Nebraska State Constitution Article I-21

Article I-21


Private property compensated for.

The property of no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor.


  • Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 21 (1875).


1. Property, what constitutes

2. Public use

3. Public improvements

4. Damages

5. Just compensation

6. Compensation, payment

7. Miscellaneous

1. Property, what constitutes

A Nebraska Public Service Commission order which directed incumbent local exchange carriers to comply with an order establishing multidwelling unit regulations and a statewide policy for access to multidwelling units by competitive local exchange carriers did not constitute a taking. In re Application of Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm., 260 Neb. 780, 619 N.W.2d 809 (2000).

Recovery may be had for damages to property occasioned by temporary takings. Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 245 Neb. 680, 515 N.W.2d 401 (1994).

Lawful covenants restricting the use of land and binding upon successors in title constitute an interest in the land and property in the constitutional sense. Horst v. Housing Authority, 184 Neb. 215, 166 N.W.2d 119 (1969).

A tenant for a term of years has a property right in land which is protected by this section. Johnson v. City of Lincoln, 174 Neb. 837, 120 N.W.2d 297 (1963).

Unexercised option to purchase real estate need not be compensated for in eminent domain proceedings. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 106 N.W.2d 727 (1960).

Legislature could not lawfully deprive lessee of school land lease of option to purchase. Pfeifer v. Ableidinger, 166 Neb. 464, 89 N.W.2d 568 (1958).

City is not liable to adjacent property owner for destruction of shade trees in street. Weibel v. City of Beatrice, 163 Neb. 183, 79 N.W.2d 67 (1956).

Claim made and rejected that appropriation of surface and ground waters without compensation violated this section. Dischner v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 147 Neb. 949, 25 N.W.2d 813 (1947).

Property rights of a lessee under school land lease are protected from invasion under the power of eminent domain. State v. Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist., 147 Neb. 289, 23 N.W.2d 300 (1946).

The right to use water for a beneficial purpose is a property right, subject to the constitutional provisions regulating the taking of private property for public use. Loup River Public Power Dist. v. North Loup River Public Power & Irr. Dist., 142 Neb. 141, 5 N.W.2d 240 (1942).

Accretions are property within the meaning of this section. Thies v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 137 Neb. 344, 289 N.W. 386 (1939).

Right of irrigation district to appropriate water is property and this right is protected by way of damages when water is diverted. Nine Mile Irr. Dist. v. State, 118 Neb. 522, 225 N.W. 679 (1929).

Riparian rights under an appropriation of water are property. McCook Irr. & Water Power Co. v. Crews, 70 Neb. 115, 102 N.W. 249 (1905).

A riparian's right to the use of the flow of the stream passing through or by his land is a right inseparably annexed to the soil and such right is entitled to protection as such, the same as private property rights. Crawford Company v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903).

Mortgagee's interest in property taken for public use is property, and requires notice to mortgagee in eminent domain proceedings. Dodge v. Omaha & S. W. R. R. Co., 20 Neb. 276, 29 N.W. 936 (1886).

2. Public use

In order to meet the initial threshold in an inverse condemnation case that the property has been taken or damaged for public use, it must be shown that there was an invasion of property rights that was intended or was the foreseeable result of authorized governmental action. Henderson v. City of Columbus, 285 Neb. 482, 827 N.W.2d 486 (2013).

The threshold issue in an inverse condemnation case is to determine whether the property allegedly taken or damaged was taken or damaged as the result of the exercise of the governmental entity’s exercise of its power of eminent domain; that is, was the taking or damaging for public use. Henderson v. City of Columbus, 285 Neb. 482, 827 N.W.2d 486 (2013).

This provision is not a source of compensation for every action or inaction by a governmental entity that causes damage to property. Instead, it provides compensation only for the taking or damaging of property that occurs as the result of an entity’s exercise of its right of eminent domain. Henderson v. City of Columbus, 285 Neb. 482, 827 N.W.2d 486 (2013).

Private property may not be taken under the power of eminent domain for a private use. Burger v. City of Beatrice, 181 Neb. 213, 147 N.W.2d 784 (1967).

Acquisition of aviation easement was a damage for public use, for which compensation could be recovered. Johnson v. Airport Authority, 173 Neb. 801, 115 N.W.2d 426 (1962).

Where land is taken outside the boundaries of right-of-way condemned, it constitutes a second taking of private property for public use. Armbruster v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 169 Neb. 594, 100 N.W.2d 781 (1960).

