.S.1943, § 48-136;
Laws 1978, LB 649, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 54; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 6; Laws 2009, LB630, § 4.
Annotations
A finding by the Workers' Compensation Court that an alleged injury is covered by the Workers' Compensation Act is not necessarily a prerequisite to a settlement agreement which includes a program of vocational rehabilitation paid for by the employer or its insurer. Miner v. Robertson Home Furnishing, 239 Neb. 525, 476 N.W.2d 854 (1991).
Agreements to settle workers' compensation cases not filed in and approved by the Workers' Compensation Court are void and of no effect. Miner v. Robertson Home Furnishing, 239 Neb. 525, 476 N.W.2d 854 (1991).
An agreement dividing compensation benefits between the parties was void where not in writing, filed with and approved by the compensation court. James v. Rainchief Constr. Co., 197 Neb. 818, 251 N.W.2d 367 (1977).
Copy of lump sum settlement is required to be filed with compensation court. Miller v. Schlereth, 151 Neb. 33, 36 N.W.2d 497 (1949).
Where settlement was never approved by workmen's compensation court, it was ineffective to defeat claim for compensation. Riggins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 11 N.W.2d 810 (1943).
Agreement to pay compensation must be approved by compensation commissioner or compensation court or it is void, and part payment will not make such agreement actionable at common law. Duncan v. A. Hospe Co., 133 Neb. 810, 277 N.W. 339 (1938).
Copy of settlement must not only be filed, but the settlement must also be approved by compensation court. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Walker, 128 Neb. 327, 258 N.W. 550 (1935).
In order to have a valid agreement for settlement, terms of act must be followed. Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661, 222 N.W. 42 (1928).
Lump sum settlement was sustained. Perry v. Huffman Auto. Co., 104 Neb. 211, 175 N.W. 1021 (1920).
Under former statute, court had no authority to order commutation of payments in lump sum in absence of agreement. Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Lumber & Coal Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N.W. 509 (1916).
48-137.
Compensation claims; actions; statute of limitations; exceptions.In case of personal injury, all claims for compensation shall be forever barred unless, within two years after the accident, the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation payable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, or unless, within two years after the accident, one of the parties shall have filed a petition as provided in section 48-173. In case of death, all claims for compensation shall be forever barred unless, within two years after the death, the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, or unless, within two years after the death, one of the parties shall have filed a petition as provided in section 48-173. When payments of compensation have been made in any case, such limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of two years from the time of the making of the last payment. In the event of legal disability of an injured employee or his or her dependent such limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of two years from the time of removal of such legal disability.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 38, p. 595; R.S.1913, § 3679; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 14, p. 210; C.S.1922, § 3061; C.S.1929, § 48-138; R.S.1943, § 48-137; Laws 1961, c. 234, § 3, p. 693;
Laws 1977, LB 144, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 55.
Annotations
1. Agreement by employer to compensate
2. Filing of petition
3. Payment of compensation
4. Latent and progressive injury
5. Material change in condition
6. Miscellaneous
1. Agreement by employer to compensate
Where employer agreed to compensate employee for injury and employee relying on promise, waited more than a year from time of accident to begin action, employer could not plead statute of limitations hereunder. Speas v. Boone County, 119 Neb. 58, 227 N.W. 87 (1929).
2. Filing of petition
The 2-year limitation contained in this section is contingent upon the failure of one of the parties to file a petition. Foote v. O'Neill Packing, 262 Neb. 467, 632 N.W.2d 313 (2001).
A claim for compensation filed 4 years after the date of the accident, with no allegation of excuse tolling the operation of the statute of limitations, is subject to demurrer. Bernhardt v. County of Scotts Bluff, 240 Neb. 423, 482 N.W.2d 262 (1992).
A proceeding under section 48-141, R.R.S.1943, to modify a previous award of the compensation court to recover additional compensation for an increase in incapacity can only be brought within two years of the time the employee knows, or is chargeable with knowledge, that his condition has materially changed and there is such a substantial increase in his disability as to entitle him to additional compensation. O'Connor v. Anderson Bros. Plumbing & Heating, 207 Neb. 641, 300 N.W.2d 188 (1981).
Where plaintiff's injury is known, and medical facts as to the extent of the injury were reasonably discoverable, the injury is not latent, and must be brought within the one-year statute of limitations. McGahan v. St. Francis Hospital, 200 Neb. 406, 263 N.W.2d 845 (1978).
Consideration of question of failure to file petition in time was unnecessary where employee failed to establish compensable injury. Cole v. Cushman Motor Works, 159 Neb. 97, 65 N.W.2d 330 (1954).
Time in which to bring action is tolled while employee is a minor. Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
Petition was filed in time. Gilbert v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 156 Neb. 750, 57 N.W.2d 770 (1953).
Petition is required to be filed within one year after employee acquires knowledge of a compensable disability. McCoy v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 156 Neb. 95, 54 N.W.2d 373 (1952).
An injured workman has one year in which to file petition in workmen's compensation case. Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb. 1044, 26 N.W.2d 15 (1947).
Where an employee, with full knowledge of his injury, fails to make claim for compensation within six months, and fails to file petition within one year, his claim is barred. Surratt v. Otoe Food Products Co., 146 Neb. 854, 21 N.W.2d 862 (1946).
To recover additional compensation for an increase in disability, proceedings must be brought within one year from the time the employee knows or is chargeable with knowledge that his condition has materially changed. Scott v. State, 137 Neb. 348, 289 N.W. 367 (1939).
Where employee is injured and dies in October 1931, and no claim is filed on behalf of minor dependents until September 1936, such claim is barred by statute of limitations. Ray v. Sanitary Garbage Co., 134 Neb. 178, 278 N.W. 139 (1938).
Failure to comply with statutory requirements as to filing claim and filing petition precludes recovery. Johansen v. Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Assn., 133 Neb. 118, 274 N.W. 393 (1937).
Where petition was filed within one year after assault causing injury, it was within time. Miller v. George & Mary Reisch Co., 132 Neb. 338, 271 N.W. 853 (1937).
Where statute has become bar to claim for compensation during lifetime of injured employee it is also a bar to a claim by his dependents after his death. Price v. Burlington Refrigerator Express Co., 131 Neb. 657, 269 N.W. 425 (1936).
Officer in municipal fire department, injured while fighting fire, was barred from claiming compensation when he failed to file petition within one year after date to which city had paid his salary in full. Dunlap v. City of Omaha, 131 Neb. 632, 269 N.W. 422 (1936).
Proceedings for compensation cannot be maintained where no claim is filed within six months, or petition within one year, of death of employee. Welton v. Swift & Co., 125 Neb. 455, 250 N.W. 661 (1933).
Where action is not brought within one year of last payment of compensation, it is barred hereunder. Kurtz v. Sunderland Bros. Co., 124 Neb. 776, 248 N.W. 84 (1933).
Recovery was not barred where employee made claim of employer within two months after injury and lodged claim with commissioner within seven months thereof. Palmer v. Saunders County, 117 Neb. 484, 221 N.W. 99 (1928).
Where petition was filed more than one year after injuries were sustained, claim was barred. Duhrkopf v. Bennett, 108 Neb. 142, 187 N.W. 813 (1922).
Knowledge by employer that employee was injured does not excuse latter from making claim for compensation within statutory period. Good v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 654, 168 N.W. 639 (1918).
3. Payment of compensation
In determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in situations where payments of compensation have been made, "the time of the making of the last payment" means the date the employee or the employee's provider receives payment. Obermiller v. Peak Interest, 277 Neb. 656, 764 N.W.2d 410 (2009).
This section provides that when payments of workers' compensation have been made, the statute of limitations will not take effect until the expiration of 2 years from the time of the making of the last payment of compensation. Payments for medical case-management services that are not required by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and that result in no benefit to the injured employee do not constitute payments of compensation which toll the statute of limitations set forth in this section. Smart v. Scrivner/Food 4 Less, 254 Neb. 111, 574 N.W.2d 505 (1998).
Generally, a payment for compensation benefits made by an employer's insurance carrier for an accident which predated its coverage tolls the statute of limitations and binds the employer. Fenster v. Clark Bros. Sanitation, 235 Neb. 336, 455 N.W.2d 169 (1990).
Furnishing of medical services constitutes payment of compensation and is sufficient to toll running of statute. Gourley v. City of Grand Island, 168 Neb. 538, 96 N.W.2d 309 (1959).
Where no petition has been filed by either party but compensation actually has been paid, in the absence of legal disabilities or latent injuries, the limitation provided by statute shall take effect at the expiration of one year after time of making the last payment of compensation. Hill v. Hinky-Dinky Stores Co., 133 Neb. 147, 274 N.W. 455 (1937).
Substitute check given to replace one lost does not extend time in which action must be brought hereunder. Samland v. Ford Motor Co., 123 Neb. 819, 244 N.W. 404 (1932).
Medical, surgical, and hospital services furnished by employer constituted payment of compensation within meaning of this section. Baade v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 118 Neb. 445, 225 N.W. 117 (1929).
On payments of compensation without agreement of settlement, limitation does not take effect until one year after last payment. Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661, 222 N.W. 42 (1928).
When payments of workers' compensation have been made, the statute of limitations shall not take effect until the expiration of 2 years from the time of the making of the last payment. Sands v. School Dist. of City of Lincoln, 7 Neb. App. 28, 581 N.W.2d 894 (1998).
4. Latent and progressive injury
The 2-year limitations period contained in this section is tolled when a claimant suffers a latent and progressive injury. The statute will not begin to run until it becomes, or should have become, reasonably apparent to the claimant that a compensable disability was present. Gloria v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 231 Neb. 786, 438 N.W.2d 142 (1989); Wissing v. Walgreen Company, 20 Neb. App. 332, 823 N.W.2d 710 (2012).
If an injury is deemed to be, at the outset, latent and progressive, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the employee discovers or should have discovered he has a compensable disability. Cemer v. Huskoma Corp., 221 Neb. 175, 375 N.W.2d 620 (1985).
Generally, reimbursement of medical expense by an employer or under a group health insurance agreement does not constitute remuneration in lieu of workmen's compensation benefits so as to toll the statute of limitations. Steadily debilitating knee injury was not within the latent exception to the statute of limitations. Maxey v. Fremont Department of Utilities, 220 Neb. 627, 371 N.W.2d 294 (1985).
If an employee suffers an injury which appears to be slight but which is progressive in its course, and which several physicians are unable to correctly diagnose, the worker's failure to file a claim or bring suit in time will not defeat his right to recovery, if he gave notice and commenced action within the statutory period after he learned that compensable disability resulted from the original accident. The mere fact that the employee did not know the full extent of his injury from a medical standpoint does not make it latent, particularly where the medical facts were reasonably discoverable, and the burden of proving the injury to have been latent and progressive is upon the employee. Thomas v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 211 Neb. 704, 320 N.W.2d 111 (1982).
Where an occupational disease results from continual absorption of small quantities of a deleterious substance from the employment environment over a period of time, the afflicted employee is considered "injured" only when the accumulated effects of the substance manifest themselves, which is when the employee becomes disabled and entitled to compensation. The statute of limitations runs from the date when the disability first occurred. Osteen v. A.C. and S., Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 307 N.W.2d 514 (1981).
Where injury is latent and progressive, period of limitation begins to run when true nature thereof is first discovered by claimant. Borowski v. Armco Steel Corp., 188 Neb. 654, 198 N.W.2d 460 (1972); Wissing v. Walgreen Company, 20 Neb. App. 332, 823 N.W.2d 710 (2012).
Period of limitation provided in this section runs from the time it is reasonably apparent that a compensable injury has been sustained, if the employee is aware that the disability is due to his employment. Williams v. Dobberstein, 182 Neb. 862, 157 N.W.2d 776 (1968).
Statute of limitations did not commence to run on disability progressive in nature until employee had knowledge that compensable disability had resulted. Welke v. City of Ainsworth, 179 Neb. 496, 138 N.W.2d 808 (1965).
Statute of limitations commences to run from the time the employee has knowledge that an accident has caused a compensable disability. Ohnmacht v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 178 Neb. 741, 135 N.W.2d 237 (1965).
To be effective to toll the statute of limitations, furnishing of medical services must have been made within one year of filing of petition. Schweiger v. Island Supply Co., 178 Neb. 547, 134 N.W.2d 233 (1965).
In case of a latent injury, the time for commencement of action is one year after the employee obtained knowledge that the accident caused compensable disability. Seymour v. Journal-Star Printing Co., 174 Neb. 150, 116 N.W.2d 297 (1962).
Where injury is latent and did not result in compensable disability, failure to file claim and commence action within time prescribed by statute will not defeat later action. Plambeck v. Natkin & Co., 171 Neb. 774, 107 N.W.2d 734 (1961); Webb v. Consumers Cooperative Assn., 171 Neb. 758, 107 N.W.2d 737 (1961).
Where an employee suffers an injury the character of which is ascertainable only by medical men, and medical men are unable to ascertain it up to a certain time, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the injury is ascertained. Keenan v. Consumers Public Power Dist., 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261 (1949).
When an employee receives an accidental injury which activates a dormant disease, the failure to bring suit within a year is not a bar if action is brought within one year after the employee acquires knowledge of a compensable disability. Dryden v. Omaha Steel Works, 148 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.2d 293 (1947).
Where injury is latent and progressive, claim must be filed within six months from the time the employee acquires knowledge of a compensable disability. Lind v. Nebraska National Guard, 144 Neb. 122, 12 N.W.2d 652 (1944).
In case of physical or mental incapacity resulting from injury, the statutory limitations as to notice and commencement of action do not begin to run until six months after removal of such incapacity. Mulvey v. City of Lincoln, 131 Neb. 279, 267 N.W. 459 (1936).
Where injury is latent and progressive, claim must be made within six months from time employee acquires knowledge of compensable disability. Park v. School District No. 27, Richardson Cty., 127 Neb. 767, 257 N.W. 219 (1934).
Where action was begun within statutory period after employee has knowledge of compensable injury, action was not barred. Astuto v. V. Ray Gould Co., 123 Neb. 138, 242 N.W. 375 (1932).
Where injury is latent, subsequently culminating in compensatory disability, claim for such injury may be filed within year from culmination thereof. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ohler, 119 Neb. 121, 227 N.W. 449 (1929).
Failure to file a claim or bring suit within specified time does not defeat right to compensation where injury is latent, if notice is given and action commenced within statutory period after employee has knowledge that compensable disability has resulted. City of Hastings v. Saunders, 114 Neb. 475, 208 N.W. 122 (1926); McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., 111 Neb. 609, 197 N.W. 615 (1924); Selders v. Cornhusker Oil Co., 111 Neb. 300, 196 N.W. 316 (1923).
If an employee suffers an injury which appears to be slight but which is progressive in its course, and which several physicians are unable to correctly diagnose, the worker's failure to file a claim or bring suit in time will not defeat his right to recovery, if he gave notice and commenced the action within the statutory period after he learned that a compensable disability resulted from the original accident. Wissing v. Walgreen Company, 20 Neb. App. 332, 823 N.W.2d 710 (2012).
In the case of a latent injury, the time for commencement of the action is 1 year after the employee obtained knowledge that the accident caused the compensable disability. Wissing v. Walgreen Company, 20 Neb. App. 332, 823 N.W.2d 710 (2012).
The mere fact that the employee does not know the full extent of his injury from a medical standpoint does not make it latent so as to toll the running of the limitations period, particularly where medical facts were reasonably discoverable, and the burden of proving the injury to have been latent and progressive is upon the employee. Wissing v. Walgreen Company, 20 Neb. App. 332, 823 N.W.2d 710 (2012).
In workers' compensation cases involving a claim for an occupational disease, the statute of limitations begins to run when the accumulated effects of the disease manifest themselves, which is when the employee becomes disabled and entitled to compensation. Ross v. Baldwin Filters, 5 Neb. App. 194, 557 N.W.2d 368 (1996).
5. Material change in condition
An employee seeking application of the exception for a material change in condition and substantial increase in disability is not required to demonstrate that he or she could not have filed a petition earlier than he or she did. Lenz v. Central Parking System of Neb., 288 Neb. 453, 848 N.W.2d 623 (2014).
The exception for a material change in condition and substantial increase in disability was not rendered unenforceable by Bassinger v. Nebraska Heart Hosp., 282 Neb. 835, 806 N.W.2d 395 (2011). Lenz v. Central Parking System of Neb., 288 Neb. 453, 848 N.W.2d 623 (2014).
The Legislature has acquiesced to the exception for a material change in condition and substantial increase in disability. Lenz v. Central Parking System of Neb., 288 Neb. 453, 848 N.W.2d 623 (2014).
6. Miscellaneous
In an occupational disease context, the date of injury, for purposes of this section, is that date upon which the accumulated effects of the disease manifest themselves to the point the injured worker is no longer able to render further service. Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting & Painting, 266 Neb. 526, 667 N.W.2d 167 (2003).
This section has at least two exceptions, including (1) where a "latent and progressive" injury is not discovered within 2 years of the accident which caused the injury and (2) where a material change in condition occurs which necessitates additional medical care and from which an employee suffers increased disability. Snipes v. Sperry Vickers, 251 Neb. 415, 557 N.W.2d 662 (1997).
In barring a workmen's compensation claim as untimely filed, compensation court held the limitation provision begins to run from the time it becomes reasonably apparent or should have become reasonably apparent that a compensable claim exists. Novak v. Triangle Steel Co., 197 Neb. 783, 251 N.W.2d 158 (1977).
Time for bringing action is not tolled by mental incapacity of employee's attorney. Bame v. Lipsett, Inc., 172 Neb. 623, 111 N.W.2d 380 (1961).
Where employer denies liability, wages paid are not credited on award. Anderson v. Cowger, 158 Neb. 772, 65 N.W.2d 51 (1954).
Application for additional award may be made although original award is fully paid. Peek v. Ayers Auto Supply, 157 Neb. 363, 59 N.W.2d 564 (1953).
Limitation does not begin to run until six months after removal of mental or physical incapacity. Simon v. Cathroe Co., 101 Neb. 211, 162 N.W. 633 (1917).
There are two exceptions to the statute of limitations: (1) where a latent and progressive injury is not discovered within 2 years of the accident which caused the injury and (2) where a material change in condition occurs which necessitates additional medical care and from which an employee suffers increased disability. Wissing v. Walgreen Company, 20 Neb. App. 332, 823 N.W.2d 710 (2012).
48-138.
Compensation;
lump-sum settlement; computation; fee.The amounts
of compensation payable periodically under the law by agreement of the parties
with the approval of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may be commuted
to one or more lump-sum payments, except compensation due for death, permanent
disability, or claimed permanent disability which may be commuted only as
provided in section 48-139.
If commutation is agreed upon pursuant to this section
or section 48-139, the lump sum to be paid shall be fixed at an
amount which will equal the total sum of the probable future payments, capitalized
at their present value upon the basis of interest calculated at five percent
per annum with annual rests.
The fee of the clerk of the compensation court for filing,
docketing, and indexing an agreement submitted for approval as provided in
this section shall be fifteen dollars. The fees shall be remitted by the clerk
to the State Treasurer for credit to the Compensation Court Cash Fund.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 40, p. 596; R.S.1913, § 3681; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 16, p. 212; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 1, p. 526; C.S.1922, § 3063; C.S.1929, § 48-140; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 25, p. 199; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-140; R.S.1943, § 48-138;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 3; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 56; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 9; Laws 2009, LB630, § 5.
Annotations
It was the legislative intent that compensation court should have exclusive original jurisdiction in handling claims for compensation. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Walker, 128 Neb. 327, 258 N.W. 550 (1935).
One relying on lump sum settlement must bring himself within statute. Ostegaard v. Adams & Kelly Co., 113 Neb. 393, 203 N.W. 564 (1925).
48-139.
Compensation; lump-sum settlement; submitted to Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court; procedure; filing of release; form; contents; payment; fees.(1)(a) Whenever an injured employee or his or her dependents and the employer agree that the amounts of compensation due as periodic payments for death, permanent disability, or claimed permanent disability under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be commuted to one or more lump-sum payments, such settlement shall be submitted to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court for approval as provided in subsection (2) of this section if:
(i) The employee is not represented by counsel;
(ii) The employee, at the time the settlement is executed, is eligible for medicare, is a medicare beneficiary, or has a reasonable expectation of becoming eligible for medicare within thirty months after the date the settlement is executed. This subdivision (ii) is not applicable if the employee's right to receive future medical, surgical, and hospital services as provided in section 48-120 is specifically excluded from the settlement and medicare has not paid medical, surgical, or hospital expenses or if medicare has paid medical, surgical, or hospital expenses for which it claims it is entitled to reimbursement and medicare has been reimbursed for such expenses at the time the settlement is executed;
(iii) Medical, surgical, or hospital expenses incurred for treatment of the injury have been paid by medicaid and medicaid will not be reimbursed as part of the settlement;
(iv) Medical, surgical, or hospital expenses incurred for treatment of the injury will not be fully paid as part of the settlement; or
(v) The settlement seeks to commute amounts of compensation due to dependents of the employee.
(b) If such lump-sum settlement is not required to be submitted for approval by the compensation court, a release shall be filed with the compensation court as provided in subsection (3) of this section. Nothing in this section shall be construed to increase the compensation court's duties or authority with respect to the approval of lump-sum settlements under the act.
(2)(a) An application for an order approving a lump-sum settlement, signed and verified by both parties, shall be filed with the clerk of the compensation court and shall be entitled the same as an action by such employee or dependents against such employer. The application shall contain a concise statement of the terms of the settlement or agreement sought to be approved with a brief statement of the facts concerning the injury, the nature thereof, the wages received by the injured employee prior thereto, the nature of the employment, a description of the medical, surgical, or hospital expenses incurred for treatment of the injury that will remain unpaid as part of the settlement which are disputed and for which compensability has been denied by the employer, and such other matters as may be reasonably required by the compensation court. The application shall also include a statement that the parties have considered the interests of medicare and have taken reasonable steps to protect any interests of medicare. The application may provide for payment of future medical, surgical, or hospital expenses incurred by the employee. The compensation court may, on its own motion, and shall, on a motion by one of the parties, hold a hearing on the application at a time and place selected by the compensation court, and proof may be adduced and witnesses subpoenaed and examined the same as in an action in equity.
(b)(i) If the compensation court finds such lump-sum settlement is made in conformity with the compensation schedule and for the best interests of the employee or his or her dependents under all the circumstances, the compensation court shall make an order approving the same.
(ii) If the expenses for medical, surgical, or hospital services provided to the employee are not paid by the employer, or if any person, other than medicaid, who has made any payment to the supplier of medical, surgical, or hospital services provided to the employee, is not reimbursed by the employer, it shall be conclusively presumed that the nonpayment or nonreimbursement of disputed medical, surgical, or hospital expenses, as set forth in the application, is in conformity with the compensation schedule and for the best interests of the employee or his or her dependents, if the employee's attorney elects to affirm and does affirm in the application that the nonpayment or nonreimbursement of disputed medical, surgical, or hospital expenses is in conformity with the compensation schedule and for the best interests of the employee or his or her dependents under all the circumstances.
(iii) If the employee, at the time the settlement is executed, is eligible for medicare, is a medicare beneficiary, or has a reasonable expectation of becoming eligible for medicare within thirty months after the date the settlement is executed, and if the employee's attorney elects to affirm and does affirm in the application that the parties' agreement relating to consideration of medicare's interests set forth in such lump-sum settlement is in conformity with the compensation schedule and for the best interests of the employee or his or her dependents under all the circumstances, it shall be conclusively presumed that the parties' agreement relating to consideration of medicare's interests set forth in the application is in conformity with the compensation schedule and for the best interests of the employee or his or her dependents.
(iv) If such settlement is not approved, the compensation court may dismiss the application at the cost of the employer or continue the hearing, in the discretion of the compensation court.
(c) Every such lump-sum settlement approved by order of the compensation court shall be final and conclusive unless procured by fraud. An order approving an application under this subsection shall, in any case in which the employee is represented by counsel and in which the application contains a description of the medical, surgical, or hospital expenses incurred for treatment of the injury that will remain unpaid as part of the settlement which are disputed and for which compensability has been denied by the employer, provide that the employer is not liable for such expenses. Upon paying the amount approved by the compensation court, the employer shall be discharged from further liability on account of the injury or death, other than liability for the payment of future medical, surgical, or hospital expenses if such liability is approved by the compensation court on the application of the parties.
(d) An exclusion from coverage in any health, accident, or other insurance policy covering an employee which provides that coverage under such insurance policy does not apply if such employee is entitled to workers' compensation coverage is void as to such employee if his or her employer is not liable for medical, surgical, or hospital expenses incurred for treatment of an injury that will remain unpaid as part of the settlement pursuant to an order entered under subdivision (2)(c) of this section.
(3) If such lump-sum settlement is not required to be submitted for approval by the compensation court, a release shall be filed with the compensation court in accordance with this subsection that is signed and verified by the employee and the employee's attorney. The release shall be made on a form approved by the compensation court and shall contain a statement signed and verified by the employee that:
(a) The employee understands and waives all rights under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, including, but not limited to:
(i) The right to receive weekly disability benefits, both temporary and permanent;
(ii) The right to receive vocational rehabilitation services;
(iii) The right to receive future medical, surgical, and hospital services as provided in section 48-120, unless such services are specifically excluded from the release; and
(iv) The right to ask a judge of the compensation court to decide the parties' rights and obligations;
(b) The employee is not eligible for medicare, is not a current medicare beneficiary, and does not have a reasonable expectation of becoming eligible for medicare within thirty months after the date the settlement is executed. This subdivision (b) is not applicable if the employee's right to receive future medical, surgical, and hospital services as provided in section 48-120 is specifically excluded from the settlement and medicare has not paid medical, surgical, or hospital expenses or if medicare has paid medical, surgical, or hospital expenses for which it claims it is entitled to reimbursement and medicare has been reimbursed for such expenses at the time the settlement is executed;
(c) There are no medical, surgical, or hospital expenses incurred for treatment of the injury which have been paid by medicaid and not reimbursed to medicaid by the employer as part of the settlement; and
(d) There are no medical, surgical, or hospital expenses incurred for treatment of the injury that will remain unpaid after the settlement.
(4) Upon the entry of an order of dismissal with prejudice, a release filed with the compensation court in accordance with subsection (3) of this section shall be final and conclusive as to all rights waived in the release unless procured by fraud. Amounts to be paid by the employer to the employee pursuant to such release shall be paid within thirty days of filing the release with the compensation court. Fifty percent shall be added for payments owed to the employee if made after thirty days after the date the release is filed with the compensation court. Upon making payment owed by the employer as set forth in the release and upon the entry of an order of dismissal with prejudice, as to all rights waived in the release, such release shall be a full and complete discharge from further liability for the employer on account of the injury, including future medical, surgical, or hospital expenses, unless such expenses are specifically excluded from the release.
(5) The fees of the clerk of the compensation court for filing, docketing, and indexing an application for an order approving a lump-sum settlement or filing a release as provided in this section shall be fifteen dollars. The fees shall be remitted by the clerk to the State Treasurer for credit to the Compensation Court Cash Fund.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 85, § 16, p. 212; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 1, p. 526; C.S.1922, § 3063; C.S.1929, § 48-140; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 25, p. 199; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-140; R.S.1943, § 48-139; Laws 1951, c. 153, § 1, p. 623;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 4; Laws 1977, LB 126, § 3; Laws 1978, LB 649, § 3; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 57; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 10; Laws 2002, LB 417, § 3; Laws 2009, LB630, § 6; Laws 2014, LB961, § 11; Laws 2018, LB953, § 1; Laws 2021, LB256, § 1.
Annotations
1. Lump sum settlement
2. Commutation
3. Release
1. Lump sum settlement
If an application for approval of a lump-sum settlement is not approved, the workers' compensation court may (1) dismiss the application at the cost of the employer or (2) continue the hearing, in the discretion of the compensation court. Loyd v. Family Dollar Stores of Neb., 304 Neb. 883, 937 N.W.2d 487 (2020).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, a lump-sum settlement must be submitted to the compensation court for approval when the claimant is a Medicare beneficiary. Loyd v. Family Dollar Stores of Neb., 304 Neb. 883, 937 N.W.2d 487 (2020).
Where lump sum settlement is made and later application is made for further compensation for disability claimed not covered by settlement, burden of proof is on employee. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co. v. Warner, 127 Neb. 796, 257 N.W. 224 (1934).
Where approved lump sum settlement, accepted by employee before death, was complete compensation, widow was not entitled to further award. Lincoln Packing Co. v. Coe, 120 Neb. 299, 232 N.W. 92 (1930).
Final power to award lump sum settlement for employee's death or permanent disability rests with district court, subject to review. Jackson v. Ford Motor Co., 115 Neb. 758, 214 N.W. 631 (1927).
Lump sum settlements are authorized only in sound discretion of district court. Myers v. Armour & Co., 103 Neb. 407, 172 N.W. 45 (1919).
Sections 48-140 and 48-141 and this section emphasize the finality of a lump-sum settlement and only contemplate "readjustment" if the "settlement" itself is procured by fraud; the statutes do not speak to readjusting underlying "awards" allegedly procured by fraud. Hunt v. Pick's Pack-Hauler, 23 Neb. App. 278, 869 N.W.2d 723 (2015).
In order to achieve a modification of a lump-sum payment that has been approved by court order pursuant to this section on the ground of increased or decreased incapacity, a party must make an application on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury. Hubbart v. Hormel Foods Corp., 15 Neb. App. 129, 723 N.W.2d 350 (2006).
Lump-sum settlements in workers' compensation actions cannot be modified in the future or be considered when determining future workers' compensation awards, because such awards are "final." Dukes v. University of Nebraska, 12 Neb. App. 539, 679 N.W.2d 249 (2004).
2. Commutation
In the approval of commutation of compensation, the public has an interest which it is the duty of the court to protect without regard to the wishes of the parties. Perry v. Huffman Auto. Co., 104 Neb. 211, 175 N.W. 1021 (1920).
Commutation cannot be ordered except with consent of both parties, but court must ratify. Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Lumber & Coal Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N.W. 509 (1916); Bailey v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 99 Neb. 109, 155 N.W. 237 (1915).
3. Release
A verified release results in a full and complete discharge from all liability under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act but does not become effective until the Workers' Compensation Court files an order of dismissal with prejudice. Dragon v. Cheesecake Factory, 300 Neb. 548, 915 N.W.2d 418 (2018).
By filing a release pursuant to the settlement procedures in subsection (3) of this section, a worker waives all rights under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, including both the right to penalties and attorney fees under section 48-125 and the right to ask a judge of the compensation court to decide the parties' rights and obligations. Holdsworth v. Greenwood Farmers Co-op, 286 Neb. 49, 835 N.W.2d 30 (2013).
The filing of a release pursuant to subsection (3) of this section does not deprive the Workers' Compensation Court of jurisdiction to hear further issues in a case. Holdsworth v. Greenwood Farmers Co-op, 286 Neb. 49, 835 N.W.2d 30 (2013).
The filing of a release pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, not actual payment of the lump-sum settlement, effects a discharge from liability for the employer. Holdsworth v. Greenwood Farmers Co-op, 286 Neb. 49, 835 N.W.2d 30 (2013).
There is no ambiguity in the statutorily required language for a release pursuant to subsection (3) of this section. Holdsworth v. Greenwood Farmers Co-op, 286 Neb. 49, 835 N.W.2d 30 (2013).
48-140.
Compensation; lump-sum settlements; conclusiveness;
exception.Any
lump-sum settlement by agreement of the parties pursuant
to section 48-139 shall be final and not subject to readjustment if the settlement
is in conformity with the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, unless the settlement
is procured by fraud. All awards of compensation made by the compensation
court, except those amounts payable periodically, shall be final and not subject
to readjustment.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 41, p. 597; R.S.1913, § 3682; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 17, p. 213; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 1, p. 527; C.S.1922, § 3064; C.S.1929, § 48-141; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 26, p. 200; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-141; R.S.1943, § 48-140;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 5; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 58; Laws 1989, LB 410, § 1; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 11; Laws 2009, LB630, § 7.
Annotations
1. Lump-sum settlement
2. Approval
3. Miscellaneous
1. Lump-sum settlement
Lump sum settlement is not final unless approved as required by act. Miller v. Schlereth, 151 Neb. 33, 36 N.W.2d 497 (1949).
Lump sum settlement must conform to statutory requirements, including filing copy with and approval by compensation court. Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661, 222 N.W. 42 (1928).
One relying upon lump sum settlement must bring himself within statute. Ostegaard v. Adams & Kelly Co., 113 Neb. 393, 203 N.W. 564 (1925).
Lump sum settlement is final, and is not subject to modification as in case of periodic payments. Bailey v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 99 Neb. 109, 155 N.W. 237 (1915).
Sections 48-139 and 48-141 and this section emphasize the finality of a lump-sum settlement and only contemplate "readjustment" if the "settlement" itself is procured by fraud; the statutes do not speak to readjusting underlying "awards" allegedly procured by fraud. Hunt v. Pick's Pack-Hauler, 23 Neb. App. 278, 869 N.W.2d 723 (2015).
Lump-sum settlements in workers' compensation actions cannot be modified in the future or be considered when determining future workers' compensation awards, because such awards are "final." Dukes v. University of Nebraska, 12 Neb. App. 539, 679 N.W.2d 249 (2004).
2. Approval
The provisions in this section which bar proceedings to modify an award of compensation payable periodically over a period of less than six months are invalid as an unreasonable classification. Snyder v. IBP, Inc., 229 Neb. 224, 426 N.W.2d 261 (1988).
Where settlement was never approved by workmen's compensation court, it was ineffective to defeat claim for compensation. Riggins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 11 N.W.2d 810 (1943).
An agreement to pay compensation must be approved by compensation court or it is void, and part payment will not make such agreement actionable at common law. Duncan v. A. Hospe Co., 133 Neb. 810, 277 N.W. 339 (1938).
Compensation commissioner has exclusive original jurisdiction of claims arising under compensation law. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Walker, 128 Neb. 327, 258 N.W. 550 (1935).
Award is subject to modification, if it covers period over six months, part of which has elapsed at time award is made. Harmon v. J. H. Wiese Co., 121 Neb. 137, 236 N.W. 186 (1931).
If court finds disability will not continue for more than six months and fixes compensation therefor, court cannot at subsequent term change that judgment, but, if finding is that disability will continue for more than six months, court may, upon application, modify after six months expires. Hanley v. Union Stock Yards Co., 100 Neb. 232, 158 N.W. 939 (1916).
3. Miscellaneous
A finding by the Workers' Compensation Court that an alleged injury is covered by the Workers' Compensation Act is not necessarily a prerequisite to a settlement agreement which includes a program of vocational rehabilitation paid for by the employer or its insurer. Miner v. Robertson Home Furnishing, 239 Neb. 525, 476 N.W.2d 854 (1991).
48-141.
Lump-sum settlement;
finality; periodic payment; modification.All
amounts paid by an employer or by an insurance company carrying such risk,
as the case may be, and received by the employee or his or her dependents
by lump-sum payments pursuant to section 48-139 shall be final and not subject to readjustment if the lump-sum settlement
is in conformity with the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, unless the settlement
is procured by fraud, but the amount of any agreement or award
payable periodically may be modified as follows: (1) At any time by agreement
of the parties with the approval of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court;
or (2) if the parties cannot agree, then at any time after six months from
the date of the agreement or award, an application may be made by either party
on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury
or that the condition of a dependent has changed as to age or marriage or
by reason of the death of the dependent. In such case, the same procedure
shall be followed as in sections 48-173 to 48-185 in case of disputed claim
for compensation.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 42, p. 597; R.S.1913, § 3683; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 18, p. 213; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 1, p. 527; C.S.1922, § 3065; Laws 1929, c. 81, § 2, p. 274; C.S.1929, § 48-142; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 27, p. 201; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-142; R.S.1943, § 48-141;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 6; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 59; Laws 1989, LB 410, § 2; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 12; Laws 2009, LB630, § 8.
Annotations
1. Modification of award
2. Attorney's fees
3. Miscellaneous
1. Modification of award
To establish a change in incapacity under this section, an applicant must show a change in impairment and a change in disability. In a workers' compensation context, impairment refers to a medical assessment, whereas disability relates to employability. Rader v. Speer Auto, 287 Neb. 116, 841 N.W.2d 383 (2013).
The party seeking modification has the burden to prove the allegations in its petition to modify the running award of temporary total disability benefits. Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 285 Neb. 272, 826 N.W.2d 845 (2013).
If future medical expenses are not a part of a final award, the judgment is final, and any future claims for medical expenses related to the same accident are absolutely barred unless the requirements of this section are met. Green v. Drivers Mgmt., Inc., 263 Neb. 197, 639 N.W.2d 94 (2002).
