Source

• Neb. Const. art I, sec. 3 (1875);
• Amended 1998, Laws 1997, LR 20CA, sec. 1.

Annotations

1. Criminal prosecutions

2. Vague or overbroad

3. Arbitrary or unreasonable

4. Procedural due process

5. Reasonable regulation

6. Fundamental rights

7. Deprived of property

8. Contract rights

9. Labor and employment

10. Taxes and special assessments

11. Laws held generally to violate due process

12. Laws held generally not to violate due process

13. Miscellaneous

1. Criminal prosecutions

For the issue involving specialized knowledge to be a significant factor, the issue must be one likely to make a difference as to the outcome if the defendant is successful in contesting it. State v. Wood, 310 Neb. 391, 966 N.W.2d 825 (2021).

There is a reasonable necessity for appointed expert assistance if the defendant shows some basis for believing the issue can only be strongly contested with the assistance of an appointed expert. State v. Wood, 310 Neb. 391, 966 N.W.2d 825 (2021).

There is no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts; an expert in any field of expertise may, under the circumstances, be a basic tool of an adequate defense or appeal. State v. Wood, 310 Neb. 391, 966 N.W.2d 825 (2021).

To show a constitutional right to appointment of an independent expert at the State's expense, the accused must timely make a preliminary, particularized showing (1) that an issue involving specialized knowledge is likely to be a significant factor in the accused's defense and (2) that there is a reasonable necessity for the defense to have expert assistance in contesting that issue. State v. Wood, 310 Neb. 391, 966 N.W.2d 825 (2021).

Under this provision, in a criminal prosecution, the State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt and may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming an ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense. Because the burden of proof always remains with the State, it cannot comment on a defendant's failure to produce evidence to refute an element of the crime, because doing so could erroneously lead the jury to believe that the defendant carried the burden of introducing evidence. The exception to this rule is when the defendant voluntarily assumes some burden of proof by asserting the defenses of alibi, of self-defense, and of others, relying on facts that could be elicited only from a witness who is not equally available to the State. While a defendant may invite the State to explain why it chose not to submit certain items for testing, a defendant in a criminal case can never open the door to shift the burden of proof. A defendant is entitled to inquire about weaknesses in the State's case, but this does not open the door for the State to point out that the defendant has not proved his or her innocence. State v. Rocha, 295 Neb. 716, 890 N.W.2d 178 (2017).

The Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions preclude admissibility of an involuntary confession. State v. Bormann, 279 Neb. 320, 777 N.W.2d 829 (2010).

The amendment to this provision providing that "no person shall ... be denied equal protection of the laws" operates prospectively only. In order to prove that a defendant's race unconstitutionally taints enforcement of the death penalty, the defendant must at a minimum establish that the decision to enforce the death penalty is based on a conscious discriminatory purpose, resulting in a discriminatory effect suffered by the defendant. A defendant has a life interest in connection with the imposition of the death penalty and is entitled to due process in the imposition of the sentence. State v. Reeves, 258 Neb. 511, 604 N.W.2d 151 (2000).

This section provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty "without due process of law", and article I, section 11, provides that the accused in a criminal prosecution shall have the right to "trial by an impartial jury". These provisions are interconnected and require that criminal convictions rest upon a jury determination that a criminal defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime charged. State v. White, 249 Neb. 381, 543 N.W.2d 725 (1996).

The due process clause of this provision precludes admissibility of an involuntary confession. State v. Mantich, 249 Neb. 311, 543 N.W.2d 181 (1996); State v. Martin, 243 Neb. 368, 500 N.W.2d 512 (1993).

Allegedly coercive conduct on the part of private detective obtaining a statement from defendant did not carry over to statement made by defendant several hours later in the presence of others. State v. Phelps, 241 Neb. 707, 490 N.W.2d 676 (1992).

Section 29-2203 does not violate either the U.S. or Nebraska Constitution. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989).

Prosecutions for felonies, including murder, may be had on informations filed by the county attorney, and such procedure neither violates the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution nor the due process clause of the Nebraska Constitution. State v. Burchett, 224 Neb. 444, 399 N.W.2d 258 (1986).

No one has a vested right in a procedure, and procedural matters can be changed at any time before trial and are binding on a defendant. State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 (1986).

Photographic lineup did not violate due process despite defendant's argument that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive in that the relative heights of suspects were readily determinable by reference to the strategically placed doorframe visible in each photograph. State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 (1986).

Trial court's determination that defendant's incriminating statements were made in a non-custodial setting was not clearly wrong; thus, police did not violate defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination. State v. Saylor, 223 Neb. 694, 392 N.W.2d 789 (1986).

Due process is afforded defendant in capital case by the traditional trial to court or jury, the presentence report on defendant, a presentence hearing and findings relating to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and automatic review in Supreme Court, all to assure the death penalty will not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977); State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977).

Sections 29-3301 to 29-3307 do not violate privilege against self-incrimination, are constitutional, and apply to physical evidence, not to oral communications or testimony. State v. Swayze, 197 Neb. 149, 247 N.W.2d 440 (1976).

Due process does not require a prosecuting attorney to hold an adversary hearing prior to determining the manner in which a minor defendant shall be proceeded against. State v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974).

Whether an identification procedure is violative of due process will be determined upon a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding it. State v. Sanchell, 191 Neb. 505, 216 N.W.2d 504 (1974).

Failure to appoint counsel to represent a defendant in a criminal case upon appeal did not violate this section. State v. Dabney, 181 Neb. 263, 147 N.W.2d 768 (1967).

Use of any confession obtained in violation of the due process clause requires reversal of the conviction, even though there is other evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Long, 179 Neb. 606, 139 N.W.2d 813 (1966).

Sexual psychopath law did not deprive accused of his liberty without due process of law. State v. Madary, 178 Neb. 383, 133 N.W.2d 583 (1965).

Due process of law in a criminal case includes right to trial by jury and right to defend in person or by counsel. Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844 (1960).

Detention in jail for six months awaiting trial was not a denial of due process. Svehla v. State, 168 Neb. 553, 96 N.W.2d 649 (1959).

Sentence of juvenile offender to state penitentiary was not a denial of due process of law. Lingo v. Hann, 161 Neb. 67, 71 N.W.2d 716 (1955).