Recovery on behalf of city by taxpayer of amount paid on void contract was not a taking of defendant's property for public use without compensation. Arthur v. Trindel, 168 Neb. 429, 96 N.W.2d 208 (1959).

Where land is taken outside the boundaries of right-of-way condemned, liability attaches for a second taking of private property for public use. McGree v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 164 Neb. 552, 82 N.W.2d 798 (1957).

City ordinance imposing license fee on taxicabs is not taking of private property for public use. Richter v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 289, 285 N.W. 593 (1939).

An individual does not have the right of eminent domain for the use and benefit of himself or his estate under the statute for the irrigation of his own land. Onstott v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 129 Neb. 54, 260 N.W. 556 (1935).

The furnishing of water to the inhabitants of a city for the purpose of health, convenience, and comfort is a public use of such water. Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933).

Statute authorizing private individuals to create and fix boundaries of a district for public improvement, to be paid for by taxes levied on the property within the district, without a tribunal for determination whether owner's property was arbitrarily or unjustly included, violates this section. Elliott v. Wille, 112 Neb. 78, 200 N.W. 847 (1924).

Statutes providing for special assessments for paving, when not in excess of special benefits, are not invalid as taking private property for public use. Brown Real Estate Co. v. Lancaster County, 110 Neb. 665, 194 N.W. 897 (1923).

Statute making railroad company liable for one dollar per day per car for delay in forwarding, giving notices, or delivery, and in addition thereto imposes liability for actual damages caused by such delay, by necessary implication, violates this section. Sunderland Bros. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 104 Neb. 319, 177 N.W. 156 (1920).

Ordinance prohibiting removal of garbage except by city employee, is not taking of private property in violation of this section, though it prevents restaurant keeper from selling garbage as feed for swine. Urbach v. City of Omaha, 101 Neb. 314, 163 N.W. 307 (1917).

The use of water power to generate electricity to supply a city and its inhabitants with light and power is a public use and owners of riparian lands should be entitled to damages sustained. Lucas v. Ashland Light, Mill & Power Co., 92 Neb. 550, 138 N.W. 761 (1912).

Transferring unclaimed witness fees and costs to school fund is not taking of private property for public use. Douglas County v. Moores, 66 Neb. 284, 92 N.W. 199 (1902), overruling State ex rel. Broatch v. Moores, 52 Neb. 770, 73 N.W. 299 (1897).

Use of water for irrigation works, and establishment thereof, must be common and not to a particular individual to be a public use. Paxton & Hershey Irr. Canal & Land Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Irr. & Land Co., 45 Neb. 884, 64 N.W. 343 (1895).

Use need not be for benefit of whole public or state, but may be for benefit of small and restricted locality, provided use and benefit is common, not to particular individual or estate. Welton v. Dickson, 38 Neb. 767, 57 N.W. 559 (1894).

Where statute required railroad company to provide underground cattle pass partly at company expense, not as safety measure but to save farmer inconvenience, there was a taking of private property for public use. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162 (1930), reversing Holmberg v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 115 Neb. 727, 214 N.W. 746 (1927).

Condemnation by drainage district in conformity with Nebraska statute was not for private purpose, where the enterprise had been adjudged by state court to be public utility. O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915).

Statute requiring property owners to destroy as public nuisance red cedar trees growing within two miles of orchards containing 1,000 or more apple trees is not void as taking of property for public or private use without compensation. Upton v. Felton, 4 F.Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1932).

3. Public improvements

County and irrigation district were liable for damages caused by structure placed in drainage ditch. Baum v. County of Scotts Bluff, 169 Neb. 816, 101 N.W.2d 455 (1960).

Municipality would be held liable for damages resulting from construction and maintenance of flood control project. Gruntorad v. Hughes Bros. Inc., 161 Neb. 358, 73 N.W.2d 700 (1955).

The only foundation for a local assessment lies in the special benefits conferred upon the property assessed by the improvement, and an assessment beyond the benefit so conferred is a taking of property for public use without compensation and therefore illegal. Loup River Public Power Dist. v. Platte County, 144 Neb. 600, 14 N.W.2d 210 (1944).

City is liable to abutting property owner for damages caused by paving street in accordance with established grade ordinance. Heflin v. City of Lincoln, 131 Neb. 484, 268 N.W. 364 (1936).

Property abutting on street is "damaged" within meaning of Constitution by changing grade from natural level. Stocking v. City of Lincoln, 93 Neb. 798, 142 N.W. 104 (1913).

