(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) through (4) of this section, all real property in this state, not expressly exempt therefrom, shall be subject to taxation and shall be valued at its actual value.

(2) Agricultural land and horticultural land as defined in section 77-1359 shall constitute a separate and distinct class of property for purposes of property taxation, shall be subject to taxation, unless expressly exempt from taxation, and shall be valued at seventy-five percent of its actual value, except that for school district taxes levied to pay the principal and interest on bonds that are approved by a vote of the people on or after January 1, 2022, such land shall be valued at fifty percent of its actual value.

(3) Agricultural land and horticultural land actively devoted to agricultural or horticultural purposes which has value for purposes other than agricultural or horticultural uses and which meets the qualifications for special valuation under section 77-1344 shall constitute a separate and distinct class of property for purposes of property taxation, shall be subject to taxation, and shall be valued for taxation at seventy-five percent of its special valuation as defined in section 77-1343, except that for school district taxes levied to pay the principal and interest on bonds that are approved by a vote of the people on or after January 1, 2022, such land shall be valued at fifty percent of its special valuation as defined in section 77-1343.

(4) Historically significant real property which meets the qualifications for historic rehabilitation valuation under sections 77-1385 to 77-1394 shall be valued for taxation as provided in such sections.

(5) Tangible personal property, not including motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers registered for operation on the highways of this state, shall constitute a separate and distinct class of property for purposes of property taxation, shall be subject to taxation, unless expressly exempt from taxation, and shall be valued at its net book value. Tangible personal property transferred as a gift or devise or as part of a transaction which is not a purchase shall be subject to taxation based upon the date the property was acquired by the previous owner and at the previous owner's Nebraska adjusted basis. Tangible personal property acquired as replacement property for converted property shall be subject to taxation based upon the date the converted property was acquired and at the Nebraska adjusted basis of the converted property unless insurance proceeds are payable by reason of the conversion. For purposes of this subsection, (a) converted property means tangible personal property which is compulsorily or involuntarily converted as a result of its destruction in whole or in part, theft, seizure, requisition, or condemnation, or the threat or imminence thereof, and no gain or loss is recognized for federal or state income tax purposes by the holder of the property as a result of the conversion and (b) replacement property means tangible personal property acquired within two years after the close of the calendar year in which tangible personal property was converted and which is, except for date of construction or manufacture, substantially the same as the converted property.

Annotations

1. Taxable value

2. Property taxable

3. Miscellaneous

1. Taxable value

This section requires that all property be taxed at actual value. Chief Indus. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Equal., 228 Neb. 275, 422 N.W.2d 324 (1988).
Uniform valuation of tangible property is required under this section. Fremont Plaza v. Dodge County Bd. of Equal., 225 Neb. 303, 405 N.W.2d 555 (1987).
The statute provides that the uniform method of valuing property for taxation as required by Neb. Const., art. VII, section 1, is valuation at actual value. Xerox Corp. v. Karnes, 217 Neb. 728, 350 N.W.2d 566 (1984).
Taxes must be levied uniformly and proportionately on all tangible property valued at its actual value. Kearney Convention Center v. Board of Equal., 216 Neb. 292, 344 N.W.2d 620 (1984).
Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing for purposes of taxation. Richman Gordman v. Board of Equalization, 214 Neb. 470, 334 N.W.2d 447 (1983); Hastings Building Co. v. Board of Equalization, 212 Neb. 847, 326 N.W.2d 670 (1982); Riha Farms Inc. v. County of Sarpy, 212 Neb. 385, 322 N.W.2d 797 (1982).
"Actual value" of a development's common areas is not reflected in the increased value of the adjacent lots where the grant of use privileges to lot owners in the common areas lacks sufficient formality, definition, and duration of creation to constitute valid restrictions on the use of the common areas. Beaver Lake Assn. v. County Board of Equalization, 210 Neb. 247, 313 N.W.2d 673 (1981).
All property not exempt is subject to taxation upon its actual value. Rehkopf v. Board of Equalization, 180 Neb. 90, 141 N.W.2d 462 (1966); H/K Company v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County, 175 Neb. 268, 121 N.W.2d 382 (1963).
Stock of merchandise is valued at actual value. Podewitz v. Gering Nat. Bank, 171 Neb. 383, 106 N.W.2d 497 (1960).
In 1959, all tangible property was required to be assessed at thirty-five percent of its actual value. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 170 Neb. 77, 101 N.W.2d 856 (1960); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 170 Neb. 106, 101 N.W.2d 873 (1960); Union P. R.R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 170 Neb. 139, 101 N.W.2d 892 (1960).
The cost of a stock of merchandise is not its actual value. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Jensen, 164 Neb. 833, 83 N.W.2d 569 (1957).
Actual value means value in the market in the ordinary course of trade. Ahern v. Board of Equalization of Richardson County, 160 Neb. 709, 71 N.W.2d 307 (1955).
Property was valued and assessed at its actual value. Gamboni v. County of Otoe, 159 Neb. 417, 67 N.W.2d 489 (1954).
State board should value and assess property at its actual value in ordinary course of trade. County of Howard v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 158 Neb. 339, 63 N.W.2d 441 (1954); County of Douglas v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 158 Neb. 325, 63 N.W.2d 449 (1954); County of Grant v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 158 Neb. 310, 63 N.W.2d 459 (1954).
Property is required to be assessed at its actual value. Laflin v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 156 Neb. 427, 56 N.W.2d 469 (1953).
All property of a city of the second class must be assessed at its actual valuation. Thomson v. City of Chadron, 145 Neb. 316, 16 N.W.2d 447 (1944).
Evidence of sale price of other farm lands was not admissible to prove fair market value. Swanson v. Board of Equalization, 142 Neb. 506, 6 N.W.2d 777 (1942).
Witness may express his opinion as to actual value without stating that he has taken each and every element affecting the actual value into consideration. Edgerton v. Board of Equalization, 140 Neb. 493, 300 N.W. 413 (1941).
In determining actual value of farm property, taxing authorities must take into consideration the market value and all other elements. Knox County v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 138 Neb. 895, 296 N.W. 157 (1941).
All nonexempt property is subject to taxation on its actual value, which means its value in the ordinary course of trade. Nebraska State Building Corporation v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 535, 290 N.W. 421 (1940); Schulz v. Dixon County, 134 Neb. 549, 279 N.W. 179 (1938), overruling Schmidt v. Saline County, 122 Neb. 56, 239 N.W. 203 (1931).
While evidence may not definitely show a market value of property in ordinary course of trade, values may be fixed from all the evidence. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co. v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 119 Neb. 28, 226 N.W. 810 (1929).
Party could not complain that property was not assessed at actual value and at same time claim that tax on intangible property was invalid. Sommerville v. Board of County Commissioners of Douglas County, 116 Neb. 282, 216 N.W. 815 (1927).
Revenue act of 1921 changed the basis of assessment generally from twenty percent of actual value to actual value. State ex rel. Liberty High School District of Sioux County v. Johnson, 116 Neb. 249, 216 N.W. 828 (1927).
Effect of change of taxation of property at its actual rather than assessed valuation was to increase the taxable value of the property fivefold. Drew v. Mumford, 114 Neb. 100, 206 N.W. 159 (1925).
Shares in foreign corporation, owned and possessed by resident, are taxable at actual value. Bute v. Hamilton County, 113 Neb. 230, 202 N.W. 616 (1925).
An assessment will not be set aside merely because all property has not been assessed at its actual value, where the assessment has been made with reasonable uniformity upon all classes of property. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 111 Neb. 362, 197 N.W. 114 (1923).
This section contemplates that all property be assessed at its true value. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 105 Neb. 843, 182 N.W. 485 (1921).
Property is to be valued at its taxable value for purpose of making a levy to raise the tax provided for. Cunningham v. Douglas County, 104 Neb. 405, 177 N.W. 742 (1920).
Owner cannot require board to value property at seventy-five percent of actual value on plea that it is custom to make such reduction. Lincoln Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Johnson County, 102 Neb. 254, 166 N.W. 627 (1918).
Bridge company is denied equal protection of laws by assessment of its property at full value while the other property in the county is assessed at a fraction of its value. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).

