2. Mental disabilities
Under this section, a person is within the age of 20 years until he or she becomes 21 years old. Carruth v. State, 271 Neb. 433, 712 N.W.2d 575 (2006).
Subsection (2) of section 25-224 is not tolled by a person's status as a minor pursuant to this section. Budler v. General Motors Corp., 268 Neb. 998, 689 N.W.2d 847 (2004).
One is within the age of 20 for purposes of this section until he or she becomes 21 years old. Brown v. Kindred, 259 Neb. 95, 608 N.W.2d 577 (2000).
Mere fact of imprisonment does not toll the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action. Gordon v. Connell, 249 Neb. 769, 545 N.W.2d 722 (1996).
One is "within the age of twenty years" until he or she becomes 21 years old. Lawson v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Neb. 725, 408 N.W.2d 256 (1987).
Suspension of the statute of limitations in accordance with this section inures to the exclusive and personal benefit of the infant, and not to the benefit of the infant's parent. Macku v. Drackett Products Co., 216 Neb. 176, 343 N.W.2d 58 (1984).
Workmen's Compensation Act makes no exception in favor of minor dependents as to limitation for filing claims, and action brought by minors under this act are governed by its provisions and not by general statute of limitations. Ray v. Sanitary Garbage Co., 134 Neb. 178, 278 N.W. 139 (1938).
Statute is not tolled by minority of heirs where it commenced to run in lifetime of ancestor. McNeill v. Schumaker, 94 Neb. 544, 143 N.W. 805 (1913).
Minor may bring action to recover interest in real estate within ten years after arriving at majority. Albers v. Kozeluh, 68 Neb. 522, 94 N.W. 521 (1903), former judgment adhered to 68 Neb. 529, 97 N.W. 646 (1903).
Time for bringing of action by minor against county for defect in highway under special statute is not extended by this section. Swaney v. Gage County, 64 Neb. 627, 90 N.W. 542 (1902).
This section tolls the running of the time limitation under section 25-222 until an infant reaches the age of majority. Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 679 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1982).
2. Mental disabilities
Insanity means such condition of mental derangement which actually prevents the sufferer from understanding and protecting his or her legal rights. Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 817, 341 N.W.2d 326 (1983).
In the case of recovery of real estate this section gives an incompetent ten years after disability is removed to bring action. In re Estate of Montgomery, 133 Neb. 153, 274 N.W. 487 (1937).
Statute does not commence to run against the owner of real property confined in an asylum for the insane at the time of a tax lien foreclosure, and who continues to be mentally incompetent after his discharge from the hospital, until he has been sufficiently restored to his mental powers to be able to comprehend that he was owner of the property and able to take some action to protect his rights with reference thereto. Walter v. Union Real Estate Co., 107 Neb. 144, 185 N.W. 323 (1921).
Fact that statute tolls limitation period during insanity does not deny prosecution of action for insane person by guardian during period of insanity. Wirth v. Weigand, 85 Neb. 115, 122 N.W. 714 (1909).
A mental disorder within the meaning of this section is an incapacity which disqualifies one from acting for the protection of one's rights. Anonymous v. St. John Lutheran Church, 14 Neb. App. 42, 703 N.W.2d 918 (2005).
A person with a mental disorder is one who suffers from a condition of mental derangement which actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his or her legal rights or from instituting legal action. Anonymous v. St. John Lutheran Church, 14 Neb. App. 42, 703 N.W.2d 918 (2005).
A person with a mental disorder is one who suffers from a condition of mental derangement which actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his or her legal rights or from instituting legal action. Vergara v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 Neb. App. 1141, 510 N.W.2d 550 (1993).
Absence from state will not extend time in which foreclosure of real estate mortgage may be brought against nonresident. Brainard v. Hall, 137 Neb. 491, 289 N.W. 845 (1940).
Absence from state does not operate to extend the period within which mechanic lien foreclosure shall be commenced. Pickens v. Polk, 42 Neb. 267, 60 N.W. 566 (1894).
Absence from state does not extend time for foreclosure of mortgage. Merriam v. Goodlett, 36 Neb. 384, 54 N.W. 686 (1893).
Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act including one-year notice of claim requirement and two-year limitation for bringing action held constitutional. Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 195 Neb. 703, 240 N.W.2d 339 (1976).
This section does not toll the statutes of limitations for the benefit of executors or administrators. Sherwood v. Merchants Mut. Bonding Co., 193 Neb. 262, 226 N.W.2d 761 (1975).
Statute runs against married woman during coverture. Watkins v. Adamson, 113 Neb. 715, 204 N.W. 816 (1925).
Courts of equity have inherent powers to refuse relief after undue and inexcusable delay, independent of statute of limitations. Hawley v. Von Lanken, 75 Neb. 597, 106 N.W. 456 (1906).
Suit to quiet title is action in rem, within this section. Lantry v. Parker, 37 Neb. 353, 55 N.W. 962 (1893).