Petition was insufficient to allege damages to adjacent property for erection of standpipe for city water supply. Bonge v. Village of Winnetoon, 90 Neb. 260, 133 N.W. 203 (1911).

Landowner is entitled to recover the damages he has actually sustained, less the special benefits to his property, if any, by subsequent change of street grade. Kavan v. South Omaha, 86 Neb. 469, 126 N.W. 77 (1910).

Owner of land is entitled to compensation for taking of part thereof for highway purposes. Johnson v. Peterson, 85 Neb. 83, 122 N.W. 683 (1909).

The construction and operation of railroad and closing of a public street entitles landowner to recover the difference between the value of the land before and its value after the road was constructed and put in operation. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. O'Neill, 58 Neb. 239, 78 N.W. 521 (1899).

The placing of poles and wires in city street by an electric street railway is such interference with owner's enjoyment of property to entitle him to compensation commensurate with injury sustained. Jaynes v. Omaha Street Ry. Co., 53 Neb. 631, 74 N.W. 67 (1898).

Owner of land is entitled to damages resulting from grading street or highway by either county or city. Douglas County v. Taylor, 50 Neb. 535, 70 N.W. 27 (1897).

A city is liable to a lot owner for the diminution in value of his property caused by construction of a sewer, built by the city near his lot, on which a brick building had been erected before the sewer grade was established. City of Plattsmouth v. Boeck, 32 Neb. 297, 49 N.W. 167 (1891).

A city is liable to a lot owner for such damages as he may sustain by filling in the street in front of his lot above the level of the same, when the buildings were erected on the lot before any grade was established or by reason of filling in street. Hammond v. City of Harvard, 31 Neb. 635, 48 N.W. 462 (1891); Harmon v. City of Omaha, 17 Neb. 548, 23 N.W. 503 (1885).

Depreciation in value in construction of public improvements entitles abutting owner to just compensation therefor. Chicago, K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Hazels, 26 Neb. 364, 42 N.W. 93 (1889).

Before section line road can be opened and worked, the damages suffered by the owners whose lands are taken must be ascertained and paid. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Douglas County, 1 Neb. Unof. 247, 95 N.W. 339 (1901).

4. Damages

The diminution in market value establishes the damages in an eminent domain case, and the term "consequential damage" only defines the kinds of damages which are compensable. Walkenhorst v. State, Dept. of Roads, 253 Neb. 986, 573 N.W.2d 474 (1998).

When private property has been damaged for public use, the owner is entitled to seek compensation in a direct action under this constitutional provision, regardless of whether the plaintiff could have sued in tort under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. Uhing v. City of Oakland, 236 Neb. 58, 459 N.W.2d 187 (1990).

Where cropland, no part of which is taken, temporarily suffers compensable damage, the measure of compensation is not the market value, but the value of the use for the period damaged, i.e., the value of the crops which could and would have been grown upon the land. Kula v. Prososki, 228 Neb. 692, 424 N.W.2d 117 (1988).

When a political subdivision with the power of eminent domain damages property for a public use, the property owner may seek damages in an action for tort, in an action for inverse condemnation under the provisions of sections 76-701 to 76-725, or in an action under the language of this provision. Slusarski v. County of Platte, 226 Neb. 889, 416 N.W.2d 213 (1987).

When private property has been damaged for a public use, the owner of such property is entitled to seek compensation in an action under this section. Parriott v. Drainage District No. 6 of Peru, 226 Neb. 123, 410 N.W.2d 97 (1987).

An irrigation district may be liable for damage due to seepage without proof of negligence if the district's activities caused the seepage. Wood v. Farwell Irr. Dist., 217 Neb. 511, 349 N.W.2d 633 (1984).

Under this section, an irrigation district is strictly liable for seepage damage. Lindgren v. City of Gering, 206 Neb. 360, 292 N.W.2d 921 (1980).

Damages caused by fire spreading from municipal dump onto land of plaintiff is within protection of this section. Colburn v. City of Valentine, 183 Neb. 391, 160 N.W.2d 203 (1968).

An abutting property owner is entitled to recover damages resulting from material impairment of his right of access to an existing highway. Swanson v. State, 178 Neb. 671, 134 N.W.2d 810 (1965).

Recovery could be had where prohibition was imposed by statute upon use of land for display of highway signs. Fulmer v. State, 178 Neb. 20, 131 N.W.2d 657 (1964), opinion withdrawn, 178 Neb. 664, 134 N.W.2d 798 (1965).

