This section has been held constitutional and convictions unappealed from and not void cannot be challenged in proceedings hereunder. Bohlen v. Kissack, 189 Neb. 262, 202 N.W.2d 171 (1972).
When his records disclose any person has accumulated twelve or more points within two years, Director of Motor Vehicles must revoke his license and privileges to operate a motor vehicle in this state. Westenburg v. Weedlun, 187 Neb. 679, 193 N.W.2d 566 (1972).
The accumulation of twelve or more points within a two-year period makes mandatory the suspension of the operator's license. Lutjemeyer v. Dennis, 186 Neb. 46, 180 N.W.2d 679 (1970).
Accumulation of twelve or more points within two-year period requires suspension of license. Martindale v. State, 181 Neb. 64, 147 N.W.2d 6 (1966).
Revocation of driver's license is for a period of one year. State v. Garst, 175 Neb. 731, 123 N.W.2d 638 (1963).
Where required number of points are accumulated, suspension of license is required. Strasser v. Ress, 165 Neb. 858, 87 N.W.2d 619 (1958).
Period of revocation of license runs from the date of latest conviction. Stewart v. Ress, 165 Neb. 211, 85 N.W.2d 260 (1957).
Plea of guilty to charge of speeding was equivalent of a conviction. Stewart v. Ress, 164 Neb. 876, 83 N.W.2d 901 (1957).
Where total of twelve or more points are accumulated in any two-year period, revocation of license is mandatory. Durfee v. Ress, 163 Neb. 768, 81 N.W.2d 148 (1957).
Revocation of an individual's license to operate a motor vehicle as the result of accumulation of 12 or more points within a period of 2 years is not an act of a state official done pursuant to, or in enforcing, the provisions of the Driver License Compact. Gillespie v. State, 230 Neb. 587, 432 N.W.2d 801 (1988).
An accumulation of points comes to the attention of the Director of Motor Vehicles at the time of receipt of the final abstract of conviction by the Department of Motor Vehicles. The action required of the director is ministerial and directory in nature. Thus, the requirement of a summary revocation relates only to the prompt accomplishment of the statute's purpose and does not require a strict and literal compliance as to every detail thereof. Berlowitz v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 210 Neb. 843, 317 N.W.2d 93 (1982).
Whenever a guilty plea is treated as a judgment of conviction to support an order revoking a motor vehicle operator's license, and it is challenged in district court, it must appear from the record that there was a judicial acceptance of that plea. Miller v. Peterson, 208 Neb. 658, 305 N.W.2d 364 (1981).
On appeal to district court from order of Director of Motor Vehicles under section 39-669.16 (transferred to section 60-498.02) revoking operator's license, the burden is on licensee to establish ground for reversal. Mackey v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 194 Neb. 707, 235 N.W.2d 394 (1975).
The Director of Motor Vehicles is required to interpret abstracts of conviction in accordance with laws regulating use of motor vehicles. Jarmin v. Kissack, 190 Neb. 365, 208 N.W.2d 675 (1973).
The amount by which the speed limit was exceeded is a part of the information to be shown on the abstract for conviction report. Melanson v. State, 188 Neb. 446, 197 N.W.2d 401 (1972).
The director acts ministerially in revoking a driver's license under this and related section. State v. Lessert, 188 Neb. 243, 196 N.W.2d 166 (1972).
Due process does not require notice and hearing before revocation for point violations hereunder. Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 195 N.W.2d 218 (1972).
In assessing points hereunder, Director of Motor Vehicles must consider provisions of statute which was violated. Westenburg v. Weedlun, 187 Neb. 679, 193 N.W.2d 566 (1972).
Validity of prior judgments of conviction cannot be collaterally attacked on appeal from order of revocation of license. Bradford v. Ress, 167 Neb. 338, 93 N.W.2d 17 (1958).