Source

• Neb. Const. art. IX, sec. 1 (1875);
• Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 26;
• Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, art. VIII, sec. 1;
• Amended 1952, Laws 1951, c. 160, sec. 1, p. 636;
• Amended 1954, Laws 1954, Sixty-sixth Extraordinary Session, c. 3, sec. 1, p. 61;
• Amended 1960, Laws 1959, c. 238, sec. 1, p. 823;
• Amended 1964, Laws 1963, c. 298, sec. 1, p. 887;
• Amended 1964, Laws 1963, c. 301, sec. 1, p. 892;
• Amended 1972, Laws 1972, LB 837, sec. 1;
• Amended 1978, Laws 1978, First Spec. Sess., LR 1, sec. 1;
• Amended 1984, Laws 1984, First Spec. Sess., LR 7, sec. 1;
• Amended 1990, Laws 1989, LR 2, sec. 1;
• Amended 1992, Laws 1992, LR 219CA, sec. 1;
• Amended 1998, Laws 1998, LR 45CA, sec. 1.
• Note: The changes made to this section by LR 1 (1978) were found to be unconstitutional in State ex rel. Douglas v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 205 Neb. 130, 286 N.W.2d 729 (1979).

Annotations

1. Uniformity

2. Valuation

3. Classification

4. Property taxes

5. Occupation taxes

6. Excise and license taxes

7. Tax on corporate franchises

8. Tax on foreign corporations

9. Special assessments

10. Exemption from taxation

11. Miscellaneous

1. Uniformity

Because subsection (4) of this provision allows for agricultural and horticultural property to be valued in a way that is not uniform and proportionate with all other real property and because statutes have been enacted effectuating this difference, it is unnecessary and improper to equalize the value of nonagricultural, nonhorticultural property with the value of agricultural and horticultural property. Krings v. Garfield Cty. Bd. of Equal., 286 Neb. 352, 835 N.W.2d 750 (2013).

Because the levy authorized under section 77-3442(2)(b) is uniform throughout the entire learning community, which is the relevant taxing district, section 77-3442(2)(b) does not violate the uniformity clause under this provision. Sarpy Cty. Farm Bureau v. Learning Community, 283 Neb. 212, 808 N.W.2d 598 (2012).

Because the levy distributed under section 79-1073 is uniform throughout the entire learning community, which is the relevant taxing district, section 79-1073 does not violate the uniformity clause under this provision. Sarpy Cty. Farm Bureau v. Learning Community, 283 Neb. 212, 808 N.W.2d 598 (2012).

The object of the uniformity clause is accomplished if all the property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed and taxed at a uniform standard of value. No difference in the method of determining the valuation or rate of tax to be imposed can be allowed unless separate classifications rest on some reason of public policy or some substantial difference of situation or circumstance that would naturally suggest justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects to be classified. Evidence of "sales chasing" may justify differential treatment accorded to a particular county. County of Douglas v. Nebraska Tax Equal. & Rev. Comm., 262 Neb. 578, 635 N.W.2d 413 (2001).

The county violated the Nebraska Constitution's uniformity clause by its selective imposition of an increased value and assessment of the taxpayer's property containing mineral interests based solely on the ownership or control of the property. Lyman-Richey Corp. v. Cass Cty. Bd. of Equal., 258 Neb. 1003, 607 N.W.2d 806 (2000); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Cass Cty. Bd. of Equal., 258 Neb. 990, 607 N.W.2d 810 (2000).

The constitutional requirement of uniformity extends to both rate and valuation. Real property taxes may not be equalized by merely classifying property and then arbitrarily applying a given value to all properties of that classification; the mere fact that a formula is devised, by which property is nonuniformly and disproportionately assessed, does not satisfy the constitutional requirement. The object of the uniformity clause is accomplished if all of the property within a taxing jurisdiction is assessed and taxed at a uniform value; differential tax treatment can only be based on the use or nature of the property, not upon who controls the property. Constructors, Inc. v. Cass Cty. Bd. of Equal., 258 Neb. 866, 606 N.W.2d 786 (2000).

The Class VI school system tax levy set forth in section 79-1078 (formerly section 79-438.13) does not violate this provision requiring uniform taxation. Swanson v. State, 249 Neb. 466, 544 N.W.2d 333 (1996).

