An alleged aider or abettor can be held criminally liable as a principal if it is shown that the aider and abettor knew that the perpetrator of the act possessed the required intent or that the aider and abettor himself or herself possessed such intent. In the context of felony murder, the required intent is the intent to commit the underlying felony rather than the intent to kill. State v. McClain, 285 Neb. 537, 827 N.W.2d 814 (2013).

One who intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime may be responsible not only for the intended crime, if it is in fact committed, but also for other crimes which are committed as a natural and probable consequence of the intended criminal act. State v. McClain, 285 Neb. 537, 827 N.W.2d 814 (2013).

Aiding and abetting is not a separate crime in Nebraska. Rather, it is another theory for holding one liable for the underlying crime. State v. Dixon, 282 Neb. 274, 802 N.W.2d 866 (2011).

An aider and abettor is accountable for that which is proximately caused by the principal's conduct regardless of whether the crime would have occurred without the aider and abettor's participation. State v. Barfield, 272 Neb. 502, 723 N.W.2d 303 (2006).

Given the provisions of this section, an information charging a defendant with a specific crime gives the defendant adequate notice that he or she may be prosecuted for the crime specified or as having aided and abetted the commission of the crime specified. An aiding and abetting instruction is proper where warranted by the evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the information charging the defendant does not contain specific aiding and abetting language. State v. Contreras, 268 Neb. 797, 688 N.W.2d 580 (2004).

An information charging an aider and abettor of a crime need not include any additional facts than those necessary to charge the principal of the crime. One who intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime may be responsible not only for the intended crime, if it is in fact committed, but also for other crimes which are committed as a natural and probable consequence of the intended criminal act. State v. Leonor, 263 Neb. 86, 638 N.W.2d 798 (2002).

One who intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime may be responsible not only for the intended crime, if it is in fact committed, but also for other crimes which are committed as a natural and probable consequence of the intended criminal act. State v. Brunzo, 248 Neb. 176, 532 N.W.2d 296 (1995).

For a defendant to be prosecuted for aiding and abetting, mere encouragement or assistance is sufficient participation in the criminal act. State v. Sanders, 241 Neb. 687, 490 N.W.2d 211 (1992).

Where a defendant is charged with aiding and abetting a second degree murder, the intent element applies to the aider and abettor or to the person who actually commits the murder. State v. Dean, 237 Neb. 65, 464 N.W.2d 782 (1991).

Aiding and abetting involves some participation in the criminal act and must be evidenced by some word, act, or deed. No particular acts are necessary, nor is it necessary that any physical part in the commission of the crime is taken or that there was an express agreement therefor. Mere encouragement or assistance is sufficient. State v. Schreck, 224 Neb. 650, 399 N.W.2d 830 (1987).

Evidence is sufficient to uphold a defendant's convictions for first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony when there is evidence indicating that the defendant had a conversation with another individual regarding who was going to kill a particular victim, that the defendant supplied the other individual with the murder weapon, that the defendant unlawfully broke into the victim's residence for the purpose of killing the victim, and that the defendant hit someone in the victim's residence with a piece of wood. State v. Larsen, 255 Neb. 532, 586 N.W.2d 641 (1998).

Injuries which a victim sustains by his or her own action may not be a foreseeable consequence of the intended criminal act. State v. Trackwell, 235 Neb. 845, 458 N.W.2d 181 (1990).

A person involved in a conspiratorial effort to steal from a store is liable for all items taken from that store. State v. Mason, 232 Neb. 400, 440 N.W.2d 490 (1989).

Where persons acting in concert commit an assault, each is responsible for the injuries received by the victim. State v. Thomas, 210 Neb. 298, 314 N.W.2d 15 (1981).