All actual damages resulting from exercise of power of eminent domain which diminish market value of property not taken may be recovered. Pieper v. City of Scottsbluff, 176 Neb. 561, 126 N.W.2d 865 (1964).

Tenant was entitled to recover damages for deprivation of right to produce crop. State v. Dillon, 175 Neb. 350, 121 N.W.2d 798 (1963).

The words "or damaged" include all actual damages resulting from the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Leffelman v. City of Hartington, 173 Neb. 259, 113 N.W.2d 107 (1962).

Constitutional provision does not change measure of damages in taking of leasehold. Ballantyne Co. v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 229, 113 N.W.2d 486 (1962).

Agreement by city to construct median and barrier curbs in street did not violate this section. Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 83 N.W.2d 76 (1957).

Temporary damage created by maintenance of a public city dump was recoverable. Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196, 82 N.W.2d 274 (1957).

All actual damages resulting from exercise of power of eminent domain may be recovered. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist. v. Armstrong, 159 Neb. 609, 68 N.W.2d 200 (1955).

Injury to entire property consisting of several city lots could be considered. Rath v. Sanitary District No. One of Lancaster County, 156 Neb. 444, 56 N.W.2d 741 (1955).

All damages which diminish market value of private property may be recovered. Quest v. East Omaha Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 538, 52 N.W.2d 417 (1952).

Landowner is assured of recovery in one action of the whole damage sustained. Little v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 150 Neb. 864, 36 N.W.2d 261 (1949).

Proof of negligence or the commission of a wrongful act is not necessary to a recovery. Wagner v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 150 Neb. 7, 33 N.W.2d 300 (1948).

Damages from seepage caused by public power and irrigation districts can be recovered under this provision without regard to negligence. Halligan v. Elander, 147 Neb. 709, 25 N.W.2d 13 (1946).

Suit may be maintained against state under this section for improper construction of state highway. Schmutte v. State, 147 Neb. 193, 22 N.W.2d 691 (1946).

The words "or damaged" include all actual damages resulting from the exercise of the right of eminent domain which diminish the market value of private property. Robinson v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 146 Neb. 534, 20 N.W.2d 509 (1945).

Legislative act conditionally destroying right to recover damages arising from flooding of lands by drainage district violated this section. Cooper v. Sanitary Dist. No. 1 of Lancaster County, 146 Neb. 412, 19 N.W.2d 619 (1945).

Damages sustained by all property owners alike arising from removal and relocation of railroad cannot be recovered under this provision of the Constitution. Scully v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 143 Neb. 184, 9 N.W.2d 207 (1943).

Measure of damages for land taken for public use is the fair and reasonable market value of the land actually taken and the difference in the fair and reasonable market value of the remainder of the land before and after the taking. Schultz v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 138 Neb. 529, 293 N.W. 409 (1940).

In action for damages to land caused by seepage from reservoir, recovery for loss of crops for 1936 and 1937, and for depreciation of land at time of trial was proper. Applegate v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 136 Neb. 280, 285 N.W. 585 (1939).

The words "or damaged" include all damages arising from the exercise of right of eminent domain which cause a diminution in value of a leasehold. James Poultry Co. v. Nebraska City, 135 Neb. 787, 284 N.W. 273 (1939).

A city is liable to owner of abutting real estate for damages caused by changing the grade of street. Quivey v. City of Mitchell, 133 Neb. 727, 277 N.W. 50 (1938).

Rule of damages is value of land actually taken and also depreciation in value of remainder of tract, exclusive of general benefits. Regouby v. Dawson County Irr. Co., 126 Neb. 711, 254 N.W. 389 (1934).

Subsequent change in highway grade to facilitate travel is not basis for action for additional damages. Psota v. Sherman County, 124 Neb. 154, 245 N.W. 405 (1932).

Organizer of irrigation district under the statutes waives right to compensation under this section for damages to property and accepts in lieu thereof the statutory remedy. Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Gering & Ft. Laramie Irr. Dist., 123 Neb. 761, 244 N.W. 296 (1932).

One whose land is damaged temporarily for public use by the construction of a public improvement by the state suffers such a damage as requires compensation under this section. Gledhill v. State, 123 Neb. 726, 243 N.W. 909 (1932).

Seepage from irrigation ditches does not entitle adjoining landowners to damages for taking or damaging property for public use. Livanis v. Northport Irr. Dist., 121 Neb. 777, 238 N.W. 757 (1931); Spurrier v. Mitchell Irr. Dist., 119 Neb. 401, 229 N.W. 273 (1930), overruled in Snyder v. Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist., 144 Neb. 308, 13 N.W.2d 160 (1944).

