(1) For purposes of the Nebraska Criminal Code and any statute passed by the Legislature after the date of passage of the code, felonies are divided into ten classes which are distinguished from one another by the following penalties which are authorized upon conviction:

Class I felony	Death
Class IA felony	Life imprisonment
Class IB felony	Maximum—life imprisonment
	Minimum—twenty years imprisonment
Class IC felony	Maximum—fifty years imprisonment
	Mandatory minimum—five years imprisonment
Class ID felony	Maximum—fifty years imprisonment
	Mandatory minimum—three years imprisonment
Class II felony	Maximum—fifty years imprisonment
	Minimum—one year imprisonment
Class IIA felony	Maximum—twenty years imprisonment
	Minimum—none
Class III felony	Maximum—four years imprisonment and two years
	post-release supervision or
	twenty-five thousand dollars fine, or both
	Minimum—none for imprisonment and nine months
	post-release supervision if imprisonment is imposed
Class IIIA felony	Maximum—three years imprisonment
	and eighteen months post-release supervision or
	ten thousand dollars fine, or both
	Minimum—none for imprisonment and nine months
	post-release supervision if imprisonment is imposed
Class IV felony	Maximum—two years imprisonment and twelve
	months post-release supervision or
	ten thousand dollars fine, or both
	Minimum—none for imprisonment and none for
	post-release supervision

(2) All sentences for maximum terms of imprisonment for one year or more for felonies shall be served in institutions under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correctional Services. All sentences for maximum terms of imprisonment of less than one year shall be served in the county jail.

(3) Nothing in this section shall limit the authority granted in sections 29-2221 and 29-2222 to increase sentences for habitual criminals.

(4) A person convicted of a felony for which a mandatory minimum sentence is prescribed shall not be eligible for probation.

(5) All sentences of post-release supervision shall be served under the jurisdiction of the Office of Probation Administration and shall be subject to conditions imposed pursuant to section 29-2262 and subject to sanctions authorized pursuant to section 29-2266.02.

(6) Any person who is sentenced to imprisonment for a Class I, IA, IB, IC, ID, II, or IIA felony and sentenced concurrently or consecutively to imprisonment for a Class III, IIIA, or IV felony shall not be subject to post-release supervision pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.

(7) Any person who is sentenced to imprisonment for a Class III, IIIA, or IV felony committed prior to August 30, 2015, and sentenced concurrently or consecutively to imprisonment for a Class III, IIIA, or IV felony committed on or after August 30, 2015, shall not be subject to post-release supervision pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.

(8) The changes made to the penalties for Class III, IIIA, and IV felonies by Laws 2015, LB605, do not apply to any offense committed prior to August 30, 2015, as provided in section 28-116.

Annotations

1. Sentencing

2. Miscellaneous

1. Sentencing

The statutory provisions of section 29-2204.02 and this section relating to post-release supervision are mandatory, and a sentence that fails to impose post-release supervision when required is an appropriate matter for an appellate court's discretionary plain error review. State v. Roth, 311 Neb. 1007, 977 N.W.2d 221 (2022).
A person convicted of a felony for which a mandatory minimum sentence is prescribed is not eligible for probation. State v. Russell, 291 Neb. 33, 863 N.W.2d 813 (2015).
For purposes of the authorized limits of an indeterminate sentence, both "mandatory minimum" as used in section 28-319.01(2) and "minimum" as used in this section in regard to a Class IB felony mean the lowest authorized minimum term of the indeterminate sentence. State v. Russell, 291 Neb. 33, 863 N.W.2d 813 (2015).
A sentence of imprisonment for a term of 60 years to life for second degree murder is not excessive in the absence of an abuse of judicial discretion. State v. Weaver, 267 Neb. 826, 677 N.W.2d 502 (2004).
When a flat sentence of "life imprisonment" is imposed and no minimum sentence is stated, by operation of law, the minimum sentence for parole eligibility purposes is the minimum imposed by law under the statute. State v. Gray, 259 Neb. 897, 612 N.W.2d 507 (2000).
The Nebraska sentencing statutes do not require that the minimum sentence be for a different term than the maximum sentence. State v. Cook, 251 Neb. 781, 559 N.W.2d 471 (1997).
County jail was not under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correctional Services; therefore, it was plain error for district court to sentence defendant convicted of Class III felony to term in county jail. State v. Wilcox, 239 Neb. 882, 479 N.W.2d 134 (1992).
Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the district court lacks statutory authority to sentence a defendant convicted of a Class III felony to a term of imprisonment in the county jail. State v. Wren, 234 Neb. 291, 450 N.W.2d 684 (1990).
Under the provisions of this section and section 28-304(2), a court is not authorized to sentence one convicted of second degree murder to an indeterminate sentence, but must sentence such a person to imprisonment either for life or for a definite term of not less than 10 years. State v. Ward, 226 Neb. 809, 415 N.W.2d 151 (1987).
Where an indeterminate sentence is pronounced, the minimum limit fixed by the court shall not be less than the minimum provided by law nor more than one-third of the maximum term. Where maximum allowable sentence is five years, an indeterminate sentence of two to five years is excessive and must be modified to a sentence of not less than one year eight months nor more than five years. State v. Bosak, 207 Neb. 693, 300 N.W.2d 201 (1981).
A defendant's sentence on a Class IIIA felony needed to be an indeterminate sentence pursuant to subsection (4) of section 29-2204.02, because the defendant was also sentenced on Class II felonies. State v. Wells, 28 Neb. App. 118, 940 N.W.2d 847 (2020).
Under subsection (2) of this section, sentences of less than 1 year shall be served in the county jail, whereas sentences of 1 year or more for Class IIIA felonies shall be served in institutions under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correctional Services. State v. Minnick, 22 Neb. App. 907, 865 N.W.2d 117 (2015).