Proceedings in contempt were not violative of due process. Cornett v. State, 155 Neb. 766, 53 N.W.2d 747 (1952).

Denial of continuance did not operate to violate due process clause. Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W.2d 561 (1949).

Where a jury in a criminal case disagrees and is properly discharged, a second trial upon original charge, even though one or more degrees of the offense have been withdrawn, does not violate this section. State v. Hutter, 145 Neb. 798, 18 N.W.2d 203 (1945).

A person charged with a crime waives constitutional rights by judicial confession of guilt. In re Application of Carper, Tesar v. Bowley, 144 Neb. 623, 14 N.W.2d 225 (1944).

Habitual criminal law, defining habitual criminal and providing punishment therefor, is not violative of this section. Rains v. State, 142 Neb. 284, 5 N.W.2d 887 (1942).

Where, after objection that copy of amended information had not been served, trial proceeded upon the original information which had been served, there was no violation of this section. Hoctor v. State, 141 Neb. 329, 3 N.W.2d 558 (1942).

An information alleging all facts necessary to constitute a criminal offense, does not violate constitutional provision as to due process of law. Chadek v. State, 138 Neb. 626, 294 N.W. 384 (1940).

Habitual criminal statute upheld. Right of accused to counsel deemed waived where no demand made. Davis v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 708, 291 N.W. 82 (1940).

Due process of law in a criminal case requires a law creating or defining the offense, a court of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to answer the charge, trial according to the settled course of judicial proceeding, and a right to be discharged unless found guilty. Dutiel v. State, 135 Neb. 811, 284 N.W. 321 (1939).

Statute prohibiting granting of new trial if Supreme Court considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred, does not justify court in denying new trial where accused's constitutional right to fair trial was violated. Scott v. State, 121 Neb. 232, 236 N.W. 608 (1931).

The Constitution guarantees a fair and impartial trial to every person accused of crime, and that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Coxbill v. State, 115 Neb. 634, 214 N.W. 256 (1927).

The judge of a district court has no jurisdiction to try and determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with a felony who pleads not guilty, without a trial to a jury, and such jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the accused. Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761, 101 N.W. 1007 (1904).

Prosecution of accused on information of prosecuting attorney did not contravene the due process of law clause of the Constitution. Bolln v. State, 51 Neb. 581, 71 N.W. 444 (1897).

Although due process does not require the appointment of counsel to represent a prisoner in a private civil matter, due process does require that the prisoner receive meaningful access to the courts to defend against suits brought against him or her. Conn v. Conn, 13 Neb. App. 472, 695 N.W.2d 674 (2005).

2. Vague or overbroad

Statute providing it shall be unlawful just to be in place where controlled substance is being used illegally is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. State v. Adkins, 196 Neb. 76, 241 N.W.2d 655 (1976).

Motor vehicle flight to avoid arrest, act held unconstitutional upon the ground of vagueness and uncertainty. Heywood v. Brainard, 181 Neb. 294, 147 N.W.2d 772 (1967).

A penal law which makes criminal an act which the utmost care and circumspection would not enable one to avoid violates this section. Markham v. Brainard, 178 Neb. 544, 134 N.W.2d 84 (1965).

Grade A Milk Act contained an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency and was unconstitutional. Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227 (1960).

Municipal ordinance directed against obscene publications was void for uncertainty. State v. Pocras, 166 Neb. 642, 90 N.W.2d 263 (1958).

3. Arbitrary or unreasonable

In setting rates that may be charged by a utility, a state cannot set rates which are unjust, unreasonable, and confiscatory and which, therefore, deprive the utility of property without the due process of law. K N Energy, Inc. v. Cities of Broken Bow et al., 244 Neb. 113, 505 N.W.2d 102 (1993).

If it becomes apparent that a statute does not tend to preserve the public health, safety, or welfare but tends more to stifle legitimate business by creating a monopoly or trade barrier, it is unconstitutional. Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Nebraska Dairy Products Board, 192 Neb. 89, 219 N.W.2d 214 (1974).

Public Auction Law imposes arbitrary and unreasonable limitations on conduct of a lawful business. Blauvelt v. Beck, 162 Neb. 576, 76 N.W.2d 738 (1956).

Primary purpose of constitutional guaranty afforded by this section was security of the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. Rein v. Johnson, 149 Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d 548 (1947).

Prohibiting manufacture and sale of milk to which has been added any fat or oil other than milk, violates the Constitution as being arbitrary and unreasonable and taking property without due process of law. Carolene Products Co. v. Banning, 131 Neb. 429, 268 N.W. 313 (1936).

Statute regulating size of loaf of bread and authorizing Secretary of Agriculture to fix reasonable excess tolerance is not violative of due process clause. Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570 (1934), affirming 124 Neb. 464, 247 N.W. 39 (1933).

Statute fixing maximum weights for loaves of bread is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924), reversing Burns Baking Co. v. McKelvie, 108 Neb. 674, 189 N.W. 383 (1922).

4. Procedural due process

The exclusive remedy provided by the Workers' Compensation Act satisfies the due process requirements of this provision, as well as the requirements of Neb. Const. art. I, section 13, that every person shall have a remedy by due course of law for any injury done to him or her. Abbott v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 907, 443 N.W.2d 591 (1989).

The hearing each motorist has on each offense before points are assessed, and right to appeal to district court from revocation of his motor vehicle operator's license under sections 39-669.27 and 39-669.28, R.R.S.1943, pending which the court may stay revocation, provide due process. Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 195 N.W.2d 218 (1972).

A person has no property in rules of the common law and such rules subject to constitutional limitations may be changed by the Legislature. State Securities Co. v. Norfolk Livestock Sales Co., Inc., 187 Neb. 446, 191 N.W.2d 614 (1971).

Preliminary hearing before a county judge not an attorney not violative of this section. State v. Howard, 184 Neb. 274, 167 N.W.2d 80 (1969).

Statute providing for withdrawal from area vocational technical schools did not violate this section in failing to provide hearing for determination of validity of signatures. Chaloupka v. Area Vocational Technical School No. 2, 184 Neb. 196, 165 N.W.2d 719 (1969).

Requirement for furnishing of probate appeal bond did not deprive party of due process of law. Rundall v. Whiteside, 182 Neb. 176, 153 N.W.2d 736 (1967).

