1. Subject to jurisdiction
2. Not subject to jurisdiction
1. Subject to jurisdiction
Nebraska's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over a noncustodial parent who removes a minor child from the child's Nebraska home under the guise of exercising visitation rights in another jurisdiction and then intentionally subjects the child to harm before returning her to this state. S.L. v. Steven L., 274 Neb. 646, 742 N.W.2d 734 (2007).
Nebraska's long-arm statute extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. S.L. v. Steven L., 274 Neb. 646, 742 N.W.2d 734 (2007).
A parent company had sufficient minimum contacts with Nebraska for a Nebraska court to exercise personal jurisdiction where the parent company contracted with its Nebraska subsidiary, coordinated the exchange of equipment between the subsidiary and other centers, prepared all tax reports, provided all forms necessary for operations in Nebraska, and operated a toll-free telephone number and Web site accessible from Nebraska. Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., 274 Neb. 236, 738 N.W.2d 453 (2007).
Nebraska's long-arm statute extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Ameritas Invest. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005); Brunkhardt v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 269 Neb. 222, 691 N.W.2d 147 (2005).
The long-arm statute expressly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation with Nebraska as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Quality Pork Internat. v. Rupari Food Servs., 267 Neb. 474, 675 N.W.2d 642 (2004).
This section expressly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Crete Carrier Corp. v. Red Food Stores, Inc., 254 Neb. 323, 576 N.W.2d 760 (1998).
This section expressly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. The fiduciary shield doctrine is not a bar to personal jurisdiction over a corporate agent or employee when the agent or employee has sufficient minimum contacts of his own with Nebraska to satisfy federal due process requirements. Crystal Clear Optical v. Silver, 247 Neb. 981, 531 N.W.2d 535 (1995).
This section explicitly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Wagner v. Unicord Corp., 247 Neb. 217, 526 N.W.2d 74 (1995).
Nonresident defendant's conduct and connection with the State of Nebraska was such that it reasonably should have anticipated being haled into court over plaintiff's cause of action for the return of its loan application fee. 24th and Dodge Ltd. v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 243 Neb. 98, 497 N.W.2d 386 (1993).
In order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if the defendant is not within the territory of the forum, due process requires that such defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. McGowan Grain v. Sanburg, 225 Neb. 129, 403 N.W.2d 340 (1987).
The establishment of a marital relationship in this state from which a nonresident has left is sufficient minimum contact with this state to permit a court of this state to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident in an action to dissolve that marriage. York v. York, 219 Neb. 883, 367 N.W.2d 133 (1985).
Company having an interest in, using or possessing real property in this state at a time when it was transacting business in this state was subject to jurisdiction of court in this state and its special appearance was properly overruled. Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Development Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974).
Nonresident manufacturer comes under long-arm statute when it places its products in the stream of commerce expecting delivery in Nebraska. Stoehr v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 429 F.Supp. 763 (D. Neb. 1977).
By statute, defendant is under state jurisdiction when defendant contracts for sale of motorcycles in Nebraska. Hetrick v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 429 F.Supp. 116 (D. Neb. 1976).
Where after defendant Illinois corporation entered into distributorship agreement for Nebraska, area contacts were numerous and continuous. Nebraska corporation's antitrust cause of action arose out of interrelated acts allegedly indicating unfair competition; sufficient contacts existed to permit in personam jurisdiction. Morton Buildings of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Buildings, Inc., 333 F.Supp. 187 (D. Neb. 1971).
Where the delivery, installation, operation, and alleged injury resulting from defective machine occurred in Nebraska, the manufacturer who had shipped same indirectly was subject to Nebraska jurisdiction. Blum v. Kawaguchi, Ltd., 331 F.Supp. 216 (D. Neb. 1971).
2. Not subject to jurisdiction
Neither an act of sexual intercourse between consenting adults nor the failure of a putative father to support his child is an act "causing tortious injury" under the terms of the Nebraska long-arm statute. State ex rel. Larimore v. Snyder, 206 Neb. 64, 291 N.W.2d 241 (1980).
