3. Valid legislation
4. Invalid legislation
Generally, a class of property owners in a certain geographic area cannot form a closed class. Dowd Grain Co. v. County of Sarpy, 291 Neb. 620, 867 N.W.2d 599 (2015).
A “closed class” refers to when a legislative body limits a law to a present condition, with no opportunity for the numbers of the class to increase. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).
A legislative act constitutes special legislation in violation of the Constitution of Nebraska if (1) it creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) it creates a permanently closed class. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).
A special legislation analysis focuses on a legislative body’s purpose in creating a challenged class and asks if there is a substantial difference of circumstances to suggest the expediency of diverse legislation; the Constitution of Nebraska’s prohibition on special legislation aims to prevent legislation that arbitrarily benefits a special class. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).
Uniformity of laws is required in order to prevent granting to any person, or class of persons, the privileges or immunities which do not belong to all persons; it is because the legislative process lacks the safeguards of due process and the tradition of impartiality which restrain the courts from using their powers to dispense special favors that such constitutional prohibitions against special legislation were enacted. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).
A legislative act constitutes special legislation if (1) it creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) it creates a permanently closed class. D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 676, 829 N.W.2d 105 (2013).
A legislative act constitutes special legislation, violative of this provision, if it (1) creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) creates a permanently closed class. City of Ralston v. Balka, 247 Neb. 773, 530 N.W.2d 594 (1995).
A legislative act can violate this provision as special legislation (1) by creating a totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) by creating a permanently closed class. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal., 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991).
A legislative act can violate this provision as special legislation in one of two ways: (1) by creating a totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification, or (2) by creating a permanently closed class. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
In Nebraska, both equal protection and the prohibition against special legislation emanate from this provision, however the test of validity under each is different. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
This provision concerns itself with disparate treatment in much the same manner as does the language of U.S. Const. amend. XIV, which prohibits a state from making or enforcing any law which denies any person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws." Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (1989).
Prohibitions in this section are confined to specific cases mentioned, and Legislature may legislate upon any subject not therein prohibited. Stewart v. Barton, 91 Neb. 96, 135 N.W. 381 (1912).
Special privilege is right, power, franchise, immunity, or privilege granted to, or vested in, a person or class of persons to exclusion of others and in derogation of common rights. City of Plattsmouth v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 80 Neb. 460, 114 N.W. 588 (1908).
It is for Legislature to determine as to applicability of general law and propriety of special law. Weston v. Ryan, 70 Neb. 211, 97 N.W. 347 (1903).
Determination of whether act is general or special depends upon substance of act, not its form. State ex rel. Wheeler v. Stuht, 52 Neb. 209, 71 N.W. 941 (1897).
This section is not restriction upon powers of Legislature over subject involved, but rather limitation in respect to manner of exercise of power. Smiley v. MacDonald, 42 Neb. 5, 60 N.W. 355 (1894).
If law is general in terms and restricted to no particular locality, and operates equally upon all of a group of objects, it is not special law. Hunzinger v. State, 39 Neb. 653, 58 N.W. 194 (1894).
No special law can be enacted where general law can be made applicable. In re House Roll 284, 31 Neb. 505, 48 N.W. 275 (1891).
Legislative classifications must be real and not illusive; they cannot be based on distinctions without a substantial difference, and the distinctive treatment must bear some reasonable relation to the legitimate objectives and purposes of the legislative act. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).
The Legislature has broad discretion to make statutory classifications, but its discretion is not unlimited; the Constitution of Nebraska prohibits it from making arbitrary classifications that favor select persons or objects while excluding others that are not substantially different in circumstance in relation to an act’s purpose. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).
To be valid under the Constitution of Nebraska, a legislative classification must rest upon some reason of public policy, some substantial difference in circumstances, which would naturally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation regarding the objects to be classified. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).
When the Legislature confers privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from many who are standing in the same relation to the privileges, without reasonable distinction or substantial difference, then the statute in question has resulted in the kind of improper discrimination prohibited by the Constitution of Nebraska. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).
A legislative body’s distinctive treatment of a class is proper if the class has some reasonable distinction from other subjects of a like general character. The distinction must bear some reasonable relation to the legitimate objectives and purposes of the legislative act. D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 676, 829 N.W.2d 105 (2013).