Requirement of due process of law was satisfied by original notice of hearing before board of appraisers in eminent domain proceedings. Weiner v. State, 179 Neb. 297, 137 N.W.2d 852 (1965).

The incorporation of a village by the county board upon a petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants is not a denial of due process of law. Kriz v. Klingensmith, 176 Neb. 205, 125 N.W.2d 674 (1964).

Due process of law was not denied by failure to mail notice of intention to pass resolution of necessity declaring advisability of constructing sewer. Jones v. Village of Farnam, 174 Neb. 704, 119 N.W.2d 157 (1963).

Procedure for investigation of conduct of attorneys was not a denial of due process of law. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Jensen, 171 Neb. 1, 105 N.W.2d 459 (1960).

Prosecution before a judge disqualified by pecuniary interest is a violation of due process of law. Conkling v. DeLany, 167 Neb. 4, 91 N.W.2d 250 (1958).

Provision for service of process upon Director of Banking in action for violation of Installment Loan Act was constitutional. McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957).

Act for change of boundaries of school district required notice and opportunity to be heard. Schutte v. Schmitt, 162 Neb. 162, 75 N.W.2d 656 (1956).

Judgment is void unless a proper method of notification is employed. Board of Trustees of York College v. Cheney, 160 Neb. 631, 71 N.W.2d 195 (1955).

Service under reciprocal nonresident guardianship act did not violate due process clause. Howell v. Fletcher, 157 Neb. 196, 59 N.W.2d 359 (1953).

Statute authorizing annexation of additional territory of rural fire protection district did not deny due process. Seward County Rural Fire Protection Dist. v. County of Seward, 156 Neb. 516, 56 N.W.2d 700 (1953).

Fact that examiner of State Railway Commission considered the interrelationship of various applications when determining action to be taken on each application separately was not a denial of due process. In re Application of Petersen & Petersen, Inc., 153 Neb. 517, 45 N.W.2d 465 (1951).

Party who invoked special proceeding could not question constitutionality thereof under this section. Lackaff v. Department of Roads & Irrigation, 153 Neb. 217, 43 N.W.2d 576 (1950).

Action of county board in determining population of county at a secret meeting without notice to county officers whose salaries were thereby affected, vitally affected the rights and interests of the officers and is void. Shambaugh v. Buffalo County, 133 Neb. 46, 274 N.W. 207 (1937).

Where juror failed to disclose his ineligibility when questioned by trial court, and is permitted to serve on jury, a new trial should be granted. Berg v. Griffiths, 126 Neb. 235, 252 N.W. 918 (1934).

A statute providing that an action for injury to person or property by a common carrier, bus or trucking company may be brought in any county on the road or line where service could be obtained on a driver thereof is not improper or taking of property without due process of law. Schwarting v. Ogram, 123 Neb. 76, 242 N.W. 273 (1932), 81 A.L.R. 769 (1932).

Statute authorizing counties to foreclose lien for taxes delinquent more than three years is not taking property without due process of law. Commercial Savings & Loan Assn. v. Pyramid Realty Co., 121 Neb. 493, 237 N.W. 575 (1931).

Legislation authorizing county superintendent, clerk, and county board to change boundary lines between school districts without notice or hearing is a violation of due process of law. Ruwe v. School District No. 85 of Dodge County, 120 Neb. 668, 234 N.W. 789 (1931).

Statute relating to service on nonresident car owners is constitutional except as to provision for 90 day continuance and does not deprive such owners of property without due process of law. Herzoff v. Hommel, 120 Neb. 475, 233 N.W. 458 (1930).

Statute empowering department to cancel water appropriation, in view of provision for notice and appeal does not deprive one of his property without due process of law. Dawson County Irr. Co. v. McMullen, 120 Neb. 245, 231 N.W. 840 (1930).

Curative act to validate proceedings for creation of a light and power district, but applicable only to particular district, is unconstitutional because it violates due process of law clause. Anderson v. Lehmkuhl, 119 Neb. 451, 229 N.W. 773 (1930).

Where an increase in the assessed valuation of property as returned by county, is made by the State Board of Equalization without notice and without affording sufficient opportunity to be heard, it amounts to confiscation of property without due process. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 119 Neb. 142, 227 N.W. 455 (1929); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 119 Neb. 138, 227 N.W. 452 (1929); Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 119 Neb. 137, 227 N.W. 454 (1929); Stanton County v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 119 Neb. 136, 227 N.W. 454 (1929).

Failing to provide for notice to resident owners of appraisers' meeting to assess damages in condemnation proceedings by county contravened the Constitution. Sheridan County v. Hand, 114 Neb. 813, 210 N.W. 273 (1926).

The issuance of bonds upon a petition of not less than fifty-one per cent of the voters stands upon the same legal footing as bonds issued by virtue of an election and the fact the taxpayer is given no opportunity to contest the validity of the bonds is not taking of property without due process of law. McCord v. Marsh, 108 Neb. 723, 189 N.W. 386 (1922).

Failure to provide in statute for notice to the property owner of the time and place at which the appraisers would meet for purpose of making their assessment in condemnation of school site is unconstitutional and actual notice cannot operate as a substitute. Albin v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 14 of Richardson County, 106 Neb. 719, 184 N.W. 141 (1921).

Law permitting jury, in court's discretion, to view premises does not violate constitutional provision of taking property without due process of law. Drollinger v. Hastings & N. W. R. R. Co., 98 Neb. 520, 153 N.W. 619 (1915).

Law purporting to validate proceedings of probate court under prior act which had been held unconstitutional contravenes due process of law and is unconstitutional. Draper v. Clayton, 87 Neb. 443, 127 N.W. 369 (1910).

Striking answer from files and denying defendant right to further defense in divorce suit violates the constitutional right of the defendant to due process of law. McNamara v. McNamara, 86 Neb. 631, 126 N.W. 94 (1910).

No judgment of a court is due process of law if rendered without jurisdiction in the court, or without due notice to the party. Herman v. Barth, 85 Neb. 722, 124 N.W. 135 (1910).

To constitute due process of law it is not necessary that notice be given of each step in the process of taxation. It is sufficient if the taxpayer has an opportunity to appear, at some time before a tribunal having jurisdiction, and there procure an adjustment of his liabilities. State v. Several Parcels of Land, 83 Neb. 13, 119 N.W. 21 (1908).

