As used in sections 76-101 to 76-123 and unless a different meaning appears from the context: (a) The term property means one or more interests either legal or equitable, possessory or nonpossessory, present or future, in land, or in things other than land, including choses in action, but excluding powers of appointment, powers of sale and powers of revocation, except when specifically mentioned; (b) the term future interest is applicable equally to property interests in land and in things other than land, and is limited to all varieties of remainders, reversions, executory interests, powers of termination (otherwise known as rights of entry for condition broken), and possibilities of reverter; (c) the term conveyance means an act by which it is intended to create one or more property interests, irrespective of whether the act is effective to create such interests, and irrespective of whether the act is intended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation; (d) the term otherwise effective conveyance means that the conveyance in question satisfies all the requirements of law other than the particular matter dealt with in the section of sections 76-101 to 76-123 in which the term is used; and (e) an intent is effectively manifested when it is manifested by the evidence of intent admissible according to the applicable rules of law with respect to the admissibility of evidence.

Annotations

Vendee under a land contract on real estate, holding a vested interest thereby, may generally assign such equitable interest to a third party assignee. Beren Corp. v. Spader, 198 Neb. 677, 255 N.W.2d 247 (1977).
The provisions of the Uniform Property Act supersede conflicting provisions of the law of property existing prior to the effective date of the act. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce T. & S. Assn., 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971).
Joint tenancy in personal property could be created. Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W.2d 346 (1953).
In absence of Nebraska decision construing Uniform Property Act, federal district court was required to exercise independent judgment in construing it. United States v. 12,800 Acres of Land in Hall County, 69 F.Supp. 767 (D. Neb. 1947).

The provisions of sections 76-101 to 76-123 apply to corporations unless the context indicates a more limited applicability.

Any possessory or future interest, power of appointment or of revocation, which can be created in this state with regard to land, can also be created with regard to anything other than land, including choses in action.

An otherwise effective conveyance of property transfers the entire interest which the conveyor has and has the power to convey, unless an intent to transfer a less interest is effectively manifested. No words of inheritance or other special words are necessary to transfer a fee simple.

Annotations

The omission of words of inheritance is of no consequence when determining if a document conveys an easement appurtenant by reason of this section. Spilker v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 211 Neb. 540, 319 N.W.2d 429 (1982).
Purpose clause, of and by itself, does not operate to limit the estate granted by a deed. Sun Oil Co. v. Emery, 183 Neb. 793, 164 N.W.2d 644 (1971).
Conveyance by deed to city for use and benefit of citizens of the city operated to convey fee simple title. City of Gering v. Jones, 175 Neb. 626, 122 N.W.2d 503 (1963).
Deed to State of Nebraska for highway purposes conveyed all interest of grantors. Rumbel v. Ress, 166 Neb. 839, 91 N.W.2d 36 (1958).
Act was enacted to modify and eliminate common law technicalities and exactions. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).
Deed executed by mortgagee in possession passed all interest of grantor in mortgage indebtedness. Campbell v. Ohio National Life Ins. Co., 161 Neb. 653, 74 N.W.2d 546 (1956).

An otherwise effective exercise of power of appointment, a power of sale or a power of revocation, whether inter vivos or by a testamentary disposition, transfers or revokes the entire interest which the holder thereof has the power to transfer or to revoke unless an intent to transfer or to revoke a less interest is effectively manifested.

An otherwise effective reservation of property by the conveyor reserves the interest the conveyor had prior to the conveyance unless an intent to reserve a different interest is effectively manifested.

Annotations

This section eliminates common-law technicalities and exactions regarding the language used to make a reservation in a deed; whether a provision is a reservation does not depend upon the use of a particular word but upon the character and effect of the provision itself. Walters v. Sporer, 298 Neb. 536, 905 N.W.2d 70 (2017).
Assignment of a vendee's vested equitable interest in land, acquired by land contract, creates a privity of estate between the assignee and the original vendor, but not a privity of contract between them. Beren Corp. v. Spader, 198 Neb. 677, 255 N.W.2d 247 (1977).
Extent of reservation of mineral rights was obscure and ambiguous, and required construction of deed. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).
Interest in oil and gas rights was reserved. Elrod v. Heirs of Gifford, 156 Neb. 269, 55 N.W.2d 673 (1952).

(1) The conveyance of an existing future interest, whether legal or equitable, is not ineffective on the sole ground that the interest so conveyed is future or contingent, except that possibilities of reverter or rights of reentry for breach of condition subsequent shall not be alienable or devisable.