For tortious act in other state, jurisdiction for damage action in Nebraska not supported by telephone calls, travel to Nebraska, and unspecified acts which induced victim to travel to other state. Von Seggern v. Saikin, 187 Neb. 315, 189 N.W.2d 512 (1971).
Where defendants maintained no offices, salespersons, or agents in Nebraska; where contracts neither executed nor performed in Nebraska; where goods neither came from or to Nebraska; the Nebraska contracts insufficient to attach jurisdiction under long-arm statutes. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1977) affirming, Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1977).
National Trailer Leasing Company under facts of case not subject to jurisdiction under this section which requires actual presence in state plus additional requirement of regular or persistent course of conduct. Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1969).
Where the activities of a physician and hospital in administering chemotherapy treatment were localized and confined to the State of Iowa, there were insufficient contacts with Nebraska for purposes of application of the Nebraska long-arm statute in a wrongful death action against the physician and hospital, notwithstanding the foreseeability of alleged effects occurring in Nebraska where the patient resided. Glover v. Wagner, 462 F.Supp. 308 (D. Neb. 1978).
Where purchase contracts were executed outside Nebraska by nonresident sellers for shipment of goods to other states, and defendants did not transact nor solicit business in Nebraska, buyers' Nebraska residence did not give federal court in Nebraska personal jurisdiction in this suit under Bankruptcy Act. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 418 F.Supp. 674 (D. Neb. 1976).
The provisions of this section requiring notice of homestead exemption rights do not apply to foreclosure of a tax lien represented by a tax sale certificate. Destiny 98 TD v. Miodowski, 269 Neb. 427, 693 N.W.2d 278 (2005).
Nebraska's long-arm statute is to be interpreted broadly in view of the rationale and philosophy underlying its adoption. Quality Pork Internat. v. Rupari Food Servs., 267 Neb. 474, 675 N.W.2d 642 (2004).
The benchmark for determining if the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process is whether the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. The existence of a Nebraska choice-of-law clause is a factor to be considered in determining whether a party should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Nebraska. Castle Rose v. Philadelphia Bar & Grill of Arizona, Inc., 254 Neb. 299, 576 N.W.2d 192 (1998).
While language of this section does not cover divorce in specific words, it indicates the legislative intention to apply the minimum contacts rule where it does not offend traditional concepts of fair play and substantial justice. Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971).
Out-of-state seller, who allegedly sold heifers to a cow-calf operation that were unfit for breeding purposes, did not have continuous and systematic business contact with Nebraska sufficient to warrant the exercise of personal general jurisdiction over seller. There was no evidence that seller designated an agent for service of process, held a license in the state, had employees in the state, or was incorporated in the state. South Dakota cattle seller's sending industry directories, in which it had placed advertisements to buyer, and maintaining 800 number, was not purposeful availment to the laws of Nebraska, as was required to warrant exercise of specific jurisdiction over seller in buyers' action alleging that seller breached warranty that heifers were fit for breeding purposes. Higgins v. Rausch Herefords, 9 Neb. App. 212, 609 N.W.2d 712 (2000).
Concept of due process in Nebraska's long-arm statute is at least as broad as the constitutional standard of due process. Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Gelt, 558 F.2d 1303 (8th Cir. 1977).
Question of whether in personam jurisdiction is acquired under Nebraska long-arm statute depends primarily on the quantity, nature, and quality of the parties' contacts with the forum state. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1977).
It is a nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state that are of interest in determining if in personam jurisdiction exists, not its contacts with the resident plaintiff. Gendler v. General Growth Properties, 461 F.Supp. 434 (D. Neb. 1978).
Nebraska long-arm statute is limited only by the constitutional constraints imposed by the minimum contacts rule. Vergara v. Aeroflot Soviet Airlines, 390 F.Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975).
Under facts in this case, defendant was amenable to service, and when copy of complaint and a summons were served by registered mail with signed receipt required, requirements of due process were met. General Leisure Products Corp. v. Gleason Corp., 331 F.Supp. 278 (D. Neb. 1971).