Statute authorizing the revival of a dormant judgment against a nonresident upon service by publication is not repugnant to state Constitution. White v. Ress, 80 Neb. 749, 115 N.W. 301 (1908).

Statute providing for the organization of a drainage district whenever the same will promote the public health, convenience or welfare, funds to be raised in proportion to benefits received, notice giving owner right to appear and be heard and to appeal from order of assignment, does not amount to the taking of private property for private use, nor for public use without just compensation nor without due process of law. State ex rel. Harris v. Hanson, 80 Neb. 724, 115 N.W. 294 (1908).

A statute that provides for seizure and forfeiture of guns used in hunting out of season, if no hearing provided for, is unconstitutional. McConnell v. McKillip, 71 Neb. 712, 99 N.W. 505 (1904).

Whenever an opportunity is offered to invoke equal protection of law by judicial proceeding appropriate for the purpose and adequate to secure the end and object sought to be attained, due process of law is said to be satisfied. Reed v. Reed, 70 Neb. 779, 98 N.W. 73 (1904).

In an action to quiet the title to real estate on the grounds of adverse possession, the former owner has not been deprived of his property without due process of law if the period has expired which, under the law, would bar an action for its recovery by the real owner. Linton v. Heye, 69 Neb. 450, 95 N.W. 1040 (1903), affirmed in 194 U.S. 628 (1904).

Act providing for assessment of damages under herd law, by arbitration, if cumulative, and not exclusive is not taking of property without due process of law. Randall v. Gross, 67 Neb. 255, 93 N.W. 223 (1903).

Statute providing that all witness fees and costs uncalled for within a certain specified time, in default of which they shall be paid into school fund is not taking of property without due process of law. Douglas County v. Moores, 66 Neb. 284, 92 N.W. 199 (1902).

Drainage district assessments, where owners are given opportunity to appear and be heard and accorded a right to review, are not taking of property without due process of law. Dodge County v. Acom, 61 Neb. 376, 85 N.W. 292 (1901).

Lord Campbell's Act gives right of action to personal representative of deceased for death of passenger and does not deprive railroad companies of their property without due process of law. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Zernecke, 59 Neb. 689, 82 N.W. 26 (1900); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hambel, 2 Neb. Unof. 607, 89 N.W. 643 (1902).

"Due process of law" is defined as such exertion of power of government as sanctioned by settled maxims of law and under such safeguards for protection of individual rights as prescribed for class of cases to which the one in question belongs. It has never been construed as right to be heard in court of last resort, but is satisfied by proceeding applicable to subject matter and conformable to such general rules as affect all persons alike. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Headrick, 49 Neb. 286, 68 N.W. 489 (1896).

Providing for organization of drainage districts and charging lands for payment of bonds, upon petition and notice is valid. Board of Directors of Alfalfa Irrigation Dist. v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411, 64 N.W. 1086 (1895).

A statute authorizing a city to change existing grades but failing to provide for notice to property owners of appraisers' meeting is unconstitutional. McGavock v. City of Omaha, 40 Neb. 64, 58 N.W. 543 (1894).

Due process requires that a prisoner receive meaningful access to the courts to defend civil suits brought against the prisoner. Board of Regents v. Thompson, 6 Neb. App. 734, 577 N.W.2d 749 (1998).

5. Reasonable regulation

A look-back provision of a natural resources district's rules governing land irrigation, which allowed acres that had been actually irrigated any year during a particular 10-year period to be certified, did not violate the substantive due process rights of a farmer who began irrigation after the 10-year period, because the provision had a substantial relation to the general welfare, in that it ensured an adequate supply of ground water and the window of time was reasonable due to the existence of limitations on "New Groundwater Irrigated Acres" in the district after that time. Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn NRD, 294 Neb. 46, 881 N.W.2d 892 (2016).

A look-back provision of a natural resources district's rules governing land irrigation, which allowed acres that had been actually irrigated any year during a particular 10-year period to be certified, did not, under a rational basis test, violate the equal protection rights of a farmer who began irrigation after the 10-year period, because the provision was rationally related to the goal of ground water conservation. Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn NRD, 294 Neb. 46, 881 N.W.2d 892 (2016).

Due process is not violated in termination of parental rights statutes where a parent of ordinary intelligence can ascertain, without guessing, the prescribed standards governing parental conduct. State v. A. H., 198 Neb. 444, 253 N.W.2d 283 (1977).

Section 39-6,193, imposing vicarious liability on owners-lessors of trucks for damages by lessees and operators of the leased trucks, is constitutional. Bridgeford v. U-Haul Co., 195 Neb. 308, 238 N.W.2d 443 (1976).

Legislative act requiring continuous residency of four months independent of school attendance to establish residence for tuition purposes does not violate this section. Thompson v. Board of Regents of University of Nebraska, 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).

Prohibiting wholesaler from giving discounts for quantity purchases of alcoholic liquor to retailers is not a denial of due process. Central Markets West, Inc. v. State, 186 Neb. 79, 180 N.W.2d 880 (1970).

Statute authorizing county board to relocate roads did not violate this section. Emry v. Lake, 181 Neb. 568, 149 N.W.2d 520 (1967).

Statute providing for limited access to interstate highway is not violative of due process. Fougeron v. County of Seward, 174 Neb. 753, 119 N.W.2d 298 (1963).

Act authorizing revocation of driver's license for failure to submit to blood or urine test did not violate this section. Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961).

Statute requiring a warehouseman to report list of property held in storage was not a denial of due process of law. United States Cold Storage Corp. v. Stolinski, 168 Neb. 513, 96 N.W.2d 408 (1959).

Statute prohibiting state and federal officers and employees from being delegates to county, district, and state political conventions did not violate this section. State ex rel. Baldwin v. Strain, 152 Neb. 763, 42 N.W.2d 796 (1950).

Act requiring proper lights on mainline switch stands by railroads was not void under due process clause. State v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 147 Neb. 970, 25 N.W.2d 824 (1947).

Claim made and rejected that appropriation of surface and ground waters without compensation violated this section. Dischner v. Loup River P.P. Dist., 147 Neb. 949, 25 N.W.2d 813 (1947).