2. Property taxable

All property not expressly exempt is subject to taxation. K-K Appliance Co. v. Board of Equalization of Phelps County, 165 Neb. 547, 86 N.W.2d 381 (1957).
Leasehold interest in buildings constructed on air force base was taxable. Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 160 Neb. 320, 70 N.W.2d 382 (1955).
Shares of stock in foreign corporation owned by resident were taxable. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Jensen, 157 Neb. 22, 58 N.W.2d 582 (1953).
Tangible property of grain broker must be returned and assessed as other tangible personal property. State v. T. W. Jones Grain Co., 156 Neb. 822, 58 N.W.2d 212 (1953).
Exempt or nonexempt character of property arises from the use to which it is put and the purpose thereof at the time the levy is made. American Province of Servants of Mary Real Estate Corp. v. County of Douglas, 147 Neb. 485, 23 N.W.2d 714 (1946).
All property, not exempt, is taxable, and obligation to return property for taxation is a continuing one. In re Estate of Rogers, 147 Neb. 1, 22 N.W.2d 297 (1946).
Legislature has implemented the general provision that all property in this state, not expressly exempt, shall be subject to taxation. International Harvester Co. v. County of Douglas, 146 Neb. 555, 20 N.W.2d 620 (1945).
Under former law all property in this state, not expressly exempt therefrom, was subject to taxation and was to be valued and assessed at its actual value. Novak v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 145 Neb. 664, 17 N.W.2d 882 (1945).
Intangible property of nonresident owner is not taxable in this state. Massey-Harris Co. v. Douglas County, 143 Neb. 547, 10 N.W.2d 346 (1943).
Laundry owned and used by charitable institution in carrying on its work is exempt from taxation. House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 113 Neb. 489, 203 N.W. 632 (1925).
Cause of action in tort is not a right in property and is not taxable. Seward County v. Jones, 105 Neb. 705, 181 N.W. 652 (1921).
Personal property in possession of owner at his place of residence in another state is not subject to taxation in this state. Preston v. Harlan County, 97 Neb. 667, 150 N.W. 1009 (1915).
When certificate is issued entitling company to patents, land is liable to taxation. Elkhorn Land & Town Lot Co. v. Dixon County, 35 Neb. 426, 53 N.W. 382 (1892); White v. Burlington & M. R. R.R. Co., 5 Neb. 393 (1877).
Government bonds are not subject to taxation if held in good faith. Dixon County v. Halstead, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N.W. 621 (1888).
Notes belonging to nonresident, placed in hands of agent in this state for collection and reloaning, are taxable. Finch v. York County, 19 Neb. 50, 26 N.W. 589 (1886).
Homestead may be taxed as soon as owner has right to complete title. Bellinger v. White, 5 Neb. 399 (1877).

3. Miscellaneous

Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, although differing factors may cause the appraised value of property to be less than its actual value, some relationship exists between appraised and actual value such that the appraised value is relevant evidence of at least the minimum value of the land. First Nat. Bank of York v. Critel, 251 Neb. 128, 555 N.W.2d 773 (1996).
The burden of proof is upon a taxpayer to establish that the value of his property has not been fairly and proportionately equalized with all other property. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County Board of Equalization, 209 Neb. 465, 308 N.W.2d 515 (1981).
Presumption that a board of equalization has faithfully performed its official duties, which obtains only while there is an absence of competent evidence to the contrary, disappears when there is competent evidence on appeal to the contrary, and from that point on the reasonableness of the valuation fixed by the board of equalization becomes one of fact based on the evidence, unaided by presumption, with the burden of showing such value to be unreasonable resting upon the appellant on appeal from the action of the board. Gradoville v. Board of Equalization, 207 Neb. 615, 301 N.W.2d 62 (1981).
A mineral interest severed from the surface ownership remains real estate but may be listed on the tax rolls separate from the surface rights. If the owner of the surface rights so requests, severed mineral interests must be separately listed on the tax rolls. State ex rel. Svoboda v. Weiler, 205 Neb. 799, 290 N.W.2d 456 (1980).
Where statute provides a method for valuing tangible property different from that prescribed for other tangible property, it is unconstitutional. Homan v. Board of Equalization, 141 Neb. 400, 3 N.W.2d 650 (1942).
Excessive valuation of nonexempt property may be corrected by proceedings in error to the district court. Eppley Hotels Company v. City of Lincoln, 138 Neb. 347, 293 N.W. 234 (1940).
Whether assessed on interest of mortgagor or mortgagee, taxes must be deemed assessed on land. Matthews v. Guenther, 120 Neb. 742, 235 N.W. 98 (1931).
Amount of assessment of bridge was proper. Meridian Highway Bridge Co. v. Cedar County, 117 Neb. 214, 220 N.W. 241 (1928).
Findings of board of equalization will not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong. Meridian Highway Bridge Co. v. Cedar County, 117 Neb. 214, 220 N.W. 241 (1928); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 105 Neb. 843, 182 N.W. 485 (1921).
In assessing for taxation stock in domestic corporations, mortgages in which mortgagor agrees to pay tax, should not be deducted. J. B. Kelkenney Realty Co. v. Douglas County, 116 Neb. 796, 219 N.W. 140 (1928).
To secure equal taxation, property undervalued should be raised. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 105 Neb. 843, 182 N.W. 485 (1921).

(a) Property of the state and its governmental subdivisions to the extent used or being developed for use by the state or governmental subdivision for a public purpose. For purposes of this subdivision:

(i) Property of the state and its governmental subdivisions means (A) property held in fee title by the state or a governmental subdivision or (B) property beneficially owned by the state or a governmental subdivision in that it is used for a public purpose and is being acquired under a lease-purchase agreement, financing lease, or other instrument which provides for transfer of legal title to the property to the state or a governmental subdivision upon payment of all amounts due thereunder. If the property to be beneficially owned by a governmental subdivision has a total acquisition cost that exceeds the threshold amount or will be used as the site of a public building with a total estimated construction cost that exceeds the threshold amount, then such property shall qualify for an exemption under this section only if the question of acquiring such property or constructing such public building has been submitted at a primary, general, or special election held within the governmental subdivision and has been approved by the voters of the governmental subdivision. For purposes of this subdivision, threshold amount means the greater of fifty thousand dollars or six-tenths of one percent of the total actual value of real and personal property of the governmental subdivision that will beneficially own the property as of the end of the governmental subdivision's prior fiscal year; and

(ii) Public purpose means use of the property (A) to provide public services with or without cost to the recipient, including the general operation of government, public education, public safety, transportation, public works, civil and criminal justice, public health and welfare, developments by a public housing authority, parks, culture, recreation, community development, and cemetery purposes, or (B) to carry out the duties and responsibilities conferred by law with or without consideration. Public purpose does not include leasing of property to a private party unless the lease of the property is at fair market value for a public purpose. Leases of property by a public housing authority to low-income individuals as a place of residence are for the authority's public purpose;

(b) Unleased property of the state or its governmental subdivisions which is not being used or developed for use for a public purpose but upon which a payment in lieu of taxes is paid for public safety, rescue, and emergency services and road or street construction or maintenance services to all governmental units providing such services to the property. Except as provided in Article VIII, section 11, of the Constitution of Nebraska, the payment in lieu of taxes shall be based on the proportionate share of the cost of providing public safety, rescue, or emergency services and road or street construction or maintenance services unless a general policy is adopted by the governing body of the governmental subdivision providing such services which provides for a different method of determining the amount of the payment in lieu of taxes. The governing body may adopt a general policy by ordinance or resolution for determining the amount of payment in lieu of taxes by majority vote after a hearing on the ordinance or resolution. Such ordinance or resolution shall nevertheless result in an equitable contribution for the cost of providing such services to the exempt property;

(d)(i) Property owned by educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery organizations, or any organization for the exclusive benefit of any such educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery organization, and used exclusively for educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery purposes, when such property is not (A) owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the owner or user, (B) used for the sale of alcoholic liquors for more than twenty hours per week, or (C) owned or used by an organization which discriminates in membership or employment based on race, color, or national origin.