2. Miscellaneous

The nonretroactive provision of subsection (7) of this section applies to the changes made by 2015 Neb. Laws, L.B. 605, to penalties for Class IV felony convictions under section 29-2204.02. State v. Benavides, 294 Neb. 902, 884 N.W.2d 923 (2016).
The Legislature lacked constitutional authority to amend the language of the statutory penalty for a Class IA felony by inserting the phrase "without parole" after "life imprisonment" during the 2002 special session. State v. Conover, 270 Neb. 446, 703 N.W.2d 898 (2005).
The change of the minimum penalty for first degree murder from life imprisonment to life imprisonment without parole is presumed to be an increase in the minimum penalty that cannot be applied to acts committed prior to the change without violating constitutional ex post facto principles. State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598, 658 N.W.2d 604 (2003).
This section does not impose a mandatory minimum term of incarceration for persons convicted of a Class II felony. State v. Hamik, 262 Neb. 761, 635 N.W.2d 123 (2001).
To sustain a conviction for "use" of a weapon under this section, the State must show that a defendant actively employed the weapon for the purpose of committing a felony. State v. Riley, 31 Neb. App. 292, 979 N.W.2d 538 (2022).
A defendant found guilty of a Class III felony does not have an equal protection right to a Specialized Substance Abuse Supervision evaluation when such defendant fails to show that he was similarly situated to felony drug offenders who were eligible for the program. State v. Borges, 18 Neb. App. 322, 791 N.W.2d 336 (2010).
The geographic limitations on the Specialized Substance Abuse Supervision program do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the program is rationally related to the State's interests. State v. Borges, 18 Neb. App. 322, 791 N.W.2d 336 (2010).

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty shall not be imposed upon any person who was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the commission of the crime.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty shall not be imposed upon any person with an intellectual disability.

(3) As used in subsection (2) of this section, intellectual disability means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior. An intelligence quotient of seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test shall be presumptive evidence of intellectual disability.

(4) If (a) a jury renders a verdict finding the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as provided in section 29-2520 or (b)(i) the information contains a notice of aggravation as provided in section 29-1603 and (ii) the defendant waives his or her right to a jury determination of the alleged aggravating circumstances, the court shall hold a hearing prior to any sentencing determination proceeding as provided in section 29-2521 upon a verified motion of the defense requesting a ruling that the penalty of death be precluded under subsection (2) of this section. If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability, the death sentence shall not be imposed. A ruling by the court that the evidence of diminished intelligence introduced by the defendant does not preclude the death penalty under subsection (2) of this section shall not restrict the defendant's opportunity to introduce such evidence at the sentencing determination proceeding as provided in section 29-2521 or to argue that such evidence should be given mitigating significance.