Under this section, the applicant for modification must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the increase in his incapacity was due solely to the injury resulting from the original accident. In proving an increase in incapacity, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there now exists a material and substantial change for the worse in the applicant's condition—a change in circumstances that justifies a modification, distinct and different from that for which an adjudication had been previously made. Gomez v. Kenney Deans, Inc., 232 Neb. 646, 441 N.W.2d 632 (1989).
Before an employee may obtain a modification of an agreement or award for periodic payment of compensation, increasing the compensation paid on account of a previously compensable injury, the employee must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, an increase in incapacity due solely to the previous compensable injury. Grauerholz v. Cornhusker Packing Co., 230 Neb. 641, 432 N.W.2d 831 (1988).
The provisions in this section which bar proceedings to modify an award of compensation payable periodically over a period of less than six months are invalid as an unreasonable classification. Snyder v. IBP, Inc., 229 Neb. 224, 426 N.W.2d 261 (1988).
A proceeding under section 48-141, R.R.S.1943, to modify a previous award of the compensation court to recover additional compensation for an increase in incapacity can only be brought within two years of the time the employee knows, or is chargeable with knowledge, that his condition has materially changed and there is such a substantial increase in his disability as to entitle him to additional compensation. O'Connor v. Anderson Bros. Plumbing & Heating, 207 Neb. 641, 300 N.W.2d 188 (1981).
An award which is payable periodically for six months or more is subject to modification on the ground of increase of incapacity due solely to the injury. Camp v. Blount Bros. Corp., 195 Neb. 459, 238 N.W.2d 634 (1976).
The amount payable periodically by agreement or award may be modified if recipient's condition changes thereafter. Shotwell v. Industrial Builders, Inc., 187 Neb. 320, 190 N.W.2d 624 (1971).
Modification is limited to increase or decrease that has occurred since award of compensation was rendered. Pavel v. Hughes Brothers, Inc., 167 Neb. 727, 94 N.W.2d 492 (1959).
Where amount of award is payable periodically for six months or more, application for increase in award may be made. Peek v. Ayers Auto Supply, 160 Neb. 658, 71 N.W.2d 204 (1955).
Statute restricts basis for modification to increase or decrease of incapacity since original award. Peek v. Ayers Auto Supply, 157 Neb. 363, 59 N.W.2d 564 (1953).
Right to maintain proceedings for modification is recognized. Dietz v. State, 157 Neb. 324, 59 N.W.2d 587 (1953).
Basis for modification is limited to increase or decrease of incapacity which has occurred since the award and is due to the injury. Riedel v. Smith Baking Co., 150 Neb. 28, 33 N.W.2d 287 (1948).
Basis for modification of award is limited to increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to injury. Ludwickson v. Central States Electric Co., 142 Neb. 308, 6 N.W.2d 65 (1942).
Upon application to modify an award of compensation under this section, petitioner must establish that the disability has increased, decreased, or terminated. Kucera v. Village of Prague, 141 Neb. 180, 3 N.W.2d 201 (1942).
Proceeding to recover additional compensation for increased disability must be brought within one year from time employee is chargeable with knowledge of his right to additional compensation. Scott v. State, 137 Neb. 348, 289 N.W. 367 (1939).
Employee must establish a material change for the worse to entitle him to additional compensation. Huff v. Omaha Cold Storage Co., 136 Neb. 907, 287 N.W. 764 (1939).
This section makes provision for situation where employee's injuries cause total permanent disability at some future date after award. Micek v. Omaha Steel Works, 136 Neb. 843, 287 N.W. 645 (1939).
Judgment is not final in sense that it can never be inquired into again where increase or decrease of incapacity can be shown. Great Western Sugar Co. v. Hewitt, 127 Neb. 790, 257 N.W. 61 (1934).
Application to modify follows same procedure as in case of dispute except that where award is made by district court, application should be filed in that court. Metropolitan Dining Room v. Jensen, 126 Neb. 765, 254 N.W. 405 (1934).
Construing this with preceding section, award is subject to modification if it covers period over six months, part of which has expired before award was made. Harmon v. J. H. Wiese Co., 121 Neb. 137, 236 N.W. 186 (1931).
Application for modification of award for increase or decrease of incapacity may be made at any time after six months from date of award. Updike Grain Co. v. Swanson, 103 Neb. 872, 174 N.W. 862 (1919).
Lump sum settlements are final, and not subject to modification as in case of periodic payments. Bailey v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 99 Neb. 109, 155 N.W. 237 (1915).
To establish a change in incapacity under this section, an applicant must show a change in impairment and a change in disability. Moss v. C&A Indus., 25 Neb. App. 877, 915 N.W.2d 615 (2018).
Whether an applicant's incapacity has increased under the terms of this section is a finding of fact. Moss v. C&A Indus., 25 Neb. App. 877, 915 N.W.2d 615 (2018).
Sections 48-139 and 48-140 and this section emphasize the finality of a lump-sum settlement and only contemplate "readjustment" if the "settlement" itself is procured by fraud; the statutes do not speak to readjusting underlying "awards" allegedly procured by fraud. Hunt v. Pick's Pack-Hauler, 23 Neb. App. 278, 869 N.W.2d 723 (2015).
A court may modify a workers' compensation award based on a change in incapacity due to a mental condition arising out of a work-related physical injury if the change is due solely to the work-related injury. Jurgens v. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 20 Neb. App. 488, 825 N.W.2d 820 (2013).
An employee seeking temporary total disability benefits must file a petition for modification as soon as she becomes totally disabled. Jurgens v. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 20 Neb. App. 488, 825 N.W.2d 820 (2013).
Where the original award of benefits did not award vocational rehabilitation services, the applicant needed to comply with the requirements of this section and allege and prove that he had suffered an increase in incapacity since the entry of the original award in order to obtain the requested vocational rehabilitation services. McKay v. Hershey Food Corp., 16 Neb. App. 79, 740 N.W.2d 378 (2007).
In order to achieve a modification of a lump-sum payment that has been approved by court order pursuant to section 48-139 on the ground of increased or decreased incapacity, a party must make an application on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury. Hubbart v. Hormel Foods Corp., 15 Neb. App. 129, 723 N.W.2d 350 (2006).
In the context of body as a whole injuries, an applicant for modification who must fulfill the requirements set forth in this section by demonstrating a change in incapacity must establish both a change in the employee's physical condition, or impairment, and a change in the employee's disability. Bronzynski v. Model Electric, 14 Neb. App. 355, 707 N.W.2d 46 (2005).
Lump-sum settlements in workers' compensation actions cannot be modified in the future or be considered when determining future workers' compensation awards, because such awards are "final." Dukes v. University of Nebraska, 12 Neb. App. 539, 679 N.W.2d 249 (2004).
A workers' compensation award may be modified at any time after 6 months from the date of the agreement or award, following an application made by either party on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury. A finding that an applicant's incapacity has increased under the terms of this section is a finding of fact. Sands v. School Dist. of City of Lincoln, 7 Neb. App. 28, 581 N.W.2d 894 (1998).
2. Attorney's fees
Attorney's fees are taxable against insurance carrier on denial of its application to reduce compensation payments. Southern Surety Co. v. Parmely, 121 Neb. 146, 236 N.W. 178 (1931).
Attorney's fees are allowable in Supreme Court to employee successfully resisting effort to reduce modified award. Harmon v. J. H. Wiese Co., 121 Neb. 137, 236 N.W. 186 (1931).
3. Miscellaneous
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act does not provide for a motion for new trial in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. Carter v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 234 Neb. 558, 452 N.W.2d 32 (1990).
Increase of incapacity must relate to condition for which original award was made, and not dissatisfaction with original award. Wilson Concrete Co. v. Rork, 216 Neb. 447, 343 N.W.2d 764 (1984).
Remedy is provided to cover future rehabilitation of employee obtaining award of total permanent disability. Rapp v. Hale, 170 Neb. 620, 103 N.W.2d 851 (1960).
Increase of incapacity must relate to condition for which original award was made. Chadd v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Neb. 483, 89 N.W.2d 586 (1958).
Where employer does not file application on ground of decrease of incapacity, but stops payment of compensation, application for continued compensation is an original action. Rexroat v. State, 142 Neb. 596, 7 N.W.2d 163 (1942).
Legislature may impose restrictions in nature of time limitations on right created by statute. Park v. School District No. 27, Richardson Cty., 127 Neb. 767, 257 N.W. 219 (1934).
48-142.
Compensation; amount agreed upon; payment to trustee; procedure.At any time after the amount of any award has been agreed upon by the parties and approved by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, a sum equal to the present value of all future installments of compensation may, when death or the nature of the injury renders the amount of future payments certain, by leave of the compensation court, be paid by the employer, or by the insurance company carrying such risk, as the case may be, to any savings bank or trust company of this state, in good standing, and such sum together with all interest thereon, shall thereafter be held in trust for the employee or the dependents of the employee, who shall have no further recourse against the employer. The payment of such sum by the employer, evidenced by the receipt of the trustee to be filed with the compensation court, shall operate as a satisfaction of such award as to the employer. Payments from such fund shall be made by the trustee in the same amounts and at the same time as are herein required of the employer until the fund and interest shall be exhausted. In the appointment of the trustee, preference shall be given, in the discretion of the compensation court, to the choice of the injured employee or the dependents of the deceased employee as the case may be.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 43, p. 597; R.S.1913, § 3684; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 19, p. 214; C.S.1922, § 3066; C.S.1929, § 48-143; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 28, p. 201; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-143; R.S.1943, § 48-142;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 7; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 60.
48-143.
Compensation; death benefits; absence of qualified administrator; payment; to whom made.In case of death, where no executor or administrator is qualified, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall, by order, direct payment to be made to such person as would be appointed administrator of the estate of such decedent, upon like terms as to bond for the proper application of compensation payments as are required of administrators.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 44, p. 598; R.S.1913, § 3685; C.S.1922, § 3067; C.S.1929, § 48-144; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 29, p. 202; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-144; R.S.1943, § 48-143;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 8; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 61.
Annotations
Action for compensation by injured employee, pending at his death, may be revived by dependents giving bond or by administrator without bond. Palmer v. Saunders County, 117 Neb. 484, 221 N.W. 99 (1928).
Action to recover compensation for death may be brought either by dependents, legal guardian or trustee of minor dependent, or executor or administrator of deceased. Coster v. Thompson Hotel Co., 102 Neb. 585, 168 N.W. 191 (1918).
48-144.
Accidents and settlements; reports; death of alien employee; notice to consul.(1) Reports of accidents and settlements shall be made in a form and manner prescribed by the administrator of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. Such reports, if filed by a workers' compensation insurer on behalf of an employer, shall be deemed to have been filed by the employer.
(2) When an injury results in the death of an employee who is a citizen or subject of a foreign country, the administrator of the compensation court shall, after the death has been reported to the compensation court, at once notify the superior consular officer of the country of which the employee at the time of his or her death was a citizen or subject, and whose consular district embraces the State of Nebraska, or the representative, residing in the State of Nebraska, of such consular officer, whom he or she shall have formally designated as his or her representative by a communication in writing to the compensation court. Such notification shall contain in addition to the name of the employee such further information as the compensation court may possess respecting the place of birth, parentage, and names and addresses of the dependents of the employee.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 45, p. 598; R.S.1913, § 3686; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 20, p. 214; C.S.1922, § 3068; C.S.1929, § 48-145; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 30, p. 202; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-145; R.S.1943, § 48-144;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 62; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 6.
48-144.01.
Injuries; reports; time within which to file; terms, defined.(1) In every case of reportable injury arising out of and in the course of employment, the employer or workers' compensation insurer shall file a report thereof with the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. Such report shall be filed within ten days after the employer or insurer has been given notice of or has knowledge of the injury.
(2) For purposes of this section:
(a) Reportable injury means an injury or diagnosed occupational disease which results in: (i) Death, regardless of the time between the death and the injury or onset of disease; (ii) time away from work; (iii) restricted work or termination of employment; (iv) loss of consciousness; or (v) medical treatment other than first aid;
(b) Restricted work means the inability of the employee to perform one or more of the duties of his or her normal job assignment. Restricted work does not occur if the employee is able to perform all of the duties of his or her normal job assignment, but a work restriction is assigned because the employee is experiencing minor musculoskeletal discomfort and for the purpose of preventing a more serious condition from developing;
(c) Medical treatment means treatment administered by a physician or other licensed health care professional; and
(d) First aid means:
(i) Using a nonprescription medication at nonprescription strength. For medications available in both prescription and nonprescription form, a recommendation by a physician or other licensed health care professional to use a nonprescription medication at prescription strength is not first aid;
(ii) Administering tetanus immunizations. Administering other immunizations, such as hepatitis B vaccine and rabies vaccine, is not first aid;
(iii) Cleaning, flushing, or soaking wounds on the surface of the skin;
(iv) Using wound coverings, such as bandages and gauze pads, and superficial wound closing devices, such as butterfly bandages and steri-strips. Using other wound closing devices, such as sutures and staples, is not first aid;
(v) Using hot or cold therapy;
(vi) Using any nonrigid means of support, such as elastic bandages, wraps, and nonrigid back belts. Using devices with rigid stays or other systems designed to immobilize parts of the body is not first aid;
(vii) Using temporary immobilization devices, such as splints, slings, neck collars, and back boards, while transporting accident victims;
(viii) Drilling of a fingernail or toenail to relieve pressure or draining fluid from a blister;
(ix) Using eye patches;
(x) Removing foreign bodies from the eye using only irrigation or a cotton swab;
(xi) Removing splinters or foreign material from areas other than the eye by irrigation, tweezers, cotton swabs, or other simple means;
(xii) Using finger guards;
(xiii) Using massages. Using physical therapy or chiropractic treatment is not first aid; and
(xiv) Drinking fluids for relief of heat stress.
Annotations
Section 48-144.04 establishes when the statute of limitations begins to run if an initial report required by this section is not filed, but section 48-144.04 does not provide for tolling of an already-running statute of limitations when and if subsequent reports are not filed. Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting & Painting, 266 Neb. 526, 667 N.W.2d 167 (2003).
48-144.02.
Compensation insurance carrier; risk management pool; reports; time within which to file.(1) Whenever any insurance carrier shall write a policy of workers' compensation insurance under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, such carrier shall file a report showing the name and address of the insured employer, the name of the insurance carrier, the policy number, the effective date and expiration date of such policy, and such other information as the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may require. Such report shall be filed with the compensation court within ten days of the effective date of such policy.
(2) Whenever any risk management pool is organized or accepts a new member or whenever any member of a risk management pool voluntarily terminates membership or is involuntarily terminated, such pool shall file a report within ten days after any such event with the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court showing the names and local addresses of its members or the name, local address, and effective date of termination or joinder of any single member.
Cross References
Risk management pool, defined, see section 44-4303.
48-144.03.
Workers'
compensation insurance policy; master
policy obtained by professional employer organization; notice
of cancellation or nonrenewal; effective date.(1)
Notwithstanding policy provisions that stipulate a workers' compensation insurance
policy to be a contract with a fixed term of coverage that expires at the
end of the term, coverage under a workers' compensation insurance policy shall
continue in full force and effect until notice is given in accordance with
this section.
(2) No cancellation of a workers' compensation insurance
policy within the policy period shall be effective unless notice of the cancellation
is given by the workers' compensation insurer to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation
Court and to the employer. No such cancellation shall be effective until thirty
days after the giving of such notices, except that the cancellation may be
effective ten days after the giving of such notices if such cancellation is
based on (a) notice from the employer to the insurer to cancel the policy,
(b) nonpayment of premium due the insurer under any policy written by the
insurer for the employer, (c) failure of the employer to reimburse deductible
losses as required under any policy written by the insurer for the employer,
or (d) failure of the employer, if covered pursuant to section 44-3,158, to
comply with sections 48-443 to 48-445.
(3) No workers' compensation insurance policy shall expire
or lapse at the end of the policy period unless notice of nonrenewal is given
by the workers' compensation insurer to the compensation court and to the
employer. No workers' compensation insurance policy shall expire or lapse
until thirty days after the giving of such notices, except that a policy may
expire or lapse ten days after the giving of such notices if the nonrenewal
is based on (a) notice from the employer to the insurer to not renew the policy,
(b) nonpayment of premium due the insurer under any policy written by the
insurer for the employer, (c) failure of the employer to reimburse deductible
losses as required under any policy written by the insurer for the employer,
or (d) failure of the employer, if covered pursuant to section 44-3,158, to
comply with sections 48-443 to 48-445.
(4) Subsections
(2) and (3) of this section terminate on January 1, 2012. Subsections (5),
(6), and (7) of this section apply beginning on January 1, 2012.
(5)(a) This
subsection applies to workers' compensation policies other than master policies
or multiple coordinated policies obtained by a professional employer organization.
(b) No cancellation
of a policy within the policy period shall be effective unless notice of the
cancellation is given by the workers' compensation insurer to the compensation
court and to the employer. No such cancellation shall be effective until thirty
days after giving such notices, except that the cancellation may be effective
ten days after the giving of such notices if such cancellation is based on
(i) notice from the employer to the insurer to cancel the policy, (ii) nonpayment
of premium due the insurer under any policy written by the insurer for the
employer, (iii) failure of the employer to reimburse deductible losses as
required under any policy written by the insurer for the employer, or (iv)
failure of the employer, if covered pursuant to section 44-3,158, to comply
with sections 48-443 to 48-445.
(c) No policy shall expire or lapse at
the end of the policy period unless notice of nonrenewal is given by the workers'
compensation insurer to the compensation court and to the employer. No policy
shall expire or lapse until thirty days after giving such notices, except
that a policy may expire or lapse ten days after the giving of such notices
if the nonrenewal is based on (i) notice from the employer to the insurer
to not renew the policy, (ii) nonpayment of premium due the insurer under
any policy written by the insurer for the employer, (iii) failure of the employer
to reimburse deductible losses as required under any policy written by the
insurer for the employer, or (iv) failure of the employer, if covered pursuant
to section 44-3,158, to comply with sections 48-443 to 48-445.
(6)(a) This
subsection applies to workers' compensation master policies obtained by a
professional employer organization.
(b) No cancellation of a master policy
within the policy period shall be effective unless notice of the cancellation
is given by the workers' compensation insurer to the compensation court and
to the professional employer organization. No such cancellation shall be effective
until thirty days after giving such notices.
(c) No termination of
coverage for a client or any employees of a client under a master policy within
the policy period shall be effective unless notice is given by the workers'
compensation insurer to the compensation court and to the professional employer
organization. No such termination of coverage shall be effective until thirty
days after giving such notices, except that the termination of coverage may
be effective ten days after the giving of such notices if such termination
is based on (i) notice from the client to the professional employer organization
or the insurer to terminate the coverage or (ii) notice from the professional
employer organization of the client's nonpayment of premium.
(d) No master
policy shall expire or lapse at the end of the policy period unless notice
of nonrenewal is given by the workers' compensation insurer to the compensation
court and to the professional employer organization. No master policy shall
expire or lapse until thirty days after giving such notices.
(e) Notice of the cancellation
or nonrenewal of a master policy or the termination of coverage for a client
or the employees of a client under such a policy shall be given by the professional
employer organization to the client within fifteen days after the cancellation,
nonrenewal, or termination unless replacement coverage has been obtained.
(7)(a) This
subsection applies to workers' compensation multiple coordinated policies
obtained by a professional employer organization.
(b) No cancellation of
a policy within the policy period shall be effective unless notice of the
cancellation is given by the workers' compensation insurer to the compensation
court, to the professional employer organization, and to the client employer.
No such cancellation shall be effective until thirty days after giving such
notices, except that the cancellation may be effective ten days after giving
such notices if such cancellation is based on (i) notice from the client to
the professional employer organization or the insurer to cancel the policy,
(ii) notice from the professional employer organization of the client's nonpayment
of premium or failure to reimburse deductibles for policies issued pursuant
to section 48-146.03, (iii) failure of the client, if covered pursuant to
section 44-3,158, to comply with sections 48-443 to 48-445, or (iv) for policies
issued pursuant to section 44-3,158, nonpayment of premium or failure to reimburse
deductibles for policies issued pursuant to section 48-146.03.
(c) No termination
of coverage for any employees of the client during the policy period shall
be effective unless notice is given by the workers' compensation insurer to
the compensation court, to the professional employer organization, and to
the client. No such termination of coverage shall be effective until thirty
days after giving such notices, except that the termination of coverage may
be effective ten days after the giving of such notices if such termination
is based on (i) notice from the client to the professional employer organization
or the insurer to terminate the coverage or (ii) notice from the professional
employer organization of the client's nonpayment of premium or failure to
reimburse deductibles for policies issued pursuant to section 48-146.03.
(d) No policy
shall expire or lapse at the end of the policy period unless notice of nonrenewal
is given by the workers' compensation insurer to the compensation court, to
the professional employer organization, and to the client. No policy shall
expire or lapse until thirty days after giving such notices, except that a
policy may expire or lapse ten days after the giving of such notices if the
nonrenewal is based on (i) notice from the client to the professional employer
organization or the insurer to not renew the policy, (ii) notice from the
professional employer organization of the client's nonpayment of premium or
failure to reimburse deductibles for policies issued pursuant to section 48-146.03,
(iii) failure of the client, if covered pursuant to section 44-3,158, to comply
with sections 48-443 to 48-445, or (iv) for policies issued pursuant to section 44-3,158, nonpayment of premium or failure to reimburse deductibles for policies
issued pursuant to section 48-146.03.
(e) An insurer may refrain from sending
notices required by this subsection to a professional employer organization's
client based upon the professional employer organization's representation
that coverage has been or will be replaced. Such representation shall not
absolve the insurer of its responsibility to continue coverage if such representation
proves inaccurate.
(8) Notwithstanding
other provisions of this section, if replacement workers'
compensation insurance coverage has
been secured with another workers' compensation insurer, then
the cancellation or nonrenewal of
the policy or the termination of coverage for a client or employees of a client
under the policy shall be effective as of the effective date of
such other insurance coverage.
(9) The notices required by
this section shall state the reason for the cancellation or nonrenewal of
the policy or termination of
coverage for a client or employees of a client under a policy.
(10) The notices required
by this section shall be provided in writing and shall be deemed given upon
the mailing of such notices by certified mail, except that notices from insurers
to the compensation court may be provided by electronic means if such electronic
means is approved by the administrator of the compensation court. If notice
is provided by electronic means pursuant to such an approval, it shall be
deemed given upon receipt and acceptance by the compensation court.
Source:Laws 1971, LB 572, § 13; Laws 1972, LB 1269, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 65; Laws 1994, LB 978, § 49; Laws 1994, LB 1222, § 61; Laws 1996, LB 1230, § 1; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 7; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 8; Laws 2007, LB117, § 33; Laws 2009, LB630, § 9; Laws 2010, LB579, § 15.
Annotations
Under subsection (10) of this section, an insurer need only prove that it sent a notice of cancellation to an employer by certified mail; the insurer's record of the certified mail tracking number used to send the notice itself was not sufficient to prove certified mail service. Greenwood v. J.J. Hooligan's, 297 Neb. 435, 899 N.W.2d 905 (2017).
Subsection (2) of this section applies only to an insurer's intent to nonrenew a policy and does not address either an employer's intent to not renew a policy for an additional term or nonrenewal by an employer through lapse at the end of the policy period due to the employer's nonpayment of a renewal premium. Brouilette v. DBV Enterprises, Inc., 9 Neb. App. 757, 619 N.W.2d 482 (2000).
48-144.04.
Reports; penalties for not filing; statutes of limitations not to run until report furnished.Any employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool who fails, neglects, or refuses to file any report required of him or her by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall be guilty of a Class II misdemeanor for each such failure, neglect, or refusal. It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to act as attorney for the state. In addition to the penalty, where an employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool has been given notice, or the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool has knowledge, of any injury or death of an employee and fails, neglects, or refuses to file a report thereof, the limitations in section 48-137 and for injuries occurring before December 1, 1997, the limitations in section 48-128 shall not begin to run against the claim of the injured employee or his or her dependents entitled to compensation or against the State of Nebraska on behalf of the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, or in favor of either the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool until such report shall have been furnished as required by the compensation court.
Source:Laws 1971, LB 572, § 14; Laws 1977, LB 40, § 271; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 66; Laws 1987, LB 398, § 43; Laws 1997, LB 854, § 3; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 7; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 9.
Cross References
Risk management pool, defined, see section 44-4303.
Annotations
Under this section, an employer has sufficient knowledge of an employee's injury if a reasonable person would conclude that an employee's injury is potentially compensable and that the employer should therefore investigate the matter further. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
This section establishes when the statute of limitations begins to run if an initial report required by section 48-144.01 is not filed, but this section does not provide for tolling of an already-running statute of limitations when and if subsequent reports are not filed. Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting & Painting, 266 Neb. 526, 667 N.W.2d 167 (2003).
48-145.
Employers; compensation insurance required; exceptions; effect of failure to comply; self-insurer; payments required; deposit with State Treasurer; credited to Compensation Court Cash Fund.To secure the payment of compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act:
(1) Every employer in the occupations described in section 48-106, except the State of Nebraska and any governmental agency created by the state, shall either (a) insure and keep insured its liability under such act in some corporation, association, or organization authorized and licensed to transact the business of workers' compensation insurance in this state, (b) in the case of an employer who is a lessor of one or more commercial vehicles leased to a self-insured motor carrier, be a party to an effective agreement with the self-insured motor carrier under section 48-115.02, (c) be a member of a risk management pool authorized and providing group self-insurance of workers' compensation liability pursuant to the Intergovernmental Risk Management Act, or (d) with approval of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, self-insure its workers' compensation liability.
An employer seeking approval to self-insure shall make application to the compensation court in the form and manner as the compensation court may prescribe, meet such minimum standards as the compensation court shall adopt and promulgate by rule and regulation, and furnish to the compensation court satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct the compensation in the amount and manner when due as provided for in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Approval is valid for the period prescribed by the compensation court unless earlier revoked pursuant to this subdivision or subsection (1) of section 48-146.02. Notwithstanding subdivision (1)(d) of this section, a professional employer organization shall not be eligible to self-insure its workers' compensation liability. The compensation court may by rule and regulation require the deposit of an acceptable security, indemnity, trust, or bond to secure the payment of compensation liabilities as they are incurred. The agreement or document creating a trust for use under this section shall contain a provision that the trust may only be terminated upon the consent and approval of the compensation court. Any beneficial interest in the trust principal shall be only for the benefit of the past or present employees of the self-insurer and any persons to whom the self-insurer has agreed to pay benefits under subdivision (11) of section 48-115 and section 48-115.02. Any limitation on the termination of a trust and all other restrictions on the ownership or transfer of beneficial interest in the trust assets contained in such agreement or document creating the trust shall be enforceable, except that any limitation or restriction shall be enforceable only if authorized and approved by the compensation court and specifically delineated in the agreement or document. The trustee of any trust created to satisfy the requirements of this section may invest the trust assets in the same manner authorized under subdivisions (1)(a) through (i) of section 30-3209 for corporate trustees holding retirement or pension funds for the benefit of employees or former employees of cities, villages, school districts, or governmental or political subdivisions, except that the trustee shall not invest trust assets into stocks, bonds, or other obligations of the trustor. If, as a result of such investments, the value of the trust assets is reduced below the acceptable trust amount required by the compensation court, then the trustor shall deposit additional trust assets to account for the shortfall.
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, a three-judge panel of the compensation court may, after notice and hearing, revoke approval as a self-insurer if it finds that the financial condition of the self-insurer or the failure of the self-insurer to comply with an obligation under the act poses a serious threat to the public health, safety, or welfare. The Attorney General, when requested by the administrator of the compensation court, may file a motion pursuant to section 48-162.03 for an order directing a self-insurer to appear before a three-judge panel of the compensation court and show cause as to why the panel should not revoke approval as a self-insurer pursuant to this subdivision. The Attorney General shall be considered a party for purposes of such motion. The Attorney General may appear before the three-judge panel and present evidence that the financial condition of the self-insurer or the failure of the self-insurer to comply with an obligation under the act poses a serious threat to the public health, safety, or welfare. The presiding judge shall rule on a motion of the Attorney General pursuant to this subdivision and, if applicable, shall appoint judges of the compensation court to serve on the three-judge panel. The presiding judge shall not serve on such panel. Appeal from a revocation pursuant to this subdivision shall be in accordance with section 48-185. No such appeal shall operate as a supersedeas unless the self-insurer executes to the compensation court a bond with one or more sureties authorized to do business within the State of Nebraska in an amount determined by the three-judge panel to be sufficient to satisfy the obligations of the self-insurer under the act;
(2) An approved self-insurer shall furnish to the State Treasurer an annual amount equal to two and one-half percent of the prospective loss costs for like employment but in no event less than twenty-five dollars. Prospective loss costs is defined in section 48-151. The compensation court is the sole judge as to the prospective loss costs that shall be used. All money which a self-insurer is required to pay to the State Treasurer, under this subdivision, shall be computed and tabulated under oath as of January 1 and paid to the State Treasurer immediately thereafter. The compensation court or designee of the compensation court may audit the payroll of a self-insurer at the compensation court's discretion. All money paid by a self-insurer under this subdivision shall be credited to the Compensation Court Cash Fund;
(3) Every employer who fails, neglects, or refuses to comply with the conditions set forth in subdivision (1) or (2) of this section shall be required to respond in damages to an employee for personal injuries, or when personal injuries result in the death of an employee, then to his or her dependents; and
(4) Any security, indemnity, trust, or bond provided by a self-insurer pursuant to subdivision (1) of this section shall be deemed a surety for the purposes of the payment of valid claims of the self-insurer's employees and the persons to whom the self-insurer has agreed to pay benefits under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act pursuant to subdivision (11) of section 48-115 and section 48-115.02 as generally provided in the act.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 46, p. 599; R.S.1913, § 3687; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 21, p. 215; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 1, p. 528; C.S.1922, § 3069; C.S.1929, § 48-146; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 31, p. 202; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-146; R.S.1943, § 48-145; Laws 1957, c. 205, § 1, p. 723; Laws 1963, c. 286, § 1, p. 860;
Laws 1971, LB 572, § 8; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 67; Laws 1988, LB 1146, § 1; Laws 1997, LB 474, § 4; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 9; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 8; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 8; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 10; Laws 2010, LB579, § 16; Laws 2015, LB480, § 4; Laws 2023, LB191, § 7.
Cross References
Intergovernmental Risk Management Act, see section 44-4301.
Annotations
A cause of action for retaliatory demotion exists when an employer demotes an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim. Trosper v. Bag 'N Save, 273 Neb. 855, 734 N.W.2d 703 (2007).
Nebraska recognizes a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine to allow an action for retaliatory discharge when an employee has been discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim. Jackson v. Morris Communications Corp., 265 Neb. 423, 657 N.W.2d 634 (2003).
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, where employee alleges that employer has failed to maintain workers' compensation insurance and employer introduces no evidence to refute employee's allegation, district court may exercise jurisdiction over employee's petition for damages for personal injuries sustained by employee in course of working for employer. Schweitzer v. American Nat. Red Cross, 256 Neb. 350, 591 N.W.2d 524 (1999).
Under Nebraska statute, any workmen's compensation policy is required to cover all of the employer's liability and all compensation awarded under the act. Neeman v. Otoe County, 186 Neb. 370, 183 N.W.2d 269 (1971).
Owner of building used in conducting owner's business who contracts for certain repairs to said building is an employer within act, unless the contractor was required to procure compensation insurance for protection of his employees. New Masonic Temple Assn. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 134 Neb. 731, 279 N.W. 475 (1938).
Where petition did not show when contract of employment was made, failure to allege election or failure to procure insurance in common-law action for damages did not require dismissal of suit. Smith v. Fall, 122 Neb. 783, 241 N.W. 560 (1932).
Noninsuring employer cannot take advantage of his own default to detriment of employee. Dietz Club v. Niehaus, 110 Neb. 154, 193 N.W. 344 (1923).
Noninsuring employer is liable either for damages at common law or for compensation, at employee's option. Avre v. Sexton, 110 Neb. 149, 193 N.W. 342 (1923).
Provision that employer must insure or furnish proof of ability to pay compensation is constitutional. Nedela v. Mares Auto Co., 110 Neb. 108, 193 N.W. 345 (1923).
Defense that plaintiff employee had waived right to sue at common law by accepting payment of hospital and doctor bill was not sustained. Brown v. York Water Co., 104 Neb. 516, 177 N.W. 833 (1920).
48-145.01.
Employers;
compensation required; penalty for failure to comply; injunction; Attorney
General; duties.(1) Any employer required to secure
the payment of compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act who
willfully fails to secure the payment of such compensation shall be guilty
of a Class I misdemeanor. If the employer is a corporation, limited liability
company, or limited liability partnership, any officer, member, manager, partner,
or employee who had authority to secure payment of compensation on behalf
of the employer and willfully failed to do so shall be individually guilty
of a Class I misdemeanor and shall be personally liable jointly and severally
with such employer for any compensation which may accrue under the act in
respect to any injury which may occur to any employee of such employer while
it so fails to secure the payment of compensation as required by section 48-145.
(2) If an employer subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation
Act fails to secure the payment of compensation as required by section 48-145,
the employer may be enjoined from doing business in this state until the employer
complies with subdivision (1) of section 48-145. If a temporary injunction
is granted at the request of the State of Nebraska, no bond shall be required
to make the injunction effective. The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court
or the district court may order an employer who willfully fails to secure
the payment of compensation to pay a monetary penalty of not more than one
thousand dollars for each violation. For purposes of this subsection, each
day of continued failure to secure the payment of compensation as required
by section 48-145 constitutes a separate violation. If the employer is a corporation,
limited liability company, or limited liability partnership, any officer,
member, manager, partner, or employee who had authority to secure payment
of compensation on behalf of the employer and willfully failed to do so shall
be personally liable jointly and severally with the employer for such monetary
penalty. All penalties collected pursuant to this subsection shall be remitted
to the State Treasurer for distribution in accordance with Article VII, section
5, of the Constitution of Nebraska.
(3) It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to act as
attorney for the State of Nebraska for purposes of this section. The Attorney
General may file a motion pursuant to section 48-162.03 for an order directing
an employer to appear before a judge of the compensation court and show cause
as to why a monetary penalty should not be assessed against the employer pursuant
to subsection (2) of this section. The Attorney General shall be considered
a party for purposes of such motion. The Attorney General may appear before
the compensation court and present evidence of a violation or violations pursuant
to subsection (2) of this section and the identity of the person who had authority
to secure the payment of compensation. Appeal from an order of a judge of
the compensation court pursuant to subsection (2) of this section shall be
in accordance with sections 48-182 and 48-185.
Source:Laws 1971, LB 572, § 18; Laws 1977, LB 40, § 272; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 68; Laws 1993, LB 121, § 283; Laws 1999, LB 331, § 1; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 9; Laws 2011, LB151, § 2.
Annotations
The word "willfully" herein is that failure by act or omission to act done knowingly and intentionally. Schademann v. Casey, 194 Neb. 149, 231 N.W.2d 116 (1975).
48-145.02.
Employers; reports required.Every employer shall upon request of the administrator of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court report to the administrator (1) the number of its employees and the nature and location of their work, (2) the name of the workers' compensation insurer with whom the employer has insured its liability under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and the number and date of expiration of such policy, and (3) the employer's federal employer identification number or numbers. Failure to furnish such report within ten days from the making of a request by certified or registered mail shall constitute presumptive evidence that the delinquent employer is violating section 48-145.01.
48-145.03.
Employers; other liabilities not affected.Sections 48-125.01, 48-145.01, and 48-145.02 shall not affect any other liability of the employer under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
48-145.04.
Self-insurance; assessment; payments.(1) The administrator of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall, prior to January 1 of each year, estimate as closely as possible the actual cost to the court of evaluating an application for self-insurance and supervising and administering the self-insurance program for the ensuing year and assess the amount thereof, but not to exceed two thousand dollars, against each applicant for self-insurance in this state. Such assessment shall be in addition to the payments required by subdivision (2) of section 48-145 and section 48-1,114. The administrator shall notify each applicant of the amount of the individual assessment. Such assessment shall be due and payable with the application for self-insurance. If any assessment is not paid, the application shall not be considered.
(2) All payments received under subsection (1) of this section shall be remitted to the State Treasurer for credit to the Compensation Court Cash Fund. Such payments shall be expended solely for evaluating applications for self-insurance and to aid in supervising and administering the self-insurance program. After the first year, the balance remaining of such payments at the time each annual assessment is made shall be taken into account when the total assessment for the ensuing year is made.
Source:Laws 1986, LB 1036, § 1; Laws 1992, LB 1006, § 93;
Laws 1993, LB 757, § 13; Laws 1999, LB 2, § 1; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 9; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 11.
48-146.
