An administrative proceeding is a "pending action" within the meaning of this section when the agency's final order is rendered. Morris v. Wright, 221 Neb. 837, 381 N.W.2d 139 (1986); In re Application of Ochsner, 216 Neb. 480, 344 N.W.2d 632 (1984).

A pending action before an administrative board is not a "pending action" within the meaning of general savings statute. Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 299 N.W.2d 527 (1980).

A petition to detach land from a school district filed with the board created by section 79-403, is not a pending action within the meaning of this section. Clark v. Sweet, 187 Neb. 232, 188 N.W.2d 889 (1971).

Rights under statutes repealed were preserved in pending proceedings before the State Railway Commission. United Mineral Products Co. v. Nebraska Railroads, 177 Neb. 802, 131 N.W.2d 388 (1964).

Law abolishing deficiency judgments in foreclosure suits does not apply to pending actions. Arnold v. Hawley, 128 Neb. 766, 260 N.W. 284 (1935); Helfrich v. Baxter, 128 Neb. 281, 258 N.W. 532 (1935).

It is not presumed that, in repeal of criminal statute, Legislature intended to cause dismissal of pending prosecution. Lower v. State, 109 Neb. 590, 191 N.W. 674 (1923).

Action foreclosing mortgage and for deficiency is pending action. Hanscom v. Meyer, 61 Neb. 798, 86 N.W. 381 (1901).

Repeal of statute will not affect pending suit to enforce right founded thereon. Thompson v. West, 59 Neb. 677, 82 N.W. 13 (1900).

Effect of repeal on pending proceeding, and legislative powers, is discussed. Kleckner v. Turk, 45 Neb. 176, 63 N.W. 469 (1895).

A suit pending to enforce a right or remedy conferred solely by statute is abated by the unconditional repeal of such statute before judgment. Globe Pub. Co. v. State Bank of Nebraska at Crete, 41 Neb. 175, 59 N.W. 683 (1894).

General saving statute preserves right of action on claim for deficiency judgment in suit to foreclose mortgage not due nor in litigation at time Legislature repealed statute permitting deficiency judgment. Vlazny v. Dittrich, 136 Neb. 266, 285 N.W. 697 (1939); Filley v. Mancuso, 135 Neb. 403, 281 N.W. 850 (1938); First Trust Co. v. Eastridge Club, 134 Neb. 785, 279 N.W. 720 (1938).

Right to deficiency judgment on a mortgage obligation created prior to amendment of law regulating foreclosure proceedings is preserved. Vlazny v. Dittrich, 136 Neb. 266, 285 N.W. 697 (1939).

Repeal of statute permitting recovery of a deficiency judgment does not prevent action to revive a dormant deficiency judgment. McCormack v. Murray, 133 Neb. 125, 274 N.W. 383 (1937).

The general saving statute preserves right of action on a claim for deficiency judgment in suit to foreclose a mortgage not due nor in litigation at time act was passed without a special saving clause. Stowers v. Stuck, 131 Neb. 409, 268 N.W. 310 (1936).

Repeal of statute relating to claims against bank depositors' guaranty fund did not affect claim already pending. State ex rel. Spillman v. Security State Bank of Eddyville, 116 Neb. 223, 216 N.W. 803 (1927).

Right to a deficiency judgment in an action based upon a mortgage executed before, but matured after, act of 1897 abolishing deficiency judgments was preserved. Burrows v. Vanderbergh, 69 Neb. 43, 95 N.W. 57 (1903).

Section relates only to causes of action accrued before such repeal. City of Lincoln v. First Nat. Bank of Lincoln, 67 Neb. 401, 93 N.W. 698 (1903).

The simultaneous repeal and reenactment of substantially the same statutory provisions is ordinarily construed to be an affirmation or continuation of the original provisions rather than a true repeal. Where a statute has been repealed and substantially reenacted with additions or changes, the additions or changes are treated as amendments effective from the time the new statute goes into effect. Dairyland Power Co-op v. State Bd. of Equal., 238 Neb. 696, 472 N.W.2d 363 (1991).

A general savings statute providing that if a statute is repealed such repeal shall in no manner affect pending actions nor causes of action not in suit which accrued prior to such repeal, except as may be provided in the repealing statute, relates to substantive and not procedural law. Denver Wood Products Co. v. Frye, 202 Neb. 286, 275 N.W.2d 67 (1979).

The rule that punishment for an act is mitigated by amendment before final judgment does not apply where a new statute does not merely lessen the punishment but defines new categories of crimes and taken as a whole evidences a legislative intent that the penalty provision thereof not apply retroactively. State v. Trowbridge, 194 Neb. 582, 234 N.W.2d 598 (1975).

This saving clause on appeal applies to both civil and criminal statutes. State v. Goham, 187 Neb. 34, 187 N.W.2d 305 (1971).

Where a criminal statute is amended by mitigating the punishment after commission of a prohibited act but before final judgment, the punishment is that provided by the amendatory act unless the Legislature has specifically provided otherwise. State v. Randolph, 186 Neb. 297, 183 N.W.2d 225 (1971).

Repeal of a statute does not affect pending cases, nor accrued causes of action except as may be provided in the repealing statute. State v. Duitsman, 186 Neb. 39, 180 N.W.2d 685 (1970).

This section does not apply when the Legislature expressly provides that repealing act shall apply retroactively. Davis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 176 Neb. 865, 127 N.W.2d 907 (1964).

General saving statute relates to substantive and not to procedural law. Lindgren v. School Dist. of Bridgeport, 170 Neb. 279, 102 N.W.2d 599 (1960).

The general saving clause applies as though it were expressly incorporated in a legislative act. State ex rel. City of Grand Island v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 152 Neb. 772, 42 N.W.2d 867 (1950).

Statutes in pari materia should be construed together. State v. Omaha Elevator Co., 75 Neb. 637, 106 N.W. 979 (1906), 110 N.W. 874 (1906).

That accrued prior to any such repeal refers to time that obligation, out of which action arose, came into existence. Hunter v. Lang, 5 Neb. Unof. 323, 98 N.W. 690 (1904).

This section points the way for the Legislature in dealing with a resolution as distinguished from a statute. State v. Goham, 191 Neb. 639, 216 N.W.2d 869 (1974).

Where, in amending a statute, the Legislature specifically provides that such amendment shall take effect immediately, and shall apply to pending cases and to all cases hereafter brought, such act is controlling over general saving clause. City of Fremont v. Dodge County, 130 Neb. 856, 266 N.W. 771 (1936).

Effect of repealing clause that certain sections and all acts and parts of acts in conflict are repealed is discussed. State ex rel. Adair v. Drexel, 74 Neb. 776, 105 N.W. 174 (1905).

Interpretation of statute by court of last resort is binding upon all departments of government. State ex rel. Norton v. Van Camp, 36 Neb. 91, 54 N.W. 113 (1893).

Where intention is not doubtful and amendatory act is not incongruous with title and scope of amended statute, amendment is valid. Fenton v. Yule, 27 Neb. 758, 43 N.W. 1140 (1889).