Annotations

The phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law" in this section neither impacts nor overrides the procedural and time limitations applicable to postconviction motions under the Nebraska Postconviction Act. State v. Lotter, 311 Neb. 878, 976 N.W.2d 721 (2022).
This section is based on the determination that mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit crimes, but because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. This section prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons because of a widespread judgment about the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty. State v. Vela, 272 Neb. 287, 721 N.W.2d 631 (2006).

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the penalty for any person convicted of a Class IA felony for an offense committed when such person was under the age of eighteen years shall be a maximum sentence of not greater than life imprisonment and a minimum sentence of not less than forty years' imprisonment.

(2) In determining the sentence of a convicted person under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall consider mitigating factors which led to the commission of the offense. The convicted person may submit mitigating factors to the court, including, but not limited to:

(d) The convicted person's ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of the conduct;

(f) The outcome of a comprehensive mental health evaluation of the convicted person conducted by an adolescent mental health professional licensed in this state. The evaluation shall include, but not be limited to, interviews with the convicted person's family in order to learn about the convicted person's prenatal history, developmental history, medical history, substance abuse treatment history, if any, social history, and psychological history.

Annotations

A sentence of 70 years' to life imprisonment was not excessive or a de facto life sentence for an offender who, at age 14, murdered his younger sister. State v. Thieszen, 300 Neb. 112, 912 N.W.2d 696 (2018).
A sentence of 110 to 126 years' imprisonment for a murder committed at age 17 was not excessive or a de facto life sentence; the court considered the relevant sentencing factors along with the offender's youth and attendant characteristics and the fact that the offender would be eligible for parole at age 72. State v. Russell, 299 Neb. 483, 908 N.W.2d 669 (2018).
The defendant's resentencing of 60 to 80 years' imprisonment with credit for time served for murder committed as a juvenile offender did not violate Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), where the defendant was not sentenced to life imprisonment without parole and instead had the opportunity for parole in just under 14 years, a full mitigation hearing was held before his sentencing at which both the State and the defendant were given an opportunity to present evidence, and the court stated that it had to consider the fact that a jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree but also had to consider the mitigating factors under this section, as well as a psychological evaluation. State v. Jackson, 297 Neb. 22, 899 N.W.2d 215 (2017).
Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to persons who committed a Class IA felony offense when they were 18 years of age. State v. Wetherell, 289 Neb. 312, 855 N.W.2d 359 (2014).
Where a defendant had been sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a crime he committed while under the age of 18 years and that sentence was later determined to be unconstitutional, this section applied to his resentencing. State v. Taylor, 287 Neb. 386, 842 N.W.2d 771 (2014).

(1) For purposes of the Nebraska Criminal Code and any statute passed by the Legislature after the date of passage of the code, misdemeanors are divided into seven classes which are distinguished from one another by the following penalties which are authorized upon conviction:

Class I misdemeanor........	Maximum — not more than one year
	imprisonment, or one thousand dollars
	fine, or both
	Minimum — none
Class II misdemeanor.......	Maximum — six months imprisonment, or
	one thousand dollars fine, or both
	Minimum — none
Class III misdemeanor......	Maximum — three months imprisonment,
	or five hundred dollars fine, or both
	Minimum — none
Class IIIA misdemeanor.....	Maximum — seven days imprisonment, five
	hundred dollars fine, or both
	Minimum — none
Class IV misdemeanor.......	Maximum — no imprisonment, five
	hundred dollars fine
	Minimum — none
Class V misdemeanor........	Maximum — no imprisonment, one
	hundred dollars fine
	Minimum — none
Class W misdemeanor.......	Driving under the influence or implied
	consent
	First conviction
	Maximum — sixty days imprisonment and
	five hundred dollars fine
	Mandatory minimum — seven days
	imprisonment and five hundred dollars
	fine
	Second conviction
	Maximum — six months imprisonment and
	five hundred dollars fine
	Mandatory minimum — thirty days
	imprisonment and five hundred dollars
	fine
	Third conviction
	Maximum — one year imprisonment and
	one thousand dollars fine
	Mandatory minimum — ninety days
	imprisonment
	and one thousand dollars fine

(2) Sentences of imprisonment in misdemeanor cases shall be served in the county jail, except that such sentences may be served in institutions under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correctional Services if the sentence is to be served concurrently or consecutively with a term for conviction of a felony and the combined sentences total a term of one year or more. A determinate sentence shall be imposed for a misdemeanor if the sentence is to be served concurrently or consecutively with a determinate sentence for a Class III, IIIA, or IV felony.