Liability of drainage district extends to damages caused by reason of volume of water passed on plaintiff's land. Compton v. Elkhorn Valley Drainage Dist., 120 Neb. 94, 231 N.W. 685 (1930).

The words "or damaged" include all damages causing diminution in value by reason of vacating public highway. Lowell v. Buffalo County, 119 Neb. 776, 230 N.W. 842 (1930).

Construction of drainage ditches across public highway does not damage abutting property within meaning of Constitution. Douglas County v. Papillion Drainage Dist., 92 Neb. 771, 139 N.W. 718 (1913).

Where in the performance of duty railroads may be required, when necessary, to construct viaducts over and across their tracks, they are liable for damages to any person whose property is injured by such construction. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 91 Neb. 150, 135 N.W. 445 (1912).

In the taking or damaging of private property by a drainage district corporation in carrying out the purposes of its organization, landowner is entitled to damages for the location of a highway or the construction of a railroad. Nemaha Valley Drainage Dist. No. 2 v. Marconnit, 90 Neb. 514, 134 N.W. 177 (1912).

Measure of damages for lowering the surface of street in front of lots was the difference between market value of the real estate immediately before and after the grading. Whelan v. City of Plattsmouth, 87 Neb. 824, 128 N.W. 520 (1910).

Granting of right-of-way for construction and maintenance of poles and wires does not permit the trimming of trees without responding in damages. Slabaugh v. Omaha Electric Light & Power Co., 87 Neb. 805, 128 N.W. 505 (1910).

One whose land is traversed by a drainage ditch is entitled to recover the value of the land actually taken therefor, together with special damages, if any, to the remainder, but not in such proceedings the damages sustained for neglect of county board to keep a previously established ditch free from silt and debris. Gutschow v. Washington County, 81 Neb. 275, 116 N.W. 46 (1908).

Where city partially vacates a street and builds a viaduct thereon opposite landowner's real estate abutting on such street, thereby diminishing the convenience of access to such property, the true measure of damages is the difference in value of property before and immediately after the improvement, unaffected by increase or decrease of property values generally in same vicinity. Gillespie v. South Omaha, 79 Neb. 441, 112 N.W. 582 (1907).

The words "or damaged" include smoke, soot, noise, and convenience of ingress and egress. Stehr v. Mason City & Fort Dodge Ry. Co., 77 Neb. 641, 110 N.W. 701 (1906).

A person whose property has been taken for a highway is entitled not only to the fair market value of the land actually taken, but also such additional damages as accrue to the remainder of the tract by reason of the opening of the road. Scace v. Wayne County, 72 Neb. 162, 100 N.W. 149 (1904).

The words "or damaged" include all damages arising from the exercise of the right of eminent domain which cause a diminution in the value of private property. City of Omaha v. Kramer, 25 Neb. 489, 41 N.W. 295 (1889).

The insertion of the words "or damaged" was intended to give a right of recovery which did not previously exist, and was not intended to limit or restrict any remedy previously existing. Omaha & R. V. R. R. Co. v. Standen, 22 Neb. 343, 35 N.W. 183 (1887).

The words "or damaged" were added to Constitution to grant relief in cases where no direct injury to the real estate, but some physical disturbance of a right possessed by owner in connection therewith. Gottschalk v. C., B. & Q. R. R., 14 Neb. 550, 16 N.W. 475 (1883), 17 N.W. 120 (1883).

Where damages for original construction have been settled or barred, railroad company is not liable to neighboring property owners for damages from smoke. Thompson v. Kimball, 165 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1948).

Operator of irrigation canal under state authority is liable for incidental damage to private property. Hooker v. Farmers Irr. Dist., 272 F. 600 (8th Cir. 1921).

5. Just compensation

The Nebraska Constitution limits the sovereign's absolute power to take private property by requiring that property owners whose property has been taken or damaged for public use under the eminent domain authority be compensated. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Chaulk, 262 Neb. 235, 631 N.W.2d 131 (2001).

Payment of just compensation applies only to vested property rights. Tracy v. City of Deshler, 253 Neb. 170, 568 N.W.2d 903 (1997).

Where city of Fairbury obtained an easement by prescription across plaintiffs' land for public sewer, compensation of plaintiffs referred to in this section not required. Beach v. City of Fairbury, 207 Neb. 836, 301 N.W.2d 584 (1981).