Legislative classifications must be real and not illusive; they cannot be based on distinctions without a substantial difference. The question is always whether the things or persons classified by the legislative act form by themselves a proper and legitimate class concerning the purpose of the act. D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 676, 829 N.W.2d 105 (2013)
To be valid, a legislative classification must be based upon some reason of public policy, some substantial difference in circumstances, that would naturally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation regarding the objects to be classified. D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 676, 829 N.W.2d 105 (2013).
A classification separating out commercial businesses or occupations as distinct from the use by the general public is a reasonable classification. Anthony, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 283 Neb. 868, 813 N.W.2d 467 (2012).
A classification which limits the application of the law to a present condition, and leaves no room or opportunity for an increase in the numbers of the class by future growth or development, is special. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
The term "class legislation" is a characterization of legislation in contravention of this provision. It is that which makes improper discrimination by conferring privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons standing in the same relation to the privileges, without reasonable distinction or substantial difference. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
A legislative classification must operate uniformly on all within a class which is reasonable. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 357, 466 N.W.2d 461 (1991).
The Legislature may, for the purpose of legislating, classify persons, places, objects, or subjects, but such classification must rest upon some difference in situation or circumstance which, in reason, calls for distinctive legislation for the class. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 357, 466 N.W.2d 461 (1991).
The Legislature may classify persons under this section as long as, absent implication of a fundamental right or suspect classification, the categorization has a rational basis. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (1989).
Constitution recognizes that villages and cities are separate and distinct. Hueftle v. Eustis Cemetery Assn., 171 Neb. 293, 106 N.W.2d 400 (1960).
Arbitrary classification may result in special legislation. United Community Services v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576 (1956).
Classification according to population is permitted where real and substantial differences exist. Dorrance v. County of Douglas, 149 Neb. 685, 32 N.W.2d 202 (1948).
Classification of business or property for taxation can be permitted only if classification is reasonable and the tax operates uniformly upon all members of the class. Thorin v. Burke, 146 Neb. 94, 18 N.W.2d 664 (1945).
If a law is general and operates uniformly and equally on all brought within the relation and circumstances for which it provides, it is not a local or special law in the constitutional sense. Bauer v. State Game, Forestation & Parks Commission, 138 Neb. 436, 293 N.W. 282 (1940).
Legislature may classify persons, corporations and property for purposes of legislation, but classification must rest upon real differences in situation and circumstances of members of the class relative to subject of legislation, and the law must operate uniformly on every member of class so designated. State ex rel. Taylor v. Hall, 129 Neb. 669, 262 N.W. 835 (1935).
Classification must be reasonable. Althaus v. State, 94 Neb. 780, 144 N.W. 799 (1913); Livingston Loan & Building Assn. v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200, 68 N.W. 375 (1896).
If statute operates equally upon all persons or objects of a class so constituted, it is enough. Dougherty v. Kubat, 67 Neb. 269, 93 N.W. 317 (1903).
Statute must be general and uniform throughout the state, and operate alike on all persons and localities of a class reasonably constituted with reference to relations and circumstances provided for. Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.W. 306 (1902), affirmed on rehearing 66 Neb. 273, 96 N.W. 212 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 66 Neb. 276, 98 N.W. 1075 (1904).
If law is general and uniform throughout the state, operating alike on all persons and localities of a class, it is not objectionable. Livingston Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200, 68 N.W. 375 (1896).
Classification of cities into classes and subclasses for purposes of legislation does not violate Constitution. State ex rel. Jones v. Graham, 16 Neb. 74, 19 N.W. 470 (1884).
3. Valid legislation
A zoning ordinance's exemption for property in a fixed geographic area was not special legislation, because it did not create a closed class nor did it create an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification. Dowd Grain Co. v. County of Sarpy, 291 Neb. 620, 867 N.W.2d 599 (2015).
The provisions of section 79-487 authorizing the transportation of nonprofit private school students on public school buses do not violate the provisions of this section in that they extend transportation benefits to nonprofit private school students on exactly the same basis and under the same regulations governing the transportation of public school students. State ex rel. Bouc v. School Dist. of City of Lincoln, 211 Neb. 731, 320 N.W.2d 472 (1982).
Section 25-222 relating to limitation of actions for professional negligence does not violate this section. Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 244 N.W.2d 201 (1976).
Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act including one year notice of claim requirements and two year limitation for bringing action held constitutional. Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 195 Neb. 703, 240 N.W.2d 339 (1976).
A bill which treats all those who exceed the fifty-five miles per hour interstate highway limit by no more than ten miles per hour, in different manner, as to fines and costs, than those in other categories is not special legislation. State ex rel. Douglas v. Gradwohl, 194 Neb. 745, 235 N.W.2d 854 (1975).
The partial exemption from taxation of classes of property specified in section 77-202.25, is not unreasonable, objectionable as discriminatory, or violative hereof. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 (1974).
Free port law does not violate constitutional provisions for uniformity and against special privileges. Norden Laboratories, Inc. v. County Board of Equalization, 189 Neb. 437, 203 N.W.2d 152 (1973).
Cigarette Tax Act, sections 77-2602 et seq., 1971 Supp., is not void for unreasonable classification, nor is it a special law. Sandberg v. State, 188 Neb. 335, 196 N.W.2d 501 (1972).
The affected class defined in L.B. 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612 is valid and the act is not a local or special law. Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972).
Statute abrogating right of action against auctioneers under conditions stated does not violate this section. State Securities Co. v. Norfolk Livestock Sales Co., Inc., 187 Neb. 446, 191 N.W.2d 614 (1971).
Statute authorizing transfer of land for school purposes was not void as special legislation. Kaup v. Sweet, 187 Neb. 226, 188 N.W.2d 891 (1971).
Law prohibiting usury defenses by corporation not violative of this section. Snyder v. Woxo, Inc., 185 Neb. 545, 177 N.W.2d 281 (1970).
Prohibiting retailer from accepting credit for purchase of beer from wholesaler while permitting acceptance of credit on purchase of liquor is constitutional. Tom & Jerry, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 183 Neb. 410, 160 N.W.2d 232 (1968).
Act of Legislature authorizing cities of primary class to annex contiguous or adjacent lands was not local or special law. Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 182 Neb. 459, 155 N.W.2d 444 (1968).
The 1964 amendment to this section was designed and intended to authorize legislation regulating installment sales. Engelmeyer v. Murphy, 180 Neb. 295, 142 N.W.2d 342 (1966).
Act regulating the profession of engineers and architects sustained as constitutional against claim of discrimination in classification. State ex rel. Meyer v. Knutson, 178 Neb. 375, 133 N.W.2d 577 (1965).
State Employees Retirement Act did not constitute an unreasonable classification and was not unconstitutional as special legislation. Gossman v. State Employees Retirement System, 177 Neb. 326, 129 N.W.2d 97 (1964).
Statute authorizing transfer of land for school purposes was not special legislation in violation of this section. McDonald v. Rentfrow, 176 Neb. 796, 127 N.W.2d 480 (1964).
Statute providing for limited access to interstate highway was not special legislation. Fougeron v. County of Seward, 174 Neb. 753, 119 N.W.2d 298 (1963).
Brand Inspection Act is not special legislation within meaning of this section. Satterfield v. State, 172 Neb. 275, 109 N.W.2d 415 (1961).
Statute providing for sewer use charge in metropolitan cities did not violate this section. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 609, 107 N.W.2d 397 (1961).
Parking Authority Law did not violate constitutional prohibition against special legislation. Omaha Parking Authority v. City of Omaha, 163 Neb. 97, 77 N.W.2d 862 (1956).
Installment Loan Act was not a local or special law regulating interest on money. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956).
A statute which becomes operative within thirty days from the date it takes effect as to existing counties in the class, but specifies no machinery by which it shall become immediately operative in counties subsequently entering the class, is not violative of this section. Midwest Popcorn Co. v. Johnson, 152 Neb. 867, 43 N.W.2d 174 (1950).
Statute providing for appointment of district judges as appraisers in condemnation proceeding is reasonable and not inimical to this section. May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W.2d 448 (1945).
Requirement that candidate for office of member of State Railway Commission be not less than thirty years of age does not violate this section. State ex rel. Quinn v. Marsh, 141 Neb. 436, 3 N.W.2d 892 (1942).
Act creating Nebraska Advertising Commission did not violate this section. Power Oil Co. v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 827, 295 N.W. 805 (1941).
Acts creating housing authorities was not special legislation. Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451 (1940).