(2) Neither possibilities of reverter nor rights of reentry for breach of condition subsequent relating to any property, whether created on, before, or after July 9, 1988, when the condition has not been broken, shall be valid for a longer period than thirty years from the date of the creation of the condition or possibility of reverter or right of reentry. If such possibility of reverter or right of reentry is created to endure for a longer period than thirty years, it shall be valid for thirty years. This subsection shall not apply to personal property which has been conveyed to a library or museum for the purpose of public display.

(3) Any cause of action arising from any possibility of reverter or right of reentry for breach of condition subsequent which existed prior to July 9, 1988, shall be commenced within a period of one year following July 9, 1988.

Annotations

The plain language of this section shows that conditions subsequent expire either upon the attempted transfer of the possibilities of reverter or rights of reentry, or 30 years after the creation of the condition subsequent. State v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 241 Neb. 675, 490 N.W.2d 461 (1992).
Creation of contingent future interests is recognized. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).

The subjection to the claims of creditors of a future interest, whether legal or equitable, is not prevented or avoided on the sole ground that such interest is future or contingent.

Any act which would be effective as a conveyance inter vivos or as a mortgage or as a testamentary disposition of property when the land or thing other than land is in the possession of the conveyor, is effective as a conveyance of the conveyor's interest therein, when the land or thing other than land is out of the conveyor's possession whether adversely held or not.

The creation of fees simple conditional as they existed under the law of England prior to the statute de donis is not permitted. The creation of fees tail is not permitted. The use in an otherwise effective conveyance of property, of language appropriate to create such a fee simple conditional or a fee tail, creates a fee simple in the person who would have taken a fee simple conditional or a fee tail. Any future interest limited upon such an interest is a limitation upon the fee simple and its validity is determined accordingly. Nothing herein contained shall affect the operation of sections 76-111 to 76-113.

Annotations

Where an estate in fee simple is devised, an attempt by the testator to prevent alienation by attaching conditions subsequent is ineffective and void for the reason that conditions are repugnant to the estate created. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce T. & S. Assn., 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971).
The operation of this section must be read and considered with other sections of the Uniform Property Act. Hauschild v. Hauschild, 176 Neb. 319, 126 N.W.2d 192 (1964).
Estates in fee simple conditional and fee tail are abolished. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).

Whenever property is limited upon the death of any person without heirs or heirs of the body or issue general or special, or descendants or offspring or children or any such relative described by other terms, such limitation, unless a different intent is effectively manifested, is a limitation to take effect only when such person dies not having such relative living at the time of his death or in gestation and born alive thereafter, and is not a limitation to take effect upon the indefinite failure of such relatives; nor, unless a different intent is effectively manifested, does it mean that death without such relative, in order to be material, must occur in the lifetime of the creator of the interest.

Whenever any person, by conveyance, takes a life interest and in the same conveyance an interest is limited by way of remainder, either immediately or mediately, to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, or his issue, or next of kin, or some of such heirs, heirs of the body, issue, or next of kin, the word heirs, heirs of the body, or next of kin, or other words of like import used in the conveyance, in the limitation therein by way of remainder, are not words of limitation carrying to such person an estate of inheritance or absolute estate in the property, but are words of purchase creating a remainder in the designated heirs, heirs of the body, issue, or next of kin.

Annotations

Will under consideration created a life estate in child of testator, and remainder in lineal descendants by right of representation. Hauschild v. Hauschild, 176 Neb. 319, 126 N.W.2d 192 (1964).
Rule in Shelley's Case has application where testator's death occurred prior to effective date of the act of which this section was a part. Sandberg v. Heirs of Champlin, 152 Neb. 161, 40 N.W.2d 411 (1950).

When an otherwise effective conveyance of property is made in favor of a person and his children, or in favor of a person and his issue, or by other words of similar import designating the person and the descendants of the person, whether the conveyance is immediate or postponed, the conveyance creates a life interest in the person designated and a remainder in his designated descendants, unless an intent to create other interests is effectively manifested.

Annotations

A devise of an interest in real estate for the use of a child of the testator during his life and upon death of the child to his lineal descendants creates a life estate in the child and a remainder in his lineal descendants. Hauschild v. Hauschild, 176 Neb. 319, 126 N.W.2d 192 (1964).
A devise to a person and his descendants creates a life estate in such person and a contingent remainder in his descendants as a class. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).
Will manifested an intention to create other interests. Dunlap v. Lynn, 166 Neb. 342, 89 N.W.2d 58 (1958).

