A person seeking to set aside a transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act must first prove that he or she is a "creditor" and that the party against whom relief is sought is a "debtor." Reed v. Reed, 275 Neb. 418, 747 N.W.2d 18 (2008).

An appeal of a district court’s determination that a transfer of an asset was not in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is equitable in nature. Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187, 681 N.W.2d 735 (2004).

A renunciation properly effected pursuant to section 30-2352 and prior to distribution is not a transfer and therefore not a fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Essen v. Gilmore, 259 Neb. 55, 607 N.W.2d 829 (2000).

An appeal of a district court's determination that transfers of assets were in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is equitable in nature. In an action seeking to set aside a fraudulent transfer, the burden of proof is on a creditor to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that fraud existed in a questioned transaction. Eli's, Inc. v. Lemen, 256 Neb. 515, 591 N.W.2d 543 (1999).

An action seeking to declare a transfer fraudulent as to a creditor invokes equity jurisdiction of a court. In an action seeking to set aside a fraudulent transfer, the burden of proof is on a creditor to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that fraud existed in a questioned transaction. Dillon Tire, Inc. v. Fifer, 256 Neb. 147, 589 N.W.2d 137 (1999).

An action which arose prior to the August 25, 1989, effective date of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is governed by the previous act, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Holthaus v. Parsons, 238 Neb. 223, 469 N.W.2d 536 (1991).