Nebraska State Constitution Article I-11

Article I-11

I-11.

Rights of Accused.

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person or by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of accusation, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses against him face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.

Source

  • Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 11 (1875).

Annotations


1. Nature and cause of accusation


2. Presence of accused


3. Meet witnesses face to face


4. Process for witnesses


5. Speedy trial


6. Impartial jury


7. County where offense committed


8. Testimony at former trial


9. Representation by counsel


10. Miscellaneous


1. Nature and cause of accusation

Defendant's right to demand the nature and cause of accusation does not require State to specify upon which aggravating circumstances of section 29-2523(1) the State intends to rely. State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 (1986).

A finding of guilt of an offense included within the charge of a greater offense does not violate this section. State v. McClarity, 180 Neb. 246, 142 N.W.2d 152 (1966).

It is sufficient if the information states the elements of the crime in the language of the statute. State v. Jarrett, 177 Neb. 459, 129 N.W.2d 259 (1964).

Failure to specify section of statute upon which charge in information was based was error without prejudice. State v. Easter, 174 Neb. 412, 118 N.W.2d 515 (1962).

Information attempting to charge disturbing the peace must set out the particular language or conduct on which the offense is predicated. State v. Coomes, 170 Neb. 298, 102 N.W.2d 454 (1960).

An information must inform the accused with such reasonable certainty of the charge against him that he may prepare his defense and plead the judgment as a bar to a later prosecution for the same offense. May v. State, 153 Neb. 369, 44 N.W.2d 636 (1950).

In prosecution for criminal trespass, complaint must describe locus definitely enough to notify defendant of charge against him. Kissinger v. State, 123 Neb. 856, 244 N.W. 794 (1932).

Embezzlement information must charge particular property with sufficient certainty to apprise defendant of facts relied upon for conviction. Davis v. State, 118 Neb. 828, 226 N.W. 449 (1929).

Amendment of information for larceny of sum of money, during trial, by inserting count for larceny of cream checks, violates constitutional rights of defendant. Stowe v. State, 117 Neb. 440, 220 N.W. 826 (1928).

Law abrogating distinction between principal and accessory does not violate constitutional right to demand nature and cause of accusation. State v. Girt, 115 Neb. 833, 215 N.W. 125 (1927); Scharman v. State, 115 Neb. 109, 211 N.W. 613 (1926).

Information need not negative statutory exceptions. Fitch v. State, 102 Neb. 361, 167 N.W. 417 (1918).

Object of information is to inform accused of precise offense for which he must answer. Moline v. State, 67 Neb. 164, 93 N.W. 228 (1903).

A person may not be informed against for one crime and convicted of another and different one. In re McVey, 50 Neb. 481, 70 N.W. 51 (1897).


2. Presence of accused

Accused has right to appear and defend in person. State v. Beasley, 183 Neb. 681, 163 N.W.2d 783 (1969).

In trial for manslaughter where trial court orally instructs jury while it is deliberating upon its verdict, in absence of and without notice to defendant or his counsel, such action is violation of constitutional rights of the accused. Strasheim v. State, 138 Neb. 651, 294 N.W. 433 (1940).

Accused cannot as a matter of right insist upon being present at time of filing, arguing or ruling upon motion for new trial. Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N.W. 984 (1897).

Accused cannot as a matter of right insist upon being present at time of interlocutory proceedings prior to the selection of the jury. Miller v. State, 29 Neb. 437, 45 N.W. 451 (1890).

Taking of testimony during voluntary and temporary absence of accused does not contravene Constitution. Hair v. State, 16 Neb. 601, 21 N.W. 464 (1884).


3. Meet witnesses face to face

The analysis of the right to confrontation under this provision is the same as that under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. State v. Jacob, 242 Neb. 176, 494 N.W.2d 109 (1993).

Both the federal and the state Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to confront or meet the witnesses against him face to face. Implicit in confrontation is the right to cross-examine all witnesses. A limitation of the right of confrontation can only be necessitated by a showing of a compelling interest and any infringement must be as minimally obtrusive as possible. Record in case did not show a compelling need to protect the child witness from further injury and absent such a showing, the use of closed-circuit television did not withstand constitutional scrutiny. State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986).

