1. Statute of limitations
1. Statute of limitations
Equity will afford relief against a judgment procured by fraud of the successful party, when it appears that the injured party did not, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, discover, within the time allowed for commencing the proceeding to vacate such judgment, sufficient evidence of the fraud to warrant a reasonable belief that such a proceeding would be successful if begun. In re Estate of West, 226 Neb. 813, 415 N.W.2d 769 (1987).
This section governs the vacation or modification of judgments after the term, and for mistake or omissions by the clerk, proceedings may be commenced within three years. Pofahl v. Pofahl, 196 Neb. 347, 243 N.W.2d 55 (1976).
If defendant's motion is viewed as an application for a writ of coram nobis, it was not effective because not filed within time limited by statute. State v. Rhodes, 192 Neb. 557, 222 N.W.2d 837 (1974).
Judgment may be attacked after two years where relief is sought upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Thomas v. Flynn, 169 Neb. 458, 100 N.W.2d 37 (1959).
District court may, after term at which order was entered, set aside order vacating decree of divorce, within time prescribed. Vasa v. Vasa, 165 Neb. 69, 84 N.W.2d 185 (1957).
Application to vacate approval of property settlement in divorce proceeding was filed in time. Pasko v. Trela, 153 Neb. 759, 46 N.W.2d 139 (1951).
To vacate judgment on ground of death of party, action must be brought within three years after defendant had notice of judgment. McNally v. McNally, 152 Neb. 845, 43 N.W.2d 170 (1950).
Proceedings to vacate judgment approving settlement in workmen's compensation case must be commenced within two years from rendition of judgment. Miller v. Schlereth, 151 Neb. 33, 36 N.W.2d 497 (1949).
Limitation of two years does not prevent setting aside of divorce decree where parties resumed marital relations within six months from entry of decree. Shinn v. Shinn, 148 Neb. 832, 29 N.W.2d 629 (1947).
Proceeding to set aside judgment for fraud must be brought within two years unless fraud was not discovered within that period. Katz v. Swanson, 147 Neb. 791, 24 N.W.2d 923 (1946).
Petition to set aside order rejecting claim in receivership proceeding upon ground of fraud was properly dismissed when filed more than two years after entry of order. State ex rel. Spillman v. Commercial State Bank of Omaha, 143 Neb. 490, 10 N.W.2d 268 (1943).
Proceeding to set aside judgment of district court disallowing will and denying probate thereof is barred after two years from rendition of the judgment. In re Estate of McLean, 138 Neb. 752, 295 N.W. 270 (1940).
A petition filed more than two years after judgment to set aside the judgment for fraud, which shows on its face the fraud was discovered within the two-year period, does not state a cause of action. In re Estate of Jensen, 135 Neb. 602, 283 N.W. 196 (1939).
Where no good cause was shown by plaintiff why proceedings were not instituted within two years to vacate order of dismissal as provided by statute, equity will refuse relief. Lindstrom v. Nilsson, 133 Neb. 184, 274 N.W. 485 (1937).
Proceedings to modify judgment or order must be commenced within two years. Hoeppner v. Bruckman, 129 Neb. 390, 261 N.W. 572 (1935).
Proceeding to vacate judgment for fraud practiced against one of unsound mind, must be commenced within two years of time disability is removed. Newcomb v. State, 129 Neb. 69, 261 N.W. 348 (1935); Scott v. Scott, 125 Neb. 32, 248 N.W. 923 (1933).
Petition to vacate judgment for fraud after two years is properly stricken where it shows on face fraud discovered within two-year period. Brandeen v. Beale, 117 Neb. 291, 220 N.W. 298 (1928).
A female under this section must commence her suit within two years after becoming of age. Kiplinger v. Joslyn, 93 Neb. 40, 139 N.W. 1019 (1913).
To open judgment for fraud petition must show facts were not discovered within two years. State ex rel. Nelson v. Lincoln Med. Col., 86 Neb. 269, 125 N.W. 517 (1910).
Proceeding to vacate judgment for mistake, neglect, or omission of clerk must be brought within three years. Brownlee v. Davidson, 28 Neb. 785, 45 N.W. 51 (1890).
Motion to retax costs must be made within three years. Cattle v. Haddox, 17 Neb. 307, 22 N.W. 565 (1885).
On refusal of application to vacate judgment for plaintiff on fire policy, court may award reasonable attorney's fee to plaintiff. Messing v. Dwelling House Mut. Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 36, 226 N.W. 914 (1929).
Equity will afford relief against fraudulent judgment where fraud was not discovered in time for statutory proceedings to vacate after term. Krause v. Long, 109 Neb. 846, 192 N.W. 729 (1923).
This section is not applicable to motion for entry of judgment or order nunc pro tunc. Calloway v. Doty, 108 Neb. 319, 188 N.W. 104 (1922).
Action may be brought by infant at any time before maturity. Martin v. Long, 53 Neb. 694, 74 N.W. 43 (1898).
This section is not applicable to a motion for an entry nunc pro tunc of a judgment or order. Hyde v. Michelson, 52 Neb. 680, 72 N.W. 1035 (1897).