Under this section, a surviving husband's claim for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress against his deceased wife's employer was barred by the employer immunity provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act because he accepted compensation from the employer as his deceased wife's dependent, he settled with and released the employer, and his claim arose from his deceased wife's injury as the phrase "arise from such injury" is used in this section. Pittman v. Western Engineering Co., 283 Neb. 913, 813 N.W.2d 487 (2012).
A public utility employee cannot maintain a separate suit against a city for an injury incurred on the job, because the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy of the injured public utility employee against the city where the public utility is an agency or department of the city. Hofferber v. City of Hastings, 275 Neb. 503, 747 N.W.2d 389 (2008).
Section 48-111 and this section are routinely referred to by the Nebraska Supreme Court as the "exclusivity" provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Bennett v. Saint Elizabeth Health Sys., 273 Neb. 300, 729 N.W.2d 80 (2007).
Nebraska does not recognize an exception that would allow a third party to seek contribution from an employer when it is alleged that the employer acted intentionally. Harsh International v. Monfort Indus., 266 Neb. 82, 662 N.W.2d 574 (2003).
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is an employee's exclusive remedy against an employer when the employee's injury was both incurred "in the course of employment" and "arose out of employment". Skinner v. Ogallala Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 262 Neb. 387, 631 N.W.2d 510 (2001).
The Workers' Compensation Act is an employee's exclusive remedy against an employer for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Tompkins v. Raines, 247 Neb. 764, 530 N.W.2d 244 (1995).
When an employer, liable to an employee under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, agrees to indemnify a third party for a loss sustained as the result of the third party's payment to the indemnitor's employee, the employer's exclusion from liability accorded by the Workers' Compensation Act does not preclude the third party's action to enforce the indemnity agreement with the indemnitor-employer. Oddo v. Speedway Scaffold Co., 233 Neb. 1, 443 N.W.2d 596 (1989); Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Kaiser Ag. Chem. Co., 229 Neb. 160, 425 N.W.2d 872 (1988).
Workmen's Compensation Act bars action by third party tort-feasor against employer for contribution or indemnity based on claim arising from the injury. Vangreen v. Interstate Machinery & Supply Co., 197 Neb. 29, 246 N.W.2d 652 (1976).
If a person files a claim against his employer in the Workmen's Compensation Court for an injury which did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, he does not thereby release his employer from liability for a tort. Marlow v. Maple Manor Apartments, 193 Neb. 654, 228 N.W.2d 303 (1975).
Employee's acceptance of benefits under Workmen's Compensation Act ordinarily constitutes release to employer of claims at law arising from the injury. Edelman v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing, Inc., 189 Neb. 763, 205 N.W.2d 340 (1973).