Legislative act providing for proceedings with reference to children born out of wedlock sustained as constitutional. In re Application of Rozgall, 147 Neb. 260, 23 N.W.2d 85 (1946).

While it is competent for the Legislature to classify, the classification, to be valid, must rest on some reason of public policy, or some substantial difference of situation or circumstances, that would naturally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects classified. Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 141 Neb. 363, 3 N.W.2d 635 (1942).

Statutes creating housing authorities and granting right of eminent domain to operate for slum clearance do not violate due process clause. Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451 (1940).

Act regulating and licensing sale of motor vehicles, and prohibiting price discriminations does not interfere with rights of property or personal liberty. Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388 (1939).

Act regulating manufacture of ice cream and dairy products is a proper exercise of police power. State v. McCosh, 134 Neb. 780, 279 N.W. 775 (1938).

City ordinance requiring persons engaged in business of moving houses to procure licenses is constitutional and reasonable exercise of police power. State v. Phillips, 133 Neb. 209, 274 N.W. 459 (1937).

Ordinance requiring peddler to have a license must be reasonable, considering the nature of the business and not so high as to prohibit the carrying on of the business. Hoyt Bros. v. City of Lincoln, 130 Neb. 79, 263 N.W. 898 (1936).

Zoning ordinance enacted as having substantial relation to public health, safety and general welfare is not deprivation of property without due process of law. State ex rel. Herbert v. Anderson, 122 Neb. 738, 241 N.W. 545 (1932); City of Lincoln v. Logan-Jones, 120 Neb. 827, 235 N.W. 583 (1931); City of Lincoln v. Foss, 119 Neb. 666, 230 N.W. 592 (1930).

Statute denying to persons under 16 the right to motor vehicle drivers' license is not in violation of this section. State ex rel. Oleson v. Graunke, 119 Neb. 440, 229 N.W. 329 (1930).

A valid exercise of police power may affect or destroy values where the use of the property for its original purpose has become unlawful by a change in public policy as disclosed by a new statute, but legislation on that ground is constitutional and does not deprive one of property without due process of law. Miller v. McLaughlin, 118 Neb. 174, 224 N.W. 18 (1929), affirmed in 281 U.S. 261 (1930).

Statute relating to drainage by irrigation company of sub-irrigated land is constitutional and does not violate the due process clause of Constitution. State ex rel. Read v. Farmers Irr. Dist., 116 Neb. 373, 217 N.W. 607 (1928).

Authorizing life insurance company to change plan of business from mutual to stock by amending articles does not violate provision relating to due process of law in Constitution. Leininger v. North Amer. Nat. L. Ins. Co., 115 Neb. 801, 215 N.W. 167 (1927).

Prohibiting foreign installment investment company doing business without certificate of approval by Department of Trade and Commerce is not in violation of due process of law. Investors Syndicate v. Bryan, 113 Neb. 816, 205 N.W. 294 (1925).

Statute prohibiting the soliciting of certain classes of claims for the purpose of instituting suits thereon outside of the state and providing a penalty therefor, are regulatory measures and as such, do not infringe the rights of an individual under the Constitution. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Davis, 111 Neb. 737, 197 N.W. 599 (1924).

Statute providing for the housing of municipal courts in the county courthouse does not interfere with vested rights of the county in such property, and is not unconstitutional as a deprivation of the use of property without due process of law. State ex rel. City of Omaha v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Douglas County, 109 Neb. 35, 189 N.W. 639 (1922).

Statute prohibiting liquor to be kept elsewhere than in private dwelling is not in violation of constitutional provision for due process of law. Fitch v. State, 102 Neb. 361, 167 N.W. 417 (1918).

City ordinance prohibiting the removal of garbage through the streets or alleys by any one not employed by the city for that purpose, is not unconstitutional as taking the property of a restaurant proprietor for public use without just compensation or as depriving him of his property without due process of law. Urbach v. City of Omaha, 101 Neb. 314, 163 N.W. 307 (1917).

Statute fixing maximum rates of premium for surety and fidelity companies under certain circumstances by the insurance board is not taking property without due process of law. State ex rel. Martin v. Howard, 96 Neb. 278, 147 N.W. 689 (1914).

Ordinance prohibiting billiard and pool halls does not take property without due process of law. Cole v. Village of Culbertson, 86 Neb. 160, 125 N.W. 287 (1910); McCarter v. City of Lexington, 80 Neb. 714, 115 N.W. 303 (1908).

Every property holder is secured in his title thereto and holds it under implied rule and understanding that its use may be so regulated and restricted that it shall not be injurious to others having equal right of enjoyment of their property, or to the rights of the community. Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W. 421 (1902).

Statute prohibiting transfer of mortgaged chattels without written consent does not violate Constitution. State v. Heldenbrand, 62 Neb. 136, 87 N.W. 25 (1901).

Statute imposing penalty for neglecting to remove obstruction in line of newly established highway does not deprive owner of property without due process of law. Black v. Stein, 23 Neb. 302, 36 N.W. 548 (1888).

Zoning ordinance of city of Lincoln limiting the rental of a single-family dwelling to one family, which is defined as including not more than three unrelated persons, does not violate due process. State v. Champoux, 5 Neb. App. 68, 555 N.W.2d 69 (1996).

Statute allowing reasonable attorney's fees to plaintiff in suit on policy covering real property does not violate the Constitution on taking of property without due process of law. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U.S. 301 (1903).

Statute regulating the practice of veterinary medicine and surgery is not a violation of this section. Peet Stock Remedy Co. v. McMullen, 32 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1929).

Amendment to charter and ordinance thereunder authorizing city to sell gasoline and oil does not violate provision of Constitution relating to taking of property without due process of law. Mutual Oil Co. v. Zehrung, 11 F.2d 887 (D. Neb. 1925).

6. Fundamental rights

A state constitutional provision is not elevated to a fundamental right solely because it mandates legislative action. Citizens for Eq. Ed. v. Lyons-Decatur Sch. Dist., 274 Neb. 278, 739 N.W.2d 742 (2007).

Besides guaranteeing fair process, the Nebraska due process clause provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. Citizens for Eq. Ed. v. Lyons-Decatur Sch. Dist., 274 Neb. 278, 739 N.W.2d 742 (2007).