A taxpayer who seeks a refund of taxes which are claimed to have been invalid as in violation of the constitutional provision requiring uniformity and proportionality in the taxation of tangible property is at most entitled to a refund of the difference between the taxes levied against the property and the taxes if all of the property treated as exempt had been placed on the rolls and taxed. Trailblazer Pipeline Co. v. Balka, 246 Neb. 221, 518 N.W.2d 646 (1994).

Real and personal property are in the same class for purposes of uniformity. A statute exempting all but a small sliver of personal property from the property tax rolls is unconstitutional under the uniformity clause because it improperly shifts the property tax burden to real property owners. Jaksha v. State, 241 Neb. 106, 486 N.W.2d 858 (1992).

Personal property and real property are both "tangible property" and must be equalized and taxed uniformly pursuant to this provision. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal., 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991).

It is the function of the county board of equalization to determine the actual value of locally assessed property for tax purposes. In carrying out this function, the county board must give effect to the constitutional requirement that taxes be levied uniformly and proportionately upon all taxable property in the county. Individual discrepancies and inequalities within the county must be corrected and equalized by the county board of equalization. AT&T Information Sys. v. State Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 591, 467 N.W.2d 55 (1991).

The taxation of personal property must be uniform not only to the rate of taxation, but to the valuation of property as well. Xerox Corp. v. Karnes, 217 Neb. 728, 350 N.W.2d 566 (1984).

The requirement that taxes be assessed uniformly and proportionately does not preclude the result that the property is assessed at less than actual value. Konicek v. Board of Equalization, 212 Neb. 648, 324 N.W.2d 815 (1982).

A mobile home as defined in section 60-1601.01 is not a motor vehicle within the exception to the constitutional provision providing for uniform and proportionate taxation of personal property. Gates v. Howell, 204 Neb. 256, 282 N.W.2d 22 (1979).

Under this section, the taxation of personal property, except as otherwise authorized herein, must be uniform both as to rate of taxation and valuation of property. State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 191 Neb. 330, 215 N.W.2d 520 (1974).

Free port law does not violate constitutional provisions for uniformity and against special privileges. Norden Laboratories, Inc. v. County Board of Equalization, 189 Neb. 437, 203 N.W.2d 152 (1973).

Harm caused by statute permitting independent hospital district to fractionate territory of counties insufficient to constitute violation of this section. Shadbolt v. County of Cherry, 185 Neb. 208, 174 N.W.2d 733 (1970).

It is the duty of the State Board of Equalization and Assessment to give effect to the requirement that all taxes be levied uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property. Hanna v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 181 Neb. 725, 150 N.W.2d 878 (1967).

The Constitution requires taxes on all tangible property to be levied by valuation, uniformly and proportionately. H/K Company v. Board of Equalization, 175 Neb. 268, 121 N.W.2d 382 (1963).

Tax upon motor vehicle dealers violated rule of uniformity as to class and was unconstitutional. State ex rel. Meyer v. Story, 173 Neb. 741, 114 N.W.2d 769 (1962).

Rule of uniformity applies to valuation of railroad property. Union P. R. R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal & Assess., 170 Neb. 139, 101 N.W.2d 892 (1960); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 170 Neb. 106, 101 N.W.2d 873 (1960); Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 170 Neb. 77, 101 N.W.2d 856 (1960).

Taxes are required to be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property. United States Cold Storage Corp. v. Stolinski, 168 Neb. 513, 96 N.W.2d 408 (1959).

Taxes on tangible property must be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately. K-K Appliance Co. v. Board of Equalization, 165 Neb. 547, 86 N.W.2d 381 (1957).

Substantial compliance as to value and uniformity is all that is required. LeDioyt v. County of Keith, 161 Neb. 615, 74 N.W.2d 455 (1956).

Uniformity as to class is required of tax on intangible property. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Heintze, 159 Neb. 520, 67 N.W.2d 753 (1954).

One of objectives is to secure a uniform and proportionate valuation. County of Buffalo v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 158 Neb. 353, 63 N.W.2d 468 (1954).

Uniform and proportionate valuation of farm lands is required. Laflin v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 156 Neb. 427, 56 N.W.2d 469 (1953).

Blanket Mill Tax Levy Act did not operate uniformly and proportionately, and was unconstitutional. Peterson v. Hancock, 155 Neb. 801, 54 N.W.2d 85 (1952).