Right of landowner to just compensation for property taken or damaged for public use is guaranteed by this section. W.E.W. Truck Lines, Inc. v. State, 178 Neb. 218, 132 N.W.2d 782 (1965).

Right of landowner or lessee to just compensation for property taken or damaged for public use is guaranteed by this section. Balog v. State, 177 Neb. 826, 131 N.W.2d 402 (1964).

Landowner could not be deprived without compensation of right to reversion of property upon vacation of street. Dell v. City of Lincoln, 170 Neb. 176, 102 N.W.2d 62 (1960).

Exercise of power of eminent domain has been limited only insofar as it is required that just compensation shall be paid for all property taken or damaged. Burnett v. Central Neb. P. P. & I. Dist., 147 Neb. 458, 23 N.W.2d 661 (1946).

Owner is entitled to recover full compensation for land actually taken and such damages to the remainder as are equivalent to diminution in the fair market value thereof. Langdon v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d 168 (1944).

Condemner is required to compensate for property taken, and also for consequential damage to other property in excess of damage sustained by the public at large. Snyder v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 144 Neb. 308, 13 N.W.2d 160 (1944).

Temporary damage caused by acquisition of an easement for construction of electric transmission line requires payment of compensation. Pierce v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 143 Neb. 898, 11 N.W.2d 813 (1943).

Section cited in stating contention of public power and irrigation district that assessments for drainage ditch were beyond the benefits conferred, and operated to take property without compensation in violation of this section. Loup River Public Power Dist. v. County of Platte, 141 Neb. 29, 2 N.W.2d 609 (1942).

In a proceeding to condemn riparian land for public use, consequential damages to other land in the same tract are not limited to governmental section a part of which is included in the land actually taken, where depreciation in the value of the remainder extends beyond those sections. McGinley v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 133 Neb. 420, 275 N.W. 593 (1937). (Syllabus No. 2, McGinley v. Platte Valley Dist., 132 Neb. 292, 271 N.W. 864 (1937), withdrawn.)

A public power and irrigation district is not authorized to condemn and take private property for public use without just compensation. State ex rel. Loseke v. Fricke, 126 Neb. 736, 254 N.W. 409 (1934).

The compensation for land taken by eminent domain is measured by its market value at the time taken, and no evidence is admissible of its peculiar value for special reasons to its owner. Wiles v. Department of Public Works, 120 Neb. 689, 234 N.W. 918 (1931).

"Just compensation" means market value at time of taking, and includes interest from time owner deprived of use pending appeal. Sioux City R. R. Co. v. Brown, 13 Neb. 317, 14 N.W. 407 (1882).

Compensation shall be made for the fair market value of the land actually taken, while special benefits may be set off against any local or incidental injury. Wagner v. Gage County, 3 Neb. 237 (1874).

Statute requiring railroads to construct sidetracks to elevators along right-of-way of railway company is taking property without just compensation. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. State, 217 U.S. 196 (1910), reversing State No. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 81 Neb. 15, 115 N.W. 614 (1908).

Loss of market place by landowner, due to removal of town occasioned by condemnation for reservoir site, is a damage common to all of the inhabitants around it, and does not deprive the landowner of property without just compensation. Feltz v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 124 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1942).

6. Compensation, payment

Change from a two-way street to a one-way street is not ordinarily compensable in eminent domain proceedings. Painter v. State, 177 Neb. 905, 131 N.W.2d 587 (1964).

Restricting funds from which a public power and irrigation district may pay for private property taken or damaged solely to revenue derived from operation, does not violate constitutional provision. Johnson v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 133 Neb. 97, 274 N.W. 386 (1937).

Public utility property cannot be acquired by a city by condemnation without paying for it. City of Mitchell v. Western Public Service Co., 124 Neb. 248, 246 N.W. 484 (1933).

Though claim for damages not filed by owner in time, county cannot appropriate land for road without paying damages. Weinel v. Box Butte County, 108 Neb. 293, 187 N.W. 939 (1922).

Lessee of school land is entitled to damages before road opened. Beste v. Cedar County, 87 Neb. 689, 128 N.W. 29 (1910).

Payment need not, unless so provided by law, precede actual taking; it is for the Legislature to determine manner of taking and time and manner of payment. State v. Several Parcels of Land, 79 Neb. 638, 113 N.W. 248 (1907).

Object of section is to stay the hand of the sovereign from the property of the individual until proper compensation has been made. Hopper v. Douglas County, 75 Neb. 329, 106 N.W. 330 (1905).