Question of whether defendant could demand production as witness of inmate in penitentiary raised but not decided. Garcia v. State, 159 Neb. 571, 68 N.W.2d 151 (1955).

Death certificate was not admissible to show cause of death. Vanderheiden v. State, 156 Neb. 735, 57 N.W.2d 761 (1953).

Contempt proceedings based on hindrance to due administration of justice did not violate this section. Cornett v. State, 155 Neb. 766, 53 N.W.2d 747 (1952).

Constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face does not apply to contempt proceedings. State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N.W. 282 (1937).

The guaranty of the Constitution of the right to meet the witnesses against him does not apply in disbarment proceedings in which depositions were taken by prosecution, as proceedings are civil, not criminal. State ex rel. Spillman v. Priest, 118 Neb. 47, 223 N.W. 635 (1929).


4. Process for witnesses

The accused in a criminal prosecution has a right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; however, a criminal defendant does not possess an absolute constitutional right to demand the personal attendance of a prisoner witness incarcerated outside the county of the venue of trial. As a result, section 25-1233 does not violate the compulsory process clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. State v. Stott, 243 Neb. 967, 503 N.W.2d 822 (1993).

Refusal to order compulsory process for witness whose testimony was immaterial was not prejudicial error. O'Rourke v. State, 166 Neb. 866, 90 N.W.2d 820 (1958).

Right to compel attendance of witness includes taking of depositions out of the state. Dolen v. State, 148 Neb. 317, 27 N.W.2d 264 (1947).

Constitution is not contravened by overruling of motion for continuance on ground of absence of material witnesses when it appears that witness was without process of court. Fanton v. State, 50 Neb. 351, 69 N.W. 953 (1897).

The county is not liable for defendant's witness costs, where he is indicted for a felony. Hewerkle v. Gage County, 14 Neb. 18, 14 N.W. 549 (1883).


5. Speedy trial

The constitutional right to a speedy trial is distinct from the provision for a speedy trial prescribed by the Nebraska speedy trial act. State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433, 461 N.W.2d 554 (1990).

The right to a speedy trial applies only to criminal trials and, thus, does not apply to postconviction actions, which are civil in nature. State v. Bostwick, 233 Neb. 57, 443 N.W.2d 885 (1989).

If a trial court relies upon section 29-1207 (4)(f), R.R.S.1943, in excluding a period of delay from the six-month computation, a general finding of "good cause" will not suffice; there must be specific findings as to the good cause. State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386, 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980).

It may be reasonably argued that the exclusionary period set forth in section 29-1207(4), R.R.S.1943, would cover the period from a defendant's commitment as a sexual sociopath to the court's opinion in State v. Shaw, 202 Neb. 766, 277 N.W.2d 106 (1979) or the Legislature's enactment of sections 29-2911 to 29-2921, R.R.S.1943. However, since this defendant was not brought to trial within six months of either date, the issue of when to begin computing the time will not be decided here. State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386, 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980).

Trial within six months of date information filed was "speedy public trial" under this section. State v. Costello, 199 Neb. 43, 256 N.W.2d 97 (1977).

In all criminal proceedings, accused is entitled to have a speedy public trial. State v. Bruns, 181 Neb. 67, 146 N.W.2d 786 (1966).

Period of time within which retrial must be had after a mistrial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Fromkin, 174 Neb. 849, 120 N.W.2d 25 (1963).

Preliminary proceedings before magistrate in filiation proceedings are in no sense a trial of the merits. In re Application of Rozgall, 147 Neb. 260, 23 N.W.2d 85 (1946).

Preliminary hearing before a magistrate is not a criminal prosecution or trial within the meaning of this section. Roberts v. State, 145 Neb. 658, 17 N.W.2d 666 (1945).

The question of whether a defendant has had a speedy trial is to be determined by what is fair and reasonable under all the facts and circumstances in each particular case. Maher v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 13 N.W.2d 641 (1944).

Accused must be brought to trial in accordance with Constitution and statutes, or be discharged. Critser v. State, 87 Neb. 727, 127 N.W. 1073 (1910).

The Constitution does not entitle accused to demand to be brought before county judge, as such, and proceed with prosecution. In re Chenoweth, 56 Neb. 688, 77 N.W. 63 (1898).

