Under former law, the statutory rule that a payor bank is accountable for a demand item presented to it and not settled for, paid, returned, or a notice of dishonor sent before the midnight deadline may be varied or waived by agreement. Stauffer Seeds, Inc. v. Nebraska Sec. Bank of Deshler, 222 Neb. 594, 386 N.W.2d 2 (1986).
Under former law, the rule that a payor bank is accountable for a demand item presented to it and not paid, settled for, returned, or a notice of dishonor sent before the midnight deadline may be varied or waived by agreement. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Minden Exch. Bank & Trust Co., 212 Neb. 820, 326 N.W.2d 176 (1982).
Damages payable for failure to use ordinary care may include consequential damages proximately caused upon showing of bad faith. Berman v. United States Nat. Bank, 197 Neb. 268, 249 N.W.2d 187 (1976).
Variation agreements authorized to modify the Uniform Commercial Code provisions by creating a deadline earlier than "midnight deadline." Berman v. United States Nat. Bank, 197 Neb. 268, 249 N.W.2d 187 (1976).
1. Section 1-102 states the general principles and rules for variation of the effect of the code by agreement and the limitations to this power. Section 4-103 states the specific rules for variation of article 4 by agreement and also certain standards of ordinary care. In view of the technical complexity of the field of bank collections, the enormous number of items handled by banks, the certainty that there will be variations from the normal in each day's work in each bank, the certainty of changing conditions and the possibility of developing improved methods of collection to speed the process, it would be unwise to freeze present methods of operation by mandatory statutory rules. This section, therefor, permits within wide limits variation of the effect of provisions of the article by agreement.
2. Subsection (a) confers blanket power to vary all provisions of the article by agreements of the ordinary kind. The agreements may not disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care and may not limit the measure of damages for the lack or failure, but this subsection like section 1-102(3) approves the practice of parties determining by agreement the standards by which the responsibility is to be measured. In the absence of a showing that the standards manifestly are unreasonable, the agreement controls. Owners of items and other interested parties are not affected by agreements under this subsection unless they are parties to the agreement or are bound by adoption, ratification, estoppel, or the like.
As here used "agreement" has the meaning given to it by section 1-201(3). The agreement may be direct, as between the owner and the depositary bank; or indirect, as in the case in which the owner authorizes a particular type of procedure and any bank in the collection chain acts pursuant to such authorization. It may be with respect to a single item; or to all items handled for a particular customer, e.g., a general agreement between the depositary bank and the customer at the time a deposit account is opened. Legends on deposit tickets, collection letters, and acknowledgments of items, coupled with action by the affected party constituting acceptance, adoption, ratification, estoppel, or the like, are agreements if they meet the tests of the definition of "agreement". See section 1-201(3). First Nat. Bank of Denver v. Federal Reserve Bank, 6 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1925) (deposit slip); Jefferson County Bldg. Ass'n v. Southern Bank & Trust Co., 225 Ala. 25, 142 So. 66 (1932) (signature card and deposit slip); Semingson v. Stock Yards Nat. Bank, 162 Minn. 424, 203 N.W. 412 (1925) (passbook); Farmers State Bank v. Union Nat. Bank, 42 N.D. 449, 454, 173 N.W. 789, 790 (1919) (acknowledgment of receipt of item).
3. Subsection (a) (subject to its limitations with respect to good faith and ordinary care) goes far to meet the requirements of flexibility. However, it does not by itself confer fully effective flexibility. Since it is recognized that banks handle a great number of items every business day and that the parties interested in each item include the owner of the item, the drawer (if it is a check), all nonbank indorsers, the payor bank, and from one to five or more collecting banks, it is obvious that it is impossible, practically, to obtain direct agreements from all of these parties on all items. In total, the interested parties constitute virtually every adult person and business organization in the United States. On the other hand they may become bound to agreements on the principle that collecting banks acting as agents have authority to make binding agreements with respect to items being handled. This conclusion was assumed but was not flatly decided in Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Malloy, 264 U.S. 160, at 167, 44 S.Ct. 296, at 298, 68 L.Ed. 617, 31 A.L.R. 1261 (1924).
To meet this problem subsection (b) provides that official or quasi-official rules of collection, that is Federal Reserve regulations and operating circulars, clearinghouse rules, and the like, have the effect of agreements under subsection (a), whether or not specifically assented to by all parties interested in items handled. Consequently, such official or quasi-official rules may, standing by themselves but subject to the good faith and ordinary care limitations, vary the effect of the provisions of article 4.
Federal Reserve regulations. Various sections of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. section 221 et seq.) authorize the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to direct the Federal Reserve banks to exercise bank collection functions. For example, section 16 (12 U.S.C. section 248(o)) authorizes the board to require each Federal Reserve bank to exercise the functions of a clearinghouse for its members and section 13 (12 U.S.C. section 342) authorizes each Federal Reserve bank to receive deposits from nonmember banks solely for the purposes of exchange or of collection. Under this statutory authorization the board has issued Regulation J (Subpart A — Collection of Checks and Other Items). Under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, federal regulations prevail over state statutes. Moreover, the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. section 4007(b) provides that the act and Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. 229, supersede "any provision of the law of any State, including the Uniform Commercial Code as in effect in such State, which is inconsistent with this chapter or such regulations". See comment 1 to section 4-102.