Until compensation of the landowner has been made sure and certain, he may not be compelled to give up his property, and the public use of the same may be enjoined. Morris v. Washington County, 72 Neb. 174, 100 N.W. 144 (1904).

Statute for depositing award with county judge is only intended as security and does not constitute payment. Brown v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 66 Neb. 106, 92 N.W. 128 (1902).

Owner of property taken by eminent domain proceedings is not compensated until the sum to which he is entitled is paid or tendered to him or to someone authorized by him to receive it. Brown v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 64 Neb. 62, 89 N.W. 405 (1902).

A landowner cannot be required to surrender his land for a public use until his damages are first ascertained, and either paid or proper provision made for their payment. Lewis v. City of Lincoln, 55 Neb. 1, 75 N.W. 154 (1898); Hodges v. Board of Supervisors of Seward County, 49 Neb. 666, 68 N.W. 1027 (1896); Hogsett v. Harlan County, 4 Neb. Unof. 310, 97 N.W. 316 (1903).

The just compensation required to be made for taking private property for public use, must, before such taking, be ascertained and payment made accordingly, whether the appropriation of such property is by a municipal or other corporation. Livingston v. County Commissioners of Johnson County, 42 Neb. 277, 60 N.W. 555 (1894).

7. Miscellaneous

The Nebraska Constitution's limit on the sovereign power of eminent domain set forth in this provision applies to temporary as well as permanent takings. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Chaulk, 262 Neb. 235, 631 N.W.2d 131 (2001).

As this provision is self-executory, a petition alleging that one's property was damaged for a public use is sufficient as against a general demurrer, notwithstanding the fact that the petition refers neither to this article and section nor to the pertinent constitutional language. Slusarski v. County of Platte, 226 Neb. 889, 416 N.W.2d 213 (1987).

To recover damages for loss of or damage to land taken for a public use under this section, it is not necessary that the constitutional provision be set out or its existence alleged in the petition stating the cause of action. It is sufficient for the litigant to allege and prove facts constituting a cause of action because of the loss. Kula v. Prososki, 219 Neb. 626, 365 N.W.2d 441 (1985).

A city may not require a property owner to dedicate private property for some future public purpose as a condition for receiving a building permit unless such future use is directly occasioned by the construction for which the permit is sought. In other cases, eminent domain proceedings are required and compensation must be paid. Simpson v. City of North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 292 N.W.2d 297 (1980).

When construing eminent domain statutes fundamental concept of this section must be considered. Keller v. State, 184 Neb. 853, 172 N.W.2d 782 (1969).

Cited in a reverse condemnation action. Dietloff v. City of Norfolk, 183 Neb. 648, 163 N.W.2d 586 (1968).

Act of Legislature authorizing city of primary class to annex contiguous or adjacent lands did not violate this section. Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 182 Neb. 459, 155 N.W.2d 444 (1968).

Airport Authority Act did not violate this section. Obitz v. Airport Authority of City of Red Cloud, 181 Neb. 410, 149 N.W.2d 105 (1967).

Constitutionality of Municipal Ground Water Act raised, but not decided. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966).

An owner of land is not entitled to recover damages for barricade of a county road where he does not suffer an injury different in kind from the public at large. Fougeron v. County of Seward, 174 Neb. 753, 119 N.W.2d 298 (1963).

This section is self-executing. Legislative action is not necessary to make it available. Gentry v. State, 174 Neb. 515, 118 N.W.2d 643 (1962).

Rural Cemetery District Act violated this provision of the Constitution. Anderson v. Carlson, 171 Neb. 741, 107 N.W.2d 535 (1961).

Weather Control Act of 1957 violated this section. Summerville v. North Platte Valley Weather Control Dist., 170 Neb. 46, 101 N.W.2d 748 (1960).

Filing of claim for damages under statute is not a condition precedent to maintenance of action. Armbruster v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 165 Neb. 459, 86 N.W.2d 56 (1957).

Statute providing for appointment of district judges as appraisers in condemnation proceedings meets all the requirements of due process. May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W.2d 448 (1945).

Zoning ordinance sustained as constitutional. Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 448, 13 N.W.2d 634 (1944).

A private employment agency is not a business in which the public has such an interest that price fixing may properly be included as a method of regulation. Boomer v. Olsen, 143 Neb. 579, 10 N.W.2d 507 (1943).

Provision is self-executing and no waiver of immunity of state from suit is required. Bordy v. State, 142 Neb. 714, 7 N.W.2d 632 (1943).