Compensation
insurance; provisions required; approval by Department of Insurance; effect
of bankruptcy.No policy of insurance against
liability arising under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be issued
and no agreement pursuant to section 44-4304 providing group self-insurance
coverage of workers' compensation liability by a risk management pool shall
have any force or effect unless it contains the agreement of the workers'
compensation insurer or risk management pool that it will promptly pay to
the person entitled to the same all benefits conferred by such act, and all
installments of the compensation that may be awarded or agreed upon, and that
the obligation shall not be affected by the insolvency or bankruptcy of the
employer or his or her estate or discharge therein or by any default of the employer after the injury, or by any default
in the giving of any notice required by such policy, or otherwise. Such agreement
shall be construed to be a direct promise by the workers' compensation insurer
or risk management pool to the person entitled to compensation enforceable
in his or her name. Each workers' compensation insurance policy and each agreement
forming a risk management pool shall be deemed to be made subject to the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Act. No corporation, association, or organization shall
enter into a workers' compensation insurance policy unless copies of such
forms have been filed with and approved by the Department of Insurance. Each
workers' compensation insurance policy and each agreement pursuant to section 44-4304 providing group self-insurance coverage of workers' compensation liability
by a risk management pool shall contain a clause to the effect (1) that as
between the employer and the workers' compensation insurer or risk management
pool the notice to or knowledge of the occurrence of the injury on the part
of the employer shall be deemed notice
or knowledge, as the case may be, on the part of the insurer or risk management
pool, (2) that jurisdiction of the employer for the purpose of
such act shall be jurisdiction of the insurer or risk management pool, and
(3) that the insurer or risk management pool shall in all things be bound
by the awards, judgments, or decrees rendered against such employer.
Except when the Professional Employer Organization Registration Act allows
coverage to be limited to co-employees as specified in a professional employer
agreement, each workers' compensation insurance policy and each
agreement providing such group self-insurance coverage shall include within
its terms the payment of compensation to all employees who are within the
scope and purview of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, including potential new or unknown employees.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 47, p. 599; R.S.1913, § 3688; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 22, p. 215; C.S.1922, § 3070; C.S.1929, § 48-147; Laws 1933, c. 91, § 1, p. 364; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 32, p. 203; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-147; R.S.1943, § 48-146; Laws 1949, c. 162, § 1, p. 415; Laws 1967, c. 291, § 2, p. 795;
Laws 1971, LB 572, § 9; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 71; Laws 1987, LB 398, § 44; Laws 1988, LB 1146, § 2; Laws 1997, LB 474, § 5; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 10; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 11; Laws 2010, LB579, § 17.
Cross References
Construction of section, see section 48-115.01.
Professional Employer Organization Registration Act, see section 48-2701.
Risk management pool, defined, see section 44-4303.
Annotations
1. Employer and insurer relationship
2. Miscellaneous
1. Employer and insurer relationship
Absent fraud or collusion, insurers in privity with their insureds will be bound by a judgment against the insured, regardless of whether the insurer was notified of the underlying action. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 274 Neb. 906, 744 N.W.2d 693 (2008).
The provisions of this section requiring that policies insuring liability arising under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act provide that jurisdiction over the insured shall be jurisdiction over the insurer and that the insurer shall in all things be bound by the awards, judgments, or decrees rendered against the insured, do not authorize the compensation court to ignore the separate identities of the insured and insurer. Rodriquez v. Prime Meat Processors, 228 Neb. 55, 421 N.W.2d 32 (1988).
Joinder of employer for purpose of subrogation was for benefit of insurance carrier. American Province Real Estate Corp. v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 178 Neb. 348, 133 N.W.2d 466 (1965).
Insurance carrier is directly liable to an accidentally injured employee of the insured. Ramsey v. Kramer Motors, Inc., 155 Neb. 584, 52 N.W.2d 799 (1952).
Agreement made between employee and adjuster for the insurance company is not binding on employer so as to toll statute of limitations. Hill v. Hinky-Dinky Stores Co., 133 Neb. 147, 274 N.W. 455 (1937).
Statute provides insurer and insured are jointly liable, and defenses, waived by voluntary appearance of insured, are extended to insurer. Collins v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 123 Neb. 227, 242 N.W. 457 (1932).
Reasonable agreement by employer with injured employee binds insurance carrier. Bailey v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 99 Neb. 109, 155 N.W. 237 (1915).
Notice to the insured-employer is binding on the insurer. Snowden v. Helget Gas Products, 15 Neb. App. 33, 721 N.W.2d 362 (2006).
2. Miscellaneous
Insurance company having written new policy is liable for entire loss even though notice of cancellation of former policy not filed within time limit set by rule of Workmen's Compensation Court. Neeman v. Otoe County, 186 Neb. 370, 183 N.W.2d 269 (1971).
Insurance carrier is a proper party defendant. Peek v. Ayers Auto Supply, 157 Neb. 363, 59 N.W.2d 564 (1953).
Agreement to pay compensation which was not approved by compensation commissioner or compensation court was void. Duncan v. A. Hospe Co., 133 Neb. 810, 277 N.W. 339 (1938).
The requirement contained in this section that each workers' compensation insurance policy covers all employees within the purview of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act overrides an insurance policy provision which excludes any such employee from coverage. Kruid v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Neb. App. 687, 770 N.W.2d 652 (2009).
48-146.01.
Transferred to section 44-3,158.
48-146.02.
Insurance provider; risk management pool; suspension or revocation of authority to provide compensation insurance; Attorney General; duties; grounds.(1)(a) If a three-judge panel of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court finds, after due notice and hearing at which the workers' compensation insurer is entitled to be heard and present evidence, that such insurer has failed to comply with an obligation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice to engage in that type of conduct, the three-judge panel may request the Director of Insurance to suspend or revoke the authorization of such insurer to write workers' compensation insurance under the provisions of Chapter 44 and such act. Such suspension or revocation shall not affect the liability of any such insurer under policies in force prior to the suspension or revocation.
(b) If a three-judge panel of the compensation court finds, after due notice and hearing at which the risk management pool is entitled to be heard and present evidence, that such pool has failed to comply with an obligation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, as set out in subsection (1) of section 44-4319, with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice to engage in that type of conduct, the three-judge panel may suspend or revoke the authority of the pool to provide group self-insurance coverage of workers' compensation liability pursuant to the Intergovernmental Risk Management Act. Such suspension or revocation shall not affect the liability of any such risk management pool under the terms of the agreement forming the pool in force prior to the suspension or revocation.
(c) If a three-judge panel of the compensation court finds, after due notice and hearing at which the self-insurer is entitled to be heard and present evidence, that such self-insurer has failed to comply with an obligation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice to engage in that type of conduct, the three-judge panel may revoke the approval of such self-insurer to provide self-insurance coverage of workers' compensation liability pursuant to section 48-145. Such revocation shall not affect the liability of any such self-insurer under an approval by the compensation court to self-insure in force prior to the revocation.
(d) The Attorney General, when requested by the administrator of the compensation court, may file a motion pursuant to section 48-162.03 for an order directing a workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insurer to appear before a three-judge panel of the compensation court and show cause as to why the panel should not take action pursuant to this subsection. The Attorney General shall be considered a party for purposes of such motion. The Attorney General may appear before the three-judge panel and present evidence that the workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insurer has failed to comply with an obligation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice to engage in that type of conduct. The presiding judge shall rule on a motion of the Attorney General pursuant to this subdivision and, if applicable, shall appoint judges of the compensation court to serve on the three-judge panel. The presiding judge shall not serve on such panel.
(e) Appeal from an action by a three-judge panel of the compensation court pursuant to subdivision (1)(b) or (1)(c) of this section shall be in accordance with section 48-185.
(2) In addition to any other obligations under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, the following acts or practices, when committed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice to engage in that type of conduct, shall subject the workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insurer to action pursuant to subsection (1) of this section:
(a) Knowingly misrepresenting relevant facts or the provisions of the act or any rule or regulation adopted pursuant to such act;
(b) Failing to acknowledge with reasonable promptness pertinent communications with respect to claims arising under the act;
(c) Failing to promptly investigate claims arising under the act;
(d) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable payment of benefits when compensability has become reasonably clear;
(e) Refusing to pay benefits without conducting a reasonable investigation;
(f) Failing to affirm or deny compensability of a claim within a reasonable time after having completed the investigation related to such claim;
(g) Paying substantially less than amounts owed under the act where there is no reasonable controversy;
(h) Making payment to an injured employee, beneficiary of a deceased employee, or provider of medical, surgical, or hospital services without providing a reasonable and accurate explanation of the basis for the payment;
(i) Unreasonably delaying the investigation or payment of benefits by knowingly requiring excessive verification or duplication of information;
(j) Failing, in the case of the denial of compensability or the denial, change in, or termination of benefits, to promptly provide a reasonable and accurate explanation of the basis for such action to the injured employee or beneficiary of a deceased employee;
(k) Failing, in the case of the denial of payment for medical, surgical, or hospital services, to promptly provide a reasonable and accurate explanation of the basis for such action to the provider of such services; or
(l) Failing to provide the compensation court's address and telephone number to an injured employee or beneficiary of a deceased employee with instructions to contact the court for further information:
(i) At or near the time the workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insurer receives notice or has knowledge of the injury; and
(ii) At or near the time of the denial of compensability or the denial, change in, or termination of benefits.
(3) In order to determine compliance with obligations under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, the compensation court or its designee may examine the workers' compensation records of (a) a workers' compensation insurer, a risk management pool, or a self-insurer or (b) an adjuster, a third-party administrator, or other agent acting on behalf of such workers' compensation insurer, risk management pool, or self-insurer. The authority of the compensation court pursuant to this subsection is subject to the limitations provided under the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege as recognized in Nebraska law.
(4) The compensation court may adopt and promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement this section.
Source:Laws 1971, LB 572, § 16; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 73; Laws 1987, LB 398, § 45; Laws 1999, LB 331, § 2; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 12.
Cross References
Intergovernmental Risk Management Act, see section 44-4301.
Risk management pool, defined, see section 44-4303.
48-146.03.
Workers' compensation insurance policy; deductible options; exception; liability; insurer; duties; prohibited acts; violation; penalty.(1) Each workers' compensation insurance policy issued by an insurer pursuant to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act:
(a) Shall offer, at the option of the insured employer, a deductible for medical benefits in the amount of five hundred dollars to two thousand five hundred dollars per claim in increments of five hundred dollars; or
(b) May offer, at the option of the insured employer and the workers' compensation insurer, a deductible for all amounts paid by the insurer as long as the deductible is not more than forty percent of the insured employer's otherwise applicable annual workers' compensation insurance premium at rates approved for the insurer but not less than fifty thousand dollars.
The insured employer, if choosing to exercise one of such options listed in this subsection, may choose only one of the amounts as the deductible. The provisions of this section shall be fully disclosed to each prospective purchaser in writing.
(2) The deductible form shall provide that the workers' compensation insurer shall remain liable for and shall pay the entire cost of medical benefits for each claim directly to the medical provider, shall remain liable for and pay the entire cost of benefits, claims, and expenses as required by the policy irrespective of the deductible provision, and shall then be reimbursed by the employer for any deductible amounts paid by the workers' compensation insurer. The employer shall be liable for reimbursement up to the limit of the deductible.
(3) A workers' compensation insurer shall not be required to offer a deductible if, as a result of a credit investigation, the insurer determines that the employer does not have the financial ability to be responsible for the payment of deductible amounts.
(4) A workers' compensation insurer shall service and, if necessary, defend all claims that arise during the policy period, including those claims payable in whole or in part from the deductible amount, and shall make such reports to the compensation court of payments made, including payments made under the deductible provisions, as may be required by the compensation court.
(5) A person who is employed by a policyholder which chooses to exercise the option of a deductible policy shall not be required to pay any of the deductible amount, and any such policyholder shall not require or attempt to require the employee to give up his or her right of selection of physician set out in section 48-120. Any violation of this subsection shall be a Class II misdemeanor.
48-147.
Liability insurance; existing contract; effect of law; violations; penalty.Nothing in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall affect any existing contract for employers liability insurance, or affect the organization of any mutual or other insurance company, or any arrangement existing between employers and employees, providing for payment to such employees, their families, dependents, or representatives, sick, accident, or death benefits in addition to the compensation provided for by such act; but liability for compensation under such act shall not be reduced or affected by any insurance of the injured employee, or any contribution or other benefit whatsoever, due to or received by the person entitled to such compensation, and the person so entitled shall, irrespective of any insurance or other contract, have the right to recover the same directly from the employer, and in addition thereto, the right to enforce in his or her own name in the manner provided in section 48-146 the liability of any insurer who may, in whole or in part, have insured the liability for such compensation. Payment in whole or in part of such compensation by either the employer or the insurer, as the case may be, shall, to the extent thereof, be a bar to recovery against the other of the amount so paid. No agreement by an employee to pay any portion of premium paid by his or her employer or to contribute to a benefit fund or department maintained by such employer for the purpose of providing compensation as required by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act shall be valid, and any employer who makes a deduction for such purpose from the pay of any employee entitled to the benefits of such act shall be guilty of a Class II misdemeanor. Nothing in this section invalidates or prohibits agreements pursuant to subdivision (11) of section 48-115 or section 48-115.02.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 48, p. 600; R.S.1913, § 3689; C.S.1922, § 3071; C.S.1929, § 48-148; R.S.1943, § 48-147;
Laws 1971, LB 572, § 10; Laws 1977, LB 40, § 273; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 74; Laws 1997, LB 474, § 6; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 11.
Annotations
Pension benefits made under city ordinance did not affect the right of plaintiff to claim and receive under Workmen's Compensation Act. Novotny v. City of Omaha, 207 Neb. 535, 299 N.W.2d 757 (1980).
Receipt and acceptance of workmen's compensation does not bar city fireman from right to fireman's pension. City of Lincoln v. Steffensmeyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938).
Widow of city fireman, who had received pension, was not barred thereby from claiming compensation for accidental death. Shandy v. City of Omaha, 127 Neb. 406, 255 N.W. 477 (1934).
Payment of private insurance benefits, even if made pursuant to an employer-funded plan, does not entitle an employer to reduce an employee's benefits due under the Workers' Compensation Act. Nunn v. Texaco Trading & Transp., 3 Neb. App. 101, 523 N.W.2d 705 (1994).
48-148.
Compensation; action to recover; release of claim at law.If any employee, or his or her dependents in case of death, of any employer subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act files any claim with, or accepts any payment from such employer, or from any insurance company carrying such risk, on account of personal injury, or makes any agreement, or submits any question to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court under such act, such action shall constitute a release to such employer of all claims or demands at law, if any, arising from such injury.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 49, p. 600; R.S.1913, § 3690; C.S.1922, § 3072; C.S.1929, § 48-149; R.S.1943, § 48-148; Laws 1955, c. 186, § 5, p. 534;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 75.
Annotations
1. Exclusive remedy
2. Indemnity
3. Miscellaneous
1. Exclusive remedy
When an employee is compensated for the inability to work due to a physical injury that arose out of and in the course of employment, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for refusing to return the injured employee to suitable work and the employee cannot seek additional remedies under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act for terminating his or her employment on the basis of the disability caused by the same workplace injury. Dutcher v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 312 Neb. 405, 979 N.W.2d 245 (2022).
Under this section, a surviving husband's claim for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress against his deceased wife's employer was barred by the employer immunity provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act because he accepted compensation from the employer as his deceased wife's dependent, he settled with and released the employer, and his claim arose from his deceased wife's injury as the phrase "arise from such injury" is used in this section. Pittman v. Western Engineering Co., 283 Neb. 913, 813 N.W.2d 487 (2012).
A public utility employee cannot maintain a separate suit against a city for an injury incurred on the job, because the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy of the injured public utility employee against the city where the public utility is an agency or department of the city. Hofferber v. City of Hastings, 275 Neb. 503, 747 N.W.2d 389 (2008).
Section 48-111 and this section are routinely referred to by the Nebraska Supreme Court as the "exclusivity" provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Bennett v. Saint Elizabeth Health Sys., 273 Neb. 300, 729 N.W.2d 80 (2007).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is an employee's exclusive remedy against an employer when the employee's injury was both incurred "in the course of employment" and "arose out of employment". Skinner v. Ogallala Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 262 Neb. 387, 631 N.W.2d 510 (2001).
The Workers' Compensation Act is an employee's exclusive remedy against an employer for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Tompkins v. Raines, 247 Neb. 764, 530 N.W.2d 244 (1995).
2. Indemnity
When an employer, liable to an employee under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, agrees to indemnify a third party for a loss sustained as the result of the third party's payment to the indemnitor's employee, the employer's exclusion from liability accorded by the Workers' Compensation Act does not preclude the third party's action to enforce the indemnity agreement with the indemnitor-employer. Jacobs Engr. Group v. ConAgra Foods, 301 Neb. 38, 917 N.W.2d 435 (2018); Oddo v. Speedway Scaffold Co., 233 Neb. 1, 443 N.W.2d 596 (1989); Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Kaiser Ag. Chem. Co., 229 Neb. 160, 425 N.W.2d 872 (1988).
Workmen's Compensation Act bars action by third party tort-feasor against employer for contribution or indemnity based on claim arising from the injury. Vangreen v. Interstate Machinery & Supply Co., 197 Neb. 29, 246 N.W.2d 652 (1976).
3. Miscellaneous
Nebraska does not recognize an exception that would allow a third party to seek contribution from an employer when it is alleged that the employer acted intentionally. Harsh International v. Monfort Indus., 266 Neb. 82, 662 N.W.2d 574 (2003).
If a person files a claim against his employer in the Workmen's Compensation Court for an injury which did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, he does not thereby release his employer from liability for a tort. Marlow v. Maple Manor Apartments, 193 Neb. 654, 228 N.W.2d 303 (1975).
Employee's acceptance of benefits under Workmen's Compensation Act ordinarily constitutes release to employer of claims at law arising from the injury. Edelman v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing, Inc., 189 Neb. 763, 205 N.W.2d 340 (1973).
48-148.01.
Denial of compensation; false representation.No compensation shall be allowed if, at the time of or in the course of entering into employment or at the time of receiving notice of the removal of conditions from a conditional offer of employment: (1) The employee knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his or her physical or medical condition by acknowledging in writing that he or she is able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation based upon the employer's written job description; (2) the employer relied upon the false representation and the reliance was a substantial factor in the hiring; and (3) a causal connection existed between the false representation and the injury.
48-148.02.
Debt collection; limitations; notice; contents; delivery; Attorney General; ensure compliance; stay of lawsuits; effect on statute of limitations.(1) After receipt of the notices provided for in this section, no debt collection shall be undertaken by a provider of services, supplier of services, collection agency, collector, or creditor attempting to collect a debt incurred against an employee or his or her spouse for treatment of a work-related injury while the matter is pending in the compensation court until final adjudication of the case regarding such debt.
(2) Notice under this section shall be made in writing and provided to each provider of services, supplier of services, collection agency, collector, or creditor as described in subsection (1) of this section. Notice shall not be imputed to any party from the service of notice upon another party.
(3) The initial notice shall contain the provider's name, employee's name, date of the injury, and a description of the injury, together with the filing date and case number pending in the compensation court. Within thirty days after the initial notice, an additional notice shall be provided specifically identifying the debt upon which collection should be stayed, unless identification was made in the initial notice. Notice shall be void if it fails to provide the proper information or is not provided within the required timeframes, or until proper notice is provided.
(4) Notice shall be made by personally delivering the notice to the person on whom it is to be served or by sending it by first-class mail addressed to the person or business entity on whom it is to be served at his or her residence or the principal office address of a business entity, or by a method otherwise agreed to between the parties. Each provider, supplier, collection agency, collector, or creditor shall not be deemed to be notified under this section unless receipt of the notice can be demonstrated.
(5) If collection efforts continue after both notices are received by the entity seeking to collect, the notices may be forwarded to the Attorney General requesting his or her assistance in gaining compliance with this act. The entity seeking to collect shall be copied on such notification to the Attorney General, and shall be given a reasonable period of time to respond to the notice and to cure any noncompliance. If noncompliance continues, the Attorney General may take such reasonable steps as is necessary to ensure compliance with this section. No private cause of action shall exist under this section. A violation of this section shall not be considered a violation of any other state or federal law.
(6) After notice is provided, collection lawsuits may be stayed, where applicable, by the plaintiff in a pending collection case, until final adjudication by the compensation court of the matter of the debt alleged to be subject to this section.
(7) The statute of limitations on the collection of such debt shall be tolled during the pendency of the compensation case from the date the case was filed with the compensation court.
(8) This section shall have no applicability outside of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and shall not apply to any other cause of action under state or federal law.
48-149.
Compensation payments; nonassignable; not subject to attachment; exceptions.No proceeds or interest thereon from payments or lump-sum settlements under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act or law of another state which provides compensation and benefits for employees sustaining job-related injuries shall be assignable, subject to attachment or garnishment, or held liable in any way for any debts, except (1) as provided in section 48-108 and (2) payments under the act or any law of another state which provides compensation and benefits for employees sustaining job-related injuries shall be subject to income withholding under the Income Withholding for Child Support Act, administrative attachment and bank matching pursuant to sections 43-3328 to 43-3339, and garnishment by a county attorney or authorized attorney pursuant to section 43-512.03 or garnishment for child support as defined in section 43-1705 by an obligee as defined in section 43-1713.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 50, p. 600; R.S.1913, § 3691; C.S.1922, § 3073; C.S.1929, § 48-150; R.S.1943, § 48-149;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 76; Laws 1993, LB 523, § 24; Laws 1993, LB 118, § 2; Laws 1997, LB 752, § 124.
Cross References
Income Withholding for Child Support Act, see section 43-1701.
48-150.
Compensation claims; same preference as wage claims.The right to compensation and all compensation awarded any injured employee or for death claims to his or her dependents in any amount shall have the same preference against the assets of the employer as unpaid wages for labor, but such compensation shall not become a lien on the property of third persons by reason of such preference.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 51, p. 600; R.S.1913, § 3692; C.S.1922, § 3074; C.S.1929, § 48-151; R.S.1943, § 48-150;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 77.
48-151.
Terms, defined.Throughout the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, the following
words and phrases shall be considered to have the following meaning, respectively,
unless the context clearly indicates a different meaning in the construction
used:
(1) Physician means any person licensed to practice medicine
and surgery, osteopathic medicine, chiropractic, podiatry, or dentistry in
the State of Nebraska or in the state in which the physician is practicing;
(2) Accident means an unexpected or unforeseen injury happening
suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the
time objective symptoms of an injury. The claimant has the burden of proof
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that such unexpected or unforeseen
injury was in fact caused by the employment. There is no presumption from
the mere occurrence of such unexpected or unforeseen injury that the injury
was in fact caused by the employment;
(3) Occupational disease means only a disease which is due
to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular
trade, occupation, process, or employment and excludes all ordinary diseases
of life to which the general public is exposed;
(4) Injury and personal injuries mean only violence to the
physical structure of the body and such disease or infection as naturally
results therefrom and personal
injuries described in section 48-101.01. The terms include disablement
resulting from occupational disease arising out of and in the course of the
employment in which the employee was engaged and which was contracted in such
employment. The terms include an aggravation of a preexisting occupational
disease, the employer being liable only for the degree of aggravation of the
preexisting occupational disease. The terms do not include disability or death
due to natural causes but occurring while the employee is at work and do not
include an injury, disability, or death that is the result of a natural progression
of any preexisting condition;
(5) Death, when mentioned as a basis for the right to compensation,
means only death resulting from such violence and its resultant effects or
from occupational disease;
(6) Without otherwise affecting either the meaning or the
interpretation of the abridged clause, personal injuries arising out of and
in the course of employment, it is hereby declared not to cover workers except
while engaged in, on, or about the premises where their duties are being performed
or where their service requires their presence as a part of such service at
the time of the injury and during the hours of service as such workers, and
not to cover workers who on their own initiative leave their line of duty
or hours of employment for purposes of their own. Property maintained by an
employer is considered the premises of such employer for purposes of determining
whether the injury arose out of employment;
(7) Willful negligence consists of (a) a deliberate act,
(b) such conduct as evidences reckless indifference to safety, or (c) intoxication
at the time of the injury, such intoxication being without the consent, knowledge,
or acquiescence of the employer or the employer's agent;
(8) Intoxication includes, but is not limited to, being under
the influence of a controlled substance not prescribed by a physician;
(9) Prospective loss costs means prospective loss costs as
defined in section 44-7504 and prepared, filed, or distributed by an advisory
organization which has been issued a certificate of authority pursuant to
section 44-7518;
(10) Client
means client as defined in section 48-2702;
(11) Professional employer organization
means professional employer organization as defined in section 48-2702;
(12) Multiple
coordinated policy means multiple coordinated policy as defined in section 48-2702;
(13) Master policy means master policy as defined in section 48-2702;
and
(14) Whenever in the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Act the singular is used, the plural is considered included;
when the masculine gender is used, the feminine is considered included.
Source:Laws 1913, c. 198, § 52, p. 601; R.S.1913, § 3693; Laws 1917, c. 85, § 23, p. 216; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 1, p. 528; C.S.1922, § 3075; C.S.1929, § 48-152; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 42, p. 211; Laws 1937, c. 107, § 1, p. 367; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-152; Laws 1943, c. 113, § 3, p. 398; R.S.1943, § 48-151; Laws 1947, c. 174, § 2, p. 560; Laws 1963, c. 284, § 3, p. 852; Laws 1963, c. 287, § 1, p. 862;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 78; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 15; Laws 1998, LB 1010, § 4; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 12; Laws 2000, LB 1119, § 40; Laws 2010, LB579, § 18; Laws 2010, LB780, § 2.
Annotations
1. Accident
2. Injury and personal injuries
3. Arising out of and in course of employment
4. Reckless indifference to safety
5. Willful negligence
6. Miscellaneous
1. Accident
An employee's death from asphyxiation, after entering a grain bin at his workplace in violation of safety regulations and then becoming engulfed in grain, was the result of an "accident" covered by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, even though the employer willfully violated the Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations. Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Co-op Assn., 286 Neb. 1, 834 N.W.2d 236 (2013).
A worker's noise-induced hearing loss is a condition resulting from the cumulative effects of work-related trauma, tested under the statutory definition of accident. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
An injured worker must satisfy three elements to prove an injury is the result of an accident: (1) The injury must be unexpected or unforeseen, (2) the accident must happen suddenly and violently, and (3) the accident must produce at the time objective symptoms of injury. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
The compensability of a condition resulting from the cumulative effects of work-related trauma is tested under the statutory definition of accident. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
The "suddenly and violently" component of an "accident" does not mean instantaneously and with force; instead, the element is satisfied if the injury occurs at an identifiable point in time, requiring the employee to discontinue employment and seek medical treatment. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
An injury caused by a mental stimulus does not meet the requirement that a compensable accidental injury involve violence to the physical structure of the body. Zach v. Nebraska State Patrol, 273 Neb. 1, 727 N.W.2d 206 (2007).
The compensability of a condition resulting from the cumulative effects of work-related trauma is to be tested under the statutory definition of accident. For purposes of this section, "suddenly and violently" does not mean instantaneously and with force, but, rather, the element is satisfied if the injury occurs at an identifiable point in time requiring the employee to discontinue employment and seek medical treatment. For purposes of this section, the time of an accident is sufficiently definite, for purposes of proving that an accident happened "suddenly and violently," if either the cause is reasonably limited in time or the result materializes at an identifiable point. Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting & Painting, 266 Neb. 526, 667 N.W.2d 167 (2003).
While cumulative effects of repeated work-related trauma have characteristics of both accidental injury and occupational disease, generally the compensability of such a condition is tested under the statutory definition of accident. The "unexpected or unforeseen" requirement of subsection (2) of this section is satisfied if either the cause was of an accidental character or the effect was unexpected or unforeseen. "Suddenly and violently" does not mean instantaneously and with force, but, rather, the element is satisfied if the injury occurs at an identifiable point in time requiring the employee to discontinue employment and seek medical treatment. Where employee returned to work, but did not resume the duties which led to his injury, but instead was transferred to a position requiring less strenuous activity, evidence was sufficient to support finding that injury occurred "suddenly and violently". The third statutory requirement under subsection (2) of this section, that the accident produced objective symptoms, is satisfied if the symptoms manifest themselves according to the natural course of such things without any independent intervening cause. In a workers' compensation case, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury for which an award is sought arose out of and in the course of employment. If the nature and effect of a claimant's injury are not plainly apparent, then the claimant must provide expert medical testimony showing a causal connection between the injury and the claimed disability. Although expert medical testimony need not be couched in the magic words "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable probability", it must be sufficient as examined in its entirety to establish the crucial causal link between the plaintiff's injuries and the accident occurring in the course and scope of the worker's employment. Owen v. American Hydraulics, Inc., 258 Neb. 881, 606 N.W.2d 470 (2000).
The compensability of a condition resulting from the cumulative effects of repeated work-related trauma is to be tested under the statutory definition of accident. Frank v. A & L Insulation, 256 Neb. 898, 594 N.W.2d 586 (1999).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, negligent medical treatment at an employer's first-aid medical facility, by a trained and qualified professional upon a coemployee, may constitute an "accident" as defined in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act upon proof and a finding of such facts. Winn v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 252 Neb. 29, 560 N.W.2d 143 (1997).
An accident is defined as "an unexpected or unforeseen injury happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury." The "unexpected or unforeseen" requirement of subsection (2) of this section is satisfied if either the cause was of an accidental character or the effect was unexpected or unforeseen. Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, 239 Neb. 854, 479 N.W.2d 490 (1992).
In order to have been the result of an "accident" as defined by this section, an injury must have been unexpected or unforeseen, have occurred suddenly and violently, and have produced objective symptoms. The objective symptoms required by subsection (2) of this section exist either where the nature and effect of the injury are plainly apparent or where there is expert testimony showing a causal connection between the injury and the claimed disability. Catlin v. Prairie Marketing, 239 Neb. 363, 476 N.W.2d 675 (1991).
The cumulative effects of repeated work-related trauma which do not, at an identifiable moment, produce objective symptoms requiring, within a reasonably limited period of time, medical attention and the interruption or discontinuance of employment are not the product of an accidental injury within the purview of subsection (2) of this section. The compensability of a condition resulting from the cumulative effects of repeated work-related trauma is to be tested under the definition of an accident contained in subsection (2) of this section. Vencil v. Valmont, 239 Neb. 31, 473 N.W.2d 409 (1991).
The cumulative effects of repeated work-related trauma which do not at an identifiable moment produce objective symptoms requiring, within a reasonably limited period of time, medical attention and the interruption or discontinuance of employment are not the product of an accidental injury within the purview of subsection (2) of this section. Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 469 N.W.2d 542 (1991).
Where an injury is the result of mental stimulus, in order for it to be compensable under the Nebraska workers' compensation law, the injured party must prove an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently and producing at the time objective symptoms of injury and violence to the physical structure of the body. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 430 N.W.2d 696 (1988).
Onset of pronator teres syndrome and carpal tunnel syndrome was an accident within meaning of statute and sufficient evidence was produced to prove causation. Masters v. Iowa Beef Processors, 220 Neb. 835, 374 N.W.2d 21 (1985).
The "unexpected or unforeseen" requirement is satisfied if either the cause was of an accidental character or the effect was unexpected or unforeseen. The "suddenly and violently" element does not mean instantaneously and with force, but instead means at an identifiable point in time requiring the employee to discontinue employment and seek medical treatment. McLaughlin v. Self-Insurance Servs., 219 Neb. 260, 361 N.W.2d 585 (1985).
The requirement that an accident occur suddenly and violently does not mean that it occur instantaneously but is satisfied if the injury occurs at some identifiable point in time, requiring the employee to discontinue employment and seek medical treatment. Trauma to the body may be caused by action other than direct blows and it may occur inside the body. In proving that an injury was caused by accident, an employee must prove three separate elements. Sandel v. Packaging Co. of America, 211 Neb. 149, 317 N.W.2d 910 (1982).
The accident requirement of the act is satisfied if the cause of the injury was of accidental character or the effect was unexpected or unforeseen, and happened suddenly and violently; and, furthermore, it is no longer necessary that the injury be caused by a single traumatic event, but the exertion in the employment must contribute in some material and substantial degree to cause the injury. The term "arising out of" describes the accident and its origin, cause, and character, i.e., whether it resulted from the risks arising within the scope or sphere of the employee's job, while the term "in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances surrounding the accident, and these two phrases are conjunctive and the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that both conditions exist. Union Packing Co. v. Klauschie, 210 Neb. 331, 314 N.W.2d 25 (1982).
The fact that one may experience pain during employment does not in and of itself prove that the employee is disabled as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of one's employment. Therefore, where the nature and effect of one's injury is not plainly apparent, it is a subjective condition requiring expert testimony, and an award based solely on the injured employee's testimony, absent objective evidence that an accident within the meaning of the act has occurred, cannot stand. Mack v. Dale Electronics, Inc., 209 Neb. 367, 307 N.W.2d 814 (1981).
Where the claimant's condition satisfied the requirements both of an injury and of an occupational disease, the workmen's compensation court's finding that an accident occurred was affirmed. Crosby v. American Stores, 207 Neb. 251, 298 N.W.2d 157 (1980).
By accident requirement satisfied either if cause was of an accidental character, or if effect was unexpected or unforeseen and happened suddenly and violently. Brokaw v. Robinson, 183 Neb. 760, 164 N.W.2d 461 (1969).
Fall from a ladder constituted an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Wheeler v. Northwestern Metal Co., 175 Neb. 841, 124 N.W.2d 377 (1963).
Mere exertion incident to occupation does not of itself constitute an accident. Pruitt v. McMaken Transp. Co., 175 Neb. 477, 122 N.W.2d 236 (1963).
Mere exertion, which is no greater than that ordinarily incident to the employment, does not of itself constitute an accident. Green v. Benson Transfer Co., 173 Neb. 226, 113 N.W.2d 61 (1962).
Injury sustained by employee through slipping on ice on public sidewalk was not compensable. Acton v. Wymore School Dist. No. 114, 172 Neb. 609, 111 N.W.2d 368 (1961).
Ordinary exertion, combined with preexisting disease, is not compensable. Hladky v. Omaha Body & Equipment Co., 172 Neb. 197, 109 N.W.2d 111 (1961).
To sustain an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there must be shown a causal connection between an accident suffered by claimant and his disability. Tilghman v. Mills, 169 Neb. 665, 100 N.W.2d 739 (1960); Feagins v. Carver, 162 Neb. 116, 75 N.W.2d 379 (1956).
To constitute accident, there must be an unexpected and unforeseen event that happened suddenly and violently. Schanhols v. Scottsbluff Bean & Elevator Co., 168 Neb. 626, 97 N.W.2d 220 (1959).
Symptoms of pain and anguish may constitute objective symptoms within requirements of act. Pittenger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 166 Neb. 858, 91 N.W.2d 31 (1958); Knudsen v. McNeely, 159 Neb. 227, 66 N.W.2d 412 (1954); Anderson v. Cowger, 158 Neb. 772, 65 N.W.2d 51 (1954).
Evidence was insufficient to show that death from coronary thrombosis was result of accident. Eschenbrenner v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 165 Neb. 32, 84 N.W.2d 169 (1957).
Mere exertion which is no greater than that ordinarily incident to the employment cannot of itself constitute an accident. Jones v. Yankee Hill Brick Mfg. Co., 161 Neb. 404, 73 N.W.2d 394 (1955).
Injury sustained while lifting gas range was accident. Gilbert v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 156 Neb. 750, 57 N.W.2d 770 (1953).
Accident requires objective symptoms of an injury. Hahl v. Heyne, 156 Neb. 599, 57 N.W.2d 137 (1953).
Burden rests upon claimant to prove injury was caused by an accident as defined in this section. Tucker v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 153 Neb. 1, 43 N.W.2d 522 (1950).
In absence of objective symptoms of an injury, mere exertion ordinarily incident to employment does not of itself constitute an accidental injury. Muff v. Brainard, 150 Neb. 650, 35 N.W.2d 597 (1949).
An accident within this act is an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. Schwabauer v. State, 147 Neb. 620, 24 N.W.2d 431 (1946).
Where objective symptoms of a ruptured gall bladder were not present, recovery could not be had upon theory that accident aggravated chronic gall bladder disease. Hassmann v. City of Bloomfield, 146 Neb. 608, 20 N.W.2d 592 (1945).
Compensation may be allowed for neurosis if it is a proximate result of injury and results in disability. Lee v. Lincoln Cleaning & Dye Works, 145 Neb. 124, 15 N.W.2d 330 (1944).
Evidence that employee suffering from arteriosclerosis felt sharp pain in eye while moving a bench, and lost sight shortly thereafter, did not prove a compensable accidental injury. Roccaforte v. State Furniture Co., 142 Neb. 768, 7 N.W.2d 656 (1943).
Where employee was cranking a car, which was ordinarily incident to his employment, and no unforeseen or unexpected event happened suddenly or violently, a compensable accidental injury did not occur even though the exertion, combined with preexisting disease, produced disability. Rose v. City of Fairmont, 140 Neb. 550, 300 N.W. 574 (1941).
