Nebraska Revised Statute 59-821

Chapter 59


Violations; recovery of actual or liquidated damages; attorney's fees.

Any person who is injured in his or her business or property by any other person or persons by a violation of sections 59-801 to 59-831, whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, may bring a civil action in the district court in the county in which the defendant or defendants reside or are found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover actual damages or liquidated damages in an amount which bears a reasonable relation to the actual damages which have been sustained and which damages are not susceptible of measurement by ordinary pecuniary standards and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.


  • Laws 1905, c. 162, § 18, p. 644;
  • R.S.1913, § 4062;
  • C.S.1922, § 3465;
  • C.S.1929, § 59-818;
  • R.S.1943, § 59-821;
  • Laws 1974, LB 1028, § 1;
  • Laws 2002, LB 1278, § 10.


  • Actual anticompetitive effects include, but are not limited to, reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in quality. ACI Worldwide Corp. v. Baldwin Hackett & Meeks, 296 Neb. 818, 896 N.W.2d 156 (2017).

  • Despite the broad remedial language of the Junkin Act, not every person claiming an injury from a Junkin Act violation can recover damages. ACI Worldwide Corp. v. Baldwin Hackett & Meeks, 296 Neb. 818, 896 N.W.2d 156 (2017).

  • To recover damages, a plaintiff must prove an antitrust injury. To constitute an antitrust injury, the injury must reflect the anticompetitive effect of the violation or the anticompetitive effects of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. ACI Worldwide Corp. v. Baldwin Hackett & Meeks, 296 Neb. 818, 896 N.W.2d 156 (2017).

  • Because the remedial provisions of the Junkin Act and Clayton Act are so similar, section 59-829 requires Nebraska courts to follow the federal courts' construction of the Clayton Act. Kanne v. Visa U.S.A., 272 Neb. 489, 723 N.W.2d 293 (2006).

  • The 2002 amendment to this section did not reject the application of standing requirements to damages under this section. It simply removed the automatic bar against indirect purchaser actions announced in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 52 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1977). It did not eliminate separate and distinct standing requirements. Kanne v. Visa U.S.A., 272 Neb. 489, 723 N.W.2d 293 (2006).

  • Where jury by special verdict found that defendant had conspired with plaintiff's former employee to injure plaintiff's business, restrain trade, create a monopoly, and acquire plaintiff's business by unfair business practices, this section permits plaintiff to recover a reasonable attorney fee. Diesel Service, Inc. v. Accessory Sales, Inc., 210 Neb. 797, 317 N.W.2d 719 (1982).

  • This section provides for damages to party injured in its business or property by reason of unlawful conspiracy or combination. O. G. Pierce Co. v. Century Indemnity Co., 136 Neb. 78, 285 N.W. 91 (1939).

  • Triple damages could not be recovered in subsequent suit when waived in original action. Marsh-Burke Co. v. Yost, 102 Neb. 814, 170 N.W. 172 (1918).

  • When plaintiff prayed for compensatory damages only and remitted part of verdict to avoid new trial, right to claim triple damages was waived thereby. Marsh-Burke Co. v. Yost, 98 Neb. 523, 153 N.W. 573 (1915).

  • Where agency agreement between insurance company and agency should have little or no effect on interests of policyholders, federal exemption from Sherman Act was not applicable. Allied Financial Services, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 418 F.Supp. 157 (D. Neb. 1976).