1. Liability of owner
1. Liability of owner
In addition to an owner's liability under this section and common-law liability for known vicious propensities, the keeper of a dog can be liable to injured third parties on a negligence theory. Van Kleek v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 289 Neb. 730, 857 N.W.2d 297 (2014).
While this section exempts a dog owner from strict liability for injuries to a trespasser caused by the owner's dog, it does not cut off the common-law tort remedy available to a trespasser for a dog bite. Guzman v. Barth, 250 Neb. 763, 552 N.W.2d 299 (1996).
The strict liability of an owner of a dog for all damages that may accrue to any person, other than a trespasser, by reason of having been bitten by such dog, does not extend to the owners of leased property upon which the dog is harbored. McCullough v. Bozarth, 232 Neb. 714, 442 N.W.2d 201 (1989).
Dog owners are statutorily liable for any and all damages inflicted by their dog to any person, other than a trespasser, without proof of scienter or knowledge of the dangerous propensities of the dogs for biting and by reason of such dog or dogs killing, wounding, worrying, or chasing domestic animals. Paulsen v. Courtney, 202 Neb. 791, 277 N.W.2d 233 (1979).
In an action based upon statutory liability for injury by a dog, the injured person will be barred from recovering if he intentionally provoked the dog, and thereby caused it to attack him. Paulsen v. Courtney, 202 Neb. 791, 277 N.W.2d 233 (1979).
Evidence was insufficient to show that injury to sheep was caused by defendant's dogs. Norman v. Sprague, 167 Neb. 528, 93 N.W.2d 637 (1958).
Owner of dogs not liable when evidence fails to show injuries to horses directly attributable to dogs. Cook v. Pickrel, 20 Neb. 433, 30 N.W. 421 (1886).
This civil dog bite statute creates a cause of action based upon strict liability on the part of the dog owner. State v. Ruisi, 9 Neb. App. 435, 616 N.W.2d 19 (2000).
Given that other words in subdivision (1)(b) of this section—"worrying" and "chasing" "any person or persons or any sheep or other domestic animals belonging to such person, firm, or corporation"—entail action directed toward the injured person or toward the injured animal owned by the damaged plaintiff, the word "injuring" must also be limited to bodily hurt caused by acts directed toward the person or animal hurt. Smith v. Meyring Cattle Co., 302 Neb. 116, 921 N.W.2d 820 (2019).
Playful and mischievous acts of dogs directed toward the person sustaining bodily hurt were not encompassed by this section. Smith v. Meyring Cattle Co., 302 Neb. 116, 921 N.W.2d 820 (2019).
The element that the dog be vicious or have dangerous propensities is implicitly part of this section by virtue of the terms "wound," "worry," and "chase." Smith v. Meyring Cattle Co., 302 Neb. 116, 921 N.W.2d 820 (2019).
The various dictionary definitions of "chase," as applied to this section imposing liability on dog owners for damages caused by their dogs chasing any person, i.e., "to follow quickly or persistently in order to catch or harm," "to make run away; drive," or "to go in pursuit" are disjunctive. Grammer v. Lucking, 292 Neb. 475, 873 N.W.2d 387 (2016).
1992 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1011, was prompted by a court decision in which an injured person had been unable to recover for a broken hip that had allegedly been caused by a dog, because it was not a "wound" within the meaning of this section. Underhill v. Hobelman, 279 Neb. 30, 776 N.W.2d 786 (2009).
When the words killing, wounding, worrying, or chasing as used in this section are read together, they exclude playful and mischievous acts of dogs. Holden v. Schwer, 242 Neb. 389, 495 N.W.2d 269 (1993).
Question whether seven-year-old child was a trespasser under statute was question for jury, which should have been instructed on definition of trespasser, including element of intent. Kenney v. Barna, 215 Neb. 863, 341 N.W.2d 901 (1983).
This section removes the common law restriction of proving scienter or knowledge of the dangerous propensities of dogs, but only as it applies to the actions of dogs specified in the statute. Paulsen v. Courtney, 202 Neb. 791, 277 N.W.2d 233 (1979).
The merely playful acts of dogs do not give rise to a cause of action or damages hereunder. Donner v. Plymate, 193 Neb. 647, 228 N.W.2d 612 (1975).
The purpose of 1992 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1011, was to expand the scope of this section to include "internal damages even if there are no external damages caused by the owner's dog." Underhill v. Hobelman, 279 Neb. 30, 776 N.W.2d 786 (2009).
Purpose of statute is to protect domestic animals, ordinarily the prey of dogs. No right exists to kill dog for past conduct. Brown v. Graham, 80 Neb. 281, 114 N.W. 153 (1907).
Owner can recover value of dog killed, if not running at large. Nehr v. State, 35 Neb. 638, 53 N.W. 589 (1892).