Tax Appraisal Board Act did not change uniformity requirements as to taxation of property and therefore did not violate this section. Midwest Popcorn Co. v. Johnson, 152 Neb. 867, 43 N.W.2d 174 (1950).

Taxes must be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property, and providing different method for fixing the actual value of real estate than that prescribed for other tangible property violates this section. Homan v. Board of Equalization, 141 Neb. 400, 3 N.W.2d 650 (1942).

Act imposing annual tax on fire insurance companies based on gross premium receipts collected on policies of fire insurance on property located within corporate limits of cities or villages did not violate constitutional requirements of equality and uniformity. Continental Ins. Co. v. Smrha, 131 Neb. 791, 270 N.W. 122 (1936).

State authorizing tax levy on stock of banks was invalid as violating rule of uniformity as to class. State ex rel. Spillman v. Ord State Bank, 117 Neb. 189, 220 N.W. 265 (1928); Central Nat. Bank of Lincoln v. Sutherland, 113 Neb. 126, 202 N.W. 428 (1925); State Bank of Omaha v. Endres, 109 Neb. 753, 192 N.W. 322 (1923).

Assessment reasonably uniform and proportionate on all classes of property will not be set aside because all property is not assessed at actual value. Chicago, R. I & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 111 Neb. 362, 197 N.W. 114 (1923).

Rule of uniformity, applied to taxation of mortgages and of shares of stock in domestic corporations, inhibits discrimination between taxpayers in any manner. City Trust Co. of Omaha v. Douglas County, 101 Neb. 792, 165 N.W. 155 (1917).

Uniformity and equality in value of property of individuals and corporations is required. State ex rel. Breckenridge v. Fleming, 70 Neb. 529, 97 N.W. 1063 (1903).

Requirement of uniformity is accomplished if all the property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed at uniform standard of value as compared with actual market value. State ex rel. Bee Building Co. v. Savage, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902).

This provision is command to Legislature to so enact laws that every person shall pay tax in proportion to value of his property. Scott v. Flowers, 60 Neb. 675, 84 N.W. 81 (1900); State ex rel. Sioux County v. Tucker, 38 Neb. 56, 56 N.W. 718 (1893).

Uniformity is satisfied if observed by each jurisdiction imposing tax. State ex rel. Young v. Osborn, 60 Neb. 415, 83 N.W. 357 (1900).

This section requires that both valuation of property and rate of levy be uniform in taxing district. High School District No. 137, Havelock v. Lancaster County, 60 Neb. 147, 82 N.W. 380 (1900); State ex rel. Ahern v. Walsh, 31 Neb. 469, 48 N.W. 263 (1891).

There must be uniformity as to persons or property within district for which tax is imposed. Clother v. Maher, 15 Neb. 1, 16 N.W. 902 (1883).

This provision and section 77-1501, read together, require a county board of equalization to ultimately value comparable properties similarly, even where separate protests are heard in the first instance by referees who recommend greatly disparate property valuations. Zabawa v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 17 Neb. App. 221, 757 N.W.2d 522 (2008).

This provision requires uniform and proportionate assessment within the class of agricultural land; agricultural land is then divided into categories such as irrigated cropland, dry cropland, and grassland. Schmidt v. Thayer Cty. Bd. of Equal., 10 Neb. App. 10, 624 N.W.2d 63 (2001).

2. Valuation

If the State Board of Equalization and Assessment arbitrarily undervalues a particular class of centrally assessed property, so that another class of such property is valued disproportionately higher, the valuation of the latter class of property must be lowered so that it will be equalized with the other property. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 357, 466 N.W.2d 461 (1991).

This section requires that taxes upon tangible property shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County Board of Equalization, 209 Neb. 465, 308 N.W.2d 515 (1981).

Act which fixed value of agricultural income-producing machinery and equipment as those used by taxpayer in determining federal income tax violated this section. State ex rel. Meyer v. McNeil, 185 Neb. 586, 177 N.W.2d 596 (1970).

Legislature may prescribe standards and methods of determining value of tangible property for taxation. Carpenter v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 178 Neb. 611, 134 N.W.2d 272 (1965).

Assessment of too high a tax does not make it void, and taxpayer should first apply to Board of Equalization for relief. Power v. Jones, 126 Neb. 529, 253 N.W. 867 (1934).