An appeal based solely on an alleged violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial can be effectively vindicated in an appeal after judgment. State v. Wilson, 15 Neb. App. 212, 724 N.W.2d 99 (2006).

The denial of a motion for discharge, based upon a constitutional right to a speedy trial and in the absence of a nonfrivolous statutory claim, is interlocutory. State v. Wilson, 15 Neb. App. 212, 724 N.W.2d 99 (2006).


6. Impartial jury

This provision provides that the accused in a criminal prosecution shall have the right to "trial by an impartial jury", and article I, section 3, provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty "without due process of law". These provisions are interconnected and require that criminal convictions rest upon a jury determination that a criminal defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime charged. State v. White, 249 Neb. 381, 543 N.W.2d 725 (1996).

If several juries are picked at one time from a single jury panel for a series of trials, examination must be allowed if requested for good reason in subsequent trials in the series to determine if any jurors should be excused for cause. State v. Myers, 190 Neb. 466, 209 N.W.2d 345 (1973).

Right to trial by jury may be waived by defendant in criminal case. State v. Carpenter, 181 Neb. 639, 150 N.W.2d 129 (1967).

Right to trial by an impartial jury was not violated by bet of juror on result of verdict. Fugate v. State, 169 Neb. 420, 99 N.W.2d 868 (1959).

To safeguard right of fair and impartial trial, Legislature has provided for peremptory challenges and challenges for cause of jurors. Oden v. State, 166 Neb. 729, 90 N.W.2d 356 (1958).

Denial of challenge of jury did not violate this section. Bell v. State, 159 Neb. 474, 67 N.W.2d 762 (1954).

Determination of sentence to be imposed by court instead of jury does not violate this section. Poppe v. State, 155 Neb. 527, 52 N.W.2d 422 (1952).

Disqualification of a juror to serve upon account of having sat as a juror in another trial of an offense arising out of the same incident may be waived. Bufford v. State, 148 Neb. 38, 26 N.W.2d 383 (1947).

Gambling places, being nuisances, may be enjoined in equity, without violating constitutional right of person accused of crime to a jury trial. State ex rel. Hunter v. The Araho, 137 Neb. 389, 289 N.W. 545 (1940).

Legislature may provide for trial of petty offenses without jury, where such offenses were not recognized as crimes when Constitution adopted. State v. Hauser, 137 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939).

Accused was guaranteed a fair trial by an impartial jury, and whether such a jury was obtainable in the jurisdiction must first be decided by the trial court. Kirchman v. State, 122 Neb. 30, 239 N.W. 207 (1931).

After a juror has denied on his voir dire that he has said he believed respondent to be guilty, it may be shown by other witnesses that the juror had made such statement. Trobough v. State, 119 Neb. 128, 227 N.W. 443 (1929).

It is not a violation of constitutional rights to try defendant for misdemeanor before jury of eleven, with his consent. Miller v. State, 116 Neb. 702, 218 N.W. 743 (1928).

When, on the trial of a criminal case, a motion to quash the venire because of alleged disqualifications of its several members is made by defendant and overruled by the court, error cannot be predicated on the ruling in the absence of a voir dire examination showing that the jurors against whom the motion was directed were challenged for cause, and that defendant exercised the peremptory challenges allowed under the statute. Kaufmann v. State, 112 Neb. 718, 200 N.W. 998 (1924).

Defendant waived right to object to disqualification of juror, who was not a resident of the county where offense was committed, by failing to interrogate him as to residence. Marino v. State, 111 Neb. 623, 197 N.W. 396 (1924); Seaton v. State, 109 Neb. 828, 192 N.W. 501 (1923).

Where two or more persons are jointly indicted or informed against for the commission of a single offense and sever in their trials, jurors who sat in trial of one are thereby disqualified to sit in trial of another. Seaton v. State, 106 Neb. 833, 184 N.W. 890 (1921).

Fact that juror has opinion which requires evidence to remove will not disqualify him if he can put aside opinion, and is otherwise qualified in accordance with statute. Whitcomb v. State, 102 Neb. 236, 166 N.W. 553 (1918); Lucas v. State, 75 Neb. 11, 105 N.W. 976 (1905).