(A) Educational organization means (I) an institution operated exclusively for the purpose of offering regular courses with systematic instruction in academic, vocational, or technical subjects or assisting students through services relating to the origination, processing, or guarantying of federally reinsured student loans for higher education, (II) a museum or historical society operated exclusively for the benefit and education of the public, or (III) a nonprofit organization that owns or operates a child care facility; and

(B) Charitable organization includes (I) an organization operated exclusively for the purpose of the mental, social, or physical benefit of the public or an indefinite number of persons and (II) a fraternal benefit society organized and licensed under sections 44-1072 to 44-10,109.

(iii) The property tax exemption authorized in subdivision (1)(d)(i) of this section shall apply to any for-profit skilled nursing facility, for-profit nursing facility, or for-profit assisted-living facility that provides housing for medicaid beneficiaries, except that the exemption amount for such property shall be a percentage of the property taxes that would otherwise be due. Such percentage shall be equal to the average percentage of occupied beds in the facility provided to medicaid beneficiaries over the most recent three-year period. This subdivision shall not be construed to modify, limit, or reduce any property tax exemption provided to a nonprofit skilled nursing facility, nonprofit nursing facility, or nonprofit assisted-living facility pursuant to subdivision (1)(d)(i) of this section. For purposes of this subdivision, skilled nursing facility has the same meaning as in section 71-429, nursing facility has the same meaning as in section 71-424, and assisted-living facility has the same meaning as in section 71-5903.

(iv) The property tax exemption authorized in subdivision (1)(d)(i) of this section shall apply to a building that (A) is owned by a charitable organization, (B) is made available to students in attendance at an educational institution, and (C) is recognized by such educational institution as approved student housing, except that the exemption shall only apply to the commons area of such building, including any common rooms and cooking and eating facilities;

(e) Household goods and personal effects not owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the owner or user; and

(f) A portion of the property owned by a taxpayer as provided in the Recreational Trail Easement Property Tax Exemption Act.

(2) The increased value of land by reason of shade and ornamental trees planted along the highway shall not be taken into account in the valuation of land.

(3) Tangible personal property which is not depreciable tangible personal property as defined in section 77-119 shall be exempt from property tax.

(4) Motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers required to be registered for operation on the highways of this state shall be exempt from payment of property taxes.

(5) Business and agricultural inventory shall be exempt from the personal property tax. For purposes of this subsection, business inventory includes personal property owned for purposes of leasing or renting such property to others for financial gain only if the personal property is of a type which in the ordinary course of business is leased or rented thirty days or less and may be returned at the option of the lessee or renter at any time and the personal property is of a type which would be considered household goods or personal effects if owned by an individual. All other personal property owned for purposes of leasing or renting such property to others for financial gain shall not be considered business inventory.

(6) Any personal property exempt pursuant to subsection (2) of section 77-4105 or section 77-5209.02 shall be exempt from the personal property tax.

(8) Any personal property exempt pursuant to the Nebraska Advantage Act or the ImagiNE Nebraska Act shall be exempt from the personal property tax.

(9) Any depreciable tangible personal property used directly in the generation of electricity using wind as the fuel source shall be exempt from the property tax levied on depreciable tangible personal property. Any depreciable tangible personal property used directly in the generation of electricity using solar, biomass, or landfill gas as the fuel source shall be exempt from the property tax levied on depreciable tangible personal property if such depreciable tangible personal property was installed on or after January 1, 2016, and has a nameplate capacity of one hundred kilowatts or more. Depreciable tangible personal property used directly in the generation of electricity using wind, solar, biomass, or landfill gas as the fuel source includes, but is not limited to, wind turbines, rotors and blades, towers, solar panels, trackers, generating equipment, transmission components, substations, supporting structures or racks, inverters, and other system components such as wiring, control systems, switchgears, and generator step-up transformers.

(10) Any tangible personal property that is acquired by a person operating a data center located in this state, that is assembled, engineered, processed, fabricated, manufactured into, attached to, or incorporated into other tangible personal property, both in component form or that of an assembled product, for the purpose of subsequent use at a physical location outside this state by the person operating a data center shall be exempt from the personal property tax. Such exemption extends to keeping, retaining, or exercising any right or power over tangible personal property in this state for the purpose of subsequently transporting it outside this state for use thereafter outside this state. For purposes of this subsection, data center means computers, supporting equipment, and other organized assembly of hardware or software that are designed to centralize the storage, management, or dissemination of data and information, environmentally controlled structures or facilities or interrelated structures or facilities that provide the infrastructure for housing the equipment, such as raised flooring, electricity supply, communication and data lines, Internet access, cooling, security, and fire suppression, and any building housing the foregoing.

(11) For tax years prior to tax year 2020, each person who owns property required to be reported to the county assessor under section 77-1201 shall be allowed an exemption amount as provided in the Personal Property Tax Relief Act. For tax years prior to tax year 2020, each person who owns property required to be valued by the state as provided in section 77-601, 77-682, 77-801, or 77-1248 shall be allowed a compensating exemption factor as provided in the Personal Property Tax Relief Act.

(12)(a) Broadband equipment shall be exempt from the personal property tax if such broadband equipment is:

(i) Deployed in an area funded in whole or in part by funds from the Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment Program, authorized by the federal Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law 117-58; or

(ii) Deployed in a qualified census tract located within the corporate limits of a city of the metropolitan class and being utilized to provide end-users with access to the Internet at speeds of at least one hundred megabits per second for downloading and at least one hundred megabits per second for uploading.

(b) An owner of broadband equipment seeking an exemption under this section shall apply for an exemption to the county assessor on or before December 31 of the year preceding the year for which the exemption is to begin. If the broadband equipment meets the criteria described in this subsection, the county assessor shall approve the application within thirty calendar days after receiving the application. The application shall be on forms prescribed by the Tax Commissioner.

(i) Broadband communications service means telecommunications service as defined in section 86-121, video programming as defined in 47 U.S.C. 522, as such section existed on January 1, 2024, or Internet access as defined in section 1104 of the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act, Public Law 105-277;

(ii) Broadband equipment means machinery or equipment used to provide broadband communications service and includes, but is not limited to, wires, cables, fiber, conduits, antennas, poles, switches, routers, amplifiers, rectifiers, repeaters, receivers, multiplexers, duplexers, transmitters, circuit cards, insulating and protective materials and cases, power equipment, backup power equipment, diagnostic equipment, storage devices, modems, and other general central office or headend equipment, such as channel cards, frames, and cabinets, or equipment used in successor technologies, including items used to monitor, test, maintain, enable, or facilitate qualifying equipment, machinery, software, ancillary components, appurtenances, accessories, or other infrastructure that is used in whole or in part to provide broadband communications service. Machinery or equipment used to produce broadband communications service does not include personal consumer electronics, including, but not limited to, smartphones, computers, and tablets; and

(iii) Qualified census tract means a qualified census tract as defined in 26 U.S.C. 42(d)(5)(B)(ii)(I), as such section existed on January 1, 2024.