The word accident as used in the statute shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated from context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of the injury. Shamp v. Landy Clark Co., 134 Neb. 73, 277 N.W. 802 (1938).
Trivial accidents which did not aggravate or affect progress of an occupational disease cannot be made basis for recovery. Svoboda v. Mandler, 133 Neb. 433, 275 N.W. 599 (1937).
Slipping and falling into river, from which employee is alleged to have caught cold, is not an accident within definition of the statute. Lang v. Gage County Electric Co., 133 Neb. 388, 275 N.W. 462 (1937).
Being shot by a highwayman while traveling in course of employment is an accident within meaning of the statute. Goodwin v. Omaha Printing Co., 131 Neb. 212, 267 N.W. 419 (1936).
Snow blindness is an accident within meaning of compensation law. Hayes v. McMullen, 128 Neb. 432, 259 N.W. 165 (1935).
Definition of accident is quoted from this section in opinion relating to case where injury and preexisting disease combined to produce disability. Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930).
Death of employee was the result of accident. Kanscheit v. Garrett Laundry Co., 101 Neb. 702, 164 N.W. 708 (1917); Young v. Western Furniture & Mfg. Co., 101 Neb. 696, 164 N.W. 712 (1917).
Injury was result of accident. Manning v. Pomerene, 101 Neb. 127, 162 N.W. 492 (1917).
2. Injury and personal injuries
Under the definition of occupational disease, the unique condition of the employment must result in a hazard which distinguishes it in character from employment generally. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
A compensable injury caused by an occupational disease must involve some physical stimulus constituting violence to the physical structure of the body. Zach v. Nebraska State Patrol, 273 Neb. 1, 727 N.W.2d 206 (2007).
A worker becomes disabled, and thus injured, from an occupational disease at the point in time when a permanent medical impairment or medically assessed work restrictions result in labor market access loss. Ludwick v. TriWest Healthcare Alliance, 267 Neb. 887, 678 N.W.2d 517 (2004).
An exertion- or stress-caused heart injury to which the claimant's preexisting heart disease or condition contributes is compensable only if the claimant shows that the exertion or stress encountered during employment is greater than that experienced during the ordinary nonemployment life of the employee or any other person. While legal cause is established by satisfying the "stress greater than nonemployment life" test, a claimant must still demonstrate medical causation. If it is claimed that an injury was the result of stress or exertion in the employment, medical causation is established by a showing by the preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed in some material and substantial degree to cause the injury. Leitz v. Roberts Dairy, 237 Neb. 235, 465 N.W.2d 601 (1991).
The terms "injury" and "personal injuries" do not include disability or death due to natural causes but occurring while the employee is at work, nor an injury, disability, or death that is the result of a natural progression of any preexisting condition. Chrisman v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc., 208 Neb. 6, 301 N.W.2d 595 (1981).
Personal injury does not include disability or death from natural causes or the result of a natural progression of a preexisting condition. Hyatt v. Kay Windsor, Inc., 198 Neb. 580, 254 N.W.2d 92 (1977).
Plaintiff did not sustain burden of proof that perforated ulcer was in fact caused by the employment. Cook v. Christensen Sand & Gravel Co., 183 Neb. 602, 163 N.W.2d 105 (1968).
Where plaintiff failed to show objective symptoms of an injury, compensation was properly denied. Skalak v. County of Seward, 174 Neb. 659, 119 N.W.2d 43 (1963).
Disability caused by combination of injury and preexisting disease is compensable. Hagler v. Jensen, 173 Neb. 699, 114 N.W.2d 755 (1962).
Term injury includes disablement from occupational disease. Hauff v. Kimball, 163 Neb. 55, 77 N.W.2d 683 (1956).
Hernia resulting from ordinary lifting was not compensable. Foster v. Atlas Lumber Co., 155 Neb. 129, 50 N.W.2d 637 (1952).
Where there is a lack of evidence of violence to the physical structure of the body, an award of compensation will not be sustained. Mook v. City of Lincoln, 143 Neb. 254, 9 N.W.2d 184 (1943).
Plaintiff failed to establish that inhaling of sewer gas was cause of pneumonia which afflicted deceased. Kaffenberger v. Iverson, 142 Neb. 257, 5 N.W.2d 687 (1942).
Claim under Workmen's Compensation Act is not sustainable unless accomplished by violence to the physical structure of the body of the claimant. Bekelski v. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
Where a public employee of a city suffered serious accidental injury to back of his head which lowered his resistance to infection so that a few days thereafter he died of lobar pneumonia, his death followed the accident with reasonable certainty. Hendershot v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 606, 286 N.W. 909 (1936).
The disease of echinococcosis is not an occupational disease incident to the employment of a beef washer, and question of whether it could be incurred as the result of accident was not determined. Russo v. Swift & Co., 136 Neb. 406, 286 N.W. 291 (1939).
Evidence failed to establish that claimant contracted eczema while telephone operator from use of unsterilized headset. McCall v. Hamilton County Farmers Telephone Assn., 135 Neb. 70, 280 N.W. 254 (1938).
Term injury does not include occupational or infectious disease contracted during course of employment. Park v. School District No. 27, Richardson Cty., 127 Neb. 767, 257 N.W. 219 (1934).
The terms injury and personal injuries mean violence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infection as may naturally result therefrom. Greseck v. Farmers Union Elevator Co., 123 Neb. 755, 243 N.W. 898 (1932).
Under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, an injury has occurred as the result of an occupational disease when violence has been done to the physical structure of the body and a disability has resulted. Moyers v. International Paper Co., 25 Neb. App. 282, 905 N.W.2d 87 (2017).
3. Arising out of and in course of employment
Under subsection (2) of this section, to sustain an award in a workers' compensation case involving a preexisting disease or condition, a claimant must prove that the injury which is the basis for the claim arose out of and in the course of employment and that the preexisting disease or condition combined with the work-related injury to produce disability, or that the work-related injury aggravated, accelerated, or inflamed the preexisting condition. Tarvin v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 238 Neb. 851, 472 N.W.2d 727 (1991).
Under subsection (2) of this section, an enhanced degree of proof, establishing a cause-and-effect relationship between a work-related injury and consequent disability, is not among claimant's burdens for obtaining an award of compensation. Clobes v. Nebraska Boxed Beef, 238 Neb. 612, 472 N.W.2d 893 (1991).
There is no presumption from the mere occurrence of an unexpected or unforeseen injury that the injury was in fact caused by employment. Gilbert v. Sioux City Foundry, 228 Neb. 379, 422 N.W.2d 367 (1988).
Under subsection (4) of this section, a disability that is due to natural causes is not compensable under the workers' compensation law. This is true even though the disability occurs while the employee is at work. But, if there is a preexisting occupational disease, then the employer is liable, but only for the degree of aggravation of the preexisting occupational disease. Gilbert v. Sioux City Foundry, 228 Neb. 379, 422 N.W.2d 367 (1988).
Evidence indicating that carpal tunnel syndrome was manifested according to the natural course of such matters and that it was caused by the repeated squeezing of a crimping device required by the employment was sufficient to support the award made by the compensation court. Erving v. Tri-Con Industries, 210 Neb. 339, 314 N.W.2d 253 (1982).
The compensation act extends to and covers workmen only while engaged in, on, or about the premises where their duties are being performed, or where their service requires their presence as a part of such service at the time of injury, and during the hours of service of such workmen. Rowan v. University of Nebraska, 207 Neb. 588, 299 N.W.2d 774 (1980).
Plaintiff's husband died of a heart attack while working but death did not arise out of the employment and, therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Court was correct in refusing compensation. Sellens v. Allen Products Co., Inc., 206 Neb. 506, 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980).
An employee who suffered back pain approximately one-half hour after doing heavy lifting suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment and is entitled to workmen's compensation. Disability is defined in terms of employability and earning capacity rather than bodily function. Thus, one who is in constant pain, unable to lift anything, and whose condition is aggravated by prolonged sitting or standing may be totally disabled. Wolfe v. American Community Stores, 205 Neb. 763, 290 N.W.2d 195 (1980).
Proof of gradual development of neckache while at work did not meet requirement that claimant prove disability was an accident or that it was caused by his employment. Eliker v. D.H. Merritt & Sons, 195 Neb. 154, 237 N.W.2d 130 (1975).
An injury, to be the basis of a cause of action under the Workmen's Compensation Act, must be caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Reis v. Douglas County Hospital, 193 Neb. 542, 227 N.W.2d 879 (1975).
Injury to plaintiff resulting from donation of blood to Red Cross did not arise out of nor in course of employment although employer gave employees time off without loss of pay to participate in program. Mauser v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 192 Neb. 421, 222 N.W.2d 119 (1974).
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, recreational or social activities are within the course of employment when the employer derives substantial direct benefit from the activity beyond the intangible value of improvement in employee health and morale that is common to all kinds of recreation and social life. Adler v. Jerryco Motors, Inc., 187 Neb. 757, 193 N.W.2d 757 (1972).
Where conditions of employment environment accentuated natural hazard, which increased hazard contributed to injury, the injury arose out of the employment and is compensable. Ingram v. Bradley, 183 Neb. 692, 163 N.W.2d 875 (1969).
The term arising out of the employment covers all risks of accident from causative acts done or occurring within the scope or sphere of the employment. Chrisman v. Farmers Coop Assn., 179 Neb. 891, 140 N.W.2d 809 (1966).
Employee killed at railroad crossing was not shown to be acting in the course of his employment. Oline v. Nebraska Nat. Gas Co., 177 Neb. 851, 131 N.W.2d 410 (1964).
Where a salesman was injured at a time when and a place where his services were not required to be performed, he was not within protection of Workmen's Compensation Act. McDuffee v. Seiler Surgical Co., Inc., 172 Neb. 325, 109 N.W.2d 384 (1961).
An occupational disease must be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the employment. Brown v. Armour & Co., 168 Neb. 835, 97 N.W.2d 342 (1959).
Where employee was injured at entrance to place of employment, injury arose in course of employment. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Kennard, 162 Neb. 220, 75 N.W.2d 553 (1956).
Burden rests on claimant to show personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Chiles v. Cudahy Packing Co., 158 Neb. 713, 64 N.W.2d 459 (1954).
Where objective symptom of an injury was not shown, death from coronary heart disease was not compensable. Ruderman v. Forman Bros., 157 Neb. 605, 60 N.W.2d 658 (1953).
Employees are not protected while absent from place of employment for lunch. Berry v. School District, 154 Neb. 787, 49 N.W.2d 617 (1951).
Volunteer fireman who slipped in kitchen of his own home and sustained injury was not entitled to compensation, since fall did not result from a risk connected with the employment. Henry v. Village of Coleridge, 147 Neb. 686, 24 N.W.2d 922 (1946).
Where employee, at time of accident, was not on premises of employer or where service for employer required him to be, and accident did not occur during the hours of service, recovery could not be had under act. Nelms v. Mahoney, 147 Neb. 626, 24 N.W.2d 558 (1946).
If an employee suffers an accident and is injured while going to or from work, from or to his home, the accident does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Lincoln Traction Company v. Reason, 143 Neb. 512, 10 N.W.2d 344 (1943).
Injury is not compensable where police officer, after reporting off duty and having no special assignment and while on his way home from work, was struck by automobile. Baughman v. City of Omaha, 142 Neb. 663, 7 N.W.2d 365 (1943).
An injury to an employee on way home after work does not arise out of or in the course of employment, whether the employee works regular hours or is subject to call by the employer. Richtarik v. Bors, 142 Neb. 226, 5 N.W.2d 199 (1942).
Workmen's Compensation Act extends to and covers only workmen while working on premises where their duties are to be performed, or where their service requires their presence at the time of the injury. Luke v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 140 Neb. 557, 300 N.W. 577 (1941).
Workmen who, on their own initiative, leave their line of duty for purposes of their own are not protected by Workmen's Compensation Act. Burlage v. Lefebure Corporation, 137 Neb. 671, 291 N.W. 100 (1940).
Where an employee breaks the continuity of his employment and is injured before he brings himself back into the line of his employment, the injury does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Bell v. Denton, 136 Neb. 23, 284 N.W. 751 (1939).
If employee is injured while using a dangerous instrument without permission of its owner, for a purpose for which it was not designed, outside of place of his employment, the owner is not liable therefore, unless instrument was used with the acquiescence, or at least the knowledge, of the employer. Albers v. Kipp, 130 Neb. 46, 263 N.W. 593 (1935).
An injury caused by slipping on ice on the public sidewalk in front of employer's store at noon hour, when employee was leaving for lunch and for a personal errand, does not arise out of and in course of employment. De Porte v. State Furniture Co., 129 Neb. 282, 261 N.W. 419 (1935).
Where employee leaves place where his duties are to be performed to engage in personal objective not incidental to employment, the relation of employer and employee ceases until he returns to place where he is required to perform services. McNaught v. Standard Oil Co., 128 Neb. 517, 259 N.W. 517 (1935).
Where employee abandons his job and takes another and while going to get his tools from old job is killed, recovery cannot be had from former employer where he was under no obligation in connection with return of tools. Hammond v. Keim, 128 Neb. 310, 258 N.W. 478 (1935).
Compensable injury can only arise while workman is engaged in or about premises where his duties are being performed, or where they require his presence. Kirkpatrick v. Chocolate Sales Corporation, 127 Neb. 604, 256 N.W. 89 (1934); Hall v. Austin Western Road Machinery Co., 125 Neb. 390, 250 N.W. 258 (1933).
Where employee was killed accidentally while engaged in aiding fellow workman who was accomplishing private purpose, injury did not arise out of employment. Bergantzel v. Union Transfer Co., 124 Neb. 200, 245 N.W. 593 (1932).
Injury to employee while going to work is not compensable hereunder. Siedlik v. Swift & Co., 122 Neb. 99, 239 N.W. 466 (1931).
Where truck driver was injured when repairing truck during afternoon when not reporting to work, he was not entitled to compensation since accident did not arise in course of his employment. Pappas v. Yant Construction Co., 121 Neb. 766, 238 N.W. 531 (1931).
Where workman engaged in dragging roads for county was injured by horse while caring for it during noon hour, accident arose out of and in course of employment and was compensable hereunder. Speas v. Boone County, 119 Neb. 58, 227 N.W. 87 (1929).
Where the actual fracture of an employee's hip occurred outside the scope of employment but the final displacement of the fracture occurred on her employer's premises, there was no injury that "arose out of" employment and no evidence that an employment risk caused the hip fracture to displace. Carter v. Becton-Dickinson, 8 Neb. App. 900, 603 N.W.2d 469 (1999).
4. Reckless indifference to safety
Reckless indifference to safety as used in statute means more than ordinary want of care, and implies a rash and reckless spirit approximating wantonness in a degree, and a willingness to take a chance. Richards v. Abts, 135 Neb. 347, 281 N.W. 611 (1938).
Reckless indifference to safety means more than want of ordinary care, implies rash and careless spirit, approximating but not necessarily wantonness. Farmers Grain & Supply Co. v. Blanchard, 104 Neb. 637, 178 N.W. 257 (1920).
Plaintiff employee's conduct did not evidence reckless indifference to safety or willful negligence. Brown v. York Water Co., 104 Neb. 516, 177 N.W. 833 (1920).
5. Willful negligence
Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as when the evidence shows that the suicide was nonvoluntary, suicide constitutes willful negligence under this section. Eddy v. Builders Supply Co., 304 Neb. 804, 937 N.W.2d 198 (2020).
The fact that an employee knew he was committing suicide will not, in all cases, constitute willful negligence. Friedeman v. State, 215 Neb. 413, 339 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
Willful negligence implies deliberate conduct evidencing reckless indifference to safety. Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
Participant in fight was not willfully negligent. Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 155 Neb. 714, 53 N.W.2d 203 (1952).
Willful negligence means deliberate act and implies conduct evidencing reckless indifference to safety. Schroeder v. Sharp, 153 Neb. 73, 43 N.W.2d 572 (1950).
Fact that injured workman sprayed water on burning oil transport did not show deliberate act constituting willful negligence. Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb. 1044, 26 N.W.2d 15 (1947).
Whether plaintiff employee's conduct evidenced willful negligence, while probable, was not decided because accident was not in course of employment. Feda v. Cudahy Packing Co., 102 Neb. 110, 166 N.W. 190 (1918).
A "deliberate act" as referenced in subdivision (7) of this section refers to an employee's deliberate injury of himself or herself. Spaulding v. Alliant Foodservice, 13 Neb. App. 99, 689 N.W.2d 593 (2004).
Pursuant to subdivision (7) of this section, an employee's violation of an employer's safety rule must be intentional in order for that employee to be held willfully negligent. Spaulding v. Alliant Foodservice, 13 Neb. App. 99, 689 N.W.2d 593 (2004).
6. Miscellaneous
A job transfer can constitute a discontinuance of work that establishes the date of injury resulting from an accident under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
An employee establishes an identifiable point in time when a repetitive trauma injury occurs if the employee stops work and seeks medical treatment. The law does not establish a minimum time that an employee must discontinue work for medical treatment to be eligible for benefits. The length of time is not the controlling factor. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 277 Neb. 679, 765 N.W.2d 170 (2009).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the law does not establish a minimum amount of time which must be missed from work for medical treatment in order for an employee to be eligible for workers' compensation benefits. The law requires only that the employee stop work and seek medical treatment. Vonderschmidt v. Sur-Gro and Tri-State Ins. Co. of Minnesota, 262 Neb. 551, 635 N.W.2d 405 (2001).
The terms "trade," "occupation," "process," or "employment" used in subsection (3) of this section refer not to the specific employer of the injured employee, but, rather, to employers as a whole in a particular occupation. Berggren v. Grand Island Accessories, 249 Neb. 789, 545 N.W.2d 727 (1996).
A disease aggravated by conditions characteristic of and peculiar to a particular employment is compensable. A preexisting disease and an aggravation of that disease may combine to produce a compensable injury. The preexisting disease need not be occupational. Miller v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 239 Neb. 1014, 480 N.W.2d 162 (1992).
Under subsection (4) of this section, an employee may recover for a new injury or aggravation of an injury resulting from medical or surgical treatment if an intervening independent cause does not break the chain of causation between the employee's original injury and the new or aggravated injury. Roan Eagle v. State, 237 Neb. 961, 468 N.W.2d 382 (1991).
This court has expressly disapproved of language in previous opinions which imposed an enhanced degree of proof by an employee with a preexisting disability or condition who is prosecuting a claim under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. For an award based on disability, a claimant need only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment proximately caused an injury which resulted in compensable disability. Gray v. Fuel Economy Contracting Co., 236 Neb. 937, 464 N.W.2d 366 (1991).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, a claimant is entitled to an award for a work-related injury and disability if the claimant shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant sustained an injury and disability proximately caused by an accident which arose out of and in the course of the claimant's employment, even though a preexisting disability or condition has combined with the present work-related injury to produce the disability; there is no enhanced degree of proof required for claimants in cases where preexisting conditions combined with a work-related injury to produce a disability. Heiliger v. Walters & Heiliger Electric, Inc., 236 Neb. 459, 461 N.W.2d 565 (1990).
Under subdivision (2) of this section, medical expert testimony is required to show that a work-related dislocated shoulder combined with a preexisting recurrent shoulder problem to cause a plaintiff's need for surgery to correct the preexisting condition. Kingslan v. Jensen Tire Co., 227 Neb. 294, 417 N.W.2d 164 (1987).
While the act of suicide may be an independent intervening cause in some cases, it is certainly not so in those cases where the uncontrovertible evidence shows that, without the injury, there would have been no suicide; that the suicide was merely an act intervening between the injury and the death and part of an unbroken chain of events from the injury to the death. Friedeman v. State, 215 Neb. 413, 339 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
Peritoneal mesothelioma is a compensable occupational disease within the meaning of this section. Osteen v. A.C. and S., Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 307 N.W.2d 514 (1981).
The requirement that objective symptoms be produced "at the time" of the accident is satisfied if they appear in natural course without any intervening cause, and need not be observed by anyone but claimant. Salinas v. Cyprus Industrial Minerals Co., 197 Neb. 198, 247 N.W.2d 451 (1976).
The burden of proving intoxication as a defense is on the employer. Johnson v. Hahn Bros. Constr., Inc., 188 Neb. 252, 196 N.W.2d 109 (1972).
A workmen's compensation claimant with atherosclerosis, which is a personal risk, has the burden of showing, unaided by presumptions, that an employment risk greater than that attributable to ordinary nonemployment life was a cause of his injury. Conn v. ITL, Inc., 187 Neb. 112, 187 N.W.2d 641 (1971).
Without evidence as to the cause of death, there is no presumption that the death arose out of and in the course of employment. Hannon v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, Inc., 186 Neb. 122, 181 N.W.2d 253 (1970).
Evidence sufficient to show that loss of eye was traceable to accidental injury. Yost v. City of Lincoln, 184 Neb. 263, 166 N.W.2d 595 (1969).
Effect of substituting injury for event in definition of accident discussed. Harmon v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 352, 160 N.W.2d 189 (1968).
Legislative change of definition of accident in this section from event to injury discussed. Williams v. Dobberstein, 182 Neb. 862, 157 N.W.2d 776 (1968).
An inference based solely on speculation or possibility will not sustain an award of compensation. Hardin v. Moorman Manuf. Co., 179 Neb. 869, 140 N.W.2d 820 (1966).
Objective symptoms of an injury are those which may be observed by others. Schoenrock v. School Dist. of Nebraska City, 179 Neb. 621, 139 N.W.2d 547 (1966).
An occupational disease is a disease which is due to causes and conditions characteristic and peculiar to the employment. Ritter v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 178 Neb. 792, 135 N.W.2d 470 (1965).
The aggravation of an employee's existing physical condition by an occupational hazard which is characteristic and peculiar to the employment is compensable. Riggs v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 173 Neb. 70, 112 N.W.2d 531 (1961).
Workmen who leave their line of duty for purposes of their own are not protected. Seger v. Keating Implement Co., 157 Neb. 560, 60 N.W.2d 598 (1953); Simon v. Standard Oil Co., 150 Neb. 799, 36 N.W.2d 102 (1949).
When accident to eye results after week or more in diseased condition, injury occurred when diseased condition culminated. Johansen v. Union Stock Yards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N.W. 511 (1916).
48-152.
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court; creation; jurisdiction; judges; selected or retained in office.Recognizing that (1) industrial relations between employers and employees within the State of Nebraska are affected with a vital public interest, (2) an impartial and efficient administration of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is essential to the prosperity and well-being of the state, and (3) suitable laws should be enacted for the establishing and for the preservation of such an administration of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, there is hereby created, pursuant to the provisions of Article V, section 1, of the Nebraska Constitution, a court, consisting of judges, to be selected or retained in office in accordance with the provisions of Article V, section 21, of the Nebraska Constitution and to be known as the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, which court shall have authority to administer and enforce all of the provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, and any amendments thereof, except such as are committed to the courts of appellate jurisdiction or as otherwise provided by law.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 1, p. 188; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-162; R.S.1943, § 48-152; Laws 1949, c. 161, § 3, p. 412; Laws 1965, c. 280, § 1, p. 806; Laws 1967, c. 292, § 1, p. 797;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 9; Laws 1983, LB 18, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 79; Laws 1988, LB 868, § 1; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 13; Laws 2023, LB799, § 7.
Annotations
Wrongful discharge in relation to filing a workers' compensation claim does not fall under the compensation court's exclusive jurisdiction over accidents arising out of and in the course of employment. Bower v. Eaton Corp., 301 Neb. 311, 918 N.W.2d 249 (2018).
Under this section, the Workers' Compensation Court can resolve only disputes between employers and employees that arise from the provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act; hence, because the act does not confer jurisdiction on the Workers' Compensation Court to hear personal injury suits against nonemployers, the Workers' Compensation Court does not have jurisdiction to resolve subrogation disputes between employers and employees stemming from funds recovered in a personal injury suit against a nonemployer. Miller v. M.F.S. York/Stormor, 257 Neb. 100, 595 N.W.2d 878 (1999).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may not acquire subject matter jurisdiction by estoppel. Anthony v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 239 Neb. 404, 476 N.W.2d 559 (1991).
A workers' compensation award cannot be based on mere possibility or speculation, and if an inference favorable to the plaintiff can only be reached on the basis thereof, he or she cannot recover. Gray v. Fuel Economy Contracting Co., 236 Neb. 937, 464 N.W.2d 366 (1991).
The right of either party to refuse to accept the findings, order, award, or judgment of a compensation commissioner and to secure a rehearing or retrial before the compensation court is paramount to and exclusive of the right of appeal from such original decision to the district court. City of Lincoln v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 133 Neb. 225, 274 N.W. 576 (1937).
Compensation court act is a complete and independent act in itself and, as such, modifies or amends existing statutes without violating constitutional provision relating to amendments. Scott v. Dohrse, 130 Neb. 847, 266 N.W. 709 (1936).
48-152.01.
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court; judges; judicial nominating commission; selection.The members of the judicial nominating commission for the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall be selected on a statewide basis as provided in section 24-803.
48-153.
Judges; number; term; continuance in office; prohibition on holding other office or pursuing other occupation.(1) The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall consist of six judges.
(2) The right of judges of the compensation court to continue in office shall be determined in the manner provided in sections 24-813 to 24-818, and the terms of office thereafter shall be for six years beginning on the first Thursday after the first Tuesday in January immediately following their retention at such election.
(3) In case of a vacancy occurring in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, the same shall be filled in accordance with the provisions of Article V, section 21, of the Nebraska Constitution and the right of any judge so appointed to continue in office shall be determined in the manner provided in sections 24-813 to 24-818. All such judges shall hold office until their successors are appointed and qualified, or until death, voluntary resignation, or removal for cause.
(4) No judge of the compensation court shall, during his or her tenure in office as judge, hold any other office or position of profit, pursue any other business or avocation inconsistent or which interferes with his or her duties as such judge, or serve on or under any committee of any political party.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 2, p. 188; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-163; R.S.1943, § 48-153; Laws 1945, c. 113, § 1, p. 363; Laws 1963, c. 288, § 1, p. 865; Laws 1965, c. 280, § 2, p. 806; Laws 1967, c. 292, § 2, p. 798;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 10; Laws 1978, LB 649, § 4; Laws 1979, LB 237, § 5; Laws 1981, LB 111, § 4; Laws 1983, LB 18, § 3; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 81; Laws 1988, LB 868, § 2; Laws 2011, LB151, § 3; Laws 2023, LB799, § 8.
48-153.01.
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court judge; eligibility.No person shall be eligible for the office of judge of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court unless he or she:
(1) Is at least thirty years of age;
(2) Is a citizen of the United States;
(3) Has been engaged in the practice of law in the State of Nebraska for at least five years, which may include prior service as a judge;
(4) Is currently admitted to practice before the Nebraska Supreme Court; and
(5) Is a resident of the State of Nebraska, and remains a resident of such state during the period of service.
This section shall not apply to a person serving as a judge of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court on August 24, 1979, who continues to serve as a judge of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court after August 24, 1979, and prior to July 17, 1986, and who continues to serve as a judge of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court on and after July 17, 1986.
48-154.
Judges; removal; grounds.Any judge of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may be removed in the same manner and for the same causes as a judge of the district court may be removed.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 3, p. 189; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-164; R.S.1943, § 48-154; Laws 1967, c. 292, § 3, p. 798;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 83.
48-155.
Presiding judge;
how chosen; term; powers and duties; acting presiding judge; selection; powers.The judges of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall,
on July 1 of every odd-numbered year by a majority vote, select one of their
number as presiding judge for the next two years, subject to approval of the
Supreme Court. The presiding judge may designate one of the other judges to
act as presiding judge in his or her stead whenever necessary during the disqualification,
disability, or absence of the presiding judge. The presiding judge shall rule
on all matters submitted to the compensation court except those arising in
the course of hearings
or as otherwise provided by law, assign or direct the assignment of the work
of the compensation court to the several judges, clerk, and employees who
support the judicial proceedings of the compensation court, preside at such
meetings of the judges of the compensation court as may be necessary, and
perform such other supervisory duties as the needs of the compensation court
may require. During the disqualification, disability, or absence of the presiding
judge, the acting presiding judge shall exercise all of the powers of the
presiding judge.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 4, p. 189; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-165; R.S.1943, § 48-155; Laws 1945, c. 113, § 2, p. 364; Laws 1959, c. 225, § 1, p. 791; Laws 1969, c. 396, § 1, p. 1386;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 84; Laws 1992, LB 360, § 15; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 10; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 14; Laws 2011, LB151, § 4.
48-155.01.
Judges; appointment of acting judge; compensation.(1) The Governor may, by single order, appoint a qualified person meeting the eligibility requirements of section 48-153.01 to serve as acting judge of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. Such appointment shall be for a period of two years. In determining whether a person is qualified to serve as acting judge of the compensation court, the Governor shall consider the person's knowledge of the law, experience in the legal system, intellect, capacity for fairness, probity, temperament, and industry. The acting judge shall be subject to call by the presiding judge of the compensation court, who may assign the acting judge to temporary duty in order to (a) sit in the compensation court to relieve a congested docket of the court or to prevent the docket from becoming congested or (b) sit for a judge of the court who may be incapacitated or absent for any reason. An acting judge appointed and assigned pursuant to this section shall possess the same powers and be subject to the duties, restrictions, and liabilities as are prescribed by law respecting judges of the compensation court, except that an acting judge is not prohibited from practicing law as provided in section 7-111.
(2) The acting judge shall receive for each day of temporary duty an amount equal to one-twentieth of the monthly salary he or she would receive if he or she were a regularly appointed judge of the compensation court and shall be reimbursed for his or her expenses while on temporary duty at the same rate as provided in sections 81-1174 to 81-1177. Within fifteen days following completion of a temporary duty assignment, the acting judge shall submit to the presiding judge of the compensation court a request for payment or reimbursement for services rendered and expenses incurred during such temporary duty assignment. Upon receipt of such request, the presiding judge shall endorse on the request that the services were performed and expenses incurred pursuant to an assignment of the presiding judge of the compensation court and file such request with the proper authority for payment.
(3) The acting judge shall not pay into the Nebraska Retirement Fund for Judges nor be eligible for retirement benefits under the Judges Retirement Act.
Source:Laws 1959, c. 226, § 1, p. 792;
Laws 1981, LB 204, § 79; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 85; Laws 1994, LB 833, § 27; Laws 2004, LB 1097, § 22; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 13.
Cross References
Judges Retirement Act, see section 24-701.01.
48-156.
Judges; quorum;
powers.A majority of the judges of the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Court shall constitute a quorum to adopt rules and regulations,
as provided in sections 48-163 and 48-164, to transact business, except when
the statute or a rule adopted by the compensation court permits one judge
thereof to act. The
act or decision of a majority of the judges constituting such quorum shall
in all such cases be deemed the act or decision of the compensation court,
except that a majority vote of all the judges shall be required to adopt rules
and regulations.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 5, p. 190; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-166; R.S.1943, § 48-156; Laws 1945, c. 113, § 3, p. 364; Laws 1965, c. 280, § 3, p. 807;
Laws 1983, LB 18, § 4; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 86; Laws 1992, LB 360, § 16; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 13; Laws 2011, LB151, § 5.
Annotations
The plain and ordinary meaning of the quorum requirement of this section is that review of a disputed claim must be conducted by no less than three judges of the Workers' Compensation Court. Hagelstein v. Swift-Eckrich Div. of ConAgra, 257 Neb. 312, 597 N.W.2d 394 (1999).
Absent statutory disqualification, bias, or other cause shown, it is not prejudicial for the one judge of the Workmen's Compensation Court to serve as one of the judges of that court on rehearing. Schademann v. Casey, 194 Neb. 149, 231 N.W.2d 116 (1975).
A majority of the court as a quorum is empowered to transact business. City of Lincoln v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 133 Neb. 225, 274 N.W. 576 (1937).
48-157.
Clerk; administrator; appointment; duties.(1) The presiding judge of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall appoint a clerk of the compensation court and such employees as the compensation court deems necessary to support the judicial proceedings of the compensation court, subject to approval of the compensation court. The clerk and employees supporting the judicial proceedings of the compensation court shall serve at the pleasure of the compensation court and shall perform such duties pertaining to the affairs of the court as the compensation court may prescribe or as otherwise provided by law.
(2) The presiding judge shall, subject to approval of the compensation court, appoint an administrator of the compensation court, who shall be the chief administrative officer of the compensation court. The administrator shall serve at the pleasure of the compensation court and shall perform such duties pertaining to affairs of the compensation court as the presiding judge may prescribe or as otherwise provided by law. The administrator shall appoint such other employees as the administrator deems necessary to carry out the duties of the administrator, subject to approval of the presiding judge. Employees appointed by the administrator shall serve at the pleasure of the administrator and shall perform such duties as the administrator may prescribe.
(3) The clerk shall, under the direction of the presiding judge, keep a full and true record of the judicial proceedings of the compensation court, record all pleadings and other documents filed with the compensation court, and issue all necessary notices and writs. No action shall be taken on any pleading or other document filed with the compensation court until the same has been recorded by the clerk. At the time a petition or motion is filed the clerk shall, on a rotating basis, assign one of the judges of the compensation court to hear the cause.
(4) The clerk may, under the direction of the presiding judge, make or cause to be made preservation duplicates of any record relating to the judicial proceedings of the compensation court. The original record may be destroyed, but only with the approval of the State Records Administrator pursuant to the Records Management Act. The reproduction of the preservation duplicates shall be admissible as evidence in any court of record in the State of Nebraska and, when duly certified, shall be evidence of equal credibility with the original record.
(5) Notices of hearings, notices of continuances, and summonses may be destroyed without preparing preservation duplicates after a record of their issuance has been made in the docket book. A reproduction of the page of the docket book or of the preservation duplicate of the page of the docket book showing such record and, in the case of summonses, showing issuance or return of the summons, when duly certified, shall be evidence of equal credibility with the original notice or summons. Correspondence, exhibits, and other documents relating to the judicial proceedings of the compensation court which the clerk deems to be irrelevant, unimportant, or superfluous may be destroyed without preparing preservation duplicates.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 7, p. 190; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-168; R.S.1943, § 48-157; Laws 1945, c. 113, § 4, p. 365; Laws 1945, c. 238, § 20, p. 713; Laws 1951, c. 311, § 2, p. 1066; Laws 1969, c. 388, § 4, p. 1363;
Laws 1975, LB 194, § 1; Laws 1983, LB 263, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 87; Laws 1997, LB 128, § 3; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 15.
Cross References
Records Management Act, see section 84-1220.
Annotations
The office of clerk of the compensation court is provided for by this section, and the clerk is made the keeper of the records of the proceedings of the court. Dolner v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., 143 Neb. 384, 9 N.W.2d 483 (1943).
48-158.
Judges; administrator; clerk; bond or insurance; oath.Each of the judges of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, the administrator of the compensation court, and the clerk of the compensation court shall, before entering upon or discharging any of the duties of his or her office, be bonded or insured as required by section 11-201 and such judges, administrator, and clerk shall, before entering upon the duties of their offices, take and subscribe the statutory oath of office.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 8, p. 191; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-169; R.S.1943, § 48-158;
Laws 1978, LB 653, § 9; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 88; Laws 2004, LB 884, § 20; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 16.
48-159.
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court; judges; employees; salary; expenses.(1) As soon as the same may be legally paid under the Constitution of Nebraska, each judge of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall receive an annual salary of ninety-two and one-half percent of the salary set for the Chief Justice and judges of the Supreme Court, payable in the same manner as the salaries of other state officers are paid. The administrator, the clerk, and all other employees of the compensation court shall receive such salaries as the compensation court shall determine, but not to exceed the amount of the appropriation made by the Legislature for such purpose. Such salaries shall be payable in the same manner as the salaries of other state employees are paid. The administrator, clerk, and other employees of the compensation court shall not receive any other salary or pay for their services from any other source.
(2) In addition to the salaries as provided by subsection (1) of this section, the judges of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court and the administrator, clerk, and other employees of the compensation court shall be entitled, while traveling on the business of the compensation court, to be reimbursed by the state for their necessary traveling expenses, consisting of transportation, subsistence, lodging, and such other items of expense as are necessary, to be paid as provided in sections 81-1174 to 81-1177.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 9, p. 191; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-170; R.S.1943, § 48-159; Laws 1945, c. 113, § 12, p. 368; Laws 1947, c. 174, § 3, p. 562; Laws 1951, c. 154, § 1, p. 624; Laws 1953, c. 164, § 1, p. 515; Laws 1957, c. 206, § 1, p. 725; Laws 1959, c. 227, § 1, p. 794; Laws 1963, c. 289, § 1, p. 866; Laws 1965, c. 281, § 1, p. 808; Laws 1967, c. 293, § 1, p. 799; Laws 1969, c. 397, § 1, p. 1387;
Laws 1972, LB 1293, § 4; Laws 1974, LB 923, § 4; Laws 1976, LB 76, § 5;
Laws 1978, LB 672, § 5; Laws 1979, LB 398, § 5; Laws 1981, LB 111, § 5; Laws 1981, LB 204, § 80; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 89; Laws 1997, LB 853, § 2; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 17.
