A court cannot extend the time for filing a claim that arose after death. In re Estate of Karmazin, 299 Neb. 315, 908 N.W.2d 381 (2018).
The 3-year limitations period of subsection (a)(2) of this section applied to the Department of Health and Human Services' Medicaid estate recovery claim because the personal representative failed to send notice to the department within 5 days of the date on which notice to creditors was first published, as required by sections 30-2483 and 25-520.01. In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).
Time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this section applied to the Department of Health and Human Services' Medicaid estate recovery claim, because under the section, under which the claim was made, section 68-919, the indebtedness to the department arose during the lifetime of the recipient. In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).
A claim against a decedent's estate which is excepted from the time limitations of this section remains subject to the statute of limitations governing the underlying claim. Babbitt v. Hronik, 261 Neb. 513, 623 N.W.2d 700 (2001).
Claims for reimbursement of medical expenses made pursuant to section 68-1036.02 arise at or after death and, therefore, are subject to the limitations period imposed by subsection (b)(2) of this section. In re Estate of Tvrz, 260 Neb. 991, 620 N.W.2d 757 (2001).
Pursuant to subsection (c)(1) of this section, a judgment lien on the proceeds from a sale is not a claim subject to the provisions of the Nebraska Probate Code. A judgment lien is not a claim and is not subject to the provisions of the Nebraska Probate Code. McCook Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 248 Neb. 567, 537 N.W.2d 353 (1995).
The purpose of the nonclaim statute is facilitation and expedition of proceedings for distribution of a decedent's estate, including an early appraisal of the respective rights of interested persons and prompt settlement of demands against the estate. In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936, 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989).
The requirements of this section are mandatory, and where a claim is not filed within the time provided in the statute, it is barred. In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936, 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989).
The defense of recoupment is not barred by this section. In re Estate of Massie, 218 Neb. 103, 353 N.W.2d 735 (1984).
The time limits under this section for presentation of claims are not applicable when the recovery sought is solely limited to the extent of insurance protection. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).
This section does not allow the institution of proceedings against a discharged personal representative while the estate is closed. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).
Although identifying the amount of a claim is not statutorily required, doing so advances the purpose of this section. In re Estate of Karmazin, 299 Neb. 315, 908 N.W.2d 381 (2018).
An award of interest commencing approximately 7 months after the decedent's death was improper because under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the time for the original presentation of the Department of Health and Human Services' claim expired 3 years after the decedent's death, and interest would not commence until 60 days thereafter, pursuant to section 30-2488(e). In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).
Subsection (a)(1) of this section applies to all creditors who may ask the county court for an extension of time to file a claim, but subsection (a)(2) of this section applies only to creditors who do not receive notice. Therefore, both subsections (a)(1) and (2) of this section apply to creditors who do not receive notice. In re Estate of Emery, 258 Neb. 789, 606 N.W.2d 750 (2000).
The creditor bears the burden of proving that it filed a claim within the required period. Katskee v. Nevada Bob's Golf of Neb., 238 Neb. 654, 472 N.W.2d 372 (1991).
Good cause within the meaning of subsection (a)(1) of this section envisions a claimant proceeding diligently toward presenting a claim against the decedent's estate, but the presentation of the claim is prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, unavoidable misfortune, or excusable neglect. In re Estate of Feuerhelm, 215 Neb. 872, 341 N.W.2d 342 (1983).
A claimant who has a claim for the proceeds of a decedent's liability insurance under subsection (c)(2) of this section is entitled to have the estate reopened for the limited purpose of service of process in the civil action filed to establish liability and liability insurance coverage. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).
Before suit can be filed, a closed estate, with a discharged personal representative, must be reopened and a personal representative appointed (or reappointed) even when seeking only liability insurance proceeds. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).
A claim by the Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support for reimbursement of medical assistance benefits pursuant to section 68-1036.02 is one that necessarily falls within the provisions of subsection (b) of this section as arising "at or after" the death of the decedent who is a recipient of those benefits. In re Estate of Tvrz, 9 Neb. App. 98, 608 N.W.2d 226 (2000).
Subsection (c) of this section does not provide for a direct action against an insurer, but, rather, an action against the estate of an alleged tort-feasor with the award being limited to the amount of available liability insurance. Robertson v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., 8 Neb. App. 758, 602 N.W.2d 27 (1999).
Administration expenses, including attorney fees, are only excepted from the time-bar provisions for bringing claims. Administration expenses may be brought under the probate claims procedure. Kerrigan & Line v. Foote, 5 Neb. App. 397, 558 N.W.2d 837 (1997).
Subsection (c)(2) of this section provides an exception to the general time-bar provisions of the probate code, and establishes a potential creditor's right to have an estate reopened for the limited purpose of service of process in a civil action to establish liability and liability insurance coverage, but this section does not authorize a suit against a former personal representative who has already been discharged for the purpose of establishing liability and insurance coverage. Mach v. Schmer, 4 Neb. App. 819, 550 N.W.2d 385 (1996).