1. Credit against sentence
2. Discretion of court
3. Not retrospective
1. Credit against sentence
Under subsection (4) of this section, the conduct in question need not be the same or related to the conduct for which time was originally served. State v. Carngbe, 288 Neb. 347, 847 N.W.2d 302 (2014).
Section 47-503 and subsection (1) of this section use similar language, so the reasoning of cases involving one of these provisions is applicable to cases involving the other. State v. Wills, 285 Neb. 260, 826 N.W.2d 581 (2013).
A defendant ordered to complete a work ethic camp was "in custody." State v. Becker, 282 Neb. 449, 804 N.W.2d 27 (2011).
Under this section, when consecutive sentences are imposed for two or more offenses, periods of presentence incarceration may be credited only against the aggregate of all terms imposed: an offender who receives consecutive sentences is entitled to credit against only the first sentence imposed, while an offender sentenced to concurrent terms in effect receives credit against each sentence. State v. Williams, 282 Neb. 182, 802 N.W.2d 421 (2011).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, a court must give credit for time served on a charge when a prison sentence is imposed for that charge. State v. Banes, 268 Neb. 805, 688 N.W.2d 594 (2004).
The import of subsection (4) of this section is that all credit available due to presentence incarceration shall be applied, but only once. State v. Banes, 268 Neb. 805, 688 N.W.2d 594 (2004).
When concurrent sentences are imposed, the credit is applied once, and the credit applied once, in effect, is applied against each concurrent sentence, because the longest sentence determines the offender's actual length of time in prison. State v. Banes, 268 Neb. 805, 688 N.W.2d 594 (2004).
A defendant is provided credit for jail time which is time he or she spends in detention pending trial and sentencing. State v. Baker, 250 Neb. 896, 553 N.W.2d 464 (1996).
Subsection (1) of this section requires that a defendant receive credit for time served pending the resolution of an appeal. State v. Marks, 248 Neb. 592, 537 N.W.2d 339 (1995).
On being sentenced for life imprisonment upon conviction of first degree murder, defendant is not entitled to credit for time in custodial detention pending trial and sentence. State v. Masters, 246 Neb. 1018, 524 N.W.2d 342 (1994).
In a criminal case, a judge in sentencing is required to separately determine, state, and grant the amount of credit on defendant's sentence to which defendant is entitled under subsection (1) of this section. State v. Esquivel, 244 Neb. 308, 505 N.W.2d 736 (1993).
For purposes of subsection (1) of this section, "in custody" means judicially imposed physical confinement in a government facility authorized for detention, control, or supervision of a defendant before, during, or after a trial on a criminal charge. The "in-custody" credit against a sentence eventually imposed on a defendant ensures that the defendant is not incarcerated longer than the maximum period of incarceration statutorily prescribed as punishment for a particular offense. State v. Jordan, 240 Neb. 919, 485 N.W.2d 198 (1992).
Home detention on probation, subject to electronic monitoring, is insufficiently restrictive to constitute "custody" under subsection (1) of this section. State v. Muratella, 240 Neb. 567, 483 N.W.2d 128 (1992).
Overruling the holding in State v. Von Busch, 234 Neb. 119, 449 N.W.2d 237 (1989), which gave credit upon sentencing for "any previously served jail time," subsection (1) of this section refers only to any jail time served on the charges for which sentences were imposed. State v. Heckman, 239 Neb. 25, 473 N.W.2d 416 (1991).
When a defendant is sentenced to an indefinite term up to the maximum prison term possible, credit must be given for any previously served jail time. State v. Von Busch, 234 Neb. 119, 449 N.W.2d 237 (1989).
One sentenced to life imprisonment is not entitled to credit for time in custodial detention pending disposition of the proceedings on the charge levied. State v. Lynch, 215 Neb. 528, 340 N.W.2d 128 (1983).
There is no requirement in this section that a defendant be awarded credit against a sentence for time spent in a mental institution. State v. Prosser, 209 Neb. 766, 311 N.W.2d 525 (1981).
Authority to give credit for time served in custody lies with district court under this section. Under section in effect in 1970, only Director of Corrections had authority to allow credit for time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. State v. Al-Hafeez, 208 Neb. 681, 305 N.W.2d 379 (1981).
This section held constitutional and sentence affirmed where defendant's time in custody prior to sentence was considered by court at sentencing. Eutzy v. State, 199 Neb. 384, 258 N.W.2d 829 (1977).
Where on motion for credit for prior jail time, sentencing judge found he had considered prior jail time, constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection were not violated although the record at sentencing is silent on the subject. State v. Nelson, 189 Neb. 580, 203 N.W.2d 785 (1973).
Credit for time served must be given against the minimum and maximum terms of a sentence. Credit for presentence incarceration is properly granted only against the aggregate of all terms imposed. State v. Sanchez, 2 Neb. App. 1008, 520 N.W.2d 33 (1994).
2. Discretion of court
The crediting of prior jail time to a sentence imposed as the minimum permitted by statute is discretionary with the sentencing judge. Addison v. Parratt, 208 Neb. 459, 303 N.W.2d 785 (1981).
A trial court may order that sentences be served consecutively, and has broad discretion in determining amount of credit for jail time. State v. Tweedy, 196 Neb. 251, 242 N.W.2d 629 (1976); State v. Tweedy, 196 Neb. 248, 242 N.W.2d 627 (1976).
A trial court has broad discretion in determining the amount of credit to be allowed defendant for time spent in jail. State v. Tweedy, 196 Neb. 246, 242 N.W.2d 626 (1976).
3. Not retrospective
This section does not apply retrospectively. State v. Keever, 234 Neb. 289, 450 N.W.2d 682 (1990).
This section is not retrospective. Housand v. Sigler, 186 Neb. 414, 183 N.W.2d 493 (1971).
Jail time is commonly understood to be the time an accused spends in detention pending trial and sentencing. State v. Fisher, 218 Neb. 479, 356 N.W.2d 880 (1984).
This section does not prohibit a second trial for offenses arising out of the same conduct, nor does it specifically indicate any direct federal-state application. State v. Pope, 190 Neb. 689, 211 N.W.2d 923 (1973).
The phrase "in custody" under this section means judicially imposed physical confinement in a governmental facility authorized for detention, control, or supervision of a defendant before, during, or after a trial on a criminal charge. State v. Anderson, 18 Neb. App. 329, 779 N.W.2d 623 (2010).