48-159.01.
Repealed. Laws 1953, c. 164, § 3.
48-159.02.
Repealed. Laws 1957, c. 206, § 3.
48-159.03.
Repealed. Laws 1959, c. 266, § 1.
48-159.04.
Repealed. Laws 1963, c. 341, § 1.
48-159.05.
Repealed. Laws 1965, c. 281, § 3.
48-159.06.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 411, § 1.
48-159.07.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 811, § 149.
48-159.08.
Judges; salary increase; when effective.Section 48-159 shall be so interpreted as to effectuate its general purpose, to provide, in the public interest, adequate compensation as therein provided for judges of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court and to give effect to such salary as soon as same may become operative under the Constitution of the State of Nebraska.
48-160.
Compensation court; seal.The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall have a seal for the authentication of its orders, awards, judgments, summons, subpoenas, and other writs. The seal may be either an engraved or ink stamp seal, and shall bear the words Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court—Official Seal, and shall be judicially noticed.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 10, p. 191; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-171; R.S.1943, § 48-160;
Laws 1971, LB 653, § 5; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 91.
48-161.
Disputed claims; submission to court required; court; jurisdiction of ancillary issues.All disputed claims for workers' compensation shall be submitted to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court for a finding, award, order, or judgment. Such compensation court shall have jurisdiction to decide any issue ancillary to the resolution of an employee's right to workers' compensation benefits, except that jurisdiction with respect to income withholding pursuant to the Income Withholding for Child Support Act shall be as provided in such act, jurisdiction with respect to garnishment for support shall be as provided in sections 25-1009 to 25-1056 and 43-512.09, and jurisdiction with respect to administrative attachment and bank matching shall be as provided in sections 43-3328 to 43-3339.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 11, p. 191; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-172; R.S.1943, § 48-161;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 92; Laws 1990, LB 313, § 3; Laws 1993, LB 523, § 25; Laws 1997, LB 752, § 125.
Cross References
Income Withholding for Child Support Act, see section 43-1701.
Annotations
1. Jurisdiction
2. Miscellaneous
1. Jurisdiction
A contractual dispute over private agreements for disability coverage that is not workers' compensation coverage is not ancillary to the Workers' Compensation Court's primary jurisdiction. Bower v. Eaton Corp., 301 Neb. 311, 918 N.W.2d 249 (2018).
Ancillary jurisdiction does not include the power to enforce an award. Burnham v. Pacesetter Corp., 280 Neb. 707, 789 N.W.2d 913 (2010).
Ancillary jurisdiction is the power of a court to adjudicate and determine matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an action. Midwest PMS v. Olsen, 279 Neb. 492, 778 N.W.2d 727 (2010).
The final resolution of an employee's right to workers' compensation benefits does not preclude an issue from being ancillary to the resolution of the employee's right to benefits within the meaning of this section. Midwest PMS v. Olsen, 279 Neb. 492, 778 N.W.2d 727 (2010).
While, under this section, the compensation court may determine the existence of insurance, such jurisdiction is not exclusive and such a determination is not mandatory. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 274 Neb. 906, 744 N.W.2d 693 (2008).
This section provides the Workers' Compensation Court with jurisdiction to determine insurance disputes in workers' compensation claims, including the existence of coverage and the extent of an insurer's liability. According to the terms of this section, that jurisdiction is not exclusive, however, and the district court may also exercise its inherent jurisdiction for these purposes. Schweitzer v. American Nat. Red Cross, 256 Neb. 350, 591 N.W.2d 524 (1999).
The Workers' Compensation Court has no jurisdiction to determine workers' compensation insurance coverage disputes. Thomas v. Omega Re-Bar, Inc., 234 Neb. 449, 451 N.W.2d 396 (1990).
The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court has exclusive jurisdiction in actions arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Peak v. Bosse, 202 Neb. 1, 272 N.W.2d 750 (1978).
Although the Workers' Compensation Court has jurisdiction to decide ancillary matters to a workers' compensation claim, an award of attorney fees for the creation of a common fund is not within such ancillary jurisdiction when the entity from which such fees are sought is not a party to the case. Heesch v. Swimtastic Swim School, 20 Neb. App. 260, 823 N.W.2d 211 (2012).
Even though this section vests the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court with jurisdiction to decide issues ancillary to an employee's right to workers' compensation benefits, such jurisdiction is not exclusive and a district court has jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment action regarding a workers' compensation insurance policy coverage dispute. Kruid v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Neb. App. 687, 770 N.W.2d 652 (2009).
Although, as a statutorily created court, the Workers' Compensation Court is a tribunal of limited and special jurisdiction and has only such authority as has been conferred on it by statute, under this section, the compensation court has jurisdiction to decide any issue ancillary to the resolution of an employee's right to workers' compensation benefits. Nerison v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 17 Neb. App. 161, 757 N.W.2d 21 (2008).
2. Miscellaneous
Employer may initiate workmen's compensation proceeding. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Kennard, 162 Neb. 220, 75 N.W.2d 553 (1956).
An award of compensation cannot be sustained if based upon possibilities, probabilities, conjectural or speculative evidence. Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945).
In disputed claim for compensation, compensation court could make award for injuries in cases not covered by the schedule of compensation. Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
An agreement to pay compensation must be approved by compensation commissioner or compensation court or it is void. Duncan v. A. Hospe Co., 133 Neb. 810, 277 N.W. 339 (1938).
Right of either party to refuse award or judgment of compensation commissioner and demand retrial before compensation court is paramount to and exclusive of right of appeal to district court from such decision. City of Lincoln v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 133 Neb. 225, 274 N.W. 576 (1937).
48-162.
Compensation court; duties; powers.(1) The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, or any judge thereof, is authorized and empowered to examine under oath or otherwise any person, employee, employer, agent, superintendent, supervisor, or officer of any partnership, limited liability company, or corporation, any officer of any domestic insurance company, any agent of any foreign insurance company, or any medical practitioner, to issue subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses and the production of books and papers, to solemnize marriages, and to administer oaths with like effect as is done in other courts of law in this state. In the examination of any witness and in requiring the production of books, papers, and other evidence, the compensation court shall have and exercise all of the powers of a judge, magistrate, or other officer in the taking of depositions or the examination of witnesses, including the power to enforce his or her orders by commitment for refusal to answer or for the disobedience of any such order.
(2) The compensation court or any judge thereof may, upon the motion of either party or upon its or his or her own motion, require the production of any books, documents, payrolls, medical reports, X-rays, photographs, or plates or any facts or matters which may be necessary to assist in a determination of the rights of either party in any matter pending before the compensation court or any judge thereof.
(3) The compensation court or any judge thereof may expedite the hearing of a disputed case when there is an emergency.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 85, § 27, p. 218; Laws 1921, c. 122, § 2, p. 530; C.S.1922, § 3076; C.S.1929, § 48-153; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 34, p. 204; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-153; R.S.1943, § 48-162;
Laws 1983, LB 18, § 5; Laws 1983, LB 263, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 93; Laws 1987, LB 187, § 2; Laws 1993, LB 121, § 284; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 16; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 18.
48-162.01.
Employees; rehabilitation services; directory of service providers, counselors, and specialists; vocational rehabilitation plan; priorities; Attorney General; duties; compensation court; powers; duties.(1) One of the primary purposes of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is restoration of the injured employee to gainful employment. To this end the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may employ one or more specialists in vocational rehabilitation. Salaries, other benefits, and administrative expenses incurred by the compensation court for purposes of vocational rehabilitation shall be paid from the Compensation Court Cash Fund.
(2) Vocational rehabilitation specialists employed by the court shall continuously study the problems of vocational rehabilitation and shall maintain a directory of individual service providers, counselors, and specialists which have been approved by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. The compensation court may approve as qualified such individual service providers, counselors, and specialists as are capable of rendering competent vocational rehabilitation services to injured employees. No individual service provider, counselor, or specialist shall be considered qualified to provide vocational rehabilitation services to injured employees unless he or she has satisfied the standards for certification established by the compensation court and has been certified by the compensation court.
(3) When as a result of the injury an employee is unable to perform suitable work for which he or she has previous training or experience, he or she is entitled to such vocational rehabilitation services, including job placement and training, as may be reasonably necessary to restore him or her to suitable employment. Vocational rehabilitation training costs shall be paid from the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund. When vocational rehabilitation training requires residence at or near a facility or institution away from the employee's customary residence, whether within or without this state, the reasonable costs of his or her board, lodging, and travel shall be paid from the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund.
If entitlement to vocational rehabilitation services is claimed by the employee, the employee and the employer or his or her insurer shall attempt to agree on the choice of a vocational rehabilitation counselor from the directory of vocational rehabilitation counselors established pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. If they are unable to agree on a vocational rehabilitation counselor, the employee or employer or his or her insurer shall notify the compensation court, and a vocational rehabilitation specialist of the compensation court shall select a counselor from the directory of vocational rehabilitation counselors established pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. Only one such vocational rehabilitation counselor may provide vocational rehabilitation services at any one time, and any change in the choice of a vocational rehabilitation counselor shall be approved by a vocational rehabilitation specialist or judge of the compensation court. The vocational rehabilitation counselor so chosen or selected shall evaluate the employee and, if necessary, develop and implement a vocational rehabilitation plan. Any such plan shall be evaluated by a vocational rehabilitation specialist of the compensation court and approved by such specialist or a judge of the compensation court prior to implementation. In evaluating a plan the specialist shall make an independent determination as to whether the proposed plan is likely to result in suitable employment for the injured employee that is consistent with the priorities listed in this subsection. It is a rebuttable presumption that any vocational rehabilitation plan developed by such vocational rehabilitation counselor and approved by a vocational rehabilitation specialist of the compensation court is an appropriate form of vocational rehabilitation. The fee for the evaluation and for the development and implementation of the vocational rehabilitation plan shall be paid by the employer or his or her workers' compensation insurer. The compensation court may establish a fee schedule for services rendered by a vocational rehabilitation counselor. Any loss-of-earning-power evaluation performed by a vocational rehabilitation counselor shall be performed by a counselor from the directory established pursuant to subsection (2) of this section and chosen or selected according to the procedures described in this subsection. It is a rebuttable presumption that any opinion expressed as the result of such a loss-of-earning-power evaluation is correct.
The following priorities shall be used in developing and evaluating a vocational rehabilitation plan. No higher priority may be utilized unless all lower priorities have been determined by the vocational rehabilitation counselor and a vocational rehabilitation specialist or judge of the compensation court to be unlikely to result in suitable employment for the injured employee that is consistent with the priorities listed in this subsection. If a lower priority is clearly inappropriate for the employee, the next higher priority shall be utilized. The priorities are, listed in order from lower to higher priority:
(a) Return to the previous job with the same employer;
(b) Modification of the previous job with the same employer;
(c) A new job with the same employer;
(d) A job with a new employer; or
(e) A period of formal training which is designed to lead to employment in another career field.
(4) The compensation court may cooperate on a reciprocal basis with federal and state agencies for vocational rehabilitation services or with any public or private agency.
(5) The Attorney General, when requested by the administrator of the compensation court, may file a motion pursuant to section 48-162.03 regarding any issue related to vocational rehabilitation services or costs pursuant to this section. The Attorney General shall be considered a party for purposes of such motion. The Attorney General may initiate an original action before the compensation court or may intervene in a pending action and become a party to the litigation. Any such motion shall be heard by a judge of the compensation court other than the presiding judge.
(6) An employee who has suffered an injury covered by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is entitled to prompt physical and medical rehabilitation services. If physical or medical rehabilitation services are not voluntarily offered and accepted, the compensation court or any judge thereof on its or his or her own motion, or upon application of the employee or employer, and after affording the parties an opportunity to be heard by the compensation court or judge thereof, may refer the employee to a facility, institution, physician, or other individual service provider capable of rendering competent physical or medical rehabilitation services for evaluation and report of the practicability of, need for, and kind of service or treatment necessary and appropriate to render him or her fit for a remunerative occupation, and the costs of such evaluation and report involving physical or medical rehabilitation shall be borne by the employer or his or her workers' compensation insurer. Upon receipt of such report and after affording the parties an opportunity to be heard, the compensation court or judge thereof may order that the physical or medical services and treatment recommended in the report or other necessary physical or medical rehabilitation treatment or service be provided at the expense of the employer or his or her workers' compensation insurer.
When physical or medical rehabilitation requires residence at or near the facility or institution away from the employee's customary residence, whether within or without this state, the reasonable costs of his or her board, lodging, and travel shall be paid for by the employer or his or her workers' compensation insurer in addition to any other benefits payable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, including weekly compensation benefits for temporary disability.
(7) If the injured employee without reasonable cause refuses to undertake or fails to cooperate with a physical, medical, or vocational rehabilitation program determined by the compensation court or judge thereof to be suitable for him or her or refuses to be evaluated under subsection (3) or (6) of this section or fails to cooperate in such evaluation, the compensation court or judge thereof may suspend, reduce, or limit the compensation otherwise payable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. The compensation court or judge thereof may also modify a previous finding, order, award, or judgment relating to physical, medical, or vocational rehabilitation services as necessary in order to accomplish the goal of restoring the injured employee to gainful and suitable employment, or as otherwise required in the interest of justice.
Source:Laws 1969, c. 388, § 1, p. 1357;
Laws 1974, LB 808, § 2; Laws 1983, LB 266, § 1; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 94; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 17; Laws 1997, LB 128, § 4; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 14; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 11; Laws 2004, LB 1091, § 3; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 19.
Annotations
1. Award of vocational rehabilitation benefits
2. Suitable employment
3. Rebuttable presumption
4. Labor market
5. Powers of court
6. Modification by court
7. Miscellaneous
1. Award of vocational rehabilitation benefits
The workers' compensation court did not clearly err in denying vocational rehabilitation benefits to an employee who had secured substantial gainful employment but who desired an award of vocational rehabilitation in case he became unable to continue his present employment. Melton v. City of Holdrege, 309 Neb. 385, 960 N.W.2d 298 (2021).
A vocational rehabilitation plan seeking to place a part-time hourly employee who suffered a permanent impairment in employment where the employee would earn wages similar to those based upon a calculation of average weekly wage under section 48-121(4) would best achieve the goal of restoring the employee to suitable employment. Becerra v. United Parcel Service, 284 Neb. 414, 822 N.W.2d 327 (2012).
In all cases not otherwise provided for by statute or by the Nebraska Evidence Rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. This rule applies to the rebuttable presumption that an opinion regarding loss of earning capacity expressed by a vocational rehabilitation counselor appointed or selected pursuant to subsection (3) of this section is correct. In determining whether the presumption contained in subsection (3) of this section has been rebutted, the single judge is required to make factual findings. Frauendorfer v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 263 Neb. 237, 639 N.W.2d 125 (2002).
To hold that a worker can receive vocational rehabilitation benefits absent a finding that the worker is permanently impaired does not amount to a sensible reading of this section. Green v. Drivers Mgmt., Inc., 263 Neb. 197, 639 N.W.2d 94 (2002).
Subsection (3) of this section does not provide for the modification of previous awards; it merely defines a benefit available to a class of injured workers. Dougherty v. Swift-Eckrich, 251 Neb. 333, 557 N.W.2d 31 (1996).
A finding that an employee's injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act is required for approval of any vocational rehabilitation plan paid for by the trust fund, though such a finding is not necessarily required for settlements including a program of vocational rehabilitation paid for by the employer or its insurer. Miner v. Robertson Home Furnishing, 239 Neb. 525, 476 N.W.2d 854 (1991).
Vocational rehabilitation may be denied where the injured worker is able to perform work for which the worker has previous training and experience. Cline v. County Seat Lounge, 239 Neb. 42, 473 N.W.2d 404 (1991).
An employee is entitled to vocational rehabilitation benefits when, as the result of a compensable injury, he or she is unable to perform work for which he or she has previous training or experience or when there is a reasonable probability that such rehabilitation will reduce the amount of earning power loss the employee would otherwise suffer. Bindrum v. Foote & Davies, 235 Neb. 903, 457 N.W.2d 828 (1990).
An employee, unless he or she is otherwise qualified to receive temporary total disability benefits, is entitled to such benefits only while undergoing rehabilitation which has been ordered by the compensation court. Bindrum v. Foote & Davies, 235 Neb. 903, 457 N.W.2d 828 (1990).
A plan of direct job placement, when prescribed as the only form of appropriate vocational rehabilitation for an injured employee, is vocational rehabilitation within the meaning of section 48-121(5). Carter v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 234 Neb. 558, 452 N.W.2d 32 (1990).
An award of vocational rehabilitation benefits is permitted when, as the result of a compensable injury, a worker is unable to perform work for which he or she has previous training or experience, or when such rehabilitation will reduce the amount of earning power loss the worker would otherwise suffer. Thom v. Lutheran Medical Center, 226 Neb. 737, 414 N.W.2d 810 (1987).
An award of vocational rehabilitation benefits must be supported by evidence which shows the workman is unable to perform work for which he has previous training and experience. Bender v. Norfolk Iron & Metal Co., 224 Neb. 706, 400 N.W.2d 859 (1987).
A finding that vocational rehabilitation is for the employee's best interest is a statutory prerequisite to ordering such. Pollock v. Monfort of Colorado, 221 Neb. 859, 381 N.W.2d 154 (1986).
A finding by the Workmen's Compensation Court of total disability upon the part of a claimant meets the requirements of this section so as to justify the award of vocational rehabilitation services. Heironymus v. Jacobsen Transfer, 215 Neb. 209, 337 N.W.2d 769 (1983).
Subsections (3) and (6) of this section when read together, mean that the statute authorizes vocational rehabilitation training when the employee has suffered a reduction in earning power that may be remedied by such training as well as when the specific requirements of subsection (3) are met. Sidel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 205 Neb. 541, 288 N.W.2d 482 (1980).
When an employee is unable to perform the work for which he has previous training or experience as a result of an injury covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act, he is entitled to vocational rehabilitation services, including retraining and job placement, as may be reasonably necessary to restore him to suitable employment. Behrens v. Ken Corp., 191 Neb. 625, 216 N.W.2d 733 (1974).
Past performance in a rehabilitation program can be used as a basis to determine whether further vocational rehabilitation should be awarded. An obvious requirement of a plan of vocational rehabilitation is that the injured party cooperate with the program. Mere physical presence in a program does not necessarily establish cooperation. Pursuant to subsection (6) of this section, the Workers' Compensation Court may suspend, reduce, or limit compensation if a worker refuses to be rehabilitated; however, the court is not required to take that action. Warburton v. M & D Construction Co., 1 Neb. App. 498, 498 N.W.2d 611 (1993).
2. Suitable employment
The goal of suitable employment, for purposes of vocational rehabilitation analysis, includes a similar earning capacity for the workers' compensation claimant. Bower v. Eaton Corp., 301 Neb. 311, 918 N.W.2d 249 (2018).
Although an injured employee ultimately wished to become self-employed growing and selling produce, a vocational rehabilitation plan designed to train the employee for full-time work as a supervisor or manager and geared toward returning the employee to employment paying wages similar to those earned prior to the injury comported with the goal to return an injured employee to suitable employment. Anderson v. EMCOR Group, 298 Neb. 174, 903 N.W.2d 29 (2017).
Suitable employment is employment which is compatible with the employee's pre-injury occupation, age, education, and aptitude. Anderson v. EMCOR Group, 298 Neb. 174, 903 N.W.2d 29 (2017).
An illegal immigrant's avowed intent to remain an unauthorized worker in the United States is contrary to the statutory purpose of this section of returning an employee to suitable employment. Ortiz v. Cement Products, 270 Neb. 787, 708 N.W.2d 610 (2005).
Accepting a job paying minimum wage does not automatically "restore" a claimant to "suitable" or "gainful" employment pursuant to this section, where the claimant's previous employment was at a significantly higher wage. Yager v. Bellco Midwest, 236 Neb. 888, 464 N.W.2d 335 (1991).
3. Rebuttable presumption
The opinions of a court-appointed vocational rehabilitation expert regarding a workers' compensation claimant's vocational rehabilitation and loss of earning power have a rebuttable presumption of validity. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, a rebuttable presumption in favor of a court-appointed vocational rehabilitation expert's opinion in workers' compensation proceedings can be rebutted by a showing that the experts' assessment was predicated on principles that are contrary to law. Giboo v. Certified Transmission Rebuilders, 275 Neb. 369, 746 N.W.2d 362 (2008).
Pursuant to Neb. Evid. R. 301, in all cases not otherwise provided for by statute or by the Nebraska Evidence Rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. This rule applies to the rebuttable presumption that an opinion regarding loss of earning capacity expressed by a vocational rehabilitation counselor appointed or selected pursuant to this section is correct. Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting & Painting, 266 Neb. 526, 667 N.W.2d 167 (2003).
Subsection (3) of this section creates two rebuttable presumptions, the "vocational rehabilitation plan presumption of correctness" and the "loss of earning capacity opinion presumption of correctness". Pursuant to the plain language of subsection (3) of this section, in order for a vocational rehabilitation plan presumption of correctness to attach, two conjunctive requirements must be met; first, the vocational rehabilitation counselor must develop a vocational rehabilitation "plan", and second, that plan must be submitted and approved by a vocational rehabilitation specialist of the Workers' Compensation Court. Where a vocational rehabilitation counselor has declined to evaluate an injured worker's loss of earning capacity, the vocational rehabilitation counselor has not provided a loss of earning capacity opinion from which to afford a rebuttable presumption of correctness. Rodriguez v. Monfort, Inc., 262 Neb. 800, 635 N.W.2d 439 (2001).
The only opinion regarding vocational rehabilitation or loss of earning power entitled to a rebuttable presumption pursuant to subsection (3) of this section is that of a vocational rehabilitation counselor chosen or selected by the procedures set forth in subsection (3) of this section. The phrase "loss-of-earning-power evaluation" in subsection (3) of this section refers to a process as opposed to a document. This section applies to the rebuttable presumption that an opinion regarding loss of earning capacity expressed by a vocational rehabilitation counselor appointed or selected pursuant to subsection (3) of this section is correct. Variano v. Dial Corp., 256 Neb. 318, 589 N.W.2d 845 (1999).
In determining whether the presumption contained in subsection (3) of this section, that any opinion expressed as the result of a loss-of-earning-power evaluation by a court-appointed vocational rehabilitation counselor is correct, has been rebutted, a single judge of the Workers' Compensation Court is required to make factual findings. The rebuttable presumption in subsection (3) of this section, that any opinion expressed as the result of a loss-of-earning-power evaluation by a court-appointed vocational rehabilitation counselor is correct, can be rebutted not only by the testimony of another expert, but also by the testimony of the claimant. Romero v. IBP, Inc., 9 Neb. App. 927, 623 N.W.2d 332 (2001).
4. Labor market
If an employer believes a court-appointed vocational expert's opinion in selecting the relevant geographic area for assessing a claimant's loss of earning power is incorrect, the employer has the burden to rebut the expert's opinion by showing there are employment opportunities reasonably available to the claimant in a prospective area. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
In determining whether to include surrounding communities as part of the relevant labor market for assessing the claimant's loss of earning power, both the court-appointed vocational rehabilitation experts and the trial judge should consider the following factors: (1) availability of transportation, (2) duration of the commute, (3) length of workday the claimant is capable of working, (4) ability of the person to make the commute based on his or her physical condition, (5) economic feasibility of a person in the claimant's position working in that location, and (6) whether others who live in the claimant's hub community regularly seek employment in the prospective area. Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
5. Powers of court
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, if rehabilitation services are not voluntarily offered and accepted, Second Injury Fund may apply to Workers' Compensation Court to determine need for vocational rehabilitation. Sherard v. Bethphage Mission, Inc., 236 Neb. 900, 464 N.W.2d 343 (1991).
To determine whether findings of fact made by the compensation court support an order granting or denying vocational rehabilitation benefits, the Supreme Court must consider the findings of fact in light of this section. Yager v. Bellco Midwest, 236 Neb. 888, 464 N.W.2d 335 (1991).
The inability of an injured employee to perform work for which he has previous training and experience is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the compensation court. Smith v. Hastings Irr. Pipe Co., 222 Neb. 663, 386 N.W.2d 9 (1986).
Whether an injured workman has a right to vocational rehabilitation depends upon his inability to perform work for which he has previous training and experience, and is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the compensation court. Evans v. American Community Stores, 222 Neb. 538, 385 N.W.2d 91 (1986).
The Workmen's Compensation Court may, as a condition of awarding compensation to an injured employee, require the employee, if appropriate, to submit himself for evaluation to determine if the employee may be retrained and thereby gainfully employed in the future. Savage v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 208 Neb. 676, 305 N.W.2d 375 (1981).
In making award for rehabilitation services, the Workmen's Compensation Court may prescribe procedure for employee to follow if he wants to obtain such services. Camp v. Blount Bros. Corp., 195 Neb. 459, 238 N.W.2d 634 (1976).
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, when a vocational rehabilitation counselor submits multiple reports that are determined to be written not because a process of recovery was incomplete from the time a prior report was written, but, rather, because a counselor gives differing opinions each based on a different factual scenario, it is up to the trial court to make factual findings to determine which report should be given the rebuttable presumption of correctness. Ladd v. Complete Concrete, 13 Neb. App. 200, 690 N.W.2d 416 (2004).
Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, when a vocational rehabilitation counselor submits multiple reports that are determined to be written not because a process of recovery was incomplete from the time a prior report was written, but, rather, because a counselor gives differing opinions each based on a different factual scenario, it is up to the trial court to make factual findings to determine which report should be given the rebuttable presumption of correctness. Noordam v. Vickers, Inc., 11 Neb. App. 739, 659 N.W.2d 856 (2003).
The Workers' Compensation Court's determination that the employee was entitled to language rehabilitation services as recommended by the rehabilitation specialist was not clearly erroneous. Paz v. Monfort, Inc., 1 Neb. App. 267, 492 N.W.2d 894 (1992).
6. Modification by court
Where a prior award by the compensation court provided medical or physical rehabilitation services, the compensation court may modify the award of such services to the extent that the compensation court finds such modification necessary in order to accomplish the goal of restoring the injured employee to gainful and suitable employment or is otherwise required in the interest of justice. Spratt v. Crete Carrier Corp., 311 Neb. 262, 971 N.W.2d 335 (2022).
Subsection (7) of this section cannot be used solely to punish or coerce an injured worker. There must be evidence to support a finding that the worker's disability would have been reduced had the worker cooperated with medical treatment or vocational rehabilitation. Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215, 803 N.W.2d 1 (2011).
Subsection (7) of this section is intended to permit the compensation court to modify rehabilitation plans in response to changed circumstances following the entry of the initial plan. It does not apply to situations in which a worker has refused to cooperate with treatment or rehabilitation. Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215, 803 N.W.2d 1 (2011).
Subsection (7) of this section is intended to prevent an employee's refusal to improve his or her medical condition or earning capacity from causing an employer to pay more workers' compensation benefits than it should. It only authorizes the complete termination of a claimant's right to benefits under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act if evidence is presented to support a finding that had the employee availed himself or herself of the benefits offered, the employee would no longer be disabled. Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215, 803 N.W.2d 1 (2011).
Both parts of the two-part test in subsection (7) of this section present factual questions to be determined by the trial judge based upon the evidence. Lowe v. Drivers Mgmt. Inc., 274 Neb. 732, 743 N.W.2d 82 (2007).
Subsection (7) of this section establishes a two-part test to determine whether benefits should be suspended, reduced, or limited. First, the employee must either refuse to undertake or fail to cooperate with a court-ordered physical, medical, or vocational rehabilitation program. Second, the employee's refusal must be without reasonable cause. Lowe v. Drivers Mgmt. Inc., 274 Neb. 732, 743 N.W.2d 82 (2007).
Under the provisions of subsection (7) of this section, the employer bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that an injured employee has refused to undertake or failed to cooperate with a physical, medical, or vocational rehabilitation program and that such refusal or failure is without reasonable cause such that the compensation court or judge may properly rely on such evidence to suspend, reduce, or limit the compensation otherwise payable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Lowe v. Drivers Mgmt. Inc., 274 Neb. 732, 743 N.W.2d 82 (2007).
The plain language of the last sentence of subsection (7) of this section contemplates a modification of services previously granted and does not provide for a modification of a final order to grant entirely new services or benefits. McKay v. Hershey Food Corp., 16 Neb. App. 79, 740 N.W.2d 378 (2007).
7. Miscellaneous
An employee's willingness to undergo evaluation and testing by a state agency is evidence that the employee is amenable to any rehabilitation, training, or educational program determined by the compensation court. Willuhn v. Omaha Box Co., 240 Neb. 571, 483 N.W.2d 130 (1992).
48-162.02.
Workers' Compensation Trust Fund; created; use; contributions; Attorney General; Department of Administrative Services; duties.(1) The Workers' Compensation Trust Fund is created. The fund shall be administered by the administrator of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court.
(2) The Workers' Compensation Trust Fund shall be used to make payments in accordance with sections 48-128 and 48-162.01. Payments from the fund shall be made in the same manner as for claims against the state. The State Treasurer shall be the custodian of the fund and all money and securities in the fund shall be held in trust by the State Treasurer and shall not be money or property of the state. The fund shall be raised and derived as follows: Every insurance company which is transacting business in this state shall on or before March 1 of each year pay to the Director of Insurance an amount equal to two percent of the workers' compensation benefits paid by it during the preceding calendar year in this state. Every risk management pool providing workers' compensation group self-insurance coverage to any of its members shall on or before March 1 of each year pay to the Director of Insurance an amount equal to two percent of the workers' compensation benefits paid by it during the preceding calendar year in this state but in no event less than twenty-five dollars.
(3) The computation of the amounts as provided in subsection (2) of this section shall be made on forms furnished by the Department of Insurance and shall be forwarded to the department together with a sworn statement by an appropriate fiscal officer of the company attesting the accuracy of the computation. The department shall furnish such forms to the companies and pools prior to the end of the year for which the amounts are payable together with any information deemed necessary or appropriate by the department. Upon receipt of the payment, the director shall audit and examine the computations to determine that the proper amount has been paid.
(4) The Director of Insurance, after notice and hearing in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, may rescind or refuse to reissue the certificate of authority of any company or pool which fails to remit the amount due.
(5) The Director of Insurance shall remit the amounts paid to the State Treasurer for credit to the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund promptly upon completion of the audit and examination and in no event later than May 1 of the year in which the amounts have been received, except that (a) when there is a dispute as to the amount payable, the proceeds shall be credited to a suspense account until disposition of the controversy and (b) one percent of the amount received shall be credited to the Department of Insurance to cover the costs of administration.
(6) Every employer in the occupations described in section 48-106 who qualifies as a self-insurer and who is issued a permit to self-insure shall remit to the State Treasurer for credit to the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund an annual amount equal to two percent of the workers' compensation benefits paid by it during the preceding calendar year in this state but in no event less than twenty-five dollars.
(7) The amounts required to be paid by the insurance companies, risk management pools, and self-insurers under subsections (2) and (6) of this section shall be in addition to any other amounts, either in taxes, assessments, or otherwise, as required under any other law of this state.
(8) The administrator of the compensation court shall be charged with the conservation of the assets of the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund. The administrator may order payments from the fund for vocational rehabilitation services and costs pursuant to section 48-162.01 when (a) vocational rehabilitation is voluntarily offered by the employer and accepted by the employee, (b) the employee is engaged in an approved vocational rehabilitation plan pursuant to section 48-162.01, and (c) the employer has agreed to pay weekly compensation benefits for temporary disability while the employee is engaged in such plan.
(9) The Attorney General shall represent the fund when requested by the administrator in proceedings brought by or against the fund pursuant to section 48-162.01. The Attorney General shall represent the fund in all proceedings brought by or against the fund pursuant to section 48-128. When a claim is made by or against the fund pursuant to section 48-128, the State of Nebraska shall be impleaded as a party plaintiff or defendant, as the case may require, and when so impleaded as a defendant, service shall be had upon the Attorney General.
(10) The Department of Administrative Services shall furnish monthly to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court a statement of the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund setting forth the balance of the fund as of the first day of the preceding month, the income and its sources, the payments from the fund in itemized form, and the balance of the fund on hand as of the last day of the preceding month. The State Treasurer may receive and credit to the fund any sum or sums which may at any time be contributed to the state or the fund by the United States of America or any agency thereof to which the state may be or become entitled under any act of Congress or otherwise by reason of any payment made from the fund.
(11) When the fund equals or exceeds two million three hundred thousand dollars, no further contributions thereto shall be required by employers, risk management pools, or insurance companies. Thereafter whenever the amount of the fund is reduced below one million two hundred thousand dollars by reason of payments made pursuant to this section or otherwise or whenever the administrator of the compensation court determines that payments likely to be made from the fund in the next succeeding year will probably cause the fund to be reduced below one million two hundred thousand dollars, the administrator shall notify all self-insurers and the Director of Insurance, who shall notify all workers' compensation insurance companies and risk management pools, that such contributions are to be resumed as of the date set in such notice and such contributions shall continue as provided in this section after the effective date of such notice. Such contributions shall continue until the fund again equals two million three hundred thousand dollars.
(12) Any expenses necessarily incurred by the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund or by the Attorney General in connection with a proceeding brought by or against the fund may be paid out of the fund. Such expenses may be taxed as costs and recovered by the fund in any case in which the fund prevails.
Source:Laws 1974, LB 808, § 3; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 95; Laws 1987, LB 398, § 46; Laws 1988, LB 1034, § 2; Laws 1992, LB 1006, § 95;
Laws 1993, LB 757, § 18; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 12; Laws 2004, LB 1091, § 4; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 20; Laws 2007, LB322, § 8.
Cross References
Administrative Procedure Act, see section 84-920.
Risk management pool, defined, see section 44-4303.
48-162.03.
Compensation court; motions; powers.(1) The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court or any judge thereof may
rule upon any motion addressed to the court by any party to a suit or proceeding,
including, but not limited to, motions for summary judgment or other motions
for judgment on the pleadings but not including motions for new trial. Several objects
may be included in the same motion, if they all grow out of or are connected
with the action or proceeding in which it is made.
(2) Parties to a dispute which might be the subject of an action under
the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act may file a motion for an order regarding
the dispute without first filing a petition.
(3) If notice of a motion is required, the notice shall be in writing
and shall state: (a) The names of the parties to the action, proceeding, or
dispute in which it is to be made; (b) the name of the judge before whom it
is to be made; (c) the time and place of hearing; and (d) the nature and terms
of the order or orders to be applied for. Notice shall be served a reasonable
time before the hearing as provided in the rules of the compensation court.
Annotations
Under subsection (1) of this section, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court has authority to rule on a motion for default judgment. Cruz-Morales v. Swift Beef Co., 275 Neb. 407, 746 N.W.2d 698 (2008).
The compensation court may rule upon any motion addressed to the court by any party to a suit or proceeding, including, but not limited to, motions for summary judgment or other motions for judgment on the pleadings but not including motions for new trial. Yost v. Davita, Inc., 23 Neb. App. 482, 873 N.W.2d 435 (2015).
48-163.
Compensation court; rules and regulations; procedures for adoption; powers and duties.(1) The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, by a majority vote of the judges thereof, may adopt and promulgate all reasonable rules and regulations necessary for carrying out the intent and purpose of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, except that rules and regulations relating to the compensation court's adjudicatory function shall become effective only upon approval of the Supreme Court.
(2) No rule or regulation to carry out the act shall be adopted and promulgated except after public hearing conducted by a quorum of the compensation court on the question of adopting and promulgating such rule or regulation. Notice of such hearing shall be given at least fourteen days prior thereto by publication in a newspaper having general circulation in the state. Draft copies of all such rules and regulations shall be available to the public at the compensation court at the time of giving notice.
(3) The administrator of the compensation court shall establish and maintain a list of subscribers who wish to receive notice of public hearing on the question of adopting and promulgating any rule or regulation and shall provide notice to such subscribers. The administrator shall distribute a current copy of existing rules and regulations and any updates to those rules and regulations once adopted to the State Library and to each county law library or the largest public library in each county.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 6, p. 190; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-167; R.S.1943, § 48-163;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 11; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 96; Laws 1992, LB 360, § 17; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 24; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 15; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 21; Laws 2023, LB191, § 8.
Annotations
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court Rules of Procedure may supersede or supplant the Nebraska Court Rules of Pleading in Civil Actions. Cruz-Morales v. Swift Beef Co., 275 Neb. 407, 746 N.W.2d 698 (2008).
This section provides that the Workers' Compensation Court may adopt all reasonable rules necessary for carrying out the intent and purposes of section 48-101 et seq. Behrens v. American Stores Packing Co., 228 Neb. 18, 421 N.W.2d 12 (1988).
Court may remand cause for purpose of procuring competent evidence as to extent of disability. Steward v. Deuel County, 137 Neb. 516, 289 N.W. 877 (1940).