Where a party having the right to condemn lands takes possession without instituting condemnation proceedings, the owner may waive this feature and recover compensation. Dawson County Irr. Dist. v. Stuart, 142 Neb. 435, 8 N.W.2d 507 (1943).

In action against city for taking and damaging realty for public use without just compensation, it is not necessary that property owner plead or prove that she filed claim with city as provided by city charter. Bridge v. City of Lincoln, 138 Neb. 461, 293 N.W. 375 (1940).

Statute imposing restrictions regarding automobile brake and light equipment and providing for inspection, was not violative of constitutional provision. Beisner v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 445, 293 N.W. 289 (1940).

Housing authority acts did not violate constitutional provision prohibiting taking or damaging private property for public use without compensation. Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451 (1940).

The Legislature cannot waive sovereignty of state in favor of a particular person or persons to permit suit against state for negligence of its agents and servants. Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 279 N.W. 482 (1938).

Noisome odors from city sewage is not damaging of private property entitling owner to injunction where nuisance may be corrected by chemical treatment of sewage. Hall v. City of Friend, 134 Neb. 652, 279 N.W. 346 (1938).

Moratorium Law provided for the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 277 N.W. 762 (1938).

Where the state acquired legal title to mortgaged real estate it cannot be made defendant in foreclosure suit without its consent. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Nordhues, 129 Neb. 379, 261 N.W. 687 (1935).

Suit against state for infringement of patent can not be brought in state court on theory that plaintiff's property is taken for public use without compensation. Thimgan v. State, 125 Neb. 696, 251 N.W. 837 (1933).

Where employees of the state enter upon land, against the will of the owner, under a void appraisement for damages and attempt to use his land for highway purposes without compensation paid or tendered, they may be restrained by injunction. Goergen v. Department of Public Works, 123 Neb. 648, 243 N.W. 886 (1932).

The Legislature has power to formulate, prescribe, enlarge, modify and alter remedies; provided, however, it does not, under the guise of a statute relating to procedure, attempt to deprive any person of a right secured by the Constitution. Croft v. Scotts Bluff County, 121 Neb. 343, 237 N.W. 149 (1931).

Zoning ordinance was valid under the police power, having substantial relation to the public health, safety and general welfare. City of Lincoln v. Foss, 119 Neb. 666, 230 N.W. 592 (1930).

Owner standing by and neglecting to assert constitutional rights while paving construction is going on, cannot enforce his constitutional rights by means of injunction in a court of equity when he has an adequate remedy at law. Meyer v. City of Alma, 117 Neb. 511, 221 N.W. 438 (1928).

The right of eminent domain cannot be exercised to take land against landowners consent as a site for a reservoir from which to irrigate private property. Vetter v. Broadhurst, 100 Neb. 356, 160 N.W. 109 (1916).

This section is self-executing, and it requires no legislation to prevent private property from being taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Hopper v. Douglas County, 75 Neb. 329, 106 N.W. 330 (1905); Douglas County v. Taylor, 50 Neb. 535, 70 N.W. 27 (1897).

Mere passive acquiescence by landowner, unaccompanied by conduct indicating affirmative assent, is not waiver of right to compensation. Kime v. Cass County, 71 Neb. 677, 99 N.W. 546 (1904), affirmed on rehearing 71 Neb. 680, 101 N.W. 2 (1904).

Levying special assessments upon tracts of land adjacent to proposed drainage ditch for special benefits received does not violate this section. Dodge County v. Acom, 61 Neb. 376, 85 N.W. 292 (1901).

It is not incumbent upon property owner to take affirmative action as condition precedent to protecting his rights. Propst v. Cass County, 51 Neb. 736, 71 N.W. 748 (1897).

Land is appropriated when its corpus is seized and devoted to an improvement so as to deprive owner of use, and it is not necessary that owner be divested of fee. Martin v. Fillmore County, 44 Neb. 719, 62 N.W. 863 (1895).

Legislature may regulate remedy and prescribe forms to be observed to enforce law, but such regulation must be reasonable and by general laws of uniform operation. City of Lincoln v. Grant, 38 Neb. 369, 56 N.W. 995 (1893).

Legislature has no power to take property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even when full compensation made. Jenal v. Green Island Draining Co., 12 Neb. 163, 10 N.W. 547 (1881).

Public cannot, by means of assessment of benefits against abutting property, reimburse itself for payment of damages occasioned by changing of street grade. Goodrich v. City of Omaha, 10 Neb. 98, 4 N.W. 424 (1880).