Legislature may tax intangible property by valuation, uniformly, and without proportionate rates. Sommerville v. Board of County Comrs., 116 Neb. 282, 216 N.W. 815 (1927), affirmed on rehearing, 117 Neb. 507, 221 N.W. 433 (1928).

Legislature may fix basis of valuation for taxation. Beadle v. Sanders, 104 Neb. 427, 177 N.W. 789 (1920).

Constitutional provision for levying tax by valuation is not self-executing, and requires legislation to carry it into effect. Failure to provide method of valuing life insurance policies prevents their taxation. Laub v. Furnas County, 104 Neb. 402, 177 N.W. 749 (1920).

Taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at actual value is entitled to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others are taxed. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).

3. Classification

A legislative classification must operate uniformly on all within a class which is reasonable. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 357, 466 N.W.2d 461 (1991).

The Legislature may, for the purpose of legislating, classify persons, places, objects, or subjects, but such classification must rest upon some difference in situation or circumstance which, in reason, calls for distinctive legislation for the class. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 357, 466 N.W.2d 461 (1991).

Constitution flatly contradicts conclusion that real property taxes may be equalized if property classified in same values applied to same classifications. County of Gage v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Neb. 749, 178 N.W.2d 759 (1970).

This section does not prohibit a graduated state income tax and specifically provides authorization for taxes other than property tax. Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967).

Business inventories and real estate are in the same class for purpose of taxation. Grainger Bros. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966).

Taxation on valuation of the capital stock of corporations is required to be uniform as to class. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Lincoln v. County of Lancaster, 177 Neb. 390, 128 N.W.2d 820 (1964).

In classifying intangible property for taxation, there must be uniformity as to class. First Continental Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis, 172 Neb. 118, 108 N.W.2d 638 (1961).

Constitution recognizes that villages and cities are separate and distinct. Hueftle v. Eustis Cemetery Assn., 171 Neb. 293, 106 N.W.2d 400 (1960).

Separate listing and assessing of motor vehicles is authorized. Peterson v. Hancock, 166 Neb. 637, 90 N.W.2d 298 (1958).

Motor vehicles could be taxed as a separate class of tangible property. Boyd Motor Co. v. County of Box Butte, 159 Neb. 514, 67 N.W.2d 774 (1954).

State board was not required to treat ranch land as a separate class of property. County of Grant v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 158 Neb. 310, 63 N.W.2d 459 (1954).

Grain on hand in elevator was taxable in same manner as other tangible personal property. State v. T. W. Jones Grain Co., 156 Neb. 822, 58 N.W.2d 212 (1953).

Purpose of 1920 amendment was to provide for a separate classification of intangibles in order that this class of property might be dealt with separately, brought out of hiding and placed on the tax rolls. International Harvester Co. v. County of Douglas, 146 Neb. 555, 20 N.W.2d 620 (1945).

Legislature cannot define and tax as tangible property that which actually is intangible property. Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424, 255 N.W. 551 (1934).

Power of classification rests with the Legislature, and courts will not interfere therewith unless classification is artificial and baseless. Cunningham v. Douglas County, 104 Neb. 405, 177 N.W. 742 (1920).

Classification of persons dealing in grain as "grain brokers" for purpose of assessment and taxation, and taxing of "average capital" is not unconstitutional. Central Granaries Co. v. Lancaster County, 77 Neb. 319, 113 N.W. 199 (1907).

Different classes of property may be listed and valued by different modes and agencies. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Omaha, 73 Neb. 527, 103 N.W. 84 (1905).

4. Property taxes

Raising of necessary revenue by taxation is one of duties of county board of equalization. Speer v. Kratzenstein, 143 Neb. 310, 12 N.W.2d 360 (1943).

Constitution permits mortgage interest in land to be taxed. Grand Lodge, Degree of Honor, A.O.U.W. of Nebraska v. Sarpy County, 99 Neb. 647, 157 N.W. 344 (1916).

Credits are by Constitution "property" and as such are to be taxed. Lancaster County v. McDonald, 73 Neb. 453, 103 N.W. 78 (1905).

Tax upon capital stock of corporation is in effect tax upon property and assets of company. State ex rel. Bee Building Co. v. Savage, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902).