Cross References

ImagiNE Nebraska Act, see section 77-6801.
Nebraska Advantage Act, see section 77-5701.
Personal Property Tax Relief Act, see section 77-1237.
Recreational Trail Easement Property Tax Exemption Act, see section 77-213.

Annotations

1. Constitutionality

2. Use and ownership of property

3. Procedures

4. Exemption granted

5. Exemption not granted

6. Effect of exemption

7. Miscellaneous

1. Constitutionality

Subsections (6) through (9) of this section are unconstitutional under Neb. Const. art. VIII, section 1. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal., 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991).
The provision including major appliances either attached or detached to real property is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 191 Neb. 330, 215 N.W.2d 520 (1974).

2. Use and ownership of property

In reference to subsection (1)(c) of this section, exclusive use means the primary or dominant use of property, as opposed to incidental use. A parsonage which is furnished to a member of the clergy, which is an essential part of a church, and which is used primarily to promote the objects and purposes of a faith is property used exclusively for religious purposes and is exempt from taxation. Neb. Unit. Meth. Ch. v. Scotts Bluff Cty. Bd. of Equal., 243 Neb. 412, 499 N.W.2d 543 (1993).
Subsection (1)(c) of this section contains a two-tier approach to property tax exemption: the first tier involves the nature, character, or status of a property owner, and the second tier concerns the use of the property. Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
To be tax exempt, property must (1) be owned by an organization designated in subsection (1)(c) of this section; (2) be used exclusively for at least one of the purposes specified in subsection (1)(c); and (3) not be (a) owned or used for financial gain to the property owner or user, (b) used more than 20 hours per week for sale of alcoholic liquors, or (c) owned or used by an organization which discriminates in membership or employment based on race, color, or national origin. Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
Under subsection (1)(c) of this section, if a property owner is not of a type entitled to property tax exemption, considering the property's use is unnecessary. Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
Property is not used for financial gain or profit to either the owner or the user if no part of the income from the property is distributed to the owner's or user's members, directors, or officers, or to private individuals. United Way v. Douglas Co. Bd. of Equal., 215 Neb. 1, 337 N.W.2d 103 (1983).
The constitution and statute require that the property be owned for an exempt purpose, but there is no requirement that the ownership and use must be by the same entity. United Way v. Douglas Co. Bd. of Equal., 215 Neb. 1, 337 N.W.2d 103 (1983).
Vacant space in property owned by a charitable organization is exempt from taxation if it is intended for a charitable use, the dominant use of the property as a whole is for exempt purposes, and the conditions under which it is held preclude its use for commercial purposes. United Way v. Douglas Co. Bd. of Equal., 215 Neb. 1, 337 N.W.2d 103 (1983).
Legislature has used the same language as appears in the Constitution in exempting from taxation property owned and used for educational, religious, or charitable purposes. Lincoln Woman's Club v. City of Lincoln, 178 Neb. 357, 133 N.W.2d 455 (1965).
The primary or dominant use, and not an incidental use, is controlling in determining whether property is exempt from taxation. Doane College v. County of Saline, 173 Neb. 8, 112 N.W.2d 248 (1961).
It is the exclusive use of property for religious or educational purposes that determines exemption from taxation. Nebraska Conf. Assn. Seventh Day Adventists v. County of Hall, 166 Neb. 588, 90 N.W.2d 50 (1958).
Use of property is test to right to exemption. Central Union Conference Assn. v. Lancaster County, 109 Neb. 106, 189 N.W. 982 (1922); St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Lancaster County, 109 Neb. 104, 189 N.W. 981 (1922).
Exemption is based solely on use of premises and not on ownership. Scott v. Society of Russian Israelites, 59 Neb. 571, 81 N.W. 624 (1900); First Christian Church of Beatrice v. City of Beatrice, 39 Neb. 432, 58 N.W. 166 (1894).

3. Procedures

In its appellate review of a question whether property is exempt from taxation pursuant to subsection (1)(c) of this section, the Supreme Court determines tax exemption in an equitable trial of factual questions de novo on the record. Immanuel, Inc. v. Board of Equal., 222 Neb. 405, 384 N.W.2d 266 (1986).
Statutes exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed, property must come clearly within the statutory provisions granting such exemption, and the burden of proving the right to the exemption is upon the claimant. United Way v. Douglas Co. Bd. of Equal., 215 Neb. 1, 337 N.W.2d 103 (1983).
The burden of proof is upon one claiming property to be exempt from taxation to establish that its predominant use is for one of the purposes set out in this section. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc. v. County of Douglas, 186 Neb. 593, 185 N.W.2d 464 (1971); Berean Fundamental Church Council, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 186 Neb. 431, 183 N.W.2d 750 (1971).
Party claiming property to be exempt from taxation has the burden of proof of establishing such exemption. Nebraska Conf. Assn. Seventh Day Adventists v. Board of Equalization of Hall County, 179 Neb. 326, 138 N.W.2d 455 (1965).

4. Exemption granted

A conservation group qualified as a "charitable organization" for purposes of subdivision (1)(d) of this section. Platte River Crane Trust v. Hall Cty. Bd. of Equal., 298 Neb. 970, 906 N.W.2d 646 (2018).
The operation of a motel and campground by an organization that also operated a museum was reasonably necessary to accomplish the educational mission of the museum, and thus, the motel and campground were exempt from property taxation. Harold Warp Pioneer Village Found. v. Ewald, 287 Neb. 19, 844 N.W.2d 245 (2013).
The lease of property from one exempt organization to another exempt organization does not create a taxable use, so long as the property is used exclusively for exempt purposes. Fort Calhoun Baptist Ch. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Equal., 277 Neb. 25, 759 N.W.2d 475 (2009).
An industrial park which is created by a city council acting as a community redevelopment authority may serve the purpose of community development, and thus be exempt from taxation as property which serves a public purpose. City of York v. York Cty. Bd. of Equal., 266 Neb. 311, 664 N.W.2d 456 (2003).
The statutes governing airports were not expressly or impliedly repealed by the passage of the 1998 constitutional amendment to Neb. Const. art. VIII, sec. 2, or subsection (1)(a) of this section. Airports owned and operated by municipalities are exempt from taxation. City of York v. York Cty. Bd. of Equal., 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003).
Pursuant to subsection (1)(a) of this section, real property acquired by the city through enforcement of special assessment liens and offered for sale to the public at a price which does not exceed delinquent special assessments and accrued interest, is used "for a public purpose" and is therefore exempt from real estate taxation. City of Alliance v. Box Butte Cty. Bd. of Equal., 265 Neb. 262, 656 N.W.2d 439 (2003).
Pursuant to the former subsection (1)(c) of this section, an assisted living facility owned and used exclusively for charitable purposes, that is, the primary or dominant use of the property is for charitable purposes, is entitled to a property tax exemption. Bethesda Found. v. Buffalo Cty. Bd. of Equal., 263 Neb. 454, 640 N.W.2d 398 (2002).
Lease of property to a charitable organization by a charitable organization for substantially less than its fair rental value is a use of property for charitable purpose. United Way v. Douglas Co. Bd. of Equal., 215 Neb. 1, 337 N.W.2d 103 (1983).
Where a nursing home's association with two other companies did not result in financial gain or profit to either the owner or user, and the primary or dominant use of the nursing home continued to be for religious or charitable purposes, the property remains exempt from taxation. Bethesda Foundation v. County of Saunders, 200 Neb. 574, 264 N.W.2d 664 (1978).
Property of rest home was exempt from taxation under this section. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc. v. County of Gage, 181 Neb. 831, 151 N.W.2d 446 (1967).
Operation of ranch for boys was such as to require entire ranch to be exempt from taxation. Lariat Boys Ranch v. Board of Equalization of Logan County, 181 Neb. 198, 147 N.W.2d 515 (1966).
Building used by Young Women's Christian Association for low-rent housing was exempt from taxation. Young Women's Christian Assn. v. City of Lincoln, 177 Neb. 136, 128 N.W.2d 600 (1964).
Legislature has exempted from taxation hospitals owned and used exclusively for charitable purposes. Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d 86 (1955).
Property of school district is exempt from taxation. Madison County v. School Dist. No. 2, 148 Neb. 218, 27 N.W.2d 172 (1947).
Scottish Rite temple and grounds are exempted from taxation as property used exclusively for educational, religious or charitable purposes. Scottish Rite of Freemasonry v. Lancaster County Board of Commissioners, 122 Neb. 586, 241 N.W. 93 (1932), 81 A.L.R. 1166 (1932), overruling Scottish Rite Building Co. v. Lancaster County, 106 Neb. 95, 182 N.W. 574 (1921), and Mt. Moriah Lodge No. 57, A.F. & A.M. v. Otoe County, 101 Neb. 274, 162 N.W. 639 (1917).
Laundry owned and used by charitable institution in carrying on its work is exempt. House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 113 Neb. 489, 203 N.W. 632 (1925).
Farm and dairy property used for school purposes are exempt. Central Union Conference Assn. v. Lancaster County, 109 Neb. 106, 189 N.W. 982 (1922).
Hospital used exclusively for religious and charitable purposes is exempt. St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Lancaster County, 109 Neb. 104, 189 N.W. 981 (1922).
City of Omaha waterworks is exempt. City of Omaha v. Douglas County, 96 Neb. 865, 148 N.W. 938 (1914).
Property of Masonic lodge was exempt. Plattsmouth Lodge No. 6, A.F. & A.M. v. Cass County, 79 Neb. 463, 113 N.W. 167 (1907).
A contested area within a community hall located on the county fairgrounds, which is used primarily for county fair purposes, is exempt under this section. Brown Cty. Ag. Socy. v. Brown Cty. Bd. of Equal., 11 Neb. App. 642, 660 N.W.2d 518 (2003).