Penalties for nonpayment of taxes are punitive in their nature and their remission by Legislature is not forbidden as arbitrary class legislation. Tukey v. Douglas County, 133 Neb. 732, 277 N.W. 57 (1938).
Statute providing for condemnation of public utilities is not special act regulating courts prohibited hereunder. City of Mitchell v. Western Public Service Co., 124 Neb. 248, 246 N.W. 484 (1933).
Statute providing venue of actions was not in violation of this section. Schwarting v. Ogram, 123 Neb. 76, 242 N.W. 273 (1932).
Act according priority to classes of claims in bank receiverships was not violative of prohibition against special and class legislation. State ex rel. Sorensen v. First State Bank of Alliance, 122 Neb. 510, 240 N.W. 750 (1932); State ex rel. Sorensen v. First State Bank of Alliance, 122 Neb. 502, 240 N.W. 747 (1932).
Law permitting fencing with gates across highway was not unconstitutional as class, local, or special legislation. McFadden v. Denter, 118 Neb. 38, 223 N.W. 462 (1929).
Law relating to testing cattle for tuberculosis does not violate provision forbidding special law where general law applicable. State ex rel. Spillman v. Wallace, 117 Neb. 588, 221 N.W. 712 (1928).
Law adding ministers to classes exempted from Railroad Anti-Pass Law was not special legislation. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 112 Neb. 248, 199 N.W. 534 (1924).
Law requiring Board of Regents to manufacture and sell hog cholera serum, at cost, to farmers and swine growers, was valid. Fisher v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 108 Neb. 666, 189 N.W. 161 (1922).
Law authorizing counties of 150,000 or more to issue bonds and levy tax to rebuild courthouse destroyed by fire or riot was valid. Cunningham v. Douglas County, 104 Neb. 405, 177 N.W. 742 (1920).
Law restricting number of candidates appearing on ballot at primary election for delegates to constitutional convention was valid. Baker v. Moorhead, 103 Neb. 811, 174 N.W. 430 (1919).
Law relating to state mineral land leases was valid. Briggs v. Neville, 103 Neb. 1, 170 N.W. 188 (1918).
Prohibiting saloons within two and one half miles of military posts is valid. Rushart v. Crippen, 99 Neb. 682, 157 N.W. 611 (1916).
Law fixing maximum rate of interest and brokerage fee for money lenders was valid. Althaus v. State, 99 Neb. 465, 156 N.W. 1038 (1916).
Law permitting teaching of foreign languages in schools was valid. State ex rel. Thayer v. School Dist. of Nebraska City, 99 Neb. 338, 156 N.W. 641 (1916).
Law regulating hours of service for firemen, but excepting chief and assistant chief was valid. State ex rel. Rea v. City Council of Lincoln, 98 Neb. 634, 154 N.W. 217 (1915).
Law authorizing county board to pay for bridge material, though claim had previously been adjudged invalid in court, was valid. Gibson v. Sherman County, 97 Neb. 79, 149 N.W. 107 (1914).
Act regulating practice of medicine was valid. Mathews v. Hedlund, 82 Neb. 825, 119 N.W. 17 (1908).
Act prohibiting common labor on Sunday was valid. In re Caldwell, 82 Neb. 544, 118 N.W. 133 (1908).
Act relating to taxation of building and loan associations as a class was valid. Nebraska Central Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County, 78 Neb. 472, 111 N.W. 147 (1907).
Act providing for election of city officers on particular day was valid. State ex rel. Pentzer v. Malone, 74 Neb. 645, 105 N.W. 893 (1905).
Act giving irrigation companies right to prior appropriation in water, does not contravene Constitution prohibiting special privileges. Farmers Canal Co. v. Frank, 72 Neb. 136, 100 N.W. 286 (1904).
Act regulating hours of employment of females in manufacturing and mechanical establishments was valid. Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W. 421 (1902).
Act providing for Tax Commissioner in city of specified class was valid. State ex rel. Prout v. Aitken, 62 Neb. 428, 87 N.W. 153 (1901).
General law, though affecting but single county, is not for that reason void as special legislation. State ex rel. Douglas County v. Frank, 61 Neb. 679, 85 N.W. 956 (1901).
Permitting prosecution by information in one county and indictment in another is valid. Dinsmore v. State, 61 Neb. 418, 85 N.W. 445 (1901).