District court has power to call in independent medical experts as witnesses. Lowder v. Standard Auto Parts Co., 136 Neb. 747, 287 N.W. 211 (1939).
Compensation court may make reasonable rules necessary for carrying out intent and purposes of the act, and shall administer and enforce all the provisions of the act except such as are committed to the courts of appellate jurisdiction. Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
This section, with others, evidences intent that the compensation claimant and employer shall be assured of a trial by the compensation court. City of Lincoln v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 133 Neb. 225, 274 N.W. 576 (1937).
Physician was entitled to fee for examination of employee made after hearing in compensation court but before trial in district court to determine whether surgical operation on employee as demanded by employer would be reasonably safe and beneficial. Solomon v. A. W. Farney, Inc., 130 Neb. 484, 265 N.W. 724 (1936).
48-164.
Compensation court; rules and regulations.The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall regulate and provide the kind and character of notices and the services thereof and, in case of an injury by accident to an employee, the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same for the establishment of the right to compensation. It shall determine the nature and form or forms of the application of those claiming to be entitled to benefits or compensation and shall regulate the method of making investigations, physical examinations, and inspections and prescribe the time within which adjudications and awards shall be made. Such rules and regulations shall conform to the provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 85, § 29, p. 220; C.S.1922, § 3080; C.S.1929, § 48-157; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 36, p. 205; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-157; R.S.1943, § 48-164; Laws 1945, c. 113, § 5, p. 365;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 97; Laws 2023, LB191, § 9.
Cross References
For service of documents upon adverse party or attorney, see section 25-534.
48-165.
Blank forms; distribution; fees; telephone number.(1) The administrator of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall prepare and make available to employees, employers, and workers' compensation insurers such blank forms as deemed proper and advisable.
(2) The administrator of the compensation court may establish a schedule of fees for services including, but not limited to, copying, reproducing documents from preservation duplicates, preparing forms and other material, responding to inquiries for information, and preparing publications. In establishing fees, the administrator may consider costs for time, material, and delivery.
(3) The administrator of the compensation court may maintain a toll-free telephone number and assign staff members of the compensation court to respond to inquiries from employees, employers, and others regarding the operation of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and to provide information regarding the rights, benefits, and obligations of injured employees and their employers under the act.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 85, § 29, p. 221; C.S.1922, § 3080; C.S.1929, § 48-157; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 36, p. 206; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-157; R.S.1943, § 48-165; Laws 1949, c. 161, § 4, p. 412;
Laws 1983, LB 263, § 3; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 98; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 22.
48-166.
Compensation
court; annual report; contents.On or before January
1 of each year, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall submit electronically an annual report to the Clerk of the Legislature for
the past fiscal year which shall include (1) pertinent information regarding
settlements and awards made by the compensation court, (2) the causes of the
accidents leading to the injuries for which the settlements and awards were
made, (3) a statement of the total expense of the compensation court, (4)
any other matters which the compensation court deems proper to include, and
(5) any recommendations it may desire to make.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 85, § 29, p. 221; C.S.1922, § 3080; C.S.1929, § 48-157; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 36, p. 206; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-157; R.S.1943, § 48-166; Laws 1945, c. 113, § 6, p. 366; Laws 1955, c. 231, § 7, p. 720;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 99; Laws 1999, LB 216, § 16; Laws 2013, LB222, § 16.
48-167.
Compensation court; record.The Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Court shall keep and maintain a full and true record of
all proceedings, documents, or papers ordered filed, rules and regulations,
and decisions or orders.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 85, § 29, p. 221; C.S.1922, § 3080; C.S.1929, § 48-157; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 36, p. 205; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-157; R.S.1943, § 48-167; Laws 1945, c. 113, § 7, p. 366;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 100; Laws 2011, LB151, § 6.
48-168.
Compensation
court; rules of evidence; procedure; informal dispute resolution; procedure.(1) The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall not be bound
by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence or by any technical
or formal rules of procedure, other than as herein provided, but may make
the investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to
ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the
spirit of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
(2)(a) The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may establish
procedures whereby a dispute may be submitted by the parties, by the provider
of medical, surgical, or hospital services pursuant to section 48-120, by a vocational rehabilitation counselor
certified pursuant to section 48-162.01, or by the compensation
court on its own motion for informal dispute resolution by a staff member
of the compensation court or outside mediator. Any party who requests such
informal dispute resolution shall not be precluded from filing a petition
pursuant to section 48-173 if otherwise permitted. If informal dispute resolution is ordered by the compensation
court on its own motion, the compensation court may state a date for the case
to return to court. Such date shall be no longer than ninety days after the
date the order was signed unless the court grants an extension upon request
of the parties. No settlement reached as the result of an informal dispute resolution
proceeding shall be final or binding unless such settlement is in conformity with the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Act. Any
such settlement shall be voluntarily entered into by the parties.
(b)(i) Except as permitted
in subdivision (b)(ii) of this subsection, a mediator shall not make a report,
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding
a mediation to a judge of the compensation court that may make a ruling on
the dispute that is the subject of the mediation.
(ii) A mediator may disclose:
(A) Whether
the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was reached,
and attendance; and
(B) A mediation communication evidencing abuse, neglect, abandonment,
or exploitation of an individual to a public agency responsible for protecting
individuals against such mistreatment.
(iii) A communication made in violation
of subdivision (b)(i) of this subsection shall not be considered by a judge
of the compensation court.
(c) Informal
dispute resolution proceedings
shall be regarded as settlement negotiations and no admission, representation,
or statement made in informal dispute resolution proceedings, not otherwise discoverable
or obtainable, shall be admissible as evidence or subject to discovery. A
staff member or mediator shall not be subject to process requiring the disclosure
of any matter discussed during informal dispute resolution proceedings. Any information
from the files, reports, notes of the staff member or mediator, or other materials
or communications, oral or written, relating to an informal dispute resolution proceeding
obtained by a staff member or mediator is privileged and confidential and
may not be disclosed without the written consent of all parties to the proceeding.
No staff member or mediator shall be held liable for civil damages for any
statement or decision made in the process of dispute resolution unless such
person acted in a manner exhibiting willful or wanton misconduct.
(d) The compensation court may adopt and promulgate rules
and regulations regarding informal dispute resolution proceedings that are considered
necessary to effectuate the purposes of this section.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 85, § 29, p. 220; C.S.1922, § 3080; C.S.1929, § 48-157; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 36, p. 205; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-157; R.S.1943, § 48-168;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 101; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 25; Laws 2006, LB 489, § 34; Laws 2009, LB630, § 10.
Annotations
1. Rules of evidence, applicability
2. Miscellaneous
1. Rules of evidence, applicability
The Workers' Compensation Court is not bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of procedure. Olivotto v. DeMarco Bros. Co., 273 Neb. 672, 732 N.W.2d 354 (2007).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), does not apply in a workers' compensation case where the rules of evidence do not apply. Veatch v. American Tool, 267 Neb. 711, 676 N.W.2d 730 (2004).
Although the evidentiary rules of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may not be more restrictive than those of trial courts, they may also be less so. The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court is permitted to admit evidence which over proper objection could not be introduced in a state trial court. Sheridan v. Catering Mgmt., Inc., 252 Neb. 825, 566 N.W.2d 110 (1997).
Subject to the limits of constitutional due process, the admission of evidence is within the discretion of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, whose determination in this regard will not be reversed upon appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Sheridan v. Catering Mgmt., Inc., 252 Neb. 825, 566 N.W.2d 110 (1997).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court is not bound by the "general acceptance" test advanced in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Sheridan v. Catering Mgmt., Inc., 252 Neb. 825, 566 N.W.2d 110 (1997).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court is not bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence. Sheridan v. Catering Mgmt., Inc., 252 Neb. 825, 566 N.W.2d 110 (1997).
Nebraska Evidence Rules do not apply to proceedings before the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. Sherard v. Bethphage Mission, Inc., 236 Neb. 900, 464 N.W.2d 343 (1991).
Evidentiary rules of the compensation court may not be more restrictive than those of trial courts. Fite v. Ammco Tools, Inc., 199 Neb. 353, 258 N.W.2d 922 (1977).
Evidence which would be incompetent as hearsay in other cases is not competent under Workmen's Compensation Act. Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945).
Statements made by injured employee within few minutes after accidental injury which resulted in death, were admissible in evidence as part of res gestae. Perry v. Johnson Fruit Co., 123 Neb. 558, 243 N.W. 655 (1932).
Technical or formal rules of procedure do not bind the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court other than as provided in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Armstrong v. Watkins Concrete Block, 12 Neb. App. 729, 685 N.W.2d 495 (2004).
2. Miscellaneous
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court Rules of Procedure may supersede or supplant the Nebraska Court Rules of Pleading in Civil Actions. Cruz-Morales v. Swift Beef Co., 275 Neb. 407, 746 N.W.2d 698 (2008).
It is a general principle that intervention is not authorized after trial and neither subsection (1) of this section nor the beneficent purposes of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act authorize a postaward intervention by the employer's insurer. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 274 Neb. 906, 744 N.W.2d 693 (2008).
No Nebraska statute grants equity jurisdiction to the compensation court. Risor v. Nebraska Boiler, 274 Neb. 906, 744 N.W.2d 693 (2008).
Sections 48-129 and 48-168, R.R.S.1943, give the Workmen's Compensation Court jurisdiction to consider the issue of joint employment. White v. Western Commodities, Inc., 207 Neb. 75, 295 N.W.2d 704 (1980).
Permission to file amended petition after decision by one judge and before rehearing before entire court was within discretion of compensation court. Faulhaber v. Roberts Dairy Co., 147 Neb. 631, 24 N.W.2d 571 (1946).
48-169.
Compensation court; proceedings; transcripts.A transcribed copy of the evidence and proceedings, or any specific part thereof, of any investigation taken by a stenographer for the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court or by a court reporter appointed or furnished as provided in section 48-178, being certified and sworn to by such stenographer or court reporter, to be a true and correct transcript of the testimony, or of a particular witness, or any specific part thereof, or to be a correct copy of the transcript of the proceedings had on such investigation so purporting to be taken and transcribed, may be received in evidence by the compensation court with the same effect as if such stenographer or court reporter were present and testified to the facts certified. A copy of such transcript shall be furnished on demand to any party in interest upon payment of the fee therefor, as provided for transcripts in the district courts of the State of Nebraska.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 85, § 29, p. 221; C.S.1922, § 3080; C.S.1929, § 48-157; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 36, p. 205; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-157; R.S.1943, § 48-169;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 102; Laws 1992, LB 360, § 18.
48-170.
Compensation court;
orders; awards; when binding.Every order and award of the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Court shall be binding upon each party at interest unless
an appeal has been filed with
the compensation court within thirty days after the date
of entry of the order or award.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 85, § 29, p. 222; C.S.1922, § 3080; C.S.1929, § 48-157; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 36, p. 206; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-157; R.S.1943, § 48-170; Laws 1967, c. 294, § 1, p. 800;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 12; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 103; Laws 1992, LB 360, § 19; Laws 1999, LB 43, § 24; Laws 2011, LB151, § 7.
Annotations
A party filing an application for rehearing under this section is not excused from a late filing due to the temporary relocation of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court when adequate notice had been provided to that party with respect to such relocation. Lopez v. IBP, Inc., 264 Neb. 273, 646 N.W.2d 628 (2002).
Negligence on the part of a party's delivery agent will not permit that party to file an application for rehearing outside of the 14 days called for by this section. Lopez v. IBP, Inc., 264 Neb. 273, 646 N.W.2d 628 (2002).
The Nebraska Supreme Court has recognized an exception that allows an appellate court to consider an appeal filed after the statutorily prescribed time for appeal where the appellant was free from neglect and was prevented from having the appeal filed in the appellate court within the statutory period through the neglect or failure of the proper court official. Lopez v. IBP, Inc., 264 Neb. 273, 646 N.W.2d 628 (2002).
This section is clear that any party who wishes to appeal the order of a single judge of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall file an application for rehearing before a three-judge panel within 14 days after the date of the single judge's order. If a claimant does not file an application for a rehearing with the compensation court within 14 days after the date of the single judge's order, the order becomes conclusive and final. Lopez v. IBP, Inc., 264 Neb. 273, 646 N.W.2d 628 (2002).
This section and section 48-180 of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act are clear that if the court fails to modify its order within 10 days and the parties fail to file an application for review within 14 days of the original order, such order becomes final and binding upon the parties. Thach v. Quality Pork International, 253 Neb. 544, 570 N.W.2d 830 (1997).
Where no appeal is taken, award of single judge is conclusive. Riedel v. Smith Baking Co., 150 Neb. 28, 33 N.W.2d 287 (1948).
When no appeal is taken from award, it is conclusive on all parties at interest except as otherwise provided by statute. Gilmore v. State, 146 Neb. 647, 20 N.W.2d 918 (1945).
Right of trial de novo in district court was preserved where notice of intention to appeal was given and where appeal was taken from award of one commissioner direct to district court. Hansen v. Paxton & Vierling Iron Works, 135 Neb. 867, 284 N.W. 352 (1939).
Orders of the compensation court have the force and effect of a judgment between the parties, except as modified by the compensation act. Chilen v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 135 Neb. 619, 283 N.W. 366 (1939).
Notice of appeal is intended to give information to opposing party and may be waived when appeal was otherwise properly completed in time required by law. Callahan v. Allied Mills Inc., 128 Neb. 352, 258 N.W. 804 (1935).
Neither county court nor district court has original jurisdiction to determine legality of a claim for compensation under the compensation act. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Walker, 128 Neb. 327, 258 N.W. 550 (1935).
Posting notice of appeal to commissioner within statutory time is not equivalent to filing. Swanson v. Village of Shickley, 125 Neb. 664, 251 N.W. 821 (1933).
Under prior act, notice was required to be filed within seven days of award on appeal to district court. Duering v. Village of Upland, 125 Neb. 659, 251 N.W. 819 (1933).
Final order of compensation commissioner denying compensation is absolute bar to subsequent suit based on same cause of action if not appealed from. Gray v. Burdin, 125 Neb. 547, 250 N.W. 907 (1933).
48-171.
Order; award; judgment; use of terms.Except as otherwise provided in sections 48-192 to 48-1,109, the words order, award, and judgment, as used in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, are used interchangeably and are deemed to have the same meaning.
Annotations
There is a distinction between findings of the workmen's compensation court and its order, award, or judgment. Light v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 166 Neb. 540, 89 N.W.2d 833 (1958).
Right of either party to refuse award, order, or judgment of compensation commissioner and demand retrial before compensation court is paramount to and exclusive of right of appeal to district court from such decision. City of Lincoln v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 133 Neb. 225, 274 N.W. 576 (1937).
48-172.
Compensation court; no filing fees; exceptions; costs; when allowed.Except as provided in sections 48-138 and 48-139, there shall be no filing fees charged by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. When a reasonable attorney's fee is allowed the employee against the employer as provided in section 48-125, the compensation court shall further assess against the employer as costs of the employee the cost of depositions if admitted into evidence and may further assess against the employer the fees and mileage for necessary witnesses attending the proceedings at the instance of the employee. Both the necessity for the witness and the reasonableness of the fees shall be approved by the compensation court. Such witnesses shall be reimbursed for their necessary mileage at the rate provided in section 81-1176.
Source:Laws 1917, c. 85, § 29, p. 222; C.S.1922, § 3080; C.S.1929, § 48-157; Laws 1935, c. 57, § 36, p. 206; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-157; R.S.1943, § 48-172;
Laws 1983, LB 18, § 6; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 105; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 26.
Annotations
This section does not authorize taxation of the fee of an expert witness as an item of cost. Inserra v. Village Inn Pancake House, 197 Neb. 168, 247 N.W.2d 625 (1976).
Guardian ad litem fees were payable from fund awarded under Workmen's Compensation Act. Copple v. Bowlin, 172 Neb. 467, 110 N.W.2d 117 (1961).
48-173.
Petition; filing; contents; medical finding required.Procedure before the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall be as follows: In all cases involving a dispute with reference to workers' compensation, either party at interest, without cost, either in person or by attorney, may file with the compensation court a petition setting forth the names and places of residence of the parties and the facts relating to the employment at the time of the injury for which compensation is claimed, the injury in its extent and character, the amount of wages being received at the time of the injury, the knowledge of or notice to the employer of the occurrence of such injury, and such other facts as may be considered necessary for the information of the compensation court, and also stating the matter or matters in dispute and the contention of the petitioner with reference thereto.
No petition may be filed with the compensation court solely on the issue of reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment unless a medical finding on such issue has been rendered by an independent medical examiner pursuant to section 48-134.01.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 13, p. 192; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-174; R.S.1943, § 48-173;
Laws 1978, LB 649, § 5; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 106; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 27; Laws 1998, LB 1010, § 5.
Annotations
This section sets out the requirements of a petition in the compensation court. Shada v. Whitney, 172 Neb. 220, 109 N.W.2d 167 (1961).
Petition is required to set out the matters in dispute. Towner v. Western Contracting Corp., 164 Neb. 235, 82 N.W.2d 253 (1957).
Either party at interest may initiate workmen's compensation proceeding. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Kennard, 162 Neb. 220, 75 N.W.2d 553 (1956).
Either party may file petition in case of dispute. Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
This section provides for the filing of petition in the compensation court. Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb. 1044, 26 N.W.2d 15 (1947).
Petition must be filed within one year from date of accident unless true character of the injuries was not known at the time. Surratt v. Otoe Food Products Co., 146 Neb. 854, 21 N.W.2d 862 (1946).
48-174.
Summons; service; return.Upon the filing of such petition a summons shall issue and be served upon the adverse party, as in civil causes, together with a copy of the petition. Return of service shall be made within fourteen days after the date of issue. An acknowledgment on the summons or the voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent to service.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 13, p. 192; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-174; R.S.1943, § 48-174;
Laws 1978, LB 649, § 6; Laws 2000, LB 1221, § 13; Laws 2023, LB191, § 10.
Annotations
Where on appeal there was timely service in fact of petition on adverse party and no prejudice resulted from the use of regular mail instead of certified or registered mail, motion to dismiss was properly overruled. Bourn v. James, 191 Neb. 635, 216 N.W.2d 739 (1974).
Service of summons may be made either as in civil cases or by registered mail. Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb. 1044, 26 N.W.2d 15 (1947).
48-175.
Summons; service.(1) Whenever the post office address of the defendant is known or may be ascertained by the officer or person charged with the duty of serving the same, such summons may be served by such officer or person by certified mail.
(2) In the event the party to be served, in accordance with subsection (1) of this section, is a corporation, a partnership, or a limited liability company, a certified copy of the summons shall be directed to the proper officer, agent, or member of such organization who is authorized by law to accept service of process.
(3) The officer in making his or her return of all processes served, in accordance with subsection (1) or (2) of this section, shall append to and file with the original return the return receipt as herein set forth. Any judge of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may serve or cause to be served such summons by certified mail as provided in this section.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 13, p. 192; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-174; R.S.1943, § 48-175; Laws 1953, c. 163, § 2, p. 513; Laws 1957, c. 242, § 41, p. 853;
Laws 1983, LB 447, § 69; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 107; Laws 1993, LB 121, § 285.
Annotations
Where on appeal there was timely service in fact of petition on adverse party and no prejudice resulted from the use of regular mail instead of certified or registered mail, motion to dismiss was properly overruled. Bourn v. James, 191 Neb. 635, 216 N.W.2d 739 (1974).
Certified copy of summons must be served. Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb. 1044, 26 N.W.2d 15 (1947).
Voluntary appearance entered by Attorney General in compensation case does not waive immunity of state from suit. Anstine v. State, 137 Neb. 148, 288 N.W. 525 (1939).
48-175.01.
Nonresident
employer; service of process; manner of service; continuance; record.(1)(a) The
performance of work in the State of Nebraska (i) by
an employer, who is a nonresident of the State of Nebraska, (ii) by
any resident employer who becomes a nonresident of this state after the occurrence
of an injury to an employee, or (iii) by any agent of such
an employer shall be deemed an appointment by such employer of the clerk of
the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court as a true and lawful attorney and
agent upon whom may be served all legal processes in any action or proceeding
against him or her, arising out of or under the provisions of the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Act, and such performance of work shall be a signification
of the employer's agreement that any such process, which is so served in any
action against him or her, shall be of the same legal force and validity as
if served upon him or her personally within this state. The appointment of
agent, thus made, shall not be revocable by death but shall continue and be
binding upon the executor or administrator of such employer.
(b) For purposes of this section,
performance of work shall include, but not be limited to, situations in which
(i) the injury or injury resulting in death occurred within this state, (ii)
the employment was principally localized within this state, or (iii) the contract
of hire was made within this state.
(2) Service of such process, as referred to in subsection
(1) of this section, shall be made by serving a copy thereof upon the clerk
of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, personally in his or her office or upon
someone who, previous to such service, has been designated in writing by the
clerk of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court as the person or one of
the persons with whom such copy may be left for such service upon the clerk
of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, and such service shall be sufficient
service upon the employer. In making such service, a copy of the petition
and a copy of the process shall, within ten days after the date of service,
be sent by the clerk of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, or such
person acting for him or her in his or her office, to the defendant by registered
or certified mail addressed to the defendant's last-known address, and the
defendant's return receipt and affidavit of the clerk of the Nebraska Workers'
Compensation Court, or such person in his or her office acting for him or
her, of compliance therewith shall be appended to such petition and filed
in the office of the clerk of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. The
date of the mailing and the date of the receipt of the return card aforesaid
shall be properly endorsed on such petition and filed by the clerk of the
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, or someone acting for him or her.
(3) The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall, on its
own motion, order such continuance of answer day and trial date, as may to
the compensation court seem necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity
to plead and to defend. No such continuance shall be for more than ninety
days except for good cause shown.
(4) It shall be the duty of the clerk of the Nebraska Workers'
Compensation Court to keep a record of all processes so served, in accordance
with subsections (1) and (2) of this section, which record shall show the
date of such service, and to so arrange and index such record as to make the
same readily accessible and convenient for inspection.
48-176.
Answer; filing; contents.Within seven days after the return day of such summons the party at interest upon whom the same is served shall file an answer to such petition, which shall admit or deny the substantial averments of the petition, and shall state the contention of the defendant with reference to the matters in dispute as disclosed by the petition.
Annotations
Answer is required to state the contention of the defendant with respect to the matters in dispute. Shada v. Whitney, 172 Neb. 220, 109 N.W.2d 167 (1961).
Evidence of second injury was admissible under general denial. Towner v. Western Contracting Corp., 164 Neb. 235, 82 N.W.2d 253 (1957).
48-177.
Hearing; judge;
place; dismissal; procedure;
manner of conducting hearings.(1) At the time a petition
or motion is filed, one of the judges of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation
Court shall be assigned to hear the cause. It shall be heard in the county
in which the accident occurred, except as otherwise provided in section 25-412.02
and except that, upon the written stipulation of the parties, filed with the
compensation court at least fourteen days before the date of hearing, the
cause may be heard in any other county in the state.
(2) Any such
cause may be dismissed without prejudice to a future action (a) by the plaintiff,
if represented by legal counsel, before the final submission of the case to
the compensation court or (b) by the compensation court upon a stipulation
of the parties that a dispute between the parties no longer exists.
(3) Notwithstanding
subsection (1) of this section, all nonevidentiary hearings, and any evidentiary
hearings approved by the compensation court and by stipulation of the parties,
may be heard by the court telephonically or by videoconferencing or similar
equipment at any location within the state as ordered by the court and in
a manner that ensures the preservation of an accurate record. Hearings conducted
in this manner shall be consistent with the public's access to the courts.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, §§ 13, 15, pp. 193, 195; C.S.Supp.,1941, §§ 48-174, 48-176; R.S.1943, § 48-177; Laws 1945, c. 113, § 8, p. 366; Laws 1949, c. 161, § 5, p. 413;
Laws 1975, LB 97, § 8; Laws 1978, LB 649, § 8; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 109; Laws 1997, LB 128, § 6; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 29; Laws 2011, LB151, § 9.
Annotations
The procedure to dismiss a case under this section is analogous to a voluntary dismissal and removes the case from the compensation court's docket. Fentress v. Westin, Inc., 304 Neb. 619, 935 N.W.2d 911 (2019).
This section gives a workers' compensation plaintiff the explicit right to dismiss the cause without prejudice so long as the plaintiff is represented by counsel and requests dismissal before the final submission of the case to the court. Interiano-Lopez v. Tyson Fresh Meats, 294 Neb. 586, 883 N.W.2d 676 (2016).
This section is not jurisdictional; it simply specifies the venue for hearing the cause. Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215, 803 N.W.2d 1 (2011).
The right of a plaintiff in a workers' compensation case to voluntary dismissal is a right that is not a matter of judicial grace or discretion. Knapp v. Village of Beaver City, 273 Neb. 156, 728 N.W.2d 96 (2007).
A plaintiff in a suit before the Workers' Compensation Court does not have an absolute right to a dismissal of the suit without prejudice. Grady v. Visiting Nurse Assn., 246 Neb. 1013, 524 N.W.2d 559 (1994).
Absent statutory disqualification, bias, or other cause shown, it is not prejudicial for the one judge of the Workmen's Compensation Court to serve as one of the judges of that court on rehearing. Schademann v. Casey, 194 Neb. 149, 231 N.W.2d 116 (1975).
This and succeeding sections prescribe two procedures for processing workmen's compensation claims carrying over rules that governed the compensation commissioner. Adler v. Jerryco Motors, Inc., 187 Neb. 757, 193 N.W.2d 757 (1972).
Initial hearing is before one judge of the workmen's compensation court. Light v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 166 Neb. 540, 89 N.W.2d 833 (1958).
Compensation case may be heard by stipulation of parties in appeal from compensation court and by the district court for any county, and a party invoking the court's jurisdiction is estopped to object thereto afterward. McCall v. Hamilton County Farmers Telephone Assn., 135 Neb. 70, 280 N.W. 254 (1938).
48-178.
Hearing; judgment;
when conclusive; record of proceedings; costs; payment.The
judge shall make such findings and orders, awards, or judgments as the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Court or judge is authorized by law to make. Such findings,
orders, awards, and judgments shall be signed by the judge before whom such
proceedings were had. When proceedings are had before a judge of the compensation
court, his or her findings, orders, awards, and judgments shall be conclusive
upon all parties at interest unless reversed or modified upon appeal as hereinafter provided. A
shorthand record or tape recording shall be made of all testimony and evidence
submitted in such proceedings. The compensation court or judge thereof, at
the party's expense, may appoint a court reporter or may direct a party to
furnish a court reporter to be present and report or, by adequate mechanical
means, to record and, if necessary, transcribe proceedings of any hearing.
The charges for attendance shall be paid initially to the reporter by the
employer or, if insured, by the employer's workers' compensation insurer.
The charges shall be taxed as costs and the party initially paying the expense
shall be reimbursed by the party or parties taxed with the costs. The compensation
court or judge thereof may award and tax such costs and apportion the same
between the parties or may order the compensation court to pay such costs
as in its discretion it may think right and equitable. If the expense is unpaid,
the expense shall be paid by the party or parties taxed with the costs or
may be paid by the compensation court. The reporter shall faithfully and accurately
report or record the proceedings.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 13, p. 193; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-174; R.S.1943, § 48-178; Laws 1945, c. 113, § 9, p. 367;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 110; Laws 1992, LB 360, § 20; Laws 2005, LB 238, § 14; Laws 2011, LB151, § 10.
Annotations
Hearing before one judge is authorized. Shada v. Whitney, 172 Neb. 220, 109 N.W.2d 167 (1961).
Where there is no increase or decrease in incapacity to work, award is conclusive unless reversed or modified on appeal. Riedel v. Smith Baking Co., 150 Neb. 28, 33 N.W.2d 287 (1948).
When a judge of the compensation court enters a judgment which he is authorized by law to make, such judgment is conclusive on all parties at interest. Gilmore v. State, 146 Neb. 647, 20 N.W.2d 918 (1945).
A party invoking the court's jurisdiction in a case where a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter is estopped to object thereto afterward. McCall v. Hamilton County Farmers Telephone Assn., 135 Neb. 70, 280 N.W. 254 (1938).
Awards for compensation cannot be based on possibilities. O'Connor v. Abbott, 134 Neb. 471, 279 N.W. 207 (1938).
Parties are entitled to a final determination of the character of the disability, the full amount to be recovered and times when this amount shall be paid. Dymak v. Haskins Bros. & Co., 132 Neb. 308, 271 N.W. 860 (1937).
48-178.01.
Payment of compensation when claimant's right to compensation not in issue.Whenever any petition is filed and the claimant's right to compensation is not in issue, but the issue of liability is raised as between an employer, a workers' compensation insurer, or a risk management pool or between two or more employers, workers' compensation insurers, or risk management pools, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may order payment of compensation to be made immediately by one or more of such employers, workers' compensation insurers, or risk management pools. When the issue is finally resolved, an employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool held not liable shall be reimbursed for any such payments by the employer, workers' compensation insurer, or risk management pool held liable.
Cross References
Risk management pool, defined, see section 44-4303.
Annotations
The Workers' Compensation Court has no jurisdiction to determine workers' compensation insurance coverage disputes. Thomas v. Omega Re-Bar, Inc., 234 Neb. 449, 451 N.W.2d 396 (1990).
This section applies only where the claimant's right to recovery was not at issue and the compensation court has entered an order of immediate payment. Bryson v. Vickers, Inc., 7 Neb. App. 595, 584 N.W.2d 44 (1998).
48-179.
Repealed. Laws 2011, LB 151, § 20.
48-180.
Findings, order,
award, or judgment; modification; effect.The
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, modify or change
its findings, order, award, or judgment at any time before appeal and within fourteen days after the date of such findings,
order, award, or judgment. The time for appeal
shall not be lengthened because of the modification or change unless
the correction substantially changes the result of the award.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 13, p. 193; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-174; R.S.1943, § 48-180;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 113; Laws 1992, LB 360, § 22; Laws 2011, LB151, § 11.
Annotations
1. Scope of modification permitted
2. Nunc pro tunc
3. Court's general powers
4. Miscellaneous
1. Scope of modification permitted
This section does not limit the reasons for which a compensation court may modify its findings, order, award, or judgment. Parks v. Hy-Vee, 307 Neb. 927, 951 N.W.2d 504 (2020).
Power is granted to workmen's compensation court to correct ambiguity or clerical error on its own motion. Light v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 166 Neb. 540, 89 N.W.2d 833 (1958).
The 2011 amendment to this section eliminated a limitation to a modification under this section to permit a compensation court to modify only through nunc pro tunc orders and expanded a compensation court's ability to modify a previously entered judgment. Carr v. Ganz, 26 Neb. App. 14, 916 N.W.2d 437 (2018).
The compensation court may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, modify or change its findings, order, award, or judgment at any time before appeal and within 14 days after the date of such findings, order, award, or judgment. Yost v. Davita, Inc., 23 Neb. App. 482, 873 N.W.2d 435 (2015).
2. Nunc pro tunc
The office of an order nunc pro tunc is to correct a record which has been made so that it truly records the actions had, which, through inadvertence or mistake, were not truly recorded. It is not the function of an order nunc pro tunc to change or revise a judgment or order, or to set aside a judgment actually rendered, even though such order was not the order intended. Green v. Drivers Mgmt., Inc., 263 Neb. 197, 639 N.W.2d 94 (2002).
This section is the statutory embodiment of nunc pro tunc principles, and pursuant to this section, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court is statutorily authorized to issue proper nunc pro tunc orders. Walsh v. City of Omaha, 11 Neb. App. 747, 660 N.W.2d 187 (2003).
3. Court's general powers
In the absence of specific statutory authority to correct an ambiguity by a procedure other than as described in this section, the compensation court does not have authority to enter an order revising one of its awards. Black v. Sioux City Foundry Co., 224 Neb. 824, 401 N.W.2d 679 (1987).
In Nebraska, in civil cases, a court of general jurisdiction has the inherent power to vacate or modify its own judgment during the term at which it was rendered. This is a common law rule which does not apply to statutory tribunals such as the compensation court. Smith v. Fremont Contract Carriers, 218 Neb. 652, 358 N.W.2d 211 (1984).
The Workmen's Compensation Court is a tribunal of limited and special jurisdiction and has only such authority as has been conferred on it by statute. A decree or award in a compensation case is final unless the petitioner seeking to reopen the case can bring it within the terms of any statute to that effect. Smith v. Fremont Contract Carriers, 218 Neb. 652, 358 N.W.2d 211 (1984).
4. Miscellaneous
This section and section 48-170 of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act are clear that if the court fails to modify its order within 10 days and the parties fail to file an application for review within 14 days of the original order, such order becomes final and binding upon the parties. Thach v. Quality Pork International, 253 Neb. 544, 570 N.W.2d 830 (1997).
The Workers' Compensation Court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion seeking modification of judgment if the motion is filed more than 10 days after entry of the judgment that is to be modified. Dobson-Grosz v. University of Neb. Med. Ctr., 1 Neb. App. 434, 499 N.W.2d 83 (1993).
48-181.
Repealed. Laws 2011, LB 7, § 1.
48-182.
Notice of appeal; bill
of exceptions; requirements; waiver of payment; when; extension of time; filing
of order.In case either party at interest refuses to accept
any final order of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, such party may,
within thirty days thereafter, file with the compensation court a notice of
appeal and at the same time the notice of appeal is filed, file
with the compensation court a praecipe for a bill of exceptions. Within seven weeks from the date the notice of appeal is filed, the court reporter
or transcriber shall deliver to the clerk of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation
Court a bill of exceptions which shall include a transcribed copy of the testimony
and the evidence taken before the compensation court at the hearing, which
transcribed copy when certified to by the person who made or transcribed the
record shall constitute the bill of exceptions. The transcript and bill of
exceptions shall be paid for by the party ordering the same, except that upon
the affidavit of any claimant for workers' compensation, filed with or before
the praecipe, that he or she is without means with which to pay and unable
to secure such means, payment may, in the discretion of the compensation court,
be waived as to such claimant and the bill of exceptions shall be paid for
by the compensation court in the same manner as other compensation court expenses.
The procedure for preparation, settlement, signature, allowance, certification,
filing, and amendment of a bill of exceptions shall be regulated and governed
by rules of practice prescribed by the Supreme Court except as otherwise provided
in this section.
When a bill of exceptions has been ordered according to law and the
court reporter or transcriber fails to prepare and file the bill of exceptions
with the clerk of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court within seven weeks from the date the notice of appeal is filed, the Supreme Court
may, on the motion of any party accompanied by a proper showing, grant additional
time for the preparation and filing of the bill of exceptions under such conditions
as the court may require. Applications for such an extension of time shall
be regulated and governed by rules of practice prescribed by the Supreme Court.
A copy of such order granting an extension of time shall be filed with the
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court by the party requesting such extension
within five days after the date of such order.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, §§ 13, 15, pp. 194, 195; C.S.Supp.,1941, §§ 48-174, 48-176; R.S.1943, § 48-182; Laws 1967, c. 294, § 2, p. 801;
Laws 1971, LB 252, § 1; Laws 1973, LB 192, § 1; Laws 1975, LB 187, § 13; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 114; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 51; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 111;
Laws 1992, LB 360, § 23; Laws 2011, LB151, § 12; Laws 2013, LB141, § 2.
Annotations
Appeals from a workers' compensation trial court to a review panel are controlled by the statutory provisions found in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, and specifically, section 48-179 and this section, which provide for the review procedure for appeals brought from the trial court to the review panel. Section 48-179 and this section pertain to the same subject matter and must be construed, if at all possible, as consistent with one another and in a sensible manner. Notwithstanding the individuation of examples of rulings listed in section 48-179, this section makes clear that when reading the two provisions together, an order appealed from a workers' compensation trial court to a review panel must be a "final order" of the workers' compensation trial court. Neither section 48-179 nor this section defines a "final order" for purposes of a workers' compensation appeal from a trial court to a review panel, and accordingly, one must look to section 25-1902, which defines three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal, and the case law under it to define "final order" for purposes of an appeal from the trial court to the review panel. Thompson v. Kiewit Constr. Co., 258 Neb. 323, 603 N.W.2d 368 (1999).
On appeal to district court, the filing of a petition and transcript of the proceedings is required. Spangler v. Terry Carpenter, Inc., 177 Neb. 740, 131 N.W.2d 159 (1964).
Motion for new trial is not a necessary prerequisite to trial de novo on appeal. Peek v. Ayres Auto Supply, 155 Neb. 233, 51 N.W.2d 387 (1952).
Filing of verified petition on appeal is required. Solheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37 N.W.2d 212 (1949).
Both petition and transcript must be filed within fourteen days to confer jurisdiction on appeal. Geller v. Elastic Stop Nut Corporation, 147 Neb. 330, 23 N.W.2d 271 (1946).