5. Exemption not granted

The intention to use property in the future for an exempt purpose is not a use of the property for exempt purposes under this section. St. Monica's v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 275 Neb. 999, 751 N.W.2d 604 (2008).
The Nebraska State Bar Foundation is not entitled to a tax exemption under subsection (1)(c) of this section as a charitable or educational organization. Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
Property owned and used primarily for furnishing low-rent housing not entitled to exemption as property owned and used exclusively for charitable purposes. Christian Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County, 186 Neb. 11, 180 N.W.2d 136 (1970); County of Douglas v. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., 172 Neb. 696, 111 N.W.2d 719 (1961).
Industries operated and maintained primarily for purpose of providing student employment are an incidental and not a direct use of property for educational purposes and do not qualify for tax exemption. Union College v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County, 183 Neb. 579, 162 N.W.2d 772 (1968).
Property of college fraternity was not used exclusively for educational purposes. Iota Benefit Assn. v. County of Douglas, 165 Neb. 330, 85 N.W.2d 726 (1957).
Household goods of the value of $200 exempt from taxation are not exempt from sale for payment of taxes properly assessed on other property of debtor. Ryder, Sheriff v. Livingston, 145 Neb. 862, 18 N.W.2d 507 (1945).
Lodge property encumbered by unpaid real estate mortgages is not owned exclusively for charitable purposes. North Platte Lodge 985, B.P.O.E. v. Board of Equalization of Lincoln County, 125 Neb. 841, 252 N.W. 313 (1934).
Portion of building of charitable institution used for business purposes was not exempt. Y.M.C.A. v. Lancaster County, 106 Neb. 105, 182 N.W. 593 (1921); Y.M.C.A. of Omaha v. Douglas County, 60 Neb. 642, 83 N.W. 924 (1900).
A fraternal beneficiary association is not a charitable association within meaning of section. Royal Highlanders v. State, 77 Neb. 18, 108 N.W. 183 (1906).
Commercial college is a school and part of property not used exclusively for school is liable to taxation. Rohrbough v. Douglas County, 76 Neb. 679, 107 N.W. 1000 (1906).
If building is used at same time for school purposes and as a family residence, it is not exempt. Watson v. Cowles, 61 Neb. 216, 85 N.W. 35 (1901).

6. Effect of exemption

Exempt from taxes means not subject to taxation. Hanson v. City of Omaha, 154 Neb. 72, 46 N.W.2d 896 (1951).
Where a tax is levied upon property as a whole, and a part is exempt under the Constitution and statutes, the assessment, if inseparable, is unauthorized, and the whole tax is void. McDonald v. Masonic Temple Craft, 135 Neb. 48, 280 N.W. 275 (1938)
Tax levied on property that is exempt is void and collection thereof may be enjoined. East Lincoln Lodge No. 210, A. F. & A. M. v. City of Lincoln, 131 Neb. 379, 268 N.W. 91 (1936).
Where two lower floors of building were rented for commercial purposes and two upper floors were used exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes, part of the taxable value of the lot could be considered in determining total taxable value of property. Masonic Temple Craft v. Board of Equalization of Lincoln County, 129 Neb. 293, 261 N.W. 569 (1935); modified on rehearing 129 Neb. 827, 263 N.W. 150 (1935).
Section does not exempt from special assessments for improvements. City of Beatrice v. Brethren Church, 41 Neb. 358, 59 N.W. 932 (1894).
Only increased value for tree culture can be exempted. Burlington & M. R. R.R. Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Seward County, 10 Neb. 211, 4 N.W. 1016 (1880).

7. Miscellaneous

A tax exemption for charitable use is allowed because those exemptions benefit the public generally and the organization performs services which the state is relieved pro tanto from performing. Platte River Crane Trust v. Hall Cty. Bd. of Equal., 298 Neb. 970, 906 N.W.2d 646 (2018).
A solid waste landfill operated pursuant to the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act serves a public purpose and may be exempt from property taxation. City of York v. York Cty. Bd. of Equal., 266 Neb. 311, 664 N.W.2d 456 (2003).
Regarding "mental" benefit of the public in subsection (1)(c) of this section as one of the requisite purposes of a charitable organization, "mental" means "intellectual," which means, among other things, engaged in creative literary, artistic, or scientific labor. Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
Relative to a charitable organization, "an indefinite number of persons" in subsection (1)(c) of this section means a group of persons with a common characteristic, that is, a class, uncertain in number and composed from the public at large or a community. Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
Under subsection (1)(c) of this section, a property owner's exemption from federal income taxation does not determine whether the owner's property is tax exempt under state law. Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
Under subsection (1)(c) of this section, "operated exclusively," in reference to a charitable organization, means an organization's primary or predominant activity. Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
Property, abandoned for religious purposes, is liable to taxation from time of abandonment. Holthaus v. Adams County, 74 Neb. 861, 105 N.W. 632 (1905).

(1) Any organization, society, or taxpayer seeking a tax exemption provided in subdivision (1)(c), (d), or (f) of section 77-202 for any real or tangible personal property, except real property used for cemetery purposes, shall apply for exemption to the county assessor on or before December 31 of the year preceding the year for which the exemption is sought on forms prescribed by the Tax Commissioner. Applications that lack an estimated valuation, or any other required information, shall result in the denial of the requested exemption. The county assessor shall examine the application and recommend either taxable or exempt for the real property or tangible personal property to the county board of equalization on or before March 1 following. For applications involving property described in subdivision (1)(d)(iii) or (iv) of section 77-202, the county assessor shall also calculate the exemption amount for the property and shall submit such calculation to the county board of equalization along with his or her recommendations. Notice that a list of the applications from organizations, societies, and taxpayers seeking tax exemption, descriptions of the property, and recommendations of the county assessor are available in the county assessor's office shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county at least ten days prior to consideration of any application by the county board of equalization.

