In an action for a libel or slander it shall be sufficient to state, generally, that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of the plaintiff, and if the allegation is denied, the plaintiff must prove on the trial the facts, showing that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of him. White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 Neb. 11, 430 N.W.2d 27 (1988).
Words to be slanderous per se must not only charge an offense which is actionable, but also the nature thereof. Nelson v. Rosenberg, 135 Neb. 34, 280 N.W. 229 (1938).
Writing libelous per se defined. Bigley v. National Fid. & Casualty Co., 94 Neb. 813, 144 N.W. 810 (1913).
Where publication is not libelous per se, special damages must be pleaded. Callfas v. World Pub. Co., 93 Neb. 108, 139 N.W. 830 (1913).
It is not necessary in action for slander to allege the name of the person to whom the words were spoken. Fitzgerald v. Young, 89 Neb. 693, 132 N.W. 127 (1911).
This section abrogates common law rule requiring facts and circumstances to be stated, connecting plaintiff with publication. Sheibley v. Huse, 75 Neb. 811, 106 N.W. 1028 (1906).
Words imputing indictable offense are actionable per se. Herzog v. Campbell, 47 Neb. 370, 66 N.W. 424 (1896).
Words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning. World Pub. Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126, 61 N.W. 108 (1894).
Words, which in effect charge embezzlement, are libelous per se and special damage need not be alleged. Pokrok Zapadu Pub. Co. v. Zizkovsky, 42 Neb. 64, 60 N.W. 358 (1894).