1. Subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
2. Actual knowledge
3. Constructive knowledge
4. Possession
5. Priority of liens
6. Delivery
7. Miscellaneous
1. Subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
A good faith purchaser of land is one who purchases for valuable consideration without notice of any suspicious circumstances which would put a prudent person on inquiry. The burden of proof is upon a litigant who alleges that he or she is a good faith purchaser to prove that he or she purchased the property for value and without notice. This burden includes proving that the litigant was without notice, actual or constructive, of another's rights or interests in the land. Caruso v. Parkos, 262 Neb. 961, 637 N.W.2d 351 (2002).
Instruments which may be but are not recorded are void as to subsequent bona fide purchasers who record first. Kimco Addition v. Lower Platte South N.R.D., 232 Neb. 289, 440 N.W.2d 456 (1989).
This section is designed to protect a subsequent purchaser even though there was a prior conveyance or transaction concerning the property, provided the subsequent purchaser recorded his title first, and provided further that the subsequent purchaser was a bona fide purchaser without notice of any other claims to the property. Miller v. McMillen, 214 Neb. 244, 333 N.W.2d 887 (1983).
This section is designed to protect a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice even though there was a prior conveyance, provided the subsequent purchaser recorded his title first. Karmann v. Haase, 191 Neb. 839, 218 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
A purchaser with notice, who purchases from one without notice, will be protected by the want of notice in his vendor. Mingus v. Bell, 148 Neb. 735, 29 N.W.2d 332 (1947).
Question as to whether mortgagee took mortgage in good faith without notice so as to render prior unrecorded deed void is properly determinable in mortgage foreclosure proceeding. Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes, 143 Neb. 58, 8 N.W.2d 545 (1943).
An unrecorded deed is void as to mortgagees, whose mortgages are placed of record first and who are without knowledge of the unrecorded deed. Clements v. Doak, 140 Neb. 265, 299 N.W. 505 (1941).
Assignment of real estate mortgage comes within this section. Mulligan v. Snavely, 117 Neb. 765, 223 N.W. 8 (1929); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Welch, 83 Neb. 106, 118 N.W. 1116 (1908); Ames v. Miller, 65 Neb. 204, 91 N.W. 250 (1902).
Where possession is taken by subsequent purchaser before recording of prior deed, he is protected, even though his deed was subsequently recorded. Kime v. Krenek, 94 Neb. 395, 143 N.W. 473 (1913).
Sheriff's deed to purchaser without notice will convey superior title to deed executed by mortgagor before foreclosure proceedings, but not recorded until after recording of sheriff's deed. Richards v. Smith, 88 Neb. 444, 129 N.W. 983 (1911).
Subsequent purchaser has burden of proof of establishing purchase without notice, actual or constructive, of prior unrecorded conveyance. McParland v. Peters, 87 Neb. 829, 128 N.W. 523 (1910).
Ordinary care and diligence is required of bona fide purchaser. Lyon v. Gombert, 63 Neb. 630, 88 N.W. 774 (1902).
If a mortgagee enters satisfaction after a mortgage has been assigned, a subsequent purchaser who acquires title without notice of the assignment will be protected. Whitney v. Lowe, 59 Neb. 87, 80 N.W. 266 (1899).
Subsequent mortgagee is subsequent purchaser within meaning of section. Dorr v. Meyer, 51 Neb. 94, 70 N.W. 543 (1897).
Holder of quitclaim deed may be bona fide purchaser. Schott v. Dosh, 49 Neb. 187, 68 N.W. 346 (1896).
Mortgage last executed and delivered will take precedence if first filed for record and grantee took same for value and without notice. Burrows v. Hovland, 40 Neb. 464, 58 N.W. 947 (1894).
2. Actual knowledge
Actual knowledge of existence of a real estate mortgage is as binding as constructive notice supplied by the duly recorded instrument. Steeves v. Nispel, 132 Neb. 597, 273 N.W. 50 (1937).
Actual knowledge of unrecorded lien is as binding as constructive notice. Bradford v. Anderson, 60 Neb. 368, 83 N.W. 173 (1900).
Purchaser takes subject to unrecorded lien, when he knows of it. Michigan Trust Co. v. City of Red Cloud, 3 Neb. Unof. 722, 92 N.W. 900 (1902).