Fundamental rights are those implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. Citizens for Eq. Ed. v. Lyons-Decatur Sch. Dist., 274 Neb. 278, 739 N.W.2d 742 (2007).

The Nebraska due process clause forbids the government from infringing upon a fundamental liberty interest, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Citizens for Eq. Ed. v. Lyons-Decatur Sch. Dist., 274 Neb. 278, 739 N.W.2d 742 (2007).

When a classification created by state action does not jeopardize the exercise of a fundamental right or categorize because of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest. Citizens for Eq. Ed. v. Lyons-Decatur Sch. Dist., 274 Neb. 278, 739 N.W.2d 742 (2007).

7. Deprived of property

Municipal employees' claim that they were denied substantive due process of law by employer's payment of disability pension benefits failed because employees presented no evidence that employer denied employees the benefit of vested employment benefits. Constitutional deprivations are not founded upon speculation or mere possibilities. Bauers v. City of Lincoln, 255 Neb. 572, 586 N.W.2d 452 (1998).

The right of ingress and egress by way of a street is a property right of which an abutting property owner cannot be deprived without compensation. Swanson v. State Dept. of Roads, 178 Neb. 671, 134 N.W.2d 810 (1965).

Statute requiring fencing of right-of-way of railroads did not deprive railroad company of due process of law. Linenbrink v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 177 Neb. 838, 131 N.W.2d 417 (1964).

Statutory authorization for recovery of treble the actual damages sustained violates this section. Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960).

Legislative act will not be permitted to operate retrospectively when effect would be to interfere with vested rights. Dell v. City of Lincoln, 170 Neb. 176, 102 N.W.2d 62 (1960).

Holder of school land lease giving option to purchase fee title could not be deprived of that right by subsequent legislation. Pfeifer v. Ableidinger, 166 Neb. 464, 89 N.W.2d 568 (1958).

Right of owner of property abutting a street to ingress and egress to and from his premises is a property right of which he cannot be deprived without due process of law. Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 83 N.W.2d 76 (1957).

Repeal of ordinance creating a water district did not invade any property rights. Brasier v. City of Lincoln, 159 Neb. 12, 65 N.W.2d 213 (1954).

Suspension of license under Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act does not deprive licensee of property right. Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620 (1952).

Provision for allowance of claim for reimbursement against recipient of old age assistance is not violative of due process. Boone County Old Age Assistance Board v. Myhre, 149 Neb. 669, 32 N.W.2d 262 (1948).

Relieving drainage district from liability for damages because of vote of landowners not to become part thereof violated this section. Cooper v. Sanitary District No. 1 of Lancaster County, 146 Neb. 412, 19 N.W.2d 619 (1945).

Zoning ordinance requiring certain size of buildings and ground area did not operate to deny property owners due process of law. Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 448, 13 N.W.2d 634 (1944).

It is a general rule that a person has no vested right in statutory licenses, permits or privileges. Beisner v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 445, 293 N.W. 289 (1940).

Statute making a stay bond a judgment against the surety does not conflict with the due process clause. Baker Steel & Machinery Co. v. Ferguson, 137 Neb. 578, 290 N.W. 449 (1940).

Act taking away right of licensees to sell alcoholic liquors at wholesale in quart bottles, by fixing uniform standards for containers, though reducing value of property formerly used in liquor traffic, does not violate constitutional provision. Marsh & Marsh v. Carmichael, 136 Neb. 797, 287 N.W. 616 (1939).

Statute authorizing reparation of freight rates unlawfully collected cannot be construed to permit retroactive action by Railway Commission. Farmers Union Livestock Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 135 Neb. 689, 283 N.W. 498 (1939).

Every person legally possesses the right of acquiring the absolute and unqualified title to every species of property recognized by law, with all rights incidental thereto, and, in connection with the right of personal liberty, it includes the right to dispose of such property in such innocent manner as he pleases, and to sell it at such price as he can obtain in fair barter. State ex rel. English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281 N.W. 607 (1938).

Public power districts taking land by eminent domain does not violate due process clause of Constitution providing just compensation is paid. Johnson v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 133 Neb. 97, 274 N.W. 386 (1937).

Creating depositors' final settlement fund authorizing assessment against state banks for payment of losses in banks closed is invalid for the reason one is deprived of his property without due process. Hubbell Bank v. Bryan, 124 Neb. 51, 245 N.W. 20 (1932), certiorari denied 289 U.S. 753 (1933).

Water right acquired prior to 1895 is a vested property right not to be taken away by legislative action. City of Fairbury v. Fairbury Mill & Elevator Co., 123 Neb. 588, 243 N.W. 774 (1932).

City ordinance prohibiting installation and operation of "automatic coin-in-the-slot gasoline pumps" at filling station is not violative of this section. Hawkins v. City of Red Cloud, 123 Neb. 487, 243 N.W. 431 (1932).

Statute transferring assets from depositors' guaranty fund to depositors' final settlement fund, excluding assets subject to payment of judgment liens, is not a violation of due process clause. Bliss v. Bryan, 123 Neb. 461, 243 N.W. 625 (1932).

Appropriation by Legislature of public money to reimburse depositors for losses sustained by depositors in banks operated by guaranty fund commission is in violation of due process provision of federal and state Constitutions. Weaver v. Koehn, 120 Neb. 114, 231 N.W. 703 (1930).

Statute authorizing license to guardian to mortgage insane ward's realty without requiring notice to ward does not violate the Constitution relating to taking of property without due process of law. Mead v. Polly, 119 Neb. 206, 228 N.W. 369 (1929).

Order of Railway Commission requiring the physical connection of two telephone companies and directing that they shall divide all new business in a certain proportion, is in effect taking of property without due process of law. Blackledge v. Farmers Independent Tel. Co. of Red Cloud, 105 Neb. 713, 181 N.W. 709 (1921), 16 A.L.R. 343 (1921).

Law depriving citizens of right to sell hog-cholera serum under certain conditions is unconstitutional. Hall v. State, 100 Neb. 84, 158 N.W. 362 (1916).

Order of Railway Commission requiring railroad to construct private overhead crossing violates due process of law as provided in the Constitution. Postle v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 98 Neb. 192, 152 N.W. 379 (1915).