5. Occupation taxes

Occupation taxes on corporations are authorized by this section. Licking v. Hayes Lumber Co., 146 Neb. 240, 19 N.W.2d 148 (1945).

Power to levy excise tax for use of highways was delegated by the people to the Legislature. Rocky Mountain Lines v. Cochran, 140 Neb. 378, 299 N.W. 596 (1941).

Occupation tax upon light, heat and power companies, without sufficient basis for classification, is void as discriminatory. City of Lincoln v. Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light Co., 100 Neb. 182, 158 N.W. 962 (1916).

Occupation tax may be levied upon the privilege of transacting the business of telegraphy within a city. City of Grand Island v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 92 Neb. 253, 138 N.W. 169 (1912).

Enumeration of occupations which may be taxed does not exclude other like enumerations. Mercantile Incorporating Co. v. Junkin, 85 Neb. 561, 123 N.W. 1055 (1909).

Occupation tax of five per cent of earnings of street railway company for municipal purposes was sustained. Lincoln Traction Co. v. City of Lincoln, 84 Neb. 327, 121 N.W. 435 (1909).

Constitution permits classification of occupations but imposition of taxes for persons of each class must be uniform. Rosenbloom v. State, 64 Neb. 342, 89 N.W. 1053 (1902).

Enumeration of business upon which occupation or license tax may be imposed does not limit such tax to business named. City of York v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 56 Neb. 572, 76 N.W. 1065 (1898).

This section does not deprive cities of power, under general law, of imposing occupation tax for municipal purposes. City of York v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 56 Neb. 572, 76 N.W. 1065 (1898); Templeton v. City of Tekamah, 32 Neb. 542, 49 N.W. 373 (1891); Magneau v. Fremont, 30 Neb. 843, 47 N.W. 280 (1890).

6. Excise and license taxes

The requirement of this provision that all taxes must be levied by valuation upon all tangible property and franchises, does not apply to excise taxes. State v. Garza, 242 Neb. 573, 496 N.W.2d 448 (1993).

Per head tax on cattle sold was an excise tax, not a property tax, and as such was not required to be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately. State v. Galyen, 221 Neb. 497, 378 N.W.2d 182 (1985).

The imposition of an excise tax need not be uniform and proportionate but may be imposed upon each transaction. State v. Galyen, 221 Neb. 497, 378 N.W.2d 182 (1985).

Act imposing excise tax on imitation butter was not uniform upon all members of the class. Thorin v. Burke, 146 Neb. 94, 18 N.W.2d 664 (1945).

A tax on gross premiums of foreign insurance companies is not a tax on property but an excise tax on the privilege of doing business in this state. State ex rel. Smrha v. General American Life Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 520, 272 N.W. 555 (1937).

Statute providing for license fee on sale of tobacco and cigarettes was not a revenue measure under this section, and was constitutional. Nash-Finch Co. v. Beal, 124 Neb. 835, 248 N.W. 374 (1933).

Gasoline tax is excise tax and power to levy same is granted by this section. Pantorium v. McLaughlin, 116 Neb. 61, 215 N.W. 798 (1927).

Oil inspection fees, in excess of expense of enforcement, are invalid hereunder. Century Oil Co. v. Department of Agriculture, 110 Neb. 100, 192 N.W. 958 (1923); State v. Standard Oil Co., 100 Neb. 826, 161 N.W. 537 (1917).

Gross receipts of corporation may be taxed as license to do business but not as property tax. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Omaha, 73 Neb. 527, 103 N.W. 84 (1905).

7. Tax on corporate franchises

Taxes on corporate franchises must be by valuation and in proportion to value. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Omaha, 73 Neb. 527, 103 N.W. 84 (1905).

Corporate franchises are regarded as property and must be valued and taxed as such. State ex rel. Breckenridge v. Fleming, 70 Neb. 523, 97 N.W. 1063 (1903).

In computing value of corporate franchise, corporate indebtedness should not be deducted. State ex rel. Shriver v. Karr, 64 Neb. 514, 90 N.W. 298 (1902).

8. Tax on foreign corporations

Tax on shares of stock of foreign corporation was constitutional. Rehkopf v. Board of Equalization, 180 Neb. 90, 141 N.W.2d 462 (1966).

