Cities of the metropolitan class, defined; population required; general powers.
All cities in this state which have attained a population of three hundred thousand inhabitants or more as determined by the most recent federal decennial census or the most recent revised certified count by the United States Bureau of the Census shall be cities of the metropolitan class and governed by this act. Whenever the words this act occur in sections 14-101 to 14-138, 14-201 to 14-229, 14-360 to 14-376, 14-501 to 14-556, 14-601 to 14-609, 14-702 to 14-704, and 14-804 to 14-816, they shall be construed as referring exclusively to those sections. The population of a city of the metropolitan class shall consist of the people residing within the territorial boundaries of such city and the residents of any territory duly and properly annexed to such city. Each city of the metropolitan class shall be a body corporate and politic and shall have power (1) to sue and be sued, (2) to purchase, lease, lease with option to buy, acquire by gift or devise, and hold real and personal property within or without the limits of the city for the use of the city, and real estate sold for taxes, (3) to sell, exchange, lease, and convey any real or personal estate owned by the city, in such manner and upon such terms as may be to the best interests of the city, except that real estate acquired for state armory sites shall be conveyed strictly in the manner provided in sections 18-1001 to 18-1006, (4) to make all contracts and do all other acts in relation to the property and concerns of the city necessary to the exercise of its corporate or administrative powers, and (5) to exercise such other and further powers as may be conferred by law. The powers hereby granted shall be exercised by the mayor and city council of such city except when otherwise specially provided.
Source:Laws 1921, c. 116, art. I, § 1, p. 398; C.S.1922, § 3488; C.S.1929, § 14-101; Laws 1935, Spec. Sess., c. 10, § 2, p. 72; Laws 1941, c. 130, § 8, p. 494; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 14-101; R.S.1943, § 14-101; Laws 1947, c. 50, § 1, p. 170; Laws 1961, c. 58, § 1, p. 215; Laws 1963, c. 43, § 1, p. 218; Laws 1965, c. 85, § 1, p. 327; Laws 1967, c. 40, § 1, p. 170; Laws 1993, LB 726, § 3; Laws 2017, LB113, § 4.
1. Home Rule Charter
1. Home Rule Charter
The chapter of which this section is the beginning section was adopted in toto in 1922 as the Omaha home rule charter. Ash v. City of Omaha, 152 Neb. 393, 41 N.W.2d 386 (1950).
This chapter includes legislative act adopted as home rule charter of Omaha. Reid v. City of Omaha, 150 Neb. 286, 34 N.W.2d 375 (1948).
City of Omaha became, on July 18, 1922, a home rule city by adopting the existing charter governing it as its home rule charter. Carlberg v. Metcalfe, 120 Neb. 481, 234 N.W. 87 (1930).
Under this section and section 14-102, a city of the metropolitan class has the power to provide firefighting services to an airport authority. Professional Firefighters of Omaha v. City of Omaha, 243 Neb. 166, 498 N.W.2d 325 (1993).
The Legislature has impliedly empowered the City of Omaha to obtain a decree in equity abating a public nuisance without proving special damage to city. City of Omaha v. Danner, 186 Neb. 701, 185 N.W.2d 869 (1971).
This section recognizes that metropolitan cities have powers provided by law in addition to those prescribed by charter, and levy may be made to pay judgments when amount of revenue to be derived from maximum levy for general municipal purposes is insufficient. Benner v. County Board of Douglas County, 121 Neb. 773, 238 N.W. 735 (1931).
City has no implied power to license or regulate business of constructing artificial stone walks. Gray v. City of Omaha, 80 Neb. 526, 114 N.W. 600 (1908), 14 L.R.A.N.S. 1033 (1908).
Title to act of 1905 was broad enough to cover all subjects of legislation contained in act, and was sustained as constitutional. Cathers v. Hennings, 76 Neb. 295, 107 N.W. 586 (1906).
Constitutionality of 1897 act sustained incorporating cities of metropolitan class. State ex rel. Wheeler v. Stuht, 52 Neb. 209, 71 N.W. 941 (1897).
Courts should not interfere with enforcement of ordinance unless its unreasonableness, or want of necessity for such measure, is shown by satisfactory evidence. State ex rel. Krittenbrink v. Withnell, 91 Neb. 101, 135 N.W. 376 (1912), 40 L.R.A.N.S. 898 (1912).
City warrant is not invalidated by recital that it is to be paid out of special unauthorized fund or fund which city negligently fails to provide. Rogers v. City of Omaha, 82 Neb. 118, 117 N.W. 119 (1908).
Act incorporating a city must be accepted as a whole, and the city accepting benefits derived therefrom must perform the duties required by law. City of Omaha v. Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446 (1877).
Nebraska private citizens cannot maintain action under Clayton Act for alleged injury to municipality arising from alleged Sherman Act violations. Cosentino v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 433 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1970).