Ordinance declaring that the carcasses of all dead animals found within the city, which were not slain for food, should at once become the property of the public contractor, is void so far as it attempts to take private property without due process of law. Whelan v. Daniels, 94 Neb. 642, 143 N.W. 929 (1913).

License to sell intoxicating liquors is but a mere temporary permit and is not a property right within the meaning of this section. Harding v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 90 Neb. 232, 133 N.W. 191 (1911).

A statute limiting the dower right of a non-resident widow to lands of which her husband died seized, and extending the dower right of a resident widow to other lands, does not contravene the Constitution. Miner v. Morgan, 83 Neb. 400, 119 N.W. 781 (1909).

Statute authorizing the entry of a judgment for costs against a complaining witness in a criminal case is unconstitutional. Teats v. Fox, 75 Neb. 747, 106 N.W. 779 (1906); Rickley v. State, 65 Neb. 841, 91 N.W. 867 (1902).

Statute preventing and punishing the desecration of the flag of the United States is not obnoxious to the provisions of Constitution against depriving any person of his property without due process of law and against special or class legislation. Halter v. State, 74 Neb. 757, 105 N.W. 298 (1905).

Divesting persons entitled thereto of unclaimed witness fees for benefit of school fund is taking of property without due process of law. State ex rel. Broatch v. Moores, 52 Neb. 770, 73 N.W. 299 (1897).

Commission's order to compel railroad to establish underpass for convenience and benefit of landowner in use of his own property is taking of property without due process of law. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162 (1930), Holmberg v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., reversing 115 Neb. 727, 214 N.W. 746 (1927).

"Cedar Rust" law does not deprive cedar tree owners of property without due process of law. Upton v. Felton, 4 F.Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1932).

8. Contract rights

Act reducing penalty for violation of Installment Loan Act did not violate this section. Davis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 176 Neb. 865, 127 N.W.2d 907 (1964).

Recovery on behalf of city by taxpayer of amount paid on void contract did not deny defendant due process of law. Arthur v. Trindel, 168 Neb. 429, 96 N.W.2d 208 (1959).

Construction of a collective bargaining contract decided upon contract and estoppel and not under due process clause of Constitution. Brisbin v. E. L. Oliver Lodge No. 335, 134 Neb. 517, 279 N.W. 277 (1938).

Statute may not operate retrospectively where it would impair obligation of contracts or interfere with vested rights. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ohler, 119 Neb. 121, 227 N.W. 449 (1929).

Requiring contract work for a city to be performed by union labor violates the due process clause of the Constitution. Wright v. Hoctor, 95 Neb. 342, 145 N.W. 704 (1914).

Statutes on unfair competition do not contravene the Constitution relative to class legislation, freedom of contract or of taking property without due process of law. It is not the making of contracts which is forbidden, but the conduct, purpose and motives of the parties in connection with their acts. State v. Drayton, 82 Neb. 254, 117 N.W. 768 (1908).

Anti-pass law, imposing a penalty on either who give or receive a free railroad pass, is not an impairment of contract or taking property without due process of law. State v. Martyn, 82 Neb. 225, 117 N.W. 719 (1908).

Regulation of Board of Soldiers and Sailors Home providing that certain specific per cent of pension be paid into cash fund of home is a matter of contract and not that of depriving inmate of property without due process of law. Howell v. Sheldon, 82 Neb. 72, 117 N.W. 109 (1908).

9. Labor and employment

Sunday closing law violated this section and was unconstitutional in its entirety. Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475 (1964).

Sunday closing ordinance of city of first class violated this section. Skag-Way Department Stores, Inc. v. City of Grand Island, 176 Neb. 169, 125 N.W.2d 529 (1964).

Fixing of a scale of wages to be paid by a successful contractor at a public letting violated this section. Philson v. City of Omaha, 167 Neb. 360, 93 N.W.2d 13 (1958).

City ordinance fixing closing hour of barber shops but not of beauty parlors is a discrimination within the due process clause of the Constitution. Ernesti v. City of Grand Island, 125 Neb. 688, 251 N.W. 899 (1933).

Statute requiring taxicab operators to deposit liability insurance or other security is not taking property without due process of law. Petersen v. Beal, 121 Neb. 348, 237 N.W. 146 (1931).

Ordinance prohibiting the selling or exchange of motor vehicles on Sunday is constitutional as police regulation. Stewart Motor Co. v. City of Omaha, 120 Neb. 776, 235 N.W. 332 (1931).

Sunday labor law is not repugnant to this section. In re Caldwell, 82 Neb. 544, 118 N.W. 133 (1908).

Statute regulating hours of employment of females in certain businesses is not unconstitutional. Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W. 421 (1902).

Prescribing 8 hour day for certain kinds of labor is a denial of due process of law. Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 59 N.W. 362 (1894).

10. Taxes and special assessments

A statute which authorized taxation of capital gain including portion of gain which accrued during taxing period prior to adoption of act was not unconstitutional. Altsuler v. Peters, 190 Neb. 113, 206 N.W.2d 570 (1973).

Laws for the levy and collection of general taxes stand upon a different footing than laws for the levy and collection of special assessments or special taxes. Frye v. Haas, 182 Neb. 73, 152 N.W.2d 121 (1967).

Penalty for failure to return personal property for taxation operated to deprive person of property without due process of law. Bachus v. Swanson, 179 Neb. 1, 136 N.W.2d 189 (1965).

An order by district court to produce a copy of income tax return is not a violation of due process clause of state Constitution. Rhodes v. Edwards, 178 Neb. 757, 135 N.W.2d 453 (1965).

Fixing of tax levy for municipal university did not violate due process clause. Ratigan v. Davis, 175 Neb. 416, 122 N.W.2d 12 (1963).

Action of State Board of Equalization and Assessment in raising values was not denial of due process. County of Howard v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 158 Neb. 339, 63 N.W.2d 441 (1954).

Ordinance of city of Lincoln imposing occupation tax on taxicabs does not violate due process of law. Richter v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 289, 285 N.W. 593 (1939).

City taxes levied and assessed in accordance with home rule charter do not violate constitutional provision. Eppley Hotels Co. v. City of Lincoln, 133 Neb. 550, 276 N.W. 196 (1937).