7. County where offense committed

This provision grants to a criminal defendant the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, but does not grant a defendant a constitutional right to be tried in a particular county. State v. Vejvoda, 231 Neb. 668, 438 N.W.2d 461 (1989).

Courts of county where offense is committed have jurisdiction to try accused for crime. State v. Furstenau, 167 Neb. 439, 93 N.W.2d 384 (1958).

Defendant has right to be tried in county where the alleged offense was committed. Gates v. State, 160 Neb. 722, 71 N.W.2d 460 (1955).

Where a person in one county procures the commission of a crime in another through the agency of an innocent person, he is subject to prosecution in the county where the acts were done by the agent. Robeen v. State, 144 Neb. 910, 15 N.W.2d 69 (1944).

The constitutional right to a trial before a jury of the county where the offense is alleged to have been committed is a mere personal privilege of the accused which he may waive. Marino v. State, 111 Neb. 623, 197 N.W. 396 (1924); Kennison v. State, 83 Neb. 391, 119 N.W. 768 (1909).

The right to a trial, anywhere or under any conditions, may be waived and in practice is waived when the accused makes a judicial confession of his guilt. The right to jury from the vicinage may be waived by judicial finding of guilt. McCarty v. Hopkins, 61 Neb. 550, 85 N.W. 540 (1901).

The offense of larceny is committed in every county into which stolen goods are carried, and prosecution may be in any such county. Hurlburt v. State, 52 Neb. 428, 72 N.W. 471 (1897).

The constitutional right to a trial before a jury of the county or district where the crime is alleged to have been committed is a mere personal privilege of the accused, and not conferred upon him from any consideration of public policy; that privilege may be waived by accused. State ex rel. Scott v. Crinklaw, 40 Neb. 759, 59 N.W. 370 (1894).

County where crime committed means precise portion of territory or division of state over which court may exercise power in criminal matters, and limited to that from which a jury for the particular term may legally be drawn. Olive v. State, 11 Neb. 1, 7 N.W. 444 (1881).


8. Testimony at former trial

Evidence of a witness at former trial may be read at later trial, where witness cannot be found after diligent search. Davis v. State, 171 Neb. 333, 106 N.W.2d 490 (1960).

Testimony of a witness under oath face to face with defendant at preliminary hearing, with opportunity for cross-examination, is admissible upon subsequent trial for same offense where attendance of the witness cannot be had. Jackson v. State, 133 Neb. 786, 277 N.W. 92 (1938).

Testimony at former trial is admissible where witness was cross-examined in open court, if attendance at second trial cannot be procured. Koenigstein v. State, 103 Neb. 580, 173 N.W. 603 (1919).

Where a deceased witness testified upon a former trial of the same party for the same offense, being brought "face to face" with the accused and cross-examined by him, it is competent upon a subsequent trial to prove the testimony of such deceased witness and such proof does not violate this section of Constitution. Hair v. State, 16 Neb. 601, 21 N.W. 464 (1884).


9. Representation by counsel

Under this provision of the Nebraska Constitution, a criminal defendant's right to conduct his or her own defense is not violated when the court determines that a defendant competent to stand trial nevertheless suffers from severe mental illness to the point where he or she is not competent to conduct trial proceedings without counsel. State v. Lewis, 280 Neb. 246, 785 N.W.2d 834 (2010).

There is no federal Sixth Amendment constitutional right to effective standby counsel, and there is no right to effective assistance of standby counsel under this provision. State v. Gunther, 278 Neb. 173, 768 N.W.2d 453 (2009).

A criminal defendant who proceeds pro se is held to the same trial standard as if he or she were represented by counsel, and it is not up to the trial court to conduct the defense of a pro se defendant. State v. Gunther, 271 Neb. 874, 716 N.W.2d 691 (2006).

A defendant who elects to represent himself or herself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his or her own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel. State v. Gunther, 271 Neb. 874, 716 N.W.2d 691 (2006).

A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel can be inferred from a defendant's conduct. State v. Gunther, 271 Neb. 874, 716 N.W.2d 691 (2006).

A waiver of counsel need not be prudent, just knowing and intelligent. State v. Gunther, 271 Neb. 874, 716 N.W.2d 691 (2006).

