The prohibition in this section applies only where the levy is for corporate or proprietary purposes and is not levied by local authority and therefore is not contravened by L.B. 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612. Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972).

Creating liability against a village for benefits to streets and alleys for drainage improvements within a drainage district is not in contravention of this section. Drainage District No. 1 in Lincoln County v. Village of Hershey, 145 Neb. 138, 15 N.W.2d 337 (1944).

Law imposing tax for operation by city of water and gas plants is unconstitutional hereunder. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. City of Omaha, 112 Neb. 93, 198 N.W. 858 (1924).

City ordinance imposing charge for support of fire departments is void. German-American Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Minden, 51 Neb. 870, 71 N.W. 995 (1897). See also Aachen & Munich Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Omaha, 72 Neb. 518, 101 N.W. 3 (1904).

Act imposing charge upon fire insurance company for support of fire departments is tax for corporate purposes and void. State v. Wheeler, 33 Neb. 563, 50 N.W. 770 (1891).

Creation of housing authorities by statute for slum clearance does not contravene constitutional inhibitions. Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451 (1940).

Intangible tax law is not violative of provision against imposing taxes on municipalities for corporate purposes. Mehrens v. Greenleaf, 119 Neb. 82, 227 N.W. 325 (1929).

Law imposing on municipality obligation to levy tax to pay hydrant rentals was constitutional, not being for "corporate purpose." State ex rel. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. City of Omaha, 112 Neb. 694, 200 N.W. 871 (1924).

Act authorizing county to levy tax to raise road fund is political power and not for corporate purposes within meaning of this section. City of Albion v. Boone County, 94 Neb. 494, 143 N.W. 749 (1913).

Act authorizing city to pension firemen and imposition of tax therefor does not violate this section. State ex rel. Haberlan v. Love, 89 Neb. 149, 131 N.W. 196 (1911).

Act authorizing city to enforce assessment against street railway for pavement between its tracks does not violate this section. Lincoln Street Railway Co. v. City of Lincoln, 61 Neb. 109, 84 N.W. 802 (1901).

The prohibition in this section applies only where the levy is for corporate or proprietary purposes and is not levied by local authority and therefore is not contravened by L.B. 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612. Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972).

The term municipal corporations herein refers only to those which exercise governmental as distinguished from proprietary functions. Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 187 Neb. 261, 188 N.W.2d 851 (1971).

Cited but not discussed. R-R Realty Co. v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 184 Neb. 237, 166 N.W.2d 746 (1969).

Airport Authority Act did not violate this section. Obitz v. Airport Authority of City of Red Cloud, 181 Neb. 410, 149 N.W.2d 105 (1967).

A county is not a "municipal corporation" within meaning of constitutional provision, and gasoline tax imposed thereon is valid. State v. Cheyenne County, 127 Neb. 619, 256 N.W. 67 (1934).