When any property is limited, mediately or immediately, in an otherwise effective testamentary conveyance, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next of kin of the conveyor, or to a person or persons who on the death of the conveyor are some or all of his heirs or next of kin, such conveyees acquire the property by purchase and not by descent.

When any property is limited, in an otherwise effective conveyance inter vivos, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next of kin of the conveyor, which conveyance creates one or more prior interests in favor of a person or persons in existence, such conveyance operates in favor of such heirs or next of kin by purchase and not by descent.

No future interest, whether legal or equitable, shall be destroyed by the mere termination, in any manner, of any or all preceding interests before the happening of the contingency to which the future interest is subject.

When an otherwise effective conveyance of property is made to two or more persons as tenants in common for life or for a term of years which is terminable at their deaths, with an express remainder, whether effective or not, (a) to the survivor of such persons, or (b) upon the death of all the life tenants to another person or persons, such conveyance, unless a different intent is effectively manifested, creates cross limitations among the several tenants in common, so that the share of the one first dying passes to his cotenants to be held by them in the same manner as their original shares, and the shares of the second and others dying, in succession, are similarly treated until the time when the property is limited to pass as a whole to the remainderman.

Annotations

Where language in a will shows a different intention, this section is not applicable. Gaughen v. Gaughen, 172 Neb. 740, 112 N.W.2d 285 (1961).

(1) Any person or persons owning property which he, she, or they have power to convey, may effectively convey such property by a conveyance naming himself, herself, or themselves and another person or persons, as grantees, and the conveyance has the same effect as to whether it creates a joint tenancy, or tenancy in common, or tenancy in partnership, as if it were a conveyance from a stranger who owned the property to the persons named as grantees in the conveyance. (2) Any two or more persons owning property which they have power to convey, may effectively convey such property by a conveyance naming one, or more than one, or all such persons, as grantees, and the conveyance has the same effect, as to whether it creates a separate ownership, or a joint tenancy, or tenancy in common, or tenancy in partnership, as if it were a conveyance from a stranger who owned the property, to the persons named as grantees in the conveyance. (3) Any person mentioned in this section may be a married person, and any persons so mentioned may be persons married to each other. (4) The conveyance of all of the interest of one joint tenant to himself or herself as grantee, in which the intention to effect a severance of the joint tenancy expressly appears in the instrument, severs the joint tenancy.

Annotations

A deed which purportedly conveyed all of the interest of one joint tenant, wherein he is both grantor and grantee, is not an act which will sever the joint tenancy. Krause v. Crossley, 202 Neb. 806, 277 N.W.2d 242 (1979).
Common law rule as to joint tenancies was modified by this section. White v. Ogier, 175 Neb. 883, 125 N.W.2d 68 (1963).
Joint tenancies have been approved by the Legislature. DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956).
Owner of property can convey to himself and another and create joint tenancy. Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W.2d 346 (1953).
Prior to adoption of this section, four unities were requisite to creation of joint tenancy. Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N.W.2d 271 (1948).
Under public policy announced by Uniform Property Act, conveyance direct by husband to wife as joint tenants with right of survivorship was effective. United States v. 12,800 Acres of Land in Hall County, 69 F.Supp. 767 (D. Neb. 1947).

A married person has the power to convey effectively property directly to his or her spouse in the same manner and to the same extent as if he or she were unmarried. Property so conveyed shall be subject to the rights of the grantor as spouse of the grantee in the same manner and to the same extent as property otherwise acquired by the grantee.

When conduct claimed to constitute waste is made the basis of a claim for damages, the claimant is limited to a recovery of compensatory damages and is not entitled to multiple damages or to declare a forfeiture of the place wasted or of the interest of the defendant in the place wasted, except in accordance with covenants, agreements or conditions binding such defendants.

Sections 76-101 to 76-123 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact them.

Annotations

Uniform act is to be construed so as to effectuate its general purpose. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).

Sections 76-101 to 76-123 shall not apply to acts which occurred or to conveyances which became effective before August 24, 1941, except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of section 76-107.

Annotations

Savings clause does not operate to withdraw from courts the power to apply Uniform Property Act to transactions which occurred before act became effective. United States v. 12,800 Acres of Land in Hall County, 69 F.Supp. 767 (D. Neb. 1947).