District court's implicit determination that plaintiff had not breached contract by failing to deliver goods at time proposed by defendant, but not agreed to by plaintiff, was supported by evidence of the negotiations between the parties. Crane Co. v. Roberts Supply Co., 196 Neb. 67, 241 N.W.2d 516 (1976).
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Subsection (1) — see sections 43(2), 45(2), 47(1), and 48, Uniform Sales Act, for policy continued under this article; subsection (2) — none; subsection (3) — none.
Changes: Completely different in scope.
Purposes of Changes and New Matter:
1. Subsection (1) requires that all actions taken under a sales contract must be taken within a reasonable time where no time has been agreed upon. The reasonable time under this provision turns on the criteria as to "reasonable time" and on good faith and commercial standards set forth in sections 1-203, 1-204, and 2-103. It thus depends upon what constitutes acceptable commercial conduct in view of the nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action to be taken. Agreement as to a definite time, however, may be found in a term implied from the contractual circumstances, usage of trade, or course of dealing or performance as well as in an express term. Such cases fall outside of this subsection since in them the time for action is "agreed" by usage.
2. The time for payment, where not agreed upon, is related to the time for delivery; the particular problems which arise in connection with determining the appropriate time of payment and the time for any inspection before payment which is both allowed by law and demanded by the buyer are covered in section 2-513.
3. The facts in regard to shipment and delivery differ so widely as to make detailed provision for them in the text of this article impracticable. The applicable principles, however, make it clear that surprise is to be avoided, good faith judgment is to be protected, and notice or negotiation to reduce the uncertainty to certainty is to be favored.
4. When the time for delivery is left open, unreasonably early offers of or demands for delivery are intended to be read under this article as expressions of desire or intention, requesting the assent or acquiescence of the other party, not as final positions which may amount without more to breach or to create breach by the other side. See sections 2-207 and 2-609.
5. The obligation of good faith under the code requires reasonable notification before a contract may be treated as breached because a reasonable time for delivery or demand has expired. This operates both in the case of a contract originally indefinite as to time and of one subsequently made indefinite by waiver.
When both parties let an originally reasonable time go by in silence, the course of conduct under the contract may be viewed as enlarging the reasonable time for tender or demand of performance. The contract may be terminated by abandonment.
6. Parties to a contract are not required in giving reasonable notification to fix, at peril of breach, a time which is in fact reasonable in the unforeseeable judgment of a later trier of fact. Effective communication of a proposed time limit calls for a response, so that failure to reply will make out acquiescence. Where objection is made, however, or if the demand is merely for information as to when goods will be delivered or will be ordered out, demand for assurances on the ground of insecurity may be made under this article pending further negotiations. Only when a party insists on undue delay or on rejection of the other party's reasonable proposal is there a question of flat breach under the present section.
7. Subsection (2) applies a commercially reasonable view to resolve the conflict which has arisen in the cases as to contracts of indefinite duration. The "reasonable time" of duration appropriate to a given arrangement is limited by the circumstances. When the arrangement has been carried on by the parties over the years, the "reasonable time" can continue indefinitely and the contract will not terminate until notice.
8. Subsection (3) recognizes that the application of principles of good faith and sound commercial practice normally call for such notification of the termination of a going contract relationship as will give the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement. An agreement dispensing with notification or limiting the time for the seeking of a substitute arrangement is, of course, valid under this subsection unless the results of putting it into operation would be the creation of an unconscionable state of affairs.
9. Justifiable cancellation for breach is a remedy for breach and is not the kind of termination covered by the present subsection.
10. The requirement of notification is dispensed with where the contract provides for termination on the happening of an "agreed event". "Event" is a term chosen here to contrast with "option" or the like.
Point 1: Sections 1-203, 1-204, and 2-103.
Point 2: Sections 2-320, 2-321, 2-504, and 2-511 through 2-514.
Point 5: Section 1-203.
Point 6: Section 2-609.
Point 7: Section 2-204.
Point 9: Sections 2-106, 2-318, 2-610, and 2-703.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1-201.
"Contract". Section 1-201.
"Notification". Section 1-201.
"Party". Section 1-201.
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204.
"Termination". Section 2-106.