Foreign insurance companies may be treated as single class and taxed at different rate from domestic companies, but no discrimination should be made in taxes on their property within state. Aachen & Munich Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Omaha, 72 Neb. 518, 101 N.W. 3 (1904).

This section does not prevent Legislature from imposing tax, in nature of license or occupation tax, upon foreign corporations regardless of property valuation. State v. Insurance Co. of North America, 71 Neb. 320, 99 N.W. 36 (1904), demurrer sustained 71 Neb. 335, 100 N.W. 405 (1904), rehearing denied 71 Neb. 341, 102 N.W. 1022 (1905), judgment sustained 71 Neb. 348, 106 N.W. 767 (1906); State ex rel. Breckenridge v. Fleming, 70 Neb. 523, 97 N.W. 1063 (1903).

9. Special assessments

An act of Legislature which exempts a railroad company from payment of special assessments on benefits received but does not exempt it from payment of any general tax does not contravene the Constitution. Hinman v. Temple, 133 Neb. 268, 274 N.W. 605 (1937).

This section has no application to assessments levied for local improvements. Erickson v. Nine Mile Irr. Dist., 109 Neb. 189, 190 N.W. 573 (1922).

This section relates to revenue for general state and municipal government only, and has no application to taxes or assessments for local improvements such as irrigation works. Bd. of Directors of Alfalfa Irr. Dist. v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411, 64 N.W. 1086 (1895).

10. Exemption from taxation

The partial exemption from taxation of classes of property specified in section 77-202.25, is not unreasonable, objectionable as discriminatory, or violative hereof. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 (1974).

Revenue from sale of water and gas by metropolitan utilities district not taxes. Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 187 Neb. 261, 188 N.W.2d 851 (1971).

Lessee's interest in housing project located on federal air base was taxable. Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 160 Neb. 320, 70 N.W.2d 382 (1955).

Housing authority created by statute for slum clearance is a governmental subdivision and, as such, exempt from taxation. Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451 (1940).

Legislature cannot release any corporation from payment of its proportion of taxes. State ex rel. Cornell v. Poynter, 59 Neb. 417, 81 N.W. 431 (1899).

11. Miscellaneous

Sections 77-132 and 77-1359 do not violate this provision. Agena v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 276 Neb. 851, 758 N.W.2d 363 (2008).

This provision and section 6 provide that the Legislature can empower a city to tax, but Article XI authorizes a city with a limitation of powers home rule charter to exercise that power to tax without first waiting for express delegation. Home Builders Assn. v. City of Lincoln, 271 Neb. 353, 711 N.W.2d 871 (2006).

This provision gives the Legislature two options with respect to tangible personal property: To tax the property on a depreciated cost basis using the same depreciation method with reasonable class lives or to tax all such property uniformly and proportionately. Pfizer Inc. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 260 Neb. 265, 616 N.W.2d 326 (2000).

The proposed amendment to Article VIII, § 1 of the Nebraska Constitution adopted by the Legislature in Special Session in 1978 (LR 1) violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by creating nonuniform taxation and violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment by failing to provide taxpayers with notice and an opportunity to be heard. It is therefore void. State ex rel. Douglas v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 205 Neb. 130, 286 N.W.2d 729 (1979).

Requiring registration of mobile homes and assessing a reasonable fee to defray cost of registration and inspection, if any, does not violate constitutional provision requiring uniform and proportionate taxation of personal property. Gates v. Howell, 204 Neb. 256, 282 N.W.2d 22 (1979).

The levying of taxes for accumulation of funds is within the constitutional provision that "necessary revenue" of the state and its governmental subdivisions be raised by taxation in such manner as the Legislature might direct. Banks v. Board of Education of Chase County, 202 Neb. 717, 277 N.W.2d 76 (1979).

Colonies of honey bees which were not in existence on January 1, which are brought into Nebraska from another state before July 1, are not subject to assessment in Nebraska where their progenitors were taxed for that year in another state. Knoefler Honey Farms v. County of Sherman, 196 Neb. 435, 243 N.W.2d 760 (1976).

Act establishing Court of Industrial Relations does not violate any constitutional provision and the standards for its guidance are adequate. Orleans Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Orleans, 193 Neb. 675, 229 N.W.2d 172 (1975).

L.B. 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612 does not contravene this section. Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972).