Appeal from award of compensation court sitting en banc is complete when petition and transcript are filed in district court within fourteen days. Henderson v. Wilson, 137 Neb. 693, 291 N.W. 96 (1940).
On appeal from the compensation court, the bill of exceptions need not be served upon the adverse party or his attorney before it is filed in district court. Wrede v. City of David City, 137 Neb. 194, 288 N.W. 542 (1939).
An award wherein the court ordered a further hearing on medical expenses and mileage is not a final order. Hamm v. Champion Manuf. Homes, 11 Neb. App. 183, 645 N.W.2d 571 (2002).
48-182.01.
Repealed. Laws 1986, LB 811, § 149.
48-183.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 187, § 19.
48-184.
Repealed. Laws 1975, LB 187, § 19.
48-185.
Appeal; procedure;
judgment by Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court; effect; grounds for modification
or reversal.Any appeal from the judgment of the
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall be prosecuted and the procedure, including the designation
of parties, handling of costs and the amounts thereof, filing of briefs, certifying
the opinion of the Supreme Court or decision of the Court of Appeals to the
compensation court, handling of the bill of exceptions, and issuance of the
mandate, shall be in accordance with the general laws of the state and procedures
regulating appeals in actions at law from the district courts except as otherwise
provided in section 48-182 and this section. The proceedings to obtain a reversal,
vacation, or modification of judgments, awards, or final orders made by the
compensation court shall be by filing in the office of the clerk of the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Court, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment,
decree, or final order, a notice of appeal signed by the appellant or his or her
attorney of record. No motion for a new trial shall be filed. An appeal shall
be deemed perfected and the appellate court shall have jurisdiction of the
cause when such notice of appeal shall have been filed in the office of the
clerk of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, and after being so perfected
no appeal shall be dismissed without notice, and no step other than the filing
of such notice of appeal shall be deemed jurisdictional. The clerk of the
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall forthwith forward a certified copy
of such notice of appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, whereupon the
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall forthwith docket such appeal. Within thirty
days after the date of filing of notice of appeal, the clerk of the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Court shall prepare and file with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court a transcript certified as a true copy of the proceedings contained therein.
The transcript shall contain the judgment, decree, or final order sought to
be reversed, vacated, or modified and all pleadings filed with such clerk.
Neither the form nor the substance of such transcript shall affect the jurisdiction
of the appellate court. Such appeal shall be perfected within thirty days
after the entry of judgment by the compensation court, the cause shall be
advanced for argument before the appellate court, and the appellate court
shall render its judgment and write an opinion, if any, in such cases as speedily
as possible. The judgment made by the compensation court shall have the same force and effect
as a jury verdict in a civil case. A judgment, order, or award of the compensation
court may be modified, reversed, or set aside only upon the grounds that (1)
the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers, (2) the judgment,
order, or award was procured by fraud, (3) there is not sufficient competent
evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award,
or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order
or award.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 13, p. 195; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-174; R.S.1943, § 48-185; Laws 1953, c. 165, § 1, p. 517; Laws 1957, c. 207, § 1, p. 726;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 14; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 115; Laws 1986, LB 529, § 52; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 112;
Laws 1992, LB 360, § 24; Laws 1999, LB 43, § 25; Laws 2011, LB151, § 13.
Annotations
1. Perfecting appeal
2. Review
3. Miscellaneous
1. Perfecting appeal
After final judgment, the filing of a motion to withdraw a party's rest is not treated as a motion for a new trial and fails to extend the time for appeal. Battiato v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 212 Neb. 474, 323 N.W.2d 105 (1982).
Appeal may be taken within thirty days from overruling of motion for a new trial. Meester v. Schultz, 151 Neb. 614, 38 N.W.2d 739 (1949).
Method of perfecting appeal to Supreme Court, including settling bill of exceptions, is governed by general laws regulating appeals in actions at law. Ratay v. Wylie, 147 Neb. 201, 22 N.W.2d 622 (1946).
Appeal to Supreme Court from district court is governed by general laws regulating appeals except the appeal must be perfected within thirty days from entry of judgment. Adkisson v. Gamble, 143 Neb. 417, 9 N.W.2d 711 (1943).
Upon appeal to Supreme Court in a compensation case, jurisdiction is conferred where transcript is filed within thirty days and bill of exceptions may be filed thereafter in accordance with general law. Fallis v. Vogel, 137 Neb. 598, 290 N.W. 461 (1940).
Appeal from district court should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, where transcript in compensation case was not filed within thirty days of the entry of the judgment. Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, 137 Neb. 1, 288 N.W. 32 (1939).
Statutory fees for filing appeal in Supreme Court do not apply to cases under workmen's compensation law. Scott v. Dohrse, 130 Neb. 847, 266 N.W. 709 (1936).
2. Review
Pursuant to this section, an appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers' Compensation Court decision only when (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award. Picard v. P & C Group 1, 306 Neb. 292, 945 N.W.2d 183 (2020); Aboytes-Mosqueda v. LFA Inc., 306 Neb. 277, 944 N.W.2d 765 (2020); Arroyo v. Caring for People Servs., 29 Neb. App. 93, 952 N.W.2d 11 (2020); Moss v. C&A Indus., 25 Neb. App. 877, 915 N.W.2d 615 (2018); Moyers v. International Paper Co., 25 Neb. App. 282, 905 N.W.2d 87 (2017).
Findings of fact made by the Workers' Compensation Court have the same force and effect as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Hintz v. Farmers Co-op Assn., 297 Neb. 903, 902 N.W.2d 131 (2017); Hull v. Aetna Ins. Co., 247 Neb. 713, 529 N.W.2d 783 (1995).
An appellate court may modify an award of the compensation court when there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the award. Nichols v. Fairway Bldg. Prods., 294 Neb. 657, 884 N.W.2d 124 (2016).
Where there was sufficient evidence to support a factual finding that knee surgery was not required by the prior work-related injury, a three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation Court did not have grounds under this section to reverse the decision of a single judge of the Workers' Compensation Court denying compensability for the surgery. Pearson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Milling Co., 285 Neb. 568, 828 N.W.2d 154 (2013).
An appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers' Compensation Court decision only upon the grounds set forth in this section. Worline v. ABB/Alstom Power Integrated CE Services, 272 Neb. 797, 725 N.W.2d 148 (2006).
Pursuant to this section, an appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers' Compensation Court decision only when (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers, (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud, (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award, or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award. Torres v. Aulick Leasing, 258 Neb. 859, 606 N.W.2d 98 (2000); Variano v. Dial Corp., 256 Neb. 318, 589 N.W.2d 845 (1999); Crouch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 255 Neb. 128, 582 N.W.2d 356 (1998); Owen v. American Hydraulics, Inc., 254 Neb. 685, 578 N.W.2d 57 (1998).
This section does not provide for appeal to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals without a properly constituted review by the Workers' Compensation Court. Hagelstein v. Swift-Eckrich Div. of ConAgra, 257 Neb. 312, 597 N.W.2d 394 (1999).
The findings of fact made by a workers' compensation court trial judge are not to be disturbed upon appeal to a workers' compensation court review panel unless they are clearly wrong on the evidence or the decision was contrary to law. McBee v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 255 Neb. 903, 587 N.W.2d 687 (1999).
This section precludes an appellate court's substitution of its view of the facts for that of the Workers' Compensation Court if the record contains evidence to substantiate the factual conclusions reached by the Workers' Compensation Court. Cords v. City of Lincoln, 249 Neb. 748, 545 N.W.2d 112 (1996).
In testing the sufficiency of evidence to support findings of fact made by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party. Paulsen v. State, 249 Neb. 112, 541 N.W.2d 636 (1996).
This section precludes an appellate court from substituting its view of the facts for that of the compensation court if the record contains evidence to substantiate the factual conclusions reached by the compensation court. Surratt v. Watts Trucking, 249 Neb. 35, 541 N.W.2d 41 (1995).
Factual determinations made by the Workers' Compensation Court will not be set aside on appeal unless such determinations are clearly erroneous. An appellate court may not substitute its view of the facts for that of the compensation court if the record contains evidence to substantiate the factual conclusions reached by the compensation court. Aken v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 245 Neb. 161, 511 N.W.2d 762 (1994).
Findings of fact by the Workers' Compensation Court on rehearing have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case and will not be set aside on appeal where there is evidence sufficient to support them. Willuhn v. Omaha Box Co., 240 Neb. 571, 483 N.W.2d 130 (1992); McGee v. Panhandle Technical Sys., 223 Neb. 56, 387 N.W.2d 709 (1986).
Procedural and evidentiary rulings of the Workers' Compensation Court may predicate reversal or modification of the court's order on appeal if the court in so ruling acted without or in excess of its powers. As the trier of fact, the Workers' Compensation Court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given testimony; furthermore, the appellate court will presume the compensation court resolved any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the successful party. Findings of fact by the Workers' Compensation Court have the same force and effect as a jury verdict and will, therefore, not be set aside unless clearly wrong. Hernandez v. Hawkins Construction Co., 240 Neb. 129, 480 N.W.2d 424 (1992).
Findings of fact by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court after rehearing have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case and will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly wrong. Cline v. County Seat Lounge, 239 Neb. 42, 473 N.W.2d 404 (1991); Brazee v. City of Lincoln, 234 Neb. 680, 452 N.W.2d 529 (1990); Elliott v. Midlands Animal Products, 229 Neb. 823, 428 N.W.2d 920 (1988); Gilbert v. Sioux City Foundry, 228 Neb. 379, 422 N.W.2d 367 (1988); Knudsen v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 220 Neb. 902, 374 N.W.2d 56 (1985); Guerra v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 211 Neb. 433, 318 N.W.2d 887 (1982); White v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 207 Neb. 528, 300 N.W.2d 15 (1980).
Under subsection (4) of this section, an order based on findings of fact made by the compensation court may be reversed if those findings do not support the court's order. Clobes v. Nebraska Boxed Beef, 238 Neb. 612, 472 N.W.2d 893 (1991).
To determine whether findings of fact made by the compensation court support an order granting or denying vocational rehabilitation benefits, the Supreme Court must consider the findings of fact in light of section 48-162.01. Yager v. Bellco Midwest, 236 Neb. 888, 464 N.W.2d 335 (1991).
Under subsection (4) of this section, an order based on findings of fact made by the compensation court may be reversed if those findings do not support the court's order. Yager v. Bellco Midwest, 236 Neb. 888, 464 N.W.2d 335 (1991).
The Workers' Compensation Court's judgment may not be set aside on appeal where there is evidence sufficient to support its judgment. Bindrum v. Foote & Davies, 235 Neb. 903, 457 N.W.2d 828 (1990); Luehring v. Tibbs Constr. Co., 235 Neb. 883, 457 N.W.2d 815 (1990).
Regarding facts determined and findings made after rehearing in the compensation court, this section precludes the Supreme Court's substitution of its view of facts for that of the compensation court if the record contains evidence to substantiate the factual conclusions reached by the compensation court. Gardner v. Beatrice Foods Co., 231 Neb. 464, 436 N.W.2d 542 (1989).
The findings of fact of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case and will not be set aside where they are supported by credible evidence and are not clearly wrong. Kalhorn v. City of Bellevue, 227 Neb. 880, 420 N.W.2d 713 (1988).
Where the record presents nothing more than conflicting medical testimony, the Supreme Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Workers' Compensation Court. The nature and number of examinations by a physician are factors affecting credibility of a medical witness and weight to be attached to testimony from such witness. Vredeveld v. Gelco Express, 222 Neb. 363, 383 N.W.2d 780 (1986).
The findings of fact made by the Workers' Compensation Court after rehearing will not be set aside unless clearly wrong. Gast v. Continental Can Co., 220 Neb. 456, 370 N.W.2d 172 (1985).
Where there is not sufficient competent evidence to support an award, this court must modify, reverse, or set aside the award. Hare v. Watts Trucking Service, 220 Neb. 403, 370 N.W.2d 143 (1985).
Under Nebraska law, it is well settled that findings of fact by the Workmen's Compensation Court on rehearing have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case and will not be set aside unless clearly wrong. Rutt v. Midwest Refuse Service, 220 Neb. 255, 369 N.W.2d 93 (1985); Paris v. J. A. Baldwin Mfg. Co., 216 Neb. 151, 342 N.W.2d 198 (1984); Earnest v. Lutheran Memorial Hospital, 211 Neb. 438, 319 N.W.2d 66 (1982); Shaw v. Gooch Feed Mill Corp., 210 Neb. 17, 312 N.W.2d 682 (1981).
The findings of fact made by the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court on rehearing have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case and will not be reversed or set aside unless there is insufficient evidence in the record to warrant the award. Tranmer v. Mass Merchandisers, 218 Neb. 151, 352 N.W.2d 610 (1984).
The compensation court's findings of fact after rehearing have the same effect as a jury verdict in a civil case and will not be set aside unless clearly wrong. The decision of the compensation court after rehearing must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party, and every controverted fact must be decided in its favor. Noah v. Creighton Omaha Health Care Corp., 213 Neb. 169, 328 N.W.2d 203 (1982).
The Supreme Court is not at liberty to substitute its views for those of the Workmen's Compensation Court regarding questions of fact if there is evidence in the record to substantiate its conclusions. Thomas v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 211 Neb. 704, 320 N.W.2d 111 (1982).
Where there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award, or the findings of fact do not support the award, the award must be modified, reversed, or set aside by the Supreme Court on appeal. A workmen's compensation award cannot be based upon possibility or speculation. Husted v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Constr. Co., 210 Neb. 109, 313 N.W.2d 248 (1981).
An award of the Workmen's Compensation Court will be reversed or modified where there is not sufficient evidence in the record to warrant the order, judgment, or award, or the findings of fact do not support the order or award. Akins v. Happy Hour, Inc., 209 Neb. 236, 306 N.W.2d 914 (1981).
The final determination of whether there exists a master and servant relationship is an issue of law for this court and not for the trier of fact. Stephens v. Celeryvale Transport, Inc., 205 Neb. 12, 286 N.W.2d 420 (1979).
Under the provisions of this section, the findings of fact made by the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court after rehearing have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case. There is no longer any provision in the statutes for de novo review by the Supreme Court of workmen's compensation cases. Herold v. Constructors, Inc., 201 Neb. 697, 271 N.W.2d 542 (1978).
In testing sufficiency of evidence to support findings of fact of Workmen's Compensation Court after rehearing, it must be considered in light most favorable to successful party. Salinas v. Cyprus Industrial Minerals Co., 197 Neb. 198, 247 N.W.2d 451 (1976).
In workmen's compensation cases, the judgment, order, or award will not be modified on appeal for insufficiency of the evidence, if there is reasonable competent evidence to support the findings of fact upon which it is based. Voycheske v. Osborn, 196 Neb. 510, 244 N.W.2d 74 (1976).
The Supreme Court in a workmen's compensation case may set aside the judgment of the district court upon grounds provided by statute only which include "(3) the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence as disclosed by the record." McPhillips v. Knox Constr. Co., Inc., 190 Neb. 306, 208 N.W.2d 261 (1973).
In a workmen's compensation proceeding, a district court finding against a party will be set aside if the evidence compels a finding for that party. Adler v. Jerryco Motors, Inc., 187 Neb. 757, 193 N.W.2d 757 (1972).
Under this section, unless the district court acted without or in excess of its powers or the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud, the judgment, order, or award may be modified or set aside only if the findings of fact do not support it. Conn v. ITL, Inc., 187 Neb. 112, 187 N.W.2d 641 (1971).
If there is reasonable competent evidence to support findings of fact in trial court's judgment, order or award will not be modified for insufficiency of the evidence. Cause will be considered de novo in the Supreme Court only where the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence as disclosed by the record. Conflicting holdings in Rapp v. Hale, 170 Neb. 620, 103 N.W.2d 851 (1960), overruled. Gifford v. Ag Lime, Sand & Gravel Co., 187 Neb. 57, 187 N.W.2d 285 (1971).
Supreme Court may only modify or set aside order of district court on four grounds. Turpin v. State, 135 Neb. 389, 281 N.W. 800 (1938).
If award for permanent total disability is not supported by the evidence, it will be set aside. Pillard v. Lincoln Packing Co., 133 Neb. 898, 277 N.W. 587 (1938).
Under this section, the judgment made by the compensation court shall have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case and may be modified, reversed, or set aside only upon the grounds that (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award. Coughlin v. County of Colfax, 27 Neb. App. 41, 926 N.W.2d 675 (2019).
An appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers' Compensation Court decision only when (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award. Nerison v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 17 Neb. App. 161, 757 N.W.2d 21 (2008); McKay v. Hershey Food Corp., 16 Neb. App. 79, 740 N.W.2d 378 (2007); Davis v. Crete Carrier Corp., 15 Neb. App. 241, 725 N.W.2d 562 (2006); Shade v. Ayars & Ayars, Inc., 2 Neb. App. 730, 513 N.W.2d 881 (1994).
An appellate court may not substitute its view of the facts for that of the Workers' Compensation Court if the record contains sufficient evidence to substantiate the factual conclusions reached by the Workers' Compensation Court. Nerison v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 17 Neb. App. 161, 757 N.W.2d 21 (2008).
This section precludes an appellate court's substitution of its view of the facts for that of the Workers' Compensation Court if the record contains sufficient evidence to substantiate the factual conclusions reached by the Workers' Compensation Court. Godsey v. Casey's General Stores, 15 Neb. App. 854, 738 N.W.2d 863 (2007).
In determining whether to affirm, modify, reverse, or set aside a judgment of a Workers' Compensation Court review panel, a higher appellate court reviews the findings of the trial judge who conducted the original hearing. Mendoza v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 8 Neb. App. 778, 603 N.W.2d 156 (1999).
In an appeal from a review where the panel affirms the order of the trial judge, the higher appellate court may still modify, revise, or set aside the order of the review panel if the panel was clearly wrong in failing to find that (1) the trial judge acted without or in excess of his or her powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the trial judge do not support the order or award. Fordham v. West Lumber Co., 2 Neb. App. 716, 513 N.W.2d 52 (1994).
If a Workers' Compensation Court review panel makes different findings of fact from those of the trial judge when there is evidence in the record before the trial judge to support the judge's findings, then the review panel has acted in excess of its powers. Pearson v. Lincoln Telephone Co., 2 Neb. App. 703, 513 N.W.2d 361 (1994).
3. Miscellaneous
Sufficient evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Court's finding that a workers' compensation claimant's mental illness arose out of a compensable workplace injury sustained during an assault by a patient at the hospital where claimant worked as a nurse and the aggravation of that injury in two further workplace assaults. The claimant was consistently employed for over 15 years before the first assault without significant or relevant physical or mental incident, during which time she worked, was married, and had a family, and the claimant required extensive treatment after the three assaults, including electroconvulsive therapy. Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 291 Neb. 757, 869 N.W.2d 78 (2015).
A direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of a single judge of the Workers' Compensation Court is not authorized. Schmidt v. Shoftstall Alfalfa, 239 Neb. 248, 475 N.W.2d 523 (1991).
An award of vocational rehabilitation benefits must be supported by evidence which shows the workman is unable to perform work for which he has previous training and experience. Bender v. Norfolk Iron & Metal Co., 224 Neb. 706, 400 N.W.2d 859 (1987).
A good-faith conflict due to self-contradiction of an expert's opinions presents a question to be resolved by the trier of fact. Vredeveld v. Gelco Express, 222 Neb. 363, 383 N.W.2d 780 (1986).
Workmen's Compensation Court denial of benefits, to applicant with blood alcohol content of .175 percent when injured, affirmed. Sandage v. Adolf's Roofing, Inc., 198 Neb. 539, 254 N.W.2d 77 (1977).
A compensable injury to the ball and socket of the hip joint, where the residual impairment is not limited to the leg, is not a schedule injury under section 48-121, subdivision (3), but a disability under subdivision (1) or (2) relating to earning capacity and employability. Jeffers v. Pappas Trucking, Inc., 198 Neb. 379, 253 N.W.2d 30 (1977).
An accidental injury sustained by an employee on premises where employed, occurring during lunch period while employee is going to or coming from work, is an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Buck v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 198 Neb. 125, 251 N.W.2d 875 (1977).
Disability under this act refers to employability and earning capacity rather than loss of bodily functions. Johnson v. Village of Winnebago, 197 Neb. 845, 251 N.W.2d 176 (1977).
Compensation court disability award reversed where claimant suffered no objective injuries and only medical evidence negated disability assertion. Evans v. Gear Drilling Co., 197 Neb. 841, 251 N.W.2d 173 (1977).
Filing of transcript on appeal to Supreme Court was duty of clerk of district court. Miller v. Peterson, 165 Neb. 344, 85 N.W.2d 700 (1957).
Powers of district judge may be exercised at chambers. Mueller v. Keeley, 163 Neb. 613, 80 N.W.2d 707 (1957).
Hearsay evidence admitted without objection may sustain a finding of fact in compensation case. Maul v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 137 Neb. 128, 288 N.W. 532 (1939).
48-186.
Accidents occurring outside state; hearing; location; exception.In all cases when the accident occurred outside of the State of Nebraska, the hearing before a judge of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall be at Lincoln, Nebraska, or in any other county in the state at the discretion of the compensation court, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties at least fourteen days before the date of hearing.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 15, p. 195; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-176; R.S.1943, § 48-186;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 15; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 116; Laws 1989, LB 261, § 1.
Annotations
Where accident occurred in another state, appeal was taken to district court for Lancaster County. Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
Nebraska act applies to workmen who are employed in Nebraska industries, even though injury may occur in performance of duties of workman in another state. McRae v. Ulrich, 147 Neb. 214, 22 N.W.2d 697 (1946).
48-187.
Filing fees; clerks of courts; what permitted.No filing fees shall be charged by the clerk of any court for any service required by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act except as provided in sections 48-138, 48-139, and 48-188.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 14, p. 195; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-175; R.S.1943, § 48-187; Laws 1959, c. 140, § 6, p. 548; Laws 1961, c. 235, § 1, p. 694; Laws 1961, c. 157, § 2, p. 481;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 117; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 28.
Annotations
No filing fee is required in workmen's compensation cases. Elliott v. Gooch Feed Mill Co., 147 Neb. 309, 23 N.W.2d 262 (1946).
Filing fees for appeals under Workmen's Compensation Act are not required. Lee v. Lincoln Cleaning & Dye Works, 144 Neb. 659, 14 N.W.2d 227 (1944).
All costs other than filing fees are taxable, and bond or cash deposit must be provided in perfecting appeal to Supreme Court. Hoffman v. State, 142 Neb. 821, 8 N.W.2d 200 (1943).
The Workmen's Compensation Act, being complete and independent in itself, amends the statutory provisions heretofore existing relating to fees on filing appeals in Supreme Court, and filing fee is not required on filing appeal to Supreme Court in compensation case. Scott v. Dohrse, 130 Neb. 847, 266 N.W. 709 (1936).
48-188.
Order, award, or judgment; filed with district court; filing fee; effect.Any order, award, or judgment by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, or any judge thereof, which is certified by the clerk of the compensation court or any order, award, or judgment made pursuant to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court which is certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court may, as soon as the same becomes conclusive upon the parties at interest, be filed with the district court of any county or counties in the State of Nebraska upon the payment of a fee of two dollars to the clerk of the district court or courts where such order, award, or judgment is filed. Upon filing, such order, award, or judgment shall have the same force and effect as a judgment of such district court or courts and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though the order, award, or judgment had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by such district court or courts.
Source:Laws 1935, c. 57, § 16, p. 196; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-177; R.S.1943, § 48-188; Laws 1951, c. 153, § 2, p. 623;
Laws 1975, LB 187, § 16; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 118; Laws 1991, LB 732, § 113;
Laws 2005, LB 13, § 30.
Annotations
The date on which a workers' compensation court award is filed in a district court pursuant to this section is the date of the judgment for purposes of computing when the judgment becomes dormant under section 25-1515. Weber v. Gas `N Shop, 278 Neb. 49, 767 N.W.2d 746 (2009).
The dormancy provisions of section 25-1515 apply to an award of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court which is filed in the district court pursuant to this section, and the date on which a workers' compensation award is filed in district court is the date of judgment for purposes of computing when the judgment becomes dormant. Allen v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 278 Neb. 41, 767 N.W.2d 502 (2009).
This section has a nunc pro tunc, or "now for then," effect. Koterzina v. Copple Chevrolet, 249 Neb. 158, 542 N.W.2d 696 (1996).
Appellate award of attorney fees could be enforced under this section, where party had filed a copy of the award from the Workers' Compensation Court and had entered the appellate award into evidence. An award by the Supreme Court becomes "conclusive upon the parties" when it issues a mandate. Sherard v. State, 244 Neb. 743, 509 N.W.2d 194 (1993).
Workmen's Compensation Act, being complete and independent in itself, amends statutes already existing relative to filing fees without violating the constitutional provision relating to amendments, and no filing fees are required in compensation cases. Scott v. Dohrse, 130 Neb. 847, 266 N.W. 709 (1936).
48-189.
Repealed. Laws 1951, c. 155, § 1.
48-190.
Suit against state or governmental agency; summons; service.The state and governmental agencies created by the state may be sued in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court upon claims for compensation benefits under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act in the same manner as provided by such act for suits against individuals and corporations. In such proceedings summons issued by the compensation court shall be served in the manner provided for service of a summons in section 25-510.02. The issuance and service of summons in such manner shall be binding upon the state and such agencies in such actions, and the Attorney General is hereby authorized and empowered to waive the issuance and service of summons and enter voluntary appearance in such suits against the State of Nebraska.
Source:Laws 1940, Spec. Sess., c. 1, § 1, p. 53; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-180; R.S.1943, § 48-190;
Laws 1983, LB 447, § 70; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 119; Laws 1997, LB 165, § 3.
48-191.
Time; how computed.Notwithstanding any more general or special law respecting
the subject matter hereof, whenever the last day of the period within which
a party to an action may file any document or pleading with
the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, or take any other action with respect
to a claim for compensation, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, any day on which
the compensation court is closed by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, or any day declared by statutory enactment or proclamation of the Governor
to be a holiday, the next following day, which is not a Saturday, a Sunday,
a day on which the compensation court is closed by order of the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, or a day declared by such enactment or proclamation
to be a holiday, shall be deemed to be the last day for filing any such document or pleading or taking any such other
action with respect to a claim for compensation.
Annotations
The plain language of this section is broad enough to include not only transactions between a party and the court, but also transactions between the parties. Herrington v. P.R. Ventures, 279 Neb. 754, 781 N.W.2d 196 (2010).
48-192.
Purpose of sections.The Legislature declares that it is its intent and purpose through sections 48-192 to 48-1,109 to provide uniform procedures for the bringing of workers' compensation claims against the state, and that the procedures provided by sections 48-192 to 48-1,109 shall be used to the exclusion of all others.
48-193.
Terms, defined.For purposes of sections 48-192 to 48-1,109, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) State agency shall include all departments, agencies, boards, courts, bureaus, and commissions of the State of Nebraska and corporations the primary function of which is to act as, and while acting as, instrumentalities or agencies of the State of Nebraska, including the University of Nebraska and the state colleges, but shall not include corporations that are essentially private corporations or entities created pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act or the Joint Public Agency Act. State agency shall not be construed to include any contractor with the State of Nebraska except and unless such contractor comes within the provisions of section 48-116;
(2) Employee of the state shall mean any one or more officers or employees of the state or any state agency and shall include duly appointed members of boards or commissions when they are acting in their official capacity. State employee shall not be construed to include any employee of an entity created pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act or the Joint Public Agency Act or any contractor with the State of Nebraska unless such contractor comes within the provisions of section 48-116;
(3) Workers' compensation claim shall mean any claim against the State of Nebraska arising under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act; and
(4) Award shall mean any amount determined by the Risk Manager and the Attorney General to be payable to a claimant under sections 48-192 to 48-1,109 or the amount of any compromise or settlement under such sections.
Source:Laws 1971, LB 390, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 811, § 122; Laws 1991, LB 6, § 1; Laws 1991, LB 81, § 3; Laws 1999, LB 87, § 75; Laws 2019, LB418, § 2.
Cross References
Interlocal Cooperation Act, see section 13-801.
Joint Public Agency Act, see section 13-2501.
48-194.
Risk Manager; authority; Attorney General; duties.The Risk Manager with the advice of the Attorney General shall have the authority to pay claims of all workers' compensation benefits when liability is undisputed. In any claims when liability or the amount of liability is disputed by the Attorney General, authority is hereby conferred upon the Attorney General to consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, and allow any workers' compensation claim. If any such claim is compromised or settled, the approval of the claimant, the Risk Manager, and the Attorney General shall be required and such settlements also shall be approved by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court following the procedure in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
Source:Laws 1971, LB 390, § 3; Laws 1972, LB 1334, § 1; Laws 1981, LB 273, § 10;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 123; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 29; Laws 2019, LB418, § 3.
48-195.
Rules and regulations.The risk management and state claims division of the Department of Administrative Services may, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out sections 48-192 to 48-1,109.
Cross References
Administrative Procedure Act, see section 84-920.
48-196.
State agency; handle claims; Attorney General; supervision.The Risk Manager may delegate to a state agency the handling of workers' compensation claims of employees of that agency, under the supervision and direction of the Attorney General.
48-197.
Claims; filing; investigation; report.All claims under sections 48-192 to 48-1,109 shall be filed with the Risk Manager. The Risk Manager shall immediately advise the Attorney General of the filing of any claim. It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to cause a complete investigation to be made of all such claims. Whenever any state agency receives notice or has knowledge of any alleged injury under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, such state agency shall immediately file a first report of such alleged injury with the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court and the Risk Manager and shall file such other forms as may be required by such court or the Risk Manager.
Source:Laws 1971, LB 390, § 6; Laws 1972, LB 1334, § 2; Laws 1981, LB 273, § 11;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 126; Laws 1992, Third Spec. Sess., LB 14, § 2; Laws 2019, LB418, § 6.
48-198.
Suits; filing; attorney's fee; expenses; allowance.Suits shall be brought in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court as set out in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, and the compensation court shall in each case designate and allow the amount of the attorney's fee and expenses to be paid from, but not in addition to, the award or judgment to the attorney representing the employee or his or her personal representatives, except as provided in section 48-125.
48-199.
Suits; liability of state.In all suits brought under sections 48-192 to 48-1,109, the state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, except that no writ of execution shall issue against the state or any state agency, and disposition of or offer to settle any claim made under sections 48-192 to 48-1,109 shall not be competent evidence of liability of the state or any employee or amount of damages.
Annotations
Under former law, in order to harmonize this section and sections 48-1,102 and 48-125 in the context of waiting-time penalties in a manner which is consistent with the overall purpose of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, the Supreme Court holds that in order to avoid assessment of a waiting-time penalty with respect to that portion of a workers' compensation award against the State which exceeds $50,000, the State must request review and appropriation of such amount during the first legislative session following the date the award became final and must pay such amount within 30 calendar days after the approval of the appropriation by the Legislature. Soto v. State, 270 Neb. 40, 699 N.W.2d 819 (2005).
One of the tests of compensability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in cases related to recreational or social activities, is whether the employer derives substantial direct benefit from the activity. Kuethe v. State, 191 Neb. 167, 214 N.W.2d 380 (1974).
48-1,100.
Attorney General; represent state; duties; powers.The Attorney General shall represent the state in any suit brought under sections 48-192 to 48-1,109, and is authorized to compromise or settle any such suit, with the approval of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court.
48-1,101.
Attorney General; delegation of powers and duties.The Attorney General may authorize the deputy attorney general in charge of the Claims Division of the Department of Justice to perform any of the duties imposed upon the Attorney General by sections 48-192 to 48-1,109, and may employ other persons, firms, or corporations to investigate claims under sections 48-192 to 48-1,109.
48-1,102.
Award or judgment; payment; procedure.Any final, nonappealable award or judgment in favor of a claimant under sections 48-192 to 48-1,109 shall be certified by the Attorney General to the Risk Manager and to the Director of Administrative Services. The Director of Administrative Services shall promptly issue his or her warrant for payment of such award or judgment out of the Workers' Compensation Claims Revolving Fund, if sufficient money is available in such fund, except that no portion in excess of one hundred thousand dollars of any award or judgment shall be paid until such award or judgment has been reviewed by the Legislature and specific appropriation made therefor. Notice of any portion of an award or judgment in excess of one hundred thousand dollars shall be delivered by the Risk Manager to the chairperson of the Business and Labor Committee of the Legislature at the next regular session of the Legislature convening after the date the award or judgment becomes final and nonappealable. Delivery of any warrant in satisfaction of an award or judgment shall be made only upon receipt of a written receipt by the claimant in a form provided by the Attorney General.
Annotations
Under former law, in order to harmonize this section and sections 48-199 and 48-125 in the context of waiting-time penalties in a manner which is consistent with the overall purpose of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, the Supreme Court holds that in order to avoid assessment of a waiting-time penalty with respect to that portion of a workers' compensation award against the State which exceeds $50,000, the State must request review and appropriation of such amount during the first legislative session following the date the award became final and must pay such amount within 30 calendar days after the approval of the appropriation by the Legislature. Soto v. State, 270 Neb. 40, 699 N.W.2d 819 (2005).
Under former law, with respect to that portion of a workers' compensation award against the State which exceeds $50,000, the 30-day period specified in subsection (1) of section 48-125 does not begin until the first day after the judgment becomes final on which the State could request review and appropriation pursuant to this section during a regular session of the Legislature. A waiting-time penalty may be assessed pursuant to section 48-125 if payment is not made within 30 calendar days thereafter. Soto v. State, 269 Neb. 337, 693 N.W.2d 491 (2005).
48-1,103.
Workers' Compensation Claims Revolving Fund; established; deficiency; notify Legislature; investment.There is hereby established in the state treasury a Workers' Compensation Claims Revolving Fund, to be administered by the Risk Manager, from which all workers' compensation costs, including prevention and administration, shall be paid. The fund may also be used to pay the costs of administering the Risk Management Program. The fund shall receive deposits from assessments against state agencies charged by the Risk Manager to pay for workers' compensation costs. When the amount of money in the Workers' Compensation Claims Revolving Fund is not sufficient to pay any awards or judgments under sections 48-192 to 48-1,109, the Risk Manager shall immediately advise the Legislature and request an emergency appropriation to satisfy such awards and judgments. Any money in the Workers' Compensation Claims Revolving Fund available for investment shall be invested by the state investment officer pursuant to the Nebraska Capital Expansion Act and the Nebraska State Funds Investment Act. Beginning October 1, 2024, any investment earnings from investment of money in the fund shall be credited to the General Fund.
Source:Laws 1971, LB 390, § 12; Laws 1981, LB 273, § 12;
Laws 1986, LB 811, § 130; Laws 1994, LB 1211, § 3; Laws 1995, LB 7, § 45; Laws 2011, LB378, § 22; Laws 2024, First Spec. Sess., LB3, § 14. Effective Date: August 21, 2024
Cross References
Nebraska Capital Expansion Act, see section 72-1269.
Nebraska State Funds Investment Act, see section 72-1260.
48-1,104.
Risk Manager; report; contents.The Risk Manager shall submit electronically a report
to the Clerk of the Legislature by January 15 of each year, which report shall
include the number of claims for which payments have been made, the amounts
paid by categories of medical, hospital, compensation, and other costs separated
by the agency and program or activity under which the claim arose. Each member
of the Legislature shall receive an electronic copy of such
report by making a request for it to the Risk Manager.
Source:Laws 1971, LB 390, § 13; Laws 1972, LB 1334, § 3; Laws 1977, LB 399, § 1; Laws 1979, LB 322, § 16; Laws 1981, LB 545, § 52; Laws 1981, LB 273, § 13;
Laws 2012, LB782, § 59.
48-1,105.
Immunity of state reserved; exception.From and after August 27, 1971, the authority of any state agency to sue or be sued in its own name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such state agency on workers' compensation claims except as authorized in sections 48-192 to 48-1,109. The remedies provided by sections 48-192 to 48-1,109 in such cases shall be exclusive.
48-1,106.
Sections, how construed.Nothing in sections 48-192 to 48-1,109 shall be deemed to repeal any provision of law authorizing any state agency to consider, ascertain, adjust, compromise, settle, determine, allow, or pay any claim other than a workers' compensation claim as defined in sections 48-192 to 48-1,109.
48-1,107.
Insurance; Risk Manager; purchase; when.The Risk Manager may, if after proper investigation he or she deems it to be in the best interests of the state, purchase a policy or policies of insurance for investigation, servicing, and payment, or any one or two of such factors, of workers' compensation to protect the agencies and their employees. Such policy or policies shall contain such conditions, requirements, limitations, and amounts deemed necessary by the Risk Manager. The Risk Manager shall purchase such policy or policies by public letting and payment shall be made therefor out of the State Insurance Fund created pursuant to section 81-8,239.02.
48-1,108.