(2) Any organization, society, or taxpayer which fails to file an exemption application on or before December 31 may apply on or before June 30 to the county assessor. The organization, society, or taxpayer shall also file in writing a request with the county board of equalization for a waiver so that the county assessor may consider the application for exemption. The county board of equalization shall grant the waiver upon a finding that good cause exists for the failure to make application on or before December 31. When the waiver is granted, the county assessor shall examine the application and recommend either taxable or exempt for the real property or tangible personal property to the county board of equalization, shall calculate the exemption amount for any property described in subdivision (1)(d)(iii) or (iv) of section 77-202, and shall assess a penalty against the property of ten percent of the tax that would have been assessed had the waiver been denied or one hundred dollars, whichever is less, for each calendar month or fraction thereof for which the filing of the exemption application missed the December 31 deadline. The penalty shall be collected and distributed in the same manner as a tax on the property and interest shall be assessed at the rate specified in section 45-104.01, as such rate may from time to time be adjusted by the Legislature, from the date the tax would have been delinquent until paid. The penalty shall also become a lien in the same manner as a tax pursuant to section 77-203.

Annotations

Sections 77-202.01 through 77-202.07 are clear and comprehensive and constitute a complete and comprehensive act dealing with the matter of tax exemptions. Indian Hills Comm. Ch. v. County Bd. of Equal., 226 Neb. 510, 412 N.W.2d 459 (1987).
A taxpayer who has sought and has been denied exemption under this section and who does not appeal pursuant to section 77-202.04 may not thereafter pay the tax and seek a refund under section 77-1736.10. Campus Lt. Hse. Min. v. Buffalo Cty. Bd. of Equal., 225 Neb. 271, 404 N.W.2d 46 (1987).
The county assessor may recommend taxable or exempt status under this section, but may not appeal from ruling of board of equalization. Bemis v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 197 Neb. 175, 247 N.W.2d 447 (1976).

The county board of equalization, between February 1 and June 1 after a hearing on ten days' notice to the applicant and the publication of notice as provided in section 77-202.01, and after considering the recommendation of the county assessor and any other information it may obtain from public testimony, shall grant or withhold tax exemption for the real property or tangible personal property on the basis of law and of regulations promulgated by the Tax Commissioner.

For applications accepted after approval of a waiver pursuant to section 77-202.01, the county board of equalization shall hear and certify its decision on or before August 15.

Annotations

The county assessor may recommend taxable or exempt status under section 77-202.01, but may not appeal from ruling of board of equalization. Bemis v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 197 Neb. 175, 247 N.W.2d 447 (1976).
A county board of equalization must give an applicant 10 days' notice before a hearing is held on the application. Washington Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Rushmore Borglum, 11 Neb. App. 377, 650 N.W.2d 504 (2002).

(1) Except as provided in section 77-202.10 and subsection (2) of this section, a properly granted exemption of real or tangible personal property provided for in subdivisions (1)(c) and (d) of section 77-202 shall continue for a period of four years if the statement of reaffirmation of exemption required by subsection (3) of this section is filed when due. The four-year period shall begin with years evenly divisible by four. A properly granted exemption of real property provided for in subdivision (1)(f) of section 77-202 shall continue for the period described in section 77-216 without the need to file any statement of reaffirmation of exemption under subsection (3) of this section.

(2) An owner of property which has been granted an exemption under subdivision (1)(d)(iii) or (iv) of section 77-202 shall be required to reapply for the exemption each year so that the exemption amount for the year can be recalculated.

(3) In each intervening year occurring between application years, the organization or society which filed the granted exemption application under subdivision (1)(c) or (d) of section 77-202 for the real or tangible personal property, except real property used for cemetery purposes and real property described in subdivision (1)(d)(iii) or (iv) of section 77-202, shall file a statement of reaffirmation of exemption with the county assessor on or before December 31 of the year preceding the year for which the exemption is sought, on forms prescribed by the Tax Commissioner, certifying that the ownership and use of the exempted property has not changed during the year. Any organization or society which misses the December 31 deadline for filing the statement of reaffirmation of exemption may file the statement of reaffirmation of exemption by June 30. Such filing shall maintain the tax-exempt status of the property without further action by the county and regardless of any previous action by the county board of equalization to deny the exemption due to late filing of the statement of reaffirmation of exemption. Upon any such late filing, the county assessor shall assess a penalty against the property of ten percent of the tax that would have been assessed had the statement of reaffirmation of exemption not been filed or one hundred dollars, whichever is less, for each calendar month or fraction thereof for which the filing of the statement of reaffirmation of exemption is late. The penalty shall be collected and distributed in the same manner as a tax on the property and interest shall be assessed at the rate specified in section 45-104.01, as such rate may from time to time be adjusted by the Legislature, from the date the tax would have been delinquent until paid. The penalty shall also become a lien in the same manner as a tax pursuant to section 77-203.

(4)(a) If any organization, society, or taxpayer seeks a tax exemption under subdivision (1)(c), (d), or (f) of section 77-202 for any real or tangible personal property acquired on or after January 1 of any year or converted to exempt use on or after January 1 of any year, the organization, society, or taxpayer shall make application for exemption on or before July 1 of that year as provided in subsection (1) of section 77-202.01. The procedure for reviewing the application shall be as in sections 77-202.01 to 77-202.05, except that the exempt use shall be determined as of the date of application and the review by the county board of equalization shall be completed by August 15.

(b) If an organization as described in subdivision (1)(c) or (d) of section 77-202 purchases, between July 1 and the levy date, property that has been granted tax exemption and the property continues to be qualified for a property tax exemption, the purchaser shall on or before November 15 make application for exemption as provided in section 77-202.01. The procedure for reviewing the application shall be as in sections 77-202.01 to 77-202.05, and the review by the county board of equalization shall be completed by December 15.

(c) If a taxpayer purchases, between July 1 and the levy date, property described in subdivision (1)(f) of section 77-202 that has been granted tax exemption and the property continues to be qualified for a property tax exemption, the purchaser shall on or before November 15 make application for exemption as provided in section 77-202.01. The procedure for reviewing the application shall be as in sections 77-202.01 to 77-202.05, and the review by the county board of equalization shall be completed by December 15.

(5) In any year, the county assessor or the county board of equalization may cause a review of any exemption to determine whether the exemption is proper. Such a review may be taken even if the ownership or use of the property has not changed from the date of the allowance of the exemption. If it is determined that a change in an exemption is warranted, the procedure for hearing set out in section 77-202.02 shall be followed, except that the published notice shall state that the list provided in the county assessor's office only includes those properties being reviewed. If an exemption is denied, the county board of equalization shall place the property on the tax rolls retroactive to January 1 of that year if on the date of the decision of the county board of equalization the property no longer qualifies for an exemption.

The county board of equalization shall give notice of the assessed value of the real property in the same manner as outlined in section 77-1507, and the procedures for filing a protest shall be the same as those in section 77-1502.

When personal property which was exempt becomes taxable because of lost exemption status, the owner or his or her agent has thirty days after the date of denial to file a personal property return with the county assessor. Upon the expiration of the thirty days for filing a personal property return pursuant to this subsection, the county assessor shall proceed to list and value the personal property and apply the penalty pursuant to section 77-1233.04.

(6) During the month of September of each year, the county board of equalization shall cause to be published in a paper of general circulation in the county a list of all real estate in the county exempt from taxation for that year pursuant to subdivisions (1)(c), (d), and (f) of section 77-202. Such list shall be grouped into categories as provided by the Property Tax Administrator. An electronic copy of the list of real property exemptions and a copy of the proof of publication shall be forwarded to the Property Tax Administrator on or before November 1 of each year.