The formula set out in sections 79-486 and 79-4,102 for determining rates for nonresident tuition does not violate sections 1 or 4 of this Article. Mann v. Wayne County Board of Equalization, 186 Neb. 752, 186 N.W.2d 729 (1971).

Act which fixed value of agricultural income-producing machinery and equipment as those used by taxpayer in determining federal income tax violated this section. State ex rel. Meyer v. McNeil, 185 Neb. 586, 177 N.W.2d 596 (1970).

Harm caused by statute permitting independent hospital district to fractionate territory of counties insufficient to constitute violation of this section. Shadbolt v. County of Cherry, 185 Neb. 208, 174 N.W.2d 733 (1970).

Act authorizing appointed members of school board to levy a tax of not exceeding two mills and to certify the same directly to county treasurer for collection does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power of taxation. Campbell v. Area Vocational Technical School No. 2, 183 Neb. 318, 159 N.W.2d 817 (1968).

This section does not prohibit a graduated state income tax and specifically provides authorization for taxes other than property tax. Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967).

Airport Authority Act did not violate this section. Obitz v. Airport Authority of City of Red Cloud, 181 Neb. 410, 149 N.W.2d 105 (1967).

Amount deducted from salary of state employee for retirement fund is not a tax within the meaning of this section. Gossman v. State Employees Retirement System, 177 Neb. 326, 129 N.W.2d 97 (1964).

Amendment to Constitution in 1920 provided for a different method of taxing intangibles. Stephenson School Supply Co. v. County of Lancaster, 172 Neb. 453, 110 N.W.2d 41 (1961).

This section has no application to the imposition of a penalty for failure to return property for taxation. Creigh v. Larsen, 171 Neb. 317, 106 N.W.2d 187 (1960).

Tax on motor vehicles should be allocated in the same proportion that levy of each political subdivision bears to total levy for all political subdivisions in which motor vehicle has a taxable situs. State ex rel. School Dist. of Scottsbluff v. Ellis, 168 Neb. 166, 95 N.W.2d 538 (1959).

The Legislature may prescribe standards for determination of actual value. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Jensen, 164 Neb. 833, 83 N.W.2d 569 (1957).

Payment of general taxes for school purposes may not operate, directly or indirectly, to secure immunity from the payment of state or county taxes, in whole or in part. Schulz v. Dixon County, 134 Neb. 549, 279 N.W. 179 (1938), overruling Schmidt v. Saline County, 122 Neb. 56, 239 N.W. 203 (1931).

Act of Legislature waiving penalty for nonpayment of taxes is not forbidden by Constitution. Tukey v. Douglas County, 133 Neb. 732, 277 N.W. 57 (1938).

Act providing for payment of delinquent taxes in installments did not violate provisions of this section. Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439, 268 N.W. 317 (1936).

Party invoking statute may not raise question of its constitutionality. Sommerville v. Board of County Comrs. of Douglas County, 116 Neb. 282, 216 N.W. 815 (1927).

Regarded as a tax, provision imposing three hundred dollars assessment against building enjoined as liquor nuisance was in conflict with this section. State ex rel. McGuire v. Macfarland, 104 Neb. 42, 175 N.W. 663 (1919).

This section has no application to statute authorizing levy for university campus extension, as same relates to "corporate purposes" of municipality. Sinclair v. City of Lincoln, 101 Neb. 163, 162 N.W. 488 (1917).

Enumeration of subjects of taxation is not exclusive. Legislature has power to provide for taxation upon inheritances. In re Estate of Sanford, 90 Neb. 410, 133 N.W. 870 (1911).

Credits of a nonresident partnership engaged in business in Nebraska are subject to taxation. Clay, Robinson & Co. v. Douglas County, 88 Neb. 363, 129 N.W. 548 (1911).

Inheritance tax law sustained as tax upon right of succession of property and not tax upon property of estate. State ex rel. Slabaugh v. Vinsonhaler, 74 Neb. 675, 105 N.W. 472 (1905).

Word "property" includes all intangible property of whatever description including franchise, and all physical or tangible property, and same must be assessed at uniform value. State ex rel. Bee Building Co. v. Savage, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902).

"Cedar Rust" law does not violate this section, as charging owner of infected trees with cost of destruction is not a tax, but an incident to practical accomplishment of police power compelling him to abate a nuisance. Upton v. Felton, 4 F.Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1932).