Federal Reserve operating circulars. The regulations of the Federal Reserve Board authorize the Federal Reserve banks to promulgate operating circulars covering operating details. Regulation J, for example, provides that "Each Reserve Bank shall receive and handle items in accordance with this subpart, and shall issue operating circulars governing the details of its handling of items and other matters deemed appropriate by the Reserve Bank". This article recognizes that "operating circulars" issued pursuant to the regulations and concerned with operating details as appropriate may, within their proper sphere, vary the effect of the article.
Clearinghouse rules. Local clearinghouses have long issued rules governing the details of clearing, hours of clearing, media of remittance, time for return of missent items, and the like. The case law has recognized these rules, within their proper sphere, as binding on affected parties and as appropriate sources for the courts to look to in filling out details of bank collection law. Subsection (b) in recognizing clearinghouse rules as a means of preserving flexibility continues the sensible approach indicated in the cases. Included in the term "clearinghouses" are county and regional clearinghouses as well as those within a single city or town. There is, of course, no intention of authorizing a local clearinghouse or a group of clearinghouses to rewrite the basic law generally. The term "clearinghouse rules" should be understood in the light of functions the clearinghouses have exercised in the past.
And the like. This phrase is to be construed in the light of the foregoing. "Federal Reserve regulations and operating circulars" cover rules and regulations issued by public or quasi-public agencies under statutory authority. "Clearinghouse rules" cover rules issued by a group of banks which have associated themselves to perform through a clearinghouse some of their collection, payment, and clearing functions. Other agencies or associations of this kind may be established in the future whose rules and regulations could be appropriately looked on as constituting means of avoiding absolute statutory rigidity. The phrase "and the like" leaves open possibilities for future development. An agreement between a number of banks or even all the banks in an area simply because they are banks, would not of itself, by virtue of the phrase "and the like", meet the purposes and objectives of subsection (b).
4. Under this article banks come under the general obligations of the use of good faith and the exercise of ordinary care. "Good faith" is defined in section 3-103(a)(4). The term "ordinary care" is defined in section 3-103(a)(7). These definitions are made to apply to article 4 by section 4-104(c). Section 4-202 states respects in which collecting banks must use ordinary care. Subsection (c) of section 4-103 provides that action or nonaction approved by the article or pursuant to Federal Reserve regulations or operating circulars constitutes the exercise of ordinary care. Federal Reserve regulations and operating circulars constitute an affirmative standard of ordinary care equally with the provisions of article 4 itself.
Subsection (c) further provides that, absent special instructions, action or nonaction consistent with clearinghouse rules and the like or with a general banking usage not disapproved by the article, prima facie constitutes the exercise of ordinary care. Clearinghouse rules and the phrase "and the like" have the significance set forth above in these comments. The term "general banking usage" is not defined but should be taken to mean a general usage common to banks in the area concerned. See section 1-205(2). In a case in which the adjective "general" is used, the intention is to require a usage broader than a mere practice between two or three banks but it is not intended to require anything as broad as a countrywide usage. A usage followed generally throughout a state, a substantial portion of a state, a metropolitan area, or the like would certainly be sufficient. Consistently with the principle of section 1-205(3), action or nonaction consistent with clearinghouse rules or the like or with banking usages prima facie constitutes the exercise of ordinary care. However, the phrase "in the absence of special instructions" affords owners of items an opportunity to prescribe other standards and although there may be no direct supervision or control of clearinghouses or banking usages by official supervisory authorities, the confirmation of ordinary care by compliance with these standards is prima facie only, thus conferring on the courts the ultimate power to determine ordinary care in any case in which it should appear desirable to do so. The prima facie rule does, however, impose on the party contesting the standards to establish that they are unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair as used by the particular bank.
5. Subsection (d), in line with the flexible approach required for the bank collection process is designed to make clear that a novel procedure adopted by a bank is not to be considered unreasonable merely because that procedure is not specifically contemplated by this article or by agreement, or because it has not yet been generally accepted as a bank usage. Changing conditions constantly call for new procedures and someone has to use the new procedure first. If this procedure is found to be reasonable under the circumstances, provided, of course, that it is not inconsistent with any provision of the article or other law or agreement, the bank which has followed the new procedure should not be found to have failed in the exercise of ordinary care.
6. Subsection (e) sets forth a rule for determining the measure of damages for failure to exercise ordinary care which, under subsection (a), cannot be limited by agreement. In the absence of bad faith the maximum recovery is the amount of the item concerned. The term "bad faith" is not defined; the connotation is the absence of good faith (section 3-103). When it is established that some part or all of the item could not have been collected even by the use of ordinary care the recovery is reduced by the amount that would have been in any event uncollectible. This limitation on recovery follows the case law. Finally, if bad faith is established the rule opens to allow the recovery of other damages, whose "proximateness" is to be tested by the ordinary rules applied in comparable cases. Of course, it continues to be as necessary under subsection (e) as it has been under ordinary common-law principles that, before the damage rule of the subsection becomes operative, liability of the bank and some loss to the customer or owner must be established.