Carrying concealed weapon; penalty; affirmative defense; applicability of provisions.
(1)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person who carries a weapon or weapons concealed on or about his or her person, such as a handgun, a knife, brass or iron knuckles, or any other deadly weapon, commits the offense of carrying a concealed weapon.
(b) It is an affirmative defense that the defendant was engaged in any lawful business, calling, or employment at the time he or she was carrying any weapon or weapons and the circumstances in which such person was placed at the time were such as to justify a prudent person in carrying the weapon or weapons for the defense of his or her person, property, or family.
(2) This section does not apply to a person who is the holder of a valid permit issued under the Concealed Handgun Permit Act if the concealed weapon the defendant is carrying is a handgun.
(3)(a) This section does not apply to storing or transporting a firearm in a motor vehicle for any lawful purpose or to transporting a firearm directly to or from a motor vehicle to or from any place where such firearm may be lawfully possessed or carried by such person, if such firearm is unloaded, kept separate from ammunition, and enclosed in a case. This subsection shall not apply to any person prohibited by state or federal law from possessing, carrying, transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm.
(b) For purposes of this subsection, case means (i) a hard-sided or soft-sided box, container, or receptacle intended or designed for the primary purpose of storing or transporting a firearm or (ii) the firearm manufacturer's original packaging.
(4) Carrying a concealed weapon is a Class I misdemeanor.
(5) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this section, carrying a concealed weapon is a Class IV felony.
Source:Laws 1977, LB 38, § 234; Laws 1984, LB 1095, § 1; Laws 2006, LB 454, § 22; Laws 2009, LB63, § 10; Laws 2021, LB236, § 3.
Concealed Handgun Permit Act, see section 69-2427.
Given the amendment to this section and the amendment to the term "knife" as defined in section 28-1201(5), any knife with a blade over 3 1/2 inches in length is a deadly weapon per se, and the manner or intended use of such deadly weapon is not an element of the crime charged. State v. Nguyen, 293 Neb. 493, 881 N.W.2d 566 (2016).
In order to be a deadly weapon per se under subsection (1) of this section, the weapon must be one specifically enumerated in the statute. Whether an object or weapon not specifically named in the statute is a deadly weapon is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact, and the resolution of that fact question will depend on the evidence adduced as to the use or intended use of the object or weapon. State v. Williams, 218 Neb. 57, 352 N.W.2d 576 (1984).
Whether an object or weapon not specifically enumerated in subsection (1) of this section was a deadly weapon is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. State v. Kanger, 215 Neb. 128, 337 N.W.2d 422 (1983).
Section 28-1202(1), R.S.Supp.,1978, combined with the definition of "deadly weapon" found in section 28-109, R.S.Supp.,1978, is sufficiently definite to meet the requirements of the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, section 3, of the Constitution of Nebraska. State v. Valencia, 205 Neb. 719, 290 N.W.2d 181 (1980).
When a person is charged with violation of this section, the State need not prove that a revolver or gun is operable in order to establish that it is a "firearm". The test is whether evidence of possession of a revolver or gun of prohibited description, which is in apparently good condition and has the characteristics and appearance commonly understood to be those of the firearm it purports to be, is prima facie evidence sufficient to go to the trier of fact in a prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon. In re Interest of Cory P., 7 Neb. App. 397, 584 N.W.2d 820 (1998).
Any instrument that consists of finger rings or guards made of a hard substance and that is designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury or death by striking a person with a fist enclosed in the knuckles is per se a deadly weapon under this section. State v. Lewis, 6 Neb. App. 867, 577 N.W.2d 774 (1998).