Insurance policy; applicability; company; Attorney General; Risk Manager; cooperate.Whenever a claim or suit against the state is covered by workers' compensation insurance, the provisions of the insurance policy on defense and settlement shall be applicable notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of sections 48-192 to 48-1,109. The Attorney General and the Risk Manager shall cooperate with the insurance company.
48-1,109.
Employees; information; furnish; refusal; effect.When any employee is injured in any accident or suffers any occupational disease arising out of or in the course of his or her employment, such employee as soon as practicable shall report full information on such occurrence to the head of the agency by which he or she is employed. The head of the agency shall furnish immediately all available information on such occurrence to the Risk Manager. All employees shall cooperate fully with the Attorney General in the investigation of all workers' compensation claims. Failure to comply with this section shall constitute grounds for dismissal from employment.
48-1,110.
Act, how cited.Sections 48-101 to 48-1,117 shall be known and may be cited as the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
Source:Laws 1986, LB 811, § 136; Laws 1986, LB 1036, § 2; Laws 1990, LB 313, § 4; Laws 1992, LB 360, § 26; Laws 1993, LB 757, § 30; Laws 1997, LB 128, § 7; Laws 1997, LB 474, § 7; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 32; Laws 2007, LB588, § 5; Laws 2010, LB780, § 3; Laws 2011, LB151, § 16; Laws 2015, LB480, § 5; Laws 2019, LB418, § 9.
48-1,111.
Repealed. Laws 2013, LB21, § 2.
48-1,112.
Laws 2011, LB151, changes; applicability.Cases pending
before the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court on August 27, 2011, in which
a hearing on the merits has been held prior to such date shall not be affected
by the changes made in sections 48-125, 48-145.01, 48-155, 48-156, 48-170, 48-178, 48-180, 48-182, and 48-185 by Laws 2011, LB151. Any cause of action
not in suit on August 27, 2011, and any cause of action in suit in which a
hearing on the merits has not been held prior to such date shall follow the
procedures in such sections as amended by Laws 2011, LB151.
Annotations
The hearing on a motion to enforce an award of compensation is the hearing on the merits referenced in this section. The hearing prior to the entry of the award is not the hearing on the merits referenced in this section. DeLeon v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 287 Neb. 419, 843 N.W.2d 601 (2014).
48-1,113.
Insurance company and risk management pool; annual payment; amount; Director of Insurance; powers and duties.Every insurance company which is transacting workers' compensation insurance business in this state shall on or before March 1 of each year pay to the Director of Insurance an amount equal to one percent of the gross amount of direct writing premiums received by the company during the preceding calendar year for workers' compensation insurance business transacted in this state. Every risk management pool providing workers' compensation group self-insurance coverage to any of its members shall on or before March 1 of each year pay to the Director of Insurance an amount equal to one percent of the annual contributions received by the pool to provide workers' compensation coverage less any amount paid for excess or aggregate workers' compensation insurance during the immediately preceding calendar year. For the purpose of calculating the amount due, a pool which has a scheme of operations that contemplates a return of a portion of the contributions of pool members without such members being claimants under the pool's insuring agreements may deduct such return contributions and any dividends paid during the immediately preceding calendar year that are attributable to workers' compensation. The computation of the amount shall be made on forms furnished by the Department of Insurance and shall be forwarded to the department together with a sworn statement by an appropriate fiscal officer of the company or the pool's chief operating officer attesting the accuracy of the computation. The department shall furnish the forms to the companies and risk management pools prior to the end of the year for which the amounts are payable together with any information deemed necessary or appropriate by the department.
Upon receipt of the payment, the director shall audit and examine the computations to determine that the proper amount has been paid. After notice and hearing in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, the Director of Insurance may rescind or refuse to reissue the certificate of authority of any company which fails to remit the amount due.
The Director of Insurance shall remit the amounts paid to the State Treasurer for credit to the Compensation Court Cash Fund, except that (1) when there is a dispute as to the amount payable, the proceeds shall be credited to a suspense account in the state treasury until disposition of the controversy and (2) one percent of the amounts received shall be credited to the Department of Insurance to cover the costs of administration.
Cross References
Administrative Procedure Act, see section 84-920.
48-1,114.
Self-insurer; annual payment; amount.Every employer in the occupations described in section 48-106 who qualifies as a self-insurer and is issued a permit to self-insure shall remit to the State Treasurer for credit to the Compensation Court Cash Fund an annual amount equal to one and one-quarter percent of the prospective loss costs for like employment but in no event less than one hundred dollars. Prospective loss costs is defined in section 48-151. The compensation court is the sole judge as to the prospective loss costs that shall be used.
48-1,115.
Other payments; cumulative.The amounts required to be paid by insurance companies, risk management pools, and self-insurers under sections 48-1,113 and 48-1,114 shall be in addition to any other amounts, either in taxes, assessments, or otherwise, required by any other law of this state.
48-1,116.
Compensation Court Cash Fund; created; use; investment.The Compensation Court Cash Fund is hereby created. The fund shall be used to aid in providing for the expense of administering the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and the payment of the salaries and expenses of the personnel of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court.
All fees received pursuant to sections 48-120, 48-120.02, 48-138, 48-139, 48-145.04, and 48-165 shall be remitted to the State Treasurer for credit to the Compensation Court Cash Fund. The fund shall also consist of amounts credited to the fund pursuant to sections 48-1,113, 48-1,114, and 77-912. The State Treasurer may receive and credit to the fund any money which may at any time be contributed to the state or the fund by the federal government or any agency thereof to which the state may be or become entitled under any act of Congress or otherwise by reason of any payment made from the fund.
Any money in the fund available for investment shall be invested by the state investment officer pursuant to the Nebraska Capital Expansion Act and the Nebraska State Funds Investment Act.
Source:Laws 1993, LB 757, § 22; Laws 1994, LB 1066, § 35; Laws 2002, LB 1310, § 5; Laws 2005, LB 13, § 33; Laws 2009, First Spec. Sess., LB3, § 24; Laws 2017, LB331, § 24; Laws 2018, LB945, § 11; Laws 2019, LB293, § 30.
Cross References
Nebraska Capital Expansion Act, see section 72-1269.
Nebraska State Funds Investment Act, see section 72-1260.
48-1,117.
Compensation Court Cash Fund; accounting; abatement of contributions.The Department of Administrative Services shall furnish monthly to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court a statement of the Compensation Court Cash Fund setting forth the balance in the fund as of the first day of the preceding month, the income and its sources, the payments from the fund in itemized form, and the balance in the fund on hand as of the last day of the preceding month.
At the close of business on June 30 of any year, if the balance in the fund is equal to or exceeds three times the sum expended and encumbered in the fiscal year then ending, the contributions to the fund pursuant to sections 48-1,113 and 48-1,114 shall abate for the calendar year next ensuing and only for that year and the compensation court shall notify all self-insurers and the Director of Insurance who shall notify all workers' compensation insurers and risk management pools of such abatement and of the date when such contributions shall resume. No abatement shall ever extend beyond one year.
48-1,118.
Cost-benefit analysis and review
of Laws 1993, LB 757; reports.On January 1, 1997, the Governor
shall direct the Director of Insurance and the Commissioner of Labor to conduct
and complete a cost-benefit analysis and a review of the effectiveness of
the changes made by Laws 1993, LB 757, to control or reduce the cost of workers'
compensation premiums. Information for the study may be elicited from interested
persons and from the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. The director and
the commissioner shall submit a report, which may include recommendations
for further legislation, to the chairperson of the Business and Labor Committee
of the Legislature, the Clerk of the Legislature, and the Governor by October
1, 1997. The Business and Labor Committee of the Legislature shall hold a
public hearing on the study and shall submit a report to the Legislature by
December 1, 1997. The Governor or the Legislature, by resolution, may require
a similar study in 1999 and every two years thereafter. Any report submitted to the committee and the Clerk of
the Legislature shall be submitted electronically.
48-201.
Current or former employer; disclosure
of information; immunity from civil liability; consent; form; period valid;
applicability of section.(1)(a)
A current or former employer may disclose the following information about
a current or former employee's employment history to a prospective employer
of the current or former employee upon receipt of written consent from the
current or former employee:
(i) Date and duration
of employment;
(ii)
Pay rate and wage history on the date of receipt of written consent;
(iii) Job description
and duties;
(iv)
The most recent written performance evaluation prepared prior to the date
of the request and provided to the employee during the course of his or her
employment;
(v)
Attendance information;
(vi)
Results of drug or alcohol tests administered within one year prior to the
request;
(vii)
Threats of violence, harassing acts, or threatening behavior related to the
workplace or directed at another employee;
(viii) Whether the employee was voluntarily or involuntarily
separated from employment and the reasons for the separation; and
(ix) Whether the employee
is eligible for rehire.
(b)
The current or former employer disclosing such information shall be presumed
to be acting in good faith and shall be immune from civil liability for the
disclosure or any consequences of such disclosure unless the presumption of
good faith is rebutted upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the information disclosed by the current or former employer was false, and
the current or former employer had knowledge of its falsity or acted with
malice or reckless disregard for the truth.
(2)(a) The consent required in subsection (1) of this
section shall be on a separate form from the application form or, if included
in the application form, shall be in bold letters and in larger typeface than
the largest typeface in the text of the application form. The consent form
shall state, at a minimum, language similar to the following:
I, (applicant), hereby
give consent to any and all prior employers of mine to provide information
with regard to my employment with prior employers to (prospective employer).
(b) The consent must be
signed and dated by the applicant.
(c) The consent will be valid for no longer than six
months.
(3)
This section shall also apply to any current or former employee, agent, or
other representative of the current or former employer who is authorized to
provide and who provides information in accordance with this section.
(4)(a) This section does
not require any prospective employer to request employment history on a prospective
employee and does not require any current or former employer to disclose employment
history to any prospective employer.
(b) Except as specifically amended in this section,
the common law of this state remains unchanged as it relates to providing
employment information on current and former employees.
(c) This section applies
only to causes of action accruing on and after July 19, 2012.
(5) The immunity conferred
by this section shall not apply when an employer discriminates or retaliates
against an employee because the employee has exercised or is believed to have
exercised any federal or state statutory right or undertaken any action encouraged
by the public policy of this state.
48-202.
Public employer; applicant; disclosure
of criminal record or history; limitation.(1) Except as otherwise provided in this
section, a public employer shall not ask an applicant for employment to disclose,
orally or in writing, information concerning the applicant's criminal record
or history, including any inquiry on any employment application, until the
public employer has determined the applicant meets the minimum employment
qualifications.
(2) This section
does not apply to any law enforcement agency, to any position for which a
public employer is required by federal or state law to conduct a criminal
history record information check, or to any position for which federal or
state law specifically disqualifies an applicant with a criminal background.
(3)(a) This section
does not prevent a public employer that is a school district or educational
service unit from requiring an applicant for employment to disclose an applicant's
criminal record or history relating to sexual or physical abuse.
(b) This section
does not prevent a public employer from preparing or delivering an employment
application that conspicuously states that a criminal history record information
check is required by federal law, state law, or the employer's policy.
(c) This section
does not prevent a public employer from conducting a criminal history record
information check after the public employer has determined that the applicant
meets the minimum employment qualifications.
(4) For purposes of this
section:
(a) Law enforcement agency means an agency or department of this
state or of any political subdivision of this state which is responsible for
the prevention and detection of crime, the enforcement of the penal, traffic,
or highway laws of this state or any political subdivision of this state,
and the enforcement of arrest warrants. Law enforcement agency includes a
police department, an office of the town marshal, an office of the county
sheriff, the Nebraska State Patrol, and any department to which a deputy state
sheriff is assigned as provided in section 84-106; and
(b) Public employer
means an agency or department of this state or of any political subdivision
of this state.
48-203.
Legislative findings, declarations, and intent; veterans' program coordinator; qualifications; duties; Department of Veterans' Affairs; duties.(1) The Legislature finds and declares that:
(a) Nebraska is a welcoming state for veterans and their families; and
(b) Nebraska is committed to workforce development initiatives that help attract and retain veterans and their families.
(2) It is the intent of the Legislature to:
(a) Increase efforts to create public awareness among veterans and their families about the benefits of living and working in Nebraska, including special initiatives enacted to make Nebraska a veteran-friendly state; and
(b) Develop new initiatives to better connect veterans to Nebraska's job market and the workforce development needs of employers.
(3) The position of veterans' program coordinator shall be maintained by the Department of Labor. The coordinator shall be a veteran and a full-time employee of the Department of Labor and shall:
(a) Seek advice and input from the Commission on Military and Veteran Affairs related to veterans' workforce development issues;
(b) Be a nonvoting, ex officio member of the Commission on Military and Veteran Affairs; and
(c) Submit an annual progress report to the Commission on Military and Veteran Affairs.
(4) The Department of Labor shall provide the necessary staff to assist the veterans' program coordinator in carrying out the purposes of this section.
(5) The Department of Veterans' Affairs shall:
(a) Develop a website, in collaboration with the Department of Labor, with a job-search tool specific to veterans. Such website shall be implemented on a date designated by the Director of Veterans' Affairs when sufficient cash funds have accumulated in the Veterans Employment Program Fund to develop such website, but no later than June 30, 2024; and
(b) Research best practices and websites specific to veterans from other states.
48-204.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 398, § 1.
48-205.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 398, § 1.
48-206.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 398, § 1.
48-207.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 398, § 1.
48-208.
Repealed. Laws 1969, c. 398, § 1.
48-209.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB1016, § 12.
48-210.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB1016, § 12.
48-211.
Repealed. Laws 2020, LB1016, § 12.
48-212.
Lunch hour; requirements; applicability.Any person, firm, or corporation owning or operating an assembling plant, workshop, or mechanical establishment employing one or more persons shall allow all of their employees not less than thirty consecutive minutes for lunch in each eight-hour shift, and during such time it shall be unlawful for any such employer to require such employee or employees to remain in buildings or on the premises where their labor is performed. This section does not apply to employment that is covered by a valid collective-bargaining agreement or other written agreement between an employer and employee.
Source:Laws 1931, c. 96, § 1, p. 265; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-215; R.S.1943, § 48-212; Laws 1955, c. 188, § 1, p. 536;
Laws 2004, LB 382, § 1.
48-213.
Lunch hour; violation; penalty.Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of section 48-212 shall be guilty of a Class III misdemeanor.
48-214.
Collective bargaining; race or color discrimination prohibited.It is hereby declared to be the policy of this state that no representative agency of labor, in collective bargaining with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or other conditions of work, shall, in such collective bargaining, discriminate against any person because of his race or color. The Department of Labor shall be and hereby is charged with the duty of enforcement of this policy in conformity with Article I of the Constitution of Nebraska and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.
Source:Laws 1941, c. 96, § 1, p. 406; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-801; R.S.1943, § 48-214.
Cross References
Actions of employees in collective bargaining with employers, designation of plaintiff, process, and execution of judgment, see sections 25-313 and 25-530.08.
Civil rights, see Chapter 20.
Annotations
Enforcement of policy of collective bargaining in labor disputes was a matter of statewide and not local concern. Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131 N.W.2d 609 (1964).
48-215.
Military supplies; production; distribution; discrimination prohibited.It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, engaged to any extent whatsoever in the State of Nebraska in the production, manufacture or distribution of military or naval material, equipment or supplies for the State of Nebraska or the government of the United States, to refuse to employ any person in any capacity, if said person is a citizen and is qualified, on account of the race, color, creed, religion or national origin of said person.
Source:Laws 1943, c. 114, § 1, p. 400; R.S.1943, § 48-215.
Annotations
This section prohibits racial discrimination by persons producing or distributing military or naval supplies. Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131 N.W.2d 609 (1964).
48-216.
Military supplies; discrimination; violation; penalty.Any person, firm or corporation, violating any of the provisions of section 48-215, shall be guilty of a Class III misdemeanor. Each violation of section 48-215 shall be a separate offense.
48-217.
Labor organizations; membership or nonmembership; prohibited acts.To make operative the provisions of sections 13, 14 and 15 of Article XV of the Constitution of Nebraska, no person shall be denied employment because of membership in or affiliation with, or resignation or expulsion from a labor organization or because of refusal to join, affiliate with, or pay a fee either directly or indirectly to a labor organization; nor shall any individual or corporation or association of any kind enter into any contract, written or oral, to exclude persons from employment because of membership in or nonmembership in a labor organization.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 177, § 1, p. 585; Laws 1961, c. 236, § 1, p. 699.
Annotations
Right to work was a right guaranteed by both state and federal Constitutions. Hanson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526 (1955).
Provisions of federal Railway Labor Act superseded and were controlling over requirements of this section. Railway Employees Department, American Federation of Labor v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
Public policy that employment not be denied on basis of union membership includes public as well as private employment. American Federation of State, Co., & Mun. Emp. v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969).
48-218.
Labor organization, defined.The term labor organization means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
Source:Laws 1947, c. 177, § 2, p. 585.
48-219.
Labor organization; violation; penalty.Any individual, corporation or association that enters into a contract after September 7, 1947, in violation of the provisions of section 48-217, shall be guilty of a Class IV misdemeanor.
48-220.
Medical examinations; employer, defined.As used in sections 48-220 to 48-223, unless the context otherwise requires, employer shall mean and include an individual, a partnership, a limited liability company, an association, a corporation, a legal representative, a trustee, a receiver, a trustee in bankruptcy, and any common carrier by rail, motor, water, air, or express company doing business in or operating within the state.
48-221.
Medical examination; cost to applicant as condition of employment; unlawful; cost to employer.It shall be unlawful for any employer, as defined in section 48-220, to require any applicant for employment, to pay the cost of a medical examination required by the employer as a condition of employment. When the employer requests an applicant for a position to submit to a medical examination, the employer shall assume the cost thereof.
Source:Laws 1963, c. 280, § 2, p. 837.
48-222.
Medical examination as condition of employment; violation; penalty.Any employer who violates the provisions of section 48-221 shall be guilty of a Class V misdemeanor. Each violation shall constitute a separate offense. It shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Labor to enforce the provisions of sections 48-220 to 48-223.
48-223.
Medical examination as condition of employment; exemptions from sections.The provisions of sections 48-220 to 48-223 shall not apply to any employment relationship entered into by the state or any subdivision of the state when a physical examination is required by law as a condition of employment.
Source:Laws 1963, c. 280, § 4, p. 838.
48-224.
Withholding of wages; when authorized.(1) Any employee of the State of Nebraska, any municipal corporation, or any public body or agency created by the laws of this state, who desires to participate voluntarily in any employee organization, credit union, or any community charity or public welfare plan approved by the Governor and the Director of Administrative Services, in the case of employees of the State of Nebraska, or by the duly elected governing body of such municipal corporation or other public body or agency, may execute an order authorizing the withholding from any wages or salary paid to such employee of a sum each month or pay period and the same to be paid to the designated recipient thereof. For purposes of this section, community charity includes any not-for-profit federation of health and human services agencies and associations.
(2) If a not-for-profit federation of health and human services agencies and associations is authorized pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, approval to similar not-for-profit federations shall also be granted on a similar equitable basis. For purposes of this subsection, a similar not-for-profit federation shall meet the following requirements:
(a) The federation has had an established office in the state for at least the last five years;
(b) The federation represents at least ten Nebraska-based health and human services agencies and associations in addition to the federation;
(c) The federation is a Nebraska corporation in good standing which holds a valid 501(c)(3) designation by the Internal Revenue Code;
(d) The federation and its agencies have an active, voluntary board which exercises administrative control over the federation and holds regular meetings; and
(e) The federation has a program focus and service delivery which is organized on either a statewide or regional basis.
Annotations
A political subdivision is not compelled to check off dues for a union because it has certified the union and agreed to bargain with it. State ex rel. Council #32 v. City of Hastings, 214 Neb. 20, 332 N.W.2d 661 (1983).
Cited as indicating public policy allowing public employees to join labor union. American Federation of State, Co., & Mun. Emp. v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969).
48-225.
Veterans preference; terms, defined.For purposes of sections 48-225 to 48-231:
(1) Servicemember means a person who serves on active duty in the armed forces of the United States except for training;
(2) Veteran means:
(a) A person who served full-time duty with military pay and allowances in the armed forces of the United States, except for training or for determining physical fitness, and was discharged or otherwise separated with a characterization of honorable or general (under honorable conditions); or
(b) The spouse of a veteran who has a one hundred percent permanent disability as determined by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs;
(3) Full-time duty means duty during time of war or during a period recognized by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs as qualifying for veterans benefits administered by the department and that such duty from January 31, 1955, to February 28, 1961, exceeded one hundred eighty days unless lesser duty was the result of a service-connected or service-aggravated disability;
(4) Disabled veteran means an individual who has served on active duty in the armed forces of the United States, has been discharged or otherwise separated with a characterization of honorable or general (under honorable conditions) therefrom, and has established the present existence of a service-connected disability or is receiving compensation, disability retirement benefits, or pension because of a public statute administered by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs or a military department; and
(5) Preference eligible means any veteran as defined in this section or the spouse of a servicemember as defined in this section, except that for a spouse of a servicemember such preference is limited to the time during which the servicemember serves on active duty as described in subdivision (1) of this section and up to one hundred eighty days after the servicemember's discharge or separation from service.
Source:Laws 1969, c. 751, § 1, p. 2826;
Laws 1991, LB 2, § 6; Laws 2001, LB 368, § 1; Laws 2005, LB 54, § 7; Laws 2014, LB588, § 2; Laws 2017, LB639, § 1.
48-226.
Veterans preference; required, when.A preference shall be given to preference eligibles seeking employment with the State of Nebraska or its governmental subdivisions. Such preference includes initial employment or a return to employment with the State of Nebraska or its governmental subdivisions if termination of previous employment was for other than disciplinary reasons.
48-227.
Veterans preference; examination or numerical scoring; notice and application; statement; veteran; duty; notice; contents.(1) Veterans who obtain passing scores on all parts or phases of an examination or numerical scoring shall have five percent added to their passing score if a claim for such preference is made on the application. An additional five percent shall be added to the passing score or numerical scoring of any disabled veteran.
(2) When no examination or numerical scoring is used, the preference shall be given to the qualifying veteran if two or more equally qualified candidates are being considered for the position.
(3) All notices of positions of employment available for veterans preference and all applications for such positions by the state or its governmental subdivisions shall state that the position is subject to a veterans preference.
(4) A veteran desiring to use a veterans preference shall provide the hiring authority with a copy of the veteran's Department of Defense Form 214, also known as the DD Form 214, or its successor form or record. A spouse of a veteran desiring to use a veterans preference shall provide the hiring authority with a copy of the veteran's Department of Defense Form 214 or its successor form or record, a copy of the veteran's disability verification from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs demonstrating a one hundred percent permanent disability rating, and proof of marriage to the veteran. Any marriage claimed for veterans preference must be valid under Nebraska law.
(5) Within thirty days after filling a position, veterans who have applied and are not hired shall be notified by regular mail, electronic mail, telephone call, or personal service that they have not been hired. Such notice also shall advise the veteran of any administrative appeal available.
Source:Laws 1969, c. 751, § 3, p. 2827;
Laws 1997, LB 5, § 2; Laws 2005, LB 54, § 8; Laws 2014, LB588, § 3; Laws 2018, LB497, § 1.
48-228.
Repealed. Laws 1997, LB 5, § 5.
48-229.
Veterans preference; Commissioner of Labor; duties.It shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Labor to enforce the provisions of sections 48-225 to 48-231. The commissioner shall act on preference claims as follows:
(1) When the employing agency and the claimant are in disagreement or when there is doubt as to any preference claim, the commissioner shall adjudicate the claim based on information given in the claim, the documents supporting the claim, and information which may be received from the armed forces of the United States, the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, or the National Archives and Records Administration;
(2) The commissioner shall allow a tentative five-percent preference, pending receipt of additional information, to any person who claims either a five-percent or a ten-percent preference but who furnishes insufficient information to establish entitlement thereto at the time of examination; and
(3) The commissioner shall decide appeals from preference determinations made by any employing agency.
48-230.
Veterans preference; violations; penalty.Any person who violates sections 48-225 to 48-231 shall be guilty of a Class IV misdemeanor. Such person shall be prohibited from receiving any compensation from public funds until he or she complies with sections 48-225 to 48-231.
48-231.
Veterans preference; county attorney; duties.The county attorneys, in their respective counties, shall prosecute, before any court of appropriate jurisdiction, all persons charged with violating sections 48-225 to 48-231.
48-232.
Anabolic steroids; terms, defined.For purposes of section 48-233:
(1) Anabolic steroid shall have the definition found in section 28-401;
(2) Employee shall mean any person, paid or unpaid, who in any way assists an entity in carrying out the business activities of such entity. Employee shall include an independent contractor;
(3) Institution shall mean any public elementary, secondary, or postsecondary educational institution;
(4) Political subdivision shall have the definition found in section 13-903;
(5) State agency shall have the definition of agency as found in section 81-1705; and
(6) Subordinate employee shall mean a person employed by the same employer as and directly or indirectly supervised in the course of such employment by an employee.
48-233.
Anabolic steroids; employees; prohibited acts; sanction.(1) In addition to the penalties provided in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, any employee of a state agency, political subdivision, or institution who possesses, dispenses, delivers, administers, uses, or knowingly allows a subordinate employee or a student attending such employee's employing institution to possess, dispense, deliver, administer, or use an anabolic steroid unless such substance is needed for a valid medical purpose:
(a) For the first conviction, shall be dismissed from employment and shall not be an employee of the dismissing entity or any other state agency, political subdivision, or institution for a period of one year after his or her dismissal; and
(b) For a second or any subsequent conviction, shall be dismissed from employment and shall not thereafter be an employee of the dismissing entity or any other state agency, political subdivision, or institution.
(2) Any sanction imposed pursuant to this section shall be subject to the Administrative Procedure Act except for those employees governed by sections 79-824 to 79-842.
(3) The use of an anabolic steroid for the purpose of hormonal manipulation that is intended to increase muscle mass, strength, or weight without a medical necessity to do so or for the intended purpose of improving physical appearance or performance in any form of exercise, sport, or game shall not be a valid medical purpose or in the course of professional practice.
Cross References
Administrative Procedure Act, see section 84-920.
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, see section 28-401.01.
48-234.
Adoptive parent; leave of absence authorized; enforcement; attorney's fees.(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, whenever an employer, including a governmental agency, permits an employee to take a leave of absence upon the birth of the employee's child, an adoptive parent, following the commencement of the parent-child relationship, is entitled to the same leave upon the same terms.
(2) The adoptive parent leave of absence is not required if the child being adopted is a special needs child over eighteen years of age, a child who is over eight years of age and is not a special needs child, a stepchild being adopted by his or her stepparent, a foster child being adopted by his or her foster parent, or a child who was originally under a voluntary placement for purposes other than adoption without assistance from an attorney, physician, or other individual or agency which later results in a petition for the adoption of the child by the person with whom the voluntary placement was made.
(3) For purposes of this section, commencement of the parent-child relationship means when the child is placed with the employee for the purposes of adoption.
(4) Whenever an employer, including a governmental agency, refuses to extend a child-care leave of absence to an adoptive parent in violation of this section, an aggrieved adoptive parent may bring an action for equitable relief and damages. In all actions brought pursuant to this section, reasonable attorney's fees, as determined by the court, shall be awarded to the prevailing party if the prevailing party is the adoptive parent.
48-235.
Law enforcement officers; ticket quota requirements; prohibited.A state agency or political subdivision shall not directly require a law enforcement officer employed by the state agency or political subdivision to issue a certain number or percentage of traffic citations, police citations, memoranda of traffic violations, memoranda of faulty equipment, or any other type of citation on any periodic basis. The purpose of this section is to prohibit all types of ticket quota requirements for law enforcement officers. For purposes of this section, law enforcement officer includes peace officers as defined in section 49-801 and conservation officers of the Game and Parks Commission.
48-236.
Genetic testing; restrictions.(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) Employee does not include an individual employed in the domestic service of any person;
(b) Employer means a person who has one or more employees;
(c) Genetic information means information about a gene, gene product, or inherited characteristic derived from a genetic test; and
(d) Genetic test means the analysis of human DNA, RNA, and chromosomes and those proteins and metabolites used to detect heritable or somatic disease-related genotypes or karyotypes for clinical purposes. A genetic test must be generally accepted in the scientific and medical communities as being specifically determinative for the presence, absence, or mutation of a gene or chromosome in order to qualify under this definition. Genetic test does not include a routine physical examination or a routine analysis, including a chemical analysis, of body fluids unless conducted specifically to determine the presence, absence, or mutation of a gene or chromosome.
(2) Except as otherwise required by federal law, an employer shall not:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire, recruit, or promote an employee or applicant for employment because of genetic information that is unrelated to the ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position;
(b) Discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee or applicant with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of genetic information that is unrelated to the ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position;
(c) Limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for employment in a way which deprives or tends to deprive an employee or applicant of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affects the status of an employee or applicant because of genetic information that is unrelated to the ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position; or
(d) Require an employee or applicant for employment to submit to a genetic test or to provide genetic information as a condition of employment or promotion.
(3) Subsection (2) of this section does not prohibit an employee from voluntarily providing to an employer genetic information that is related to the employee's health or safety in the workspace. Subsection (2) of this section does not prohibit an employer from using genetic information received from an employee under this subsection to protect the employee's health or safety.
(4) This section shall not apply to the employment of an individual by his or her parent, spouse, or child.
48-237.
Employer; prohibited use of social security numbers; exceptions; violations; penalty; conviction; how treated.(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) Employer means a person which employs any individual within this state as an employee;
(b) Employee means any individual permitted to work by an employer pursuant to an employment relationship or who has contracted to sell the goods of an employer and to be compensated by commission. Services performed by an individual for an employer shall be deemed to be employment, unless it is shown that (i) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his or her contract of service and in fact, (ii) such service is either outside the usual course of business for which such service is performed or such service is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such service is performed, and (iii) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business. This subdivision is not intended to be a codification of the common law and shall be considered complete as written;
(c) Person means the state or any individual, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint-stock company, trust, corporation, political subdivision, or personal representative of the estate of a deceased individual, or the receiver, trustee, or successor thereof;
(d) Temporary employee means an employee of a temporary help firm assigned to work for the clients of such temporary help firm; and
(e) Temporary help firm means a firm that hires its own employees and assigns them to clients to support or supplement the client's workforce in work situations such as employee absences, temporary skill shortages, seasonal workloads, and special assignments and projects.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, an employer shall not:
(a) Publicly post or publicly display in any manner more than the last four digits of an employee's social security number, including intentional communication of more than the last four digits of the social security number or otherwise making more than the last four digits of the social security number available to the general public or to an employee's coworkers;
(b) Require an employee to transmit more than the last four digits of his or her social security number over the Internet unless the connection is secure or the information is encrypted;
(c) Require an employee to use more than the last four digits of his or her social security number to access an Internet website unless a password, unique personal identification number, or other authentication device is also required to access the Internet website; or
(d) Require an employee to use more than the last four digits of his or her social security number as an employee number for any type of employment-related activity.
(3)(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b) of this subsection, an employer shall be permitted to use more than the last four digits of an employee's social security number only for:
(i) Compliance with state or federal laws, rules, or regulations;
(ii) Internal administrative purposes, including provision of more than the last four digits of social security numbers to third parties for such purposes as administration of personnel benefit provisions for the employer and employment screening and staffing; and
(iii) Commercial transactions freely and voluntarily entered into by the employee with the employer for the purchase of goods or services.
(b) The following uses for internal administrative purposes described in subdivision (a)(ii) of this subsection shall not be permitted:
(i) As an identification number for occupational licensing;
(ii) As an identification number for drug-testing purposes except when required by state or federal law;
(iii) As an identification number for company meetings;
(iv) In files with unrestricted access within the company;
(v) In files accessible by any temporary employee unless the temporary employee is bonded or insured under a blanket corporate surety bond or equivalent commercial insurance; or
(vi) For posting any type of company information.
(4) An employer who violates this section is guilty of a Class V misdemeanor.
(5) Evidence of a conviction under this section is admissible in evidence at a civil trial as evidence of the employer's negligence.
48-238.
Veterans preference in private employment; policy; notice to Commissioner of Labor; registry.(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) Private employer means a sole proprietorship, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a limited liability company, or any other entity with one or more employees;
(b) Veteran means (i) a person who served full-time duty with military pay and allowances in the armed forces of the United States, except for training or for determining physical fitness, and was discharged or otherwise separated with a characterization of honorable or general (under honorable conditions), or (ii) the spouse of a veteran who (A) has a one hundred percent permanent disability as determined by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs or (B) was killed in hostile action; and
(c) Voluntary veterans preference employment policy means a private employer's voluntary preference for hiring and promoting a veteran over another equally qualified applicant or employee.
(2) A private employer may adopt a voluntary veterans preference employment policy. Such policy shall be in writing and applied uniformly to decisions regarding hiring and promotion.
(3) If a private employer offers a voluntary veterans preference employment policy, a veteran desiring to use such policy shall provide the private employer with a copy of the veteran's Department of Defense Form 214, also known as the DD Form 214, or its successor form or record. A spouse of a veteran desiring to use such preference shall provide the private employer with a copy of the veteran's Department of Defense Form 214 or its successor form or record, proof of marriage to the veteran, and either (a) a copy of the veteran's disability verification from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs demonstrating a one hundred percent permanent disability rating or (b) a copy of the veteran's Department of Defense Form 1300 or its successor form documenting that the veteran was killed in hostile action.
(4) If a private employer implements a voluntary veterans preference employment policy, it shall notify the Commissioner of Labor of such policy. The commissioner shall use the information to maintain a registry of the private employers that have a voluntary veterans preference employment policy in Nebraska.
(5) A voluntary veterans preference employment policy shall not be considered a violation of any state or local equal employment opportunity law including the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act.
Cross References
Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, see section 48-1125.
48-239.
COVID-19 vaccine; employer; requirements; vaccine exemption form; contents.(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) COVID-19 means the novel coronavirus identified as SARS-CoV-2; any disease caused by SARS-CoV-2, its viral fragments, or a virus mutation therefrom; and all conditions associated with the disease which are caused by SARS-CoV-2, its viral fragments, or a virus mutation therefrom;
(b) Department means the Department of Health and Human Services;
(c)(i) Employer means a person engaged in an industry who has one or more employees;
(ii) Employer also includes any party whose business is financed in whole or in part under the Nebraska Investment Finance Authority Act regardless of the number of employees and includes the State of Nebraska, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions; and
(iii) Employer does not include (A) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the government of the United States, or an Indian tribe or (B) a bona fide private membership club, other than a labor organization, which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code;
(d) Health care practitioner means a person licensed under (i) the Medicine and Surgery Practice Act to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery, (ii) the Medicine and Surgery Practice Act to practice as a physician assistant, or (iii) the Advanced Practice Registered Nurse Practice Act to practice as an advanced practice registered nurse;
(e) Medicare-certified or medicaid-certified provider or supplier means any entity, including, but not limited to, a health care facility as defined in section 71-413, that is a medicare-certified or medicaid-certified provider or supplier and that is subject to the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' COVID-19 health care staff vaccination requirements; and
(f) Vaccine exemption form means the form created by the department under subsection (2) of this section.
(2)(a) The department shall develop a vaccine exemption form for an individual to claim an exemption from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine as provided in this section. The department shall make the form available on the department's website within fifteen days after March 1, 2022.
(b) The form shall include a declaration by the individual seeking an exemption that:
(i) A health care practitioner has provided the individual with a signed written statement that, in the health care practitioner's opinion, (A) receiving a COVID-19 vaccine is medically contraindicated for the individual or (B) medical necessity requires the individual to delay receiving such vaccine; or
(ii) Receiving a COVID-19 vaccine would conflict with the individual's sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance.
(3) Subject to subsection (5) of this section, an employer that requires applicants or employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 shall allow for an exemption to such requirement for an individual who provides the employer with:
(a) A completed vaccine exemption form; and
(b) For an individual claiming an exemption based on the statement of a health care practitioner, a copy of such signed written statement.
(4) An employer may require an employee granted an exemption under this section to:
(a) Be periodically tested for COVID-19 at the employer's expense; and
(b) Wear or use personal protective equipment provided by the employer.
(5) A medicare-certified or medicaid-certified provider or supplier or a federal contractor may require additional processes, documentation, or accommodations as necessary to be in compliance with federal law and to maintain compliance with the rules and regulations of the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
Cross References
Advanced Practice Registered Nurse Practice Act, see section 38-201.
Medicine and Surgery Practice Act, see section 38-2001.
Nebraska Investment Finance Authority Act, see section 58-201.
48-301.
Terms, defined.For purposes of sections 48-302 to 48-313:
(1) Employment means (a) service for wages or (b) being under a contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied. Employment, other than detasseling, does not include any employment for which the employer is not liable for payment of the combined tax or payment in lieu of contributions under section 48-648, 48-649 to 48-649.04, or 48-660.01; and
(2) Detasseling means the removal of weeds, off-type and rogue plants, and corn tassels in hand pollinating