In order to determine whether a defendant's self-representation rights have been respected, the primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his or her case in his or her own way. State v. Gunther, 271 Neb. 874, 716 N.W.2d 691 (2006).

In order to waive the constitutional right to counsel, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. State v. Gunther, 271 Neb. 874, 716 N.W.2d 691 (2006).

The fact that a defendant has had the advice of counsel throughout his or her prosecution is an indication that the defendant's waiver of counsel and election to represent himself or herself was knowing and voluntary. State v. Gunther, 271 Neb. 874, 716 N.W.2d 691 (2006).

A criminal defendant who proceeds pro se is held to the same trial standard as if he or she were represented by counsel. State v. Shepard, 239 Neb. 639, 477 N.W.2d 567 (1991).

An accused is entitled to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings against him, including sentencing. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989).

Neither the U.S. nor Nebraska Constitution requires that two attorneys be appointed to represent a criminal defendant in a capital case. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989).

The exercise of sixth amendment rights to counsel is subject to the necessities of judicial discretion. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989).

Under both the state and federal Constitutions, a defendant in a criminal trial has a right to represent himself and proceed without counsel if he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. State v. Kirby, 198 Neb. 646, 254 N.W.2d 424 (1977).

The right to counsel does not apply as a matter of absolute right to a lineup or showup by the police previous to the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. State v. Sanchell, 191 Neb. 505, 216 N.W.2d 504 (1974).

There is no requirement that counsel be furnished accused prior to preliminary hearing. State v. O'Kelly, 175 Neb. 798, 124 N.W.2d 211 (1963).

Accused has right to counsel and opportunity to make due preparation for trial. Stagemeyer v. State, 133 Neb. 9, 273 N.W. 824 (1937).


10. Miscellaneous

A witness’ testimony is not the result of unconstitutional coercion simply because it is motivated by a legitimate fear of a death sentence. State v. Lotter, 278 Neb. 466, 771 N.W.2d 551 (2009).

Perjury per se is not a ground for collateral attack on a judgment. State v. Lotter, 278 Neb. 466, 771 N.W.2d 551 (2009).

True promises of leniency are not proscribed when made by persons authorized to make them. State v. Lotter, 278 Neb. 466, 771 N.W.2d 551 (2009).

When the reliability of a given witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence in the prosecutor’s file which is relevant to the witness’ credibility violates due process, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. State v. Lotter, 278 Neb. 466, 771 N.W.2d 551 (2009).

Where the testimony is in any way relevant to a case, the knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution deprives a criminal defendant of his or her right to a fair trial. State v. Lotter, 278 Neb. 466, 771 N.W.2d 551 (2009).

A defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive personal instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure. State v. Gunther, 271 Neb. 874, 716 N.W.2d 691 (2006).

A defendant may waive his or her rights under this provision through his or her knowing and voluntary absence at trial. State v. Zlomke, 268 Neb. 891, 689 N.W.2d 181 (2004).

In order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and this provision of the Nebraska Constitution, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, that is, demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Buckman, 259 Neb. 924, 613 N.W.2d 463 (2000).

In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice should not be presumed for derogatory comments made during final arguments. In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice should not be presumed when a tactical decision has been made to concede the elements of a lesser-included offense to avoid a conviction for a greater offense. State v. Hunt, 254 Neb. 865, 580 N.W.2d 110 (1998).

To sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, that is, demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Boppre, 252 Neb. 935, 567 N.W.2d 149 (1997).

Notwithstanding constitutional mandates regarding a jury trial, there is no constitutional right to trial by jury for petty offenses carrying a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 6 months or less. State v. Kennedy, 224 Neb. 164, 396 N.W.2d 722 (1986).

The failure of the accused to object to the setting of a trial date more than six months after charges were filed did not constitute a waiver of his rights under this section. State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386, 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980).

Jury sentencing is not required in a capital case. Nebraska's procedure of having a three-judge panel impose sentence meets the requirements of this section and of the U.S. Constitution. State v. Anderson and Hochstein, 207 Neb. 51, 296 N.W.2d 440 (1980).

