As used in sections 28-317 to 28-322.04, unless
the context otherwise requires:
(1) Actor means a person accused of sexual assault;
(2) Intimate parts means the genital area, groin, inner thighs,
buttocks, or breasts;
(3) Past sexual behavior means sexual behavior other than
the sexual behavior upon which the sexual assault is alleged;
(4) Serious personal injury means great bodily injury or
disfigurement, extreme mental anguish or mental trauma, pregnancy, disease,
or loss or impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ;
(5) Sexual contact means the intentional touching of the
victim's sexual or intimate parts or the intentional touching of the victim's
clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's sexual or intimate parts.
Sexual contact shall also mean the touching by the victim of the actor's sexual
or intimate parts or the clothing covering the immediate area of the actor's
sexual or intimate parts when such touching is intentionally caused by the
actor. Sexual contact shall include only such conduct which can be reasonably
construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of either
party. Sexual contact shall also include the touching of a child with the
actor's sexual or intimate parts on any part of the child's body for purposes
of sexual assault of a child under sections 28-319.01 and 28-320.01;
(6) Sexual penetration means sexual intercourse in its ordinary
meaning, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any intrusion, however
slight, of any part of the actor's or victim's body or any object manipulated
by the actor into the genital or anal openings of the victim's body which
can be reasonably construed as being for nonmedical or nonhealth purposes.
Sexual penetration shall not require emission of semen;
(7) Victim means the person alleging to have been sexually
(8) Without consent means:
(a)(i) The victim was compelled to submit due to the use
of force or threat of force or coercion, or (ii) the victim expressed a lack
of consent through words, or (iii) the victim expressed a lack of consent
through conduct, or (iv) the consent, if any was actually given, was the result
of the actor's deception as to the identity of the actor or the nature or
purpose of the act on the part of the actor;
(b) The victim need only resist, either verbally or physically,
so as to make the victim's refusal to consent genuine and real and so as to
reasonably make known to the actor the victim's refusal to consent; and
(c) A victim need not resist verbally or physically where
it would be useless or futile to do so; and
(9) Force or threat of force means (a) the use of physical
force which overcomes the victim's resistance or (b) the threat of physical
force, express or implied, against the victim or a third person that places
the victim in fear of death or in fear of serious personal injury to the victim
or a third person where the victim reasonably believes that the actor has
the present or future ability to execute the threat.
Source:Laws 1977, LB 38, § 33; Laws 1978, LB 701, § 1; Laws 1984, LB 79, § 3; Laws 1985, LB 2, § 2; Laws 1995, LB 371, § 3; Laws 2004, LB 943, § 4; Laws 2006, LB 1199, § 4; Laws 2009, LB97, § 11.
1. Jury instruction
2. Sexual contact
3. Sexual penetration
1. Jury instruction
Jury instruction approved, defining cunnilingus as including licking, kissing, sucking, or otherwise fondling the sex organ of a female with the mouth or tongue. State v. Piskorski, 218 Neb. 543, 357 N.W.2d 206 (1984).
2. Sexual contact
In the context of a conviction for third degree sexual assault under section 28-320, evidence of physical contact between the defendant's penis and the victim's shin was sufficient to support a finding of "sexual contact" as defined in subdivision (5) of this section. State v. Fuller, 279 Neb. 568, 779 N.W.2d 112 (2010).
In proving sexual contact, the State need not prove sexual arousal or gratification, but only circumstances and conduct which could be construed as being for such a purpose. State v. Osborn, 241 Neb. 424, 490 N.W.2d 160 (1992).
"Sexual contact," as defined in subsection (5) of this section, is established when the State proves that defendant intentionally touched the victim's underpants in the area between the legs. State v. Andersen, 238 Neb. 32, 468 N.W.2d 617 (1991).
In proving "sexual contact," defined in subdivision (5) of this section, the State need not prove sexual arousal or gratification, but only circumstances and conduct which could be construed as being for such a purpose. State v. Berkman, 230 Neb. 163, 430 N.W.2d 310 (1988).
In proving sexual contact, as defined in subdivision (5) of this section, the State need not prove sexual arousal or gratification, but only circumstances and conduct which could be construed as being for such purpose. In re Interest of Kyle O., 14 Neb. App. 61, 703 N.W.2d 909 (2005).
Nebraska does not criminalize sexual contact for the purpose of humiliating or degrading a person. In re Interest of Kyle O., 14 Neb. App. 61, 703 N.W.2d 909 (2005).
The issue of intent of sexual gratification in minors must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and the fact finder must consider all the evidence, including the offender's age and maturity, before deciding whether intent can be inferred. In re Interest of Kyle O., 14 Neb. App. 61, 703 N.W.2d 909 (2005).
Without some evidence of the child's maturity, intent, experience, or other factor indicating his or her purpose in acting, sexual ambitions must not be assigned to a child's actions. In re Interest of Kyle O., 14 Neb. App. 61, 703 N.W.2d 909 (2005).
3. Sexual penetration
The slightest intrusion into the genital opening is sufficient to constitute penetration, and such element may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Archie, 273 Neb. 612, 733 N.W.2d 513 (2007).
Penetration need not be penile to be sufficient to establish first degree sexual assault. State v. Shepard, 239 Neb. 639, 477 N.W.2d 567 (1991).
The act of fellatio constitutes a sexual penetration within the meaning of this section. State v. Gonzales, 219 Neb. 846, 366 N.W.2d 775 (1985).
The slightest penetration of the sexual organs is sufficient, if established beyond a reasonable doubt, to constitute the necessary element of penetration in a prosecution for first degree sexual assault. State v. Tatum, 206 Neb. 625, 294 N.W.2d 354 (1980).