Act providing for recovery of attorney's fees to be treated as costs in action against fire insurance company was valid. Insurance Co. of North America v. Bachler, 44 Neb. 549, 62 N.W. 911 (1895).
Ordinance granting exclusive contract for removal of garbage was valid. Coombs v. MacDonald, 43 Neb. 632, 62 N.W. 41 (1895).
Statute allowing reasonable attorney's fee to plaintiff, to be taxed as costs, in suit on insurance policy covering real property was valid. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U.S. 301 (1903).
Statute relative to practice of veterinary medicine and surgery was not discriminatory hereunder. Peet Stock Remedy Co. v. McMullen, 32 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1929).
Cedar Rust Law was not special legislation. Upton v. Felton, 4 F.Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1932).
4. Invalid legislation
The amendment of anti-attachment statutes to allow a civil judgment to attach to the distributed retirement assets of State Patrol officers and other public employees who had committed six specified crimes constituted special legislation in violation of the Constitution of Nebraska. The Legislature’s attempt to create very limited exceptions to an absolute privilege from attachment of a public employee’s retirement assets resulted in a law that benefited only a select group of victims and arbitrarily protected public employees who were convicted of comparably serious crimes, yet retained an absolute privilege from attachment of their retirement assets because their crimes were not included in the amendment. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).
Act providing for the reimbursement of funds to depositors of failed industrial loan and investment companies violated this provision. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
Section 60-1701 contains classifications and exceptions which are unreasonable, arbitrary, and unrelated to the public interest, and is therefore unconstitutional and void in violation of this section. State v. Edmunds, 211 Neb. 380, 318 N.W.2d 859 (1982).
Provisions of legislation creating the Local Government Revenue Fund were unconstitutional because classifications created by the act were arbitrary and unreasonable closed classifications in that they prevented a county from moving from one classification to another and the legislation was, therefore, a special law as to each of the state's counties. State ex rel. Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181 (1980).
An act which permits public grants to students, which must be used in private institutions in this state, is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 219 N.W.2d 726 (1974).
To hold that city of first class without home rule charter may be annexed but one with home rule charter could not be dissolved would violate this section. City of Millard v. City of Omaha, 185 Neb. 617, 177 N.W.2d 576 (1970).
Act which fixed value of agricultural income-producing machinery and equipment as those used by taxpayer in determining federal income tax violated this section. State ex rel. Meyer v. McNeil, 185 Neb. 586, 177 N.W.2d 596 (1970).
Cited legislation violated this section by creating permanently closed class and by being totally arbitrary and unreasonable in method of classification. City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 175 N.W.2d 74 (1970).
Amendment extending time for appeal under section 77-510, R.R.S.1943, after appeal time had expired violated this section. In re Valuation and Equalization, 182 Neb. 621, 156 N.W.2d 728 (1968).
Provisions of Grid System Act constituted a grant of special privileges and an unlawful splitting of a class, and was unconstitutional. Wittler v. Baumgartner, 180 Neb. 446, 144 N.W.2d 62 (1966).
Penalty for failure to return property for taxation was special law in violation of this section. Bachus v. Swanson, 179 Neb. 1, 136 N.W.2d 189 (1965).
Legislative Bill 16 of 1963 Special Session violated this section and was unconstitutional in its entirety. Kometscher v. Wade, 177 Neb. 299, 128 N.W.2d 781 (1964).
Statute changing penalty relating to agreements for sale of personal property upon an installment basis held to be special legislation in violation of this section. Davis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 176 Neb. 865, 127 N.W.2d 907 (1964).
Designation of retail installment sales contracts as a class, in fixing maximum interest permitted to be charged, was special legislation inhibited by this section. Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.2d 844 (1963).
Installment Sales Act of 1959 was unconstitutional because it fixed different interest rates on automobiles according to age. Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963).
Amendment to Installment Loan Act creating four classes as to which different penalties were applicable was violative of this section. Thompson v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp., 169 Neb. 377, 99 N.W.2d 761 (1959).
Statute requiring reporting of property in warehouse for taxation and excepting household goods was violative of this section. United States Cold Storage Corp. v. Stolinski, 168 Neb. 513, 96 N.W.2d 408 (1959).
Legislature cannot create liability on part of state for fraud of its officers, and waive statute of limitations for benefit of few within a class. Bordy v. State, 142 Neb. 714, 7 N.W.2d 632 (1943).