Annotations

If property is tax exempt in any given year, such exemption may continue for 3 successive years after grant of such exemption, if the property owner annually and timely files the specified affidavit. Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1, 465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
An integral part of the process to obtain a tax exemption is reapplication for such exemption. A new application is required before a previously granted exemption has expired, and failure to make reapplication for exemption or to file a new application as required by this section results in cessation of the tax exemption when the current exemption expires. Indian Hills Comm. Ch. v. County Bd. of Equal., 226 Neb. 510, 412 N.W.2d 459 (1987).
This section does not require a board of equalization to review an exemption during the four-year exemption period when there is no evidence of a change in the use of the exempt property. Ross v. Governors of the Knights of Ak-Sar-Ben, 207 Neb. 305, 299 N.W.2d 145 (1980).

(1) Notice of a county board of equalization's decision granting or denying an application for exemption from taxation for real or tangible personal property shall be mailed or delivered to the applicant and the county assessor by the county clerk within seven days after the date of the board's decision. Persons, corporations, or organizations may appeal denial of an application for exemption by a county board of equalization. Only the county assessor, the Tax Commissioner, or the Property Tax Administrator may appeal the granting of such an exemption by a county board of equalization. Appeals pursuant to this section shall be made to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission in accordance with section 77-5013 within thirty days after the decision of the county board of equalization. The Tax Commissioner or Property Tax Administrator may in his or her discretion intervene in any such appeal pursuant to this section within thirty days after notice by the Tax Equalization and Review Commission that an appeal has been filed pursuant to this section. If the county assessor, Tax Commissioner, or Property Tax Administrator appeals a county board of equalization's final decision granting an exemption from property taxation, the person, corporation, or organization granted such exemption by the county board of equalization shall be made a party to the appeal and shall be issued a notice of the appeal by the Tax Equalization and Review Commission within thirty days after the appeal is filed.

(2) A copy of the final decision by a county board of equalization shall be delivered electronically to the Tax Commissioner and the Property Tax Administrator within seven days after the date of the board's decision. The Tax Commissioner or the Property Tax Administrator shall have thirty days after the final decision to appeal the decision.

(3) Any owner may petition the Tax Equalization and Review Commission in accordance with section 77-5013, on or before December 31 of each year, to determine the taxable status of real property for that year if a failure to give notice as prescribed by this section prevented timely filing of a protest or appeal provided for in sections 77-202 to 77-202.25.

Annotations

This section delineates who may appeal from the decision of the county board of equalization on a tax exemption determination and applies regardless of whether the appeal was by petition in error. McClellan v. Board of Equal. of Douglas Cty., 275 Neb. 581, 748 N.W.2d 66 (2008).
A taxpayer who has sought and has been denied exemption under section 77-202.01 and who does not appeal pursuant to this section may not thereafter pay the tax and seek a refund under section 77-1736.10. Campus Lt. Hse. Min. v. Buffalo Cty. Bd. of Equal., 225 Neb. 271, 404 N.W.2d 46 (1987).
Giving notice of appeal and filing appeal bond must be completed within twenty days following board decision. United Way of the Midlands v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, 199 Neb. 323, 259 N.W.2d 270 (1977).
An appeal from a tax exemption may be taken pursuant to this section only. Bemis v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 197 Neb. 175, 247 N.W.2d 447 (1976).

The Tax Commissioner shall prescribe forms for distribution to the county assessors on which persons, corporations, and organizations may apply for tax-exempt status for real or tangible personal property. The forms shall include the following information:

(1) Name of owner or owners of the property, and if a corporation, the names of the officers and directors, and place of incorporation;

(2) Legal description of real property and a general description as to class and use of all tangible personal property;

(3) The precise statutory provision under which exempt status for such property is claimed;

(5) For applications for tax-exempt status for property described in subdivision (1)(f) of section 77-202:

(b) Certification from the eligible holder, as defined in section 77-215, confirming compliance with public access and connectivity requirements.

Any cemetery organization seeking a tax exemption for any real property used to maintain areas set apart for the interment of human dead shall apply for exemption to the county assessor on forms prescribed by the Tax Commissioner. An application for a tax exemption shall be made on or before December 31 of the year preceding the year for which the exemption is sought. The county assessor shall examine the application and recommend either taxable or exempt to the county board of equalization on or before March 1 following. If a cemetery organization seeks a tax exemption for any real or tangible personal property acquired for or converted to exempt use on or after January 1, the organization shall make application for exemption on or before July 1. The procedure for reviewing the application shall be the same as for other exemptions pursuant to subdivisions (1)(c) and (d) of section 77-202. Any cemetery organization which fails to file on or before December 31 for exemption may apply on or before June 30 pursuant to subsection (2) of section 77-202.01, and the penalty and procedures specified in section 77-202.01 shall apply.

Any real property exemption granted to a cemetery organization shall remain in effect without reapplication unless disqualified by change of ownership or use. On or before August 1 the county assessor shall annually make a review of the ownership and use of all cemetery real property and report such review to the county board of equalization.

(1) Leased public property, other than property leased for a public purpose as set forth in subdivision (1)(a) of section 77-202, shall be taxed or exempted from taxation as if the property was owned by the leaseholder. The value of the property shall be determined as provided under section 77-201.

(2) On or before January 31 each year, the state and each governmental subdivision shall provide to the appropriate county assessor each new lease or preexisting lease which has been materially changed which went into effect during the previous year and a listing of previously reported leases that are still in effect.

(3) Taxes on property assessed to the lessee shall be due and payable in the same manner as other property taxes and shall be a first lien upon the personal property of the person to whom assessed until paid and shall be collected in the same manner as personal property taxes as provided in sections 77-1711 to 77-1724. The state or its governmental subdivisions shall not be obligated to pay the taxes upon failure of the lessee to pay. Notice of delinquent taxes shall be timely sent to the lessee and to the state or the governmental subdivision. No lien or attachment shall be attached to the property of the state or the governmental subdivisions for failure of the lessee to pay the taxes due.

(4) The state or any governmental subdivision may, if it chooses to do so in its discretion, provide the appropriate county assessor a description of the property rather than a copy of the lease; request that the assessor notify it of the amount of tax which would be assessed to the leaseholder; voluntarily pay that tax; and collect that tax from the leaseholder as part of the rent.

(5) Except as provided in Article VIII, section 11, of the Constitution of Nebraska, no in lieu of tax payments provided for in any other section of law shall be made with respect to any leased public property to which this section applies.

Annotations

In relation to public property owned by a political subdivision governed by article VIII, section 11 of the Constitution of Nebraska, property taxes (assessed against the lessee) and a payment in lieu of tax may both be collected. Conroy v. Keith Cty. Bd. of Equal., 288 Neb. 196, 846 N.W.2d 634 (2014).
Lessees of the property of a political subdivision organized primarily to provide electricity or irrigation and electricity may be subject to taxation under this section. Conroy v. Keith Cty. Bd. of Equal., 288 Neb. 196, 846 N.W.2d 634 (2014).
Where the lessees of public property were not sent notice pursuant to this section or section 77-202.12 and were not parties to the proceedings before the board of equalization or the Tax Equalization and Review Commission, the Tax Equalization and Review Commission lacked jurisdiction to decide whether property taxes could be assessed against the lessees. Conroy v. Keith Cty. Bd. of Equal., 288 Neb. 196, 846 N.W.2d 634 (2014).

(1) On or before March 1, the county assessor shall send notice to the state or to any governmental subdivision if it has property not being used for a public purpose upon which a payment in lieu of taxes is not made. Such notice shall inform the state or governmental subdivision that the property will be subject to taxation for property tax purposes. The written notice shall contain the legal description of the property and be given by first-class mail addressed to the state's or governmental subdivision's last-known address. If the property is leased by the state or the governmental subdivision to another entity and the lessor does not intend to pay the taxes for the lessee as allowed under subsection (4) of section 77-202.11, the lessor shall immediately forward the notice to the lessee.