Venue may be proven like any fact, by testimony or by conclusion reached as the only logical inference under the facts. State v. Liberator, 197 Neb. 857, 251 N.W.2d 709 (1977).

Permitting amendment as to date of prior felony alleged in information in habitual criminal charge was not error. State v. Harig, 192 Neb. 49, 218 N.W.2d 884 (1974).

Hearsay testimony of prosecution witness violated this section. State v. Davis, 185 Neb. 433, 176 N.W.2d 657 (1970).

Section of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act sustained as constitutional. State ex rel. Brito v. Warrick, 176 Neb. 211, 125 N.W.2d 545 (1964).

A preliminary hearing before a magistrate is not a criminal prosecution or trial. Wilson v. Solomon, 172 Neb. 616, 111 N.W.2d 372 (1961).

Rights guaranteed under this section are personal privileges which may be waived. Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844 (1960); Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W.2d 561 (1949).

A proceeding for contempt is not a criminal prosecution. State ex rel. Beck v. Lush, 168 Neb. 367, 95 N.W.2d 695 (1959).

Preliminary hearing is not a criminal prosecution or trial. Lingo v. Hann, 161 Neb. 67, 71 N.W.2d 716 (1955).

Rights guaranteed by this section are personal privileges and may be waived by a judicial confession of guilt. Kissinger v. State, 147 Neb. 983, 25 N.W.2d 829 (1947).

A person charged with a crime waives constitutional rights by judicial confession of guilt. In re Application of Tail, Tail v. Olson, 145 Neb. 268, 16 N.W.2d 161 (1944); In re Application of Carper, Tesar v. Bowley, 144 Neb. 623, 14 N.W.2d 225 (1944).

Habitual criminal law, defining habitual criminal and providing punishment therefor, is not violative of this section. Rains v. State, 142 Neb. 284, 5 N.W.2d 887 (1942).

Rights may be waived by a judicial confession of guilt. Davis v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 708, 291 N.W. 82 (1940); Alexander v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 645, 290 N.W. 718 (1940).

Constitutionality of statute forbidding picketing cannot be determined where information on which defendant was convicted was insufficient to charge offense. Dutiel v. State, 135 Neb. 811, 284 N.W. 321 (1939).

Refusal to allow accused to cross-examine state's witness for bias and prejudice violated this section. Flannigan v. State, 124 Neb. 748, 248 N.W. 92 (1933).

Separate causes consolidated and tried simultaneously on stipulation, does not violate this section. Luke v. State, 123 Neb. 101, 242 N.W. 265 (1932).

Magistrates and police courts are vested with jurisdiction to try without jury all violations of liquor act and of all of such ordinances wherein the penalty does not exceed a fine of one hundred dollars or imprisonment for a period of three months. State v. Kacin, 123 Neb. 64, 241 N.W. 785 (1932).

Statute prohibiting granting of new trial if Supreme Court considers no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred, does not justify court in denying new trial where accused's right to fair trial was violated. Scott v. State, 121 Neb. 232, 236 N.W. 608 (1931).

The showing of prior convictions for violating liquor laws, by cross-examining defendant and wife, in prosecution for larceny is a violation of this section. Kleinschmidt v. State, 116 Neb. 577, 218 N.W. 384 (1928).

The Constitution guarantees a fair and impartial trial to every person accused of crime, and that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Coxbill v. State, 115 Neb. 634, 214 N.W. 256 (1927).

Order of court excluding spectators from courtroom is a violation of this section. Rhoades v. State, 102 Neb. 750, 169 N.W. 433 (1918).

No instruction should be given the jury which would impose upon defendant a burden to which he was not legally subject, and the effect of which would be to prevent him from having a fair and impartial trial under the law of the land. Kennison v. State, 80 Neb. 688, 115 N.W. 289 (1908).

Accused cannot waive jury in felony case and sentence is void in trial by court alone. Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761, 101 N.W. 1007 (1904).

The proceeding by quo warranto is a civil remedy; it is the means employed by the state to cancel and recall a privilege which the corporation proceeded against has abused. State v. Standard Oil Co., 61 Neb. 28, 84 N.W. 413 (1900).

In order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and this provision, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, that is, demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Cardona, 10 Neb. App. 815, 639 N.W.2d 653 (2002).