Where legislation is of state wide concern, a legislative act applying to part of cities within designated class and not applying to other cities within the same class having a home rule charter violates this section. Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942).
An act of Legislature attempting to waive sovereignty of the state and create liability on state's part in favor of an individual for negligence of state's servants and agents is a special law in contravention of this section. Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 279 N.W. 482 (1938).
Act providing for annual tax on fire insurance companies based on gross premiums received by each for insurance written within state was invalid because it did not operate equally and uniformly upon all members of class. Continental Ins. Co. v. Smrha, 131 Neb. 791, 270 N.W. 122 (1936).
Act extending time in which to pay taxes was invalid as based on arbitrary classification. Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439, 268 N.W. 317 (1936).
Act exempting irrigation companies from building bridges over ditches crossing public roads was discriminatory and void. State ex rel. County of Dawson v. Dawson County Irr. Co., 125 Neb. 836, 252 N.W. 320 (1934).
Law authorizing counties of more than 150,000 to use portion of gas tax to retire highway construction bonds was invalid, as special legislation. State ex rel. Cone v. Bauman, 120 Neb. 77, 231 N.W. 693 (1930).
Statute purporting to validate proceedings to form light and power districts was invalid as special legislation. Anderson v. Lehmkuhl, 119 Neb. 451, 229 N.W. 773 (1930).
Law regulating public dances on Sunday, but excepting metropolitan cities from its operation, was invalid special legislation. Galloway v. Wolfe, 117 Neb. 824, 223 N.W. 1 (1929).
Proviso authorizing irrigation districts under certain circumstances, to require landowners to construct and maintain laterals and supervise water distribution, was prohibited special legislation. State ex rel. Campbell v. Gering Irr. Dist., 114 Neb. 329, 207 N.W. 525 (1926).
Law imposing liability on counties for destruction of personal property of officers in public buildings by riotous mobs, was void. Court intimates that it would also be void as special legislation. Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 191 N.W. 337 (1922).
Classification of counties for purpose of relocating county seats, if not general and cannot be applied to all counties, is void as special legislation. State ex rel. Conkling v. Kelso, 92 Neb. 628, 139 N.W. 226 (1912).
Statute operating upon county of specified population for particular year was void as special legislation. State v. Scott, 70 Neb. 685, 100 N.W. 812 (1904).
Act fixing day's work at eight hours for labor but exempting farmers or domestic labor, was void as special legislation. Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 59 N.W. 362 (1894).
A court may review the legislative history of a statute or ordinance when considering a special legislation challenge. D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 676, 829 N.W.2d 105 (2013).
Requiring registration of mobile homes and assessing a reasonable fee to defray cost of registration and inspection, if any, does not violate constitutional provision requiring uniform and proportionate taxation of personal property. Gates v. Howell, 204 Neb. 256, 282 N.W.2d 22 (1979).
Claim of unconstitutionality of city ordinance regulating labor relations as special law raised but not decided. Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131 N.W.2d 609 (1964).
Power to regulate interest on money may not be done by local or special law. State Securities Co. v. Ley, 177 Neb. 251, 128 N.W.2d 766 (1964).
Waiver or remission of penalties by a local or special law is prohibited. Creigh v. Larsen, 171 Neb. 317, 106 N.W.2d 187 (1960).
State may enjoin threatened diversion of realty from its original use where it was granted by state to a church for religious purposes. State ex rel. Hunter v. Home Savings & Loan Assn., 137 Neb. 231, 288 N.W. 691 (1939).
Regulation of Nebraska Liquor Control Commission providing that opening and closing hours for sale of beer in rural districts shall be same as those fixed by ordinance in nearest incorporated city or village was valid. Griffin v. Gass, 133 Neb. 56, 274 N.W. 193 (1937).
Refusal of State Railway Commission to grant authority to operate motor buses to a second common carrier in Omaha was not inhibited by this section. Furstenberg v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 132 Neb. 562, 272 N.W. 756 (1937).
Federal district court would not abstain from deciding whether state banking statute was properly adopted by Nebraska Legislature where analysis of the applicable Nebraska case law left no doubt that such statute was invalid. Nebraskans for Independent Banking, Inc. v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 423 F.Supp. 519 (D. Neb. 1976).