(2) The state, governmental subdivision, or lessee may protest the determination of the county assessor that the property is not used for a public purpose to the county board of equalization on or before April 1. The county board of equalization shall issue its decision on the protest on or before May 1.

(3) The decision of the county board of equalization may be appealed to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission on or before June 1. The Tax Commissioner in his or her discretion may intervene in an appeal pursuant to this section within thirty days after notice by the Tax Equalization and Review Commission that an appeal has been filed pursuant to this section.

Annotations

Where the lessees of public property were not sent notice pursuant to this section or section 77-202.11 and were not parties to the proceedings before the board of equalization or the Tax Equalization and Review Commission, the Tax Equalization and Review Commission lacked jurisdiction to decide whether property taxes could be assessed against the lessees. Conroy v. Keith Cty. Bd. of Equal., 288 Neb. 196, 846 N.W.2d 634 (2014).
Where the parties availed themselves of the procedure in this section and the issue to be decided by the board of equalization was whether the relevant parcels were used for a public purpose, the appeal to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission was governed by the June 1 deadline in this section. Conroy v. Keith Cty. Bd. of Equal., 288 Neb. 196, 846 N.W.2d 634 (2014).

As used in sections 77-202.23 and 77-202.24, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) Disabled veteran has the same meaning as in 5 U.S.C. 2108, as such section existed on January 1, 2025; and

(2) Blind veteran means a veteran whose sight is so defective as to seriously limit such veteran's ability to engage in the ordinary vocations and activities of life.

A mobile home shall be exempt from taxation if it is owned and occupied by a disabled veteran or blind veteran of the United States Armed Forces whose disability or blindness is recognized by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs as service connected and who was discharged or otherwise separated with a characterization of honorable or general (under honorable conditions).

Application for the exemption provided in section 77-202.24 shall be made to the county assessor on or before April 1 of every year. The county assessor shall approve or disapprove such application and shall notify the taxpayer of his or her decision within twenty days of the filing of the application. The taxpayer may appeal the decision of the county assessor to the county board of equalization within twenty days after notice of the decision is mailed by the county assessor.

The taxpayer may appeal any decision of the county board of equalization under this section pursuant to section 77-202.04.

All property taxes levied for any county, city, village, or other political subdivision therein shall be due and payable on December 31 next following the date of levy except as provided in section 77-1214. Commencing on that date taxes on real property shall be a first lien on the property taxed until paid or extinguished as provided by law. Taxes on personal property shall be a first lien upon the personal property of the person to whom assessed until paid.

Annotations

1. First lien

2. Miscellaneous

1. First lien

All general real property taxes are a first lien. Polenz v. City of Ravenna, 145 Neb. 845, 18 N.W.2d 510 (1945).
Lien of taxes is not satisfied by statutory sale of property, but the sale only operates to transfer the lien to the purchaser. Coffin v. Old Line Life Ins. Co., 138 Neb. 857, 295 N.W. 884 (1941).
Special assessments are subsequent to general taxes in distribution of proceeds of tax foreclosure sale. Douglas County v. Shannon, 125 Neb. 783, 252 N.W. 199 (1934).
Since taxes are required to be paid and are a first lien on land, agreement to pay taxes and highest rate of interest is usurious and invalidates mortgage to extent of usury. Matthews v. Guenther, 120 Neb. 742, 235 N.W. 98 (1931).
Taxes take precedence over all other liens. Merriam v. Goodlett, 36 Neb. 384, 54 N.W. 686 (1893); Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Siefken, 1 Neb. Unof. 860, 96 N.W. 603 (1901).
Lien of taxes due to county was inferior to perfected loan of agency of United States. United States v. Hauff, 267 F.Supp. 390 (D. Neb. 1966).
Proceeds of sale of real estate of bankrupt corporation were allocated first to county for real estate taxes. In re Independent Truckers, Inc., 226 F.Supp. 440 (D. Neb. 1963).

2. Miscellaneous

Under this section, property tax liability is not determinable or chargeable until December 31 following the prior year. Under this section, property tax liability is not apportionable between the real estate life tenant and the remaindermen. In re Estate of Olsen, 254 Neb. 809, 579 N.W.2d 529 (1998).
Where right to levy certain taxes is clearly conferred on cities of metropolitan class, such cities may supply the details necessary for full exercise of such power. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Bauman, 132 Neb. 67, 271 N.W. 256 (1937).
Life tenant should pay taxes on land during continuance of his estate. Spiech v. Tierney, 56 Neb. 514, 76 N.W. 1090 (1898).

One-half of the taxes due under section 77-203 shall become delinquent on May 1 and the second half on September 1 next following the date the taxes become due, except that in counties having a population of more than one hundred thousand, the first half shall become delinquent April 1 and the second half August 1 next following the date the taxes become due.

All delinquent taxes shall draw interest at a rate equal to the maximum rate of interest allowed per annum under section 45-104.01, as such rate may from time to time be adjusted by the Legislature, from the date they become delinquent, and the interest shall be collected the same as the tax upon which the interest accrues.

Annotations

Penalty of interest is that which the Legislature has fixed as an inducement to pay taxes. In re Estate of Rogers, 147 Neb. 1, 22 N.W.2d 297 (1946).

The first lien upon real estate under section 77-203 shall take priority over all other encumbrances and liens thereon.

Annotations

Special assessments are inferior to lien of general taxes. Polenz v. City of Ravenna, 145 Neb. 845, 18 N.W.2d 510 (1945); County of Garden v. Schaaf, 145 Neb. 676, 17 N.W.2d 874 (1945); Douglas County v. Shannon, 125 Neb. 783, 252 N.W. 199 (1934).
Irrigation district assessments are first lien on land, and are prior to existing mortgage lien. Flansburg v. Shumway, 117 Neb. 125, 219 N.W. 956 (1928).

All special assessments, regularly assessed and levied as provided by law, shall be a lien on the real estate on which assessed, and shall take priority over all other encumbrances and liens thereon except the first lien of general taxes under section 77-203.

Annotations

All special taxes are a lien, subject to the lien of general taxes, and superior to all other encumbrances and liens. Polenz v. City of Ravenna, 145 Neb. 845, 18 N.W.2d 510 (1945).
Proceeds of tax foreclosure are applied, first, to the payment of costs; second, to the payment of general taxes; and the remainder, if insufficient to pay special assessments, to be prorated equitably upon special assessments due. County of Garden v. Schaaf, 145 Neb. 676, 17 N.W.2d 874 (1945).
Charges for irrigation water sold and delivered are not special assessments for which a lien is given. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Cover, 137 Neb. 260, 289 N.W. 331 (1939).
On tax foreclosure, general taxes are superior to special assessments. Douglas County v. Shannon, 125 Neb. 783, 252 N.W. 199 (1934).
Where notice to landowners is not given, lien of special assessments will be held subject to liens of recorded mortgages. Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 Neb. 596, 209 N.W. 256 (1926).
Lien for special assessments due to city was inferior to perfected lien of agency of United States. United States v. Hauff, 267 F.Supp. 390 (D. Neb. 1966).
Proceeds of sale of real estate of bankrupt corporation were allocated first to county for real estate taxes. In re Independent Truckers, Inc., 226 F.Supp. 440 (D. Neb. 1963).

Any political subdivision, tax-exempt corporation, or proprietorship acting with respect to any hospital and which provides office buildings or office space to tenants who shall be engaged in private enterprise shall charge such tenants a sufficient amount of rent so that a portion of the rent payments shall be in lieu of taxes. Such payments in lieu of taxes shall be paid to the county treasurer to be allocated to the taxing units within which the property is located so that each shall receive, as in lieu of tax payments, the same amount that it would have received from such leased property if it were not exempt from taxation.

Space provided for supportive medical services to patients in hospitals shall be exempt from section 77-211.