Gross premium tax on foreign insurance companies is an excise tax on privilege of doing business in Nebraska, and not violative of due process clause of Constitution. State ex rel. Smrha v. General American Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 520, 272 N.W. 555 (1937).

Statute imposing excise tax on gasoline is consistent with the due process clause of the Constitution. Burke v. Bass, 123 Neb. 297, 242 N.W. 606 (1932).

A special assessment levied upon state banks was not deprivation of private property in violation of this section. Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 119 Neb. 153, 227 N.W. 922 (1929), affirmed in Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931).

Sanitary District Law does not require the officers of a sanitary district to give notice of the levying of a tax which is within their power to levy; if they exceed their power, they may be enjoined. Whedon v. Wells, 95 Neb. 517, 145 N.W. 1007 (1914).

Occupation tax is a revenue measure and does not violate this section. Norris v. City of Lincoln, 93 Neb. 658, 142 N.W. 114 (1913).

Due process of law does not necessarily require a judicial hearing in matters of taxation. Trainor v. Maverick Loan & Trust Co., 80 Neb. 626, 114 N.W. 932 (1908).

The provisions of the statute granting the landowner the right to object to the confirmation of sale, affords him an opportunity to have the question of the validity of the tax determined before he is deprived of his property. State v. Several Parcels of Land, 75 Neb. 538, 106 N.W. 663 (1906).

Statute providing for an assessment of railway property by State Board of Equalization is not deprivation of property by taxation without due process of law. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Richardson County, 72 Neb. 482, 100 N.W. 950 (1904); State ex rel. Morton v. Back, 72 Neb. 402, 100 N.W. 952 (1904).

An owner is not deprived of his property without due process of law if he has an opportunity to question its validity or the amount of tax or assessment at some stage of the proceedings, either before the amount is finally determined or in subsequent proceedings for its collection. Hacker v. Howe, 72 Neb. 385, 101 N.W. 255 (1904).

Statute providing for foreclosure of tax lien on land for payment of delinquent taxes by proceeding in district court with notice by publication sufficiently answers the demand of due process of law. Woodrough v. Douglas County, 71 Neb. 354, 98 N.W. 1092 (1904).

The power of the state to levy taxes obviously carries with it the power to collect them and to provide all means necessary or appropriate to insure and enforce their collection. Leigh v. Green, 64 Neb. 533, 90 N.W. 255 (1902).

11. Laws held generally to violate due process

Rural Cemetery District Act violated this provision of the Constitution. Anderson v. Carlson, 171 Neb. 741, 107 N.W.2d 535 (1961).

Weather Control Act of 1957 violated this section. Summerville v. North Platte Valley Weather Control Dist., 170 Neb. 46, 101 N.W.2d 748 (1960).

Fair Trade Act violated due process clause. McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., Inc., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955).

12. Laws held generally not to violate due process

This section was not violated in adoption of L.B. 425 (Laws 1967) amending section 14-1041 and creating section 14-1042, R.R.S.1943. Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 187 Neb. 261, 188 N.W.2d 851 (1971).

Statutes relating to annexation of urban and suburban land by first-class cities and providing annexation benefits thereto held constitutional. Plumfield Nurseries, Inc. v. Dodge County, 184 Neb. 346, 167 N.W.2d 560 (1969).

Airport Authority Act did not violate this section. Obitz v. Airport Authority of City of Red Cloud, 181 Neb. 410, 149 N.W.2d 105 (1967).

Statute creating Nebraska Power Review Board did not violate this section. City of Auburn v. Eastern Nebraska Public Power Dist., 179 Neb. 439, 138 N.W.2d 629 (1965).

Zoning ordinance of city of Omaha did not violate this section. Wolf v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501 (1964).

Statute authorizing paving in city of the second class did not deny due process of law. Elliott v. City of Auburn, 172 Neb. 1, 108 N.W.2d 328 (1961).

Reorganization of School Districts Act did not violate this section. Nickel v. School Board of Axtell, 157 Neb. 813, 61 N.W.2d 566 (1953).

Reclamation Act did not violate this section. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950).

Unfair Sales Act sustained as constitutional. Hill v. Kusy, 150 Neb. 653, 35 N.W.2d 594 (1949).

Par Check Law sustained as constitutional exercise of police power. Placek v. Edstrom, 148 Neb. 79, 26 N.W.2d 489 (1947).

Statute prohibiting trial of divorce suit until six months after service of summons does not violate due process of law. Garrett v. State, 118 Neb. 373, 224 N.W. 860 (1929).

Employees liability act does not violate the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Wickline, 103 Neb. 21, 170 N.W. 193 (1918).

Innkeepers' act providing for night watchman to protect guest from fire does not contravene the Constitution in that it deprives the innkeeper of life, liberty and property without due process of law. Strahl v. Miller, 97 Neb. 820, 151 N.W. 952 (1915), Ann. Cas. 1917A 141 (1915).

Bulk sales law does not violate provision of taking property without due process of law. Appel Mercantile Co. v. Barker, 92 Neb. 669, 138 N.W. 1133 (1912).

13. Miscellaneous

Limitations on ex post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process, and retroactive judicial decisionmaking may be analyzed in accordance with the more basic and general principle of fair warning under the Due Process Clause; the question is whether the judicial decision being applied retroactively is both unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue. Caton v. State, 291 Neb. 939, 869 N.W.2d 911 (2015).

Constitutionality of legislative act as being in violation of this section raised but not decided, as act was in violation of another section of the Constitution. Williams v. County of Buffalo, 181 Neb. 233, 147 N.W.2d 776 (1967).

Constitutionality of Municipal Ground Water Act raised, but not decided. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966).

Claim of deprivation of property without due process of law under labor relations ordinance was raised but not decided. Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131 N.W.2d 609 (1964).

Unconstitutionality of tax statute under this section raised but not decided. Creigh v. Larsen, 171 Neb. 317, 106 N.W.2d 187 (1960).

Issue of double taxation of motor vehicles raised but not decided. Peterson v. Hancock, 166 Neb. 637, 90 N.W.2d 298 (1958).

Effect of instruction as denial of due process raised but not decided. Liakas v. State, 161 Neb. 130, 72 N.W.2d 677 (1955).

Constitutionality of statute authorizing service by publication raised but not decided. Johnson v. Richards, 155 Neb. 552, 52 N.W.2d 737 (1952).