3. Constructive knowledge
This section is intended to impart to a prospective purchaser notice of instruments which affect the title of land in which such purchaser is interested. Ihde v. Kempkes, 228 Neb. 433, 422 N.W.2d 788 (1988).
Recording gives priority only to instruments registerable in form. Rumery v. Loy, 61 Neb. 755, 86 N.W. 478 (1901).
Constructive notice by record of conveyance is limited to those who must trace their title through grantor. Traphagen v. Irwin, 18 Neb. 195, 24 N.W. 684 (1885).
4. Possession
A purchaser is charged with notice of tenant's rights when the tenant is in actual possession of the real estate. Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Development Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974).
Possession cannot be notice of nonexisting fact. Burt v. Baldwin, 8 Neb. 487, 1 N.W. 457 (1879).
5. Priority of liens
The lien of a judgment does not take priority over a prior unrecorded mortgage made and delivered in good faith for a valuable consideration. Omaha Loan and Building Assn. v. Turk, 146 Neb. 859, 21 N.W.2d 865 (1946).
A prior unrecorded deed, if made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, will take precedence over an attachment or judgment, if recorded before deed based upon such attachment or judgment. Naudain v. Fullenwider, 72 Neb. 221, 100 N.W. 296 (1904).
Prior unrecorded mortgage takes precedence over deed with no consideration. Fisk v. Osgood, 58 Neb. 486, 78 N.W. 924 (1899).
Ordinary judgment lien is subject to prior liens, legal or equitable. Mansfield v. Gregory, 11 Neb. 297, 9 N.W. 87 (1881); Harral v. Gray, 10 Neb. 186, 4 N.W. 1040 (1880).
6. Delivery
Third parties who acquire rights in property after recording but before actual delivery of conveyance will be protected. Barnes v. Cox, 58 Neb. 675, 79 N.W. 550 (1899).
Deed becomes operative upon delivery. Brown v. Hartman, 57 Neb. 341, 77 N.W. 776 (1899).
Delivery of duly acknowledged and recorded deed is presumed. Bowman v. Griffith, 35 Neb. 361, 53 N.W. 140 (1892).
7. Miscellaneous
This section requires the filing of covenants and restrictions in the office of the register of deeds and it also provides that a filing is ineffective, when the statute is not followed, only as to those without notice, either actual or constructive. How v. Baker, 223 Neb. 100, 388 N.W.2d 462 (1986).
Recording act does not apply to taxes. Licking v. Hays Lumber Co., 146 Neb. 240, 19 N.W.2d 148 (1945).
Where creditors represented by trustee in bankruptcy were each without deed, mortgage or other conveyance, mortgages were not required to be recorded, so that failure to record them more than four months before filing of petition did not give rise to illegal preference. Stocker v. Church, 113 Neb. 639, 204 N.W. 398 (1925).
Party obtaining decree quieting title cannot obtain benefits of recording act unless exemplified copy of decree is recorded in office of register of deeds. McCarthy v. Benedict, 90 Neb. 386, 133 N.W. 410 (1911).
Recording acts, not law merchant, determine rights of assignee of mortgage notes. First Nat. Bank of Falls City v. Edgar, 65 Neb. 340, 91 N.W. 404 (1902).
The purpose of the registry law is to furnish record evidence of land titles. Hare v. Murphy, 60 Neb. 135, 82 N.W. 312 (1900).
Unrecorded assignment of mortgage is not void as to creditors generally, but only as to creditors whose deeds, mortgages or other instruments should be first recorded. Blair State Bank v. Stewart, 57 Neb. 58, 77 N.W. 370 (1898).
Assignee of interest coupons may foreclose mortgage after release by mortgagee. Griffith v. Salleng, 54 Neb. 362, 74 N.W. 619 (1898).
Grantee of unrecorded deed acquires title as between parties. Connell v. Galligher, 39 Neb. 793, 58 N.W. 438 (1894).
Vendor's lien is not recognized. Edminster v. Higgins, 6 Neb. 265 (1877).
Where bankrupt executed mortgage for full present consideration more than four months prior to bankruptcy, but mortgage was recorded within four months' period, mortgage was not voidable at suit of trustee in bankruptcy as fraudulent transfer on theory that withholding mortgage from record constituted fraud on creditors. Rankin v. Cox, 71 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1934).