Because the remedial provisions of the Junkin Act and Clayton Act are so similar, section 59-829 requires Nebraska courts to follow the federal courts' construction of the Clayton Act. Kanne v. Visa U.S.A., 272 Neb. 489, 723 N.W.2d 293 (2006).
The 2002 amendment to this section did not reject the application of standing requirements to damages under this section. It simply removed the automatic bar against indirect purchaser actions announced in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 52 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1977). It did not eliminate separate and distinct standing requirements. Kanne v. Visa U.S.A., 272 Neb. 489, 723 N.W.2d 293 (2006).
Where jury by special verdict found that defendant had conspired with plaintiff's former employee to injure plaintiff's business, restrain trade, create a monopoly, and acquire plaintiff's business by unfair business practices, this section permits plaintiff to recover a reasonable attorney fee. Diesel Service, Inc. v. Accessory Sales, Inc., 210 Neb. 797, 317 N.W.2d 719 (1982).
This section provides for damages to party injured in its business or property by reason of unlawful conspiracy or combination. O. G. Pierce Co. v. Century Indemnity Co., 136 Neb. 78, 285 N.W. 91 (1939).
Triple damages could not be recovered in subsequent suit when waived in original action. Marsh-Burke Co. v. Yost, 102 Neb. 814, 170 N.W. 172 (1918).
When plaintiff prayed for compensatory damages only and remitted part of verdict to avoid new trial, right to claim triple damages was waived thereby. Marsh-Burke Co. v. Yost, 98 Neb. 523, 153 N.W. 573 (1915).
Where agency agreement between insurance company and agency should have little or no effect on interests of policyholders, federal exemption from Sherman Act was not applicable. Allied Financial Services, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 418 F.Supp. 157 (D. Neb. 1976).